Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
As for the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon", Peirce's criticisms of Kant are justified. But Kant may be excused for not understanding modern scientific methodology. By the late 19th and early 20th c, Peirce recognized that the science of his day had produced results that people could trust with their lives -- cars, trains, bridges, airplanes, and electricity. That did not guarantee the absolute certainty of scientific "laws", but it meant that they deserved a high level of confidence. In conclusion, I believe that Jack could "update" Kant by identifying the noumenon with Peirce's search for scientific "laws" that have been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of pragmaticism was very close to Kant's goal of a proof of his noumena John, list, Yes, this is what I am doing as of now. The thesis, that is, when published will be Kant through Peirce (not linear - as of now, convinced I've proven the necessity of the thing in itself but also convinced I've understood the precise juncture where Peirce and Kant come to disagreement and it is, in truth, incredible nuanced as you would expect of each: entirely a categorical matter with respect to each's respective system). Thanks for the information, by the way (have been gathering lots from the list exchange of late). Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Friday, June 9, 2023 7:06 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, Jon, Jack, Helmut, et al., Before discussing Peirce's comments about Kant and others, I think it's important to review Peirce's background and the influences that led to his final synthesis. By the time Peirce was 8 years old, his father had taught him Greek, Latin, mathematics, and chemistry. When he was 12, he taught himself logic from Whateley's book, and when he was 16, he and his father worked their way through Kant's KdrV (or CdrV in the spelling of that time). I believe that the combined effect of those influences led him to generalize his framework in order to accommodate all the details. I also believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby, starting in 1903, led to him to produce his clearest and most general foundation. The first effect (in 1904) was to replace his abstract phenomenology with a phenomenoscopy that was more compatible with her significs. He produced his final synthesis in 1911, shortly after he had promised to send her a copy of his latest work.. . Jeff> it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz... Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: "Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception." CP 2.370 Jeff> How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? The context of CP 2.370 is a section about univerals that begins at 2.367. In the remainder of 2.370 and later, Peirce did not distinguish the positions of those three. He quoted Leibniz (in French) as saying "all the examples that confirm a general truth, no matter how many they are, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of that same truth." He then quoted a long German passage in which Kant says that its a serious mistake to conclude "whatever holds in most cases holds in all cases." In the remainder of that section and 2.371, Peirce ignored differences among Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. His main conclusion was that they agreed that evidence for universals could not come from observations. Kant said that universals came from some "Erkentniss (understanding) a priori", but he did not explain where that Erkentnis came from. Peirce added "Descartes in particular, and Leibnitz in some measure, perhaps even Kant (though it would be very illogical for him to do so) did more or less attach weight to the irresistible apparent evidence, and to some degree to the catholic acceptance, of propositions as tending to persuade us of their truth; but not as criteria of their origin.". Although those three correctly recognized that observations alone could not guarantee the truth of univeersals, none of them had an adequate answer to the question about where
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jeff, Jon, Jack, Helmut, et al., Before discussing Peirce's comments about Kant and others, I think it's important to review Peirce's background and the influences that led to his final synthesis. By the time Peirce was 8 years old, his father had taught him Greek, Latin, mathematics, and chemistry. When he was 12, he taught himself logic from Whateley's book, and when he was 16, he and his father worked their way through Kant's KdrV (or CdrV in the spelling of that time). I believe that the combined effect of those influences led him to generalize his framework in order to accommodate all the details. I also believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby, starting in 1903, led to him to produce his clearest and most general foundation. The first effect (in 1904) was to replace his abstract phenomenology with a phenomenoscopy that was more compatible with her significs. He produced his final synthesis in 1911, shortly after he had promised to send her a copy of his latest work.. . Jeff> it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz... Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: "Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception." CP 2.370 Jeff> How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? The context of CP 2.370 is a section about univerals that begins at 2.367. In the remainder of 2.370 and later, Peirce did not distinguish the positions of those three. He quoted Leibniz (in French) as saying "all the examples that confirm a general truth, no matter how many they are, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of that same truth." He then quoted a long German passage in which Kant says that its a serious mistake to conclude "whatever holds in most cases holds in all cases." In the remainder of that section and 2.371, Peirce ignored differences among Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. His main conclusion was that they agreed that evidence for universals could not come from observations. Kant said that universals came from some "Erkentniss (understanding) a priori", but he did not explain where that Erkentnis came from. Peirce added "Descartes in particular, and Leibnitz in some measure, perhaps even Kant (though it would be very illogical for him to do so) did more or less attach weight to the irresistible apparent evidence, and to some degree to the catholic acceptance, of propositions as tending to persuade us of their truth; but not as criteria of their origin.". Although those three correctly recognized that observations alone could not guarantee the truth of univeersals, none of them had an adequate answer to the question about where the Erkentniss or other kind of understanding might come from. All three of them recognized that problem and wrote many words that Peirce did not find convincing (but he did not analyze their writings in that section). With his training in experimental science, starting at age 8, Peirce would agree with the three of them that observation alone was not sufficient to establish the truth of a universal or general proposition. However, scientific methodology (or his version of pragmaticism) could establish general truth to a high degree of certainty. But his principle of fallibilism meant that nothing could be absolutely certain, and his First Rule of Reason meant that everything must be open to questioning. There is no such thing as a universal principle that cannot be questioned, although there are many that we believe so strongly that we are willing to trust our lives to their truth. Flying in an airplane, for example, requires a high degree of faith in the science and engineering that produced it. As for the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon", Peirce's criticisms of Kant are justified. But Kant may be excused for not understanding modern scientific methodology. By the late 19th and early 20th c, Peirce recognized that the science of his day had produced results that people could trust with their lives -- cars, trains, bridges, airplanes, and electricity. That did not guarantee the absolute certainty of scientific "laws", but it meant that they deserved a high level of confidence. In conclusion, I believe that Jack could "update" Kant by identifying the noumenon with Peirce's search for scientific "laws" that have been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John, I tend to agree with you regarding Kant and Peirce. That Kant's claim is true (I would say categorically). I have been reading Kant through Peirce and Peirce through Kant, as is proper at the moment and have already had a few eureka moments regarding what is the nature of the ambiguity - incredibly nuanced as JAS and some private correspondence has alluded to - between the two. This I wish to keep for my thesis/article as and when it moves to publication (soon, I expect), but it has been a fruitful interchange with many here already. Will have reply to JAS, hopefully, within a few days which most here should find of interest. Best Jack From: John F Sowa Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 6:16 AM To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jon, Jack, et al., As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and your version does not correct the flaw. JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate". Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and ind
