date:20181213

*some references*

*A reversible programming language and its invertible self-interpreter*
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1244404

A reversible programming language supports deterministic forward and
backward computation. We formalize the programming language Janus and prove
its reversibility. We provide a program inverter for the language and
implement a self-interpreter that achieves deterministic forward and
backward interpretation of Janus programs without using a computation
history. As the self-interpreter is implemented in a reversible language,
it is invertible using local program inversion. Many physical phenomena are
reversible and we demonstrate the power of Janus by implementing a
reversible program for discrete simulation of the Schrödinger wave equation
that can be inverted as well as run forward and backward.

*A Reversible Processor Architecture and Its Reversible Logic Design*
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260749482_A_Reversible_Processor_Architecture_and_Its_Reversible_Logic_Design

We describe the design of a purely reversible computing architecture, Bob,
and its instruction set, BobISA. The special features of the design include
a simple, yet expressive, locally-invertible instruction set, and fully
reversible control logic and address calculation. We have designed an
architecture with an ISA that is expressive enough to serve as the target
for a compiler from a high-level structured reversible programming
language. All-in-all, this paper demonstrates that the design of a complete
reversible computing architecture is possible and can serve as the core of
a programmable reversible computing system.

*A Linear-Time Self-Interpreter of a Reversible Imperative Language*
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309516210_A_Linear-Time_Self-Interpreter_of_a_Reversible_Imperative_Language

A linear-time reversible self-interpreter in an r-Turing complete
reversible imperative language is presented. The proposed imperative
language has reversible structured control flow operators and symbolic
tree-structured data (S-expressions). The latter data structures are
dynamically allocated and enable reversible simulation of programs of
arbitrary size and space consumption. As self-interpreters are used to show
a number of fundamental properties in classic computability and complexity
theory, the present study of an efficient reversible self-interpreter is
intended as a basis for future work on reversible computability and
complexity theory as well as programming language theory for reversible
computing. Although the proposed reversible interpreter consumes
superlinear space, the restriction of the number of variables in the source
language leads to linear-time reversible simulation.

*A Minimalist's Reversible While Language*
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316604429_A_Minimalist's_Reversible_While_Language

The paper presents a small reversible language R-CORE, a structured
imperative programming language with symbolic tree-structured data
(S-expressions). The language is reduced to the core of a reversible
language, with a single command for reversibly updating the store, a single
reversible control-flow operator, a limited number of variables, and data
with a single atom and a single constructor. Despite its extreme
simplicity, the language is reversibly universal, which means that it is as
powerful as any reversible language can be, while it is linear-time
self-interpretable, and it allows reversible programming with dynamic data
structures. The four-line program inverter for R-CORE is among the shortest
existing program inverters, which demonstrates the conciseness of the
language. The translator to R-CORE, which is used to show the formal
properties of the language, is clean and modular, and it may serve as a
model for related reversible translation problems. The goal is to provide a
language that is sufficiently concise for theoretical investigations. Owing
to its simplicity, the language may also be used for educational purposes.

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?



> On 13 Dec 2018, at 05:01, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2018 1:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Right, which is what Bruno's result, Markus Muller's paper shows is the case 
>> with arithmetical truth in its relation to physical systems. Assuming 
>> arithemtical truth, one can explain how to derive physics from it.
> 
> No.  You can claim it's consistent with a little bit of physics. And you can 
> claim that you "must be able to derive physics”.

Physicalism imposes a non computationalist theory of mind. Or explain the role 
of physics in the mind. If you succeed without invoking magic, numbers will 
too. If you use magic also, actually, but the point is that we can test all 
this.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
 
 (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>> 
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>>> reality.
>>> 
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to 
>>> relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, 
>>> but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>> 
>>> I've been following him like forever.
>>> 
>>> * e.g.
>>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
>> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
>> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
> 
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
> It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
> soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in 
> any 3p terms.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>> consciousness primary.
> 
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.
> 
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
> 
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
> that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
> universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
> physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
> that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 
> 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such 
> approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, 
> and the invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
> (definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the 
> relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math 
> shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] 
> is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is 
> my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula 
> of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of 
> PA saying that PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the 
> provability of the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa 
> Klauss, then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put 
> in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove that the 
> provability of something entails that something. PA is maximally modest on 
> her own provability ability. 
> 
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
> equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
> provable and is not a theorem of PA.
> 
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
> 
> Truth p
> Provable  []p
> Knowable  []p & p
> Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
> = consistent)
> Sensible  []p & <>t
> 
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
> the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:26, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 4:07:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>>  As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Victor Stenger
>> Materialism Deconstructed?
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the reality 
>> of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he didn't 
>> deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>> being a member of that group. Right? AG
>> 
>> - pt
>>  
>> 
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>> 
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental substance 
>> in nature") is in his books. Timeless Reality in particular.
>> 
>> One can be open-minded, or ironist in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism 
>>  ], and he was that.
>> 
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always a 
>> hardcore materialist.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
> 
> 
> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible cosmos”. 
> There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that physics can be 
> derived from few principles.
> 
> I don't think seeking a few first principles is particularly Platonic. Thales 
> thought there were just four elements, and he was way before Plato. AG

Plato did not invent anything indeed. For me, the first platonician was 
Pythagorus. Plato just sum up well his knowledge/inquiry. Note that Pythagorus 
too invent nothing, but he was a great traveller and brought back mathematics 
and metaphysics from its meeting in the East (to simplify a lot, of course).
The idea of first principle, studied rather systematically comes with the 
neopythagoreans and then the neoplatonist. 




> 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, he seems to ignore the mind-body problem,
> 
> You can't expect him, or anyone, to solve every outstanding problem. AG

No, but he seems to ignore the necessity of solving this to just makes sense to 
its “comprehensible cosmos”. He uses the identify brain-mind, which does not 
work with physicalism.



>  
> and so he does not explain how that physical reality can select our 
> consciousness in way corresponding to what we observe.
> 
> Not a problem; Darwinian evolution.

If you apply Darwin also for the origin of the physical laws, from arithmetic. 
Then it can work.




> If our consciousness were disjoint or somehow contradicting what was "out 
> there", in no time we'd be toast on the trash heap of evolution. AG


We have to explain the appearance of primary matter, without assuming it, as 
this would give it a magical role with respect to digital mechanism.



> 
> So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of rigour (by 
> not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a physical reality 
> to do that selection,
> 
> No major AFAICT; just the observation that without POVI, a study of nature 
> called "physics" couldn't exist. AG
> 
> instead of deducing his first physical principle from arithmetic and 
> machine’s psychology, as we have to do with mechanism. That is even more 
> apparent in his less interesting books like “God the paling hypothesis, 
> (where I agree with the content, but find it bad because he identifies 
> theology with the current theology which assumes a creator but also a 
> creation).
> 
> He was trying to debunk the creator theory, so he had to deny any creation. 
> In fact, I think his favorite origin theory was a non-origin theory. AG 
> 
> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was on 
> the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to comprehend the 
> cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would

Re: What is more primary than numbers?


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 1:39:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there would 
> >> be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained not 
> >> only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly 
> >> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
> 
> > You are assuming the answer at the start. 
> 
> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because I 
> am very good at nothing.
> 
> > None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather than 
> > derivative.
> 
> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you can 
> show that some things are more fundamental than others. 
> 
> > So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? 
> 
> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
> 
> > How many things to count are necessary?
> 
> More than none.
> 
> > Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the 
> > universe of numbers
> 
> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics. 
>  
> > are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness
> 
> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it involves 
> change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy is the only 
> known thing that can change.
>  
> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do 
> >>anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter 
> >>that obeys the laws of physics.   
> 
> > You have provided no proof to back up this statement.
> 
> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic but 
> nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or may 
> not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than arithmetic. 
> 
> > Spacetime does not change in time or space either.
> 
> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block 
> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore 
> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the 
> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates of 
> existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D shape 
> of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it must be a 
> different time.  
>  
> > The universe is a static four dimensional block. 
> 
> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could only 
> be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both space 
> and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
> 
> > If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop existing 
> > for you to experience change,
> 
> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already 
> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of 
> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop". 
> 
> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
> 
> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
> space, but such a move would take time. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
> 
>  
> 
> Great quotable!


Then you, or Clark, should explain why Hulk is not taught in all primary school 
on he planet, like elementary arithmetic is. May be we should ask all 
physicists, economist and bankers as well, to use Hulk instead of the numbers, 
when they share their results.

Do you agree that x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33 does admit or not a solution? Do the 
term “open problem” makes sense? Ca you give me an open problem about Hulk?

Bruno




> 
> - pt 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
> 
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
 
 That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
 make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
 reality.
 
 Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
 “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
 philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
 to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
 idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
 lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
 
 I've been following him like forever.
 
 * e.g.
 Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have 
 the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
 professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
 in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
 that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
 infinity.
>>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is 
>>> not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction 
>>> is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>> 
>> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
>> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The 
>> machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
>> describable in any 3p terms.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>>> consciousness primary.
>> 
>> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
>> body.
>> 
>> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
>> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>> 
>> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
>> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
>> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
>> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of 
>> approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine 
>> grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many 
>> such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial 
>> equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
>> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
>> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
>> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
>> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
>> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
>> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It 
>> represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the Löb 
>> rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
>> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
>> prove the existence of Santa Klauss.
> 
> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved. 
For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact 
<>t -> ~[]<>t. 
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


> Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.



> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false. 

Which is of course easily refuted.



> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
> from the common one.

“BBB” is true just in case it

Re: What is more primary than numbers?


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 23:33, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 4:10 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> > Tell me why an electron is a thing and 3 is not.
> 
> An electron can change in time and space, 3 can not change in either.
>  
> >>Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
> >>Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics. 
> 
> >And the "universe of numbers that describe the coordinates of mathematical 
> >objects called elections and photons" ? 
> 
> I don't understand the question.
>  
> > One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it 
> > involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy 
> > is the only known thing that can change.
> 
> > Between any two casually separated universes, there is no means of 
> > comparing time, mass, size, etc. 
> 
> If it's separated there is no means of proving it even exists. But it's even 
> worse than that, logically the number 3 can not change, if it did it would 
> not be a 3. It reminds me of an old joke: 3+3=7, for extremely large values 
> of 3.
>  
> > That platonic computations seem static is only from your viewpoint.
> 
> But I thought our subjective viewpoint was what you were trying to figure out 
> and our viewpoint is certainly not static.
>  
> > For those beings whose minds are described by those computations, they 
> > would see a changing dynamic world around them.
> 
>  What would they see change?  It can't be numbers, in arithmetic  numbers are 
> replaced not changed, even after writing 3+3=6 the number 3 is still around 
> and doing just fine. If you know of something besides matter/energy that can 
> change I'd love to hear about it.


Very easy. The content of the relative memory of all observers implemented in 
arithmetic.

