On 21 Jul 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
computation to be there.
On 22 Jul 2011, at 11:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Bruno and Craig,
On 7/22/2011 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be
Regardless of what the nerve cells experience individually, if it can't be
communicated it to other nerve cells, it can't be talked about, thought
about, or wondered about.
I think it could be shared between nerve cells, I'm saying it's not
shared with us. We are a political partition of a living
No doubt it would be technically difficult to make an artificial
replacement for a neuron in a different substrate, but there is no
theoretical reason why it could not be done, since there is no
evidence for any magical processes inside neurons.
Subjectivity is the magic processes inside living
On Jul 22, 1:53 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number
On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 7/22/2011 1:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
All the relevant parts of relativity which
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
Not at
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb
Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
matter, etc.) are given by the modal variant of self-reference. This
has been done and this
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 11:31 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
defined
relations between
Hey Bruno,
I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our ongoing
discussion.
To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to human
consciousness. I now have an argument that I
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only
to believe that you interact with a world/reality, whatever that
is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some magic in both
consciousness and world.
So I need to believe some
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for
On 7/22/2011 4:16 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have already addressed this point - you can have a living person
with a prosthetic limb but you can't replace a person's brain with a
prosthetic and have it still be that person. The limb only works
because there is enough of the body left to
On Jul 22, 3:49 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
There is no objective quality of resemblance without a
subjective intepreter
says who?
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On 7/22/2011 10:46 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
Actually I was friends with two
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease. If it were possible to spare certain areas or categories of
neurons then I would expect more of a fragmented subject whose means
of expression are intact,
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
If i see two mounds of dirt they might look the same to me, but maybe
they host two different ant colonies. Is the non-subjective
resemblance more like mine or the ants?
On Jul 22, 4:41 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If
On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need
only to believe that you interact with a world/reality,
whatever that is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some
magic in both
On 22 Jul 2011, at 14:17, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
On 22 Jul 2011, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a
system
that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by
definition
computable!
The recipe is
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 4:54 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
Hi Jason,
None of those papers address the concern of narratability that I am
considering. In fact they all assume narratability. I am pointing out that
thinking of time as a dimension has a big problem! It
Hi Terren,
On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:51, terren wrote:
I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our
ongoing
discussion.
To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand
how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to
human
On 22 Jul 2011, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point
On 22 Jul 2011, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
On 23 Jul 2011, at 00:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
network, then functionality should be retained
Neurological
On Jul 22, 7:26 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Comp embraces the non computable. If you study the work you will
understand that both matter and mind arise from the non computable,
with comp.
See the second part of sane04. Ask question if there are problems.
I know you must
On Jul 22, 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That would just mean that the neuronal level is too much high for
being the substitution level. Better to chose the DNA and metabolic
level.
Right. If you make tweaked real cells out of real atoms that are
arranged as an
On 7/22/2011 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
network,
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
sentence: Degradation is preserved with high fidelity.
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad conversation
over clear telephones?
...A neuron is
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course if you
have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that artificial.
Actually, I think it would have to be a real quark (if quarks even
'exist'). The
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
sentence: Degradation is preserved with high fidelity.
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad
On 7/22/2011 9:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course if you
have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that artificial.
Actually, I think it would
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