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Mary, Jeff, List: The new volume by Atkins is surely another valuable contribution from him to Peirce scholarship, but searching it on Google Books turns up zero instances of "thing in itself," "things in themselves," or "*Ding an sich*." It apparently does not even discuss collateral experience/observation, which would be the most relevant Peirce-specific terminology. Again, the first premiss in CP 5.525 is that that every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found. This is the basic principle of logic that we can *only *identify and distinguish an individual external thing using an *index *(2ns), not a verbal description (3ns) of its qualities (1ns)--e.g., a line of identity in the Beta part of Existential Graphs, or a variable in the now-standard first-order predicate calculus. Any interpreter of a sign referring to that thing (dynamical object) must *already *be acquainted with it from collateral experience/observation. CSP: [E]very correlate of an existential relation is a single object which may be indefinite, or may be distributed; that is, may be chosen from a class by the interpreter of the assertion of which the relation or relationship is the predicate, or may be designated by a proper name, but in itself, though in some guise or under some mask, it can always be perceived, yet never can it be unmistakably identified by any sign whatever, without collateral observation. Far less can it be defined. It is *existent*, in that its being does not consist in any *qualities*, but in its effects--in its actually acting and being acted on, so long as this action and suffering endures. Those who experience its effects perceive and know it in that action; and just that constitutes its very being. It is not in perceiving its qualities that they know it, but in hefting its insistency then and there, which Duns called its *haecceitas *... (CP 6.318, 1907) Biological twins are neither identical (strictly speaking) nor indiscernible, no matter how closely they resemble each other in appearance. At a minimum, they occupy different locations in space. Unless they are sons of George Foreman, we can distinguish them by using their proper names, which Peirce classified as rhematic indexical legisigns; or if we happen to be with them in the same room, then we can do so simply by pointing at them. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 1:30 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> wrote: > Hello John, Mary, all, > > I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and > remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested > earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to > respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in > light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. > > Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological > twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of > Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are > indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are > identical. > > In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between > Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual > things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective > accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as > existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That > is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by > looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual > individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general > laws that govern such individuals. > > A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential > for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which > is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our > perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general > conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, > individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at > a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, > maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own > character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the > requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of > signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. > > We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims > about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these > differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we > need to consider different
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Hello John, Mary, all, I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical. In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals. A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects. Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception. CP 2.370 How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? --Jeff From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM To: Mary Libertin Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John From: "Mary Libertin" Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. * * Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins _ _ _ _ _
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
John and Peirce-List, Here is the link to an excerpt from the book Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard Kenneth Atkins. https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false Best, Mary > On Jun 8, 2023, at 12:01 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Mary, > > Thanks for citing that book. > > Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro > or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any > excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. > > After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to > refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of > identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are > two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects > of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface > observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in > themselves"? > > For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles > of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for > tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. > > John > > > From: "Mary Libertin" > Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM > > John, Peirce-list > > For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this > discussion. > > Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By > Richard Kenneth Atkins > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John From: "Mary Libertin" Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. - - Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins > On Jun 8, 2023, at 1:16 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, Jack, et al., > > As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce > presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer > Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and > your version does not correct the flaw. > > JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an > sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. > CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after > all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a > subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise > indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The > Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no > proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of > it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless > surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) > The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey > has been thrown into the