RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants
Gary f. Do not loose hope. - It truly is cumbersome to proceed from thinking in trichotomies into thinking in triads. - Most transform even trchotomies into dyads, or worse still, into dichotomies. With dichotomies, one deals with megations, without mediation. Thus not in a Peircean way. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 21.3.2018 14:02: Jon, Gary R, Evidently I was wrong to think that I can follow your reasoning, so I’d better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking for more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open. What I can do is provide here a more complete quotation from the letter to James (14 March 1909) that Gary mentioned, which includes several examples, and may be of some further use in the discussion: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e., the Object as represented in the sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign _cannot_ express, which it can only _indicate_ and leave the interpreter to find out by _collateral experience._ For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I can't make my companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in the field of vision. It is useless to attempt to discuss the genuineness and possession of a personality beneath the histrionic presentation of Theodore Roosevelt with a person who recently has come from Mars and never heard of Theodore before. A similar distinction must be made as to the Interpretant. But in respect to _that_ Interpretant, the dichotomy is not enough by any means. For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” _This_ is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the _impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains._ Whose Interpretant, as expressed, is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is _my answering her question._ But beyond that, there is a _third_ Interpretant. The _Immediate Interpretant_ is what the Question expresses, _all_ that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly restated above. The _Dynamical Interpretant_ is the actual effect that it has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the _Ultimate,_ or _Final, Interpretant_ is her _purpose_ in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its _Immediate Object_ is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the _character_ of it, but the _identity_ of it. The _Dynamical Object_ is the _identity_ of the actual and _Real_ meteorological conditions at the moment. The _Immediate Interpretant_ is the _schema_ in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. The _Dynamical Interpretant_ is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her. The _Final Interpretant_ is the sum of the _Lessons_ of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. Now it is easy to see that my attempt to draw this three-way, “trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and important three-way distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of study before it is rendered perfect. Lady Welby has got hold of the same real distinction in her “Sense, Meaning, Significance,” but conceives it as imperfectly as I do, but imperfectly in other ways. Her _Sense_ is the _Impression_ made or normally to be made. Her _Meaning_ is what is intended, its purpose. Her _Significance_ is the real upshot. [EP2:498] Gary f. FROM: Jon Alan Schmidt SENT: 20-Mar-18 21:42 TO: Peirce-L SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants Gary F., List: On the contrary, it merely implies that the Intentional Interpretant of a given Sign is not determined by _that _Sign itself, but by the Signs that come _before _it in the uttering Quasi-mind; and I am assuming, along the same lines as Gary R., that each Sign is determined by exactly two Objects and determines exactly three Interpretants, but I am still trying to sort out the latter. Perhaps an abstract example of what I am proposing, rather than a concrete one, will be helpful for keeping everything straight. Suppose that Quasi-mind A utters Sign Y, which determines Quasi-mind B to a further Sign Z as its Effectual or Dynamic Interpretant. The Communicational Interpretant of Sign Y is simply its Immediate Interpretant--the Form that Sign Y communicates from Quasi-mind A to Quasi-mind B as a determination of their overlap, the Commens (A ∩ B). The Intended or Intentional Interpretant is Sign X, the _preceding _determination of Quasi-mind A by
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Roses are red
Helmut, list, Pastness is always relative to present and future, that is what Peirce means. There is a feeling of pastness attacheched to memories and reminiscences. Which is the ground for recognizing them AS memories. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.5.2018 17:40: John, Stephen, list, I agree that it is trivial. But then why did Peirce write that pastness is relative? Maybe "pastness" is the feeling, not the past? Here is the quote again: Peirce: CP 8.194 Cross-Ref:†† "A questioner to whom pragmaticism comes as a novelty will naturally ask, "Do you mean to say that you do not believe there has been any past?" To which the pragmaticist will reply, -- and note well his answer, because it is analogous to the answer he will give to a host of questions to which no further allusion will be made, -- "Why, I believe in the reality of the past just as completely as you do, and just in the way that you do, except that either you or I perhaps do not describe correctly the intellectual side of [its] real meaning. To any memory [of] the past, there attaches a certain color, -- a certain quality of feeling, -- just as there does to the sight of a Jacqueminot rose.†5 Ontological metaphysicians usually say that 'secondary sensations,' such as colors, are delusive and false; but not so the Pragmaticist. He insists that the rose really is red; for red is, by the meaning of the word, an appearance; and to say that a Jacqueminot rose really is red means, and can mean, nothing but that if such a rose is put before a normal eye, in the daylight, it will look red. Just so, the feeling qualities attaching to memories are entirely true and real, though obviously relative, as pastness itself obviously is relative." Best, Helmut More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . Links: -- [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic
John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way to his latest existential graps, I would be most grateful. Greimas, the Lithuanian semiotician I have met and discussed with, used a square similar to the one in page 397. It turned out that he had never thought of his semiotic square in terms of triad (or triple) relations. A square, like the diagram in CSP page 397, can be folded two ways. Then one gets two triangles. One recto, one verso, each visible at a time, but not together (the very idea of recto and verso). My interest lies mainly on the relation of logical negation and other forms of opposition. Pythagorean oppositions, for example are often treated as negations, without proper grounds. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.5.2018 18:44: On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: I've only seen Venn mention Peirce in regard to Peirce's symbolism for symbolic logic. It's too bad there wasn't more interaction between the two. I agree. After reading your note, I didn't do an exhaustive search, but I found that Peirce (a) had a high regard for Venn, (b) recognized the limitations and errors in Venn's writings, and (c) considered Venn's errors a stimulating starting point for his own thinking. That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics. They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books: "On the various notations adopted for expressing the common propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66). This article includes brief excerpts from a large number of sources, including Frege (1879) and Peirce (1880). But Venn's comments about Frege's notation were not encouraging. See the attached FregeByVenn.jpg. Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of logical propositions." In this one, he compares his own diagrams with a variety of other representations. In 1882, Peirce wrote a letter to O. H. Mitchell (Writings, vol 4, pp. 394 to 399) in which he drew diagrams to represent the "logic of relatives. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic
Helmut, list, I do not get confused very easily on these topics:) But I think I quite understand your dilemmas. Helmut. Negation is no easy topic. Formal logic may succeed in making it seem easy. To my mind mostly because the sentences to be formalized are invented for the purposes of demonstation. Thus they are made seem easy. But if and when one is interested in natural language, one soon tumbles into various difficulties & problems. I would recommend skimming through a book by Lawrence R. Horn (1989: A natural history of negation. Horn is a linguist, who "..focused on the exploration of natural language negation and its relation to other operators" (Wikipedia). Just in order to get an overview on the variety of problems. Don't get stuck with 'exclusion'! - CSP starts his graph theory with the concept of a sheet of assertion, which has a recto and verso. - Now, does the recto exclude the verso? - Well, yes AND no. IF you have started with the idea of a sheet of paper, then you can only see what's on it but not simultaneously the other side. IF you have started out with yhe idea of pages in a book, you simultaneously can see two pages, and then you need to turn the page. (But unless you have superpowers you only can read the pages one by one.) With computer screens thigs go differently. It is no longer obvious to all, that any verso even exists. Common sense is changing... though slowly. CSP's general advice is: one must start what we believe (i.e do not doubt in our hearts). And then proceed in a methodical way, step by step, without jumping into conclusions. As our minds naturally, i.e spontaneously tend to do. In order to follow Peirce's mindset in laying out the logic in EG's, one must start with the practical settings in his days. A sheet of paper and a pen, OR a blackboard and a piece of chalk. Which one is positive? Which on is negative? - One just must make up ones mind! AND be consistent with the choice. - Ink on paper cannot be easily erased, whilst chalk on a blackboard is. Our contemporary habits have more and more been formed to accord with computer screens. Erasing is so easy, one does not tend to even take notice of doing so. Why do these practical trivialities matter? - Because they presume and indicate certain kinds of mind-sets, which change in time. Our task (as Peirceans) is to understand his mind-set and 'translate' as best we can to our contemporaries (with now prevailing mind-sets). Action and experience are formed by each other. => Common sense. I have only studied in detail Peirce's introduction to EGs. Partly because my limited interest in formal logic. My main interest lies in natural language(s), discourse in the Foucaldian sense. Even with that my interests lie in meanings conveyed, i.e. the relations between thoughts and various ways of conveying thoughts. I.e. understanding. Your problems with the concept 'identity' I find most relevant and important. - There is a great difference between mathematical indentity and logical identity. ( I think you may gain from taking up Fayerabent: Anything goes. He writes a most fun exposition on varieties of traits in attempts to define anything. I do not agree with his conclusions, mind you. - But they somewhat resemble what you write in your post.) There was (in the list) a quote (by gnox) from CSP on three lines of identity I have hoped to take up here. We'll see. - Was it about magpies? If it was about another species of birds, it makes no (logical) difference. Somewhere in his writings the demonstrative example is about magpies. Thank you for your post! Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 27.5.2018 01:41: Kirsti, list, I also think, that "negation" is an interesting and urgent topic. Peirce´s graphs are maybe based on exclusion, but is exclusion the same as negation? And, is exclusion the opposite of inclusion (Venn?) And is negation of negation the same as affirmation? Many questions, of which I suspect each answer to be "No". But we want to find the "Yes"ses, dont we. Example: There is said (in the internet) that integrity is based on identity. I don´t agree: Identity is traital negation, definition by exclusion of certain traits, and keeping the left ones, and if there are none, just pick any out of the blue, like nations, ethnics, your mothers, esoterics, religions, or else. Integrity is negation of negation of temporal and situative differences of behaviour. So both are completely different, but are not opposites either, as they concern different things. So there may be a negation which is not a negation. So much for that, I hope I have completely confused you, because complete confusion is the most democratic starting point for a fruitful discussion. Best, Helmut. 26. Mai 2018 um 18:38 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?
John, P-listers, I wonder why science(s) seems to be left out of the context in the discussions in this thread. To my mind they are direly needed in order to make sense , ecp. of the latter part of the title, to start with. So: What does a variable refer to? Within empirical science(s) a variable refers to something specifically measured , and to something specifically controlled & by any means attepted to keep constant OR taken as non-significant in relation the issue under study. Theories and theoretical models are needed in order to make sensible decisions on which are the variables that matter. – Thus "a variable" (in this context )refers to the model chosen for the investigation. The model may or may not be presented as a diagram. All models present simplifications of reality. Just as any map presents a simplification of the terrain. – Otherwise it simply does not do the job. – EG's present a certain kind of logical maps . John wrote: " When we use the words 'possible' and 'actual', we must distinguish pure mathematics and applied mathematics: 1. Pure mathematics is pure possibility. It can never make any claims about what is or is not actual. 2. But *applied* mathematics must determine which of the infinitely many theories are the best approximations to some actuality Lets take up the logical form of the first assertion. It is about the relation between pure math and pure possibility, with the logical connection "IS". This seemingly inocuous connective smuggles in the assumption that we are dealing with an existent relation, a relation between two existents we can simply name. – With existents, a question of the type: is OR NOT is, makes sense. With other kinds, it does not. (Remember Hamlet: to be OR NOT to be? – Hamlet got stuck in the question. Ofelia went mad with Hamlet stuck in it.) When *applied* math enters, it never does so but within and into a stage and scene and plot already *there*. The audience is also already there. – With no audience, the play just flops. A division between *pure' and *applied* makes sense only within a historical, ongoing context. I do understand that John does have a context, an actual, ongoing discussion (ontology) he is taking part in. I do not wish to interfere with that. Thus I only send this to the Peirce-list. Just because I was left wondering wether the ontology context proves out to be a Procrustean bed for a Peircean frame of thought? Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.8.2018 08:31: Azamat, When we use the words 'possible' and 'actual', we must distinguish pure mathematics and applied mathematics: 1. Pure mathematics is pure possibility. It can never make any claims about what is or is not actual. 2. But *applied* mathematics must determine which of the infinitely many theories are the best approximations to some actuality [JFS] Challenge: I claim that it's impossible to find or describe anything that is somewhere in between possible/actual or mathematical/physical -- according to the way I defined it. [AA] It was shown by Aristotle that the method of dichotomy is not good in making an exhaustive division into two and ONLY two classes. But that statement is about applied mathematics, where we have to choose among all the possibilities. That is the gray area where there is no certainty. We can never do an exhaustive analysis. AA Reality is so rich and diverse that hardly any formal science or logical scheme could meet its infinite complexity. Yes. But I would prefer to emphasize the choice: JFS Reality is so rich and diverse and the possibilities are infinite. We can never be certain which formal science or logical scheme is best. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
John, list, First, I wish to thank John for his comments to my earlier post to the list. I agreed with all, but one point. Which consist in an, to my mind, unwarranted focus on classifications. Peirce in several occasions wrote about KINDS. (Should be easy enought to google). - Kinds (as a philosophical concept) rely on Qualities and qualitative differentiation. Thus on Firstness. Classifications, at least as we late moderns know them, do not. Take, for example, genus, species and an existent individuals (be they a facts, events or something else). All empirical sciences deal with facts, events or some other kinds of existent individuals. It is well worth noticing, that CSP relied on KINDS of events in laying the grounds for his theory of probabilities. To CSP, they come first. - So cutting a long story short, in order to successfully and scientifically probabilities in science, including humanities, there must be some sense of these qualities. Now, there is a peculiar linguistic fact, that in English there are two different verbs to denote BEING and EXISTENCE. But in French or in Latin there are not. In ancient Greece, as far as I know, this would have been unconceivable. Peirce was a polyglott, who conversed with fluence and subtlety e.g. on Baskian language. - But I do not recall his ever taking up this special feature of English. (And Spanish, as well). I wonder why? Nowadays English has more and more become the new Latin of scientists and scholars. Thus perpetuating a new uniformity within ways of thinking. - Translating ones thoughts from one language to some others helps a lot in sustaining diversity of thoughts and human mental life. Which is just as important as biodiversity. When taking up MIND, in a Peircean context, one should remember that Peirce took up unconscious mind, and especially pointed out that he used his concept of FEELING in the same sense that it was used and developed by Tetens. Peirce named Tetens Kant's teacher. - Still, no Kant expert, nor Peirce expert I have discussed on this, had ever even heard of Tetens. To my knowledge, Kant never mentioned Tetens. (Perhaps google knows better nowadays). Why did Peirce change the term 'phenomenology* into 'faneroscopy'? - My hypothesis was that it was an attempt to make a distinction with (by then more and more popular) Husserlian phenomenology. - I then met a very distinguished Peirce scholar in Finland and asked her what she thougt. She confirmed that the side notes in the manuscripts were all fore this hypothesis. Peirce does write that math makes its ow logic, but he does not write that it is all there is to it. But no Peircean should do the error of taking the mind as the same as consciousness, whatever one may mean by that. Husserlian philosophy was designed as a philosophy of consciousness, it aimed to answer to the modern question of knowledge, not the ancient or medieval one. - Wisdom of the heart was by then dismissed from epistemology. Not so by Aristotle and his Sensus Communis. The clift between epistemology and ontology has left this into the reign of common stupidity. In the era of mass media, when it would be most direly needed and cultivated. With best wishes, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 13.9.2018 17:03: Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD, Both subject lines are closely related. For modes of being, I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite: Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. That is a dramatic way of making a point that Peirce repeated many times in many ways: Every theorem in pure mathematics is hypothetical. It has the form "If hypothesis (and/or axioms), then conclusion." That means the subject matter of pure mathematics is pure possibility, and the theorems are necessary statements about those possibilities. If a mathematical theorem is applied to something actual in some branch of science or in common sense, then its conclusion is a prediction about those actual entities that must be tested by methodeutic. For quotations by Peirce, search for the phrase "pure mathematics" in CP. There are 49 instances. As for semiotic, there is a reason why CP 1.190 is just one line: Phenomenology is, at present, a single study. Please look at CP 1.300 to 1.353, which he wrote in 1894. That is his study of the "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought." Since he had previously written that long analysis, there was no reason for him to say more about phenomenology in 1903. In 1905, he used the term 'phaneroscopy': Phaneroscopy is the description of the _phaneron_; and by the _phaneron_ I mean the total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. (CP 1.284) Whether or not phaneroscopy/phenomenology are identical or closely related, Peirce's writings
[PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism
List, After reading some more of the discussion on these threads, I wish to remind all of endless feminist disputes on essentialism and universalism. The answer does not have the form: either/or. Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism
Thank you, Edwina. Kirsti Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 16.9.2018 17:35: Kirstima Thank you so much for your very astute and wise posts - both of them. You have pointed out, very subtly and yet accurately, the problem [in my view] of the many posts on 'exact terminology'. Edwina On Sun 16/09/18 10:17 AM , kirst...@saunalahti.fi sent: List, After reading some more of the discussion on these threads, I wish to remind all of endless feminist disputes on essentialism and universalism. The answer does not have the form: either/or. Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being
Jerry, John is quoting what Peirce stated in several contexts. So he is right. In other contexts, CSP writes a lot on unconscius (subconscious etc) mind. But he definitely considered his normative logic only applicable to deliberate thought. - He also stated that a person is a bunch of habit. And on the nature of habits he had a lot to say. How is unconscious or subconscius mind present to the consicousness? CSP's answer was FEELING. - Emotions are something else, they are qualitatively different. - What you happened to write below on emotion and thought shows in itself how muddled common views on these issues are. - Peirce, by the way, did not present a theory of emotions. Cheers, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 17.9.2018 21:51: John: On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa wrote: To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and narrow" and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory of self-controlled or deliberate thought". Hmmm… Does this really help? How does a thought, a spontaneous thought, become normative? What is the compelling distinction between an ordinary every day emotion (say, about the sexuality of a beautiful women /man) become differentiated from normative logic? Perhaps CSP would have referred to habitual feelings held by a group of like-minded investigators or some similar rhetorical gesture? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure and applied mathematics
The answer offered here to Jerry Chandler by John Sowa I find a very good answer. Cheers, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.9.2018 17:33: Jerry LRC, As Kirsti said, the subject line about categories and modes was a long thread about Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences. I plan to post a copy that text, my diagram about it, and related quotations by Peirce on my web site. But I changed the subject line for the topic of pure & applied math. everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory of pure mathematics. How can one describe a “feeling” in pure mathematical terms? You can't. That would require applied mathematics. How can one describe a large bio-molecule, such as Nicotinamide Adenine Dinucleotide (NAD) in pure mathematical terms?" For any theory of applied math, there is a simple procedure for finding a corresponding theory of pure math. And it's based on the point you mentioned: Simply quote W.O Quine: “To be is to be a variable.” 1. Start with whatever applied theory you have. Let's assume that it's stated in some mixture of mathematical formulas, chemical symbols, chemical formulas, and English statements. 2. Leave every name or symbol in pure math unchanged. Replace every name or symbol in the application with some distinct, but non-obvious name -- for example, relation names R1, R2, R3...; function names F1, F2, F3...; and entity names E1, E2, E3 For variables, use non-obvious names: x1, x2, x3... 3. Then translate every statement or formula in any notation to predicate calculus (Peirce-Peano algebra). This would be systematic for the formulas in math & chemistry, but it may take some thought and rewriting to force raw English into predicate calculus. But if the English is precise (or can be restated precisely), the translation can be done. 4. But your theory probably depends on many other theories of chemistry and physics. Repeat the above steps with all of those theories -- and be sure to maintain a record of the way each name was translated -- consistent translation across all the theories is essential. 5. After you finish that, throw away the crib sheet that says how the original names were mapped to the R, F, E, and x symbols. You now have a theory about which Bertrand Russell would say "We don't know what we're talking about or whether what we're saying is true." That's pure math. Of course, nobody would ever attempt to translate a complex theory with many complex dependencies by the above procedure. Scientists and engineers normally adopt and adapt pure math theories one at a time, as they are needed. They often create applied theories from scratch, without looking for a prefabricated theory in pure math. But all such theories can be translated to pure math by the above method or some variation of it. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon, The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean. "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of nature". The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well. It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short and simple way! That much is shown beyond doubt by today. Best, Kirsti Määttänen Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:51: John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature _themselves_, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon and Edwina, Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be developed. That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange. Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor. To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples: Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional to t squared: x = ½ gt² Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system travel in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse. Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena. Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains all the above plus many more phenomena. Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to reality -- but each one is still a law of science. In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs expressed in the same ways as other laws of science. John Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John, I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with "laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just something unthinkable for them. I assume something like that is still going on within computer science. Artificial Intelligence being notoriously unable to handle anything like that. - To the detriment of all of us. You used the term in a very, vary vague sense. - The quote you were commenting on, nothing metaphorical was intended. You presented your point very nicely, by taking up a language game "gone on a holiday". Have you given any thought on the difference between unintended and intended metaphors? And on kinds of metaphors which work, do the job, and kinds which fail? I also thank you for the papers you have shared in the List. Truly admiradle, truly clear. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:35: Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be developed. That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange. Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor. To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples: Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional to t squared: x = ½ gt² Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system travel in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse. Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena. Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains all the above plus many more phenomena. Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to reality -- but each one is still a law of science. In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs expressed in the same ways as other laws of science. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon A. Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. - If you see my point. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02: Jon, List ... I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but maybe not too recently. A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O×S×I, where O, S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively. In a systems-theoretic framework we may think of these domains as dynamical systems. We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one and the same. Indeed, we could have O=S=I=U, where the system U is the entire universe. This would make the entire universe a sign of itself to itself. A very general way to understand a system-theoretic law is in terms of a constraint — the fact that not everything that might happen actually does. And that is nothing but a subset relation. So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself could be nothing other than a sign relation L ⊆ U×U×U. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com [3] On Apr 6, 2017, at 3:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: List: With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we _describe_ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other _representation_ of it; I am talking about the law of nature _itself_, the real general that governs actual occurrences. As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign. What is its Dynamic Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its _potential_ instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O relation? It is not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)? What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given _actual _instantiation, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or Rheme, like a term? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://inquiryintoinquiry.com - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
