Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F, Jeff, Mike,

Thanks for the reference, Jeff.

I thought that the question of consequentiae might be more complicated than
being able to relate it to the terms of formal symbolic logic, but I wanted
to see what your thoughts were on it, and so I do. The confirmation is much
appreciated.

-- Franklin

On Oct 25, 2017 8:05 PM, "Mike Bergman" <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:

> Hi Jeff,
>
>
> Thank you. The Bellucci reference is excellent and timely. I found a PDF
> online at http://www.academia.edu/download/41369857/Bellucci_
> CSP_consequences.pdf; some of the Abelard quotes are translated at
> http://johnmacfarlane.net/abelard.pdf.
>
>
> Best, Mike
>
> On 10/25/2017 6:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
> Franklin, Gary F, List,
>
>
> In *Reading Peirce Reading*, Richard Smyth suggests that many logicians,
> such as Quine, make the error of   making assignments to the truth table
> for the conditional in a rather arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other
> hand, is developing a logical theory that seeks to explain why some
> inferences that we take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As
> such, he is setting up a semantic assignment of values to the truth table
> that is not arbitrary.
>
>
> Here, in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up
> mathematical system of logic that will enable us to analyze examples of
> reasoning more carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying to avoid the
> temptation of developing a logical system that prejudges the questions
> we're trying to answer in the normative theory of logic.
>
>
> For background on the relation between these different accounts of the
> conditional, it might be worth looking atFrancesco Bellucci
> <http://www.tandfonline.com/author/Bellucci%2C+Francesco>'s "Charles S.
> Peirce and the Medieval Doctrine of *consequentiae".*
> See: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.
> 2015.1118338?scroll=top=true&
>
>
> In this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what Peirce
> was drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this account of the
> conditional shape his understanding of the relation of implication.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
>
> Gary F,
>
> If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of
> truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict
> implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between
> ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to
> do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to
> treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material
> approach becomes problematic?
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> Franklin, list,
>
>
>
> The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other
> if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
> absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible
> ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all
> between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent
> *except* that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind
> the why or wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the
> conditional proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the
> antecedent is true *and* the consequent is false. The proposition as a
> whole — contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of
> view — remains perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in
> themselves false.
>
>
>
> The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce
> proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional 
> *de
> inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in
> logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is
> impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true
> likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is
> false or B is true.”
>
> From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what
> is inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the
> g

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to
do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to
treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material
approach becomes problematic?

-- Franklin


On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

Franklin, list,



The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other
if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible
ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all
between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent *except*
that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind the why or
wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the conditional
proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the antecedent is true *and*
the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole — contrary to the
“ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — remains
perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in themselves false.



The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional *de
inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in
logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is
impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true
likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is
false or B is true.”

>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what is
inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the
ground level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later
become problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s
why I’m trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in
the way he did.



The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as
we take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to
talk about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify
exactly how EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more
directly visible to me.



Gary f.



*From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* 25-Oct-17 14:32
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4



Gary F,



Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.



-- Franklin



Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*

 Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
*consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex de
inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et nunc*.
But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that here and
now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but that in
each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood range of
possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. So
understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that on
each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

-- Franklin

On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:

> Gary f:
>
> "pet theories"?   :)
>
> Best,
> J
>
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jerry R, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls it,
>> as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in
>> the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first *why*
>> Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in the
>> presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a section
>> from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more detail what
>> the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” is so
>> important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>>
>>
>>
>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>>
>>
>>
>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>>
>>
>>
>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
>> two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
>> propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
>> thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
>> only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
>> this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
>> precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
>> Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
>> clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
>> been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
>> part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
>> to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
>> is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
>> lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.
>>
>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>>
>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is
>> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible
>> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel
>> that I was violating the usages of speech.
>>
>> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of
>> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still,
>> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the
>> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a
>> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language
>> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms*
>> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed
>> by 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology

[Franklin Ransom]

I agree with off-list comments to Gary that the post was inappropriate, and
I believe Gary acted appropriately. In my view, the post aiming to chastise
John was directly inflammatory and counter-productive to the purpose of the
list.

-- Franklin

On Jun 20, 2017 5:08 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:

> Dear list:
>
>
>
> I appreciate Gary and list-moderators' earnest willfulness to maintain
> Ransdell’s original intention. It can be viewed as a thankless but
> beautiful responsibility.
>
>
>
> With respect to kirsti’s comment:
>
>
>
> "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't
> know  what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and
> expecting your fame on other fields with get you through."
>
> *These remarks were seen by one lister as "denigrating" and by another as
> "untoward." I agreed and wrote Kirsti off-list.*
>
>
> I agree that it is denigrating and untoward.  However, the despising, the
> disgust, reveals something of our nature and for that, I am thankful.  For
> if only taken as denigrating and untoward, then what purpose does it serve?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 4:03 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Gary, list,
>>
>> First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and
>> authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of
>> anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. -
>> Which I apologized.
>>
>> After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and
>> tone.
>>
>> Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that?
>>
>> I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on
>> list, or post it to me.
>>
>> I do not understand how or why  anything on P-list should be to anyone's
>> likings.
>>
>> End of this dicussion in my part.
>>
>> Kirsti
>>
>>
>> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30:
>>
>>> Kirsti, list,
>>>
>>> As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be
>>> the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and
>>> moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered
>>> to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as
>>> Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks,
>>> see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit):
>>>
>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1]
>>>
>>> if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I
>>> highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from
>>> time to time.
>>>
>>> In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these
>>> passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these).
>>>
>>> CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS
>>>
>>> -
>>>
>>> It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued:
>>> philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed
>>> and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in
>>> this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not
>>> to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing
>>> which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself
>>> by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because
>>> there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it
>>> is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take
>>> that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect
>>> intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular
>>> time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should
>>> be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests
>>> and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to
>>> rectify the problem on-list.
>>>
>>> GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly
 contacted by three members of the list who found especially this
 passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic:
 Kirsti had written:

 "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't
 know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice
 and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through."

 THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY
 ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST.

>>>
>>> WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING
>>>
>>> -
>>>
>>>
>>> Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt
>>> to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with
>>> it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral,
>>> legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge
>>> you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly
>>> special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Franklin Ransom]

quot; Correspondence, then, is just
the fact that the object responds in the way we predict it will, when we
interact with it. If it does not, then our idea of the object fails to
correspond with the object. I can't recall if Peirce ever explicitly puts
it in this way. I am fairly certain I remember John Dewey putting it in
this way. While I disagree with much that Dewey says in logic and
epistemology, I have found this way of thinking about correspondence as an
apt way to put the matter and that it is in harmony with Peirce's point of
view about correspondence.

Would you be thinking of a triad: reception, perception, conception?


This is another case in which I should quote myself from the passage to
which you were responding: "[W]e could consider the initial experience as
one of perception only, then the experience of seeing the smoke and coming
to recognize it as smoke, and then the experience later of interacting with
the fire that is the source of the smoke" So the triad would be:
perception, conception, interaction. Or maybe: perception, conception,
conduct.

I am sorry to say this, but I have decided to devote all of my time for the
next few months to some intensive reading of logic texts, which includes
Vol. 3 and 4 of CP; and before them, some logic texts that I see as
important precursors to Peirce's work. Once I am done with that project, I
will be back and probably have some questions to pose for the Peirce-L
community. For now, I will not be posting again and will not respond to any
posts. This is nothing personal, Jerry. I just have to commit myself to
this, and it requires all of the intellectual effort I can muster to get
through it. But I do look forward to future dialogue with you.

-- Franklin

On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>
wrote:

> (This post was found in my email "Draft Box”. This response was drafted on
> Dec. 13 th, 2015.
>
> Franklin, Matt, List:
>
> Some short responses to your concerns and further questions are raised.
> On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> Jerry, list,
>
> Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.
>
> Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit
> I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling'
> and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the
> original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from
> which other, more complex things can be built up out of.
>
>
> The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP.
> Coupling referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula.  Grammar in the
> typical sense that that one may find in the classical text by Otto
> Jesperson, *The Philosophy of Grammar *or in CSP's writings*.*
> "Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics
> (mass, distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or
> integers as numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92
> different logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc).  Take
> you pick for meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal
> philosophy.
>
>
> I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in
> which they were presented.
>
> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
>> character"?
>
>
> I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and
> mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost
> tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are
> different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken
> as supporting any one of them specifically.
>
>
> But, you wrote:
> Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a
> whole, requires the whole work of understanding.
>
> This is what motivated my questions:
> In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers
> changing an adjective into a noun -in the grammatical sense of the
> wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation?
>
>
> Is smoke a unit?  Is a precept a unit?
>
>
> I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the
> context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or
> units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down
> more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break
> down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing
> experienced. Similarly with smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the
> matter in terms of commonly understood 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Edwina,

I don't see this discussion as beneficial for either of us, and think it's
time to let it go. I appreciate your clearly very spirited attempt to
correct my misunderstanding and ignorance, and I'm sorry that we can't
understand one another on this issue.

-- Franklin

-

On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 5:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Franklin -  briefly, I don't see language as 'just grammar' and therefore,
> disagree with your description of me:
>
> I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the
> development of a language must be a development of its grammar.
>
> I don't see that the development of the knowledge base of a society
> requires a 'development of the grammar' of its language! [From what to
> what] Just as I don't see that the words/terms must be in place BEFORE
> the thought - as you seem to believe. I believe the opposite - the thought
> is expressed by a slew of new words or, using old words, by giving them new
> meanings.
>
> I see a language as a grammar and words - and the words can change their
> meaning, and also, new words can be created. But - I don't equate the
> cognitive nature of a group with their language. You seem to do this.
>
> Of course a word, since it is purely a symbol, only means what the human
> mind has defined it to mean. But - does man think only in words? Of course
> not - as Peirce noted, man uses both words and other external symbols (eg,
> graphs, diagrammes, mathematics) to articulate his thoughts.
>
> No, I don't pit Firstness versus Thirdness and I didn't say that it
> 'erases' Thirdness. Remember, that Thirdness is about generalities and it
> can, as such, permit multiple versions and meanings of the same symbol. Nor
> did I say that the human mind is independent of language - and wonder how
> you came up with both these conclusions about my views. BUT, MIND, as a
> natural axiom of the universe, IS independent of language - As I pointed
> out - it appears in the work of bees, of crystals. The human mind, with
> very little innate knowledge, is not independent of symbolic communication
> - which, in one format, language, operates within a grammatical structure
> expressed in 'bits' or words.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 4:40 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Edwina,
>
> My point is that ANY peoples, - since they have the capacity for thought -
>> and thus, ANY language, can achieve such a result - and it doesn't require
>> any 'development of the language'.
>
>
> It certainly does require that the language has developed the terms that
> allow more complex thoughts to be articulated.
>
> I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the
> development of a language must be a development of its grammar. As I had
> been saying to Sungchul originally, language is a term than can be taken in
> a wider sense, and it depends in what sense that term is meant. Clearly,
> you want to identify language and grammar as the same thing. I believe that
> the vocabulary of a language is also part of what that language is, and the
> development of a language's available vocabulary is a development of that
> language. Shakespeare, for example, is commonly understood to have
> transformed the English language and made it much more expressive in terms
> of its vocabulary. Whether one should include the culture and history that
> goes with a language as being part of the language, is also a matter for
> consideration. I'm not trying to say that one should think of language in
> that way, only that this is one way to think about the meaning of the term;
> and one needs to get clear about what is meant by the term 'language' when
> discussing language. I said that at the outset, and I would have
> appreciated it if you read the original discussion and understood that
> before accusing me of erroneous views based on your own presumption as to
> what language is and what must be meant by its development. I attempted to
> clarify that by a language being capable of articulating scientific
> terminology, I did not mean that it required a change in its general
> grammar to do so, but that there is a community of thought, expressed in
> that language, that has developed in that language to express scientific
> concepts and understanding. Not every human language has come to develop in
> this way with respect to every science there is as of today, and there will
> no doubt be sciences in the future that language today, even the one we
> cur

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

20, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Franklin - thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below:
>
> ----- Original Message -
> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:53 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Edwina,
>
> I will quote myself from the response I gave to Matt Faunce right before
> replying to you.
>
> "Matt, list,
>
> Can you give your source for this?
>
>
> 1) I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did
> not mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
> terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the
> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
> terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today,
> in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the
> point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed
> to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For
> example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in
> biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the
> development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories
> like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated.
>
> EDWINA: I don't think that 'language' develops as a language and then
> possibly at some time, this development enables it to 'develop scientific
> terminology'. Indeed, I don't know what you mean by 'development of a
> language'. You seem to be suggesting that there is something in the grammar
> that must develop!?
> I think that the* terms* used to 'name scientific issues' can be created
> in any language. I don't see what has to develop in a language to render it
> then and only then, capable of 'articulating scientific terminology'.
>
> 2) I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human
> languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
> things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in
> a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only
> that language won't be able to say things about it without going through
> the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about
> it, or by translating from another language.
>
> EDWINA: Of course a language can develop a new system of terminology! The
> English and other modern-use languages have all developed such a capacity
> for 'discussing projective geometry'. Any language can and does develop new
> terms. All the time. That's the nature of thought, and thus, of language -
> its openness to new terms.
>
> 3) My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to
> human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter
> of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because
> there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a
> universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised
> concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for
> representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would
> have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each
> human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning,
> and would become indistinguishable from linguistics."
>
> EDWINA: I agree with you that language should not be used as a model for
> representing reasoning or logic, since - although language IS logically
> ordered - this doesn't mean that its logical order is *also* a model for
> logical reasoning. Peirce repeats that 'reasoning is of a triadic
> constitution' (6.321) - and this doesn't fit in with the constitution of a
> language. As he also says, logic is 'independent of the structure of the
> language in which it may happen to be expressed" 3.430.And I also reject,
> as do you, that there are 'different kinds of reasoning, one for each human
> language'. But the very FACT that 'the world is chiefly governed by thought
> [1.349] means that it includes ALL three modal categories. Not just
> Thirdness, habit, a 'frozen language'.
>
> 4) If you think this statement does not clarify my position well enough,
> please let me know what specifically you feel continues to be an important
> issue. If it helps, by saying that human languages differ with respect to
> the things that can be said, I don't mean to imply that the language can't
> develop, say, a mathematical science

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, Gary F, list,

It's nice to see some clear textual proof for the presence of Firstness in
the percept. However,

and then something like a diagram (what he will later call a percipuum)
> comes in as the interpretant of the qualisign.


Where does Peirce refer to the percipuum as a diagram? Or to a diagram as
an interpretant of a qualisign? The latter case should be impossible,
following the modal determination of the aspects of the sign; a qualisign
can only be determined, and in turn determine, at the level of Firstness in
each aspect, though a diagram is clearly representing relations, not
qualities. If one wants to turn to the ten-trichotomy classification, I
think it inadvisable to use the term qualisign, since it is unclear that in
the ten-trichotomy system, a qualisign could not have a dynamical object
that is in the mode of Secondness or Thirdness, and consequently that the
immediate object is in such modes, prior to the determination of the sign
in the aspect in which it is apprehended, which is properly the aspect of
the qualisign (though Gary F's comments with respect to this identification
are important to keep in mind).

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> List,
>
> GF:  There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see
> how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I
> think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction
> of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It
> has to be First in that trichotomy.
>
> Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague.  Here is one
> place in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism:  "But not to interrupt
> our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object
> of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that
> lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant
> of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that
> is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate
> Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not
> psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants
> furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the
> Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of
> Percepts. CP 4.539  I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of a
> perceptual universe. Without reflection, that universe is taken to be the
> cause of such objects as are represented in a percept. Though each percept
> is vague, as it is recognized that its object is the result of the action
> of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425
>
> Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character:
> "the reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of reasoning
> are always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will exclaim, "can we
> not reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or the identity of
> the Man in the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course. Still, the
> conclusion will not be at all like remembering the historical event. In
> order to appreciate the difference, begin by going back to the percept to
> which the memory relates. This percept is a single event happening hic et
> nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing its essential character. For
> it is an actual passage at arms between the non-ego and the ego. A blow is
> passed, so to say. Generalize the fact that you get hit in the eye, and all
> that distinguishes the actual fact, the shock, the pain, the inflammation,
> is gone. It is anti-general. The memory preserves this character, only
> slightly modified. The actual shock, etc., are no longer there, the quality
> of the event has associated itself in the mind with similar past
> experiences. It is a little generalized in the perceptual fact. Still, it
> is referred to a special and unique occasion, and the flavor of
> anti-generality is the predominant one."  CP 2.146
>
> For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on
> the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign,
> legislgn), I do think it would help to spell out the manner in which each
> of these types of signs is determined by its object.  For example, in the
> Minute Logic, which was written in 1902 (one year before NDTR), Peirce says
> the following about the relation between the percept and the perceptual
> jugment:  "The most ordinary fact of perception, such as "it is light,"
> involves precisive abstraction, or prescission. But hypostatic
> abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into "there is
> light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to the word
> abstraction (since prescission will do for 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

articulate
> scientific terminology'  seems to me the same conclusion in this post.
>
> I note again, that you refer to the 'rules of construction' and suggest
> that in certain languages, these rules prevent scientific expression. How?
>
> My view is that ALL peoples have the SAME cognitive abilities, the same
> logical capabilities - and they can adapt their languages to express ANY
> thought. That includes new terms (we didn't refer to telephones 1,000 years
> ago). Therefore - a language, such as, eg, that of the Dobe !Kung, can
> readily either adapt and use the same word (telephone) or come up with
> their own term. BUT - *cognitively and logically, since we all are the
> same species* - then, we can all think the same way. Language - either in
> its grammar or its words - does not confine or define us.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:48 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as
> all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and
> signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language
> determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that
> language determines (some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought
> anyone ever has is determined by a given language. It does mean that to a
> significant extent, our thoughts are determined by the language in which we
> express many of our thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent
> interpretants of that language.
>
> I find it absurd that my position has been represented as 'sociolinguistic
> relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in attempting to
> respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the different
> ways in which one could mean language, which included the consideration of
> logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that language,
> taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs there
> are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way to
> think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good
> reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could
> never be reduced to a study of human language.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> ---
>
> On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred to
>> as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the
>> knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear
>> causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up
>> to empirical analysis.  But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works
>> of various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought,
>> and even, there were some who suggested that some languages should be
>> eradicated (eg native) because the language was defined as 'primitive'
>> and prevented the users from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'.
>>
>> Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express anything
>> by coming up with new terms and expressions.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
>> *Sent:* Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>
>>
>> On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>>
>> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
>> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
>> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
>> terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
>>
>> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from
>> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
>> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward
>> Vajda writes
>>
>> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
>>
>> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
>> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

Can you give your source for this?


I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not
mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the
development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today,
in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the
point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed
to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For
example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in
biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the
development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories
like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated.

I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human
languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in
a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only
that language won't be able to say things about it without going through
the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about
it, or by translating from another language.