predicate". > > Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words > that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other > languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new > concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the > 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found > in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. > > In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. > Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. > And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure > precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. > > In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our > daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our > senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science > progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is > still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. > > John > > > Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" > Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM > > The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first > paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. > One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they > both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full > complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not > believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) > Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we > experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough > time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. > > As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of > the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an > optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as > pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of > those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. > . > "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in > the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already > reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final > opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all > that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, > or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought > to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... > > This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - > a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. > Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the > appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities > which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but > noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental > action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Jack, et al., As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and your version does not correct the flaw. JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate". Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate the latest attempt at simplification, but it is still not a deductively valid argumentation. In fact, its conclusion is an incorrect *definition*. JRKC: 13. Elemental qualities, in the absence of human (or, all organic) experience, must exist in themselves. 14. This is what Kant calls the “thing in itself”. On the contrary, this is *not *what Kant calls the "thing in itself." #13 is not controversial at all, as long as we are using "exist" in the logical sense of belonging to a universe of discourse; from the metaphysical standpoint, qualities have their *being *in themselves (1ns), but they do not *exist *except as embodied in things (2ns). Moreover, we agree that cognition (and representation in general) is always *mediation *such that things with their embodied qualities can and do exist without ever *actually *being cognized; again, the *real *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about it*, and the *external *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about anything*. We further agree that no cognition or other sign of an external thing is *identical *to that thing. In short, no one is disputing that external things *exist *independently of mediation or human cognitive processes, but at issue is whether external things and/or some of their embodied qualities are *incognizable*, i.e., impossible to *represent *by means of mediation (semiosis) including human cognitive processes. You still have not provided a series of premisses from which *that *conclusion follows necessarily, like I did by reformulating and formalizing Peirce's straightforward proof that the *Ding an sich* is nonsensical (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2023-06/msg00016.html). Instead, you seem to be *assuming *that whatever is *independent *of any representation of it is *incapable *of being represented at all, thus begging the question. JRKC: I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. These remarks reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peircean semeiotic. Strictly speaking, it is true that nothing *serves *as a dynamical object unless/until it *actually *determines a sign (such as a cognition) to represent it. Nevertheless, whatever logically exists, in *any *of the three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908), is *capable* of being represented and thus a *potential *dynamical object for a sign. Again, the problematic concept here is not so much the thing-in-itself as the *incognizable *thing-in-itself, the claim that something can exist yet be *impossible *to cognize/represent. For both Kant and Peirce, metaphysics depends on logic for principles, not the other way around. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 7:18 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps > it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the > thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how > to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the > problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That > is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but > surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow > each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the > primary points - semantic - are all sound. > > Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used > to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I > cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation > (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - > comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa > have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary > objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only > because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going > through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of > articulation. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack and Jon, I believe that the two of you are talking past one another. I also suspect that a major reason for the disagreement is that Kant and Peirce had very different criteria for what it means to know something. By knowing, Kant meant absolutely total knowledge of something, not just its appearances at the surface. But Peirce was first and foremost a scientist, who understood that scientific knowledge is acquired by years or even centuries of collaborative research by an untold number of scientists. The following quotation summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] John From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, June 5, 2023 10:31 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really held by all philosophers of all stripes, namely, that experience is all we know, understand experience in their nominalistic sense as the mere first impressions of sense. These "first impressions of sense" are hypothetical creations of nominalistic metaphysics: I for one deny their existence. But anyway even if they exist, it is not in them that experience consists. By experience must be understood the entire mental product. (CP 6.492, c. 1896) Peirce clarifies later, "But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist P
