Re: substitution level

On 12 Jun 2017, at 01:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 10:34:44AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and Control, 57, pp. 40-47. And I raise you with @Article{Chang-etal94, author = {Richard Chang and Benny Ch

Re: substitution level

Thanks both for the references! Best, Telmo. On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 10:34:44AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and >> Control, 57, pp. 40-47. >> > > And I raise you wi

Re: substitution level

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 10:34:44AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and > Control, 57, pp. 40-47. > And I raise you with @Article{Chang-etal94, author = {Richard Chang and Benny Chor and Oded Goldreich and Juris Hartman

Re: substitution level

On 09 Jun 2017, at 18:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Jun 2017, at 15:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: I guess you mean that it does not v

Re: substitution level

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 06 Jun 2017, at 15:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. >>> >>> >>

Re: substitution level

On 06 Jun 2017, at 15:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. Yes. Of course, it can "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emula

Re: substitution level

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:35 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Telmo Menezes > wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play? >> >> >> >> > >> Why so nasty? > > > It's been 152 years. Too soon? I don't know, but I have a friend who is obsessed

Re: substitution level

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. > > > Yes. > > Of course, it can > > "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject, > > that a classica

Re: substitution level

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 , spudboy100 via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > c​ > onsciousness may be profitable field of learning, or it may stand still > forever, as is surmised. Of course doing experiments with living things, > including ourselves > ​ [...] > ​Not ​

Re: substitution level

xists. An anti-Xeno sort of thing. -Original Message- From: John Clark To: everything-list Sent: Mon, Jun 5, 2017 12:35 pm Subject: Re: substitution level On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > ​>​ Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play?

Re: substitution level

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> ​>​ >> Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play? > > ​> ​ > Why so nasty? ​It's been 152 years. Too soon?​ > ​> ​ > All I was saying is that quantum computers are not > ​ ​ > qualitatively different in a way that could he

Re: substitution level

On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote: I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. Yes. Of course, it can "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject, that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine random

Re: substitution level

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 6:01 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 3:05 AM, Telmo Menezes > wrote: > >> > >> There is nothing that a quantum >> computer can do that a classical computer cannot do, > > > There are problems a > classical computer > can't solve in polynomial time that a quan

Re: substitution level

> I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. Yes. > Of course, it can > "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject, > that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine > random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum comp

Re: substitution level

On 05 Jun 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 11:48:23AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 9:48 PM, Russell Standish > wrote: ​> ​ That is not the same thing. The largest prime number doesn't exist, so ​ ​ there's no answer to find there, but th

Re: substitution level

On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 11:48:23AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 9:48 PM, Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > ​> ​ > > That is not the same thing. The largest prime number doesn't exist, so > > ​ ​ > > there's no answer to find there, but the halting problem always has an > > ​

Proof and truth are not the same thing (was: substitution level)

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done >> then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.​ > > ​> ​ > If "can be done" means "can compute or emulate", I am OK. That is > basically Chur

Re: substitution level

On 04 Jun 2017, at 03:20, John Clark wrote: Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.​ If "can be done" means "can compute or emulate", I am OK. That is basically Church's Thesis. If by "can

Re: substitution level

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 3:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: ​> ​ > There is nothing that a quantum > ​ ​ > computer can do that a classical computer cannot do, ​There are problems a ​ classical computer ​ can't solve in polynomial time that a quantum computer can.​ ​> ​ > given sufficient > ​ ​ > tim

Re: substitution level

On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 9:48 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > ​> ​ > That is not the same thing. The largest prime number doesn't exist, so > ​ ​ > there's no answer to find there, but the halting problem always has an > ​ ​ > answer - a program either halts, or it does not. > ​But that's not ​the H

Re: substitution level

On 01 Jun 2017, at 19:38, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote: Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level

Re: substitution level

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 1:20 AM, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> > >> Regarding the quantum computer, I understand that it is still a >> classical computer > > > If a Human being like you, or any computer in existence today, > had a telephone number and tried to m

Re: substitution level

On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 09:20:29PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 Russell Standish wrote: > > ​> ​ > > Random oracle computers appear to be faster for some problems in a > > similar way, but don't compute anything a Turing machine can't do. > > ​[...] ​ > > the set of problems t

Re: substitution level

On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 Russell Standish wrote: ​> ​ > Random oracle computers appear to be faster for some problems in a > similar way, but don't compute anything a Turing machine can't do. > ​[...] ​ > the set of problems that can be solved is identical ​ That's because as far as we know a Turi

Re: substitution level

On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 07:20:29PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 Telmo Menezes wrote: > > ​> ​ > > Regarding the quantum computer, I understand that it is still a > > classical computer > > > ​If a Human being like you, or any computer in existence today, > had a telephone numb

Re: substitution level

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 Telmo Menezes wrote: ​> ​ > Regarding the quantum computer, I understand that it is still a > classical computer ​If a Human being like you, or any computer in existence today, had a telephone number and tried to match it up with a name in a telephone book that had one mulli

Re: substitution level

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) >> >>>> What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than >&

Re: substitution level

On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote: Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and activations levels? That would

substitution level

Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) >> What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than >> quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and >> activations levels? > > > That would enlarge the

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

. Comp1 is the proposition that the brain can be replaced by a digital computer at some level of emulation. OK. It can be replaced, in the physical reality, at the substitution level. The brain's function must be Turing emulable. At least those relevant for the relevant compu