What an excellent post! Just an addition to what John said on bacteria: It seems hard to (in prevalent culture) to understand the fact that we are not directly nourished by our intake of nutritients (food), but via the bacteria in our digestive system. We feed the (kinds of) bacteria, which feed us. It is all mediated by the bacteria. We provide the bacteria, they provide us. - In other words: We cultivate the bacteria, which cultivates us. - See the ancient meaning of "culture"! Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 10.4.2017 04:41: Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined. There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case. HR In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). Even the interior is not well defined. There are many more billions of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body. Some of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. HR I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous) by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks. ET The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. Very few molecules exist in isolation. For example, salt (NaCl) rarely consists of Na-CL pairs. In a crystal, the atoms are organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms of both kinds. In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. ET in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog... There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and species. Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with coyotes. Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as gene transfers that occur naturally. Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing throughout life. Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary for maturation. Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. And many can be inherited. The only reason why DNA remains relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. ET in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations called laws of physics): conservation of mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, charge, etc. But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of years. But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in a camera, they change. Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most other particles are highly unstable. In quantum electrodynamics, the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the borderline of existence. JAS biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics. But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness (purpose, goals, or intentions). John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon A., I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at my disposal. - Sorry for that!! Best, Kirsti Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44: Kirsti, List: I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary, I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in particular--which is why I sought input from the List. "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds." How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM, wrote: Jon, The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean. "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of nature". The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well. It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short and simple way! That much is shown beyond doubt by today. Best, Kirsti Määttänen Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon, Whilst I agree with your points on what must be taken seriously, there remains serious problems with understanding understanding. Your approach comes from information theoretical viewpoint. Which relies on bits. Not so human understanding. All information theories rely on a certain kind of view of human mind. Which has been prevalent hundreds of years, during all modernity. I am not sying that what you write goes wrong or anything like that. I admire your meticulous logical consistency. What I am saying is that its aplicability seem to me limited. Just like Euclidean geometry is still as valid as ever, but the view on its applicability has changed. If the limits are taken as a serious problem to ponder, I'm all fore your work. Regards, Kirsti Information may be tranmitted from machine to machine, but human minds do not take in information like a mail package. Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.4.2017 16:46: Kirsti, List ... I put a slightly clearer version of my last post on my blog: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/04/10/icon-index-symbol-%e2%80%a2-3/ I posted in under the Icon Index Symbol rubric as those two questions ran together in my mind. I appended a few resources on sign relations, triadic realtions, semiotic information, and Peirce's logic of information that may be of use to inquiring minds. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John, Thanks a lot! A most interesting post. I'll look up your paper. Even though I have approached these questions from a different angle , I wholly agree with your conlusion views on the nature of thirds. And on the arguments offered by Peirce. - It has seemed to me, too, that he did not solve these issues, but he pointed the ways on how to get on solving them. I do lack expertice on the topics you deal with. Still, I have been groping for undestanding the connections between triadic thinking, three-body problem & dissipative systems for a long time. So,thanks & my very best regards, Kirsti John Collier kirjoitti 12.4.2017 23:45: Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like all conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be reached in a finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems. There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions, though you can get probabilities of various solutions. For example, Mercury is in a 3/2 rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was expected to be 1:1 like the Moon around the Earth. A bit of a surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest energy one. However, everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is stable. Now the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors are such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor has a point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of accuracy of measurement can allow predicting which attractor the system is in. So Frances Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always faces the Earth is incomplete, and can never be fully completed. There is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% for 3-2 capture, and the rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end states aren’t just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much more complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are involved. I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death eliminating genetic information) works the same way. I first published on this as the first paper in the journal _Biology and Philosophy_ n 1986. The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation capacity. It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are like a regular computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the calculations. Basically, there are far more functions that are not Turing computable than are, and many of these give widely different possible solutions. It’s really just another case of the number of theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs is only aleph 0. I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable, but not reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not possible. But we can get a good idea of what is going on, after the fact (though our first guess in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong). Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they can’t be reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments convincing about the irreducibility. John FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM TO: Peirce-L SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier wrote: Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even in Newtonian mechanics. Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of rather I was more thinking that any solution is approximate and the errors can propagate in weird ways. But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex than we can calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although it clearly manifests in the problem of reduction and emergence. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
Tom,list, Well put, well put, indeed! Also, I wish to remind you all, that CSP did not view lawa of nature as eternally unchangable. To his mind, tehy do change, albeit mostly very, very slowly. Think about climate change. With it very, very slow changes meet changes with other time-scales. Mother nature does not work exaclty in the same ways it did by the time of our ancients. Do remember CSP's work on the pendulum, as well. Best regars, Kirsti Määttänen Thomas903 kirjoitti 17.4.2017 20:18: Group ~ Going back to the original question, I believe a "law of nature" is characterized differently, in terms of Sign relationships, depending upon one of three ('ness) perspectives from which the "law of nature" is being considered: 1 - To Peirce-Emerson-The Sphinx: Existence consists solely of: (a) objects which (b) behave logically. To Peirce, behaving logically is the ONLY law of nature. It is the unifying element of all of existence, and represents ultimate Truth. From this perspective (of ultimate Truth), phenomena labeled by Man as "laws of nature" (such as the law of gravity) are physical potentials of existence (firstness), which do not necessarily occur everywhere, or in all times. 2 - To an object, like Man, affected by but unable to affect a "law of nature," the law is a physical regularity in its environment that can be counted on without fail. It enters the Man's logic-decision calculus as an object or brute force (secondness). 3 - Finally, the objects comprising the environment (i.e., the environment responsible for the "law of nature" that Man perceives) are themselves engaged in habitual-optimizing behaviors (thirdness). These alternating perspectives for perceiving-assigning Signs carry over to other objects, apart from "laws of nature." For example, subatomic particles that obey Pragmatic Logic will in certain environmental settings evolve into a uranium atom. In other environments, those particles would have evolved into something else. From this perspective, a "uranium atom" is a potential (firstness Sign) of a universe of logical particles. To Man, the uranium atom has specific-fixed physical qualities, including decaying at a certain fixed/predictable rate. Here, the uranium atom is an object, with a secondness Sign. From the perspective of the particles comprising the uranium atom, presently they are experiencing the optimizing relationship that earlier evolved between them (thirdness). However, having landed on earth, the particles comprising the uranium atom find themselves in an inhospitable environment (relative to that of the u-atom's "birth"). Therefore, the original habits of the particles are no longer optimal. The decay of the uranium atom represents a transition phase (secondness activities), where the particles seek new optimizing actives appropriate for their earth environment (thirdness). Regards, Tom Wyrick - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . Links: -- [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
John, list, The invasion of Big Data into social sciences makes critical views on Carnap (& co) utterly important nowadays. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 24.4.2017 04:34: Helmut, Jeffrey, Jon A, Clark, list, HR Not every triadic relation is categorically thirdness. But which are? That's a good question. Some basic principles: 1. For each of Peirce's categories, there is a characteristic question: Firstness: What is it? What kind of mark? Secondness: How does it relate or react to something? Thirdness: Why does it relate or react to something? Answer: (1) quality; (2) relation or reaction; (3) mediation. 2. Peirce used the term 'triad', not 'triadic relation'. You can represent a verb, such as 'give' as either a triadic relation or as a nominalized node attached to three dyadic relations. See the attached give.gif, which shows two ways of mapping the sentence "Sue gives a child a book" to a graph -- a conceptual graph, which may be mapped to an existential graphs or to an algebraic formula. 3. As give.gif illustrates, a triad in a graph cannot be eliminated by using dyadic relations. But a graph with a tetrad, pentad, ... can always be mapped to and from a graph that has no nodes with more than 3 links. 4. A non-degenerate triad always involves something law-like, intentional, or mental. That implies some mind or quasi-mind that does the interpretation. Nominalists don't like that way of talking. 5. Strict nominalists, such as Carnap, deny that abstract entities exist -- that includes all forms of Thirdness: laws, intentions, goals, purposes, or habits. That is why Carnap insisted that all laws of science are nothing more than summaries of observations. HR Is it reasonable to say that a relation has an intension and an extension, the intension is firstness, and the extension secondness (of the relation, which is secondness)? As Church pointed out, the intension is a rule of correspondence that determines the extension. That rule is a law-like entity, which is a kind of Thirdness. Note, by the way, that multiple, independently defined rules may specify the same extension. Two functions or relations may differ in intension , but be identical in extension. JBD why [do] nominalists such as J.S. Mill and Nelson Goodman strongly prefer extensional systems--and have significant reservations about using intensional systems in philosophy All definitions by intension imply some law-like rule. That's why Carnap insisted that laws of science are "summaries of observations". He would never say "law of nature" -- because (a) the phrase implies that there exists something called nature, and (b) it also implies that nature has something called laws. JA an extensional definition of a 2-place relation ... can be generalized to k-place relations and then beyond the finite arity case... But there is nothing remotely nominal going on here, as the definition invokes sets of tuples. Sets and tuples are the very sorts of abstract objects nominal thinkers would eschew Church used sets to define extensions because he had no reason to avoid sets. But Lesniewski and other nominalists replaced set theory with mereology. If you have a set of N elements, you have N+1 entities, which consist of the N elements plus an abstract set. But with mereology, a collection of N elements does not imply the existence of anything more than the N elements. Therefore, a mereologist could say that the elements of an N-tuple are parts of a whole called an N-tuple. They would not consider the whole as something distinct from the sum of its parts. JA I have never found going on about Firstness Secondness Thirdness all that useful in any practical situation. If you think at those terms as a count of links in a graph, they don't explain much. It's better to look at the three kinds of questions summarized at the top of this note. JA until you venture to say exactly *which* monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you haven't really said that much at all. CG Glad I’m not alone in thinking that. I agree that we need to look at specific cases. For examples of the kinds of Thirdness that nominalists deliberately ignore, see Section 2 (pp. 3 to 8) of http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf . The title of that section is "A Static, Lifeless, Purposeless World". Some excerpts: p. 4: Einstein criticized Russell's "Angst vor der Metaphysik" and said “Mach was a good experimental physicist but a miserable philosopher”; he made “a catalog not a system.” p. 5: When introducing Russell for his William James Lectures at Harvard, Whitehead said “This is my friend Bertrand Russell. Bertie thinks that I am muddleheaded, but then I think that he is simpleminded” (Lucas 1989:111). That remark is consistent with a statement attributed to Russell: “I’d rather be narrow minded than vague and wooly” (Kuntz 1984:50).
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Dear listers, I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words. For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. - and this is not a trifle issue. Within philosopy one should mind one's wordings. For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided: MB One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of the same subject." (CP 1.501) Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. The key point being the relation between 'subject' and 'predicate'. CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least he does so in separating the issues for a specific approach &consideration each approach needs. What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE taking them both as an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a concept as a continuum. A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang as a start or an end just illustrates current minds, current common sense. The still dominating nominalistic world-view. What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing the scale. Any line which appeared to previous imagination as a straight one, and necessarily so, does not appear so after the fact that the earth is round had been fully digested. This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean geometry. And it does not in the stories and histories told about it. The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human beings. And goes on to appear so untill interplanetary tourism becomes commonplace. Flat, although somewhat bumby. I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.5.2017 00:28: Jeff and Mike, Those are important points. JBD In a broad sense, Sir William Rowan Hamilton anticipated Einstein's idea that space and time can be conceived as parts of a four dimensional continuum. In fact, he used the algebra of quaternions to articulate a formal framework for conceiving of such physical relations as part of a four dimensional field. Peirce was familiar with Hamilton's work. And when he was editing the second edition of his father's book _Linear Algebra_, he added some important theorems to it. In particular, he proved that the only N-dimensional algebras that had division were the real line (1D), the complex field (2D), quaternions (4D), and octonions (8D). MB One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of the same subject." (CP 1.501) He also discussed non-Euclidean geometry. While he was still at the US C&GS, he proposed a project to determine whether the sum of the angles of triangles at astronomical distances was exactly 180 degrees. Simon Newcomb rejected that project. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Alkuperäinen viesti Aihe: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum? Päiväys: 29.5.2017 18:13 Lähettäjä: kirst...@saunalahti.fi Vastaanottaja: Jerry LR Chandler Jerry, Well, stricly speaking you are not taking up a triad, but three interconnected propositions. Anyway, you asked about MY views . - Euclidean geometric line does not even exist outside Euclidean geometry. It is an abstraction, a part of results of systematic human imagination. Thus there is no sense in assumiming it has any properties outside the geometry in question. Continuity was assumed, that is true. But as it turned out, Euclidean geometry could only deal with issues of limited scale. - Continuity demands unlimited scale. - Any Euclidean geometric line is treated as(and assumed to be) continuous. But so is the case with non-Euclidean geometry just as well. - It was only the (pre)supposition that a geometric line is and will be forever straight, not bend, that was put into question. With the very good results. - Thus became modern topology into being! - It makes no sense to ask whether a continuum is continuous or not. Of course any continuum is continuous, It is presupposed. But within its own limits. So no answer to this question can provide any answet to the question of continuity per se. Here comes functional geometry and differential and integral calculus to the fore. SCP handled them like water in his tab. - Euclid did not have any inkling of these issues. Infinity became something mathematicians could and did handle. - Or could they, really? Just provisional answers, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 29.5.2017 17:42: Kirsti, List: Could you expand your intervention to give some examples of how YOU assign tangible meaning to CP 1.501? Other comments will have to wait, but for one. A Euclidian geometric line has continuity. A Euclidian geometric line is continuous. A Continuum is continuous. Do you agree with this triad? :-) Cheers jerry On May 29, 2017, at 9:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Dear listers, I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words. For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. - and this is not a trifle issue. Within philosopy one should mind one's wordings. For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided: MB One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of the same subject." (CP 1.501) Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. The key point being the relation between 'subject' and 'predicate'. CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least he does so in separating the issues for a specific approach &consideration each approach needs. What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE taking them both as an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a concept as a continuum. A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang as a start or an end just illustrates current minds, current common sense. The still dominating nominalistic world-view. What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing the scale. Any line which appeared to previous imagination as a straight one, and necessarily so, does not appear so after the fact that the earth is round had been fully digested. This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean geometry. And it does not in the stories and histories told about it. The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human beings. And goes on to appear so untill interplanetary tourism becomes commonplace. Flat, although somewhat bumby. I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.5.2017 00:28: Jeff and Mike, Those are important points. JBD In a broad sense, Sir William Rowan Hamilton anticipated Einstein's idea that space and time can be conceived as parts of a four dimensional continuum. In fact, he used the algebra of quaternions to articulate a formal framework for conceiving of such physical relations as part of a four dimensional field. Peirce was familiar with Hamilton's work. And when he was editing the second edition of his father's book _Linear Algebra_, he added some important theorems to it. In particular, he proved that the only N-dimensional algebras that had division were the real line (1D), the complex field (2D), quaternions (4D), and octonions (8D). MB One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects of one predicate precisely what time doe
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Jerry, list, In my view (with no access to the latest writings of CSP) did not just anticipate continuity, but grasped it, both in respect of space and time. But he did not solve the new kinds of problems arising with those. One essential issue, to my mind, is that he advised not to mix them BEFORE both are given due attention, with adequate results. His experimental work on gravitation gave him a global view on space and spatiality. Not just the by then triviality that "the earth is round". Continuity and change belong together. Even gravity does not work exactly the same way on all points of the earth. An often neglegted point in his works is the concepts of residue. It has been mistaken as only an error of measurement. To CSP it was not. To him it was just as well in the nature of nature. To bend, just a little, now and then. Giving rise to question in the nature of: What if... We all know that in any kind of graphical presentation in a global scale the picturing must curve. The meridians do bend towards the poles. Our flat pictures on the globe do not present our globe 'as it really is'. How about genetics, then? We know, or should know, that just a little bending, small changes do work, but major changes tend to end in disasters. Well. well. I truly do not know why I am writing this to you lot. All I say is just common sense (or wished for common sense). - Always, and always 'continuum' is taken as a synonym for continuity. In the history of mathematics, a major change occurred with the amalgamation of Arabic and European math. (Not the first time, mind you). The idea of Zero (as well as nothingness) entered Western math. With zero entered many things. Not just its counterpoint, infinity. But also equations, for instance. With the arithmetics taught in primary schools, equation marks (=) are used. In ancient Greece, there were no such marks, no such idea. Grattan-Guinness is the only writer on history of mahtematics I know, who has taken this up. The modern idea of identity was both unknow and unimaginable for the Greeks by then. Well, then. The modern idea oof identitity has many facets. Modern logic has taken it as one of the tree basic logical rules, in the form that any 'thing' is identical to itself. A= A and B=B. - Many disputes followed between mathematician and logicians. CSP takes as an example of identifying a characterization of any magpie that it is 'stealish'. Fact or fancy? But that is not the issue. Chemical identities are the field Jerry is working on. But I see the problems coming on with the concept 'identity'. Two different lines of thinking on and about it tend to mix in the wrong way. - One is identifying, the other is identicality as equation. Identification relies on implications, not equation. The true difference between toso two come to the fore (only) with time. With any equation, your mind may go bacwards and forwards as you wish. Not so with implications. Empirical evidence is always about implications (with grounds). Never about = , or <=>. And by the way, the digital world is an always-already-put-to-pieces world. Which never can tell about the world we live in. And live on. Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 29.5.2017 18:16: Alkuperäinen viesti Aihe: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum? Päiväys: 29.5.2017 18:13 Lähettäjä: kirst...@saunalahti.fi Vastaanottaja: Jerry LR Chandler Jerry, Well, stricly speaking you are not taking up a triad, but three interconnected propositions. Anyway, you asked about MY views . - Euclidean geometric line does not even exist outside Euclidean geometry. It is an abstraction, a part of results of systematic human imagination. Thus there is no sense in assumiming it has any properties outside the geometry in question. Continuity was assumed, that is true. But as it turned out, Euclidean geometry could only deal with issues of limited scale. - Continuity demands unlimited scale. - Any Euclidean geometric line is treated as(and assumed to be) continuous. But so is the case with non-Euclidean geometry just as well. - It was only the (pre)supposition that a geometric line is and will be forever straight, not bend, that was put into question. With the very good results. - Thus became modern topology into being! - It makes no sense to ask whether a continuum is continuous or not. Of course any continuum is continuous, It is presupposed. But within its own limits. So no answer to this question can provide any answet to the question of continuity per se. Here comes functional geometry and differential and integral calculus to the fore. SCP handled them like water in his tab. - Euclid did not have any inkling of these issues. Infinity became something mathematicians could and did handle. - Or could they, really? Just provisional answers, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 29.5.2017 17:42:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Jon, Thanks for your prompt response. I've read your mails, I do know you see the problem. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 29.5.2017 18:36: Kirsti, List, I know what you mean about the title but decided to take it more as a reference to the revolution in physics that began with relativity and quantum mechanics in the last century than any particular issue about the nature of continua. Anyway, I tried to focus on the underlying conceptual transformation in my previous posts on this thread. https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00019.html https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00023.html As it happens, this whole ball of wax falls in line with some sporadic reflections I've been writing up on my blog, so I lumped the above thoughts in with that series of posts: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/05/14/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-4/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/05/17/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-5/ Regards, Jon On 5/29/2017 10:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Dear listers, I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words. For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. - and this is not a trifle issue. Within philosopy one should mind one's wordings. For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided: MB One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of the same subject." (CP 1.501) Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. The key point being the relation between 'subject' and 'predicate'. CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least he does so in separating the issues for a specific approach &consideration each approach needs. What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE taking them both as an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a concept as a continuum. A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang as a start or an end just illustrates current minds, current common sense. The still dominating nominalistic world-view. What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing the scale. Any line which appeared to previous imagination as a straight one, and necessarily so, does not appear so after the fact that the earth is round had been fully digested. This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean geometry. And it does not in the stories and histories told about it. The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human beings. And goes on to appear so untill interplanetary tourism becomes commonplace. Flat, although somewhat bumby. I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some. Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Nothing should be does not quite amount to nothing is. CSP was for the first, not for the second. Are there dogmas in science? Could there be? If so, how could one tell? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 1.6.2017 09:34: On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science. As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, nothing is a dogma of science. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Clark, I fully agree with your points. Kirsti Clark Goble kirjoitti 1.6.2017 22:33: On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not so, but then there must be some kind of counting buffer mechanism to make sure that in a bigger scale infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed by laws. I do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws nothing would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may change, but that there are some laws that dont. And if these laws are only the ones based on tautology: One plus one can never be 2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these eternal laws are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans are mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by just putting an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which is indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses. My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound constructed of an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a changeable part ((temporary) constants). Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s Theorem. That more or less just states the relationship between symmetries and conservation laws. I don’t think we need a “buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It would seem that continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus determines the conservation. Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that bares her name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But Peirce did do some work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to the theorem. So far as I know he never approached the insight of her theorem though. He was familiar with the abstract principles though. However Peirce did write on conservation laws which we discussed here a few months back as tied to chance and determinism relative to habits. In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows: 1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the conservation of energy. 2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable. 3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real chance. 4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is maintained. (CP 6.613) So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by determinism. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where? Or are his theories just surprising and odd? In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well designed and carried out. I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!) All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the below text. Lalala, Helmut Dear list members, I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads to false conclusions. To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same? If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done now to some extent? On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of epigenetic mechanisms. When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl molecules. But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted, and so on. Best, Helmut 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr "John Collier" wrote: I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses that have served well. But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a selectionist explanation. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier [2] FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM TO: Peirce-L SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk John S, list, John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that nothing _ought _to be a dogma. And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism of actions/reactions of 2ns, etc. Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an _ideal_ of scientific, but I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether they would say they do, or think they do, or not. Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the Additaments) by writing that even "approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist pr
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Dear J. Rhee, You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection to my recent post to the list. Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to be a most important one. Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds. With most kind regards. Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21: Dear kirsti, all, "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction." Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, wrote: Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where? Or are his theories just surprising and odd? In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well designed and carried out. I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!) All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the below text. Lalala, Helmut Dear list members, I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads to false conclusions. To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same? If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done now to some extent? On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of epigenetic mechanisms. When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl molecules. But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted, and so on. Best, Helmut 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr "John Collier" wrote: I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses that have served well. But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a selectionist explanation. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] [2] FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM TO: Peirce-L SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk John S, list, John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that nothing _ought _to be a dogma. And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical phi
