Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:44 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
[it was written:] I am satisfied that there are perfectly adequate
vote once
systems available for all public elections, both single-office
elections and assembly elections.
If they
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:36 AM 12/28/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 9:45 AM
The UK is also parliamentary, so I suppose there would be few places
where you could actually have a runoff.
Given that all members of the UK Parliament
Just for clarity, can we agree that
In Bucklin, after the first round, there is no majority.
is a non-sequitor? There aren't rounds in Bucklin. All counts for all
(#voters ranking alternative x = rank n are known simultaneously.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
At 12:55 PM 12/30/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
However, consider this: the Plurality voting system (FPTP)
encourages compromise already. There would have been more sincere
first preference votes. My guess, though, is that the use of, say,
Bucklin, would have
At 12:46 PM 12/30/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:48 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
That makes the entire cycle, including polls and feedback, into one
election system. Method is too narrow, because the system
...@electorama.com
Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 7:30 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 12:02 PM 12/28/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
I don't want to re-hash our Wikipedia argument about whether an exhausted
ballot in a full-ranking-possible IRV election should be treated
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2008 7:54 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
From: Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Abd wrote:
snip
The term majority
On Mon, Dec 29, 2008 at 6:50 PM, Terry Bouricius
ter...@burlingtontelecom.net wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
snip
since abstentions or blanks are from those who have not voted.
snip
To be more precise, I meant
since abstentions or blanks are from those who have not voted IN THE
ELECTION CONTEST.
I side with Abd over Terry on this one. Topic is what activity should be
counted as a vote in determining what percentage of the votes were for the
leader (was it a majority?).
Agreed that overvotes count - the voter clearly intended to vote, though
the result was defective.
Agreed that
At 08:50 PM 12/29/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
snip
since abstentions or blanks are from those who have not voted.
snip
I believe my interpretation of Robert's Rules of Order is correct. In
order for a ballot being reviewed by a teller to be blank, and thus
excluded from the
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:05 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:36 AM
Do you think my runoff idea could work, or is it too complex?
My personal view is that runoff is not desirable and would be an
unnecessary and unwanted
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Still, your point is taken. The problem with ordinal methods is that
you can't specify strength; but that's also, in some sense, an
advantage, since that means the method is less prone to being tricked
by noise or by optimization. Which matters more is a question of
Methods
Mailing List election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 12:16 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 08:06 PM 12/24/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Another shortcoming of two-round elections is the sharply lower voter
participation
At 07:38 PM 12/27/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Most UK organisations, large and small, from national trade unions
to local badminton clubs, would follow essentially the same
procedures, particularly with regard to making no provision for
write-ins and requiring written confirmation by each
At 04:44 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
[it was written:] I am satisfied that there are perfectly
adequate vote once
systems available for all public elections, both single-office
elections and assembly elections.
If they are good for public
At 05:48 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The error was in imagining that a single ballot could accomplish
what takes two or more ballots. Even two ballots is a compromise,
though, under the right conditions -- better primary methods -- not
much of one.
At 10:36 AM 12/28/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 9:45 AM
The UK is also parliamentary, so I suppose there would be few places
where you could actually have a runoff.
Given that all members of the UK Parliament are elected from
James Gilmour had written:
This not about MY view. The background to this recent discussion was
about the political acceptability of a weak Condorcet winner
to ordinary electors. I said I thought a strong
third-place Condorcet winner would be
politically acceptable. But I had, and
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:32 PM
Yes. You are English.
At 09:55 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
NO, I am not English. I was born in the UK and I am a subject of
Her Majesty The Queen (there are no citizens in the UK), but I am
not English.
Abd
At 07:43 AM 12/27/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:32 PM
Yes. You are English.
At 09:55 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
NO, I am not English. I was born in the UK and I am a subject of
Her Majesty The Queen (there are no
One more approach is to allow ranked
ranking preferences, e.g. ABCDEF.
Juho
--- On Fri, 26/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
To: eutychus_sl
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
IRV has been
used for public elections for many decades in several
countries. In contrast, despite having been around for
about 220 years, the
Condorcet voting system has not been used in any public
elections anywhere, so
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
The myth that single-member-district voting systems
work well for assembly elections when there are
only two parties in very
persistent. We must all work together and do everything we
can to kill it off because it is just a
On Dec 26, 2008, at 9:46 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
We have a nominee list with much of the formality you describe.
Then we have write-ins, with very little formality.
James frowns on such, saying that the UK properly demands more
formality in dealing with the needed exceptions to normal
At 05:31 PM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
It is not a question of my thinking in terms of plurality - that
is where our electors (UK and USA) are coming from. It is my
experience (nearly five decades of campaigning) that UK electors
attach great importance to their first preference.
At 05:57 AM 12/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
One basic reason is of course that
Condorcet methods are too tedious to
hand count in large elections with
many candidates. Obviously Condorcet
is now better off due to the
availability of computers.
There is a simple Condorcet method which only
At 12:46 PM 12/26/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
We have a nominee list with much of the formality you describe.
Then we have write-ins, with very little formality.
Too little, probably. I know of a case where a write-in should have
won the election, by law, but the clerk didn't count the votes.
An exchnage that escaped the list - acccidentally.
--- On Thu, 12/25/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
I do not think you have to be anywhere near the zero
first-preferences Condorcet winner scenario to be in the sphere of
politically unacceptable. I am quite
Dave Ketchum Sent: Friday, December 26, 2008 3:15 AM
On Thu, 25 Dec 2008 14:25:09 - James Gilmour wrote:
Yes, all the marked preferences will allow the voter's one vote to be
used in as many pair-wise comparisons as the voter wishes to
participate in.
Voter wishes do not
Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
James Gilmour wrote (24 Dec 2008):
IRV has been used for public elections for many decades
in several countries. In contrast, despite having been
around for about 220 years, the Condorcet voting system
has not been used in any public elections anywhere,
so far as
I do not think you have to be anywhere near the zero
first-preferences Condorcet winner scenario to be in the
sphere of politically
unacceptable. I am quite certain that the 5% FP CW
would also be politically unacceptable, and that there would
political chaos in
the government in
At 03:36 AM 12/25/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Do you think my runoff idea could work, or is it too complex?
For years, attempts were made to find a majority using advanced
voting methods: in the U.S., Bucklin was claimed to do that, as it is
currently being claimed for IRV.
--- On Thu, 12/25/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
To: Gervase Lam gervase@group.force9.co.uk
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date
At 09:05 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:36 AM
Do you think my runoff idea could work, or is it too complex?
My personal view is that runoff is not desirable and would be an
unnecessary and unwanted expense. I know runoff
At 09:25 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 5:39 PM
The general legal opinion seems to be that it doesn't fail that
principle. It *looks* like the person has more than one vote, but,
when the smoke clears, you will see that only one of
At 09:55 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd, you are a great wriggler.
Thanks. I'm not a butterfly to be pinned to your specimen board.
My comments were not in the context of small direct democratic
situations. The discussion was
about major public elections - city mayor, state
Aaron Armitage wrote:
Perhaps the voter is given an extra vote to augment his more strongly
held preferences, so that if he gives it all to his first preference,
that candidate gets two votes against all other candidates, but the
second choice gets one vote against everyone ranked lower. On the
Aaron ArmitageSent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 7:40 PM
To: jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk; election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
I do not think you have to be anywhere near the zero
first-preferences Condorcet winner
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:01 PM
At 09:05 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
My personal view is that runoff is not desirable and would be an
unnecessary and unwanted expense. I know runoff voting systems are
used in some other countries, but they are not used
--- On Thu, 12/25/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
From: James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Thursday, December 25, 2008, 4:31 PM
Aaron ArmitageSent
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 8:32 PM
At 09:55 AM 12/25/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd, you are a great wriggler.
Thanks. I'm not a butterfly to be pinned to your specimen board.
Abd, I don't want to pin you or anyone else to a specimen board. I just don't
think
On Thu, 25 Dec 2008 14:55:23 - James Gilmour wrote:
Incidentally, my personal view is that there should be no provision for
write-ins at all in public elections. If I am not
prepared to declare myself as candidate and be nominated in the same way as all
the other candidates, I cannot see
At 12:56 AM 12/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
[starts with Venzke, then my response, then his]
Mean utility is supposed to be naive, and it is
optimal, if you are
naive about win odds.
I know that this
Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 7:43 AM
Using single-winner methods to implement
multi-winner elections is a weird
starting point in the first place.
All my comments were exclusively in the context of single-office single-winner
elections.
As I have said many times
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 9:54 AM
Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet
systems would have a first preference threshold, either on candidates
or on sets: anyone getting less than x% FP is disqualified.
I have not seen any advocate of Condorcet make
James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 9:54 AM
Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet
systems would have a first preference threshold, either on candidates
or on sets: anyone getting less than x% FP is disqualified.
I have not seen any
I wrote:
As I have said many times before, it is my firmly held view that
single-winner voting systems should NEVER be used for the general
election of the members of any assembly (city council,
state legislature, state or federal parliament, House of Representatives or
Senate). All
Dave Ketchum Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 6:11 AM
Does real likely fit the facts? Some thought:
Assuming 5 serious contenders they will average 3rd rank with CW doing
better (for 3, 2nd). Point is that while some voters may rank the CW low,
to be CW it has to average toward
Hallo,
James Gilmour wrote (24 Dec 2008):
IRV has been used for public elections for many decades
in several countries. In contrast, despite having been
around for about 220 years, the Condorcet voting system
has not been used in any public elections anywhere,
so far as I am aware. That
Markus Schulze Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 9:24 PM
James Gilmour wrote (24 Dec 2008):
IRV has been used for public elections for many decades
in several countries. In contrast, despite having been around for
about 220 years, the Condorcet voting system has not been used in any
At 04:47 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
In a post last night I wrote:
Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 11:14 PM
I am not going to comment of the rest of your interesting
post in detail, but I am surprised that anyone should take
Bucklin seriously. I, and some of our intuitive electors,
At 05:18 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
But, of course, if it were possible to elect a no first
preferences candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would
be disastrous.
No example is known to me. It's easy to see
At 07:23 PM 12/22/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting?
52 of 100 prefer M over D
53 of 100 prefer M over R
Neither R nor D got a
At 08:56 PM 12/22/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Dave,
I think you make a common semantic manipulation about the nature of a
Condorcet winner (particularly in a weak CW example) by using the term
wins by a majority.
He wouldn't be the one who invented this practice, Terry.
In fact, each of
a...@lomaxdesign.com
To: Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net; Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com; Election Methods Mailing List
election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 7:02 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 08:56 PM 12/22
At 08:02 AM 12/23/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Dave, I never said that I would find that result
objectionable. What I did say was that I thought such a result would be
POLITICALLY unacceptable to the ELECTORS - certainly in the UK,
and perhaps also in the USA as there are SOME similarities in
At 10:29 PM 12/23/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
(in response to my post)
This is missing the point. There is no implication anywhere that a
zero-info strategy is supposed to be usable by real voters.
If we use zero-info strategy to judge a method, and that strategy
doesn't apply to real voters,
At 02:42 AM 12/24/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
... the Condorcet voting system will never get off the ground
so long as a 5% FP Condorcet winner is a realistic scenario,
as it is when
the current (pre-reform) political system is so dominated
by two big political parties.
The question is if
At 06:59 AM 12/24/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
As I have said many times before, it is my firmly held view that
single-winner voting systems should NEVER be used for the general
election of the members of any assembly (city council, state
legislature, state or federal parliament, House of
At 08:06 PM 12/24/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Abd,
Abd wrote about center squeeze:
snip
The problem happens with
reasonable frequency with Top Two Runoff, and the principles are the
same. *In this way,* IRV simulates TTR, though, in fact, it is a
little better in choosing among the remaining
At 08:06 PM 12/24/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Another shortcoming of two-round elections is the sharply lower voter
participation (primarily among lower income voters) typical in one of the
rounds of a two election system. I know you have written favorably about
such drop off in voter turnout
Hallo,
Terry Bouricius wrote (22 Dec 2008):
In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a
little-considered candidate that every
voter ranks next to last.
Markus Schulze wrote (23 Dec 2008):
As the Borda score of a CW is always
above the average Borda score, it is
not possible that the CW is a
Dave KetchumSent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 12:23 AM
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
Dave, I never said that I would find that result objectionable. What I did say
was that I thought such a result would be
POLITICALLY unacceptable to the
Dave Ketchum Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 9:54 PM
Ok, I did not say it clearly.
Obvious need is to package arguments such that they are salable.
Take the one about a Condorcet winner with no first preferences. Ugly
thought, but how do you get there? Perhaps with three incompatible
Hello,
--- En date de : Dim 21.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
Hello,
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
With LNH, the harm is that the voter
sees a
second preference candidate elected rather than
the
Hello,
--- En date de : Lun 22.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
At 12:56 AM 12/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
[starts with Venzke, then my response, then his]
Mean utility is
On Tue, 23 Dec 2008 23:05:56 - James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 9:54 PM
Ok, I did not say it clearly.
Obvious need is to package arguments such that they are salable.
Take the one about a Condorcet winner with no first preferences. Ugly
thought, but
At 06:14 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 1:44 AM
LNH as an absolute principle, which, as an election criterion, it is,
is harmful.
That is a value judgement - which of course you are perfectly
entitled to make.
Sure. The
At 06:39 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA
elected by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35%
and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely
unimaginable, ever, that a candidate with 5% of the
--- On Mon, 22/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
The two situations I had in mind were:
Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R;
centrist candidate M
Election 1
35% DM; 33% RM; 32% M
Election 2
48% DM; 47% RM; 5% M
M is the Condorcet winner in both
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting?
52 of 100 prefer M over D
53 of 100 prefer M over R
Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.
As to my no first
-
From: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
To: jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 7:23 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable
Hallo,
Terry Bouricius wrote (22 Dec 2008):
In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a
little-considered candidate that every
voter ranks next to last.
As the Borda score of a CW is always
above the average Borda score, it is
not possible that the CW is a
little-considered candidate that
every
James Gilmour wrote:
Kevin Venzke Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:49 PM
The reason I believe LNHarm is more valuable than
monotonicity is that when a method fails LNHarm, the voter is
more likely to realize in what insincere way to vote
differently, in order to compensate. When a method
Dave Ketchum Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 3:51 AM
Responding to one thought for IRV vs C (Condorcet):
My comments were not specific to IRV versus Condorcet.
JG had written
When there is no majority winner they may well be prepared to take a
compromising view, but there are some very
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 1:44 AM
LNH as an absolute principle, which, as an election criterion, it is,
is harmful.
That is a value judgement - which of course you are perfectly entitled to
make.
It prevents the system acting as a negotiator seeking
Kristofer,
Woodall's DAC and DSC and Bucklin and Woodall's similar QLTD
all meet mono-raise and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions).
DSC meets LNHarm and the rest meet LNHelp.
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sun.Dec.21):
snip
In any case, it may be possible to
At 04:31 AM 12/21/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In any case, it may be possible to have one of the LNHs and be
monotonic and have mutual majority. I'm not sure, but perhaps
(doesn't one of DAC or DSC do this?). If so, it would be possible to
see (at least) whether people strategize in
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider
it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable
process of compromise that public elections should simulate.
I don't have time to
At 10:36 PM 12/18/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Mar 16.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
However, in defense of Venzke, he thinks that the situations where IRV
is non-monotonic are rare enough that it's not worth worrying about.
What I think would
Kevin Venzke Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:49 PM
The reason I believe LNHarm is more valuable than
monotonicity is that when a method fails LNHarm, the voter is
more likely to realize in what insincere way to vote
differently, in order to compensate. When a method fails
On Sat, 20 Dec 2008 19:19:02 - James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
I don't have time to read any of the extended essays that now feature on this
list, but these two remarks in a recent post caught my
eye and I could not let them pass.
Hello,
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
Highly speculative. Bucklin probably experiences
about the
same level of bullet voting due to LNH fears as
IRV, not
much more, because the harm only
happens when a
majority isn't found in the
At 03:36 AM 12/15/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:29 PM 12/7/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But your description confused me somewhat, regarding what's the
assembly and what's the electoral college.
The electoral college is simply a term for the
Hi Kathy,
You are responding to me, not Abd ul-Rahman Lomax.
--- En date de : Mar 16.12.08, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com a écrit :
Hi,
--- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a ?crit?:
That's not very generous. I can
think of
a couple of defenses.
At 09:58 PM 12/15/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Kevin's post had lost all formatting, the quoted
material was extremely difficult to follow, and
the new text was only distinguishable with
difficulty, because I recognize, sort of, my own
writing. So I may have missed a lot
Hi, --- En date
At 08:49 AM 12/16/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Thus, *all things being equal* (which must
be kept in mind if it's IRV that is on your mind), I would expect that
failing LNHarm will provoke more insincerity (and thus destroy more
information) than failing monotonicity.
Highly speculative. Bucklin
At 01:24 AM 12/16/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 02:58:29 + (GMT)
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Hi,
--- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a ?crit?:
That's
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:29 PM 12/7/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But your description confused me somewhat, regarding what's the
assembly and what's the electoral college.
The electoral college is simply a term for the collection of electors,
who are public voters. It's
Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
That's not very generous. I can think of
a couple of defenses. One would
be to point out that it is necessitated by
the other criteria that IRV
satisfies. All things being equal, I consider
LNHarm
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 02:58:29 + (GMT)
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Hi,
--- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
?crit?:
That's not very generous. I can think of
a couple
Sorry folks, self-correction here:
Abd ul,
I misstated this:
That is about the strangest position I've seen you take on any subject
because it is equivalent to saying that it is more important for a
voting method not to hurt my lower choice candidates than my first
choice candidates.
At 08:57 PM 12/13/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Lun 8.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
What you're talking about here isn't even playing nice, it's more
like using lower ratings as loose change to toss into an (inadequate)
street musician's hat. I'm not
Hello,
Here are some sections I wanted to quickly reply to.
--- En date de : Lun 8.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
What you're talking about here isn't even playing nice, it's more
like using lower ratings as loose change to toss into an (inadequate)
street
At 04:33 PM 12/6/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
So, to try to summarize. You can argue for Range in two ways. On the
one hand, if voters really do vote similarly to how they behave under
the simulations, then Range is the ideal method according to utility.
On the other hand, if Range doesn't work
At 02:29 PM 12/7/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But your description confused me somewhat, regarding what's the
assembly and what's the electoral college.
The electoral college is simply a term for the collection of
electors, who are public voters. It's similar to the U.S. electoral
At 03:17 AM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 10:52 PM
The tragedy is that IRV is replacing Top Two Runoff, an older
reform that actually works better than IRV.
I have seen statements like this quite a few
At 10:09 AM 12/4/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer MunsterhjelmSent: Thursday, December 04, 2008 8:17 AM
I'm not Abd, but I think the argument goes like this: in TTR, if a
(usually) third candidate gets enough FPP votes to make it to the second
round, that candidate has a real chance
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:37 AM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a very
selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their friends).
From what I understand, those voted for in the first round become the
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
For the benefit of those who aren't familiar with the terminology,
Supplementary Vote is top-two batch-elimination IRV. In the United
States, there are or have been a few implementations of SV, and
FairVote claims these as IRV successes.
That's not quite standard
1 - 100 of 153 matches
Mail list logo