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 Jun 2015, at 16:56, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Kim Jones wrote: > Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are you as well? The crime is intellectual dishonesty. I don

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 Jun 2015, at 10:18, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 11 June 2015 at 10:50, meekerdb wrote: > "I'm a solipsist and I'm surprised more philosophers aren't solipsists." > --- letter to Bertrand Russell > "Phew, another solipsist! I was afraid I might be the only one." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gr

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/10/2015 7:56 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Kim Jones > wrote: > Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are you as well? The crime i

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/10/2015 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also know

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Kim Jones wrote: > Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable > about the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are > you as well? > The crime is intellectual dishonesty. I don't believe anyone this side of a looney bin rea

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 LizR wrote: > does a group mind refer to "ourself" or "myselves" ? > That depends on the speed of light and how far apart the individual brains are. It they're far apart and it takes a long time to send a signal to another brain relative to the time it takes to send interna

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always fo

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 Jun 2015, at 03:35, Kim Jones wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of ax

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of b

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED, string theory or theoretical computer science. A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does not refute th

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematici

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

> On 10 Jun 2015, at 2:20 pm, LizR wrote: > >> On 10 June 2015 at 15:23, Kim Jones wrote: >> Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. What >> are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with me.) > > Thanks! :) > >> So yes, I don't think h

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 15:23, Kim Jones wrote: > Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. > What are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with > me.) > Thanks! :) > So yes, I don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much. > > It's b

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

> On 10 Jun 2015, at 11:53 am, LizR wrote: > >> On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones wrote: >>> On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> Bru

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones wrote: > On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR wrote: > > On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Ke

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

> On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR wrote: > >> On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Given a set of axio

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made.

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/9/2015 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED, string theory or theoretical computer science. A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does not refute that rockets can work. Brent :) -- You recei

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:59, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruce Kellett wrote: > What axioms led to arithmetic? The Peano axioms. Or the Robinson axiom, or many other systems. but they don't disagree on any formula. Even the theories having weird axioms like "PA is inconsistent"

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/9/2015 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree w

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a mater

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruce Kellett wrote: > What axioms led to arithmetic? The Peano axioms. They were chosen because they are very simple and self evident. You need to be very conservative when picking axioms, for example we could just add the Goldbach Conjecture as an axiom, but then if a com

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

> On 9 Jun 2015, at 8:07 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results >>> always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is >>> made.

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as "kicking back". Johnson did

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net >> wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of ma

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au >> wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. I

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:21, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 7:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is imp

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:37, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been inven

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:24, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA expl

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 00:21, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computatio

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:37, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on "justified". Plato's Theaetetus dialogue defines "knowledge" as "true belief". I think that's a deficiency in

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but tha

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making "more

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that position is proved to be

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 18:40, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined in standard set theory >> YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTAT

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett > wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and cou

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 7:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exis

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 7:41 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Jun 09, 2015 at 02:32:13PM +1200, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR wrote: (And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that "snuck" may

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Tue, Jun 09, 2015 at 02:32:13PM +1200, LizR wrote: > On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR wrote: > > > >> (And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?) > >> > > > > I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that "snuck" may have > > sneaked into t

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR wrote: > >> (And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?) >> > > I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that "snuck" may have > sneaked into the language: > > http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. >> >> That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathe

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR > wrote: > On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know >> that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be >> conscious. But that doesn't mean that only com

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is im

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: > LizR wrote: > >> Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or >> whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was >> invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it >> disc

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Sat, Jun 06, 2015 at 07:18:19PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 meekerdb wrote: > > > In a Newtonian world physics is deterministic > > > > Yes, but deterministic is not the same as predictable. > > > > > so there is an exact solution: > > > > That doesn't necessarily foll

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb > wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because every

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. > > That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is > important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, bu

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic > is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we > cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making "m

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know > that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be > conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations can be conscious, > nor does it mean

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on "justified". Plato'sTheaetetusdialogue defines "knowledge" as "true belief". I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, e

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making "more real" some computations in place of others. It

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just "I am a digitalizable

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true >>> sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be >>> defined in standard set theory >> >> > >> YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION! > > > I can

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on "justified". Plato's Theaetetus dialogue defines "knowledge" as "true belief". I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to formalize good informal reasoning. But I can

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 01:14, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2015 3:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is incap

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 00:00, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is incapable of handling 4 coordinates? > Of

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 04:31, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 at meekerdb wrote: > everyone agrees that 2+2=4 by definition, it's not so clear that arithmetic objects exist. If 2+2=4 exists then 2+2=5 does too. 2+2 is true. That's all. Platonia may contain all true statements but it

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 04:14, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined in standard set theory YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 8 June 2015 at 11:14, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/7/2015 3:00 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> An event is just a place and a time; are you saying th

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Monday, June 8, 2015, LizR wrote: > On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > >> >> On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal > > wrote: >> >> >> An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is incapable of handli

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 at meekerdb wrote: > > everyone agrees that 2+2=4 by definition, it's not so clear that > arithmetic objects exist. > If 2+2=4 exists then 2+2=5 does too. Platonia may contain all true statements but it contains all false statement as well and even Platonia has no way to com

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences > of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined > in standard set theory > YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION! >> Half of your theory is t

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