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Dear Jerry R., list No theoretical paper gives detailed enough description of the experiments, experimental designs & the process of conducting the experiments in order to check its soundness. Which is a time consuming job & which cannot be done without being properly skilled in designing and conducting experimental research oneself. Which is what I have been doing for a couple of decades. I also have been teaching post-graduate students how to design and conduct experimental investigations for many, many years. Your belief that e.g. Wolpert "ought to lead" to sound evidence just is not good enough for me. Also, if you find Wolpert's paper/ evidence mysterious, how can you conclude that the evidence is sound? Best, Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 22:43: dear kirsti, list: I was responding to your remark: ""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up." I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on morphogenetic fields. It's rather large and still mysterious once you get down to the molecular details. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM, wrote: Dear J. Rhee, You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection to my recent post to the list. Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to be a most important one. Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds. With most kind regards. Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21: Dear kirsti, all, "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction." Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, wrote: Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where? Or are his theories just surprising and odd? In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well designed and carried out. I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!) All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the below text. Lalala, Helmut Dear list members, I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads to false conclusions. To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same? If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done now to some extent? On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of epigenetic mechanisms. When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl molecules. But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the ways how "habit"
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Jerry R., list The question of "sizing" electromagnetic "fields" is not the kind of question to be posed first. (See e.g. Kaina Stoicheia). If you pose the question, the answer is: Not possible to answer it. The problem of morphic (etc.) resonance must be tackled before any measuring of any kind of size makes sense. If e.g. the equation of quantum potential is properly studied, one can see that distances vanish, only frequences remain (to be measured). With kinds of requences only possible resonance matters. In principle, there are just three kinds of (inter)resonance. One of them is indifference. Wave theory is needed, not just particle theory. They are complementary. As you most likely well know. Also, the question of proper scale must be tackled before any attepts to measure sizes in any sensible way. Best, Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 22:48: btw, I was also trying to call attention to the difficult problem of sizing the field, for different, complex physical/mechanical and chemical interactions operate across large domains. It's hard to imagine a complete theory of pattern formation involving a field size of a whole, entire vertebrate embryo. a better approach would be to treat individual, growing fields of proper size, ~ 500um. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 2:43 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: dear kirsti, list: I was responding to your remark: ""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up." I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on morphogenetic fields. It's rather large and still mysterious once you get down to the molecular details. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM, wrote: Dear J. Rhee, You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection to my recent post to the list. Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to be a most important one. Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds. With most kind regards. Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21: Dear kirsti, all, "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction." Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, wrote: Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where? Or are his theories just surprising and odd? In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well designed and carried out. I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!) All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the below text. Lalala, Helmut Dear list members, I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads to false conclusions. To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same? If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done now to some extent? On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of epigenetic mechanisms. When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier convinced
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Jerry R. You wrote: J.R. " why do you not even bring up the biology when you're so ready to bring up matters that are of importance for you?" IS THERE a certain kind of biology, which deserves to be called THE biology? - If so, what are the criteria you use? Biology today is going through a rapid change (like many other fields in science). Thus there are strifes and disputes going on. The basics (in biology) are being & have been put to serious question for a long time. – Wolpert belongs to one of many schools of thought. My mother was a biologist. Her sister, too. So I have kind of grown up with and within biology. When I was 7 years old, I had read all the books on biology in our library at home. Which since then became kind of a habit. More importantly, my mother taught me to observe nature. Systematically. – Something I have nowadays been passing on to my grandchilden. If I were to bring up biology to this discussion with you , it would be very different from your conception of biology. – Would take all too much time and energy to get our views close enough. On specifally biological issues, CSP did not have much still valid to say. It would be idle to dwell on those notes. Wolpert does not seem a Peircean to my mind. Rather - quite the contrary. Best, Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 8.6.2017 00:33: As per how the Wolpert quote ought to lead, please try a google search for: The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction. And if you're concerned of where actually the ambiguity lies, I'd recommend looking up bicoid or wnt in morphogenesis. Best, Jerry R On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 4:29 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: kirsti, list: thanks for your response. I am well aware of certain things and not so of others. But when I raise attention to the sizing and scaling problem, I am concerned with future objections. It is with that intention I said what I said. For instance, why do you not even bring up the biology when you're so ready to bring up matters that are of importance for you? "Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato [1]'s idea of _ἰδέα_, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it." Best, Jerry R On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 3:46 AM, wrote: Jerry R., list The question of "sizing" electromagnetic "fields" is not the kind of question to be posed first. (See e.g. Kaina Stoicheia). If you pose the question, the answer is: Not possible to answer it. The problem of morphic (etc.) resonance must be tackled before any measuring of any kind of size makes sense. If e.g. the equation of quantum potential is properly studied, one can see that distances vanish, only frequences remain (to be measured). With kinds of requences only possible resonance matters. In principle, there are just three kinds of (inter)resonance. One of them is indifference. Wave theory is needed, not just particle theory. They are complementary. As you most likely well know. Also, the question of proper scale must be tackled before any attepts to measure sizes in any sensible way. Best, Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 22:48: btw, I was also trying to call attention to the difficult problem of sizing the field, for different, complex physical/mechanical and chemical interactions operate across large domains. It's hard to imagine a complete theory of pattern formation involving a field size of a whole, entire vertebrate embryo. a better approach would be to treat individual, growing fields of proper size, ~ 500um. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 2:43 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: dear kirsti, list: I was responding to your remark: ""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up." I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on morphogenetic fields. It's rather large and still mysterious once you get down to the molecular details. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM, wrote: Dear J. Rhee, You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection to my recent post to the list. Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to be a most important one. Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds. With most kind regards. Kirsti Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21: Dear kirsti, all, "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction." Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, wrote: Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not expl
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Helmut, Now you are talking! Excellent post. "Interaction" is one way of taking relational logic seriously. But it does not follow that "explanation" (if based on scientific evidence, may not have any objective definition. Or whatever the term used. I would prefer the expression: "objective grounds". Nominalistic philosophizing realies on just definitions. In geometry, as well as with any deductive inferences (e.g. formal logic) definitions play a very different role than in empirical sciences, relying a great deal on abductive % probable inferences. "Interaction" is a dual idea. CSP deals with such taking them to present secondness & Secondness. Which do not mean quite the same in the writings of CSP. He uses capitalized and not so terms SYSTEMATICALLY. Which has not been taken into proper consideration in republishing & editing his writings. - It not just a matter of linguistic concerns & current usage of capitals. CSP was definely not modern, he truly was post-modern. Anticipating developments in our millennium. So, interaction is good to start with, but a third is needed. Mediation brings in the third. The third brings in Meaning, not just reference. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 9.6.2017 22:16: John, Kirsti, All, Now I think that it was naiive of me to put "explanation" in opposition to "magical thinking", which "reverses cause and effect". Because cause and effect are reversed all the time in what we call "interaction". And "explanation" has no objective definition, it merely is subjective, when an individual says: "Ok, I am satisfied, this explains it for me". Now I say: Magical thinking is to take an effect for cause and be satisfied with that, and stop inquiring. To be open minded would mean not to stop the inquiry, and say: Nothing is the cause alone, nothing the effect alone, what I am looking for is interaction with known other effects and laws. I doubt, that a magnetic field is fully explained to everybody. At least for me, there remain many mysteries. But there is known interaction between the magnetic field and other phenomena: Electric current, change of electric field, presence of iron or nickel... With the morphogenetic field this is not so. Also the memory of water is mysterious to me: I think, that only solid structures (stable networks) can have a memory. This is not a criticism of Sheldrake´s: It is not his fault, that there are not sufficient interactions discovered, that would sort of explain "morphogenetic field" and "water memory" to me. All I want to say is: I do not believe in two worlds (a physical and a magical or fine-substantional (? german:"feinstofflich") one) between which there is no measurable interaction, and the said phenomena are, experimentally well confirmed ok, but not causes, but effects, of something not yet uncovered, I guess. Best, Helmut 07. Juni 2017 um 08:54 Uhr "John F Sowa" wrote: Jerry, Kirsti, Gary R, Helmut, list, I didn't respond to some earlier points in this thread because I was tied up with other things. But I looked into Sheldrake's writings and the earlier writings on morphogenesis by Conrad Waddington, a pioneer in genetics, epigenetics, and morphogenesis. For a 1962 article about Waddington's theories, see http://www.microbiologyresearch.org/docserver/fulltext/micro/29/1/mic-29-1-25.pdf?expires=1496787497&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4E2DC93EE4641BFAB00E8253006B4B2C [1] . Alan Turing (1952) wrote a mathematical analysis "The chemical basis of morphogenesis" and cited a 1940 book _Organisers and Genes_ by Waddington. See http://cba.mit.edu/events/03.11.ASE/docs/Turing.pdf [2] Sheldrake has a PhD in biochemistry from Cambridge, and he spent a year at Harvard studying the philosophy of science. His primary reference is to Waddington's work. But many scientists believe that he crossed the thin line between genius and crackpot: he took a reasonable hypothesis in biology and mixed it with dubious speculations about parapsychology. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Sheldrake [3] For a sympathetic interview with Sheldrake by a skeptic, see https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/scientific-heretic-rupert-sheldrake-on-morphic-fields-psychic-dogs-and-other-mysteries/ [4] Some comments on previous notes: Jerry > Are you saying Hamiltonian:Lagrangian :: local state:global state? No. I was just saying that the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian are related: both are global functions of a system, and local equations of motion can be derived from them. For any physical system, the Hamiltonian represents the total energy, and the Lagrangian represents the total action (it has the dimensions of energy x time). Kirsti > Are there dogmas in science? Could there be? Gary R, > Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an ideal of scientific... Science, as science, does not have dogmas. As Peirce stated in his First Rule of Reason, "Do not block the way of inquiry." But
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
John, list, Thanks for interesting points sheading light to the historical contexts of Sheldrake's work. I 'm quite interested in knowing which was the year he spent at Harward & whether he got familiar with Peirce by then. Which I do not think was the case. To my mind it seems that Sheldrake is mainly doing science, not so much interested in the various schools and variable top ten's in current philosophy of science. Being a laboratory minded scientist. (As was Peirce). You wrote: JFS "People have been trying to find evidence for parapsychology for centuries without success. There is nothing wrong with considering the idea as an interesting hypothesis. But Sheldrake seemed to be just as dogmatic as anybody that he was criticizing." I do think you are mistaken here. To my mind Sheldrake has not been searching evidence for 'parapsychology' as such, as a somehat popular stream of thinking, instead he has been lead to investigate phenomena commonly considered paranormal. Such as 'telepathy', i.e non-local connections between minds which may have systematically observable effects. Sheldrake did not just whimsically adopt a hypothesis, he was lead to do so by results in his own experimental investigations. He wanted to find out, not just philosophize in thin air. Just compare the experimental investigations by Jastrow and Peirce. with those by Sheldrake. Peirce never stopped observing similar phenomena in his everyday life. As is evidenced by scattered remarks in his writings till the end of his life. He observed (systematicly) the workings of his own mind as well as the workings of his dog's mind. And he experimented with both. – So have I, by the way. Regards, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.6.2017 09:54: Jerry, Kirsti, Gary R, Helmut, list, I didn't respond to some earlier points in this thread because I was tied up with other things. But I looked into Sheldrake's writings and the earlier writings on morphogenesis by Conrad Waddington, a pioneer in genetics, epigenetics, and morphogenesis. For a 1962 article about Waddington's theories, see http://www.microbiologyresearch.org/docserver/fulltext/micro/29/1/mic-29-1-25.pdf?expires=1496787497&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4E2DC93EE4641BFAB00E8253006B4B2C . Alan Turing (1952) wrote a mathematical analysis "The chemical basis of morphogenesis" and cited a 1940 book _Organisers and Genes_ by Waddington. See http://cba.mit.edu/events/03.11.ASE/docs/Turing.pdf Sheldrake has a PhD in biochemistry from Cambridge, and he spent a year at Harvard studying the philosophy of science. His primary reference is to Waddington's work. But many scientists believe that he crossed the thin line between genius and crackpot: he took a reasonable hypothesis in biology and mixed it with dubious speculations about parapsychology. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Sheldrake For a sympathetic interview with Sheldrake by a skeptic, see https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/scientific-heretic-rupert-sheldrake-on-morphic-fields-psychic-dogs-and-other-mysteries/ Some comments on previous notes: Jerry Are you saying Hamiltonian:Lagrangian :: local state:global state? No. I was just saying that the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian are related: both are global functions of a system, and local equations of motion can be derived from them. For any physical system, the Hamiltonian represents the total energy, and the Lagrangian represents the total action (it has the dimensions of energy x time). Kirsti Are there dogmas in science? Could there be? Gary R, Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an ideal of scientific... Science, as science, does not have dogmas. As Peirce stated in his First Rule of Reason, "Do not block the way of inquiry." But scientists are human, and some are dogmatic. They might do everything they can to block hypotheses they don't like. Kirsti If so, how could one tell? Sometimes it's hard to tell. A theory that has proved to be reliable for a wide range of applications is hard to give up. Tycho Brahe, for example, correctly believed that the Ptolemaic theory of epicycles was more accurate than the circles in the theory by Copernicus. But it was Kepler, Brahe's assistant, who discovered that elliptical orbits were more accurate than the epicycles. Kirsti Are there flaws and shortcomings in [Sheldrake's] theory? People have been trying to find evidence for parapsychology for centuries without success. There is nothing wrong with considering the idea as an interesting hypothesis. But Sheldrake seemed to be just as dogmatic as anybody that he was criticizing. Helmut "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". Words, by themselves, can't explain anything. Peirce admitted that the following two statements are different ways of stating the same observation: Opium puts people to sleep. Opium ha
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
John, Actually Sheldrake was able to test a hypothesis (which, to my knowledge he did not himself believe in at the time)on non-local effects. His series of experiments (one will never do) on pidgeons are truly ingenious and suberb AS experimental designs. If that is agreed (after thorough studying), then his findings arew noteworthy. Within my expertice his experimental designs were impeccable. - If the result feel odd and mysterious, that is no scientific ground to reject them. This has nothing to do with sympathy or antipathy. The result of any well-conducted experiment are what they are. They present 'brute secondness' as I think CSP would have put it. Being so seasoned as I am in doing and evaluating experimental research, I do not take seriously any 'results' I have not been able to check according to the design, process and statistical methods used. - Sheldrake with his pidgeon investigations passed this test. In philosophy of science, as you well know, there was a belief in cumulating scientific 'facts' showing us 'the truth'. Positivism. Now we, at least most of us, know that truth is a bit more complicated issue. With former investigations on phenomena called 'telepathy' or other of the same kind, one of the flaws rises up from statistical tests used to test statistical significance. Any results (measuremensts) of any investigation showing statistically nonsignificant difference between zero hypotothesis (no effect) and the hypothesis tested, do not in fact prove the zero hypothesis. - The 'no effect' hypothesis is extremely difficult to prove. - It may well be that it is LOGICALLY impossible to prove. To my knowledge this has not been truly PROVED, so far. I believe it will be. But this is just foreboding. Relational thinking is needed in taking any stance with 'paranormal' phenomena. What today is taken as such, were not so taken in history. Even our history as modern scientists and logicians. It is not so long ago phenomena now considered as odd, were considered as normal. One difference lies in that people talked about such things. Nowadays people get worried about seeming odd. - Nothing scientific or logical in that. It is about paying attention. In science, that means systematic, prolonged attention. The modern world and history is full of totally useless experimental investigations. Sheldrake's investigations do not belong in this lot. This does not mean that I all fore for his "dogma" thing. I am definitely not. But I do think they are worth some attention. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 11.6.2017 13:36: Kirstina, I'm sympathetic to the possibility of paranormal phenomena. In fact, I know of some unexplained examples. But the only thing we can say is "They're weird, and we don't know how or why they happened." Sheldrake has not been searching evidence for 'parapsychology' as such, as a somewhat popular stream of thinking, instead he has been lead to investigate phenomena commonly considered paranormal. Such as 'telepathy', i.e non-local connections between minds which may have systematically observable effects. Investigation involves search. There have been claims about paranormal phenomena for centuries. They fall into three categories: 1. Explainable by normal or abnormal psychology. For example, as the result of human feelings and imagination -- sometimes delusional. 2. Deliberate fraud. Magicians are experts in creating weird effects -- and in exposing fraudulent claims by other magicians. 3. Unexplainable by any known causes. For #3, there have been many kinds of explanations, but none of them can make any testable predictions. For telepathy, there are cases where people have experienced information about a distant event that could not have come by any known method of communication. But nobody is able to control the telepathy or to do it on a consistent basis (i.e., at a level above chance). That failure of control is not a proof that telepathy does not occur. But unless telepathy can be done at a level above chance, it cannot be distinguished from a lucky guess. Just compare the experimental investigations by Jastrow and Peirce with those by Sheldrake. They are totally different. Jastrow and Peirce were doing science: They started with observations, formed hypotheses, make predictions about what would happen in new circumstances, performed the experiments, and got results that confirmed their predictions. He observed (systematicly) the workings of his own mind as well as the workings of his dog's mind. And he experimented with both. Sheldrake started with some observations (or claims about observations) and formed hypotheses. But he did not make testable predictions, perform experiments, and get results that confirmed the predictions. And the experiments have to be performed under controlled conditions. A dog can easily pick up subtle cues. See the case of Clever Hans:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440
Jerry, list Dictionary may not be the source to turn to. ERGO is an abbreviation used by CSP to his audience at the time. There are hidden parts, assumed to be self-evidently known to all his readers. In another parts of his writings CSP tells that the primary and fundamental logical relation is: IF - THEN. ERGO present just the THEN part. The funny thing with the IF -part is that it can never get fully explicated. Gödel proved this, in his part. But still his proof has not been fully believed in. The ppoof is absolutely valid. Just hard to understand. Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.6.2017 04:10: Open questions to the list: The following quote, posted by gnox (Thanks, Gary) appears to be a deep conundrum from several perspectives of 21 st Century logic. On Jun 9, 2017, at 8:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896): [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by _ergo_. A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. The common noun happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European languages. In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated from a verb or participle. “Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]] First we note that CSP notes that he has held the view for 29 years! Second, we note the singularity of the assertion there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation Thirdly, we note that this single ur-form of logic is expressed by a single term: expressed by _ergo_. In English, the word Ergo means therefore. Next, CSP expresses his conclusion on the nature of a proposition: A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. With this simple sentence, does the single term, “argumentation” replace the traditional ur-logical ground of logic, antecedent and consequence? How important is this sentence? If "divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion”, then what is the meaning of the grammar? Or the meaning of arithmetic? Are arguments to be fabricated in a completely ad hoc manner, depending solely on the emotions whims of the author? The sentence In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. suggests that all of language is merely a blank form. The notion of “counting” is apparently completely discounted. My gut level response to CP 3.440, in toto, is that if I take this description of a fundamental logical relation as a conclusive statement, it seems to deny the realism of my experiences. I am very curious as to how others interpret this gloss of 3.440 and welcome both online as well as offline responses. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Well, it is well known that CSP was not so very keen on existence. Even though he succeeded in completing his Existential Graphs to his full approval. But on being that was not the case. Being was to him the key to what is real. What was real (to him) was effects. Does belief in God have effects. - It most certainly does. No statitical tests needed. Wtih existance follows the question of location. With elector-magnetic phenomena the question is just silly. Was CSP essentialist? - Absolutely so. But not in the sense of catching any being by any set of firmly set definitions. - Which are just as abolutely needed in deductive inferences. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 12.6.2017 15:08: On 6/12/2017 7:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: It may well be that it is LOGICALLY impossible to prove. That may be true. That may be like the existence of God. There are no proofs that God exists. There are no proofs that God does not exist. In fact, there are no two people -- believers or nonbelievers -- who will give you the same definition of God. Just ask them. But I do think they are worth some attention. I agree. A useful term is 'prescientific'. That is not the same as 'unscientific'. It just means that the methods of science are not applicable. Perhaps someday they might be. But nobody knows how. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440
Jerry, When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize that. Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited degree. Best Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55: List: On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: ERGO present just the THEN part. from Wikipedia (sorry!) Ergo may refer to: * A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum. * A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for example, in ergonomics. Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the syntactical force of “then”. Just my opinion. Cheers jerry Links: -- [1] apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440
Hi, Jerry, Where in earth did you take the "moral authority" you (mistakenly) assume I was refering to? Pity you did not understand my points. But if Hilbert is your leading star in the universe of sciences, then it is understandable that you hold on to his mistakes, as well as his achievements. I do not find the concept of identity as easy and simple as eg. Hilbert took for granted. - But if you remain happy with your ideas on it, I just wish you luck. Best, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.6.2017 16:37: Hi Kirsti: Curious reply! Other matters have dominated my life in recent months so that I have not the time to respond to most issues opened here. Nevertheless, you post deserves comment. On Jun 15, 2017, at 12:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Jerry, When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize that. What is the source of the moral authority that I am supposed to be following. These three sentences are typical of philosophical conjectures. Science uses more effective means of communication. Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. I am concerned with two clearly separate and distinct notions of logic. 1. The logic of nature that generates the consistency, the completeness, and the decidability of natural phenomenology. (following Hilbert.) 2. The logics of human communication by whatever means. These logics are entangled with one another. How are they entangled? Various categories of these logics have been used and abused. The records of human communication about logic appear to originate several millennia ago and these forms of communication continue to evolve today. CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. I am pleased to learn that philosophers can be, on occasion, infallible! :-) I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited degree. IMHO, every human being is free to use terminology in whatever form of “units of meaning" that they choose - the forms of the units of meaning are often related to experience and sometimes even to units of fact! Of course, one’s usage of terminology allows colleagues to evaluate the meanings of those units from any perspective the colleagues may choose. The central concept behind these comments is the conceptual role of identity in generating the conceptual dynamics of the perplexity of individual minds. Abstractly, as I noted some months ago, “The union of units unify the unity.” The graphs (icons) of such perplex unions record the meanings visually. Cheers Jerry Best Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55: List: On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: ERGO present just the THEN part. from Wikipedia (sorry!) Ergo may refer to: * A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum. * A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for example, in ergonomics. Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the syntactical force of “then”. Just my opinion. Cheers jerry Links: -- [1] apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