Bruno




> 
> >>I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic 
> >>but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or 
> >>may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than 
> >>arithmetic. 
> 
> > This statement just shows you haven't read the papers.
> 
> I read them until it got too silly to read more, and that didn't take long.
> 
> >I am showing the inconsistency of the "Presentism" view, that what exists 
> >must constantly change in order for us to perceive change.
> 
> The past must leave some sort of record of itself for the present to know it 
> existed, and to make a record something must change and numbers don't change, 
> as far as we know only matter and energy have the ability to change in space 
> and time.
>  
> >>If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
> >>respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
> >>space, but such a move would take time. 
> 
> > Change as we experience it is with respect to the self's indexical position 
> > and relation to previous and later states in some causal progression.
> 
> Without matter/energy and thus without change how are these indexical marker 
> positions of yours recorded? If I'm in the integer 8 in the Fibonacci 
> sequence there is no way I could know that I was in the Fibonacci sequence or 
> in a sequence of any sort unless I remembered that my previous state was a 5 
> and the one before that was a 3, but to form a memory something has to change 
> and 3, 5 and 8 never change.
>  
>  > Thus our brains perceive change despite being a part of what is 
> objectively a static object.  The you from 5 minutes ago is still perceiving 
> the point in time 5 minutes ago.
> 
> That requires a memory and that means something must have changed 5 minutes 
> ago that has persisted to now. And there is no way for pure numbers to do 
> that, but matter/energy can.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> Jason 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> SNIP
>> 
>> 
>>> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
>> 
>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
>> made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>> 
>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. Physics 
>> seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
>>> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>>> 
>>> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and Materialism, 
>>> and why are they incompatible? AG 
>> 
>> 
>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical 
>> functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be 
>> “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you 
>> can assume it outright). 
>> 
>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal machine 
>> (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences.
>> 
>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>> 
>> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
>> some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
> existence of a universal machine.
>  
> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism implies 
> we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need mechanism to be 
> true for your theory to be viable.


I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
transplantation. Yes.

I don’t claim it is true.

I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
collapse).





> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
> materialism. AG


No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and Materialism 
are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the observable world to 
attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
Dovetailer) step by step.

Bruno




> 
> The existence of such machine is already a theorem in any Turing-complete 
> theory with a bit of induction. It is feature of the arithmetical reality. 
>> As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet.
> You are right. My conclusion has never been problematical with any 
> physicists. Only metaphysician or theologian who want to assume the existence 
> of a primary physical universe have a problem with this. My “enemy” are 
> pseudo-religious believers for whom physicalism is a dogma. They are never 
> physicists. The physicists are usually aware that the whole story on matter 
> is not yet told, and that the foundation of physics are still problematical. 
> Only those who believe they know have such dogma.
> 
> Bruno
>> AG 
>> 
>> Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent with 
>> Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. 
>> 
>> If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine structure 
>> was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be extraordinary, 
>> but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than materialism, which has 
>> never succeeded nor even propose an experimental test.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong


> On 12 Dec 2018, at 22:30, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>>  As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Victor Stenger
>> Materialism Deconstructed?
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the reality 
>> of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he didn't 
>> deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>> being a member of that group. Right? AG
>> 
>> - pt
>>  
>> 
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>> 
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental substance 
>> in nature") is in his books. Timeless Reality in particular.
>> 
>> One can be open-minded, or ironist in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism 
>>  ], and he was that.
>> 
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always a 
>> hardcore materialist.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
> 
> 
> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible cosmos”. 
> There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that physics can be 
> derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to ignore the mind-body 
> problem, and so he does not explain how that physical reality can select our 
> consciousness in way corresponding to what we observe. So there is still a 
> bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of rigour (by not seeing that he 
> uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a physical reality to do that 
> selection, instead of deducing his first physical principle from arithmetic 
> and machine’s psychology, as we have to do with mechanism. That is even more 
> apparent in his less interesting books like “God the paling hypothesis, 
> (where I agree with the content, but find it bad because he identifies 
> theology with the current theology which assumes a creator but also a 
> creation).
> 
> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was on 
> the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to comprehend the 
> cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to derive the cosmos 
> from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that have to 
> do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in the 
> foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the time (now 
> some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. It was like 
> So you are a Platonist now? :)
> 
> I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist. 

Just to be clear, I am only an arithmetical realist, like anyone who believe 
that 2+2=4.

Then I do not do philosophy, in the sense that I would defend some truth. I 
just try to solve the mind body problem, and shows that with the 
HYPOTHESIS/THEORY of Mechanism, it reduces into justifying the laws of physics 
from a theory of consciousness or machine self-reference. It works, so I take 
this hypothesis as plausible, bit if tomorrow someone shows a departure of the 
mathematical physics in the head of the machine with the observation, I will 
take that into account.

Bruno


> POVI is simple; there can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on 
> which direction one is looking. AG






> 
> 
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

 On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift >>> > wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker > 
 wrote:

 On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
> fundamental.
> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal 
> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ 
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 
>  ]) as providing a purely 
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
> why would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter 
> itself would seem to be superfluous. 
> 
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation 
> of pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come 
> into existence.

 If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations 
 of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
 consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. 
  So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those 
 conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  
 Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  
 God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.

 It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's 
 paper:

 In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
 “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
 observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
 since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the 
 measure µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns 
 probability close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a 
 brick, then the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all 
 abstract insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick 
 irrelevant.  

 Jason 

 What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?

 The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as 
 you see it evolve.

 What is its power supply?

 Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of 
 the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit 
 the creation of computers which require no power to run.

 See the bit about reversible computing: 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle 
   (computations that 
 are reversible require no energy).
>>> 
>>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
>>> computations in the CT sense.
>> 
>> They are computations in the CT sense.
> 
> CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at random 
> doesn't halt.

?

There is no CT for the programs who always halt. Universal machine would not 
exist. The price of being a universal machine is that not only it does not 
always halt, but there is no mechanical procedure deciding when it halts or not.

Reread the combinators thread on the MU operator, which explains that 
UNIVERSLITY is obtained by permitting a program to search a number which do not 
exist.

Of course the program BASIC “10 GOTO 10” does not halt either.

> 
>> All computations can be done reversibly.
> 
> OK.  Here's my result,  1029394857.   What two numbers did I add to compute 
> it?

I did not say that all computations can be done reversibly. I said just that 
all computation can be done reversibly.

If you numbers were 1029394800 + 57, the simplest way to compute this 
reversibly is just to memorise the inputs, like in quantum computing using 
“ancillary” memory.

1029394800 + 57 = 1029394857 [1029394800,  57]

> 
>> Read and write needs some energy, but is not part of the computation,
> 
> A quantum computation stops when you read its output.

When we get one.

>   A CT

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)



On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 9:30:10 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>  the mathematical idea of "true" is very different from the common one.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
This reminds me of the "truth" the guys on *The Big Bang Theory* refer to a 
lot: They have arguments of what would be the case (be "true") of 
characters in their favorite comic, SF, fantasy universes (Game of Thrones, 
Star Trek, Marvel, DC, ...).

Math truth is pretty much like that.

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?



On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:01:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 1:39:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there 
 would be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be 
 explained 
 not only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly 
 because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.

>>>
>>> *> You are assuming the answer at the start.  *
>>>
>>
>> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because 
>> I am very good at nothing.
>>
>> *> None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather 
>>> than derivative.*
>>>
>>
>> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you 
>> can show that some things are more fundamental than others.  
>>
>> > *So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? *
>>>
>>
>> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
>>
>> *> How many things to count are necessary?*
>>>
>>
>> More than none.
>>
>> *> Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the 
>>> universe of numbers *
>>>
>>
>> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
>> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
>>  
>>
>>> > *are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness*
>>>
>>
>> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it 
>> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy 
>> is the only known thing that can change.
>>  
>>
>>> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do 
 anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter 
 that obeys the laws of physics.   

>>>
>>> *> You have provided no proof to back up this statement.*
>>>
>>
>> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic 
>> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or 
>> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than 
>> arithmetic. 
>>
>> *> Spacetime does not change in time or space either.*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block 
>> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore 
>> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the 
>> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates 
>> of existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D 
>> shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it 
>> must be a different time.  
>>  
>>
>>> > *The universe is a static four dimensional block. *
>>>
>>
>> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could 
>> only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both 
>> space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
>>
>> *> If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop 
>>> existing for you to experience change,*
>>>
>>
>> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already 
>> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of 
>> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop".  
>>
>> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>>>
>>
>> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
>> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
>> space, but such a move would take time. 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
>
>
> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
>
>  
>
> Great quotable!
>
>
>
> Then you, or Clark, should explain why Hulk is not taught in all primary 
> school on he planet, like elementary arithmetic is. May be we should ask 
> all physicists, economist and bankers as well, to use Hulk instead of the 
> numbers, when they share their results.
>
> Do you agree that x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33 does admit or not a solution? Do 
> the term “open problem” makes sense? Ca you give me an open problem about 
> Hulk?
>
> Bruno
>
>
I think there are "open questions" in the comic universes:

*There are many open questions surrounding Avengers: Infinity War. A film 
that brings together all facets of the Marvel Cinematic Universe has a lot 
to live up to. Even after the credits roll there are still many open 
questions that will keep fans theorizing until the still-unnamed Avengers 4 
is released next year. Without further ado, let us take a look at a few 
unanswered questions that will haunt us until next year after witnessing 
the aftermath of Thanos’ journey to gather the Infinity Stones.*

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong



On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>>>
>>>
>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately 
>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>>>
>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
 Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
 appearance comes from something else, non physical.

>>>
>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). 
>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
>>> (or you can assume it outright). 
>>>
>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
>>> evidences.
>>>
>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>>>
>>
>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*
>>
>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>> existence of a universal machine.
>>
>  
> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>
>
>
> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>
> I don’t claim it is true.
>
> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
> collapse).
>
>
>
>
>
> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
> materialism. AG*
>
>
>
> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
> Dovetailer) step by step.
>
> Bruno
>
>

The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, 
Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
*experientialities* (not *infinities)*.

- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-13 Thread agrayson2000

On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:43:24 AM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:55:13 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:41:13 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:21:15 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:13:10 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:

 On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of 
 believing there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have 
 never 
 heard that position articulated by any physicist, in person or on 
 the 
 Internet. AG *

>
>
>>>
>>> Victor Stenger
>>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>>
>>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in 
>> the reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks 
>> back. But 
>> he didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
>> fundamental underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is 
>> the 
>> materialist position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know 
>> this, 
>> of course, being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>  
>
> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him 
> fairly personally .
>
> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
> particular.
>
> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>
> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
> always a hardcore materialist.
>
> - pt
>

 Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal 
 and unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model 
 of 
 materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 

 You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The 
 comprehensible cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: 
 he 
 shows that physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, 
 he 
 seems to ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how 
 that 
 physical reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to 
 what 
 we observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of 
 lack 
 of rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to 
 allow a 
 physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
 physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we 
 have to 
 do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting 
 books 
 like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but 
 find 
 it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
 assumes a creator but also a creation).

 So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But 
 he was on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt 
 to 
 comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would 
 need to 
 derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> It is interesting that you raise

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> SNIP
>>>

 *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.

 Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
 modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where 
 unfortunately 
 the made “stealing” was made in 1248.

 Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
 mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
 Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.

 In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible 
> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>

 *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
 Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *

 Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
 physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
 sense). 
 To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
 (or you can assume it outright). 

 But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
 distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
 Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
 run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
 This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
 statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
 do 
 the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
 machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
 symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
 Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
 on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
 evidences.

 Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
 in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
 substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 

>>>
>>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
>>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*
>>>
>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>>> existence of a universal machine.
>>>
>>  
>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>>
>>
>>
>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
>> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>>
>> I don’t claim it is true.
>>
>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>> collapse).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without 
>> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation 
>> of materialism. AG*
>>
>>
>>
>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
>> Dovetailer) step by step.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, 
> Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
> *experientialities* (not *infinities)*.
>
>
> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, 
> if we want keep Mechanism. 
>
> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and 
> that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, 
> (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes 
> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, 
> for machines.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists 
today are right about: *It isn't the case.*

Max Tegmark says this emphatically. (Infinities are "ruining physics", he 
says.) Maybe a rare instance where I think he may be right.

- pt 

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?




On 12/12/2018 11:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 10:44 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 12/12/2018 5:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:04 PM Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift
mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6,
Jason wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM
UTC-6, Jason wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of
matter, only the idea that matter is
primary.  That is, that matter is not
derivative from something more fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial)
computationalism (e.g. *The universal
numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B
[
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993
]) as providing a purely informational basis
for (thinking of) matter and consciousness,
but then why would *actual matter* need to
come into existence at all? Actual matter
itself would seem to be superfluous.

If actual matter is not needed for
experientiality (consciousness), and actual
matter does no exist at all, then we live in
a type of simulation of pure numericality.
There would be no reason for actual matter to
come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like
matter and obeys the equations of matter how
is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is
that consciousness of matter and it's effects
are all we can know about matter. So if the
"simulation" that is simulating us, also
simulates those conscious thoughts about
matter then that's a "actual" as anything
gets. Remember Bruno is a theologian so all
this "simulation" is in the mind of
God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the
ur-stuff.


It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion.
from Markus Muller's paper:

In particular, her observations do not
fundamentally supervene on this “physical
universe”; it is merely a useful tool to
predict her future observations. Nonetheless,
this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
since its state is strongly correlated with
her experiences. If the measure µ that is
computed within her computational universe
assigns probability close to one to the
experience of hitting her head against a
brick, then the corresponding experience of
pain will probably render all abstract
insights into the non-fundamental nature of
that brick irrelevant. 



Jason






What is the computer that running "her computational
universe"?


The very same that powers the equations that bring life to
our universe as you see it evolve.

What is its power supply?


Power is only required to erase information, and that is
only a concept of the physical laws of this universe. 
Even the laws of our universe permit the creation of
computers which require no power to run.

See the bit about reversible computing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle
(computations that are reversible require no energy).


And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They
are not even computations in the CT sense.


They are computations in the CT sense.


CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an
forth at random doesn't halt.


A reversible computation can still halt. It doesn't have to be a
never ending circle, it just has to be possible to re-wind back
to the original state, in theory (by not throwing

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong



On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 1:12:35 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


 SNIP

>
>
> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>
>
> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where 
> unfortunately 
> the made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>
> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>
>
>
>
>
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible 
>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
>> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>>
>
> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>
>
>
> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
> sense). 
> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
> (or you can assume it outright). 
>
> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a 
> computation 
> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
> do 
> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
> evidences.
>
> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>

 *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
 to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*

 You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
 existence of a universal machine.

>>>  
>>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
>>> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>>>
>>> I don’t claim it is true.
>>>
>>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>>> collapse).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without 
>>> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation 
>>> of materialism. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
>>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
>>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
>>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
>>> Dovetailer) step by step.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, 
>> Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
>> *experientialities* (not *infinities)*.
>>
>>
>> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, 
>> if we want keep Mechanism. 
>>
>> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and 
>> that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, 
>> (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes 
>> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, 
>> for machines.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists 
> today are right about: *It isn't the case.*
>
> Max

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)




On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*

http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf


Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic 
NOT available for the machines.


What about S5 makes it not available for machines?

Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)





On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.


I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
proved.


So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
So in this case proof entails truth??



For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
G* \ G.


Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.

Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
undefinable)?  Or are you asserting that there is at least one true 
proposition for which []<>t -> <>t is false?






Nothing which is proven can be false,


Assuming consistency, which is not provable.


So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.







which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.


Which is of course easily refuted.



Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


“BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.


But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the 
successor of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.


Brent



I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).


Bruno



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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-13 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 1:49 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/12/2018 11:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 10:44 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/12/2018 5:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:04 PM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that
>>> matter is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from 
>>> something
>>> more fundamental.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The
>> universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a
>> purely informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, 
>> but
>> then why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all?
>> Actual matter itself would seem to be superfluous.
>>
>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness),
>> and actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of
>> simulation of pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual 
>> matter
>> to come into existence.
>>
>>
>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the
>> equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
>> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about 
>> matter.
>> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
>> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
>> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
>> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>>
>
> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's
> paper:
>
> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
>> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
>> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
>> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the 
>> measure
>> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
>> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
>> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
>> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.
>
>
> Jason
>





 What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?


>>> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe
>>> as you see it evolve.
>>>
>>>
 What is its power supply?


>>> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept
>>> of the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe
>>> permit the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>>>
>>> See the bit about reversible computing:
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations
>>> that are reversible require no energy).
>>>
>>>
>>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
>>> computations in the CT sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> They are computations in the CT sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at
>>> random doesn't halt.
>>>
>>
>> A reversible computation can still halt. It doesn't have to be a never
>> ending circle, it just has to be possible to re-wind back to the original
>> state, in theory (by not throwing away information).
>>
>>
>> But the point is that there must be an entropic gradient to define which
>> way the computation goes if every step is reversible.  Otherwise it doesn't
>> "go" anywhere.
>>
>>
> It works the same way any other computer or computation would.  There is
> no magic to it. The only difference from conventional computers and
> conventional logic gates is that it preserves enough information along the
> way (during the computation) such that in principal given some Nth state,
> you could work backwards to determine what the N-1th state was.
>
> For example, a "CCNOT" gate (or Toffoli gate
> ) is a universal logic gate,
> which takes in three input bits: a, b, c.

Class calculus and conscious AIs

2018-12-13 Thread Mason Green

Hi, I’m wondering if any of you have read this paper and if so, what do you 
think about it. The author says he’s discovered a new kind of mathematics that 
could give rise to machine consciousness. A few other publications picked it up 
but it got surprisingly little fanfare, for such a bold claim.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.03301.pdf

-Mason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-13 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 6:01 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:13 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>> > An electron can change in time and space, 3 can not change in either.
>>>
>>
>> You are ruling out the block time view, which contradicts special
>> relativity.
>>
>
> The block universe changes along the time dimension and special relativity
> deals with time, but the number 3 never changes with time and has nothing
> to do with it.
>

Then you agree that there can be an objectively static object, and that if
we proceed through it in some dimension some view of it changes.
How is this different from a platonic computation, along which you can view
the state of the machine at individual steps?

>
>
>> > What are particles but computations involving positional coordinates?
>>
>
> What are computations but the descriptions of particle's motion? Particles
> can do computations but computations can't do particles.
>
>

How are the motions of "really real" particles different from the motions
of particles in a simulation of particles?  You believe a simulation of a
conscious mind still results in consciousness, don't you?
I think you are being inconsistent here. How are simulated particles
different from really real particles from within the level where those
particles are simulated and appear to move?

>
> > Change is an illusion.
>>
>
> As we're talking about subjectivity and an illusion is subjective that
> statement contains ZERO information. How would things be different if
> change were not an illusion?
>

Because you use "math is static and can't change" as an argument against it
supporting computations and consciousness.  But this same argument could be
leveled against the physical reality we are in.  If change is an illusion,
that illusion can exist within the conscious minds implemented in platonic
computations as well.

>
>
>> > Think of consecutively computed states in the Game of Life, for
>> example.
>>
>
> Bad example. There is no memory in the Game of Life,
>

I picked the example on purpose. Game Of Life is Turing Complete. You can
build Turing Machines in the Game of Life, so you can build systems with
memories that perform arbitrary processing.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=My8AsV7bA94

> from within the game there is no way to know what your previous state was
> because more than one previous state could produce the exact same current
> state.
>

Likewise with out universe, as the quantum erasure experiment shows, or
even just the single photon interferometer experiment.

> And the Game of Life needs either a biological brain or a electronic
> computer for the game to change, that is to say for it to DO anything, and
> both brains and computers are made of matter and obey physics.
>

False, see above. You can have a non-biological, non-electronic computer
built within the "physics" of the Game of Life.  This computer could
simulate a mind with consciousness.  No electrons or photons are needed.
Just a lot of gliders and glider guns, and other such structures.  All
built from very simple rules.

>
> *>They observe changes between computation states.*
>>
>
> For me to compare my present state I need a record of it , and that means
> my previous state must have somehow changed something that I can read now.
> But my previous state had only numbers to work with so which number did it
> change, is 3 no longer 3? All I want is for you to tell me of something
> other than mass/energy that can change.
>

All you need to support an experience of change is a memory that contains
information about an older and a more recent state.  Experiencing change is
the temporal equivalent of your experience of depth perception by making
comparisons between two similar sets of information. Notably, this part of
the brain can fail in humans:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akinetopsia

>
> *> The value of a variable in a computation may change from one
>> computational step to the next.*
>>
>
> Yes, and when I make a long calculation I need a scratch pad to write down
> the results of one part of it so I remember it while I work on some other
> part of the calculation, but a scratch pad it made of matter and it took me
> energy to write on it, but you have neither all you have to work with is
> numbers; so what is your scratchpad made of and how do you change it?
>
>
What keeps track of the fact that 2+2=4?  Or any of the other infinite
facts in mathematics?  Mathematical truth tracks each of the states of the
computation, as in the example I provided with the equation that describes
the evolution of an x86 CPU processing a LISP program.

> > *The mathematical truth of the valid solutions to the equations yields
>> the executions of every possible LISP program at every possible time step. *
>>
>
> No. You're simply asserting the very thing you're trying to prove. Nothing
> gets executed and nothing yields anything without matter/energy.
>

"You're simply asserting the very thing you're

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-13 Thread agrayson2000

On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> SNIP
>>>

 *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.

 Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
 modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where 
 unfortunately 
 the made “stealing” was made in 1248.

 Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
 mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
 Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.

 In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible 
> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>

 *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
 Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *

 Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
 physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
 sense). 
 To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
 (or you can assume it outright). 

 But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
 distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
 Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
 run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
 This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
 statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
 do 
 the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
 machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
 symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
 Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
 on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
 evidences.

 Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
 in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
 substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 

>>>
>>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
>>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*
>>>
>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>>> existence of a universal machine.
>>>
>>  
>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>>
>>
>>
>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
>> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>>
>> I don’t claim it is true.
>>
>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>> collapse).
>>
>
>
> *I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if 
> it were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG *
>
>
>
> That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying 
> the argument/proof.
>
> Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital 
> Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or 
> better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from.
>
> Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the 
> scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t 
> think so (I hope).
>
>
>
>
> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>> materialism. AG*
>>
>>
>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. 
>>
>
> *Which form of materialism are you referring to? *
>
>
> Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like 
> anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be 
> not having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological 
> commitment in (Aristotelian) substance.
>
>
>
>
> *Not the form or definition used by Stenger. *
>
>
> He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and 
> some physical reality.
>
> Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the 
> arithmetical quantum logic is known. Despite being

Re: What is more primary than numbers?




On 12/13/2018 4:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
See the bit about reversible computing: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle (computations 
that are reversible require no energy).


And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not 
even computations in the CT sense.


They are computations in the CT sense.


CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth 
at random doesn't halt.



?

There is no CT for the programs who always halt. Universal machine 
would not exist. The price of being a universal machine is that not 
only it does not always halt, but there is no mechanical procedure 
deciding when it halts or not.


No, my point was that unless a program halts it has not computed 
anything.  I objected to the above /"computations that are reversible 
require no energy"/.   This is either a statement about the abstract 
mathematical computation, in which case it is trivial, or it is a 
statement about physically realized computations in which case it is 
false because physically reversible computations have no direction.


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-13 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:13 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> > An electron can change in time and space, 3 can not change in either.
>>
>
> You are ruling out the block time view, which contradicts special
> relativity.
>

The block universe changes along the time dimension and special relativity
deals with time, but the number 3 never changes with time and has nothing
to do with it.

> > What are particles but computations involving positional coordinates?
>

What are computations but the descriptions of particle's motion? Particles
can do computations but computations can't do particles.

> > Change is an illusion.
>

As we're talking about subjectivity and an illusion is subjective that
statement contains ZERO information. How would things be different if
change were not an illusion?

> > Think of consecutively computed states in the Game of Life, for
> example.
>

Bad example. There is no memory in the Game of Life, from within the game
there is no way to know what your previous state was because more than one
previous state could produce the exact same current state. And the Game of
Life needs either a biological brain or a electronic computer for the game
to change, that is to say for it to DO anything, and both brains and
computers are made of matter and obey physics.

*>They observe changes between computation states.*
>

For me to compare my present state I need a record of it , and that means
my previous state must have somehow changed something that I can read now.
But my previous state had only numbers to work with so which number did it
change, is 3 no longer 3? All I want is for you to tell me of something
other than mass/energy that can change.

*> The value of a variable in a computation may change from one
> computational step to the next.*
>

Yes, and when I make a long calculation I need a scratch pad to write down
the results of one part of it so I remember it while I work on some other
part of the calculation, but a scratch pad it made of matter and it took me
energy to write on it, but you have neither all you have to work with is
numbers; so what is your scratchpad made of and how do you change it?

> *The mathematical truth of the valid solutions to the equations yields
> the executions of every possible LISP program at every possible time step. *
>

No. You're simply asserting the very thing you're trying to prove. Nothing
gets executed and nothing yields anything without matter/energy.

> at every possible time step.

Time does not change numbers, arithmetic worked the same way in the
Jurassic as it does now.

> > *Its solutions yields a fractal like structure within which you would
> see the execution traces of every program, and within the patterns of the
> registers in some of those solutions, you would see evolved life
> manifesting behaviors we would ascribe to conscious beings, such as writing
> books about consciousness, and talking over e-mail lists about
> consciousness.*
>

All that could indeed happen if the program was executed on a computer, but
it it's not all you'll see is a inert sequence of squiggles printed on a
paper that never changes and is unable to DO anything.

> If I'm in the integer 8 in the Fibonacci sequence there is no way I could
>> know that I was in the Fibonacci sequence or in a sequence of any sort
>> unless I remembered that my previous state was a 5 and the one before that
>> was a 3, but to form a memory something has to change and 3, 5 and 8 never
>> change.
>>
>
> > No, but if you were something with a memory [...]
>

And that is exactly the problem! Pure numbers have no memory because
regardless of how you arrange them they never change in space or time.

> > When you say "there is no way for X", might it be a failure of
> imagination?
>

That depends on what X is. If X is a pure number then you'd better hope
nobody can change it because if they did then mathematics would not only
become useless it would be ridiculous. And without change you can't have
memory and without memory you can't make a calculation and without
calculation you can't have intelligence or consciousness. Fortunately for
us numbers can't change but one thing can, matter/energy.

John K Clark

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> SNIP
>>> 
>>> 
 No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
>>> 
>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
>>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
>>> made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>>> 
>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
 Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
 appearance comes from something else, non physical.
 
 Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
 Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical 
>>> functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be 
>>> “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you 
>>> can assume it outright). 
>>> 
>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
>>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences.
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
>>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>>> 
>>> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
>>> some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>> existence of a universal machine.
>>  
>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism implies 
>> we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need mechanism to be 
>> true for your theory to be viable.
> 
> 
> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
> transplantation. Yes.
> 
> I don’t claim it is true.
> 
> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
> collapse).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>> materialism. AG
> 
> 
> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
> Dovetailer) step by step.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, Philip 
> Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
> experientialities (not infinities).

Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, if we 
want keep Mechanism. 

Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and that is 
provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, (true opinion) 
refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes implicitly a form 
of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, for machines.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:31, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:01:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 1:39:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch > wrote:
>> 
>> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there would 
>> >> be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained not 
>> >> only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly 
>> >> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>> 
>> > You are assuming the answer at the start. 
>> 
>> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because I 
>> am very good at nothing.
>> 
>> > None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather than 
>> > derivative.
>> 
>> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you can 
>> show that some things are more fundamental than others. 
>> 
>> > So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? 
>> 
>> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
>> 
>> > How many things to count are necessary?
>> 
>> More than none.
>> 
>> > Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the 
>> > universe of numbers
>> 
>> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
>> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics. 
>>  
>> > are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness
>> 
>> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it involves 
>> change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy is the only 
>> known thing that can change.
>>  
>> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do 
>> >>anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter 
>> >>that obeys the laws of physics.   
>> 
>> > You have provided no proof to back up this statement.
>> 
>> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic 
>> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or 
>> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than arithmetic. 
>> 
>> > Spacetime does not change in time or space either.
>> 
>> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block 
>> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore 
>> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the 
>> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates of 
>> existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D 
>> shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it 
>> must be a different time.  
>>  
>> > The universe is a static four dimensional block. 
>> 
>> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could 
>> only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both 
>> space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
>> 
>> > If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop existing 
>> > for you to experience change,
>> 
>> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already 
>> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of 
>> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop". 
>> 
>> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>> 
>> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
>> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
>> space, but such a move would take time. 
>> 
>> John K Clark
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
>> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Great quotable!
> 
> 
> Then you, or Clark, should explain why Hulk is not taught in all primary 
> school on he planet, like elementary arithmetic is. May be we should ask all 
> physicists, economist and bankers as well, to use Hulk instead of the 
> numbers, when they share their results.
> 
> Do you agree that x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33 does admit or not a solution? Do the 
> term “open problem” makes sense? Ca you give me an open problem about Hulk?
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> I think there are "open questions" in the comic universes:
> 
> There are many open questions surrounding Avengers: Infinity War. A film that 
> brings together all facets of the Marvel Cinematic Universe has a lot to live 
> up to. Even after the credits roll there are still many open questions that 
> will keep fans theorizing until the still-unnamed Avengers 4 is released next 
> year. Without further ado, let us take a look at a few unanswered questions 
> that will haunt us until next year after witnessing the aftermath of Thanos’ 
> journey to gather the

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-13 Thread agrayson2000



On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>>>
>>>
>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately 
>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>>>
>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
 Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
 appearance comes from something else, non physical.

>>>
>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). 
>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
>>> (or you can assume it outright). 
>>>
>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
>>> evidences.
>>>
>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>>>
>>
>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*
>>
>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>> existence of a universal machine.
>>
>  
> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>
>
>
> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>
> I don’t claim it is true.
>
> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
> collapse).
>


*I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if it 
were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG *

> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
> materialism. AG*
>
>
> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. 
>

*Which form of materialism are you referring to? Not the form or definition 
used by Stenger. He never affirms or denies a primal unknown other than 
possibly energy underlying matter. If you replace mind by digital machine 
for a person, mustn't the machine depend on matter to do any calculations? 
AG*

Mechanism and Materialism are in complete opposition. 
>

*Do you have a private definition of Mechanism (and Materialism)? AG*

You need high infinities in the observable world to attach a piece of 
> matter to a mind. 
> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
> Dovetailer) step by step.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> The existence of such machine is already a theorem in any Turing-complete 
>> theory with a bit of induction. It is feature of the arithmetical reality. 
>>
>> *As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet.*
>>
>> You are right. My conclusion has never been problematical with any 
>> physicists. Only metaphysician or theologian who want to assume the 
>> existence of a primary physical universe have a problem with this. My 
>> “enemy” are pseudo-religious believers for whom physicalism is a dogma. 
>> They are never physicists. The physicists are usually

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> SNIP
>>> 
>>> 
 No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
>>> 
>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
>>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
>>> made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>>> 
>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
 Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
 appearance comes from something else, non physical.
 
 Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
 Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical 
>>> functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be 
>>> “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you 
>>> can assume it outright). 
>>> 
>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
>>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences.
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
>>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>>> 
>>> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
>>> some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>> existence of a universal machine.
>>  
>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism implies 
>> we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need mechanism to be 
>> true for your theory to be viable.
> 
> 
> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
> transplantation. Yes.
> 
> I don’t claim it is true.
> 
> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
> collapse).
> 
> I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if it 
> were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG 


That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying the 
argument/proof.

Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital 
Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or 
better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from.

Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the 
scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t think 
so (I hope).




>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>> materialism. AG
> 
> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism.
> 
> Which form of materialism are you referring to?

Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like 
anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be not 
having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological commitment in 
(Aristotelian) substance.




> Not the form or definition used by Stenger.

He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and some 
physical reality.

Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the 
arithmetical quantum logic is known. Despite being decidable, the propositional 
theology is quickly intractable, today. 




> He never affirms or denies a primal unknown other than possibly energy 
> underlying matter.

Yes. That is already a lot. 




> If you replace mind by digital machine for

Re: What is more primary than numbers?