My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to
human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter
of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because
there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a
universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised
concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for
representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would
have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each
human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning,
and would become indistinguishable from linguistics.

-- Franklin


On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
> terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
>
> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from
> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda
> writes
>
> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
>
> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly
> industrialized society.  *There are no primitive languages*.  Virtually
> no linguist today would disagree with this statement."
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Edwina, list,

I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as
all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and
signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language
determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that
language determines (some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought
anyone ever has is determined by a given language. It does mean that to a
significant extent, our thoughts are determined by the language in which we
express many of our thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent
interpretants of that language.

I find it absurd that my position has been represented as 'sociolinguistic
relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in attempting to
respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the different
ways in which one could mean language, which included the consideration of
logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that language,
taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs there
are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way to
think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good
reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could
never be reduced to a study of human language.

-- Franklin

---

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:

> Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred to
> as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the
> knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear
> causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up
> to empirical analysis.  But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works
> of various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought,
> and even, there were some who suggested that some languages should be
> eradicated (eg native) because the language was defined as 'primitive'
> and prevented the users from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'.
>
> Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express anything
> by coming up with new terms and expressions.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
>
> On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
> terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
>
> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from
> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda
> writes
>
> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
>
> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly
> industrialized society.  *There are no primitive languages*.  Virtually
> no linguist today would disagree with this statement."
>
>
> I don’t know about that quote in particular. However a decade or so back
> Michael Tomasello had a fascinating book on the evolution of language in *The
> Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. *While he doesn’t speak of it in
> Peircean terms he creates a model where it appears a certain kind of
> thirdness in terms of interpretation of signs develops. Once that evolves
> then he sees language’s capabilities as being largely there and develops
> fast. It’s been a while since I read it but I think he keeps the
> traditional dating of the evolution of language to around 80,000 - 100,000
> years. The evolution after that is really developing the language and
> culture once you have the capability.
>
> I know he has a newer text based upon some lectures he gave called *The
> Origins of Human Communication* although I’ve not read that one.
>
> --
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type,
e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.

This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type;
but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as a
token, and there is smoke as a type. The token and the type are not the
same thing. The token, in being related to other tokens, is not thereby a
type. The token is an instance of a type, and the type is what refers to
all the instances. A token, rightly, only refers to the 'here and now', and
not to other tokens like it, which are other 'here and now's'.

But your point is taken: "I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a
perceptual judgment."

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 12/13/15 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
>
> Matt wrote:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
>> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
>> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
>
> Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is
> not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate.
>
>
> I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment. I hoped
> that would've been understood from the context, e.g., my clause "relating
> to *other instances* of smoke," as an instance is a token, not a
> generality. As usual, I could've written it better. Then I continued to
> give my argument for the fact that there can be no token in perception
> without that token being of a type, concluding with "If this is correct
> then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns." Let me add bracketed
> insertions to my first paragraph to clarify what I meant:
>
>  EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas
> percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you
> have a perceptual judgment. So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as
> understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is
> a perceptual judgment.
>
> I continued...
>
> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
>> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
>> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to
>> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y.  For
>> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is
>> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark
>> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.'
>>
>> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of
>> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine
>> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If
>> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.
>>
>> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good
>> one.
>>
>> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
>> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark.
>> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems
>> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x',
>> 'the dark tone' only comes as a result of the distinction (this basic level
>> generalization)
>>
> Matt
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

> fallibilism and also his view that all thought is in signs, he should avoid
> it.
>
>
>
> I would argue that the grounds for knowledge are the topological
> structures of the distinctions in our experience. This is a form of
> information theoretic structure that I think Dretske, for one, has shown to
> be much more productive than might seem at first. Nonetheless, it is a
> pretty radical idea in epistemology at this stage. What I have called the
> effability issue is the motivation for moving in this radical direction,
> since it seems to rule out other kinds of ground for knowledge.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 13 December 2015 23:19
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
>
>
> John, list,
>
>
>
> I will become much less active for the next few months after today.
>
>
>
> I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as
> ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of
> Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable
> though.
>
>
>
> It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which
> together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of
> empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves
> empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and
> thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible.
> If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between
> these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical
> knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly.
> In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both.
>
>
>
> I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual
> pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a
> priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed.
> The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual
> judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that
> perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to
> percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori
> can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are
> held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never
> be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a
> priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But
> for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false,
> and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at
> the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to
> question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it.
>
>
>
> I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality
> unique to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis.
> Only this does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not
> mean the quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it
> is not precisely the same as those other qualities.
>
>
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
>
> -
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>
> Jon,
>
> It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to
> many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are
> ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions
> because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current
> discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from
> perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances
> alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted
> to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly,
> however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence
> directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using
> the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self
> and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have
> experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation
> (thirdness) as either "this" or "that".
>
> John
>
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/colli

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

Matt wrote:

EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.


Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is not
the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as I
said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the
general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a
type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate,
or type, to the subject, or percept.

Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208:
"Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or
proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a
present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in
its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by
the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the
interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes
something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as
the subject of the judgment.

Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The Seven
Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what part
Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the
Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working
out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have,
organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an
argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being
precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this
huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us* and
these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which *icons*
Qualities are immediately presented."

In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires
the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of
the general element in perception.

As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of
lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The
elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason."

-- Franklin



On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Franklin, Peircers,
>
> Here a distinction that I find helpful:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to
> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y.  For
> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is
> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark
> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.'
>
> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of
> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine
> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If
> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.
>
> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good
> one.
>
> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark.
> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems
> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x',
> 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level
> generalization).
>
> Matt
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom <
> <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Gary F,
>
> Just to clarify, do the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Sung, list,

Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll
respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and
since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I
wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice
in which you participate?

With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is not
necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it
wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a
logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to
agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think
the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy.

So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have said
does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a sentence
which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is a
proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or an
icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference.

-- Franklin


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, List,
>
> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
>
>
> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
>(121315-1)
> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
>
> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
> introducing   (1213`15-2)
> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
> dicisign)."
>
> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
>  (121315-3)
> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
> type, to the subject, or percept."
>
> These fit with my understanding [1] that
>
>  (121315-4)
>  In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
> vehicle of a sentence.>
>
> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
>
> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
>(121315-5)
>
> Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.
>
> "A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
>   (121315-6)
> the general as its predicate."
>
> Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a
> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.
>
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> Reference:
>[1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961).  *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*.  The
> University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

John, list,

I will become much less active for the next few months after today.

I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as
ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of
Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable
though.

It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which
together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of
empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves
empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and
thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible.
If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between
these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical
knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly.
In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both.

I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual
pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a
priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed.
The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual
judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that
perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to
percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori
can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are
held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never
be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a
priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But
for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false,
and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at
the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to
question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it.

I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique
to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this
does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the
quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not
precisely the same as those other qualities.

-- Franklin

-


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to
> many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are
> ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions
> because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current
> discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from
> perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances
> alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted
> to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly,
> however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence
> directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using
> the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self
> and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have
> experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation
> (thirdness) as either "this" or "that".
>
> John
>
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> > Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21
> > To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> > Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
> >
> > John, List,
> >
> > I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean
> > preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with
> > must leave the appearances invariant.
> >
> > I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either
> > save or solve.  I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure.
> > Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment:
> >
> > https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C
> > E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0-
> > %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B
> > 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Jon
> >
> > On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > > Peirce List,
> > >
> > > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point
> Matt
> > has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in
> the
> > process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of
> continuity of
> > knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses
> > and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that
> work at
> > 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

ively as the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post
> that I wrote for the [biosemiotics] list is [biosemiotics:46] dated
> December 26, 2012, I believe.
>
> (*2*) You wrote:
>
> "With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
> not   (121315-1)
> necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
> proposition
> can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer
> to the
> grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point.
> Perhaps
> some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea,
> but I
> am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is
> going
> to get us anywhere in philosophy."
>
> I agree.  Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal
> language evolved in the human society, and all organism must be making
> judgement although they do not have any sentences as we do.
> But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of
> reasoning in both humans and non-human species.  For me, human language (or
> humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms
> as well as the Universe itself. In fact I am now of the opinion that there
> may be two aspects to language -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be
> denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and (ii) the languages as *tokens* of
> *L* (to be denoted as L), leading to the following notations:
>
> *   L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln)
> (121315-2)
>
> where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe,
> including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e.,
> mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.).  It is possible that *L* can
> be identified with Peircean semiotics.  Do you know of any evidence to
> invalidate this possibility ?
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Franklin Ransom <
> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, list,
>>
>> Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so
>> I'll respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and
>> since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I
>> wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice
>> in which you participate?
>>
>> With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
>> not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
>> proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it
>> wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a
>> logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to
>> agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think
>> the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy.
>>
>> So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have
>> said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a
>> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is
>> a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or
>> an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference.
>>
>> -- Franklin
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Franklin, List,
>>>
>>> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
>>>
>>>
>>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
>>>  (121315-1)
>>> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
>>>
>>> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
>>> introducing   (1213`15-2)
>>> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
>>> dicisign)."
>>>
>>> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
>>>(121315-3)
>>> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
>>> type, to the subject, or percept."
>>>
>>> These fit with my understanding [1] that
>>>
>>>  >>  (121315-4)
>>>  In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
>>> vehicle of a sentence.>
>>>
>>> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
>>>
>>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
>>&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
considered as a singular phenomenon?

I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is
a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign.
Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign?

-- Franklin

--

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM,  wrote:

> Franklin, Jeff,
>
>
>
> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To
> perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of
> that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting
> its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which like all
> predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence
> of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), then you
> have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not).
>
>
>
> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue
> the thread without me for awhile ...
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,

Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate
Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the
Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual
impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are right that
Peirce would lean toward the latter conclusion. However, I do not think
this is necessarily a fair way to put the matter. It seems to me that while
we can directly perceive the real, such perception does not mean that we
immediately understand it as a whole; for that understanding, we require a
concept of the real that is perceived, and perceptual judgment is an
instinctual attempt at applying a concept. The way I would state the matter
is that the percept, while not the whole of the real object, is at least in
some sense a part of that object, which we find ourselves immediately
related to by way of physiological processes, as the eye is affected by, in
the supposed example, the smoke (plus light, other percepts, etc.), and so
comes to visually perceive the smoke. That effect of the smoke is in some
sense part of what it is to be smoke. Going beyond the part of the real
that we perceive, and grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of
understanding. But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the
whole of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a
part of the perceiver.

-- Franklin




On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 9:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Franklin, Gary F., List,
>
> If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the
> "smoke itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke?
> Peirce indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following
> explanation of a percept:  "A visual percept obtrudes itself upon me in its
> entirety. I am not therein conscious of any mental process by which the
> image has been constructed. The psychologists, however, are able to give
> some account of the matter. Since 1709, they have been in possession of
> sufficient proof (as most of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its
> apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental processes,
> or at all events of processes for all intents and purposes mental, except
> that we are not directly aware of them;" CP 7.624
>
> This fits with the definitions he provides in the Century dictionary:
>
> 1.  Perceive:  1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of
> some object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience;
> in psychology, to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind
> (commonly upon the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential
>
> 2.  Perception:  1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of
> the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the
> operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or
> resulting a construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue
> of a real action of an object upon the mind.
>
> 3. Percept:  the immediate object in perception, in the sense in which the
> word is used by modern psychologists.
>
> Insofar as the modern psychologists are engaged in a special science that
> is empirical in origin, then it would appear that Peirce is importing a
> technical term from the special science into his philosophical logic, and
> he is trying to articulate what is necessary for the percept to function in
> the (uncontrolled) process of drawing perceptual judgments as inferential
> conclusions.  One might think that these kinds of inferential processes are
> only of subsidiary concern if our aim is to understand the divisions Peirce
> is drawing between different kinds of signs in NDTR.  My assumption is that
> Peirce is generalizing from way in which terms and propositions function in
> self controlled arguments in order to account for these uncontrolled
> processes of mind.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Franklin Ransom]

hile whether we consider the smoke as experienced in part, or as a
whole, depends on how experience is considered in a given context of
analysis.

-- Franklin

--

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com
> wrote:

> List, Frank:
>
> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke.
> Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a
> whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is
> not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole of the object, it is nevertheless
> as much a part of smoke as it is a part of the perceiver.
>
>
> While I concur with these sentences, I would ask further of your views:
>
> What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of
> the experience?
>
> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events
> with internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the
> generates the coupling of the parts of the whole?
>
> Is smoke a unit?  Is a precept a unit?
>
> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
> character"?
>
> Just curious.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Franklin Ransom]

John,

You said:

The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist.


I've been trying to figure this one out for myself, but am having some
trouble, in particular with the "idea that the physical is just what we can
experience." Would you be willing to clarify how you mean this? Is physical
opposed to mental, and thus the mental is not something we can experience?
And/or the spiritual? Or would you include mental and/or spiritual as
subdivisions of the physical? My sense of physicalism, aside from your
characterization, is that it's the idea that what is real is whatever
physics discovers or says is real, which is quite different from what you
are suggesting. I hope that you can understand my concern. After all,
clearly an idealist could just as easily say that what is mental is
whatever we can experience, and I think you can understand that idea.
What's the point of calling all of experience one or the other?

-- Franklin


On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of
> firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking
> about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You
> aren’t talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like
>
>
>
> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise
> when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.
>
>
>
> Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical
> perspective.
>
>
>
> Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views
> on firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).
>
>
>
> Unless you understand  this you are going to be asking questions without
> an answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with
> my physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe).
> The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. Basically,
> you err, as I see it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in
> meaning, however much it might seem to. It violates Peirce’s
> prope-positivism, which he uses to deflate a lot of metaphysics.
>
>
>
> Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of
> experience Peirce uses, or both, in  order to save your distinction. But
> then you aren’t talking about Peirce’s firsts when you say they have
> structure.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Franklin Ransom]

John,

I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've
had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in
experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience
external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I feel
as though asking this question might be somehow perceived as obnoxious, but
I confess that I have a sincere desire to understand how you think about
it; since what you've had to say seems to imply, so far as I can tell, that
you would probably admit that you experience external minds (like my mind),
but that you also have to admit that you think of the experience of my mind
as of something physical, not mental (i.e., not referring to illusions,
dreams, etc.), since it is something external to you. Have I ascertained
your point of view rightly on this, or am I guilty of warping your meaning
in some unfortunate way?


-- Franklin


On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 9:04 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> Dear Franklin, List members:
>
>
>
> I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out
> now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit
> subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce
> scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in
> Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not
> impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without
> accepting this argument I lay out.
>
>
>
> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to
> something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in  one sense), or
> we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to
> Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the
> objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has
> to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental
> experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to
> mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than
> objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for
> objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred
> to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see
> to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an
> external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning.
> Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of
> external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all
> things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by
> external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the
> external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this
> class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just
> identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are
> illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and
> dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples –
> though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but
> Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere
> possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist
> epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they
> are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we
> can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the
> defeater requirement).
>
>
>
> Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of
> definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine
> defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not
> what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me)
> since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics
> tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has
> been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is
> safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study
> effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical
> has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually
> leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of
> idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no
> contradiction  between his views about experience, and the physical, and at
> least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is
> neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have
> reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental
> experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical,
> mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least.
> In order to make our ideas 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[Franklin Ransom]

 for the reply.
>
> First principles that we have to "work through a variety of considerations
> to reach" are not the kind of first principles Peirce is rejecting -
> although, like you, I don't pretend to speak with much authority on how to
> accurately characterize Aristotle's actual position on this matter.  I
> grant you that Peirce often expresses sympathy with Aristotle's approaches.
>
> As for Descartes, we might say that he also "work[s] through a variety of
> considerations" - but with a view to showing that we don't, in the end,
> have to work through them since, as it turns out, on Descartes' view, the
> clear and distinct deliverances of consciousness are the ultimate arbiter.
> They are also examples of the kind of "first cognition" which Peirce rules
> out. Peirce also rules out, on my view, anything resembling uninterpreted
> sense data as the "foundation" of anything.
>
> There is no foundation, on Peirce's view (as I understand it), which we
> can identify as the justification of our beliefs by tracing our beliefs
> back to them.  The Peircean truth-criterion looks forward and not backward.
>
> I agree with you that Peirce devotes considerable attention to how to
> (deliberately) choose which abductive conclusions to investigate first. He
> also - perhaps it's in the "Law of Mind" series - speculates that it's
> because the mind is a historical product of the evolution of the universe
> that it tends to produce abductive guesses much closer to the ultimate
> truth than mere chance would account for.
>
> My use of 'serendipidous' was motivated by a reflection on Peirce's
> definition of the scientific method in "The Fixation of Belief" - which is
> perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be. The scientific method
> is there described as a method which consists of allowing Reality to affect
> the content of our opinions. To this we may object that our opinions are
> always and invariably affected by the real conditions in which they emerge,
> so that this definition does not tell us what is distinctive about the
> scientific method. What we are talking about, then, is a *particular* way
> in which Reality can be induced to affect our opinions - namely a strategy
> that consists in creating situations where the observed result can be
> expected to be different, depending on whether our hypothesis is true or
> false.
>
> As for experimentation in Aristotle, I now recall the experiment of
> plunging one hand into cold water, the other hand into hot water and then
> both hands into lukewarm water. I was also struck by Aristotle's
> observation of how drops of water on, say, a red-painted surface, appear to
> be red - and by the ingenious (but in the end incorrect) hypothesis
> Aristotle advances to explain this phenomenon. This discussion occurs in De
> Anima, where there is a lot of reflection on how light and vision work.  We
> now think of this phenomenon as being explained by refraction - but
> Aristotle wanted to know how it was that the drops of water could actually
> "become" red.
>
> As for social prejudices, in "Fixation" Peirce notes as one of the
> weaknesses of the a priori method that - in spite of all the deployment of
> reason and argument this method involves - it turns out to be subjected to
> the secular whims of fashion, passing from materialism to spiritualism and
> back again in endless cycles, causing doubt to re-emerge in those who
> observe that this is happening.
>
> A serendipidous scientific strategy, on the other hand, will produce
> convergence.
>
> But if a controversy is not about something "real", there will be no
> convergence. (Except by chance, and then only for a while.)
>
> Cheers,
>
> James
>
>
> Le 2015-11-25 06:08, Franklin Ransom a écrit :
>
> James, list,
>
> James, welcome to the list.
>
> James wrote:
>
> Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian
>> and Aristotelian First Principles
>
>
> I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering whether
> this point might be further explained. In the case of Cartesian first
> principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to these principles,
> and then from them work out and justify the rest of all that is understood.
> I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the case of Aristotelian first
> principles, we certainly do not use extreme doubt, but work through a
> variety of considerations that ultimately lead us to first principles, not
> in the sense of principles which come first in understanding, but in
> nature. So there is this line from Aristotle to the effect that we reason
> from what is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[Franklin Ransom]

James, list,

Sorry, quick correction: Peirce does not discuss the relative importance of
characters in "The Doctrine of Chances" (the third paper in the series),
but in "The Order of Nature" (the fifth paper in the series).

-- Franklin



On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 7:35 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> James,
>
>
> Well, looking it up, I can't find serendipidous, but I found
> serendipitous, which is defined as "occurring or discovered by chance in a
> happy or beneficial way", which is what I noted in my last post. If you
> think that a scientific strategy that occurs or is discovered by chance in
> a happy or beneficial way is what will produce convergence, I must confess
> that I can not see it the way you do. I believe I will have to leave it at
> that. If you think you can make this connection you observe clearer, I'm
> all ears (so to speak).
>
> There is no foundation, on Peirce's view (as I understand it), which we
>> can identify as the justification of our beliefs by tracing our beliefs
>> back to them.  The Peircean truth-criterion looks forward and not backward.
>
>
> This we agree upon. Of course, I take it that by looking forward, is meant
> the constant readiness to submit belief to experiential, experimental test.
> So if Aristotle's first principles ultimately end up not passing such
> testing, then we should be prepared to give them up; their continued
> adoption is dependent on how well they continue to explain the phenomena we
> experience.
>
> With respect to your comment on social prejudices, I'm aware of what he
> says about the a priori method in the Fixation of Belief article. In fact,
> since our guesses can be so prejudiced, it is all the more important that
> such guesses be put to inductive, experimental testing. Which brings me to
> another part of the Fixation article that you refer to:
>
> My use of 'serendipidous' was motivated by a reflection on Peirce's
>> definition of the scientific method in "The Fixation of Belief" - which is
>> perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be. The scientific method
>> is there described as a method which consists of allowing Reality to affect
>> the content of our opinions. To this we may object that our opinions are
>> always and invariably affected by the real conditions in which they emerge,
>> so that this definition does not tell us what is distinctive about the
>> scientific method. What we are talking about, then, is a *particular* way
>> in which Reality can be induced to affect our opinions - namely a strategy
>> that consists in creating situations where the observed result can be
>> expected to be different, depending on whether our hypothesis is true or
>> false.
>
>
> Allowing Reality to affect the content of our opinions is conducted by
> submitting our beliefs to inductive testing--we directly interact with the
> Real to find out whether it answers to our belief about it or not, and this
> is what Peirce means at this point in the Fixation article. As the series
> of articles continues (of which the Fixation article is the first of that
> series, "Illustrations of the Logic of Science"), Peirce goes on to explain
> the need to predesignate hypotheses and the significant characters we are
> looking for. This is why in the Doctrine of Chances article in that series,
> he works to show that a chance universe is completely systematic, but can
> never make any explanation more likely than any other, because everything
> in a pure chance universe is singular and logic, being about what is
> general, is impossible. But we do observe order, this means we do not live
> in a pure chance universe, and that means that rather than trying to choose
> characters based only upon systematic considerations, we must make our
> selection with respect to some purpose and thus predesignate what we are
> looking for. Hence the development of a strategy for understanding reality,
> paying attention to the conditions that are conducive to bringing about the
> desired result, and so forth. I'm not sure we really disagree, but I wanted
> to point out that the Fixation article is the first of a six paper series
> that goes on to explain in detail the logic of science and scientific
> method, as Peirce says at the end of the Fixation article. So I think it's
> very misleading to say that the definition of the scientific method in "The
> Fixation of Belief" is perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be,
> since it is precisely the aim of the series of papers to clarify what is
> meant by the scientific method and how it ought to proceed, and Peirce
> explicitly 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[Franklin Ransom]

James, list,

James, welcome to the list.

James wrote:

Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and
> Aristotelian First Principles


I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering whether
this point might be further explained. In the case of Cartesian first
principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to these principles,
and then from them work out and justify the rest of all that is understood.
I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the case of Aristotelian first
principles, we certainly do not use extreme doubt, but work through a
variety of considerations that ultimately lead us to first principles, not
in the sense of principles which come first in understanding, but in
nature. So there is this line from Aristotle to the effect that we reason
from what is better known to us to what is better known to nature. After
having gotten to such first principles, we can understand nature better. I
am not so sure I find Peirce rejecting this. I'm sure that Peirce would
want to add that there needs to be experimentation to really put the
principles to the test. but as far as observation and deduction goes, I
find Peirce mostly in agreement with Aristotle's point of view. Perhaps I
have misunderstood what Aristotle is about, or why Peirce would have had
some important issue to take with Aristotle, other than the need for
experimentation?

Also, James wrote:

Scientific method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to
> happen in the most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction.


I don't find that it makes sense to say that one devises a strategy for
something to happen with something happening in a serendipitous way,
Serendipity is really about some chance occasion that turns out fortunate.
Devising a strategy, in Peirce's logic of science, is something that
involves the selection of hypotheses for testing. We might say that
abduction as an inference is itself serendipitous, although I think that
there is some truth to the idea that continued observation will inevitably
result in the development of better abductions. With respect to scientific
method though, it is certainly not serendipitous, but aimed at the
strategic selection of given hypotheses according to the principles of the
economy of research, and would include deduction and induction. Hopefully
the result of the method doesn't lead us to simply hope for a serendipitous
result. Another way of putting it is that Peirce never really suggests how
we can devise strategies to come up with better abductions, only strategies
of what we can do once we have hypotheses to consider.

I myself am interested in the idea of developing strategies for inducing
better abductions, but I haven't found Peirce so interested. For him, it
seems that an abductive inference is simply uncontrolled, and we can only
begin controlled inquiry once we have already a hypothesis delivered from
an abductive inference. Perhaps he would admit that psychology could
discover something more about how we come up with the abductions that we
do. That is to say, that we come up with abductions is the purview of
logic, but why we come up with specific ones, and that some are more common
than others in human inquirers, might be something that psychology could
study. For instance, when unconscious social prejudices affect the kinds of
guesses we're prepared to make in a given social context.

-- Franklin

P.S. -- I too hope for a positive prognosis and speedy recovery for John.

--

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 3:36 PM, James Crombie  wrote:

> If rationalism is the view that the real is what-can-be-thought, then the
> arch-rationalist is Parmenides. I would agree that Descartes is a
> foundationalist rationalist - and opine that Peirce is a
> non-foundationalist rationalist - and also a non-foundationalist
> empiricist. Peirce holds that the real is definitely what-can-be-thought -
> or at least a subset of what can be thought. But Peirce also holds that
> under the influence of experience we can change what we think. Scientific
> method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to happen in the
> most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction.  Peirce's
> non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and
> Aristotelian First Principles - and in his simultaneous rejection of
> empiricist First Sensations. See the end of Section IV in "The Fixation of
> Belief".  Non-foundationalism ("no first cognition") and fallibilism go
> together very nicely.
>
> Greetings from Nova Scotia!
>
> James Crombie
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary, Jeff, list,

I see that the thread count got to 100, so I suppose this is why the thread
(in my email account, anyway) seems to have moved over to the one started
by Jeff (accidentally?) awhile ago. I would have thought a new 100 count
would have started rather than the mail move to a similarly named thread
that hadn't reached 100 yet. Somewhat bizarre really.

With respect to the nomenclature and divisions of triadic relations, I was
certainly aware that terms, propositions, and arguments are all symbols; I
thought I had mentioned that at some point, maybe not. I tend to reference
Liszka's book, "A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S.
Peirce", which makes it easier for me to pay attention to that kind of
detail. It's a fine book, especially for speculative grammar, though not so
much for logical critic.

Anyway, that quote and the info from Turrisi is certainly interesting,
Gary. It does help somewhat, with respect to propositions. In the case of
arguments, I'm not sure. Perhaps, since an argument could be considered a
conditional proposition, and it could be supposed there is a conditional
proposition which includes within itself two other conditional propositions
as its predicate and subject, that in such a case arguments could be
considered as terms. Of course, this would mean that propositions and
arguments could be referred to as predicates or subjects. I'm not sure how
I feel about that, and whether it would make sense to consider them as such
with respect to logical quantities of characters and real objects, or
whether it would make more sense with respect to what Peirce says in 1893
about the informed depth and breadth of propositions and arguments.

-- Franklin



On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:28 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, Franklin, list,
>
>
>
> I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come
> across a couple of things that may be of use to it.
>
>
>
> In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition
> of pragmatism:
>
> “Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible
> in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose
> only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a
> corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having
> its apodosis in the imperative mood.” Turrisi, in her edition of the
> Harvard lectures, provides a note on this (p. 257) which throws some light
> on the relationship between “terms” and propositions:
>
>
>
> [[*Apodosis* is, in the most conventional, contemporary sense, according
> to Webster, the clause expressing the conclusion or result in a conditional
> sentence, as distinguished from *protasis*, the clause that expresses the
> condition in a conditional sentence. The *Oxford English Dictionary*
> defines apodosis as “the concluding clause of a sentence, as contrasted
> with the introductory clause, or *protasis*; now usually restricted to
> the consequent clause in a conditional sentence as ‘If thine enemy hunger, 
> *feed
> him*’.” It is important to remember that the “clause” which has evolved
> in modern definitions as the grammatical form of *apodosis* was
> understood initially as a “term” which was itself an entire proposition.
> Richard Whateley, whom Peirce professed to have read in one sitting at the
> age of twelve, discussed conditional propositions in his *Elements of
> Logic*, saying, “we must consider every Conditional Proposition a
> universal affirmative categorical Proposition, of which the Terms are
> entire Propositions, viz., the antecedent answering to the *Subject* and
> the consequent to the *Predicate*, e.g., to say “if Louis is a good king,
> France is  likely to prosper,” is equivalent to saying, “the case of Louis
> being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper.” It is more
> useful to think of “apodosis” in this way, as a categorical proposition of
> a universal kind, as in Whateley. And it is more consonant with the meaning
> of pragmatism which Peirce engenders insofar as pragmatism is a device of
> logic.]]
>
>
>
> This might help to explain Peirce’s 1893 statement that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term.
>
>
>
> If we move on to the ten sign types defined in Peirce’s “Nomenclature and
> Divisions of Triadic Relations,” we find that the Tenth is the Argument,
> the Ninth is the Proposition (i.e. the Dicent Symbol), and the Eighth, the
> Rhematic Symbol, “either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a
> General Term” (EP2:295). So term, proposition and argument are all symbols,
> the difference among them being that the term is a Rheme, the proposition a
> Dicisign, and the argument of course an Argument.
>
>
>
> Perhaps you were already aware of all this, but at least it helps to clear
> up my own confusion.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a
> continuum of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

524-558)
>
> A.B. Kempe on the mathematical theory of relations :
> a. 1886 A Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
> b. 1887 Note to a Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
> c. 1889-90 “On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the
> Geometrical Theory of Points”
> d. 1890 “The Subject Matter of Exact Thought”
> e. 1894 “Mathematics”
> f. 1897 “The Theory of Mathematical Form.  A Correction and Explanation”
>
> Peirce’s notes and responses to Kempe
> g. Notes on Kempe 1889-90 (MS 1584)
> h. Notes on Kempe’s Paper in Vol XXI… (MS 709)(undated)
> i. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MS 710: 2-8)
> j. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MSS 711: 2-5, 712: 2, 712s :2-3; 713:2-3)
> k. Notes on Kempe’s Paper on Mathematical Form (MS 714)
> l. Reply to Mr. Kempe” (MS 708: 2-19)
> m. Notes on “A.B. Kempe, ‘On the Relation Between the Logical Theory of
> Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Point’” (MS 1584: 17-24)
> n. Annotations in his copy of Kempe 1886.
>
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> 
> From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L
> Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions,
> Arguments
>
> Jeff, list,
>
> Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
> thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
> thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.
>
> I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
> to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
> your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
> Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
> Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
> and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
> particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
> details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
> relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
> extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
> thought I'd ask.
>
> I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> 
>
> Franklin, List,
>
> Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
> earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some
> additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your
> questions are in quotes.  Short responses follow.
>
> A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
> object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
> is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
> belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
> suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
> but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point
> made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said,
> let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
> a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
> Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
> Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between
> kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
> immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
> Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
> that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
> classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
> account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant.  In my
> efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
> 66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
> here.  After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
> is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
> interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.
>
> B.  "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used
> for the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and
> perceptual judgment."  I should have made it clearer that I was trying to
> point out that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the
> qua

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jon,

Yes, I agree, even though I haven't read through it. It was my plan to be
getting to Vol. 3, which includes the LOR, next. Then after starting Vol.
3, I decided reading precursors like Boole and De Morgan would be a good
idea. Anyway, I've been sidetracked for the moment with conversations on
Peirce-L. With respect to Jeff's ideas, I'd like to offer as much as I can
to thought for now, before I get back to my reading.

-- Franklin



On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 9:36 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Re: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
> Re: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
>
> Franklin, Jeff, all ...
>
> In order to understand what Peirce is saying one has to understand
> what he is talking about.  When it comes to the logic of relatives
> and the mathematics of relations, my personal recommendation for
> the best place to start would be the 1870 Logic of Relatives.
> There Peirce is writing for people who already inhabit the
> space he is talking about and his task reduces to that of
> giving them better maps and microscopes and telescopes
> for exploring and describing the territory in view.
> That is by no means an insignificant assignment but
> it's still more tractable than starting from zip.
>
> My study of the 1870 LOR, as far as I've got for now, is here:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce's_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

n't mind, would you please be so kind as to
offer a page reference for me that makes the point?


> In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce
> defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a
> cognition of a mind.”


FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as
"a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind."


> Then in 1909 he writes that:
> “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the
> nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living
> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as
> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of
> being” (CP 6.341, 1909).
> What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say
> that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that?


FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly
the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign
that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed
to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage
that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a
proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject,
that does not make it any less true that a term can have something
predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated
(and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process
by which this happens.


I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are
the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to
statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information,
and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes
sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say
about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously
that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to
believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this would
contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly
suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this
reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and
signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in
which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any
sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of
being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce
meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever.


-- Franklin


---

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Franklin, my responses inserted below.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on
> Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread,
> of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
>
>
>
> I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign"
> instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that
> Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions.
>
> GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of
> signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters
> that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*,
> then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a
> sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the
> objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject*
> (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these are
> definitions of *predicate* and *subject*?
>
>
>
> Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of
> predicates and subjects:
>
> “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the
> characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*.
> … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of
> the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” Now, when
> you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply
> propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth?
> According to Peirce’s definition here, 

Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,
>
>
Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.

I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
thought I'd ask.

I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.

-- Franklin



Franklin, List,

Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some
additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your
questions are in quotes.  Short responses follow.

A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point
made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said,
let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between
kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant.  In my
efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
here.  After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.

B.  "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for
the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment."  I should have made it clearer that I was trying to point out
that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the qualisign is,
taken as a token instance, the sinsign that stands in relation to the
dynamical interpretant.  The curved line was meant to show that it is
carried over--along with its relation to qualisign and immediate object
(percept) into the open blank.

C.  A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation."  There are diagrams at
work in many places.  In the case of the immediate interpretant in relation
to the antecept, it is a vague diagram of future possibilities.  In
relation to the ponecept, it is a diagram of past memories of those
qualities we notice in the qualisign.  The immediate interpretant of the
percept is a limiting case of what I actually see now--as that is
interpreted in relation to the near past and present.  As such, it is a
skeleton set of skeleton sets (i.e., a diagram of diagrams).

I have reasons for thinking that this way of diagramming the basic
relations between signs, objects and interpretant is a reasonable
approach--and that is more enlightening than other kinds of diagrams that
have been offered in the secondary literature.  That, however, will require
a longer explanation.

With that much said, let's turn to the interpretation of the term
"percipuum."  Here are the definitions of the Latin terms:
1.  Praecipio:  to advise, give 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The
idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of
collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of
the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had
some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what
the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through
experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge
itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information
we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or
the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to
determine the dynamical object being signified.

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the
object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because
we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it
through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an
index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common
knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise,
the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a
symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless
it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of
whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of
physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human
body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't
know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal
at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the
symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to
something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later
through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous
experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes
the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this
collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a
disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.

Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been
before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place
signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have
been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of
objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and
signs. So our collateral information, or common knowledge, gives us an
indirect experience of the place by its connection with other objects, like
certain kinds of landmarks and signs, that we have experienced before, and
when we come upon those landmarks and signs, we will understand their
physical connection to the place. And that understanding will begin with
the giving of directions, which references one's starting point as having
certain physical connections to follow to those landmarks and signs, that
will in turn lead to the place. Once we have visited the place, it will now
be a part of the real objects we have experienced; and when we learn new
information about the place, we will now have the direct collateral
experience or information to understand which object the new information is
about.

To put the point more generally, there are all manner of physical
connections in nature. But we are not in a position to understand each and
every one of those connections, because there are many things we have not
experienced. As we gain experience of more things, we become able to
interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not
true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of
inquiry, or scientific community.

-- Franklin

---

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

>
> Franklin,
> right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical
> object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of
> self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like
> autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under
> the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding
> as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much
> for your friendly counseling!
> Best,
> Helmut
> 15. November 2015 um 23:55 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.
>
> I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a
> word of caution regarding them. It probably do

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

The unicorn issue is one that I am uncertain about. There's not much more
to say about it at this point, as I don't recall what CSP had to say about
such things, and I haven't put much thought into it with respect to the
semiotic point of view. One thing I could mention is that Peirce
distinguished between natural classes and artificial classes, and I think
it is safe to say that unicorn is an artificial class. This leaves in doubt
whether there is any genuine information about it, or whether there is a
dynamical object. I don't really like the suggestion that there is no
dynamical object in this case, but I suppose it's something to consider. In
any case, it is possible to have logical quantity--intension and
extension--without it being informed logical quantity. To be candid with
you though, these are just some stray thoughts, and I don't have a
considered answer at this time. It's quite possible that Peirce gave a
considered answer, but I don't recall it at this time.

The argument becoming a proposition when understood or believed is an idea
that might be worth considering. I wouldn't exactly say that it becomes a
proposition. It has already been mentioned in recent discussions in the
recent discussion on the list that an argument can be considered as a
proposition, and how that would work. Whether there is some special
consideration with respect to the argument becoming understood or believed,
I remain hesitant to say.

I'm not sure what you meant about the "level of source of collateral
information" and how it relates to the definition of the dynamical object,
or the possible connection with the final interpretant.

-- Franklin

-

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have
> confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many
> other things with each other.
> Franklin,
> I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a
> dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then
> Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the
> concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course,
> this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least
> not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like
> that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an
> intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people
> thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in
> Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of
> the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought,
> whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real
> nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about
> aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they
> cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in
> nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this
> argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a
> knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an
> argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or
> even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the
> immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is
> easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that
> electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that
> there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at
> which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the
> dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the
> dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might
> be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a
> character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in
> real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged
> to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by
> reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is
> good also for everybody else in this list.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Sungchul, list,

First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it
said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one
list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that
out.

Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with you, Sungchul. Your
reply to me seems to be on topic and just the sort of thing that I am
inclined to consider and respond to. But, I have seen many, many of your
posts, and almost always I simply move on as soon I see that it is from
you. I have noted from reading previous discussions you have had on the
list that you seem to have a couple of problems. One is that you haven't
really read much of Peirce, and don't seem inclined to correct this
problem. The other is that you have a funny way of constantly quoting
yourself, and have a habit of adding attachments to your posts. I don't
know if you have changed your ways and actually dug into some of Peirce's
texts; if you have, great, and you can disregard what I have said about
that. I just want to be perfectly clear and open here with you: If I sense
that what you have to say is the result of willful ignorance on your part
by choosing to not read Peirce, I will not reply. If you start adding
quotes from previous posts of yours from years ago, I will not reply (which
means, of course, if you do it again, I will not reply). If you start
adding attachments, I will not reply. I don't want to be rude, but I'm not
here to discuss the philosophy of Sungchul. I'm here to engage in
meaningful dialogue with others who have a sincere interest in Peirce's
philosophy. So long as I observe that to be in evidence, I will be more
than happy to discourse with you.

Moving on...

I don't really like these two lines:

Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
> would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>


> Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
> if there were no interpretant."


My problem is that I am given to understand that Peirce wanted to use the
term 'interpretant' to cover the possibility that a sign might not be
interpreted. So the idea is that even if the sign were not actually being
interpreted at just this moment, it would still have an interpretant. I can
only guess that you got your quotes from Peirce, somewhere, somehow,
although you don't mention specifically where. All I can say is that
sometimes Peirce says things that I find upsetting, and this is one of
those cases. I maintain the view that the interpretant is there, regardless
of whether the sign is interpreted or not. There is no sign that does not
have an interpretant. In the case of a symbol needing to be interpreted, I
would say that so long as a symbol has been interpreted, it does not need
to be interpreted at just this moment in order to have an interpretant. It
is enough that the symbol has already been interpreted and has the real
possibility of being interpreted again.

I find your distinction between elementary and composite signs unfortunate
and undesirable. The nine 'elements', as you identify them, are not signs
in their own right. When we discuss a sign from the point of view of the
determination of a particular trichotomy, it is because it is not important
to consider other aspects of the sign class for the purpose of a given
analysis. If there were 'elementary' signs, it would probably have to be
those signs which other signs require in order to allow them to signify, as
when rhematic icons and rhematic indices are required by a dicentic symbol
(a proposition) in order to signify at all. This might be somewhat
misleading though, since as Stjernfelt points out in Natural Propositions
(p.77-78) with respect to terms, propositions, and arguments, a
'compositional' theory of signs is probably counter to what Peirce had in
mind.

Now as for the confining of the discussion, I disagree. So far as I see it,
the issue of the presentative aspect of the sign is not at issue. Would it
be possible to have a finer grained discussion if we discussed the ten
classes? Certainly. It would also be possible to have an even finer grained
discussion if we discussed the sixty-six classes. But what's the point? I
don't see it. If you think there is a point to discussing the matter in
such detail, then it is up to you to show the relevance of the finer points
introduced by considering the ten classes. If you can do that, I would
certainly be thankful. But I have only so much intellectual effort I can
expend, and I'd rather not waste my time and effort unless a consideration
is given that shows it is not a waste of time.

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, lists,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.

I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word
of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or
'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is
going on there is highly experimental for Peirce. I understand the
sentiment to want to jump in right there (I did that myself some years
ago), but it's not a good place to begin. The primary benefit of those
letters (so it seems to me) is their suggestiveness of ideas. but that's
not very helpful if one doesn't have a more basic understanding in place to
test.

It's sort of like the common layman attempt to talk about abstract
theoretical physics without knowing any of the basic ideas of physics, how
they're defined, and how calculus applies to them. Many people can't help
it, because everyone experiences time and space and such, and so each
person thinks they have a sense of the subject matter and can kind of grasp
what's being said (no matter how abstract the idea and the real need for
understanding the mathematics that goes with it). But really, a layman's
understanding is no understanding, and sometimes directly contradicts the
truth. I would say it is similar with the semiotics discussed in the
letters. We all think about signs and meaning, so we can't help wanting to
understand it all right away; but if one isn't well-prepared, it won't be
very helpful, and may actually prove harmful, for genuine understanding.
Even those early papers I suggested can be challenging (especially "On a
New List of Categories)", but at least they're not so experimental as the
letters to Welby, and they will make clear certain elementary ideas in
Peirce's semiotic, because that is the purpose of those papers.

Well, just a word of caution regarding the letters. If you think you can
handle it, by all means, have at it. But if you start feeling the need for
some rules of navigation to help you out on that open sea, I would just
suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of
them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the
letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now.

-- Franklin



On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Franklin,
> thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how
> many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was
> based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself
> too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on
> this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby
> are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 14. November 2015 um 23:52 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
>
> Helmut,
>
> I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable
> to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected
> Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they
> stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going
> around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for
> under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very
> unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't
> portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The
> commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary
> literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.
>
> If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there
> are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that
> if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a
> link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself
> usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance
> to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of
> Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is
> important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain
> Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"
> would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be
> thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are
> invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that
> Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.
>
> Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number
> of things to say.
>
> When you say "The first is the meaning of the sig

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

 real existential relation, or genuine
Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real
object.' (*Syllabus*, 1903, EPII, 276; 2.310)

This leads Peirce to the surprising conclusion that--since the object of
the interpretant is the same as that of the sign itself--this existential
relation between Dicisign and object forms, *in itself*, part of the object
of the Dicisign. Consequently, the Dicisign has *two* objects; one,
primary, is the object referred to--another, secondary, is the very
reference relation claimed to exist between the Dicisign and that object:

   'Hence this same existential relation [between Sign and Object] must be
an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real Object. This
represented existential relation, in being an Object of the Dicisign, makes
that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an Object of
the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the *Primary
Object*, the other being termed the *Secondary Object*.' (*Syllabus*, 1903,
EPII 276; 2.310)

What is here called Primary/Secondary object is what is later developed
into the doctrine of Dynamic/Immediate Object, cf. below. Correspondingly,
the predicate part describes some character of the Primary Object--at the
same time as it depicts the indexical relation which the Dicisign claims to
hold between itself and its object. This is, in short, the truth claim of
the proposition--which can be analyzed as the Dicisign saying there exists
indeed an indexical relation between itself and its object. This is why the
Dicisign, in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one
referring to the object, and the other--the predicate--referring to the
relation between the sign itself and the object."

So perhaps, Helmut, you might be looking for the concept of the Immediate
Object, which, in being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the
Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the
Immediate Object is internal to the sign.

I hope this helps.

-- Franklin

---



On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Franklin,
> I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens
> dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more
> before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by
> this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign
> belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized,
> objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like
> self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a
> proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took
> "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the
> talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a
> special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have
> read much more by Peirce.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 14. November 2015 um 04:10 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly
> rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical
> object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is
> not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated
> from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from
> itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is
> independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to
> be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that
> you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know
> much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover,
> I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing
> Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted
> you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting
> with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for
> discussing these ideas.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> -
>
> On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Franklin, Gary, list,
>> I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object
>> concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what
>> kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there
>> is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, ex

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

ation of the sign, the dynamical object is the
> sign-class this sign belongs to, and the immediate object is the sign
> itself. So the sign is self-referring in the way, that it is its own
> immediate object. It has to say: "I am an argument", to be understood as
> such. It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or
> "therefore". So an argument contains a term. This is quite trivial,  I have
> only mentioned it, as I was thinking of in what manner might an argument
> imply a proposition and a term. In the other thread it was about the
> question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell
> eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without
> a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this
> consideration is a deduction. Phew- as I said, I donot want to cause a
> confusion- but I cant help to do, sorry.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  14. November 2015 um 19:13 Uhr
> "Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking
> it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to
> gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it
> original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both?
>
> I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though
> reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your
> interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with
> in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into
> Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture
> over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of
> interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to
> read a lot more before participating.
>
> I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1,
> "Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a
> proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself,
> this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this,
> if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that
> matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the
> thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a
> sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a
> triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly
> represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from
> the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that
> there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of
> representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it
> represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents
> its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object
> itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would
> be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all
> then, but simply the thing itself.
>
> But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements",
> p.321, Peirce writes:
>
> "It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at
> least in the only sense in which a thing that has no *real being* but
> only *being represented*, and which exists in *replica*, can be said to
> be identical with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a
> map of itself; that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped.
> But this does not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example
> of a symbol of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is
> expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol
> whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol
> considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes;
> and in denoting it, it *is* that very thing, or a fragment of it taken
> for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the
> purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its
> whole."
>
> Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced
> than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is
> saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the
> symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this
> case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's
> as if we took t

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,

I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that
any reply is made to what I have to say.

After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments.
I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much
about this subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with
the subject matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here.

One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object
is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is
identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong
to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose
the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it
is a little confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we
are talking about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call
it) is shown as part of the third triad, then it does not seem like we can
have a rheme and a dicent in the other two triads, since neither of those
include the I-relation. So some explanation is required to make sense of
these bracketed identifications.

A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the
second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment. There is the percept and then there is the perceptual judgment
which judges the percept. If we look to "Telepathy" from the seventh volume
of the CP (I googled and got a pdf from commens.org that collects the
statements about percipuum), we find such statements as the following:

"Perhaps I might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both
percept and perceptual judgment." (7.629)

"...I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately interpreted in
the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 'percipuum.'" (7.643)

It's not clear that the percipuum acts as medium between percept and
perceptual judgment, or exactly how the percipuum could be understood as a
medium. In the diagram, it is asserted to be a sinsign, but does this
really make sense? The percipuum, in its Secondness, serves as medium
between the percept and the perceptual judgment? I don't find this
intuitive. I'm not saying that I necessarily have a better idea of how to
think of percept and perceptual judgment. But it is true that in EP2,
"Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction," Peirce compares the perceptual
judgment to an abductive inference, so that the perceptual judgment would
be considered the interpretant of an argument sign, and thus of a legisign,
not sinsign.

A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation. I could be wrong here, but
I thought I should mention it.

In general, I'm not sure the diagrams are a fair depiction of the idea in
question. I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes
are incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
But I'm not convinced that the diagrams really show how this might work. I
don't think rhemes typically deal with the immediate object and immediate
interpretant while a dicent typically deals with the dynamic object and
dynamic interpretant, and so on. Rather each one will have to account for
each of the ten trichotomies. I guess that the idea in, for instance,
making a rheme nest in a dicent that way, is to suggest that the dynamic
object and/or the dynamic interpretant fulfill the role of filling in the
blanks (or new bonding sites), while when a proposition or group of
propositions is nested into an argument, the (new?) dynamic object and/or
the final interpretant fulfills that role of filling in or new bonding. It
seems to me that this is probably wrong. But, if something else was meant
to be shown, it would be helpful if some further explanation were offered.
Otherwise, I'm missing it.

Having said all this, I still very much approve of the original idea. It is
simply its explication through the proposed diagrams that I find
problematic.

-- Franklin

-----



On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Jeff, Gary F, Ben,
>
> I like Jeff's suggestion very much. It seems to me a a more develop

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff,

Again, just to note in case you didn't see my other post, I thought it
better to move discussion to a more appropriately titled thread, in case
you are interested in responding.

On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> List,
>
> I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate
> thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction"
> anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms,
> Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a
> description of any further discussion of our issues.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> -----
>
> On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom <
> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I
>> think I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am
>> in part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about
>> the informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and
>> because in KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions
>> information and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to
>> terms, and not propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further
>> in KS how these ideas apply to propositions specifically.
>>
>> -- Franklin
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>>>
>>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions
>>> and not signs?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
>>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
>>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the
>>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311),
>>> and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the
>>> proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e.
>>> predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term
>>> which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and
>>> depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the
>>> proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can
>>> *be* a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a
>>> proposition), but it can’t *have* a predicate.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
>>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
>>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
>>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
>>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
>>> Bateson] {
>>>
>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary F, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
>>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
>>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
>>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
>>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
>>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
>>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
>>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
>>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
>>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
>>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to
>>> which it is applied" and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry,

I am referencing the diagrams that Jeff attached to his last post, under
the subject thread "Vol. 2 of CP, On Induction" and never meant to be
saying anything theoretical about diagrams in general..

-- Franklin



On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com
> wrote:

> Franklin:
>
>
>
> On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are
> incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
> arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
> by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
> in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
>
>
> The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to.
>
> See:
>
>- Greaves, M., 2002, *The Philosophical Status of Diagrams*, Stanford:
>CSLI Publications.
>
>
> This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider
> a logical framework.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

List,

I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate
thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction"
anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms,
Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a
description of any further discussion of our issues.

-- Franklin

-

On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Gary F, list,
>
> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I think
> I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am in
> part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about the
> informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and because in
> KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions information
> and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to terms, and not
> propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further in KS how these
> ideas apply to propositions specifically.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>>
>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
>> not signs?
>>
>>
>>
>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
>> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
>> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
>> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
>> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
>> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
>> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
>> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
>> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have*
>> a predicate.
>>
>>
>>
>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
>> Bateson] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
>> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
>> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
>> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>>
>>
>>
>> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
>> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
>> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
>> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
>> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
>> part of the obj

[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

ol to have whatever interpretant the
judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol
to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same
way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in
communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the
interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a
term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it
expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does.

--Franklin

---


On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>
> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
> not signs?
>
>
>
> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have* a
> predicate.
>
>
>
> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>
>
>
> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>
>
>
> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
> language) would be the very Universe."
>
>
>
> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
> same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
> have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
> in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting object

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F, list,

I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I think
I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am in
part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about the
informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and because in
KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions information
and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to terms, and not
propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further in KS how these
ideas apply to propositions specifically.

-- Franklin

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>
> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
> not signs?
>
>
>
> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have* a
> predicate.
>
>
>
> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>
>
>
> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>
>
>
> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
> language) would be the very Universe."
>
>
>
> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
> same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
> have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
> in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying
> characters. Since

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

it
> permits its accuracy to be tested, and its other implications to be deduced.
> The commutative verb conceals any difference between Harry's logic and
> that of Peter -- as though no relevant difference could exist between two
> people.
>
> (I offer empirical evidence against the commutative verb: Long ago in high
> school, a fellow named Jack decided to fight me.  He threw two punches,
> while I threw none.  Instead, I talked to him (in a persuasive manner).
> Jack fought Tom, but Tom did not fight Jack.)
>
> Now, if both Peter and Harry are fighting, when the observer uses 'fought'
> after one name instead of the other ("Harry fought Peter"), that phrasing
> may indicate (or hint) to a listener that Harry initiated the fight.  It
> may also reflect an affiliation between Harry and the observer, the
> outcome of the fight, or the observer's belief about the loyalties of the
> listener.
>
> If the battle is mutually engaged in by Harry and Peter, and if the
> observer is informed and impartial, then neither "Harry fought Peter" nor
> "Peter fought Harry" would be incorrect, but neither would provide a
> faithful, unambiguous account of the 'transaction' between Harry and Peter.
>  "Harry and Peter fought each other" is a neutral description.
>
> A recent comment by Jerry about the evolution of Peirce's thinking is
> pertinent to this discussion.  As Jerry noted, early in Peirce's career,
> the will (logic) of the chemist dominated each compounding 'transaction'
> that occurred in lab: "I add two parts of hydrogen to two parts of oxygen
> to make water."  The only Pragmatic logic was that of the (purposeful)
> chemist, while atoms were perceived and manipulated within a semiotic
> context:  A+2B = 2B+A = C.
>
> Later, as Jerry noted, the new analysis and notation meant that each atom was
> modeled as obeying its own logic. Then, chemical reactions were described
> as optimizing (Pragmatic) responses by the various atoms to a change in
> their environments.  The logic of the principal actors -- atoms -- became
> paramount; the logic of the chemist-observer moved to the sidelines.  "In
> close proximity their valence electrons synchronize, causing one hydrogen
> atom to combine with two oxygen atoms, and they become water."
>
> If "Harry fought Peter," then only Harry is known (from the statement) to
> behave purposely.  Peter is present, but not animated by any known logic.
> That is the old, non-Pragmatic chemistry.
>
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 7:46 PM, Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Ben, Jerry,
>
> In general, I ditto Ben's interleaved remarks from his post. In
> particular, I will note a couple of differences:
>
> Jerry wrote:
>
> Consider the sentence:
>> Harry fought Peter and contrast it with it's "twin", Peter fought Harry.
>> Does it have the same logical meaning as the first sentence?
>>
>
> Ben replied:
>
> BU: It has a different meaning. I'm not sure what you mean by "logical
>> meaning." The word "fought" has the same meaning in both sentences. Taken _
>> *separately*_, each sentences has the logical form 'c fought d.' Maybe
>> that is what you mean by "same logical meaning." But if they're taken
>> together, (for example as in "Harry fought Peter or Peter fought Harry")
>> then one letter needs to be assigned to Peter in both sentences and the
>> other letter needs to be assigned to Harry in both sentences.
>
>
> I would consider "_ fought _" to be commutative, and there is no change in
> logical meaning, so long as the subjects are the same; in this case, Peter
> and Harry. With respect to "Cain kills Abel", this would not be
> commutative. It depends upon the predicate. It should be kept in mind
> though that logical meaning with ideas like commutative and associative and
> such typically refer to syncategorematic terms like logical addition,
> logical multiplication, etc. as we see Peirce describe in his improvement
> on Boole's Calculus of Logic, or in logical operators like conjunction and
> disjunction in modern symbolic logic.
>
> Another exchange:
>
> [JC] More broadly, one can ask the question, what is the role of the
>> concept of ORDER in grammar in contrast with its roles in logics and
>> mathematics.
>> BU: I don't know.
>
>
> I would say, one can ask the question, but in order to answer it, one
> would have to define one's concept of order. If by order in grammar, you
> mean syntax, that is pretty clear. And if you said the same for logic, that
> is pretty clear.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Ben, Jerry,

In general, I ditto Ben's interleaved remarks from his post. In particular,
I will note a couple of differences:

Jerry wrote:

Consider the sentence:
> Harry fought Peter and contrast it with it's "twin", Peter fought Harry.
> Does it have the same logical meaning as the first sentence?
>

Ben replied:

BU: It has a different meaning. I'm not sure what you mean by "logical
> meaning." The word "fought" has the same meaning in both sentences. Taken _
> *separately*_, each sentences has the logical form 'c fought d.' Maybe
> that is what you mean by "same logical meaning." But if they're taken
> together, (for example as in "Harry fought Peter or Peter fought Harry")
> then one letter needs to be assigned to Peter in both sentences and the
> other letter needs to be assigned to Harry in both sentences.


I would consider "_ fought _" to be commutative, and there is no change in
logical meaning, so long as the subjects are the same; in this case, Peter
and Harry. With respect to "Cain kills Abel", this would not be
commutative. It depends upon the predicate. It should be kept in mind
though that logical meaning with ideas like commutative and associative and
such typically refer to syncategorematic terms like logical addition,
logical multiplication, etc. as we see Peirce describe in his improvement
on Boole's Calculus of Logic, or in logical operators like conjunction and
disjunction in modern symbolic logic.

Another exchange:

[JC] More broadly, one can ask the question, what is the role of the
> concept of ORDER in grammar in contrast with its roles in logics and
> mathematics.
> BU: I don't know.


I would say, one can ask the question, but in order to answer it, one would
have to define one's concept of order. If by order in grammar, you mean
syntax, that is pretty clear. And if you said the same for logic, that is
pretty clear. And likewise for mathematics. If we're talking about syntax.
But in mathematics, at least, order could probably be considered as
something other than syntax; there's a lot going on in mathematics. In
logic, at least, I know Josiah Royce defined logic as the science of order,
and I'm sure one could say a lot about that. Anyhoo, what's the point of
all this, Jerry? It's a vague statement you are making.

Jerry wrote:

Also, compare this usage with CSP's description of the mapping of an icon
> to a rhema in which it compares the generative relation of this map to
> chemical radicals!


Where is this description in CSP's texts?

Jerry wrote:

In my view, a clear and distinct meaning for the relationships among
> relatives necessarily requires a clear and distinct cognitive stance with
> respect to the identity of the term. [ergo, a "family tree" of meanings of
> terms]
> In this regard, contrast with 3.420-421 wrt relative rhema. (see The
> Existential Graphs of CSP, D. Roberts, p.21-25 for discussions).


I'm not sure what you mean by "the identity of the term", nor do I follow
your "ergo." I read 3.420-421, but I don't understand what I'm supposed to
contrast it with. I don't happen to have a copy of Roberts's book, so
you'll have to help me out here.

I can summarize this line of thought by a general proposition for the logic
> of terms as units of meaning as in the "Quali-sign-Sin-sign-legi-sign,
> icon-index-symbol, rheme, dicisign, argument" format for logic by CSP, but
> now expressed in mereological terms of parts of the whole:
> "The union of the units unifies the unity."   [ergo, a fight, ergo,
> beta-graphs.]
> In a metaphysical LOGIC:
> "The union of the units unifies the unity of the universe."  [ergo,
> existence]


Jerry, I'm afraid this is all quite over my head. I almost feel as though
I'm reading something straight out of Hegel at his most abstruse, and that
is saying a lot.

Now, setting aside the general confusion I feel from having read your post,
it seems to me that you are all along trying to get at the issue of the
meaning of terms. I don't understand at all why you felt the need to go to
grammar, especially since you don't appear to mean speculative grammar. Or
at least, when you reference grammatical nouns, it seems clear. I am
somewhat wondering whether you waffle back and forth between the grammar of
a natural language and speculative grammar. The discussion of logical
quantities, in particular with respect to the meaning of terms, is, I
think, a way of getting at the logic of terms. I'm not sure, but my guess
is that you want to contrast the idea of a term as a unit of measure (or
meaning?) with the idea that terms have logical quantity, or what? Some
clarification would be helpful.

Btw, at least according to Whately in his Elements of Logic, the
Introduction (edition I am reading is from 1853, available through Google
books), it was Antisthenes who introduced simple terms, along with
propositions and arguments, and the Stoics picked up the distinction from
him between simple terms, propositions, and arguments. I would not be
surprised to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F, list,

I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.

In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it
is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is
true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
explained in KS. Did he change his views here?

Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a sign,
A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that
is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a part
of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe."

Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying
characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it
seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign
whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there
would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about
the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every
sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters.

How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to
propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs?

Franklin

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 1:48 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Franklin,
>
>
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way. But to me it sounds like a precursor
> of his (much later) observation that one can analyze a proposition by
> “throwing everything” into the predicate *or* by throwing everything into
> the subject. Maybe his comment in the Regenerated Logic also works in both
> directions.
>
>
>
> In the Kaina Stoicheia passage, when Peirce says that the “totality of
> the predicates of a sign” is “called its logical *depth*,” and that the
> “totality of the subjects … of a sign is called the logical *breadth,*”
> the sign he is referring to has to be a proposition, because only
> propositions include subjects and predicates. Each subject and each
> predicate can be called a “term,” but it’s the breadth and depth of the
> whole sign, the proposition, that Peirce is defining here, not the breadth
> or depth of the terms (which is what he defined in ULCE). And, as you say,
> propositions and arguments also have information (which for Peirce is the
> logical product of breadth and depth).
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The birth and death of the leaves are the rapid whirls of the eddy whose
> wider circles move slowly among the stars. [Tagore] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 12:32
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> Gary, thank you, thank you so much for finding that quote about the
> information of propositions and arguments! I spent so many hours, and not
> just yesterday, trying to find that q

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Ben, Gary F,

I like Gary's suggestion about "throwing everything" into the predicate or
into the subject. However, not quite everything gets thrown in, right?
There still needs to be some bare minimum subject if everything gets thrown
into the predicate, and some bare minimum predicate if everything gets
thrown into the subject. I'm not sure this works.

Ben, I thought to myself of that possibility, namely of erasing the subject
and letting the rhema or term remain. But I don't see how propositions and
arguments can really be like terms in this sense, since propositions
certainly require subjects and arguments do because they require premisses
in the form of propositions.

But, I was looking through Natural Propositions to make sure I understood
the "throwing everything in" idea, and I found a quote from Peirce that
Frederik included in his text that seems pertinent. NP, p.84, quoted from
"Pragmatism", 1907, 5.473:

The interpretant of a proposition is its predicate; its object is the
> things denoted by its subject or subjects (including its grammatical
> objects, direct and indirect, etc.).


So this says that the subject-term represents the object of the
proposition, while the predicate-term represents the interpretant of the
proposition. We should probably imagine that interpretants don't all come
down to being cases of predicate-terms. But if we consider that the
conclusion of an argument is the argument's interpretant, and comes in the
form of a proposition, and that such proposition itself can be interpreted
by way of its predicate, then propositions and arguments can ultimately be
interpreted as predicate terms. A term, in this way, as an interpretant,
signifies all the characters of the propositions and arguments leading to
it, while denoting, by way of its determination from such determining
signs, the object(s) of the determining signs. What do you think?

Franklin



On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Gary F., Franklin,
>
> Gary, you wrote,
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way.
> [End quote]
>
> In "Kaina Stoicheia" III. 4. (EP 2:308), 1904,
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm
> Peirce says:
>
> [] If we erase from an argument every monstration of its special
> purpose, it becomes a proposition; usually a copulate proposition, composed
> of several members whose mode of conjunction is of the kind expressed by
> "and," which the grammarians call a "copulative conjunction." If from a
> propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately
> denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a *rhema*; but I
> shall take the liberty of calling it a *term*. Thus, from the proposition
> "Every man is mortal," we erase "Every man," which is shown to be
> denotative of an object by the circumstance that if it be replaced by an
> indexical symbol, such as "That" or "Socrates," the symbol is reconverted
> into a proposition, we get the *rhema* or *term* "_ is mortal." []
> [End quote]
>
> Somewhere Peirce also notes that a proposition is a medadic term.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 11/8/2015 1:48 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> Franklin,
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way. But to me it sounds like a precursor
> of his (much later) observation that one can analyze a proposition by
> “throwing everything” into the predicate *or* by throwing everything into
> the subject. Maybe his comment in the Regenerated Logic also works in both
> directions.
>
> In the Kaina Stoicheia passage, when Peirce says that the “totality of the
> predicates of a sign” is “called its logical *depth*,” and that the
> “totality of the subjects … of a sign is called the logical *breadth,*”
> the sign he is referring to has to be a proposition, because only
> propositions include subjects and predicates. Each subject and each
> predicate can be called a “term,” but it’s the breadth and depth of the
> whole sign, the proposition, that Peirce is defining here, not the breadth
> or depth of the terms (which is what he defined in ULCE). And, as you say,
> propositions and arguments also have information (which for Peirce is the
> logical product of breadth and depth).
>
> Gary f.
>
> } The birth and death of the leaves are the rapid whirls of the eddy whose
> wider circles move slowly among the stars. [Tagore] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs*
> gateway
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Ben, list,

You wrote:

If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the whole, what sort of
> actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole?


Yes, that is a good point. He must have changed his views, but I'm not sure
exactly how. I just re-read the paragraph in Kaina Stoicheia where he
introduces depth, breadth, and information, but there is not much there,
and certainly nothing about how they relate to inference. He clearly still
has the basic ideas there so many decades later, but how to apply them in
light of changes to his views in semiotics?

If all mental action has the form of inference, then they all must be
> related to inferences in some way.


Yes, exactly my thought.

Franklin

On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Franklin, list,
>
> Thanks for pointing out those subsequent passages and unraveling them for
> us. It's been a while since I read "Upon Logical Comprehension and
> Extension" from beginning to end.
>
> When Peirce previously in the same paper defined induction as increasing
> the breadth without changing the depth, the idea seem to be that of
> extending the character to a larger population which is asserted to exist,
> i.e., induction's conclusion asserts an actual increase of breadth without
> asserting a change of depth. But he comes to say of induction:
>
> [] On the other hand, P is not yet found to apply to anything but S',
> S'', S''', and Siv, but only to apply to whatever else may hereafter be
> found to be contained under M. The induction itself does not make known any
> such thing. []
> [End quote]
>
> It is true that the induction does not _*make known*_ the truth of its
> conclusion's claims, but in this picture the induction does not even _
> *assert*_ the existence of a larger, encompassing population, but instead
> leaves it conditional and hypothetical, so the breadth increase is
> potential, not assertedly actual. Moreover the conclusion isn't usually
> framed like "whatever else may hereafter," it just says "Any M is P" and
> this doesn't even entail that there are S's found to be M & P. This is a
> question of what is the fairest way to frame an inference. You make a good
> point about Peirce not bringing iconicity and indexicality much into the
> account in that paper. If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the
> whole, what sort of actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole?
> You wrote,
>
> It is a bit unclear to me why some of the changes in information didn't
> seem to correspond to one of the three inferences []
> [End quote]
>
> I had that thought recently too. I once tried to make a table of all the
> changes in information and I found that the potential size of the table was
> rather larger than I expected. If all mental action has the form of
> inference, then they all must be related to inferences in some way.
>
> Best, Ben
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry, list,

Well, this turned out longer than I anticipated.

You wrote:

BTW, this is just another example of CSP's usage of his chemical knowledge
> to ground his logical explorations.


Yes, I was surprised some such reference to chemistry and its importance in
influencing Peirce's work wasn't in your first post; I suppose you were
winding up for the pitch. There is a very decidedly chemistry-centric
direction that your posts take here on Peirce-L. I think it's important to
notice that I'm not a chemistry whiz, but that I will do my best to keep
up. For what it's worth, I would like to point out that I see no reason to
deny your claims about the important influence of developments in chemistry
on Peirce's work in logic. I just don't always see the relevance in a given
discourse.

What is the information content of a symbol (as a diagram, icon, index or
> any term) if the change of the sign does not indicate a change in
> information?
>


> Recent extension of the discussion point out that both "breadth" and
> "depth" can be viewed as changes in the distinctiveness of the sign (or
> information content.)


This question needs some clarification before it can be answered. When you
say "What is the information content of a symbol (as a diagram, icon,
index, or any term)," it is unclear whether you mean for diagrams, icons,
indices, and any term to be understood as a symbol. Strictly speaking,
icons and indices cannot be symbols, a diagram is a type of icon, and
terms, well, that depends on how one means term; in particular, it matters
if one envisions dicisigns as involving terms (rhemes?), or whether one
restricts terms to propositions proper, and then specifically the predicate
term. My guess is that you understand all of this, but your wording was
vague, and I wanted to be clear that we are specifically talking about
symbols. If you want to include diagrams, icons, indices, and any term,
then it is important to note that icons only serve content for information;
indices also serve content for information, and some types of indices also
convey information--i.e., dicent indices. But they do not possess
information in the sense that a symbol does. Information is the ongoing
relating of informed breadth and informed depth relative to one another,
which is possible only in a symbol.

I would also like to point out that "Upon Logical Comprehension and
Extension" (ULCE) only deals with terms, not propositions or arguments. I
seem to recall that in his later years Peirce had specified what
information would be like for propositions and arguments, but after looking
around a bit, I can't find a text to cite and I don't exactly recall how it
worked, only that it didn't work the same way for them as for terms. (At
least in the case of propositions, I think it had to do with the possible
cases in which a given proposition was applied or true, or followed
validly, or some such thing.)

So if we talk about the information content of a symbol, we must limit
ourselves to terms. Moreover, it's not clear that the term in some sense
contains anything, but rather the term's information relates to the
synthetic propositions, or facts, in which it participates as either
subject or predicate. So the information of a term-symbol is something that
the term has relative to other terms given in synthetic propositions that
collectively inform what Peirce referred to as the state of information.
This idea of the state of information is important to keep in mind.
Consider how in ULEC Peirce treats of the idea of distinctness (in a
footnote following the quote he references the introduction of the idea of
distinctness to the work of Scotus):

If *T* be a term which is predicable only of *S'*, *S''*, and *S'''*, then
> the *S'*'s, the *S''*'s, and the *S'''*'s will constitute the informed
> breadth of *T.* If at the same time, *S'* and *S''* are the subjects of
> which alone another term *T'* can be predicated, and if it is not known
> that all *S'''*'s are either *S'* or *S''*, then *T *is said to have a
> greater informed breadth than *T'*. If the *S'''*'s are known not to be
> all among the *S'*'s and *S''*'s, this excess of breadth may be termed
> *certain,* and, if this is not known, it may be termed *doubtful.* If
> there are known to be *S'''*'s, not known to be *S'*'s or *S''*'s, *T* is
> said to have a greater *actual* breadth than *T'*;but if no *S'''*'s are
> known except such are known to be *S'*'s, and *S''*'s (though there may
> be others), *T* is said to have a greater *potential* breadth than *T'*.
> If *T* and *T'* are conceptions in different minds, or in different
> states of the same mind, and it is known to the mind which conceives *T* that
> every *S'''* is either *S''* or *S'*, then *T* is said to be more *extensively
> distinct* than *T'.*
>

And then

The depth, like the breadth, may be certain or doubtful, actual or
> potential, and there is a comprehensive distinctness corresponding to
> extensive 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry, list,

Yes, that is true, a change in meaning is not necessarily a change in the
state of information. Peirce is clear about that in "Upon Logical
Comprehension and Extension". One can find at least a couple of cases of
this mentioned in the sixth section or 'paragraph', in particular his
definitions of generalization and descent.

You wrote:

Is this sentence an example speculative rhetoric or speculative grammar?


By example, I take it that you mean, is this a proposition or claim (or
observation) in the study of speculative rhetoric, or in speculative
grammar? Actually, I believe this would belong to neither, but instead
belong to the second branch of semiotic logic, i.e. logical critic, the
branch that focuses on inference and its classifications. Speculative
grammar, of course, plays a role: Peirce uses his newly-defined concepts
from "On a New List" to understand information, in particular the concept
of interpretant. But the outcome of the paper on information is an
explanation of the three kinds of inference as represented by their role in
changing information. Notice that in the paper, Peirce references his
syllogistic approach to understanding induction and hypothesis in order to
help make sense of the changes of information brought about by induction
and hypothesis. But syllogistic is properly part of logical critic, not
speculative grammar. With respect to speculative rhetoric, nothing is
discussed in regard to questions of scientific method or of communication
and semiotic community generally, though one would expect an understanding
of information and the variety of changes it can undergo to prove of aid in
the issues that speculative rhetoric treats of.

You could argue that information theory belongs in speculative grammar
after all, and I can see that. But my instinct is that discussing changes
of anything isn't really the purview of speculative grammar. Grammar
classifies signs, but it does not discuss their changing relations with
each other--that's what inference and method do, and studies of inference
and method properly belong to critic and methodeutic, respectively. Again,
grammar contributes the needed classifications to understand
what-contributes-what to information, but it shouldn't have to do with
discussing changes in information.

Franklin

On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 10:18 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> On Nov 1, 2015, at 11:43 PM, Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> In any case, change in distinctness is not change in information.
>
>
> This assertion appears problematic.
>
> In particular, it appears to suggest that a change in meaning is not a
> change in information.
>
> Is this sentence an example speculative rhetoric or speculative grammar?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Ben, list,

Well thank you so much for the diligent researching!

That is really something, about the eight forms of induction. Although,
from what he said, it sounds like there are eight other forms of induction,
so there would total nine or maybe ten forms, depending on how one reads
what he said there. I suppose he had written about them elsewhere, but for
the time being there is likely nothing published beyond the memoir, and I
don't have access to the mss.; nor would I relish trying to swim in that
ocean to find the drop or two I'm looking for. Hopefully as the Writings
continue to be published, something will come out that addresses the nine
or ten forms of induction.

It's at least helpful to know that these other eight forms are supposed to
be of lower forms, and my guess is that qualitative and quantitative are
the two he referred to as the first two. Perhaps crude induction is
supposed to represent the other eight forms in some general way. Then
again, in 1883, I don't think he had changed his idea of abduction, so
perhaps crude and quantitative induction are the two he meant, and
qualitative somehow addresses the other eight. Well, it's all nothing but
wild speculation on my part until something gets published about it.

As for the paragraphs 232 and 233, I think you're right that it refers to
the last clause, but then I don't understand why it's qualitative
induction, and not simply induction. Even accepting your point about
including evidential values, that doesn't explain why it should normally be
restricted to qualitative induction in the first place. Perhaps I just need
to revise my understanding of Peirce's view of scientific method, and
accept that it typically involves qualitative induction, and not
quantitative induction or crude induction.

As for abduction, you make some interesting points. Perhaps I have
attempted to too rigidly understand the tripartite classification of
semiotic logic into stechiology, critic, and methodeutic. My understanding
up to this point had been that critic would, well, critique inferences
and/or arguments from a formal perspective. I also believed that this meant
the analysis of changes in logical quantity belongs to critic, since in his
1867 paper on information, inferences play the role of representing changes
in the state of information, and the various ways of changing the state of
information offers a somewhat finer-grained approach to classifying
inferences/arguments. Thus I would expect that abduction would still play
some role in understanding changes in the state of information, because it
is an inference. Maybe this is wrong headed, I'm not sure, and I should
consider such changes to be restricted to induction and deduction now.
Actually, since deduction doesn't technically change the state of
information, perhaps it should really only be restricted to understanding
forms of induction.

On the other hand, you wrote:

If you mean Peirce's theory of information (comprehension × extension),
> Peirce said in 1902 that he had previously made the syllogistic forms and
> the doctrine of comprehension and extension more fundamental than they
> really are for understanding abductive inference.


I notice that although they were made more fundamental than they really
are, that doesn't imply that they don't play a role in understanding
abductive inference at all. Even the importance of the syllogistic forms is
still upheld by Peirce into his last years, and the logical quantities are
discussed (though in a short way) in Kaina Stocheia, so both syllogistic
forms and logical quantities possibly still have some significance for the
understanding of abduction. As far as logical quantity goes, I simply have
no idea how.

Franklin

On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Franklin, list, on your other questions,
>
> You wrote,
>
> [CP 8.]232. Or, what is usually the best way, he may turn to the
> consideration of the hypothesis, study it thoroughly and deduce
> miscellaneous observable consequences, and then return to the phenomena to
> find how nearly these consequences agree with the actual facts.
>
> [CP 8.]233. This is not essentially different from induction. Only it is
> most usually an induction from instances which are not discrete and
> numerable. I now call it Qualitative Induction. It is this which I used to
> confound with the second line of procedure, or at least not to distinguish
> it sharply.
>
> []
>
> [Franklin] So my difficulty is with paragraph 233. When he says "[t]his is
> not essentially different from induction," I'm not sure what 'this' he
> means.I would think that it refers to the subject of paragraph 232, but
> paragraph 232 looks to me as though it simply describes ideal scientific
> method--abduce a hypothesis, deduce its consequences, and then induce the
> consequents and compare whether the consequents induced conform to the
> consequents expected to follow from the antecedents. []
> [End 

[PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Hello list,

I just finished Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers, and had a couple of
questions, if anyone is interested in helping out.

Going through the material on induction towards the end of the volume, much
of it seemed to be from Peirce's earlier work on induction, where
hypothesis or presumption (or abduction) is conceived of as an inference
having to do with inferring that a character or set of characters apply to
an object or set of objects. However, the editors included a piece from
1905 that treats of crude, qualitative, and quantitative induction. My
understanding is that Peirce came to believe in his later years that what
he had originally identified as hypothesis is actually qualitative
induction, and hypothesis or abduction is something else. But in the
selected piece from 1905, Peirce is not clarifying that point and instead
has some other remarks about qualitative induction. I am wondering whether
Peirce was consistent about maintaining in his later work that the earlier
view of abduction really should be considered qualitative induction, or if
Peirce's views about this topic are more complicated. It strikes me as odd
that the editors might have purposely misled readers about this point
concerning hypothesis and qualitative induction, but I have difficulty
seeing it otherwise. Perhaps this point is clarified in later volumes of
the CP?

My second question is that I recall hearing at some point that Peirce
identified nine different kinds of induction, but I don't recall seeing
anything by Peirce about this. I was hoping I would find something in the
CP, but I'm not so sure I will find it now. Does anyone know anything about
this, and where I might look for it? I'm not sure if I've asked about this
before; please forgive me for not remembering if I have.

-- Franklin

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1

[Franklin Ransom]

Jon,

Do you mean to pursue this in further posts, or is this simply a one-time
post meant to attract notice to previous work?

-- Franklin

On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 10:00 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Post : Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1

 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/05/17/survey-of-semiotic-theory-of-information-%e2%80%a2-1/

 Peircers,

 This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on
 the Semiotic Theory Of Information.  All my projects
 are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry
 is more open-ended than most.  The question is:

 • What is information and how does it impact the spectrum of activities
 that answer to the name of inquiry?

 Setting out on what would become his lifelong quest to explore and explain
 the “Logic of Science”, C.S. Peirce pierced the veil of historical
 confusions
 enclosing the issue and fixed on what he called the “laws of information”
 as
 the needed key to solving the puzzle.  This was in 1865 and 1866, detailed
 in his lectures at Harvard College and the Lowell Institute.

 Fast forward to the present and I see the Big Question as follows. Having
 gone
 through the exercise of comparing and contrasting Peirce's theory of
 information,
 however much it remains in a rough-hewn state, with Shannon's paradigm
 that so
 pervasively informs the ongoing revolution in our understanding and use of
 information today, I have reason to believe that Peirce's idea is root and
 branch more general and has the potential, with due development, to resolve
 many mysteries that still bedevil our grasp of inference, information, and
 inquiry.

 C.S. Peirce on the Laws of Information and the Logic of Science
 ===

 • Information = Comprehension × Extension
 (
 http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension
 )

 Excursions
 ==

 • Semiotic Information
 ( http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information )

 • Peirce's Logic Of Information
 (
 http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce%27s_Logic_Of_Information
 )

 Reference
 =

 • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”
 ( http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm )

 Regards,

 Jon

 --

 academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8574] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, lists,


That is a general explanation attempt of why humans are capable of
 abduction - that does not say anything about particular cases such as
 Wegener's.


Hmm. I'm not sure what you could be looking for here. In general, any
semiotic being capable of abduction must have a natural instinct. In
particular, any given abduction will be the result of that natural instinct
meeting with the observation of given phenomena. On the other hand, if you
mean it seems that with this idea we can't really get into a detailed
analysis of just how this hypothesis was achieved and none of the others, I
too share some such frustration, and would try to offer a more robust
account than Peirce offered.

You are right that discoveries are often seen or suspected prior to
 demonstration - but it is too little to say demonstrations are only for
 communication and persuasion purposes.


Yes, you are right, it is too little to say. Certainly it helps to check
one's work to be really convinced of the idea, and make sure it doesn't
turn out somehow self-contradictory or incoherent. But I stand by the
contention that the method of discovery of the idea is typically separate
from its demonstration in the context of mathematical research.

Certainly - and that is where P argues that theorematic deduction is called
 for -



Yes, I know, though of course I am saying instead that this is when
abduction is called for. Theorematic reasoning should describe the whole
process, both abductive and deductive, in my opinion. But I think that this
is as far as we will get in discussion about it. I'll just have to agree to
disagree with Charles on this one.

-- Franklin


On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 3:55 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
wrote:

  Dear Franklin, lists -


   It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal
 structure af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a
 matter of necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain
 B) does not explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other
 propositions with the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on
 abduction)


  Though Peirce did address this issue in terms of Galileo's il lume
 naturale, with the qualification that it has to do with a natural instinct.
 I have my own ideas about why we can happen upon the right hypotheses, but
 this is not the thread for such a discussion.


  That is a general explanation attempt of why humans are capable of
 abduction - that does not say anything about particular cases such as
 Wegener's.


  And this is where the trial-and-error phase of theorematic reasoning
 differs from ordinary abduction. The latter is standardly seen as a step in
 empirical research, from data to hypothesis. But all P's examples of
 theorematic reasoning are non-empirical, there is no data, for the whole
 problem considered is purely formal (like when selecting the right
 auxiliary lines in the triangle proof). That is a trial-and-error thing
 without procedural necessity - you may have to experiment with different
 lines until you find the right ones permitting you to conduct the proof.
 In that sense it is an abductive phase of theorematic reasoning. But it
 is not abductive in the sense that its starting point is data and its
 conclusion is a hypothesis. The right auxiliary lines are not at all a
 hypothesis explaining anything. For that reason, I do not think the
 proposal of saying that theorematic reasoning is just trivial deduction
 interspersed with abduction is satisfactory.


  I'm not sure about abduction being characterized as a move from data to
 hypothesis. Peirce's early account of abduction is somewhat close to that
 idea, but not so much his later account. Rather, it is typified by the move
 from a surprising fact, something which does not fit available data, to a
 hypothesis explaining the surprising fact.


  Correct, and that fact is a part of data.


  Suppose a case where the conclusion of the theorematic proof is
 considered the first premiss of an abductive argument, and the second
 premiss is the introduction of a hypothesis that would explain the
 conclusion of the theorematic proof. Then the conclusion of such an
 abduction would be the theorem introduced into the proof. So the data is
 simply the desired conclusion itself. In later discussions of abduction,
 Peirce does put it as something like this: There is a surprising fact. But
 if A were true, then the surprising fact would be a matter of course.
 Therefore A is true. Peirce admits though that not every case of abduction
 involves a surprising fact, but simply something that calls for
 explanation. I would suggest in this case that the desired conclusion is
 what is in need of explanation.

  It should be noticed that the way mathematicians make new discoveries is
 not typically through mathematical demonstrations; rather, the
 demonstrations are produced after the fact to communicate and prove the
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Dear Frederik, lists,

Frederik: Something like that. P seldom used the word empiricist.
Sometimes he refers to the British empiricists, sometimes to James'
radical empiricism which he equated with pragmatism. I do not remember
seeing him using it about himself. Of course the later version of
empiricism a la Vienna (sense data + tautological logic) had not seen the
light of day at the time so he could not refer to that (and he was
definitely not an empiricist in that narrow sense) … 

Franklin: Well, I can't really agree to that; it seems to me that he is
certainly an empiricist. But what you have to say is food for thought, and
I'll try to keep it in mind when reading Peirce.

Frederik: I suggest P gave up the Kandinskys graphical experiment
because he realized it led nowhere in its present shape - in that sense it
was a red herring. I guess he realized that in order to address real kinds,
such figures would have to be made up of graphical properties with formal
dependency relations between them - which was not the case in the graphical
formalism he was experimenting with in that case. But if that is the case,
 that was no small result, and I think the whole development of the notion
of icon, diagram, and of theorematic reasoning comes out of that train of
thought in P

Franklin: That's interesting. I hadn't quite taken away the idea from Ch.9
that the Kandinsky's were a failed graphical experiment, and that the
diagrammatic reasoning represents an advance beyond that failure in terms
of graphical representation. Now that's insightful. I wish you had made
that point clearer in the conclusions drawn at the end of the chapter, but
it's good to see it that way now. Not that I necessarily agree, but
nevertheless that is possibly a much more fruitful idea to consider.

Frederik: Frankly, I am away in a summer house right now so I cannot
consult my Writings copies either. The ref. in ch. 9 is to W 1, 418 and the
year is given there as 1866, is it not? As far as I can find on the
internet,  this ref.  is correct, and the text referred to is not the OLEC,
but the fourth Lowell lecture. So the error is not in that reference, but
 rather in the sentence you quote where I ascribe that position to MS. 725
as well. 

Frankliln: Ah, I see that now, p.236 of NP. Thank you for that
clarification!

Frederik: You are indeed right, that is Peirce's position. I do not claim
it is not. But I claim I cannot see that position is consistent. 

Franklin: Well, I can't see what is inconsistent about it, so I suppose
we'll just have to agree to disagree about that one.

Frederik: Certainly, but his idea is to go to beyond term-symbols to
proposition-symbols where b and d are independent - 

Franklin: My guess is that you mean in a proposition-symbol, the breadth
and depth are distinguished from each other as subject and predicate, which
is not true in the case of a term-symbol. At least, that's the only way I
can understand your statement as reasonable. I'm not sure what that has to
do with what I said about analytic term-symbols involving an inverse
relation of increase and decrease in logical quantity.

Frederik: I think you here again confuse procedural necessity of reasoning
with logical necessity of the result. Peirce knew very well that
theorematic reasoning was not algorithmic and required the creative
selection of additional elements - but still he stably classified it as
deduction, because of the logical necessity of the conclusion.

Franklin: Okay, I see your point about the logical necessity of the
conclusion. But still, if I were to consider how abductive, deductive, and
inductive inference work together in inquiry, it's not as if the inquiry as
a whole is an inference (contra IBE). Instead, it's different inferences
drawing conclusions that contribute to the inquiry as a whole. In the case
of theorematic reasoning, it seems to me that both abductive and deductive
inferences are at work, so the reasoning as a whole is not simply
deductive, but constitutes an inquiry that involves more than one kind of
inference. It is recognizing the inclusion of abductive inference that to
me shows why the conclusions of mathematics can only concern hypotheses.
The difference between corollarial and theorematic then would be whether,
during a series of deductive inferences, another abductive inference
occurred, rather than before the deductive reasoning altogether. Yes, the
conclusion is logically necessary. But there is still an abduction
conducted during the reasoning process, and I find it misleading to call
the whole thing overall deductive. Well, that's what I think, but I
recognize that I am in disagreement with both you and Peirce on this one,
which makes me leery of my thoughts on it.

Frederik: Getting to natural kinds are among the main purposes of all the
different disciplines of the sciences - so all of the machinery of
observation, experiment,  epistemology, logic, ontology etc. etc. are
involved in their discovery. My 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8566] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, lists,


It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal structure
 af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a matter of
 necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain B) does not
 explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other propositions with
 the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on abduction)


Though Peirce did address this issue in terms of Galileo's il lume
naturale, with the qualification that it has to do with a natural instinct.
I have my own ideas about why we can happen upon the right hypotheses, but
this is not the thread for such a discussion.


And this is where the trial-and-error phase of theorematic reasoning
 differs from ordinary abduction. The latter is standardly seen as a step in
 empirical research, from data to hypothesis. But all P's examples of
 theorematic reasoning are non-empirical, there is no data, for the whole
 problem considered is purely formal (like when selecting the right
 auxiliary lines in the triangle proof). That is a trial-and-error thing
 without procedural necessity - you may have to experiment with different
 lines until you find the right ones permitting you to conduct the proof.
 In that sense it is an abductive phase of theorematic reasoning. But it
 is not abductive in the sense that its starting point is data and its
 conclusion is a hypothesis. The right auxiliary lines are not at all a
 hypothesis explaining anything. For that reason, I do not think the
 proposal of saying that theorematic reasoning is just trivial deduction
 interspersed with abduction is satisfactory.


I'm not sure about abduction being characterized as a move from data to
hypothesis. Peirce's early account of abduction is somewhat close to that
idea, but not so much his later account. Rather, it is typified by the move
from a surprising fact, something which does not fit available data, to a
hypothesis explaining the surprising fact.

Suppose a case where the conclusion of the theorematic proof is considered
the first premiss of an abductive argument, and the second premiss is the
introduction of a hypothesis that would explain the conclusion of the
theorematic proof. Then the conclusion of such an abduction would be the
theorem introduced into the proof. So the data is simply the desired
conclusion itself. In later discussions of abduction, Peirce does put it as
something like this: There is a surprising fact. But if A were true, then
the surprising fact would be a matter of course. Therefore A is true.
Peirce admits though that not every case of abduction involves a surprising
fact, but simply something that calls for explanation. I would suggest in
this case that the desired conclusion is what is in need of explanation.

It should be noticed that the way mathematicians make new discoveries is
not typically through mathematical demonstrations; rather, the
demonstrations are produced after the fact to communicate and prove the
discovery to the satisfaction of other mathematicians. Considered in the
larger context of the difference between discovery and demonstration in
mathematics, it may very well be the case that every such major theorem in
theorematic reasoning started off as a hypothesis to explain a desired
conclusion, and the demonstration was produced after the fact. Of course,
it would be very difficult to prove this as a general rule. But it is an
alternative explanation which bears merit. It should also be noticed that
all of this doesn't change the necessity of the conclusion in the
theorematic reasoning, once proven.

I suppose it could be replied that nevertheless, diagram experimentation
would be required to develop the hypothesis. Well, my suggestion would be
that, having certain propositions already, and a desired conclusion, but
not being able to reach that conclusion from the given propositions alone,
the diagram is put on hold while the mathematical mind starts thinking
about what would explain the conclusion.

-- Franklin

On Sat, May 2, 2015 at 4:41 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
wrote:

  Dear Franklin, lists -
 OK, we're getting closer to agreeing about what to disagree about, at
 least!

  Frederik: Hm, I am not sure. How could we know this? This is a bit of a
 catch-22 because one of the classic riddles of abduction is exactly how to
 select the better hypothesis among many possible. So to say the hypothesis
 should already be there is begging the question, as far as I can see - 

  Franklin: I'm not sure how much of a riddle it is.


  It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal
 structure af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a
 matter of necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain
 B) does not explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other
 propositions with the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on
 abduction)

  Peirce did introduce the idea of the economy 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, Gary F, lists,

I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very informative post,
particularly the last part of it.

Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce
strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!

And what definition of empiricist do you think would apply to Peirce?
Simply someone who strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge,
while nevertheless advocating non-empirical knowledge as well?

I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to
find out what in the world those Kandinskys were really about ...

In a post in the Ch.9 thread, I noted that I agreed with you about the
Kandinskys, that they should have been included in publication of the Ms.
However, after going through the chapter, you ended up saying that it was
all a red herring, and ultimately led to theorematic reasoning as the way
to take instead towards hidden properties and natural kinds. In the context
of the book as a whole, which is explicitly aimed at introducing and
defending the dicisign idea in order to advance your work from
Diagrammatology, I think it clear that the overall take-away point of the
chapter is its significance for diagrammatic reasoning, and theorematic
reasoning in particular. But yes, I overstated it when I said that it was
the entire point. I apologize for overstating my case.

I had said: In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find
in the quoted passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of
natural kinds is that they are classes which have more properties than
their definition (NP, p.255).

You replied: It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there
is an error in the ref. saying 419, sorry for that.

This is really confusing. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the
Writings. What I do have is your book and the online copy of ULEC at
cspeirce.com. In your book (p.234, 2nd fn), you noted that OLEC is
published as ULEC in Writings vol. 2, not vol.1, and the pages are 70-86;
so they do not include 418 or 419. As to any mention of Writings vol. 1 and
p.419, I do not see that anywhere in Ch.9. Is there a different version
published in W 1 as well, which includes discussion of natural kinds? The
ULEC copy at cspeirce.com contains no such reference to natural kinds.
Furthermore, you say on p.255 the following: In the brief paragraph
preceding the graphical experiments of Ms. 725, Peirce proposes no less
than three different definitions of natural classes, two of them negative:
they are 1) classes which are not mere intersections of simpler natural
classes, 2) classes which have more properties than their definition, 3)
classes without [sic] an Area. As to the brief paragraph you quote in
full that is an addendum discussing natural kinds, I can find no reference
regarding classes which have more properties than their definition.
Please help me out here?

But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply
them to give an area?

Looking at paragraph 6 of the ULEC at cspeirce.com, we can see that Peirce
would say we cannot. Introducing the multiplication of breadth and depth
is preceded by this statement in the text: By breadth and depth, without
an adjective, I shall hereafter mean the informed breadth and depth. This
will of course include the breadth and depth mentioned in the
multiplication. The analytic quantities, as I called them, would be
referred to by Peirce as essential breadth and essential depth, as
shown in paragraph 5 that they encompass what is given in a definition. Of
course, this doesn't stop you from disagreeing with Peirce.

I suppose he would say that when we manipulate the breadth and depth of
analytic term-symbols, it's always an inverse relation, so that an increase
in depth means a decrease in breadth, and vice versa, as per the
traditional doctrine of the logical quantities that he discusses earlier in
the paper. Information allows us to get past the inverse relation with
term-symbols, but, given that he distinguishes natural from artificial
kinds by the use of area, I suppose that only natural classes can involve
the synthetic propositions that inform the term-symbol. To me, this makes
intuitive sense. If induction worked for artificial kinds, they wouldn't
seem to be so artificial anymore.

Peirce's point in theorematic reasoning is that there are deductive
reasonings which are not analytic - in the sense that they give access to
theorems which do not lie directly (as corollaries) in the definition of
terms (cf. the example with Euclid's proof of the angle sum of the triangle
which can not be conceptually deduced from the triangle definition)...Here
are some important consequences. One is that the theorematic type of
deductive reasoning process involves an abductive trial-and-error phase (in
order to find the right new elements to add or manipulations to make with
your diagram).

This admission that abduction plays a role counts against theorematic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, Tommi, lists,

Frederik, thank you for sending this off-list exchange to the lists. I
think Tommi explicated more fully my own concerns regarding abduction and
the a priori, and your response is very helpful for understanding your
view. I can hardly believe that you deny Peirce is an empiricist, but I
suppose I will have to accept it and let it go at that.

I too share Tommi's concerns. It seems to me that most folks here don't
understand that you view theorematic reasoning as the road to identifying
natural kinds, although it is clear from your concluding paragraphs in Ch.
9 that this is exactly what you believe; indeed, that was the entire point
of writing that chapter, was it not?

But in the realm of such forms, we are back to diagrams and diagrammatical
reasoning. And here, again, it remains central to Peirce that such diagrams
may give occasion of 'theorematic reasoning' whose aim it is exactly to
discover properties of their objects which were not mentioned in the
explicit construction of the diagram--corresponding to the definition of
the class.

So the idea of the additional, hidden properties to be deduced kept their
place in Peirce's doctrine, so that the 'system of forms' of the 'Minute
Logic' may give rise to natural classes for the same reasons sketchily
outlined in MS. 725. So, the strange drawings at the end of that Ms. may
have put him on an important track, realizing that the fascinating
diagrammatic experiments with Cows and Red Cows were originally motivated
by a red herring. (NP, p.257)

In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in the quoted
passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds is
that they are classes which have more properties than their definition
(NP, p.255). I also gave in that post a response to a statement made on the
same page, It is hard to see why Red Cows should not have an Area in the
simple b x d sense defined in the OLEC; as defined in the OLEC, it makes
perfect sense because artificial classes cannot involve synthetic
propositions, only analytic logical quantity of breadth and depth. The
position that natural kinds must have an area, or information, is still
important, as is the point that area or information has to do with
synthetic propositions, and not merely the analytical ones found in
deductive reasoning, including theorematic diagrammatic reasoning.
Theorematic reasoning cannot be the way we get to natural kinds.

-- Franklin

On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 8:01 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
wrote:

  Dear Lists -
 The below exchange jumped off lists, but here it is
 F


 Start på videresendt besked:

  *Fra: *Tommi Vehkavaara tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
  *Emne: **Vedr.: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,*
  *Dato: *26. apr. 2015 00.09.36 CEST
  *Til: *Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
  *Cc: *Tommi Vehkavaara tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi


 Dear Frederik

 Thank you for your patient explication, that cleared a lot - it is just
 that my understanding is too loaded on Kantian distinction of a priori and
 a posteriori (although that seems to be a distinction that cannot be
 clearly made) that my mind rebels against this kind of definition - why
 these necessary relations should be called a priori (compare Peirce's
 ethics of terminology). But obviously they are just two different concepts
 that are referred by the same word and if there is any meeting point it is
 in mathematics (and perhaps in logic too).

 However, it is still not clear to me does this your a priori concern
 concepts or directly objects, the necessity here, at least seems to be some
 kind of metaphysical (or just physiological in case of food?) necessity and
 not the logical/cognitive one.
 What bothers me that at least in my reluctant mind this seems to lead back
 to some kind of metaphysical priorism or even foundationalism.

 Yours,

 Tommi

 BTW, you sended your reply only to me, not to lists, and therefroe I too
 replied to you only though it could have gone to lists.

 Lainaus Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk:

 Dear Tommi, lists -

 I have been busy all day and see the discussion has already run several
 rounds. But let me try to answer Tommi's question about P's two gates
 criterion.

 The same question could be posed not with food as an example, but
 pertaining to Peirce's characteristics of the whole apparatus of his own
 logic and semiotics as the A Priori theoy of signs which I quoted a few
 days ago. How could that be compatible with the passports-at-both gates
 claim which you quote?

 Obviously, A Priori could not mean prior to senses as you say. But that
 was not the definition I was discussing. I was discussing a definition
 which meant describable in terms of necessary relations. As the great quote
 which Jon cited from Ketner a couple of posts ago, necessity here should
 be understood as necessary in terms of relations between aspects of the
 object - not necessary in the sense that 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8387] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10:

[Franklin Ransom]

 to agree in disagreeing.

 But my notion of the a priori has nothing to do with transcendentalism
 (see the refs. in my answer to Howard). And I would not say I am
 professionally committed to it, whatever that means. It is not in my
 university contract.
 Peirce vacillated as to the a priori. I know his 1878 rejection in
 Fixation; later in life, he described his own logic and semiotics as an a
 priori doctrine of signs.

  Your notion of empiricism as you define it, is obviously more
 sophisticated than the crude sense data+logic variant. I take note of you
 mentioning conjunction and continuity in experience - later you say these
 are the work of the mind. But indeed Peirce's claim would be that they are
 already present in reality and not merely the product of the mind.
 In your abduction-deduction-induction example, I do not think a priori and
 empirical stuff can be nicely separated.

  But all this comes down to us discussing two different notions of the a
 priori - you the Kantian one which you (rightly, I think) refuse, I the
 Husserlian one of objective dependence relations which we may only
 gradually come to know (hence fallibilism). Take biology. It is now
 accepted that life involves the interdependent notions of metabolism,
 replication, adaptation, evolution, etc. These are the ontological
 structures underpinning empirical biological research. Earlier ontological
 assumptions of elan vital and the like have been given up. So, the
 discussion will depend upon the interpretation of such basic concepts in
 the single sciences. Can there be given a convincing empiricist account of
 such concepts? I do not think a mentalist idea that such concepts are
 merely psychical constructions of the mind would work. Neither would
 Peirce, cf. his realism about universals. But such realism about
 universals, to me, is tantamount to apriorism in the sense mentioned.

  You're right, these mails grow long and we might get away from the
 discussion of ch. 10 of my book …

  Best
 F

  Den 21/04/2015 kl. 02.18 skrev Franklin Ransom 
 pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com
 :

  Frederik, lists,

  I'm not sure, but this appears in my email as a separate thread, having
 copied posts that I sent to the other thread. Since Frederik replied to my
 posts on this one, I suppose I'll reply here for now. If this doesn't
 appear as a new thread to anyone else, then please ignore my comment.

  Just to be clear, I think that this will definitely be a case of we
 will just have to agree to disagree. Frederik, you are clearly
 professionally committed to the a priori; I am constitutionally committed
 to radical empiricism. Now that you are forewarned about that, I'll say a
 couple of things about my point of view.

  I'm not so sure that empiricists like myself have an a priori fear of
 the a priori. When I look at the philosophy of transcendentalism and its
 results, the fear strikes me as quite experience-based. One can also think
 about Peirce's remarks in The Fixation of Belief about the method of the
 a priori.

  I'm not, as an empiricist, particularly impressed with logical
 positivism as a form of empiricism. I believe it a commonplace in classical
 pragmatism that the theory of experience at play in pragmatism is not the
 atomistic approach of the British empiricists or their inheritors in
 logical positivism/empiricism. My understanding is that whether we are
 talking about Peirce, James, or Dewey, experience is not conceived on the
 model of a series of distinct, discrete sense impressions or sense-data.
 Instead, experience is much more complex, in which conjunction and
 continuity are just as much found in the experience as are disjunction and
 discreteness--we do not require some outside source to make our experiences
 appear connected for us in the first place. Certainly the mind works to
 bring connection and continuity to its experiences. But it does not do this
 ex nihilo; such connections and continuities work to extend in novel ways
 connections and continuities already experienced--the mind generalizes what
 it has been given to work with. So far as I see it, this is the empiricism
 that classical pragmatism is based upon, and is part of what my take on
 empiricism amounts to.

  I'm not entirely sure what is meant by dependence structures of
 objectivity. I also find your ascription of fallibilism to a priori
 knowledge as bizarre.

  Rather than discuss what you have had to say further (this post would
 become inordinately long), I think it would be best to simplify the matter.
 Suppose I have a surprising experience, and then develop a hypothesis to
 explain that experience. Once I have the idea in hand from the hypothesis,
 I deduce consequences from this hypothesis to the point that I now know how
 to put the hypothesis to inductive experimentation. Now, at this point, I
 have not yet conducted any inductions. Is this process, from the gaining of
 a hypothesis to the deduction of consequences, altogether

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9

[Franklin Ransom]

Jon,

Yes, that is exactly it, thank you so much!

-- Franklin

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:30 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Franklin,

 This looks like the post you had in mind:

 BU:
 article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15796/match=breadth+depth

 BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15796

 Regards,

 Jon


 On 4/20/2015 8:21 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:

 Jon, Ben, lists,

 Whoops! Sorry about that! I guess it just struck me as a Jon kind of
 thing to do, with the slow reads going on about Peirce's earlier logical
 works. I apologize for the mistake!

 -- Franklin

 On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:42 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

  Franklin, List,

 I think that was Ben Udell.

 Regards,

 Jon

 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

 On Apr 20, 2015, at 7:30 PM, Franklin Ransom 
 pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Cathy, Frederik, lists,

 Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous
 post,
 counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it
 should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some
 inquiry.

 As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from
 Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like
 1,
 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth
 and
 breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of
 being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly
 contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not
 simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of
 being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth
 without limit.

 -- Franklin

 On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
 wrote:

Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists -

 A small clarification: Peirce's *BxD=A* idea, I think, should not be

 taken a device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size
 -
 it is rather the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth.
 His
 idea comes from the simple idea that when intension is zero, there is no
 information, while when extension is zero, there is also no information
 -
 and that is the relation of the two factors in a product.  (It is a bit
 like his first Boole-inspired definition of universal quantification as
 a
 product - he defines truth as 1, falsity as 0,  then, in order to be
 true,
 each single case of a universal proposition should be true - if any
 single
 one of them is false, the total product of them all will be zero.)
 The BXD=A idea allows him to investigate what happens if intension or
 extension are in- or decreased, etc. - even if not being able to express
 that in precise numbers.

   Best
 F


   Den 20/04/2015 kl. 01.14 skrev Franklin Ransom 
 pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com:

   Cathy, lists,

   Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the
 senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea
 of
 what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a
 new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put
 to
 the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters
 to
 look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects
 (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters
 obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we
 are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more
 information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become
 informed, and deduction is merely explicative, based on relating the
 idea
 to other ideas and previously gathered information regarding those
 ideas.

   Obviously, we cannot conduct induction without end, because that is a
 practical impossibility. Our 'sum', as you put it, far from being
 always an
 infinity, will very likely never be an infinity in practice, in whatever
 sense you mean to understand the application of infinity to a 'sum' of
 information. Of course, as an ideal, where science, the community of
 inquiry as such, continues to investigate, it is possible for the
 information of an idea to reach a much greater 'sum' than would
 otherwise
 be possible for individuals such as you or me. But it is a commonplace
 of
 science that ideas that work and continue to work are understood more
 thoroughly in their relations to other ideas over the course on inquiry.
 This means of course that not only the breadth, but also the depth of
 the
 idea continues to grow. As a result, typically, rather than tending to
 make
 comparisons moot, we start to see a hierarchy of ideas and related
 sciences
 appear.

   Consider this passage: The former [Cows] is a natural class, the
 latter [Red Cows] is not. Now one predicate more may be attached to Red
 Cows than to Cows; hence Mr. Mill's attempts to analyze the difference
 between natural and artificial

Re: Fwd: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Franklin Ransom]

). What Peirce says is that
 sometimes corollarial deduction won't suffice, and that then theorematic
 deduction is needed in order to bring something to light.

 Whew. I'm not sure I've addressed all in your post, but I'll let it stand
 for now and retract who knows what tomorrow.

 Best, Ben

 On 4/19/2015 5:12 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:


 -- Forwarded message --
 From: Franklin Ransom pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com 
 Date: Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 5:11 PM
 Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch.
 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
 To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee


 Ben, lists,

  Thank you, Ben, for a post that is (clearly) on topic.

  Frederik notes, in the fourth definition of theorematic reasoning, that
 it involves schemata rather than words. Actually, he qualifies this claim,
 noticing that Peirce says even words are schemata, but rather simple
 schemata. Theorematic reasoning typically involves then complicated
 schemata. It is really a matter of degree or gradation though, as
 corollarial reasoning typically involves simpler schemata and theorematic
 reasoning typically involves complicated schemata, relative to each other.
 In the text, p.276-7, Frederik seems to associate schemata with diagrams,
 so that corollarial reasoning makes less use of diagrams and theorematic
 reasoning makes greater use of diagrams.

  If I recall correctly, this is all that is really mentioned about
 complexity or complication. Otherwise, there is the discussion in the
 chapter regarding the possibility that some theorematic reasoning, using a
 different logic system (by this, meaning a different set of axioms and
 rules), may be reworked as corollarial reasoning, because not needing to
 include something new or foreign to the premises and conclusion as the
 other logic system would have required. I believe that is in p.280-3.

  As I understand it, what Frederik takes to be most essential is the
 introduction of something new or foreign to the reasoning, and not so much
 the relative simplicity or complexity of the reasoning. This is probably
 due to the flexibility of some reasonings as being capable of
 classification under either head, depending upon the logic system at work.

  With respect to nontriviality or depth, this isn't really discussed in
 the chapter. The point of the chapter is less about the value of theorems
 than it is about explaining what theorematic diagrammatic reasoning is and
 what its significance is. In fact, the significance seems to be less about
 the importance of theorematic reasoning in mathematics and more about the
 importance of theorematic reasoning for epistemology, i.e. for knowledge
 whether of the scientific sort or of the everyday sort.

  My concern about corollarial reasoning is that, since corollarial
 reasoning does involve experimentation, what should be the point of
 experimentation if nothing unnoticed or hidden ever appeared as a result? I
 don't doubt that theorematic reasoning is better for the purpose, I just
 don't think that it's a hard-and-fast line to be drawn between theorematic
 and corollarial reasoning. Perhaps my concern would be better answered
 though if it were made clearer what the role of these reasonings is in the
 context of scientific method, which would allow for a clearer account of
 the Holm example.

  -- Franklin

 On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 2:05 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com 
 wrote:

  Franklin, lists,

 I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post.

 You wrote,

 [] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation and
 experimentation, reveal unnoticed and hidden relations? After all, on
 p.285-6, Frederik mentions the work of police detective Jorn Old Man Holm
 and his computer program, which Frederik describes as a practical example
 of corollarial map reasoning (p.285). In this example, Holm uses the
 corollarial reasoning to reveal information about the whereabouts of
 suspects. Doesn't the comparison of the map reasoning with suspects'
 testimony end up revealing unnoticed and hidden relations?

 There's a distinction that some make between complexity and mere
 complication. Corollarial reasonings may accumulate mere complications
 until the result becomes hard to see, although it involves little if any
 complexity in, more or less, the sense of depth or nontriviality.

 I don't know whether there's a theorematic approach to Jørn Holm's
 diagrammatization that would show its result in a nontrivial aspect, and
 anyway its diagrammatic, pictorial presentation already leaves one in no
 doubt that a pattern is revealed. A good example involving alternate proofs
 that seem corollarial and theorematic is the Monty Hall problem, a popular
 puzzle based in probability theory. I remember reading an essentially
 corollarial proof of the answer, and seeing a round diagram that showed how
 alternatives lead inevitably to the conclusion in the diagram's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Stjernfelt: Chapter 9

[Franklin Ransom]

Cathy, Frederik, lists,

Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous post,
counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it
should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some
inquiry.

As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from
Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like 1,
0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth and
breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of
being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly
contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not
simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of
being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth
without limit.

-- Franklin

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
wrote:

  Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists -

 A small clarification: Peirce's *BxD=A* idea, I think, should not be
 taken a device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size -
 it is rather the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth. His
 idea comes from the simple idea that when intension is zero, there is no
 information, while when extension is zero, there is also no information -
 and that is the relation of the two factors in a product.  (It is a bit
 like his first Boole-inspired definition of universal quantification as a
 product - he defines truth as 1, falsity as 0,  then, in order to be true,
 each single case of a universal proposition should be true - if any single
 one of them is false, the total product of them all will be zero.)
 The BXD=A idea allows him to investigate what happens if intension or
 extension are in- or decreased, etc. - even if not being able to express
 that in precise numbers.

  Best
 F


  Den 20/04/2015 kl. 01.14 skrev Franklin Ransom 
 pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com:

  Cathy, lists,

  Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the
 senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea of
 what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a
 new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put to
 the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters to
 look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects
 (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters
 obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we
 are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more
 information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become
 informed, and deduction is merely explicative, based on relating the idea
 to other ideas and previously gathered information regarding those ideas.

  Obviously, we cannot conduct induction without end, because that is a
 practical impossibility. Our 'sum', as you put it, far from being always an
 infinity, will very likely never be an infinity in practice, in whatever
 sense you mean to understand the application of infinity to a 'sum' of
 information. Of course, as an ideal, where science, the community of
 inquiry as such, continues to investigate, it is possible for the
 information of an idea to reach a much greater 'sum' than would otherwise
 be possible for individuals such as you or me. But it is a commonplace of
 science that ideas that work and continue to work are understood more
 thoroughly in their relations to other ideas over the course on inquiry.
 This means of course that not only the breadth, but also the depth of the
 idea continues to grow. As a result, typically, rather than tending to make
 comparisons moot, we start to see a hierarchy of ideas and related sciences
 appear.

  Consider this passage: The former [Cows] is a natural class, the latter
 [Red Cows] is not. Now one predicate more may be attached to Red Cows than
 to Cows; hence Mr. Mill's attempts to analyze the difference between
 natural and artificial classes is seen to be a failure. For, according to
 him, the difference is that a real kind is distinguished by unknown
 multitudes of properties while an artificial class has only a few
 determinate ones. Again there is an unusual degree of accordance among
 naturalists in making Vertebrates a natural class. Yet the number of
 predicates proper to it is comparatively small (NP, p.238, quoting
 Peirce). We can see here that further simplifications are introduced, so
 taking what is learned about various vertebrates, a new idea, that of
 vertebrates, appears which simplifies the characters involved. Conversely,
 species under vertebrates will become much more determinate in terms of
 their characters, but be simplified with respect to their extension.

  You said above: Under synechism every real object has an infinite
 number of attributes, and every meaningful predicate or general term
 effectively has

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8369] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10:

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, lists,

I'm not sure, but this appears in my email as a separate thread, having
copied posts that I sent to the other thread. Since Frederik replied to my
posts on this one, I suppose I'll reply here for now. If this doesn't
appear as a new thread to anyone else, then please ignore my comment.

Just to be clear, I think that this will definitely be a case of we will
just have to agree to disagree. Frederik, you are clearly professionally
committed to the a priori; I am constitutionally committed to radical
empiricism. Now that you are forewarned about that, I'll say a couple of
things about my point of view.

I'm not so sure that empiricists like myself have an a priori fear of the
a priori. When I look at the philosophy of transcendentalism and its
results, the fear strikes me as quite experience-based. One can also think
about Peirce's remarks in The Fixation of Belief about the method of the
a priori.

I'm not, as an empiricist, particularly impressed with logical positivism
as a form of empiricism. I believe it a commonplace in classical pragmatism
that the theory of experience at play in pragmatism is not the atomistic
approach of the British empiricists or their inheritors in logical
positivism/empiricism. My understanding is that whether we are talking
about Peirce, James, or Dewey, experience is not conceived on the model of
a series of distinct, discrete sense impressions or sense-data. Instead,
experience is much more complex, in which conjunction and continuity are
just as much found in the experience as are disjunction and
discreteness--we do not require some outside source to make our experiences
appear connected for us in the first place. Certainly the mind works to
bring connection and continuity to its experiences. But it does not do this
ex nihilo; such connections and continuities work to extend in novel ways
connections and continuities already experienced--the mind generalizes what
it has been given to work with. So far as I see it, this is the empiricism
that classical pragmatism is based upon, and is part of what my take on
empiricism amounts to.

I'm not entirely sure what is meant by dependence structures of
objectivity. I also find your ascription of fallibilism to a priori
knowledge as bizarre.

Rather than discuss what you have had to say further (this post would
become inordinately long), I think it would be best to simplify the matter.
Suppose I have a surprising experience, and then develop a hypothesis to
explain that experience. Once I have the idea in hand from the hypothesis,
I deduce consequences from this hypothesis to the point that I now know how
to put the hypothesis to inductive experimentation. Now, at this point, I
have not yet conducted any inductions. Is this process, from the gaining of
a hypothesis to the deduction of consequences, altogether a priori on your
account?

-- Franklin


On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk
wrote:

  Dear Franklin, lists -

  Sorry for having rattled Franklin's empiricist sentiments with
 references to the a priori!
 Empiricists seem to have an a priori fear of the a priori … but no
 philosophy of science has, as yet, been able to completely abolish the a
 priori - even logical positvism had to admit logic as a remaining a priori
 field (reinterpreting that as tautologies, that is true).
 I should probably have given a note here to my own stance on the a priori
 - for the interested, I wrote a bit about it in ch. 8 of Diagrammatology
 (2007). My take on it there comes more from the early Husserl than from
 Peirce: the a priori has nothing to do with Kantian subjectivity, rather,
 it consists in dependence structures of objectivity - this makes it subject
 to fallibilism -  the a priori charts necessities - these come in two
 classes, formal ontology and material ontology - the former holds for all
 possible objects, the latter for special regions of reality (like physics,
 biology, society) - no discipline can function without more or less
 explicit conceptual networks defining their basic ideas - being
 fallibilist, a priori claims develop with the single scientific disciplines
 …

  I happen to think this Husserlian picture (for a present-day version,
 see Barry Smith) is compatible with Peirce's classification of the sciences
 where, as it is well known, the upper echelon is taken to be a priori in
 the sense of not at all containing empirical knowledge while the lower,
 positive levels inherit structures from those higher ones, co-determining
 the way they organize and prioritize their empirical material.
 So, it is in this sense of material ontology that I speak of
 biogeographical ontology and and the ontology of human culture development
 involved in Diamond's argument. Given these assumptions, Diamond's
 argument, so I argue, is a priori. His conclusion that Eurasia privileges
 the spread of domesticated animals does not depend on the empirical
 investigation of early cultural 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8354] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial

[Franklin Ransom]

Steven, list,

Steven, if I tried to do that, I might as well start with the Ancient
philosophers and mathematicians and move my way up; and I don't see you
trying to champion the cause of Euclid. In any case, my post is not a
published work in scholarship; it's an attempt to discuss the work. In the
work itself, credit is given where it should be. My aim was to discuss the
ideas, which are partly Benjamin's, partly Charles's, and partly
Frederik's. Since it is assumed that participants have read, or are
reading, the book, and there is quite a lot going on in the chapter, I
aimed to grasp what is most essential and (re)present it.

But I appreciate your point about Benjamin's contributions, along with
Euclid's. If Benjamin's take on these ideas is of some further relevance
for the subject of the chapter, please continue and communicate the
relevance for diagrammatic experimentation.


-- Franklin


On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:38 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us
wrote:


 No mention of Benjamin is made in your original post and it reads as if
 all from Charles, giving new readers especially a false idea concerning his
 contributions. When his individual contribution should be positioned in the
 community of scholars.

 This is why the discussion is relevant.

 Regards,
 Steven


 --
 Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
 http://iase.info




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8352] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary, list,

Sorry, I noticed that Steven and Edwina had not been posting to Peirce-L,
so I thought I should leave that discussion in the biosemiotics list.

-- Franklin

On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:31 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
wrote:

 I am taking the liberty of forwarding Frank's note to peirce-l which was,
 I assume, inadvertently sent only to the biosemiotics list. I agree with
 his principal point that it might be a good idea to return to the
 discussion of Chapter 10 of NP. Certainly other topics can be given new
 Subject lines. Best, Gary

 [image: Gary Richmond]

 *Gary Richmond*
 *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
 *Communication Studies*
 *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
 *C 745*
 *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690*

 On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Franklin Ransom 
 pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com wrote:

 Steven, Edwina, list,

 I'm not entirely sure what the discussion between Steven and Edwina has
 to do with the content of the chapter that is the topic of the thread.
 Hoping this gets back to that somehow, I would like to say a couple of
 things.

 First, it is not only the ideas about mathematics drawing necessary
 conclusions and other sciences borrowing principles from mathematics that
 are at work here--it is important that the subject matter of mathematics
 has to do with hypotheses concerning forms of relations. Without that idea,
 the other ideas could not deliver the results that Frederik discusses for
 the significance of diagrams for mathematics and epistemology.

 Second, of course Charles Peirce did not originate every idea of which he
 made use. Just about the thing I love most about him and his work is the
 way he works to carry forward the work of others, in the genuine spirit of
 community of inquiry. And I don't see why, because Benjamin Peirce
 developed certain ideas, that this somehow lessens what is at stake in Ch.
 10 of NP. Are we supposed to judge of the merit of an idea based upon the
 character of the person who first introduced it? I admit that in certain
 limited situations, this may be true, but I don't see that in this context,
 a context which is guided by an interest in scientific inquiry.

 Which brings me to my third point: Even if we give due credit to Benjamin
 Peirce, how does that affect the argument that is up for discussion in the
 chapter? Is this really just about saying that Frederik should have said
 that Charles got a couple of those ideas from his father? Frederik already
 made a point of mentioning that mathematics as the science of drawing
 necessary conclusions comes from Benjamin.

 So, why are we talking about this here?

 -- Franklin

 On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 3:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
 wrote:

  You are missing the point of 'la longue duree' - with your changing it
 to a long-term Result. You are reducing complex causality to a singular
 linear 'what comes after some individual comes up with a new idea'..and are
 describing individuals who advocate, copy, echo.  That's not what 'la
 longue duree' is about nor is it what I am talking about...that 'community
 of scholars' that develops knowledge.

 Your insistence that Benjamin Peirce originated an idea and that Charles
 Peirce merely copied it - and your question of - so what is new' about what
 Peirce said - fits in with your answer, that one individual comes up with
 the idea and others simply copy it. That's not what I'm talking about.

 I'm talking about the development of knowledge. You claim that it's all
 based on 'individuals' - which I call The Great Man theory. I reject that
 and claim that knowledge and its development is based within a
 community-of-knowledge, with individuals in that community working within a
 societal complex (population, economic mode, societal beliefs, technology,
 power-politics etc)..and these individuals as a network develop new
 knowledge. One individual may articulate that new knowledge but it never
 appears unattached to the deeper community-of-knowledge and the societal
 complex.

 I suggest we stop this interaction, as we each have our point of view,
 and each of us remains unconvinced by the arguments of the other.

 Edwina

 - Original Message -
 *From:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us
 *To:* Biosemiotics biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
 *Cc:* The Peirce Family List peircefamil...@googlegroups.com
 *Sent:* Sunday, April 19, 2015 3:18 PM
 *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8346] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10:
 Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams


  On Apr 19, 2015, at 11:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
 wrote:

 'la longue duree'



 In terms of this idea “La Longue Duree. Each individual may contribute
 to the momentum of new ideas by apprehending the idea and advocating it.
 There is certainly causal power in advocacy and echoing. But this does not
 diminish the particular role of the individual in those ideas and their
 development.

 Think about the development of ideas

Re: [biosemiotics:8358] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Franklin Ransom]

Ben, lists,

The connection you drew between the first and the fourth definitions of
theorematic reasoning is quite interesting; I had not thought of conceptual
analysis in quite that way. At least, though, the complexity of the diagram
or icon is likely more complicated in the case of theorematic reasoning
than in corollarial reasoning. I suppose I somehow think that a theorematic
reasoning is often a previous corollarial reasoning but with something
novel introduced, which would make the theorematic reasoning
straightforwardly more complicated than the corollarial reasoning.

Part of my concern about the relationship between theorematic reasoning and
abductive inference is that Frederik isn't just attempting to discuss
mathematics when treating of theorematic diagrammatic reasoning. Rather,
the significance is for all knowledge. Because the mathematical-diagrams
are ubiquitous, and because Frederik takes the mathematical diagrams to be
a priori, this means that all knowledge includes the a priori as a
constituent element. This is a very Kantian move, repeated by C.I. Lewis in
his *Mind and the World-Order*. I am quite wary of this move.

I think it very important the way you put the following: The conclusions
are aprioristically true only given the hypotheses, but the hypotheses
themselves are not aprioristically true nor asserted to be true except
hypothetically, and this hypotheticality is what allows such assurance of
the conclusions, although even the hypothesis is upended if it leads to
such contradictions as render the work futile. And then part of your quote
from Peirce: Mathematics merely traces out the consequences of hypotheses
without caring whether they correspond to anything real or not. It is
purely deductive, and all necessary inference is mathematics, pure or
applied. Its hypotheses are suggested by any of the other sciences, but its
assumption of them is not a scientific act. There are two things to be
said about this. The first is that the hypotheses are originally suggested
by experience. The second is that, even once assumed, a hypothesis could
lead to a contradiction, which is a kind of experience, or so it seems to
me; there is a sense of brute fact, or Secondness, about a contradiction.
For hypotheses that continue to work, and turn out to apply to everyday
experience and sciences other than mathematics, it is the application which
proves the ultimate efficacy of the hypotheses and the necessary
conclusions drawn from them, and thus makes them a posteriori, a matter of
being really accepted as knowledge only when proved in application.

Here's an example of Frederik's take on a priori reasoning from p.287-8,
discussing Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel*: Domestication
presupposes the presence of easily domesticated species and the stable
human settlement over many generations in the environment favoring the
survival of these species. But local domestications only get the ability to
deeply influence the development of human civilization if they are able to
spread from there to other areas and cultures...Most favourably it spreads
in the overall East-West direction, along isotherms, keeping climate
conditions approximately constant--as opposed to traveling in the
North-South direction where climate changes drastically with latitude. By
this piece of a priori diagram reasoning--based on the combination of
biogeographical ontology and the ontology of human culture
development--Eurasia stands out as a privileged site for the original
domestication of agricultural species...Empirical findings subsequently
corroborate this piece of theorematic reasoning.

The biogeographical ontology and the ontology of human culture development
cannot themselves be a priori, but rather the deliverance of scientific
inquiry. A whole host of information is brought forward, which is
inadequately reflected in the reference to two ontologies rather than to
two fields of scientific inquiry, which understanding as dealing not simply
with ontologies but with sciences would make not only ontology but also the
previously gathered information acknowledged as relevant. The diagrammatic
reasoning cannot be considered as an a priori affair. It is, so far as I
understand Peirce's placement of deduction in the order of inquiry, a
deductive development of ideas received through hypotheses, as would occur
in the typical abduction-deduction-induction approach to scientific method.

I don't doubt that pure mathematics is possible. I only doubt that it is
somehow to be conceived as reasoning which happens prior to all experience.
That's just not true. What is true is that its conclusions do not
immediately have to do with reality; for that, experiment in experience is
required.

I guess this is all related to my wondering about how diagrammatic
experimentation relates to experimentation generally, and the place of the
mathematical diagrammatic reasoning in the context of scientific method. It
seems to me that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9

[Franklin Ransom]

Cathy, list,

I was hoping to post sooner, but just got around to it; I'm sorry for the
late contribution.

First of all, I find myself in agreement with Frederik's proposed view of
the Kandinskys, namely that they form a part of Peirce's analysis of
natural classes in the manuscript, and probably should have been included
in the publication of the manuscript.

Second, I noticed that on p.255, when enumerating the definitions of
natural classes given from Ms. 725, Frederik writes for the third
definition: 3) classes without an Area. Compare with p.239, where
Frederik quotes the paragraph from Ms. 725: In other words *cow* is a term
which has an area; *red cow* has no area, except that area which every term
has, namely that it excites a particular emotion in the mind. The third
definition has to be a typo on Frederik's part; it should read 3) classes
with an Area. Of course, Frederik goes on to argue that this way of
defining natural classes is untenable, because artificial classes must have
area too, on Frederik's view. I would like to discuss this problem of
defining natural classification further below.

But first, Cathy, you said above:

I think what the snippet shows is that it's worth bearing in mind that
Peirce's paper on logical comprehension and extension was very early - 1867
- and here he is still working in a 'finitist' tradition in metaphysics and
logic, which he manages to shake himself free of in his later
synechism. Under synechism every real object has an infinite number of
attributes, and every meaningful predicate or general term effectively has
an infinite number of aspects, so a simple multiplication of B x D is
pointless.

Are you making a criticism of the position that Frederik defends in Chapter
9, arguing that his interpretation does not adequately take into account
the influence of Peirce's synechism on later accounts of his theory of
information? Consider p.236, where Frederik says: In the geometrical
metaphor adopted from Hamilton, Peirce consequently names this information
concept 'Area':

Breadth x Depth = Area = Information

This formula is a formalization of the common sense intuition that if a
sign says a lot of things about a lot of objects, it contains much
information, but it does not yield to explicit quantification because of
the issue of quantifying intensions (depth). A quarter of a century later,
in the 'Kaina Stocheia' (1904), Peirce retains this theory: 'Besides the
logical depth and breadth, I have proposed (in 1867) the terms *information*
and *area* to denote the total fact (true or false) that in a given state
of knowledge a sign embodies' (EP II, 305).

On my view, this means that a multiplication of B x D is anything but
pointless. While it is true that Frederik goes on to say that area cannot
be sufficient for identifying natural classes, this is not the same as
saying that area definitions are pointless. The definition of a natural
class does not exhaustively identify a thing's attributes, but it does form
the basis of further inquiry, wherein the information identified with the
natural class can increase throughout the course of inquiring into that
natural class; whereas this cannot really be true for an artificial class,
which has its area decided by fiat, or so Frederik would have to aver. So
the difference between a natural class and an artificial class is not that
one has area and the other does not; rather it is that a natural class's
area can change and increase over time, while an artificial class's area
cannot. This means that breadth x depth = area = information is still very
much at play and basic to Peirce's theory of logical quantity; in other
words, the multiplication of B x D is not pointless, but still forms the
basis of analyzing the meaning of a term (or proposition, or argument), as
well as forms the basis of its synthesizing with new findings in continuing
inquiry.

It seems to me that you, Cathy, do recognize that a natural class is one
into which we can continue to inquire and learn more about the class, but I
find your analysis then gets confused in rejecting the idea of information
as the product of breadth and depth; this formula is never really rejected
by Peirce, and I don't find that Frederik rejects it either. It only
becomes more nuanced and part of a more complex analysis over the years, or
so I find.


Now, having accepted it for the sake of argument above, I would actually
like to take issue with Frederik's notion that the class *red cows*, or any
artificial class, has an area. In OLEC, Peirce clearly states the following
(see 6th paragraph, The Conceptions of Quality, Relation, and
Representation, applied to this Subject, available online at Arisbe;
italics in original):

1st, The informed *breadth* of the symbol;

2d, The informed *depth* of the symbol;

3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or
predicate, or the *information* concerning the symbol.

By breadth and depth, without an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims

[Franklin Ransom]

Yogi, Gary, list(s),

I'm not on the biosemiotics list, so I can't send my reply there. If
someone wants to forward it for me, that would be nice; or if I should join
that list-serv, please me know that I should do so and how.

On the subject of the pragmatic maxim, Yogi says:

A sign’s immediate meaning is the “sum of all the obvious logical
implications of that sign,” while the dynamic meaning of the same sign is
“inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the final meaning of
that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the state of knowledge” at
its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to stress Peirce’s
“important tension” between the given incomplete current regarding of a
sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect knowledge (p. 296).

In Frederik's text, it seems to me that he identifies the pragmatic maxim
and a sign's immediate meaning as one and the same. He writes:

As a meaning theory, it may be compared to the mature Peirce's idea that
the immediate meaning of a sign is the sum of all the obvious logical
implications of that sign (to be distinguished from the dynamic meaning of
the sign, inferable from the context of utterance, on the one hand, and the
final meaning of the sign, on the other, comprising all implications of it
in the state of knowledge in the limit) (p.295).

This suggests that Frederik does identify the two as one and the same. But
in various places in his writings, Peirce distinguishes logical analysis
from pragmatic analysis; logical analysis has to do with analyzing the
implications of a definition. Also, I'm not so sure the immediate
interpretant of a sign is its obvious logical implications; after all,
Peirce did introduce the idea of the logical interpretant, not as an
alternative to the immediate interpretant, but as associated with the final
meaning of the sign. And besides that, I'm not so sure that the pragmatic
maxim has to do with logical implications, or at least not all of them; I
would suppose the pragmatic maxim limited to logical implications involving
subjunctive conditionals or counter-factuals, given what Peirce says in his
later writings. So I have some concerns with Frederik's depiction of the
pragmatic maxim from the standpoint of semiotic.

Overall the chapter seems fine to me in showing how the maxims inter-relate
and work together. What I don't really understand is the preoccupation with
the Enlightenment, and trying to talk about it as something that predates
humanity; that strikes me as a bit bizarre. Before man, this implies that
the process of Enlightenment was already brewing in organic nature
(p.304). And earlier, a statement is made which I'm not sure how to make
sense of: The growth of symbols, then, is the Enlightenment process of
self-evolving semiotic systems approaching reality in the limit (p.297).
Why is this an Enlightenment process? Doesn't this seem to be stretching
what was a particular historical period in Western history into a cosmic
process? Why is this necessary to do?

-- Franklin

On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
wrote:

 List,

 I'm certain Yogi meant to send this post to peirce-l as well as to the
 biosemiotics list.

 Best,

 Gary

 [image: Gary Richmond]

 *Gary Richmond*
 *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
 *Communication Studies*
 *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
 *C 745*
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 -- Forwarded message --
 From: yogi hendlin hend...@philsem.uni-kiel.de
 Date: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 6:04 PM
 Subject: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12
 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
 To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee


 Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 “Strategies of Research: Peirce’s
 Enlightenment Maxims”



 Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can
 finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt’s closing chapters, he
 assembles what he calls Peirce’s three Enlightenment maxims.

 According to “The Pragmatic Maxim,” which states that “all sorts of
 metaphysical ideals which do not have any ‘practical bearings’ or ‘effects’
 (1878), any ensuing ‘imperative practical maxims’ (1903), are null and
 void” (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an
 interesting position of only being “real” insofar as such abstractions make
 “marks on bodies” in the world (to take Karen Barad’s (2007) quote of Niels
 Bohr as the reference point of Bateson’s “differences that make a
 difference”). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic
 abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent
 they are translated into something in the world observable to and having
 effects on others. A sign’s *immediate* meaning is the “sum of all the
 obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the *dynamic* meaning
 of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the
 *final* meaning