My applauds, Gene! What a great wake-up call. Kirsti Määttänen Eugene Halton kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:10: Gary f: "I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence, but what would motivate them to kill us? I don’t think the Terminator scenario, or that of HAL in _2001,_ is any more realistic than, for example, the scenario of the Spike Jonze film _Her_." Gary, We live in a world gone mad with unbounded technological systems destroying the life on the Earth and you want to parse the particulars of whether "a machine" can be destructive? Isn't it blatantly obvious? And as John put it: "If no such goal is programmed in an AI system, it just wanders aimlessly." Unless "some human(s) programmed that goal [of destruction] into it." Though I admire your expertise on AI, these views seem to me blindingly limited understandings of what a machine is, putting an artificial divide between the machine and the human rather than seeing the machine as continuous with the human. Or rather, the machine as continuous with the automatic portion of what it means to be a human. Lewis Mumford pointed out that the first great megamachine was the advent of civilization itself, and that the ancient megamachine of civilization involved mostly human parts, specifically the bureaucracy, the military, the legitimizing priesthood. It performed unprecedented amounts of work and manifested not only an enormous magnification of power, but literally the deification of power. The modern megamachine introduced a new system directive, to replace as many of the human parts as possible, ultimately replacing all of them: the perfection of the rationalization of life. This is, of course, rational madness, our interesting variation on ancient Greek divine madness. The Greeks saw how a greater wisdom could over flood the psyche, creatively or destructively. Rational Pentheus discovered the cost for ignoring the greater organic wisdom, ecstatic and spontaneous, that is also involved in reasonableness, when he sought to imprison it in the form of Dionysus: he literally lost his head! We live the opposite from divine madness in our rational madness: living from a lesser projection of the rational-mechanical portions of reasonableness extrapolated to godly dimensions: deus ex machina, our savior! This projection of the newest and least matured portions of our brains, the rationalizing cortex, cut free from the passions and the traditions that provided bindings and boundings, has come to lord it over the world. It does not wander aimlessly, this infantile tyrant. It projects it's dogmas into science, technology, economy, and everyday habits of mind (yes, John, there is no place for dogma in science, but that does not prevent scientists from being dogmatic, or from thinking from the unexamined dogmas of nominalism, or from the dogmas of the megamachine). The children and young adults endlessly pushing the buttons of the devices that confine them to their screens are elements of the megamachine, happily being further "programmed" to machine ways of living. Ditto many (thankfully, not all) of the dominant views in science and technology, and, of course, also in anti-scientific views, which are constructing with the greatest speed and a religious-like passion our unsustainable dying world, scientifically informed sustainability alternatives notwithstanding. Perfection awaits us. What "would motivate them to kill us?" Rationally-mechanically infantilized us. Gene Halton "There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness." On Jun 15, 2017 11:42 AM, "John F Sowa" wrote: On 6/15/2017 9:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems. That definition is compatible with Peirce's comment that the search for "the first nondegenerate Thirdness" is a more precise goal than the search for the origin of life. Note the comment by the biologist Lynn Margulis: a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient exhibits intentionality. In the article "Gaia is a tough bitch", she said “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria” lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.” I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence, but what would motivate them to kill us? Yes. The only intentionality in today's AI systems is explicitly programmed in them -- for example, Google's goal of finding documents or the goal of a chess program to win a game. If no such goal is programmed in an AI system, it just wanders aimlessly. The most likely reason why any AI system would have the goal to kill an
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deely & Apel
Hello Brad, A very interesting theme you have taken on. A challenging one, too. Apel and Deely come from very different traditions. I guess about all listers have read Deely (on Peirce), but none to my knowledge has read Apel (on Peirce). Except me. - I'd like to know if there are some other seasoned listers with an interest in the views of Apel on CSP. Early on I took the habit of avoiding any reading of interpretations on any classic texts before I had got the feel of understanding the classic in question on its own right. (Invented many kinds of tests to my correct understanding in the way.) Now you have taken the job of comparing two eminent writers with a very, very different background and standpoints. Different traditions of thought. If you are seaching for earlier publications comparing Deely's interpretations and those of Apel, I suspect there is none to find. How come you got interested in Apel? - I am a European philospher, so of course I do know Apel, and not only on CSP. My best, Kirsti Määttänen Tampere University, Finland Brad Venner kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:19: Hi, all. My name is Brad Venner - I'm a new list subscriber. I'd like to put together a paper comparing the approaches of John Deely and Karl-Otto Apel, in memorium of their recent passing (Deely in Jan 2017; Apel in May 2017). I'm thinking of focusing on their history of philosophy projects as a frame. Both credit Peirce as the originator of a new philosophical age. Apel considers three major phases of "first philosophy" (ontology, transcendental subject, transcendental semiotics) while Deely considers four (ancient, latin, modern, post-modern). Thus Deely splits the ancient age into Greek and Latin phases. This difference seems related to their overall emphasis on Peirce's influences - Apel emphasizes the Kantian influences, while Deely emphasizes the Latin influences. Apel's term "transcendental semiotics" caries this Kantian/Latin distinction. I haven't found any such direct comparisons in the literature so far, which concerns me a little, since it almost certainly reflects my ignorance of philosophy (I'm a professional statistician). If anyone has any relevant references that I've missed, or related ideas that you know of, I'd appreciate if you would post them to the list. Thanks! - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity! Gratefully, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39: On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal) in that they study real things and not idealizations. In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach. In the 20th c, it was adopted by the Vienna Circle in the form of logical positivism. As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system. But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost all the subtlety of Peirce's use. The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers. To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were just summaries of observation data. The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang in 1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method: It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods — the trouble being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or of practical import is being discussed. Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but he found Lewis more congenial. He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of Wang, Hao (1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know, MIT Press. Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found Carnap's attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap was there. Peirce would have found it equally repulsive. If he had known that the word 'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce would have disowned it. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Gene, The most important message ever in Peirce-list is this one you posted! I repeat: ever! I am literally schocked by the fact, that I am the first to respond. This late. Am I conversing with human beings? - Or just kinds of extensions to automatization of everyday life & "common sense" moulded into it? The news you are sharing, Gene, are even more alarming than climate change. Because this proceeds more rapidly, for instance. I have no deep trust in tests of empathy etc. But even a poor tests do catch this kind of change. in these proportions. Are you folks happy with this? - Not moving your eyelid? If this is the situation in US, something like it happens almost all over the world. But, just a moment, this list may not be about what CSP was concerned about. This list may nowadays be concerned just about AI. And how to (mis)use CSP to those purposes. Hey, fellows, there is life to attend to! Kirsti Eugene Halton kirjoitti 12.6.2017 19:40: In the past generation in the United States, empathy among college students, as measured by standardized tests, has dropped about 40% according to a 2010 University of Michigan study, with the largest drop occurring after the year 2000. This is the new normal. Should we now suppose the previous norm to be paranormal, above or beyond the norm? Other standardized tests show that Narcissism has gone up for this age group, as would be expected, since Narcissism involves empathy deficiency. Could there be a day when empathy is regarded as a paranormal phenomenon? Imagine that society where rigorous experiments on the subjects show no signs of empathy above chance, because the society has systematically self-altered itself to diminish or virtually extinguish a passion older than humanity itself. Of course all of this involves socialization and especially parenting. Imagine a society where frequent empathic touch and gaze between parent and young children is regarded as paranormal, because the norms reveal very little empathic touch or gaze. Harlow’s monkey experiments showed what this would be like. A society shaped by a rational-mechanical bureaucratic mindset is likely to manifest it not only in its norms of parenting and social interaction, but tacitly in its science and technology as well, despite the best intentions and technical methods. The passions tend to be denigrated in such a world. In mid-twentieth century “the new synthesis” in genetics, as Julian Huxley called it, showed a determinist perspective in which socialization, experience, and Lamarckian-like phenomena, such as Peirce’s idea of “evolutionary love,” evolution by Thirdness, were unacceptable, perhaps again, literally “paranormal.” Epigenetics and related developments in biology have shown the limitations of "the new synthesis." I grant that Sheldrake attempted rigorous experiments with original designs, which I'd like to look further into, including the dog ones. On the upside I can see that the dog experiments at least included beings living more from their passions. It throws a light on the more typical experimental assumptions: Why would we think that randomized untrained subjects from the humanly diminished altered state of a rational-mechanical bureaucratic society performing cognitive tasks would provide rigorous objective data in experiments on phenomena such as telepathy? Gene Halton On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:41 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: Kirsti’s very solid post is worthy of a very careful read, although I not state the case so forcefully. In general, although I have not studied Sheldrake’s work as closely as she, I have followed it for several decades from the perspective of biochemical dose-response relationships. In general, I find his scientific logic sound. Historically, quantitative scientific measurements of phenomena can proceed decades or centuries before a quantitative theories of how the phenomena can be symbolized. A clear example of the factual measurements before quantitative explanations are genetic phenomena. Inheritable traits appear as if by magic. Another example, the need for specific vitamins in diets and the influence of hormones on behavior. CSP grounds his view of realism on the facts associated with quali-signs, sin-signs and legi-signs, in illation to possible measurement. Scientific theories are necessarily grounded in such facts, either qualitative of quantitative. It (observation) is what it is, regardless of assertions about the formal logics of mathematics. Sheldrake's statements about scientific “dogmas” contain some grains of truth but are not well stated from either a chemical, mathematical or logical point of view. Sheldrake is certainly NOT applying a Procrustian bed to observations in order to accommodate his personal philosophy. Cheers Jerry On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, Actually Sheldrake was able to test a hypothesis (wh
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
Hah. The minute I sent my message on no response, I got John's response. This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through. It is not that some identifiable person is needed to put AI into inhuman action. Nor is it needed that this kind of mishap originates in any identifiable "machine". You know better! In any net, everything is connected with every other 'thing'. Just as you said on the philosphy of CSP. Life is net-like. Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual persons' ??? If so, you are not seeing the forest, just the trees. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.6.2017 06:15: On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: What "would motivate [AI systems] to kill us?" Rationally-mechanically infantilized us. Yes. That's similar to what I said: "The most likely reason why any AI system would have the goal to kill anything is that some human(s) programmed [or somehow instilled] that goal into it." these views seem to me blindingly limited understandings of what a machine is, putting an artificial divide between the machine and the human rather than seeing the machine as continuous with the human. I'm not denying that some kind of computer system might evolve intentionality over some long period of time. There are techniques such as "genetic algorithms" that enable AI systems to improve. But the word 'improve' implies value judgments -- a kind of Thirdness. Where does that Thirdness come from? For genetic algorithms, it comes from a reward/punishment regime. But rewards are already a kind of Thirdness. Darwin proposed "natural selection" -- but that selection was based on a reward system that involved energy consumption (AKA food). And things that eat (such as bacteria) already exhibit intentionality by seeking and finding food, as Lynn Margulis observed. As Peirce said, the origin of life must involve some nondegenerate Thirdness. There are only two options: (1) Some random process that takes millions or billions of years produces something that "eats". (2) Some already intelligent being (God? Demiurge? Human?) speeds up the process by programming (instilling) some primitive kind of Thirdness and lets natural selection make improvements. But as I said, the most likely cause of an evil AI system is some human who deliberately or accidentally put the evil goal into it. I would bet on Steve Bannon. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Jon, I like your tenor, but do not quite agree. Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say. But logic? In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it is an ongoing process, with no predictable end. Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to give a vague sense of what I mean by ' modern'. With this, I mostly follow Foucault's analysis. There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. - The very position of formal locic is at stake. The fight really is not about what locically is valid or not. Nor is it about which kind of locic gets science on with it's task. It is about taking hold of university departments as fortresses. About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'. We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and you. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00: John, Kirsti, List ... The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative. Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win out in the long run. And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair. It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives. A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials as a descriptive science. So logic may deal with abstractions from language but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language. Regards, Jon On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Kirsti and Jon A. Kirsti Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. Jon ditto amen qed si. Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic. They are related by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic. The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a very low opinion of language. Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder. He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts." My "correction" to Frege: "We must break the domination of analytic philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world." For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf Kirsti, CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. Yes. Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework. He studied the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail. Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from language. The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development. Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not as a replacement for language. In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell. But Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW. Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell. I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf Kirsti I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a limited degree. I certainly agree with that point. When I said that dictionaries were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion. Please remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several dictionaries. But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time. Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations. See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer Adam Kilgarriff: https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] An apology
Dear John, I sincerely apologize for any negative feelings my latest mail addressed to you may have caused. I have been reprimanded by list managers that my tenor and tone are not tolerated. In a democratic list, so I am told. There have been three complaints. Off-list. So I'm told. My rare praises have been out-of-place and unfounded too. So I have been told as well. Hereby I publicly apologize for both kinds of responses. Regards, Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 10.11.2016 15:51: John, list, Most important points you take up, John. Time-sequences between stories do not apply. - The big-bang is just a story,one on many just as possible stories. Time-scales are just as crucial with the between - issue as are storywise arising issues. There are no easy ways out ot the time-scale issues. Best, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.11.2016 21:25: Edwina, Kirsti, list, ET I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail. I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2 of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point: GB thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones... A story is a little knot or complex of that species of connectedness which we call relevance. This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term 'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans: CP 4.551 Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi- interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. Re time: We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality (whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs. ET The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S] read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic worlds. This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories: the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories about ideal, mathematical forms. The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the time sequence of a physical story. We may apply the math (for example, the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the construction of a physical story. But that application is a mapping between two stories. The term 'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories. In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from the stories we tell about our experience. The time sequences in two different stories may have some similarities, but we must distinguish three distinct sequences: the time sequences of each story, and the time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story. JFS Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension? KM I am most interested in knowing more on this. David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below: Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least in principle... [He] seems not to have responded to the continuously- evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to Einstein's conceptual unification of space and time. In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of relating different views. It also allows for metalevel reasoning that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that have independent time scales and sequences. John From Google books: _A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiotics_ edited by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Springer, 2008: https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement&source=bl&ots=DQUnZlvOYu&sig=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement&f=false David R. Finkelstein, _Quantum Relativity: A Synthesis of the Ideas of Heisenberg and Einstein_, Springer, 1996. https://books.google.com/books?id=OvjsCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277&lpg=PA277&dq=peirce+relativity&source=bl&ots=0r
Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
Gary, list, First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - Which I apologized. After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and tone. Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that? I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on list, or post it to me. I do not understand how or why anything on P-list should be to anyone's likings. End of this dicussion in my part. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30: Kirsti, list, As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1] if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from time to time. In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS - It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to rectify the problem on-list. GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly contacted by three members of the list who found especially this passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: Kirsti had written: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST. WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING - Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons for this: (1) None of us really knows yet what the most humane and productive communicational mores will turn out to be for communication of this sort: it is continually surprising, and if anything is certain here it is that our initial hunches tend to be unreliable. The list manager is more likely to understand enough about the dynamics of this particular list than anyone else, and has also had enough experience of these things to have learned what is likely to be the most effective response to something problematic. (2) It is the list manager who is ultimately responsible for the list, as regards institutional accountability. Speaking directly to this: I need to have these things under my own control if I am to handle judiciously the problems that can arise in such connections. I am open to advice and counsel at all times and try not to act imperiously. But there is no way that I can effectively delegate my responsibility to the list members, which would be essential if the members were themselves to participate in the management of the list other than as informal advisors in off-list discussion. (3) It is probably because everybody on the list understands (at least unreflectively) that no list members as such have any special right to regulate or moderate the conduct of others as list members that criticisms of one another that suggest directly or indirectly that someone is not of the proper sort to be on the list because of what they post are highly inflammatory and are the cause
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'
A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give grounds for it. It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to uphold old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the message? I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in a philosophical context. I hope to get more information on this. Did Peirce ever use this word? Kisti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 29.6.2017 02:10: Jeff, What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the _application_ of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of information conveyed by those propositions. So I think it's misleading to say that Peirce's "meaning" of those terms changed from 1867 to 1893 (or later), or that his _concepts_ of breadth and depth changed in any way. Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such as "New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very old indeed, and he does _not_ say that he is repurposing these well-established logical terms to say something different from what logicians have said for centuries. Indeed his own ethics of terminology would discourage that sort of repurposing. His originality was in defining "information" as a third "quantity" which could be formalized as the logical product of the other two. In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what Peirce did by broadening their _application_ within logic was to demonstrate just how basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so quotes from Peirce to back this up, and will do that if you wish, but there's probably no need for that. Gary f. FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] SENT: 28-Jun-17 18:15 TO: Peirce-L SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information' Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List, I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms. I restricted myself to _TERMS, _because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable to _PROPOSITIONS _and to _ARGUMENTS. _The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP 2.407 Fn P1 p 249) I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this broadening in the meaning of both of these terms? Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions and arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and the interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the relation between the sign and the _final_ interpretant in particular--I tend to think that Peirce is reforming the early explanations in a number of ways--but it isn't obvious to me what might count as natural development or refinement of the earlier position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in position. The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to reconsider how the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the context of the mature semiotic theory. --Jeff - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Peirce did not use the term "semantics. But he did use the term: "semeiotics". He even gave advice in spelling the word. This was his advice: " see-my-o-tics". Anyone can google this, I assume. If need be. In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings. Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek heritance. And did not accept the modern meanings attacted to the basic concepts. - He re-interpreted them. With this he truly was in line with Peirce. In 1970's ( and onwards) Peirce became kind of covertly famous in Europe. His writings were studied by the top philosophers. But his name was seldom, if ever mentioned. The French style of writing philosophy relies on argumentation. Within the text at hand. It is kind af assumed that any reader is thoroughly famaliar with the sources. I do not know this much on the German tradition. Continental it was, that is sure. Since I read Heidegger's Time and Being, It has been quite clear to me that he was after something akin to Peirce. - Kind of muddled Peirce, I thought. Afterwards I read about all Heidegger has written. And was even more convinced that my idea was valid. Kirsti CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 30.7.2017 19:52: On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of _logica docens_, or logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or, speculative rhetoric). These branches of logic all concern themselves with the _study of signs as such_, while phenomenology is, as it were, pre-logica docens (although it most certainly employs logica utens as has been discussed on this list as we all employ logic even before we've reflected on it in a scientific spirit). My understanding is that for Peirce semiotics (our term) is grounded in phenomenology or phaneroscopy. So I definitely don’t want to argue that the semantic extension of terms is the same in the Heideggarian tradition as in the Peircean tradition. Rather I wish to argue that via similar influences there is a similarity of content. Heidegger doesn’t really engage much with semiotics proper - his focus is primarily on Being arising out of his early work on Scotus and then via rethinking Husserl’s phenomenology - primarily intentionality and moving from bracketing/reduction to a general hermeneutic. Derrida is the one who later takes up semiotics in the more Heideggarian tradition via his research on Peirce. So I’ll readily concede some of your points, such as pointing that some things are metaphysics rather than phenomenology for Peirce. But again I think we have to distinguish between the content of the two movements versus the terminology used to describe that content. I think the latter gets focused on to the detriment of thinking through the former. In truth this more scientific logical _trivium_ goes back very far indeed, to the Romans, Peirce writes: Yes, while we often look to Peirce’s engagement with the scholastics, particularly Scotus, a lot of this can be found in the tradition of platonism and stoicism in late antiquity. I’ll confess I’ve not read or studied much of Peirce’s engagement with such figures although I know he was very well read in the texts available - particularly Proclus and similar figures. So while I agree that in Heidegger as in Peirce that there is no _bracketing or reduction_ or _psychologism_ or _egoic intentiality_ as there is in Husserl, yet speculative grammar (as a branch of logic) is, in Peirce's classification of the sciences, further down in the list of sciences and, so, draws principles from it and not the reverse. This is quite different from your commenting that, "like Peirce, Heidegger uses [speculative grammar] as a stepping off point" for his phenomenology. Quite the contrary in my opinion. Let me think through this a bit. Although my initial inclination is to note that in terms of thinking through issues it’s different from the position in the taxonomy of Peirce. That is while phenomenology ultimately grounds signs and signs these later fields that doesn’t entail that in inquiry the process of thinking proceeds solely in that direction. But you raise some good points and I’ll have some further comments later. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into triads and triadic thinking (as a method). On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's. As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer to the list archives. It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism" published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions. What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that his starting points were different from those most often refered and discussed here in the list. Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read. In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics. Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only analytical philosophy. Best, Kirsti CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52: On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural features, not to be glossed over in my opinion. Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver. But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was. I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the driver. My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus on meaning. Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair. (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers) He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of “would be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning. He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and others. Again, I’m fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far better versed in the nuances of Peirce’s development than I. But it really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others over meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the structure of the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades. SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now? Maybe it is both. . . This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while others at times emphasize using his ideas to furthe