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, list, I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the primary points - semantic - are all sound. Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of articulation. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, June 5, 2023 10:31 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a *necessary *inference, i.e., a *deductive* conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the *existence *of anything *strictly *by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is *not *deductive at all, it is *abductive/retroductive*--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually *explain *anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is *impossible *to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can *attribute *predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even *talk *about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really held by all philosophers of all stripes, namely, that experience is all we know, understand experience in their nominalistic sense as the mere first impressions of sense. These "first impressions of sense" are hypothetical creations of nominalistic metaphysics: I for one deny their existence. But anyway even if they exist, it is not in them that experience consists. By experience must be understood the entire mental product. (CP 6.492, c. 1896) Peirce clarifies later, "But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 11:09 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, > > Just with respect to "inference": > > I just wish to say, in advance of what I think will be a slow creep, on my > part, toward a methodological break down of an already confirmed thesis (as > it stands to me, but necessary for its confirmation is not understood by > others or accepted) that my use of inference/infer is correct. I infer it, > the thing in itself exists, but as it is in itself, as to its qualities re > cognition, I cannot cognize it even as I do. My imagination of it is not > what it is, but merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to > imagine it. > > That is, I know that Socrates
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Just with respect to "inference": I just wish to say, in advance of what I think will be a slow creep, on my part, toward a methodological break down of an already confirmed thesis (as it stands to me, but necessary for its confirmation is not understood by others or accepted) that my use of inference/infer is correct. I infer it, the thing in itself exists, but as it is in itself, as to its qualities re cognition, I cannot cognize it even as I do. My imagination of it is not what it is, but merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to imagine it. That is, I know that Socrates existed. I do not know what he looked like but I might imagine such a man. I do not pretend my imagining of Socrates is what Socrates, the actual man, appeared in physical characteristic. But that I have an imagining of such a man, and know it to be incorrect, and also know that such a man existed, to which some "truthful" quality pertained, this is no contradiction at all. Thus, I infer that Socrates existed whilst also inferring that my representation of Socrates, in image, is not what Socrates, the man, actually looked like. More accurately, then: People operate upon this structural basis quite frequently. I'm sure I have read of this very means in Peirce. And yet, I cannot point you precisely to it, as it were, which is, diagrammatically, a micro-variety of the same phenomena. However, consider this: I hear of a person - predicate 1 - and something they've done/something qualitatively associated with them - predicate 2. I do not know the first predicate at all - the person - but am very familiar with the second predicate - the quality which is "something" they've done or is "something associated with them". Now, let's pretend the second predicate is "died/death". Thus, I may justly infer a conclusion, which is both inductive and deductive and have it stand entirely valid despite absolutely no knowledge of the first predicate. Insofar as "naturally occurring propositions" go, then, limited/no exposure to the first predicate beyond formal acquaintance, that it represents "a person", but quite a lot of exposure with/to the second predicate, which here is the quality of "death/died" is such, sui generis, that my inference corresponds to UnknownKnown wherein my attempts to imagine the Unknown, are entirely fallible And such is a logical truism: that the unknown may exist, and frequently does, (ordinally here), as in the above scenario where I have never met the first person, but I may still imagine that person via whatever images, as result of Collateral Experience, are present to my mind as means of furnishing. Yet, such images, I know, simultaneously, are not, at all, what that person, the unknown-but-really-extant "predicate", actually is/looks-like. It is Schopenhauer who posits the Known Unknown within the Kantian context of the thing in itself. He deviates, I have to recall here as it is ten years since I have read Schopenhauer, from my understanding of Kant, but that UnknownKnown, or KnownUnknown, is something, which, experientially, you find in Peirce (as Peirce explaining things as they are in representational terms - within his schema: is it abduction? the term is not important to me here, but what it refers to, as it were, is a rather true phenomena). At any rate, to infer that the thing in itself necessarily exists but that all cognitions of it are not it, beyond the mere fact that it exists, is not as contradictory as it may seem. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 8:57 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argument) is never an indication (index), it is always a symbol; and anything that we infer is thereby something that we cognize. In other words, as I have said twice before, even if your alleged "proof" demonstrates that the thing-in-itself must be inferred, it still must be capable of being represented, and thus cognizable after all. Cheers, Jon On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 2:45 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Hi Jon, li
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Helmut, List, No doubt, Jon, the burden of proof rests with me here because I am asserting that I have proved the necessary inference of the thing in itself and also assert that it cannot be cognized (as per Kant). I don't find myself rejecting basic principles of logic, at all, to be honest, but perhaps you find me rejecting basic principles of Peircean logic? For I read that Peircean extract differently and in a manner entirely logical, just one we do not agree with. But you have, to your credit, outlined precisely why you think the thing in itself can be represented whereas I say, and must now prove, within the Peircean idiom, so to speak, precisely why this is not true. Thus, I think it a premature statement, on your behalf, here, to say that I am "blocking" the road of "inquiry" when I am spending a hot Monday afternoon rather heuristically reading through eclectic Peircean material and responding to Peircean scholars about the very nature of the Peircean schema. Indeed, I believe we advance inquiry precisely by doing what we are now doing. Thanks. Now I think, that representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to it giving a hint. I think that's entirely accurate, Helmut. I am, too, more concerned with the general outline, (of how Peirce derives his categories and general categorical framework), than with specifics because to approach the Kantian/Hume (now Peirce, too) debate, you must go to the generalities in logic before, insofar as I can tell, rushing to the specificities of any given writer's system. I find myself engaged with Peirce's "lists" as of now, that is, the means by which he came to deduce his categories. The Deduction of Categories in Peirce's "New List" Author(s): Fred Michael Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society , Summer, 1980, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1980), pp. 179-211 Published by: Indiana University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319892 I recommend the above. Perhaps (or, rather, likely, given the audience) familiar to many of you already. I am concerned with the most general as of now, the burden of proof being upon me. For though I am convinced it is logically proven already, that we are debating it means I have not proved it sufficiently, it isn't accurate, or I have not sufficiently made myself understood. Thus, it falls back upon me, rather than other people, to sufficiently prove my thesis: that the thing in itself must necessarily be inferred and, necessarily, cannot be cognized (part of my thesis, at any rate). That's fine, I think, as my interest is philosophy/logic with particular interest in Semeiotic/Peirce, and I find myself discussing all of these things with the requisite audience. I would only stress this: argumentation over something such as this can never limit inquiry. We are necessarily advancing it by removing ambiguity regardless of whose position wins out. That is, if JAS be correct (his position within the debate-parameters), then truth, via consensus, over time, wins and such can never be a bad thing. The same if my thesis is found to be accurate. I find this debate very helpful, that is, for the parameters - what is required of me as it were and thus what is found lacking by others within my position - have been suitably set. That is already a dividend reaped for honest inquiry. This is a nuanced issue, if you ask me, and will take time to consider. I have been formulating series/natural language descriptions for nearly a year now. It's not a rush to the finish line for me. Thus, Jon, your position, for example. Suppose it is actually accurate and I instead walk away with that proof? Well, I have nonetheless explored Peirce/Kant/Hume - metaphysics and semeiotic - exhaustively. There is no such thing as "failed thesis", an old advisor once told me, if you can advance the area of research within which said thesis is published. Less about winning, I suppose, and more about advancing the truth by hook or crook but honestly. Best wishes, Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 8:57 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, Helmut, List: Deciding from the outset that no sign can ever represent its object as it is in itself is blocking the way of inquiry, not to mention begging the question. Given that stance on Jack's part, again, there is nothing more for us to discuss. The supposed "is-ought distinction" is not relevant here. Every sign means something because that is part of the very definition of a sign--it has an *immediate *(possible) interpretant, such that it is capable of producing *dynamical *(actual) interpretants. Logic as semeiotic is a *normative *science in the sense that it prescribes how we *ought* to reason, *if *our goal in doing so is to adopt only true beliefs, i.e., to conform our dynamical interpretants of any given sign to its *final *(ideal) interpretant. A thing in itself (*dynamical *object) is as it is regardless of how anyone *actually *represents it (*immediate *object), but it is precisely how an infinite community *would *represent it after infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 11:19 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Jack, Jon, List, > > Both Hume´s law, and the "natural fallacy"- theory say, that you cannot > conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, that is because the two are > categorically different approaches. So I guess, that it neither is possible > to conclude the other way, from "Ought" to "Is". Now I think, that > representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean > something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is > iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to > it giving a hint. The only critical variety (a variety in which it is > possible to conclude from ought to is, resp. when "Ought" turns into "Is"), > I see, is indexical with complete induction, when the hints fill the space > of possibility in a way, that there is no more space for counter-hints. But > this case is not only unlikely, I think, but also contradicts Goedel. The > range of the space of possibility is necessarily unknown, otherwise it > could not be called "possibility". So I guess, that you cannot conclude > from an ought-matter such as representation to an is-matter, like the > essential being of a thing. > > Best, Helmut > *Gesendet:* Sonntag, 04. Juni 2023 um 09:50 Uhr > *Von:* "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" > *An:* "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the > object as it is in itself. > > Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear > argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to > disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object > as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good > pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach > consensus one way or the other. > > Thanks. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argument) is never an indication (index), it is always a symbol; and anything that we infer is thereby something that we cognize. In other words, as I have said twice before, even if your alleged "proof" demonstrates that the thing-in-itself must be inferred, it still must be capable of being represented, and thus cognizable after all. Cheers, Jon On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 2:45 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two > specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the > discussion further. > > Hi Jon, list, > > I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer > these two questions. I agree with that. > > I would say, provisionally, that premises 1 and 2, 4 and thus 5 are all > wrong. That the thing in itself can be indicated but its indication comes > by inference (for, as you know, it cannot possibly be cognized). > > But it requires a better treatment from me which I've began drafting (not > overly long as in the last essay-post and more conventional). > > Thanks again. > > Jack > > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > Any argumentation that has a "gap" *cannot *be deductively valid. The > whole point is to *show *that the conclusion follows necessarily from the > premisses by spelling them *all *out, especially the ones that are likely > to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in > itself" entails that nothing has been *demonstrated *yet. *Which > premiss(es) are you omitting?* > > By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the *Ding an > sich* is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. > > CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after > all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains > a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or > otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be > prescribed. The *Ding an sich*, however, can neither be indicated nor > found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or > false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be > thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) > > > In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, > we can reformulate it as follows. > > 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or > found (all S is I or F). > 2. The *Ding an sich* can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). > 3. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* cannot be the subject of a meaningful > proposition (no D is S). > > > We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. > > 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E > is S). > > 5. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* does not exist (no D is E). > > > Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). *Which > premiss(es) are you denying?* > > Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the > *non-existence* of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing > misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it > violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction > to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the > full context. > > CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up > in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of > things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the > universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think > Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe > which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to > be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I > cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself. Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach consensus one way or the other. Thanks. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example, you say over and over that our concepts of things are not identical to those things, but this is uncontroversial and irrelevant--the sign is not the object, but
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Hi Jon, list, I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer these two questions. I agree with that. I would say, provisionally, that premises 1 and 2, 4 and thus 5 are all wrong. That the thing in itself can be indicated but its indication comes by inference (for, as you know, it cannot possibly be cognized). But it requires a better treatment from me which I've began drafting (not overly long as in the last essay-post and more conventional). Thanks again. Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
nowledge of things as they are as > the result of our * finite *inquiries, it is whether it *would be* > possible for an *infinite *community to attain knowledge of things as > they are as the result of *infinite *inquiry." > > I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which > Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed > objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an > infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of > infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is > in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't > "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of > the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the > period of time be finite or infinite. > > And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is > necessary. > > Best > > Jack > ---------- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not > deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to > those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are > as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). > Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of > things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical > interpretants)--cannot *represent *those things as they are in > themselves, i.e., that we cannot * cognize *those things as they are in > themselves (final interpretant). > > Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. > We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not > at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an > incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is > not whether the *finite *community of humans can ever *actually *attain > knowledge of things as they are as the result of our *finite *inquiries, > it is whether it *would be* possible for an *infinite *community to > attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of *infinite * > inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > 1. Things impress upon me, > 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. > 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then > 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. > 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, > beyond our impressions (formal) of them. > > That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. > > I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they > are. We can only know their human aspect”. > > May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. > > Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly > cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions > which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as > they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation > necessitates that such things are in themselves. > > Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies > things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here > rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, > consistently in all manner of logical forms. > > John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is > accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, > when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as > scholar (polymath) until his death. > > Best, > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, I had to go to an essay, though somewhat colloquial, to properly treat this matter (in the context of things I have alluded to and shared, in part, but to which texts/etc., not everyone has access). It isn't a formal essay, thus colloquial, but addresses the core part of this argument (primarily between JAS and myself regarding the "thing in itself" and Kant's position within Peircean semeiotic). The essay-lite lacks proper references, etc., in places, but I think is sufficient to advance the debate. Best, Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack The Thing In Itself. Kant and Peirce..docx Description: The Thing In Itself. Kant and Peirce..docx _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality The mistake Kant makes, in my opinion, and the opinions of many a philosopher (as people here will know), is to try and qualify the noumenal. He is correct, that is, to imply the necessity of the thing in itself, but as it cannot be cognized, which is no fallacy, or tautology, (Peirce could grasp it in 1911), then there is very little beyond interference which one can say about the "realm" to which it corresponds. His system, the Critique, is pulled apart for these reasons. But, as Kant said of Hume - just because certain things are inconsistent within a given philosopher's system does not mean we have to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and I say the same with respect to Kant and his treatment, discursive, of the noumenal which beyond speculation cannot really be described. The Hegelian "Geist" (if we take it as Spirit, somewhat as Hegel would have it?, except much less defined as it is in Hegel for the same reasons which apply to Kant), is about as close as one may get (it is a known incognizable, ala Schopenhauer, except here I depart from Schopenhauer and Hegel, by implication, for Schoperhauer's telos is of Hegel's Geist: overly defined). Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 3:34 AMal To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, List: Admittedly, I have not read a lot of Kant, so I am mostly just agreeing with Peirce that "the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). Also, "The Ding an sich ... can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). I further agree with Peirce that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality--that which is as it is regardless of any representation of it, but which is nevertheless capable of being represented, and thus "cognizable in some degree" and "itself of a representative nature." While our representations of reality--prescinded predicates, hypostasized subjects, and composed propositions attributing the former to the latter--are "creations of [our] thought," the reality itself is not. Again, this reflects the distinction between the immediate and dynamical objects of a sign. Kant and Peirce indeed agree that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience," but Peirce immediately adds that "we have direct experience of things in themselves. ... Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented" (CP 6.95, 1903). By contrast, "Kant failed to work out all the consequences of this third moment of thought and considerable retractions are called for, accordingly, from some of the positions of his Transcendental Dialectic" (ibid). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 3:47 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon, Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms. As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic knowledge of that. JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry." I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the period of time be finite or infinite. And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is necessary. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot *represent *those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot *cognize *those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the *finite *community of humans can ever *actually *attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our *finite *inquiries, it is whether it *would be* possible for an *infinite *community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of *infinite *inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > 1. Things impress upon me, > 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. > 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then > 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. > 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, > beyond our impressions (formal) of them. > > That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. > > I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they > are. We can only know their human aspect”. > > May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. > > Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly > cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions > which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as > they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation > necessitates that such things are in themselves. > > Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies > things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here > rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, > consistently in all manner of logical forms. > > John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is > accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, > when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as > scholar (polymath) until his death. > > Best, > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
e is the extent to which Kant and Peirce > appear to agree about the "rule which admits of no exception." > > --Jeff > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 1:23 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be > represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and > Kant was wrong. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object > would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after > infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. > > Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via > the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the > mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can > never be, to us, "as it is in itself". > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 9:23 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Hi Jon, Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms. As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought. And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever." What strikes me about this passage is the extent to which Kant and Peirce appear to agree about the "rule which admits of no exception." --Jeff From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 1:23 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object > would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after > infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. > > Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via > the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the > mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can > never be, to us, "as it is in itself". > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: What Peirce specifically denies is that there is any *incognizable* "thing in itself." If your alleged "proof" merely demonstrates that it must be inferred, then it must be capable of representation after all--as the conclusion of a deductive, inductive, or abductive argument--and thus cognizable. Peirce would agree with this, having affirmed that even perceptual judgments--"the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903)--"are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227, 1903). Without a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context, "meaning" is just as vague as "value." Of course, for Peirce as a pragmaticist, *ultimate *meaning consists in habits of conduct--whether exhibited by humans, birds, snails, or worms. Moreover, as I have pointed out before, Peirce *opposes *"noumenal" to "thing in itself" instead of aligning them. "[T]hat to which the representation should conform [as its object] is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign,--something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself" (CP 5.553, EP 2:380, 1906). Moreover, "The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol. But I say the same element is in all signs. The essential thing is that it is capable of being represented. Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). In other words, to be intelligible at all is to be capable of being represented, and therefore of a representative nature. The upshot is that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--not incognizable/unintelligible "things in themselves." Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:42 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic > justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to > incognizable but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) > "essence" is no wide departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of > all Kant's works, would, in places, put it precisely as that. Which is part > of the task I have when engaging in natural language descriptions. Now, > that there is a thing in itself, of this kind, which must necessarily be > inferred is something Peirce denies (calling Kant a confused realist, > though he also "more than" admired him). > > As for value, Jon, just swap it out for "meaning" (the meaning derived or > found within any experience whatsoever which becomes "value" when delimited > for sake of clarity). Though it can always be more concise. As for Essence > - I mean noumenal. I say nothing of it except that it - the noumenal thing > in itself - must now, when I have set the proper parameters with feedback > given from various quarters, be inferred to exist via the formalisms I > employ. That is, I claim here that I have proven the core part of Kant's > thesis whilst my own does not necessarily have to stay within the Kantian > limits but does, as you rightly point out, have to properly situate the > Kantian thesis before departing. On that, I agree absolutely. > > Best > > Jack > > ---------- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in > philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For > example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you > mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an > "interaction." You seem to be talking about different *representations*, > which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. > > If you are *not *using Kant's well-established philosophical definition > of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical > definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing > those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a > novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever > deliberately uses a word or other s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different representations, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are not using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no actual representation is ever a complete representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the immediate object (as represented in this sign) and the dynamical object (independent of any representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks again for offering to critique. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively valid, it
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to incognizable but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) "essence" is no wide departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of all Kant's works, would, in places, put it precisely as that. Which is part of the task I have when engaging in natural language descriptions. Now, that there is a thing in itself, of this kind, which must necessarily be inferred is something Peirce denies (calling Kant a confused realist, though he also "more than" admired him). As for value, Jon, just swap it out for "meaning" (the meaning derived or found within any experience whatsoever which becomes "value" when delimited for sake of clarity). Though it can always be more concise. As for Essence - I mean noumenal. I say nothing of it except that it - the noumenal thing in itself - must now, when I have set the proper parameters with feedback given from various quarters, be inferred to exist via the formalisms I employ. That is, I claim here that I have proven the core part of Kant's thesis whilst my own does not necessarily have to stay within the Kantian limits but does, as you rightly point out, have to properly situate the Kantian thesis before departing. On that, I agree absolutely. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different representations, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are not using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no actual representation is ever a complete representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the immediate object (as represented in this sign) and the dynamical object (independent of any representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire struct
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different *representations*, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are *not *using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no *actual *representation is ever a *complete *representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the *immediate *object (as represented in *this *sign) and the *dynamical *object (independent of *any *representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible *in principle*, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, list, > > That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. > > I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for > computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into > suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, > if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear > situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is > also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has > "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about > whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and > ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of > engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will > submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as > possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too > precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. > > Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. > However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that > link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely > await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of > the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). > > I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks > again for offering to critique. > > Best > > Jack > > ---------- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you > sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide > your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its > conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all its > terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all > its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be > disagreement, especially about that last requirement. > > One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not > synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. > Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that > makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is > ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms > seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for > how they
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks again for offering to critique. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively valid, it is not sound unless all its terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be disagreement, especially about that last requirement. One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for how they are being used in this particular context. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Dear Jon/Helmut and List, https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce obviously being present). Best wishes Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all its terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be disagreement, especially about that last requirement. One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for how they are being used in this particular context. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Dear Jon/Helmut and List, > > https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 > > The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, > the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is > accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the > necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). > > These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. > I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as > quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any > criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine > my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have > to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce > obviously being present). > > Best wishes > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Dear Jon/Helmut and List, https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce obviously being present). Best wishes Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 4:16 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Helmut, list It wasn't what I was going for, but it is a metaphysical proof, so it will share characteristics of arguments such as that, I suppose (thing in itself being "noumenal"). Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 7:55 PM To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). List, I have not fully understood the proof of the thing in itself, but it seems to me, that it is formally the same or similar as Anselm of Canterbury`s proof of God. Is that so? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Mai 2023 um 05:16 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wr
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List In the logical series here, I demonstrate that the infinite is recursive (not as repetition but as perpetuating difference) and apply it to the "continua" (infinite is continuous - if it isn't continuous, doesn't continue, it isn't properly infinite). As for Godel, that is the point really. I take what only applied to axiomatic formal systems (from within) logic and demonstrate how it applies to all systems which derive "value" of any variety (and necessarily). But as to your request - to make it more rigorous and coherent - I agree, that is something which has to be done on my "side" if it still meets with misunderstanding. I will go away and try to formalize more simply and more rigorously with "value" being delineated precisely. Best, Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 4:16 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [*actual*] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable *in principle*. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the > formalism), it is *of the continua*. It is infinite - continuous - in its > recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but > infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, > only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the > thing in itself. > > Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness > resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation > itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no > single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist > competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's > value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each > instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the > naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or > salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. > Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and > humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits > - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then > compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is > admitted and then denied. > > JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current > representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate > representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, > claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an > artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge > > It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human > representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via > logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational > inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of > representation (mediation *sui generis*). A "raised" (meta) claim > regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and > I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (*formally*), > then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step > forward. > > You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners > of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f > you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually > true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that > which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? > > I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know > (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical > form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after > (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very > much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is > Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wrong regarding the thing in > itself (and think, moreover, that it has been proven). > > That is - and this is not aimed at you - rather than pick a summary here > or a quotative there, what I seek is analysis of the logical series and an > alternative. For I know not else how to go about weighing proofs or alleged > proofs. We must disregard the terminologies of any given philosopher - > suspend it for a time - until the logical form is dealt with and then see > which schema, tradition, personage, best accommodates the result. > > Best > > Jack > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary