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely left this road. By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research relying on Peircean Categories. It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the issues involved. To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle. Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only work in the context of his work as a whole. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12: List, Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is that so? It is my impression. And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much. Best, Helmut 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into triads and triadic thinking (as a method). On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's. As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer to the list archives. It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism" published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions. What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that his starting points were different from those most often refered and discussed here in the list. Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read. In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics. Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only analytical philosophy. Best, Kirsti CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52: >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond >> wrote: >> >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important part >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion. > > Well I think we're saying the same thing the question is more the > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of > structure in general. That's a more subtle point I don't have > strong positions on although I'm sympathetic to what I took Kirsti > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver. > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was. > > I'd love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the > driver. > > My own beliefs here (which I'm more than happy to change with > further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted > earlier "Pragmatism" from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus > on meaning. > >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite >> another affair. > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers) > > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking > how his principles of predication
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Helmut, You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even impossible to grasp what you seem to be after. Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing". I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues. Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three logically necessary approaches. I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's I tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54: Kirsti, List, For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of. So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both. So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only work in the context of his work as a whole." Best, Helmut 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely left this road. By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research relying on Peircean Categories. It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the issues involved. To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle. Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only work in the context of his work as a whole. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12: > List, > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is > that so? It is my impression. > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much. > Best, > Helmut > > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > wrote: > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A > question > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into > triads and triadic thinking (as a method). > > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early > 2000's. > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I > refer > to the list archives. > > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto > Apel's book: "Charles S
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Concernig the supplement: Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something higher". Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12: Supplement: I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for" something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money. Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to rule it. Kirsti, List, For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of. So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both. So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only work in the context of his work as a whole." Best, Helmut 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely left this road. By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research relying on Peircean Categories. It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the issues involved. To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle. Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only work in the context of his work as a whole. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12: > List, > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is > that so? It is my impression. > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much. > Best, > Helmut > > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > wrote: > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A > question > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into > triads and triadic thinking (as a method). > > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early > 2000's. > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I > refer > to the list archives. > > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto > Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism" > published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions. > > What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is > that > his starting points were different from those most often refered and > discussed here in the
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Jerry, A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in the context of my work. Of your work I said nothing. Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that? Best, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37: Kirsti: On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues. In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the essence of human communication and the formation of human communities, including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics, chemistry, biology, and the medical professions. Thus, we are at polar opposites here. The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if... Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06: Kirsti, you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"." Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). " But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture? Helmut, It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a whole picture". A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue. What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering methods and tools for research. There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or making them. I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and understanding you are after? Best, Kirsti 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi Helmut, You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even impossible to grasp what you seem to be after. Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing". I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues. Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three logically necessary approaches. I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's I tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54: > Kirsti, List, > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But > composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of. > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics > (make them one topic) to understand both. > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP > just does not work. The "pieces" only > work in the context of his work as a whole." > Best, > Helmut > > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > wrote: > Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean > philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only > classifications. > This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the > only, > or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely > left this road. > > By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often > they > are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious > research > relying on Peircean Categories. > > It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work > Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that > the > reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The > issue > was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the > issues involved. > > To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and > misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Jerry, list, It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, leave me out of any expectations of participating in further discussions on the topic. Best, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37: Kirsti: On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues. In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the essence of human communication and the formation of human communities, including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics, chemistry, biology, and the medical professions. Thus, we are at polar opposites here. The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...In view Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
List, I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work with sign classifications. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52: I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims." I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs." In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign" and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled "Meaning": [[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_," which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_ that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_ place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_ or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 (1910) ] This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a focus on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone can provide an even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but dispenses with the focus on signs, I could take that as supporting Kirsti's claim about "historical fact." Otherwise I don't think that claim stands up to scrutiny. Gary f. } I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway -Original Message- From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00 Jerry, list, It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he fou
Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Helmut, That is good to know. Thanks. Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09: Kirsti, you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and understanding you are after?" I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs. Best, Helmut 05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06: > Kirsti, > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. > According to my > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"." > > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). " > > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture? Helmut, It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a whole picture". A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue. What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering methods and tools for research. There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or making them. I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and understanding you are after? Best, Kirsti > > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > > Helmut, > > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" > and > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of > which > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived > at > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after. > > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing". > > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I > spent > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on > those > issues. > > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found > CSP > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding > the > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the > three > logically necessary approaches. > > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's > I > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success. > > Best, Kirsti > > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54: > > Kirsti, List, > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex > and > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of > categorial > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or > "NAND", > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But > > composition is just a matter different from classification. > Therefore > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no > > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of. > > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and > > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct > to > > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of > > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is > not > > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both > topics > > (make them one topic) to understand both. > > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces fr
RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was explaining her about his earlier work and results on the topic, as best he could. Also following the rules of polite correspondence (by then) and taking her interests (Welby's Significs) to the foreground. As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests, works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that is. Best Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:39: List, I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work with sign classifications. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52: I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims." I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs." In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign" and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled "Meaning": [[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_," which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_ that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_ place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_ or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 (1910) ] This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a focus on signs and various ty
Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
Helmut, Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense (meaning) it is used nowadays. I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most superficial way. I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are others with similar aims. Best wishes, Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41: Helmut, That is good to know. Thanks. Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09: Kirsti, you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and understanding you are after?" I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs. Best, Helmut 05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06: > Kirsti, > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. > According to my > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"." > > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). " > > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture? Helmut, It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a whole picture". A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue. What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering methods and tools for research. There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or making them. I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and understanding you are after? Best, Kirsti > > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > > Helmut, > > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" > and > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of > which > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived > at > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after. > > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing". > > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I > spent > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on > those > issues. > > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found > CSP > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding > the > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the > three > logically necessary approaches. > > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's > I > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success. > > Best, Kirsti > > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54: > > Kirsti, List, > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex > and > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of > categorial > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or > "NAND", > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But > > composition is just a matter different from classification. > Therefore > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no > > matter what a sini- o
Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc
John, Your posts greatly appreciated. But Peirce did write on cyclical arithmetics. With detailed instructions on how demonstrate the rules by experimenting with a pack of cards. Detailed instructions include strict rules on how to achieve a random order with the pack of cards at hand. Only after doing this, the experimentations may duly be executed. CSP describes eg. a procedure to demonstrate the birth of a habit, for instance. You start with a random pack and end up with, say, spades only. Thus his cyclical arithmetics is deeply bound together with his ideas on the relation between probability and rules. What happens with true randonmess with a rule (any rule) applied to it? This, for CSP was a question in need of experimentation as well as pre-locical (math!) demonstration.. The rule CSP choosed was that of cyclicity. Nowhere have I seen this relation studied. Not in Moore's collection, nowhere. A pack of cards contains 52 cards. - Well, there is a pattern of patience I have known since childhood. It may be called Napoleon' grave or not. Anyway, it consists of three cycles of ten. So, 52 ends up uneven with cycles of ten. Does this make a significant difference with as few cycles as three? - CSP does not tell. - In this context, anyway. All Peirce writes on cyclical arithmetics can be tested AND personally exprienced by really doing exactly as he minutely advices. Also repeatedly, as any experiment worth anything should be done. I have been experimenting systematically with a pack of cards for several, several decades. In order to truly understand the principles of cyclical arithmetics, by CSP. What I have found out, for example is the huge difference between repeating, for three times in a cycle of ten, a pack of random 52 to a pack of 50. Really doing the patience includes that one counts down wins and losses as something personal, It is you who wins or loses. - It makes a difference, too. There is no way any collection of quotes may replace experimentation. Inferences should be based on those, not just by leaning on any kind of hear-say. Not on even well-selected quotes ripped from manuscrips by CSP. With best wishes, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.8.2017 23:42: Jerry, JFS In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction, testing (actions) and repeat. JLRC> Do you have specific citations? I wish that Peirce had used the word 'cycle' and had drawn a diagram similar to the one I frequently use. See the attached soup1.jpg. I pieced together passages from many of Peirce's writings about induction, abduction, and deduction to construct that cycle. There are many such comments scattered all through his writings. (His lectures on pragmatism in EP vol. 2 contain many of them.) Following is a passage (CP 5.171) that mentions all four arrows of the cycle: abduction, deduction, testing (action), and induction: Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about. See Section 7, pp. 26 to 34, of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf . Diagram 7 (p. 31) is soup1.jpg. On page 32, I use that diagram to explain Peirce's point "truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us." (EP 2.379-380) That passage implies a cycle. Peirce's lectures on pragmatism would have been much clearer if he had drawn such a cycle. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc
John, list In response, John wrote: "Kirsti, But Peirce did write on cyclical arithmetics. With detailed instructions on how demonstrate the rules by experimenting with a pack of cards. Yes. But he used that cycle for a different purpose. That cycle represents patterns in a particular mathematical subject. The cycle in the logic of pragmatism is a cycle among the steps of reasoning. It's not a cycle in the subject matter." Which cycle do you mean, John? I was talking about cyclical arithmetics, not about any special, let alone any singular cycle. Mathematics, simplest especially, was for CSP a pre-locical science, more abstract than logic itself. Arithemtics was considered (at the time) the simplest of simples, the first to be taught to stupid kids. Peirce made a twist to this common belief (by then considered a good habit) with his cyclical math and detailed instructions to play with a pack of cards. With certain sets of rules, which - with randomness duly taken care of, turn out to show unexpected results. Under one's very nose. CSP used math for general logical purposes. Even mainly so. He did concentrate sometimes on special issues in math, with remarkable results. No denying that. You have always put forward how the works of CSP form a whole, to my reading at least. - How come cyclicity seems to get a different treatment? Just wondering, and pondering, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
As wished by John, some comments to the jpg, as well as on some comments presented: I find the diagram a misleading, not a clarifying one. I found the quote provided by Tommi a highly relevant problematization of the issue. I also agree with the critical notes provided by Jerry, up to a point. The essence of anything lies in what it aims at, wrote Peirce. He also emphasized that meaning lies in effects, not just in words. Changing 'science' into 'knowledge' in CSPsciences jpg cannot be justified by current English dictionaries or other records of current use of the word 'science' in US or UK. - In Finnish usage, for example, the word for 'sciences' includes human sciences, and philosophy. Who could say, on any grounds, that here and now we have a state of affairs (in science) CSP aimed at? The future he was aiming at? What has truly and really changed from the day CSP died to this day, is that by now CSP has become popular in academic circles. That is a new, quite recent phenomena. With fame comes all the misfortunes always attached to it. – People just do not like to change their habits of thought. (Which truly is cumbersome!) People are inclined to accomondate whatever is presented to accord and follow their habits. With even acrobatic twists and turns in their (mostly spontaneus and nonconscious) moves of mind in the process of making sense of whatever is offered. CSP was a radical, in the sense of not following the well-trodded-on pathways. His ways of thinking still are radical in that respect. Easy-to-digest presentations will do no good. To cut it short: I do find this CSPsciences.jpg a misrepresentation. The latin rooted "idio" was used by CSP for a deep reason, in accord with his comprehension of the web of (semeiotic) relations between minds and meanings. – It just is not something to be thrown into a bin as 'outdated'. This web of relations I have been studying for almost half a century. First without Peirce, then with Peirce. So I have deep reasons, just as well. Jerry has been approaching the idea of 'idio' from the viewpoint of identity and perplexity. And has met with conundrums, id est (ie) cul-de-sac's. Hegel tried to tackle the question with his Phänomenologie des Geistes. –It is to be noted that whilst Peirce quite harshly mocked Hegels 'Logik', he later on took a much more mellow view with Hegel's phenomenology. Even stated that the three moments by Hegel bore a clear resemblance with his three elements of (all) experience. (Which is what the quote presented by Tommi is basicly about). Peirce found a positive accord with the phenomenology of Hegel, but definitely not so with Husserl & followers. – However, nowadays the WORD phenomenology is commonly understood as refering to Husserlian phenomenology. With whatever variation of its meaning that may apply with any given audience. This is a problem to be addressed, not something to be overlooked. Especially with audiences not familiar with CSP. Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical arithmetics. Has this not been recognized? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53: On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et ultima scientia". From p. 2 of the article: According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural sciences as well as theology... I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context. Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many decades before his 1903 classification. I believe that the dotted lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent ideas he had been contemplating for many years. Tommi So because anything that can be found real can also be merely "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical concepts and structures are present in any other science (and therefore "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). Yes. That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning. As he said, mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning": draw or imagine a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections and patterns in it. The diagram need not conform to any prior knowledge or experience. Tommi philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory in special science... But from such principle follows severe restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in which sense psychology is dependent on logic). That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas. But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and the normative sciences. I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887), which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology: http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf From p. 4 of "Logical Machines": When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy under certain general conditions, and observe the result. In this point of view too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much as there are certain relations between its parts, which involve other relations that were not expressly intended... [But] every machine has two inherent impotencies... In this comment, Peirce admitted that machines could do mathematical reasoning. The two impotencies of a machine: "it is destitute of all originality, of all initiative"; and "it has been contrived to do a certain thing, and it can do nothing else". He added "the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has no such limitations... And this great power it owes, above all, to one kind of symbol, the importance of which is frequently entirely overlooked -- I mean the parentheses." With that comment, Peirce stated the importance of recursion. He used recursive methods in various writings, but most logicians and philosophers who read his writings missed that point because the word 'recursion' was not used in mathematics until the 1930s. And by the way, recursion looks circular, but useful recursions always include a test for stopping when the result is achieved. These issues about recursion came out of the debates of Gödel, Church, and Turing when they were together in Princeton. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1
List, I agree with Jerry. Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41: List, Gary: Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream. It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to communicate with others. This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical stances are common and part of the everyday communications among practitioners. Beyond that, the following quote: I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be interpreted. simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all possible sin-signs could be given form? "But after I had written it out,…" Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript? The phrase: "the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might be emended…" remains a logically impossible task today. I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put into premises. Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic numbers. Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves. IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY? I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various disciplines. Cheers Jerry On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!). Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a “thorough and formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious argument which would exemplify this “false notion of reasoning.” He proposes instead “simply to describe the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of _phenomenology_, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify the irreducible elements found in _any and every possible phenomenon_ — including those “presented in reasoning.” In this way we can show how the phenomena necessarily involved in reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this process combining observation and generalization, we can establish some “facts_”_ about reasoning. Then we can see “how the [fallacious] argument under examination must falsify these facts.” Peirce is proposing to refute a “confused” theory of logic by confronting it with facts gleaned from phenomenology. This procedure is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic as dependent on phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which accompanied these Lowell Lectures. That’s how I see it, anyway. Gary f. http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] SENT: 23-Sep-17 09:06 Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the source information given in EP2:242: _[Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8. 176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave at the Lowell Institute in Boston under
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1
Gary R. You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the snippet you took up, it has been unintentional. As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable. However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good about the way you expressed your concern. Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate valuable discussions. Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining in the list. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25: Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list, Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this snippet from his message: "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?" But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_ have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such extremely thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem an impossible task). I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that there are other members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan Schmidt, who have contributed to SPIN. I'm looking forward to a lively discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures on peirce-l. I'll try to respond to Gary F's comments in the next few days, but have just returned from what was to have been a vacation trip on Martha's Vineyard but which soon became something of a battle with Tropical Storm Jose. Best, Gary R GARY RICHMOND PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING COMMUNICATION STUDIES LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 718 482-5690 [3] On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 3:55 PM, wrote: List, I agree with Jerry. Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41: List, Gary: Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream. It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to communicate with others. This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical stances are common and part of the everyday communications among practitioners. Beyond that, the following quote: I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be interpreted. simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all possible sin-signs could be given form? "But after I had written it out,…" Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript? The phrase: "the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might be emended…" remains a logically impossible task today. I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put into premises. Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic numbers. Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves. IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY? I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various disciplines. Cheers Jerry On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly malignant” because of a peculiar
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1
Gary, Is it truly possible to just by defining to make oneself into strictly separate parts? An interesting question. Nevertheless, this discussion does not deserve continuation. All your points have become quite clear. With the undertones. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 25.9.2017 05:00: Kirsti, List, I really can't say that I understand what your complaint is. Your post began with and highlighted the snippet pointed to . Here it is exactly as it appears in your post: List, I agree with Jerry. Kirsti IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY? You offered, btw, no reasons for your 'agreement'. You now say: Kirsti: You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the snippet you took up, it has been unintentional. Looking again at what I just quoted, it certainly seems intentional to me. But if it wasn't, so what? That wasn't at all the point of my post. You continued: KR: A s a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable. I wasn't looking at this as list manager at all. In fact, when I post something as 'list manager' or, ore characteristically, since it's my principal role on peirce-l, viz., 'list moderator', I add to my signature, ("writing as list moderator" and sometimes when Ben and I have drafted a post together, "writing as list moderator and co-manager with Ben Udell). You continued: Kirsti: However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good about the way you expressed your concern. Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate valuable discussions. Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining in the list. So, in the context of my posting merely as a member of the forum, your other comments (just quoted) seem at least untoward since, again, I make a fairly sharp distinction between my role as moderator and that of simple participant in forum discussions. To reiterate: my post was merely to suggest that (a) one couldn't simply say that one agreed with Jerry when he was indeed suggesting several (4) options, and even as he seemed to be leaning strongly toward one or two in particular and (b) that _IF_ _I_ were to choose one of the four that it would be Jerry's #1, _style_, that the 'introductory flourish' which Jerry remarked was perhaps an expression of Peirce's style of thinking, especially when he was delving into logical questions as fully and as deeply as he could. I gave my reasons for my choice and even tried to moderate them (pardon the pun) by suggesting that Peirce _may_ have rhetorically overstated his case. I must admit that this kind of exchange which you introduced seems to me besides the point, is, in my opinion, a waste of my and the list's time. I, for one, would rather be addressing Gary F's thoughtful comments having briefly commented on Jerry's remarks. Although I may be mistaken, it would appear that you have some 'beef' with the way I moderate (or co-manage?) the list. But that is an entirely different matter which you might have, as discussed here even rather recently, first addressed to me as list moderator off-list. Best, Gary R (writing as list moderator) GARY RICHMOND PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING COMMUNICATION STUDIES LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 718 482-5690 On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 7:06 PM, wrote: Gary R. You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the snippet you took up, it has been unintentional. As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable. However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good about the way you expressed your concern. Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate valuable discussions. Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining in the list. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25: Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list, Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this snippet from his message: "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?" But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_ have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such extremely thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem an impossible task). I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might not
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8
List, Jerry and John Highly problematic, I agree. But it is not true that any contradiction,or all contradictions imply everything. Not logically, not really. Everything does not mean the same as anything. For CSP anything remains an open (vague) question UNTILL further studies & determinations on that basis. On everything we can never definitely say. On whichever moment in time (the current present), there always remains more to be found out. - Or else there is no one to say anything. Kirsti Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.10.2017 00:22: List, John: On Oct 10, 2017, at 1:17 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction implies everything. Everything? While this assertion is widely repeated in the literature, I think it is highly problematic. Because it violates the common sense of the meaning of natural language terms in the premise. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8
List, John, Jerry and Jon, LEM presents one of the three basic misassuptions in modern logic. For all I know CSP and Brouwer came to similar conclusions independently. They also offered their grounds and conclusions very differently. There was a deep change in math and locic during and after the centuries 1500-1600. Arabic influence, for starters. Latinization of ancient greek philosophical heritage. Modal logic was self-evident for Plato, Aristoteles etc. Modern (especially formal) logic is just feebly trying to recover and gather together the remants after LEM & the other two mispremisses. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 11.10.2017 09:20: Jerry LRC, Jon AS, List, Jerry [JFS] Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction implies everything. Everything? While this assertion is widely repeated in the literature, I think it is highly problematic. It's widely repeated because it is a fundamental assumption of most versions of formal logic -- i.e., of every logic that assumes the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). But it is indeed problematic. Brouwer, for example, rejected LEM for intuitionistic logic. And even for systems that are based on LEM, nobody actually claims that everything has been proved. Instead, they recognize that there is a mistake somewhere, and they start searching for it. Jon [JFS] For modal logic, there are three options: necessary, possible, and contingent (not necessary and not impossible). Did you mean to say necessary, impossible, and contingent? Yes. I wrote that too hastily. "not impossible" is a synonym for "possible". For the three options, I should have written necessary, impossible, and contingent (possible and not necessary). But after I sent that note, I did some googling, which led me to the article "Peirce and Brouwer" by Conor Mayo-Wilson: http://mayowilson.org/Papers/Peirce_Brouwer.pdf Some excerpts: page 1 In his 1908 "The Unreliability of the Logical Principles" Brouwer rejected the law of excluded middle (LEM)... Five years earlier, Peirce had reached similar conclusions... p. 2 Peirce and Brouwer's common rejection of LEM is not simply a coincidence, but rather, stems from a deep underlying similarity in their respective philosophical analyses of the continuum. p. 3 Peirce and Brouwer seemed to have no knowledge of each other's work. Brouwer might have learned of Peirce's ideas on semiotics in the 1920's through his association with Lady Welby... However, the two most likely worked independently... Fernando Zalamea also discusses Peirce and Brouwer in connection with the continuum. But he doesn't mention Lady Welby: http://uberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Zalamea-Peirces-Continuum.pdf In any case, these sources indicate that Peirce began to reconsider his ideas about LEM around the same time as the Lowell lectures. His thoughts about the continuum seem to be the original reason. But by 1909, his thoughts led to 3-valued logic and a new way of representing and describing existential graphs. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8
John, Jerry, list I feel utterly surprised. It never occurred to me that LEM could be taken as a 'technical' term. - Thank you Jerry for correcting that mistake. The three basic assumtions of modern logic are, of course, intertwined. If LEM is put questionable, the other two simultaneously begin to wave. - Then fall. Well, they do no fall. Rather what logically happens resembles what has happened with classical mechanics (Newton etc. you know). It has never been proven wrong, (which it is not), but it has been relativized. It only applies within certain scales. Peirce and his logic were not modern. They reach the time and scale beyond modernity. Existential graphs and trichotomies do not show that. It is possible to use those fluently without ever noticing any problems. Everyone knows Einstein's relativity theory. But there are few who understand it. Present day cosmology is attempting to make sense, to understand & find empirical evidence in order to get a better understanding.It is all about relativity theory. Well, Peircean locic is all about relations and relativity. It is not about naming things. As if they were always already out there to pick up and see. Seeing just does not happen that way. And to note: my name is NOT kirstima. I am not identical with my e-mail address. I always sign my post with my name. Which is: Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.10.2017 01:47: List, John: Comments on “technical” aspects of Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) are inserted. On Oct 12, 2017, at 3:15 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jerry and Kirstima, Jerry the issue of the "Law of the Excluded Middle” is a red herring to me. Kirstima LEM presents one of the three basic misassumptions in modern logic. LEM is a convention used in a technical (mathematical) sense. It's important to keep the conventions distinct from ordinary (non-technical) uses of words. LEM plays a central role in triad, the logic of logic, the logic of mathematics and the logic of science. It is far more important then just a notational convention or a traditional usage of a mathematic symbol which is free to substitution for another symbol with the same definition. LEM has profound geometric inference for continuity. Jerry “Everything”, in my opinion, goes far beyond the ultra-simple notions mathematical logic, mathematical formalisms, and physical units of representations Yes, of course. You have to keep technical terms in logic distinct from words in ordinary language that are spelled the same. ??? My view is rather different, perhaps because economic considerations are suppressed. If the usage of a word is not that of ordinary language, then one is obligated to distinguish the technical usage and explain to the reader what it means. CSP was very careless in this area and, often, the modern reader is very hard put to make any sense of his techno - babble. At least, that is how I often feel. On the other side of the coin, when CSP felt up to the task, he wrote many beautiful sentences and paragraphs with a special brilliance that is seldom matched. The term 'universe of discourse' is a technical term, which Boole introduced in his famous book, _Laws of Thought_ (1854): Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of discourse. Furthermore, this universe of discourse is in the strictest sense the ultimate subject of the discourse. When Peirce was talking about logic, he followed the terminology of Boole and de Morgen. It's important to remember that context. I disagree. CSP often stated that chemistry and chemical names were intrinsic to his logical terminology. If one is fluent in the logic of chemistry (as it developed in the second half of the 19 th Century), then the augmentation of Boolean and de Morgen terminology is readily apparent in the logic of relatives. And in his development of his views on (non-mathematical?) Graph Theory. I agree that it is important to remember context, but this is possible if and only if one is looking at at all possible interpretations of “icons, indices and symbols” as used in the scientific community in his age. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
John, Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become actual. Thus a token. There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48: This thread is getting hung up on words. I recommend Peirce's advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow from any options that anyone is debating. Let's consider the two words 'real' and 'existence'. Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his dictum: "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." Consider the following sentence from a recent note: I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential, but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits. My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you like). That process of translation is a purposive action. Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified variables. Each of them refers to something that the speaker would be committed to say exists. By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables. Therefore, they refer to something that exists. But that existence might not be in the physical world. However, Peirce talked about "real possibilities". So they might exist in some possible realm. Next problem: Do signs exist? In the real world or in some realm of possibilities? To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad: Mark, Token, Type. To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type." By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'. Therefore, all three refer to something that exists. Mark and token refer to something perceptible. Therefore, they exist in the physical world. But type would refer to a possibility. Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities. I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would agree with me. But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments, I'll assume the above answers. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
John, For the first time, there seems to be a deep disagreement of views. Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter. Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. Which I have taken to be one of the points in your most valuable mails. I must say I feel confused. Lets rather take Aristotle as a starting point. We all know Peirce took Aristotle as his starting point, developed those ideas in his work. Into something new. True, the logic Quine presents takes up the existential quantifier: there is one (or some) (this or that). Thus he (amongst others), but he takes it (amogst others) as a single fact (true or untrue as such). Then, in addition, there are propositions (understood as sentences, a major fault), which claim: "All x "(etc), or "no x" (etc). Seems ok, but te the true fact is that no fact stands alone. No individual stands alone, about possibilities we do not know. Will they remain open? - We do not know. Aristotle bended into thinking tha all possibilities will be actualized sometime. - There is no way any of us can explore and decide for certain whether this is true OR not. - The end of time was not decided, or even taken up by Aristotle. What is real in Peircean way of thougt lies in the future. As it unfolds, in everyday life as well as in experiments. One steam engine proves the possibility of steam engines. No need for two. That would be twice. Which, of cource is needed. - Two and twice are not logically identical. The first is about cardinal numbersystem, the second about ordinal numbersystem. Very few mathematicians, since Peirce, have given serious thought on this basic issue. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.10.2017 19:06: Kirsti and Gary R, If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely. Kirsti, Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they become actual. In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues: 'real', 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's dictum: "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'. I wrote 'Kirsti' in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.) But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold. In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation for predicate calculus. For "first intentions", he used quantified variables to range over individuals. For "second intentions", he used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals. Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language can be represented by a relation in logic. For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and geometrical shapes. For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent generals of any kind. Those generals include possibilities, among which are sign types. If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions. For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan. As a general, it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities. But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill) which does exist in the physical world. However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan. We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations in the domain of second intentions. Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503) [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine. In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about what "many a logician" would consider: reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same. Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use logic to represent both reality and existence. But the domains would be different. Logic about physical existence is first intentional; it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionar
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)
Hah! To the point Ben! Kirsti Ben Novak kirjoitti 19.10.2017 14:30: Dear List: Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the difficulty here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then be used to talk about both _actual _things and _real _relations." My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or f'unction to "talk about actual things and real relations"? Ben Novak BEN NOVAK 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephone: (814) 808-5702 _"All art is mortal, __not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves._ _One day the last portrait of Rembrandt_ _and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—__though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—__because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message __will have gone." _Oswald Spengler On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:46 AM, Mike Bergman wrote: Hi Gary, List, I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list) have at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the "surprising fact" that causes us to question the generals in Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results of abductive logic informs the possibilities to be considered anew in the next sequence of inquiry, so informs what to consider in Firstness. By this thought, abduction is really a bridge between Thirdness and Firstness in a dynamic process. In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you are making here. In that context, then, virtually any "conditional proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration could/would be instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even unicorns fit under this umbrella, since we know of no natural reason to discount a horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under this formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen as real. While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the CSP quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned" criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional proposition". I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character of what gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are obviously real). But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a notion that any possible is real simply because it is possible. My sense is there is more here. BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question? Thanks! Mike On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Mike, List, Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that post, so I'm glad you found it of interest. I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what I've termed the_ vector of involution_, commencing at 3ns, which involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of hand ("quantified variables") which makes _everything_ "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not only existence, but also reality. While the problem is difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate. You quoted me, then asked: GR: As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries. MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with citations). I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly important to point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be." But I believe that the first question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon." My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some" of those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses which might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce writes: Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate nat
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)
Ontology/ epistemology taken as it has been does not apply to Peirce. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.10.2017 15:53: Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben, Jon By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual things that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495). Yes. That's why I avoided the word 'exist'. In my note, I did not use the words 'exist', 'existence', 'real', or 'reality'. I assumed logic in a way that could be represented in either Peirce's algebraic notation or his existential graphs. In his Gamma graphs, Peirce used lines of identity in areas that represented possibilities. One can use English sentences without the word 'exist' and map them to logic in a way that the variables or the lines of identity show what kinds of things are assumed. But assumption does not imply existence. Edwina thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough attention to relations. Thanks. And note that Frege may have published the first complete notation for first-order logic in 1879. But Peirce was the first to introduce higher-order logic by quantifying over relations in 1885. Jerry I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate metaphysical terms is highly problematic. The sentence is merely a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention... Yes! Exactly! I'm sure that Quine's rhetorical trick is one that Peirce would have loved: diverting attention away from the words is essential. That step cuts through a mass of verbiage to clarify the implicit logical assumptions. Quine was a strict nominalist, who used his trick to get rid of assumptions he did not like. But I used it to support Peirce's much richer ontology, which uses logic in ways that Quine did not approve: metalanguage, higher-order logic, and modal logic. Jerry Consider the word “Love” for example. Or, almost any human feeling. ... the logics of molecular biology and medicine. which require recursive compositions of terms to operate in multiple metalanguages. Good examples. Write sentences about those topics in English and translate them to your choice of logic. Q's dictum will show which assumed entities are referenced by quantified variables. Gary according to Peirce existence is not "properly" a term of logic, but of metaphysics. 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7 ...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of discourse. That is exactly what I was trying to say. Note the word 'But', which separates what Peirce said about the metaphysical sense and the logical sense. By applying Quine's dictum to the logic, we can determine what is contained in the logical universe (AKA domain of discourse). Instead of saying that the possibilities exist, we can say that they are contained in a special domain of discourse. That does not imply existence in the physical environment. Gary As for the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that "...it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries. Mike Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with citations) Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his ideas. But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the future. If you translate those plans to logic or a computer program, the variables represent "real possibilities". But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley". Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops. Ben My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or function to "talk about actual things and real relations"? I doubt that having a verb is relevant to the issues. Peirce was a logician, who allowed logic to refer to multiple universes (or domains) of discourse. When he applied his logic to issues expressed in ordinary language, he always kept that logical distinction in mind. As Peirce himself said, he found that existential graphs clarified his way of thinking about all the issues in his philosophy. The exercise of mapping his language to logic can help us understand what he was trying to say. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@li
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)
Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree. By the way, using the term 'universe' is fine with me. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03: Kirsti and Gary R, Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter. My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized in just one line. If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited: 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613 ...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially the same thing... 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7 ...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of discourse. The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in a metaphysical sense. The last three lines state the equivalent of Quine's dictum: In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier. In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to the referent of a line of identity. The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of discourse". If you object to the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'. Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable." I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler. But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition. Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. I agree. Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the logical sense. That enabled him to talk about a domain of possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable. As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds to Peirce's metaphysical existence. Therefore Quine equated existence in the physical universe with reality. Quine never used modal logic, metalanguage, or higher-order logic. And he was strongly opposed to any talk about real possibilities. Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's realism and Quine's nominalism. In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but Quine allowed only one universe (or domain). John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6
Thank you very much John for a most enlightening post. Recto/verso issue (in other forms, of course) was taken up & became somewhat popular within feminist philosophy 1980's and 1990's. I felt uncomfortable with it. But could not pinpoint the locical (in the narrow sense) errors. A pseudograp is always false, you wrote. If and when probabilies are taken seriously. Just as the prefix in naming the concept implies. In other contexts CSP uses "quasi-", denoting an "as if.." prefix. Something, anything in priciple, may be taken as if it were true. - E.g. beliefs no one present (in any sense) doubts. N-valued logic, in abtracto, does not involve time. So I gather? - So, even if the possible truth values are unnumerable, innumerable, as soon as events and successions of events are involved, (logical) anything just vanishes. Then there always (already) is something. With empereia, there always is something. To all I know, CSP never used the term 'semantics'. It was introduced & became popular after CSP. (If anyone proves me wrong, I'll be glad to know better). I attended Hintikka's lectures on game theory in early 1970's. No shade of Peirce. I found them boring. No discussion invited nor wellcomed. Later on he got more mellow. And very interested on Peirce. - I greatly appreciate his latest work, remarkable indeed. Especially from a representative of analytical philosophy, to which he remained true. - Still, it hurts my heart and soul to read a suggestion that Peirce's endoporeutic may have or could have been a version of Hintikka's game theoretical semantics. - Must have been a slip. Is it so that Peirce never gave up his project on developing a genuinely triadic formal logic? Even though Part II, existential graphs were the only part he completed in a satisfactory way (to his own mind)? Thanks again, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 29.10.2017 19:16: Jon A and Gary F, Peirce's way of presenting EGs in his Lowell lectures and his publications of 1906 is horrendously complex. The best I could say for it is "interesting". But I would never teach it, use it, or even mention it in an introduction to EGs. I would only present it as a side issue for advanced students. The version I recommend is the 8-page summary that he wrote in a long letter (52 pages) in 1911. The primary topic of that letter is "probability and induction" (NEM v 3, pp 158 to 210). When he got to 3-valued logic and probabilities, the recto/verso idea is untenable. Instead of talking about cuts, seps, and scrolls, he just talks about *areas* on the sheet of assertion. To represent negation, he uses a shaded oval, which he calls an area, not a cut. The shading makes his notation much more readable. An implication (the old scroll) becomes a shaded area that encloses an unshaded area. His rules of inference are much clearer, simpler, and more symmetric: just 3 pairs, each of which has an exact inverse. See the attached NEM3p166.png. (URLs below) Jon Peirce's introduction of the “blot” at this point is I would continue that sentence with the word 'confusing'. Peirce said that a blank sheet of assertion is a graph. Since it's a graph, you can draw a double negation around it. The blank is Peirce's only axiom, which is always true. If you draw just one oval around it, you get a graph that negates the truth. Therefore, it is always false. Peirce called it the pseudograph. In a two-valued logic, the pseudograph implies everything. But when you get to probabilities or N-valued logic, you can't make that assumption. I believe that's why Peirce dropped his earlier explanations. For the semantics, he adopted endoporeutic, which is a version of Hintikka's Game Theoretical Semantics. Gary At this point the “experiment” resorts to a kind of magic trick: Peirce makes the blot disappear (gradually but completely) — yet falsity remains Yes. But it's just another confusing way of explaining something very simple: The pseudograph is always false. If you draw it in any area, it makes the entire area false. John ___ I first came across this version of Peirce's EGs from a copy of a transcription of MS514 by Michel Balat. (By the way, I thank Jon for sending me the copy. I still have his email from 14 Dec 2000.) For my website, I added a commentary with additional explanation and posted it at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm In 2010, I published a more detailed analysis with further extensions: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf For the published version in NEM (v3 pp 162-169), see https://books.google.com/books?id=KGhbDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA163&lpg=PA163&dq=%22false+that+there+is+a+phoenix%22&source=bl&ots=LKYw9nZEKh&sig=LEaTyTSTGiEuT-P_-9a6XHEVwWQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi509vA9pPXAhWEOSYKHcDQBZQQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=%22false%20that%20there%20is%20a%20phoenix%22&f=false Note: I found that volume of NEM by searching for the quoted p
[PEIRCE-L] A test
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6
OK. Thanks. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 30.10.2017 20:45: Kirsti, List, It would be more accurate to say, and I'm sure it's what John meant, that Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers in terms of a game between two players attempting to support or defeat a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many later versions of game-theoretic semantics. Regards, Jon On 10/30/2017 2:33 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: I attended Hintikka's lectures on game theory in early 1970's. No shade of Peirce. I found them boring. No discussion invited nor wellcomed. Later on he got more mellow. And very interested on Peirce. - I greatly appreciate his latest work, remarkable indeed. Especially from a representative of analytical philosophy, to which he remained true. - Still, it hurts my heart and soul to read a suggestion that Peirce's endoporeutic may have or could have been a version of Hintikka's game theoretical semantics. - Must have been a slip. Is it so that Peirce never gave up his project on developing a genuinely triadic formal logic? Even though Part II, existential graphs were the only part he completed in a satisfactory way (to his own mind)? Thanks again, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6
John, Jon, list Some comments in response In Peirce's view logic needs mathematical grounds, but I have not found anything to support the view that there should be such sharp distinction as you propose. – There were many, many classifications of sciences he developed over the years. Of which latest ones should be given precedence. According to Peirce, the expession 'should be' has no meaning, if no aim is involved. If and when it is agreed that Peirce was aiming at something better, then this becomes self-evident, does it not? I have difficulties in understanding what is meant by John: Game theoretical semantics (GTS) is just a mathematical theory. As pure mathematics, Peirce would not object to it. My understanding of what Peirce meant by pure math just does not fit with this statement. I won't even try to express how and why. Instead, I take up the question at hand. Hintikka's early lectures on game theory were addressed to philosophers and social scientists, as part of the curriculum of practical philosophy at Helsinki University. Prisoner's dilemma played a major role. I wonder whether it has been taken up by the means of existential graphs? Would like very much to see it/them. My interest lies in that it presents the Dilemma of Achilles and tortoise in other cloths. The (seemingly) physical problem is dressed up as a (seemingly) social problem in Prisoner's Dilemma. Peirce did not object to the former, he just solved it. Thus I see no reason why he would have objected the latter, he just would have shown it to be a pseudoproblem. Both dilemmas exist. No doubt about that. – But are they real problems, is quite another kind of issue. An issue about the relations between thought and language, but not only. As soon as the latter dilemma is given the name 'Prisoner's dilemma', a host of presuppositions are taken in. – Let's just make a seemingly tiny change. Let's call it 'Prisoners dilemma', thus omitting a grammatical detail, which deeply affects the meaning conveyed. – The logical move entails a move from one to many. Not something to be overlooked or dismissed, surely. In GTS it has been. But now I have pointed it out, a needle in the haystock of GTS. If you feel no sting, then I must have overestimated your logical sensitivity. I have studied Peirces writings on existential graphs in a preliminary way, just to get the general idea & to understand it's proper place within Peirce's philosophy. After testing the idea on the contents of further (and further…) reading CSP, it holds. After testing it in the light of your most valuable teachings, it seems to hold. - Which is why I get deeply puzzled if and when your views on CSP are not, well, congruent. Also, I wish to point out the currently common (sense?) misunderstanding with the term DIALOGUE. The very word is taken as referring to a discussion involving two (and only two) participants. As if Greek 'DIA' would mean two, which it does not. It just means 'between'. Thus I find Jon: Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers in terms of a game between two players attempting to support or defeat a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many later versions of game-theoretic semantics. as neclecting something essential (in a Peircean view). The implied third is the audience ( from 'dear reader' on…). 'There is one…' claims a possibility. 'All…' claims a necessity. In between the lies the realm of probable inference, abduction, hypothesis & the lot. The idea of continuity is of course needed to understand the the real nature both dilemmas and to solve them. Both are pseudoproblems, in the positive meaning of the term offered in EG. Really solving them, of course, goes beyond the proper realm of existential graphs. Gamma graphs would be needed. But if the meaning of the term 'formal theory' is for starters defined as just a part of math, then … Well, what? Does math then mean anything else but 'formal'? Wondering, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.11.2017 22:08: Gary F, Jeff BD, Kirsti, Jon A, I didn't respond to your previous notes because I was tied up with other work. Among other things, I presented some slides for a telecon sponsored by Ontolog Forum. Slide 23 (cspsci.gif attached) includes my diagram of Peirce's classification of the sciences and discusses the implications. (For all slides: http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf ) Among the implications: The sharp distinction between "formal logic", which is part of mathematics, from logic as a normative science and the many studies of reasoning in linguistics, psychology, and education. Peirce was very clear about the infinity of mathematical theories. As pure mathematics, the only point to criticize would be the clarity and precision of the definitions and reasoning. But applications may be criticized as irrelevant, inadequate, or totally wrong. Gary as late as 1909 Peirce was still trying (a
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.6
Jon, You expressed my point even in what I did not put into words. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 3.11.2017 23:06: Kirsti, List, The Greek “dia-” means across, apart, or through. And Peirce recognizes that one is often talking to oneself or one's future self, so the number of people that one is speaking across to is indefinite. Regards, Jon On 11/3/2017 4:50 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, Jon, list Some comments in response In Peirce's view logic needs mathematical grounds, but I have not found anything to support the view that there should be such sharp distinction as you propose. – There were many, many classifications of sciences he developed over the years. Of which latest ones should be given precedence. According to Peirce, the expession 'should be' has no meaning, if no aim is involved. If and when it is agreed that Peirce was aiming at something better, then this becomes self-evident, does it not? I have difficulties in understanding what is meant by John: Game theoretical semantics (GTS) is just a mathematical theory. As pure mathematics, Peirce would not object to it. My understanding of what Peirce meant by pure math just does not fit with this statement. I won't even try to express how and why. Instead, I take up the question at hand. Hintikka's early lectures on game theory were addressed to philosophers and social scientists, as part of the curriculum of practical philosophy at Helsinki University. Prisoner's dilemma played a major role. I wonder whether it has been taken up by the means of existential graphs? Would like very much to see it/them. My interest lies in that it presents the Dilemma of Achilles and tortoise in other cloths. The (seemingly) physical problem is dressed up as a (seemingly) social problem in Prisoner's Dilemma. Peirce did not object to the former, he just solved it. Thus I see no reason why he would have objected the latter, he just would have shown it to be a pseudoproblem. Both dilemmas exist. No doubt about that. – But are they real problems, is quite another kind of issue. An issue about the relations between thought and language, but not only. As soon as the latter dilemma is given the name 'Prisoner's dilemma', a host of presuppositions are taken in. – Let's just make a seemingly tiny change. Let's call it 'Prisoners dilemma', thus omitting a grammatical detail, which deeply affects the meaning conveyed. – The logical move entails a move from one to many. Not something to be overlooked or dismissed, surely. In GTS it has been. But now I have pointed it out, a needle in the haystock of GTS. If you feel no sting, then I must have overestimated your logical sensitivity. I have studied Peirces writings on existential graphs in a preliminary way, just to get the general idea & to understand it's proper place within Peirce's philosophy. After testing the idea on the contents of further (and further…) reading CSP, it holds. After testing it in the light of your most valuable teachings, it seems to hold. - Which is why I get deeply puzzled if and when your views on CSP are not, well, congruent. Also, I wish to point out the currently common (sense?) misunderstanding with the term DIALOGUE. The very word is taken as referring to a discussion involving two (and only two) participants. As if Greek 'DIA' would mean two, which it does not. It just means 'between'. Thus I find Jon: Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers in terms of a game between two players attempting to support or defeat a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many later versions of game-theoretic semantics. as neclecting something essential (in a Peircean view). The implied third is the audience ( from 'dear reader' on…). 'There is one…' claims a possibility. 'All…' claims a necessity. In between the lies the realm of probable inference, abduction, hypothesis & the lot. The idea of continuity is of course needed to understand the the real nature both dilemmas and to solve them. Both are pseudoproblems, in the positive meaning of the term offered in EG. Really solving them, of course, goes beyond the proper realm of existential graphs. Gamma graphs would be needed. But if the meaning of the term 'formal theory' is for starters defined as just a part of math, then … Well, what? Does math then mean anything else but 'formal'? Wondering, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.11.2017 22:08: Gary F, Jeff BD, Kirsti, Jon A, I didn't respond to your previous notes because I was tied up with other work. Among other things, I presented some slides for a telecon sponsored by Ontolog Forum. Slide 23 (cspsci.gif attached) includes my diagram of Peirce's classification of the sciences and discusses the implications. (For all slides: http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf ) Among the implications: The sharp distinction between "formal logic", which is part of mathematics, from logic as a nor
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
Gary f., I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his "categories"??? Insted of... his categories??? Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too? Not about just classification. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52: List, Mary, Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154: Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads, triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb, needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as --obeys mamma you obey-- A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete the assertion as —OBEYS— or —IS IDENTICAL WITH— A _triad_ needs just three subjects as --gives--to-- --obeys both--and-- The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate" in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot" in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate" of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and the interpreter of it." The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb, though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the "spots." In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals enclosing graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great difficulties of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different kind of sign. Signs of the first kind represent objects in their firstness, and give the significations of the terms. Signs of the second kind represent objects as existing,-- and therefore as reacting,-- and also in their reactions. They contribute the _assertive_ character to the graph. Signs of the third kind represent objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon them turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct the system of graphs. One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in _Baldwin's Dictionary_ -- http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1] --is helpful for understanding Peirce's usage. Gary f. SENT: 23-Nov-17 16:38 Continuing from Lowell 2.13, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620 [2] You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that _something exists_, a fact that graphist and interpret
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
Gary f., Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. They are not synonyms. But if anyone uses Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as just names for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification. If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps not. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47: Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on. As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in the terminology of EGs. Gary f. -Original Message- From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14 Gary f., I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his "categories"??? Insted of... his categories??? Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too? Not about just classification. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52: List, Mary, Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154: Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads, triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb, needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as --obeys mamma you obey-- A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete the assertion as —OBEYS— or —IS IDENTICAL WITH— A _triad_ needs just three subjects as --gives--to-- --obeys both--and-- The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate" in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot" in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate" of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and the interpreter of it." The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb, though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the "spots." In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having such loose ends) are s
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
Gary f. wrote: - “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology... Many mistakes in this. - Just offer one example where CSP explicitly states that these are TECHNICAL TERMS. (If you can.) Categories concern definitely not only Peircean phenomenology. Which present A PART embedded in Peirce's philosphy. He continues: ..which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language. The question of MEANING cannot be reduced just to intensions, especially not into those in ordinary language. With CSP we are dealing with PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY, not just ordinary language. Then he continues: "As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which are extremely difficult to grasp;" Are you making a claim that Categories and Elements are not concepts? Or are claiming that they are easy to understand? It seems to me you get into difficulties with all of them, not just the last three. To me they have all become quite easy. After harduous work, of cource. The way you both Gary's are dealing with legitimate questions posed by Jerry F. Chandler seems to me just evasive, at best. Best, Kirsti P.S. I am not asking for "detailed explanations". I wish to be saved from such. g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 27.11.2017 00:01: Jerry, Kirsti, list, “Spot”, “dot” and “blot” are three of the many technical terms used by Peirce to explain his system of existential graphs. Peirce has given both visual examples and definitions of all three in those parts of Lowell Lecture 2 which I have posted to the list. If you are confused about their exact role in the EG system, you probably need to review Lowell 2 by studying the complete text, which is online at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm [1] . Secondary sources such as Roberts are also helpful, but you need to study them carefully in order to see how the system elucidates Peirce’s logic of relations, and perhaps set aside your preconceptions about the meanings of key terms. “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language. As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which are extremely difficult to grasp; sometimes the ordinary-language meanings of terms listed above are helpful, and sometimes they are misleading. These concepts are pretty much unique to Peirce, so you have to pay close attention to Peirce’s usage of them _in context_ if you want to understand what they mean. Lowell Lecture 3 is one of his most extensive and cogent explanations of his phenomenology, which is (from 1902 on) foundational to both his logic and his classification of signs. This will all be discussed in connection with Lowell Lecture 3, and I don’t have time now for dozens of examples and detailed explanations of these points, so that’s all I’ll say about them for now. My previous commentary on 2.14 consisted mostly of direct quotations from Peirce and some factual observations about the sources of those quotations, which I identified in the post. Kirsti, it’s not clear what you are disagreeing with, or what exactly you think I am “mistaken” about. If you will quote my words that you disagree with, I’ll try to resolve the disagreement. But if you don’t believe that Peirce used both “categories” and “elements” as terms referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, I think you need to read the Peirce texts (especially the Lowells and the Syllabus texts given in EP2) and see for yourself. As I said, I don’t have time right now to search out and paste in dozens of examples to demonstrate what should be obvious from a careful reading of Peirce. The question of _why_ Peirce chose the terms that he did is interesting, but I’ll leave that for the discussion of Lowell 3. If you want to get a head start on that, there’s a fairly large chunk from Lowell 3 starting at CP 1.343. And finally, my comments on the Lowell bits I’m posting are just that, comments — they are not meant to be a substitute for reading the actual Peirce texts, and probably don’t make much sense to those who haven’t read those Peirce texts. Gary f. -Original Message- From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Sent: 26-Nov-17 08:29 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14 Gary f., Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. They are not synonyms. But if anyone uses Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as just names for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification. If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps not. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47: Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation marks. It’s b
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14
John, Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the list. Now it's all making sense. With gratitude, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05: Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list, In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs. He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169). I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 version. Gary [Mary's] question about the “blot” has me thinking again about “the two peculiar graphs” which are “the blank place which asserts only what is already well-understood between us to be true, and the blot which asserts something well understood to be false” Kirsti, instead of warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. In his 1911 terminology, Peirce did not use the words 'spot', 'dot', or 'blot'. Instead, a spot is just a very short line of identity. The line represents an existential quantifier, and there is no reason to distinguish long lines from short lines (spots). He used the word 'peg' instead of 'dot'. Each relation has zero or more pegs, to which lines of identity may be attached. He also shaded negative areas (nested in an odd number of negations) and left positive areas unshaded (nested in an even number, zero or more, negations). A blot is just a shaded area that contains nothing but a blank. Gary [The blank place and the blot] are peculiar in several ways, and each is in some sense the opposite of the other. Each is the negation of the other. The blank place is unshaded, and the blot is a shaded blank. Gary For instance, the blank cannot be erased, but any graph can be added to it on the sheet of assertion; while the blot can be erased, but nothing can be added to it, because it “fills up its area.” One reason why the "the blank place" is "peculiar" is that Peirce had talked about it in two different ways. He called the sheet of assertion the universe of discourse when it contains all the EGs that Graphist and Grapheus agree is true. But the blank, by itself, is true before anything is asserted. In modern terminology, the blank is Peirce's only axiom. Any EG that can be proved without any other assumptions is a theorem. In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms: 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet. Gary, quoting Peirce [A blot] "fills up its area." In 1911, Peirce no longer used this metaphor. With the rules of 1903 or 1911, a blot or a shaded blank implies every graph. To prove that any graph g can be proved from it: 1. Start with a sheet of paper that contains a shaded blank. 2. By the rule of insertion in a shaded area, insert the graph for not-g inside the shaded area. All the shaded areas of not-g then become unshaded, and the unshaded areas become shaded. 3. The resulting graph consists of g in an unshaded area that is surrounded by a shaded ring that represents a double negation. 4. Finally, erase the double negation to derive g. Another important point: In 1911, Peirce allowed any word, not just verbs, to be the name of a relation. From NEM, page 3.162: Every word makes an assertion. Thus ——man means "There is a man" in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to. The dash before "man" is the "line of identity." This EG is Peirce's first example in 1911. And note that he begins with a Beta graph. In fact, he does not even mention the distinction between Alpha and Beta. The same rules of inference apply to both. For Peirce's version of 1911 with my commentary, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm Jerry, CSP’s genius [etc.] make it difficult for anyone to project his thoughts into rarefied logical, mathematical, scientific or philosophical atmospheres. Yes. He wrote volumes of insights that we still need to explore. But you can't put words in his mouth. If you can't find where he stated something explicitly, you can't claim him as the source. Note my discussion above. Every one of my claims is based on something that Peirce explicitly wrote. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14
Jon, I agree! Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 27.11.2017 17:30: John, Kirsti, List ... JFS: In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms: 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet. There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse and *representing* a universe of discourse. The basement level universe of discourse X is part of some object domain O in view and the systems of signs that represent aspects of the universe belong to whatever sign domain S and interpretant domain I are relevant to the context of discourse at hand. With logic as formal semiotics and semiotics as the study of triadic sign relations, properly understanding how Peirce's graphical symbol systems manage to represent universes of discourse requires us to consider the larger contexts of triadic sign relations in which they play their role. Regards, Jon On 11/27/2017 6:49 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the list. Now it's all making sense. With gratitude, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05: Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list, In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs. He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169). I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 version. Gary [Mary's] question about the “blot” has me thinking again about “the two peculiar graphs” which are “the blank place which asserts only what is already well-understood between us to be true, and the blot which asserts something well understood to be false” Kirsti, instead of warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. In his 1911 terminology, Peirce did not use the words 'spot', 'dot', or 'blot'. Instead, a spot is just a very short line of identity. The line represents an existential quantifier, and there is no reason to distinguish long lines from short lines (spots). He used the word 'peg' instead of 'dot'. Each relation has zero or more pegs, to which lines of identity may be attached. He also shaded negative areas (nested in an odd number of negations) and left positive areas unshaded (nested in an even number, zero or more, negations). A blot is just a shaded area that contains nothing but a blank. Gary [The blank place and the blot] are peculiar in several ways, and each is in some sense the opposite of the other. Each is the negation of the other. The blank place is unshaded, and the blot is a shaded blank. Gary For instance, the blank cannot be erased, but any graph can be added to it on the sheet of assertion; while the blot can be erased, but nothing can be added to it, because it “fills up its area.” One reason why the "the blank place" is "peculiar" is that Peirce had talked about it in two different ways. He called the sheet of assertion the universe of discourse when it contains all the EGs that Graphist and Grapheus agree is true. But the blank, by itself, is true before anything is asserted. In modern terminology, the blank is Peirce's only axiom. Any EG that can be proved without any other assumptions is a theorem. In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms: 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet. Gary, quoting Peirce [A blot] "fills up its area." In 1911, Peirce no longer used this metaphor. With the rules of 1903 or 1911, a blot or a shaded blank implies every graph. To prove that any graph g can be proved from it: 1. Start with a sheet of paper that contains a shaded blank. 2. By the rule of insertion in a shaded area, insert the graph for not-g inside the shaded area. All the shaded areas of not-g then become unshaded, and the unshaded areas become shaded. 3. The resulting graph consists of g in an unshaded area that is surrounded by a shaded ring that represents a double negation. 4. Finally, erase the double negation to derive g. Another important point: In 1911, Peirce allowed any word, not just verbs, to be the name of a relation. From NEM, page 3.162: Every word makes an assertion. Thus ——man means "There is a man" in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to. The dash before "man" is the "line of identity." This EG is Peirce's first example in 1911. And note that he begins with a Beta graph. In fact, he does not even mention the distinction between Alpha and Beta. The same rules of inference apply to both. For Peirce's version of 1911 with my commentary, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm Jerry, CSP’s genius [etc.] make it difficult for anyone to project his tho
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14
John, Jon, list, Thank you for a most interesting discussion. Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to these assertion of mine: If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human beings to make even the empty ones. If there exists any assertion stated on it, there has to have been a human individual to draw/write (etc) it. As you can see, I have taken time into the timelessly considered issue of empty sets. Thus, empty sheets may exist, but they can only become real (have any effect) if and only if some community (of whatever kind) not only exists, but has become real. How about these? Comments? These present some outcomes from taking BOTH formulations of the Pragmatic Maxim simultanously seriously. Which they usually are not. People tend to take sides at the outset. I have made wonders with modulations of Aristotelian syllogisms on this basis. With the help of two new concepts, experiential time and experiential meaning. Which have been exploited, but not funded. Which kind of reminds me of someone else... Who on earth could it be... With kind regards, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 19:00: On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: JFS: In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms: 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet. There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse and *representing* a universe of discourse... I agree. In the Lowell lectures, Peirce defined the Sheet of Assertion as the representation of a universe that was constructed during a discourse between Graphist and Grapheus. But that is just one of many ways of using logic. In 1911, he wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet": Every word makes an assertion. Thus ——man means "There is a man" in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to. This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures. For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to write a proof by contradiction. In that case, there would be no universe about which the statements on the paper could be true. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14
John & Jon, The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb 'to indentify' did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary. Many questions arose. JFS: "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures that are isomorphic. Some mathematicians call that practice "abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the marks in order to distinguish the references. But most do not bother to clutter their notations with such annotations." Question: Which (variety of) notations do you mean? 2 = 2 and a = a ? Both can be read aloud as – equals – , OR – is identical with – . The mark remains the same, but there is change of meaning, depending on the (mathematical) context. With cardinals, 2 = 2 can be taken as equal and identical with 1+1 = 1+1. With a = a the situation is not that simple. With ordinals this does not apply. As was shown by CSP in his cyclical arithmetics. Not only does "how many?" count, "how many times? " counts. (This is a joke, mind you). Positions within multiple cycles begin to mean a lot. Also zero becomes very interesting, indeed. When zero was introduced (by arabic influence) to our number system, it brought with it not only calculus, but also the arabic numbering system. Thus 000 = 00 (etc.), but 10 and 100 and 1000 (etc.) make a huge difference. (As we all may, sorely or happily, know by looking at one's bank accounts.) This is not as trivial as it may seem to some. Neither mathematically, nor logically. The first zero, the second zero, the third zero … acquire a different meaning by their relative position in the chain of numbers. Which is not trivial, either. Relational logic is needed. Which is just as complex ( and perplex) as CSP has shown it to be. I have presented my thoughts as simply as I possibly can, but it does not follow that the thoughts are inherently simple. With ordered chains of numbers (or other kindred marks) the problem of reversibility and irreversibility acquire a new acuity. CPS deals with the problem a lot in Lowell Lectures. I'll leave my second question on the meaning of identifying to a later date. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.12.2017 23:06: On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa JFS: In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms: ‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn’t or shouldn’t shade a blank area of a sheet. There is a difference between being a universe of discourse and representing a universe of discourse. On your website, please do not imply that I was confusing being and representing. In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures that are isomorphic. Some mathematicians call that practice "abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the marks in order to distinguish the references. But most do not bother to clutter their notations with such annotations. If you are not convinced by mathematical practice, note the first definition of 'identify' in the Merriam-Webster dictionary: "1 a: to cause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united (in spirit, outlook, or principle)." Request: Please remove the initials "JFS" from that page on your website, or please insert the above two paragraphs to clarify the meaning of the word 'identify'. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14
John, Jon, I agree with John on the issue of "every word.." Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording in: JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs. It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or speech act, such as assertion. Shouldn*t the last word be "asserting", thus using the verb, not the noun? This may sound trifle, but I do think it is important to make clear whether and when one is talking about an act, or an entitity. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 28.11.2017 22:03: Jon A and Kirsti, Jon, replying to JFS [In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about which the statements on the paper could be true. In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty. Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion about the Sheet of Assertion is too restrictive. Jon By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion” is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism... No. Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only be interpreted in context. The sentence that precedes the in question states the context: "This syntax is so simple that I will describe it." (NEM 3:162) I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a comparison with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs" that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds of entities in the universe of discourse. In 1911, he did not limit the part of speech of the words or phrases that named rhemes or predicates. See Peirce's own examples in http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm : From the first two graphs: -man, -eats. Fig 1: -phoenix. Fig 3: -thunder, -lightening. Unlabeled graph: -is-. Fig 5: -will die. Fig 7: -boy, -industrious. Fig 9: -known for certain, -communication with-. Fig 10: -deceased. Kirsti If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human beings to make even the empty ones. Yes, and those people must have some reason or intention for doing so. Assertion is just one reason among many. Peirce discussed the kinds of "speech acts" long before John Austin. Any of those acts may be performed with EGs: metalanguage (talking about an EG); hypothesis (suggesting an EG without claiming it's true); proof (drawing implications before the conclusion is known); teaching the syntax and rules for EGs (what Peirce was doing in his lectures)... In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs. It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or speech act, such as assertion. For more examples of contexts in language and logic, see the slides in http://jfsowa.com/contexts.pdf . John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...
John, Thanks for changing the subject line! I'm well aware of hypostatic abstraction and I have given a lot of thought to its position in the overall philosophy of CSP. Which is the context for both EG's and his logical graphs in a more general sense. In a certain narrow sense hypostatic abstraction may be seen as (just a) distinction between verb forms and noun forms. But the relation between hypothesis and hypostasis is more complicated, as I assume you are well aware. Your example (opium) seems somewhat simplistic and misleading. (Of course it is difficult to express one' ideas in short mails like these!) In any experiment in the strict and narrow sense, a hypothesis in absolutely needed. Further, a hypothesis must initially present a certain kind of question. Only questions which imply a YES or NO answer will do. The next step (next act) is to transform the question into an assertion. Which is then experimentally tested. In order to perform a scientific experiment, there must be statements (verbal ones) on some existent entities taken together with reasons to believe that one/some/all other entitities will be affected in certain ways. (Thus presenting some kind of regular relation(s). ) If it were just stated "Opium – sleep", then it is asserted that there is (a well known substance) opium which is somehow related to (a well known) state of mind called sleep. (The expression is commonly called elliptic). Now, this (elliptic) expression does not state what kind this asserted relation is. (In English the word "sleep" as such does not by itself reveal whether it is used as a noun or a verb. In Finnish, which is verb dominated language , like (old) Latin and Greek were in this respect. ) To my mind Molière (and Peirce) ridiculed just as well the kinds of answers commonly offered and generally accepted to WHY – questions. My claim is that this is a cultural issue, not a scientific one. Peirce made great efforts to transform such (unconscious) habits of thought into philosophically and experimentally relevant and interesting ones. (Unfortunately my studies on Cultural Paradigms and their relation to sciences are published only in Finnish. Still, I can share thoughts based on these investigations of mine. (In the hope that they are not just exploited, but give credit, too) Existential quantifiers, theory of probabilities etc.were a part of this work by CSP. Just as were logical graphs. - JFS: " …Peirce said that the act of replacing the verb to noun leads to a hypothesis (hypostatic abstraction) that there exists something that causes sleep. That hypothesis led chemists to discover morphine as the substance with dormitive virtue. " Is this a summary interpretation? Or did CSP truly write so? - Either there is irony in the statement, or something is wrong. Or are you using the verb "to discover" in the sense of "leaning how to make in a laboratory a synthetic substance with the same kinds of effects that opium, a natural product, was already known to possess" ? "Opium facit dormire", opium makes people (and animals) sleep was a well know fact for ages before CSP. – The "WHY" question, on the other hand, is still not resolved. A chemical formula does not answer the question to the full, because there are living beings involved. As expressed by the word "sleep". To heap of new questions still unanswered, belongs e.g.: Why do some people need opioids to get any sleep? Why do not they spontaneously fall asleep, as even babies are able to do so? 'It is because they are addicted', won't do. 'Before' and 'after' get confused in those kinds of answers. In experiments, even thought experiments, like actually doing EG's , time is essentially involved. Before – after. Even the logical form celebrated by CSP: If – then, involves time. You take up Chinese in a way which makes me assume you mainly know Chinese in its present, mechanized and computerized form. Which tends to hide from view the true nature of Chinese as a language, worth clearing up in more detail. It does not consist of "words" in the Western sense. Our categories of nouns, verbs and adjectives just does not apply. Written Chinese consists of concepts, not only presented in certain successions, but also painted by hand with a brush IN A CERTAIN TRADITIONAL ORDER. The order of strokes brings in meaning, stroke by stroke. So Chinese marks resembl a theory, more than anything else. Then the "little theories" are presented in a certain order, which sheads ligth on the meaning of the whole. (The meaning of the whole gets transformed as long as the writing in question goes on.) In Japanese, there are two kinds of notations for writing down one's voiced thoughts. One like in Chinese, another one like our Western habits of writing down our thoughts. Wittgenstein devoted his later work on traps our language games lure us
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
List, Peirce did not just "refer to" some well-established "facts" of his time; he has all the time been developing a whole theory. All good and true theories go beyond any number of "facts" (id est: array of empirical findings). It could be called 'hypo-determination' (just a coined word, c.f hypo-stasis and hypo-thesis). They are under-determined by empirical findings. Theories aim to the future, their purpose is to guide later investigations. Organic substances are active substances. Rotating to the right or to the left has later been commonly called handedness. Thus 'handedness' and/or 'veering to the right or left' are what anyone can google and find out about the present views. This is not just about organic chemistry, it is about LIFE. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 13.12.2017 14:56: Jeff, Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to _organic_ compounds as "such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring to as "those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left." What would those be called by chemists today? Something like the DNA molecule? Of course its structure was not known until long after Peirce died, but I'm guessing some simpler organic molecules would have been known at the time to fit Peirce's description. I guess what I'm trying to grasp is the connection (in Peirce's mind) between three-dimensionality and Thirdness. Conceptualizing the elements of the phaneron takes a long time, as Peirce is about to say in Lowell 3 … Gary f. FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] SENT: 12-Dec-17 22:11 TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List, Gary F: "his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not very clear, at least to me" One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the chemical character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." As in the Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be drawing on a phenomenological account of the categories--both material and formal--as a basis for sorting out the phenomena that call out for explanation in philosophy. Peirce says: Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual, or inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward relations, or resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of resemblances and differences of bodies are classificatory, or chemical. We know little about them; but we may assert with some confidence that there are differences between substances -- i.e., differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and a classification based on that, and there are differences in the structure of bodies, and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of bodies, depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences in the manner in which bodies are built up out of their smallest pieces. Here we have a distinction between that kind of structure which gives rise to forms without power of truth [true?] growth or inorganic structures, and the chemistry of protoplasms which develope [or] living organisms. (CP 1.512) Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual or inward." (1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or resemblances of bodies. (2) Law_s of mind._ The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature of the smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic elements), and the laws that are based (b) on the structural relations between the parts of bodies. The latter class is further divided into the laws of (i) inorganic chemistry, which are based on the shape and size of the atomicules, and the laws of organic chemistry, which give rise to (ii) forms that have the power of growth and life. The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm) are, I take it, examples of the chemistry of "active substances" because they are the kinds of things that are capable of growth and of developing into living organisms. As such, the laws of organic chemistry are on the border between the laws of fact and the principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern the growth of living things. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca SENT: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu SUBJECT: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list, Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of _The Meaning of Meaning_, and
[PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...
John, I'll rephrase my point (which you seem to have missed). We started from your post saying: JFS The distinction between a verb form such as 'asserting' and a noun such as 'assertion' is what Peirce called *hypostatic abstraction*. To illustrate the point, Peirce used a term that Molière invented as a joke in "Le Malade Imaginaire": Quare Opium facit dormire: … Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva. Why does opium make one sleep: Because in it is dormitive virtue. My point is that both Peirce and Molière ridiculed the question - answer sequence & the ease and please such sequences get accepted. (I also took a look and noted that the Latin "quare" means both HOW and WHY. But this is just a side remark.) I cannot recall the context where Peirce used this example, but I think you are somewhat mistaken in what CSP meant with the concept: hypostasis. You view seems too narrow. Dominated by nouns too much. Well, it is also possible that CSP wrote down something on hypostasis which just does not make sense. I remember having a lot of trouble with the concept & being somewhat dissatisfied with the sample of his clarifications I had run across by then. I assume you agree in that nothing can be explained by a word, ecpecially by a noun. It is good to remember that Peirce objected grammarians for use of the term "pronouns" and exclaimed that nouns should be called "prodemonstratives". NAMING IS NOT EXPLAINING, this is Kirsti Määttänen's maxim, not as such found in Peirce's wrtitings. Thank you, John for taking up this quote from Molière. - A very, very interesting example. Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 12.12.2017 12:48: John, Thanks for changing the subject line! I'm well aware of hypostatic abstraction and I have given a lot of thought to its position in the overall philosophy of CSP. Which is the context for both EG's and his logical graphs in a more general sense. In a certain narrow sense hypostatic abstraction may be seen as (just a) distinction between verb forms and noun forms. But the relation between hypothesis and hypostasis is more complicated, as I assume you are well aware. Your example (opium) seems somewhat simplistic and misleading. (Of course it is difficult to express one' ideas in short mails like these!) In any experiment in the strict and narrow sense, a hypothesis in absolutely needed. Further, a hypothesis must initially present a certain kind of question. Only questions which imply a YES or NO answer will do. The next step (next act) is to transform the question into an assertion. Which is then experimentally tested. In order to perform a scientific experiment, there must be statements (verbal ones) on some existent entities taken together with reasons to believe that one/some/all other entitities will be affected in certain ways. (Thus presenting some kind of regular relation(s). ) If it were just stated "Opium – sleep", then it is asserted that there is (a well known substance) opium which is somehow related to (a well known) state of mind called sleep. (The expression is commonly called elliptic). Now, this (elliptic) expression does not state what kind this asserted relation is. (In English the word "sleep" as such does not by itself reveal whether it is used as a noun or a verb. In Finnish, which is verb dominated language , like (old) Latin and Greek were in this respect. ) To my mind Molière (and Peirce) ridiculed just as well the kinds of answers commonly offered and generally accepted to WHY – questions. My claim is that this is a cultural issue, not a scientific one. Peirce made great efforts to transform such (unconscious) habits of thought into philosophically and experimentally relevant and interesting ones. (Unfortunately my studies on Cultural Paradigms and their relation to sciences are published only in Finnish. Still, I can share thoughts based on these investigations of mine. (In the hope that they are not just exploited, but give credit, too) Existential quantifiers, theory of probabilities etc.were a part of this work by CSP. Just as were logical graphs. - JFS: " …Peirce said that the act of replacing the verb to noun leads to a hypothesis (hypostatic abstraction) that there exists something that causes sleep. That hypothesis led chemists to discover morphine as the substance with dormitive virtue. " Is this a summary interpretation? Or did CSP truly write so? - Either there is irony in the statement, or something is wrong. Or are you using the verb "to discover" in the sense of "leaning how to make in a laboratory a synthetic substance with the same kinds of effects that opium, a natural product, was already known to possess" ? "Opium facit dormire", opium makes people (and animals) sleep was a well know fact for ages before CSP. – The "WHY" question, on the other hand, is still not resolved. A chemical formula does not answer the question to the full, because there are l
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.1
Gary f, A kind remark on a typo in lecture 3, which you may wish to correct. It is in short paragraph consisting of three lines. It begins: "A quality, or Firstness, has mere logical..." Third sentence thereof should begin with a capital, but it does not. It should be: "A fact, or Secondness.." NOT "a fact...) Just a typo which should be corrected. Even if it were originally made by CSP. Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Irony and style in CSP (Was: Peirce's adjectives...)
Cassiano, Jon, list I have been studying style in connection with argument analysis for a long time. Recognizing textual markers of irony forms a part of the method I developed in 1990's in my university lectures in Finland. In 2000's I started a slow read on Kaina Stoicheia (New Elements) in the P-list. It can be found on the list archives by that title. In the slow read I describe my method of argument analysis (for complex texts) as I proceed. But Gary f found the method too arduous, and the pace of reading to slow for his taste, and all of a sudden jumped ahead with the text under study. - Consequently I ended my slow read. Perhaps Jon Awbrey will help? I hope so even myself. Regards, Kirsti Määttänen Cassiano Terra Rodrigues kirjoitti 6.12.2017 05:38: Hello fellow listers, It's been a while I notice Peirce has some great nouns of his own pen, frequently used in ironic contexts. For instance, besides pragmaticism, I could mention projaculation in Evolutionary Love, or maybe the nychtemeron in the article on God's Reality (tough this is not really Peirce's, it's Gospel's). But I was wondering, and about adjectives? Do you notice preferred adjectives in Peirce's vocabulary? He uses First, Second and Third as adjectives, of course, but I mean real adjectives, or adjectival expressions. Ironic or not. Maybe other preferred expressions, for exclamations etc.? I assume there has been previous discussion on Peirce's style&language in the list, so excuse me if I am being tautological. But I think the recurrent expressions a writer uses reveal a lot, especially adjectives and other seemingly unimportant idiomatic expressions. And it's always fun to know what others regard as interesting in an admired writer's style. So, apart from the more deep stuff, if anyone is willing to share their preferred Peircean quotes, but in the sense above, I'm an interested reader. Best regards to everyone, cass. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Listers, Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning? Best, Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 18.12.2017 23:07: List, Aristotle's remarks at the beginning of _De Caelo_ go like this: "A magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all', and the number they give is the triad." Peirce occasionally called this triad the "cenopythagorean categories" -- but for him, there is much more to them than we find in Aristotle's summary of the Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are so fundamental that "confused notions" of them go back to the beginning of philosophy, great patience and effort is required to clarify them as they ought to be clarified by anyone interested in philosophy. Peirce's comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate Peirce's own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on "the inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions" -- referring I think to conceptions _in general_, not just the three in question here -- is remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him to say "I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent elements." In the drafts of this lecture and elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors, though he decided not to "inflict" such an account on his audience at this time. I think we can be sure that if Peirce never managed to "analyze a single idea into its constituent elements," it wasn't for lack of effort or skill at logical analysis. Gary f. FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] SENT: 17-Dec-17 15:07 TO: 'Peirce-L' SUBJECT: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6 Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896 [1] Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can. [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's _De Caelo,_ where it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them. [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a philosopher, 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness; 2nd, Inventive originality; 3rd, Generalizing power; 4th, Subtlety; 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact; 6th, Systematic procedure; 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to philosophy. [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent elements. [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived, had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three elements much more clearly. But the element of Secondness, of _hard fact,_ is not accorded its due place in his system; and in a lesser degree the same is true of Firstness. After Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that were remarkably fruitful in all the means for attaining that 5th requisite. Yet Hegel's followers, instead of going to work to reform their master's system, and to render his statement of it obsolete, as every true philosopher must desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at best, some superficial changes without replacing at all the rotten ma
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Gary f., list, g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 21.12.2017 16:39: "Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points." Yes its does. But that does not answer the questions I posed. Perhaps I should have added: What do you (listers) think? Gary f.: " By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for _point_ before Euclid." Interesting. Was in connection with geometry? Or how does your source infer it was used FOR 'point'? Best, Kirsti -Original Message- From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25 Listers, Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning? Best, Kirsti Links: -- [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Helmut, I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of course, are deeply related. But how? To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures. Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a laboratory, but one needs though experiments. I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the question and searching for answers which logically fit with the question, is such an experiment. Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred. EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines. Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for logical thinking. Comments? Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32: Gary, Kirsti, List, I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of", geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry. Best, Helmut 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Kirsti, list, Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for _point_ before Euclid. Gary f. -Original Message- From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25 Listers, Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning? Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] . Links: -- [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
John, list, I have been out of reach for more than a week. A heap of mails in this thread. My responses may seem to many as ancient history. For that reason I'll leave the comment responded below. And I'll try to be concice. No arguments on words and reference, however detailed, can possibly give next to nothing towards making clear the crucial issue on the nature of rel. betw. sign and meaning. (CSP of cource presupposed as the context). Analytical (nominalistic) philosophy made the mistake of taking words and reference as all there is to sings and meaning. Do you agree? Best, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.12.2017 08:00: Kirsti and Gary F, K Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . GF By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign and root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with στιγμή (stigma). I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique, and Heath's translation and commentary on Euclid. The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something; for example, as a sign of ownership. From that, the word 'stigma' (ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed instrument. The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's plumage; then it came to mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant. Aristotle explicitly said that a point was a marker on a line, not a part of the line. Heath said that Euclid generally followed Aristotle. But in vol. 1, p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was probably "considered more suitable than 'stigme' (a puncture) which might claim to have more reality than a point." In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer to a mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others. K Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning? The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark. Euclid used it for just one particular kind. For that use in geometry, the thing it refers to has no parts. K the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words: 'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Gary f, list My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of the mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic. (& Liddell and Scott, of course.) It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or classifications) between sciences that are taken for granted today did not exist in ancient times. - Still, Eucleides was studied by mathematicians for centuries. It was taken for granted. Up till non-Euclidean math. Even the Bible came much, much later. Meaning is context-dependent, that much we all agree. We have signs from old times, no dispute on that. But do we have meanings? I have problems with the following: GARY f.: My answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]: “upon a continuous line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a point on the line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has a beginning and end, then it has those two points (discontinuities) already. I cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in what follows. Peirce took up in several contexts his point of marking any points and thus breaking continuity. He took care to set down rules for (logical) acceptability for doing so. In order to understand his meaning three triads are needed. Possibility, virtuality and actuality makes one of them. (But only one of them.) CSP wrote on Ethics of Terminology. - Did he follow these ethical rules? - I'd say YES and NO. To the despair of his readers he chanced his terminology over the decaces very, very often. But it was HIS to change, in order to accommondate with renewed understanding of his whole conceptual system, his new findings along the way in making it move... I firmly believe he had a reason every time for those changes. BUT he also experimented with words he took into a kind of test driving for his concepts. Such as "phaneron". An experiment doomed to fail. Why do I believe so? - I have never read him explicitly saying so. But the term (etymology etc) did get the idea twisted in such ways which were inconsistent with his deeper views. - So when I read those texts by him using "phaneron", I took note of the year and looked forward to see him stop using it. It not a job for me to search whether he did or not. It is job for seminary minded philosophers. Not for the laboratory minded ones. I wish to take up Ethics of Interpretation in a similar spirit. In order to make our ideas more clear, it may be good to try to keep quotes and interpretations so marked that any reader can tell which is which. It is an impossible task, I know. Just as impossible to any human being as is Christian ethics. But a very good guideline to keep in mind & to follow as best one can. The links in any post may get read or not. - It takes too much time to read all those offered. What cannot be included in the verbal response, I find informative. Still, I may not have the time at my disposal to open them. Looking forward to forthcoming chapters in Lowell lectures. My thanks for the most valuable job you are doing Gary f. Best regards, Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 22.12.2017 14:50: Kirsti, John, list, My source for the usage of SEMEION was Liddell and Scott (which can be searched online). As John says, the primary meaning is “mark”. My answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]: “upon a continuous line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a point on the line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has a beginning and end, then it has those two points (discontinuities) already. I was suggesting an analogy to a sign: for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several. The more “complete” a sign is, the more the element of continuity (or Thirdness) is predominant in it, and thus the more room there is in it for POSSIBILITIES of parts, i.e. the more opportunity for analyzing it into “partial signs.” Sorry for being so elliptical in my post, but that was my point (if you’ll pardon the expression). I have a very unPeircean fondness for conciseness. By the way, the manuscript of Lowell 4 has a very detailed and previously unpublished explanation of (hypostatic) abstractions such as “dormitive virtue”, so that may be of use for continuing your recent discussion of abstraction, when we reach that point in the next lecture. Gary f.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
John, list, Now, with John, we are talking! This was the last post I (quite hastily) read before leaving the e-world. - And I left with a happy tone. Best, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.12.2017 17:38: On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several. But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts. A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example, consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'. If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols, and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2. But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation. That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part" is only one of many ways of "having". One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that greater-than has infinitely many parts. The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms (several statements with multiple symbols). But those axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation. In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to describe any relation, including the sign relation. If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?", I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking that question? What would you do with the answer?" John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)
Jerry, list, JERRY: "Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me. Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?" No mystery to me what CSP meant with "corpuscular philosphy". - The problem with your question lies in "Exactly what..." - It (logically ) demands some kind of an exact (verbal) definition. Such cannot be given. Definitely it was not (just) about Boscowitz. Still, I find it silly to ponder what CSP may have or not have known at his time. - What are theories for? They are for reaching beyond available information. Philosophical theories especially are (or should be) for making clear what must be, what may be, and what cannot be. There you have it. In a nutshell. This is a logical triad no new information or data may ever break down. All exact definitions must, of course, be accommondated to this logical triad together with new data or information, which consist of some experimental results. which - if brand new - have not been to hold in the long run OR with a wider view. Best, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:03: List, John: On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jerry, Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing. But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day. I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples for making a stronger claim: For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and Left-handed screws) “There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the corpuscular philosophy.” By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics was that all the major problems had been solved. But the first decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency. If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow the corpuscular philosophy." John Your response deserves a longer reply. But, for the moment, one brief comment. Here is a recent reference from the the Royal Society journal: Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of biological homochirality Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and Albert Moyano J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699 (published December 13, 2017) http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 [1] It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in emergence of life. CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem to this day. The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of natural sorts and kinds using physical laws alone. Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to me. Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices? At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics. Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?) Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon atom, as a well-defined natural geometrical object that was irreducible to a triad, posed a major conundrum for him (and all others) who seek to construct a universe in simpler terms. Cheer Jerry Links: -- [1] http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699?etoc - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Helmut, Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:14: Kirsti, is the term "part" already defined? No, it is not. You hit the point with "virtual". Best, Kirsti - I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points). Best, Helmut 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Helmut, I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of course, are deeply related. But how? To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures. Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a laboratory, but one needs though experiments. I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the question and searching for answers which logically fit with the question, is such an experiment. Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred. EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines. Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for logical thinking. Comments? Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32: > Gary, Kirsti, List, > I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of", > geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a > part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is > meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line > metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the > point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional > part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical > part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear > spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not > geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think > they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry. > Best, > Helmut > > 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr > g...@gnusystems.ca > wrote: > > Kirsti, list, > > Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has > points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last > month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1] [1]. By the way, > according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for > _point_ before Euclid. > > Gary f. > > -Original Message- > From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] > Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25 > > Listers, > > Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for > geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it > as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word > instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later > Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. > > Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning? > > Best, Kirsti > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply > List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L > posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a > message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] [2] . > > Links: > -- > [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1] > [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] . Links: -- [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .