Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
> The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what
> randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not
> specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer
> branches.
>

One of the troubles with this is that it takes no account of probability --
the fact that some outcomes might be more or less likely than others. The
outcome on any one trial may be unpredictable for the branching individual,
but unpredictability is not random selection from a distribution. If you do
not take probabilities into account you cannot understand the correlations
that exist between outcomes on repeated trials.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 18:25, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something
>>>>>>>> along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the 
>>>>>>>> branches,
>>>>>>>> which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get 
>>>>>>>> such an
>>>>>>>> idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between 
>>>>>>>> branches.
>>>>>>>> Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere
>>>>>>>> else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate 
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>> apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of 
>>>>>>>> intrinsic
>>>>>>>> randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible
>>>>>>> to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient 
>>>>>>> being.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>>>>>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>>>>>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>>>>>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to 
>>>>>> add,
>>>>>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a
>>>>> version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being 
>>>>> predicts
>>>>> that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version
>>>>> of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end
>>>>> up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A.
>>>>> It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just
>>>> one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is
>>>> unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient
>>>> being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic
>>>> probability -- *viz*. the Born Rule.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is
>>> what randomness is.
>>>
>>
>> That is not randomness. Unpredictability might be a consequence of
>> randomness, but they are not the same thing.
>>
>
> Maybe they are. It is subject to debate.
>

Just because something is debated does not mean that the issue is not clear.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:45 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 18:15 Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>> Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 10:12, Stathis Papaioannou  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something
>>>>>>>> along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the 
>>>>>>>> branches,
>>>>>>>> which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get 
>>>>>>>> such an
>>>>>>>> idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between 
>>>>>>>> branches.
>>>>>>>> Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere
>>>>>>>> else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate 
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>> apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of 
>>>>>>>> intrinsic
>>>>>>>> randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible
>>>>>>> to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient 
>>>>>>> being.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>>>>>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>>>>>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>>>>>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to 
>>>>>> add,
>>>>>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a
>>>>> version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being 
>>>>> predicts
>>>>> that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version
>>>>> of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end
>>>>> up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A.
>>>>> It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just
>>>> one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is
>>>> unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient
>>>> being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic
>>>> probability -- *viz*. the Born Rule.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is
>>> what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is
>>> not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer
>>> branches.
>>>
>>
>> The thing is to recover the born rules, some frequency must be in play,
>> some things are more likely than other, if you had to make a bet, it's
>> important and you wouldn't bet every outcome is equally likely.
>>
>
> Isn’t that separate from the question of whether the randomness an
> observer sees in MWI is truly random?
>

No. Randomness includes the notion of a probability distribution.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:15 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 10:12, Stathis Papaioannou  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something
>>>>>>> along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches,
>>>>>>> which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get 
>>>>>>> such an
>>>>>>> idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between 
>>>>>>> branches.
>>>>>>> Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere
>>>>>>> else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate 
>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>> apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic
>>>>>>> randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible
>>>>>> to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>>>>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>>>>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>>>>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add,
>>>>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a
>>>> version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts
>>>> that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version
>>>> of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end
>>>> up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A.
>>>> It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just
>>> one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is
>>> unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient
>>> being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic
>>> probability -- *viz*. the Born Rule.
>>>
>>
>> The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is
>> what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is
>> not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer
>> branches.
>>
>
> The thing is to recover the born rules, some frequency must be in play,
> some things are more likely than other, if you had to make a bet, it's
> important and you wouldn't bet every outcome is equally likely.
>

That is a very important point. You need to be able to take account of
probability, and in QM the Born Rule does this. Unfortunately, many-worlds
or branching models have great problems giving any sensible account of
probability. Attempts, such as those of Carroll and Zurek, make use of the
assumption that equal amplitudes have equal probabilities. When you think
about it, this is essentially the Born Rule, since it introduces both the
concept of probability, and relates it to amplitudes. Thus all such
attempts in the context of many-worlds or other branching models, are
inherently circular.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something
>>>>>> along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches,
>>>>>> which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such 
>>>>>> an
>>>>>> idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between 
>>>>>> branches.
>>>>>> Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere
>>>>>> else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such
>>>>>> apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic
>>>>>> randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to
>>>>> predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>>>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>>>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>>>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add,
>>>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a
>>> version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts
>>> that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version
>>> of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end
>>> up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A.
>>> It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.
>>>
>>
>> It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just
>> one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is
>> unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient
>> being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic
>> probability -- *viz*. the Born Rule.
>>
>
> The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what
> randomness is.
>

That is not randomness. Unpredictability might be a consequence of
randomness, but they are not the same thing.

It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or
> MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.
>

The problem with this approach is that it takes no account of probability.
I can arrange things so that the probability of a particular result is,
say, 0.7, and this can be verified with repeated experiments. If it is just
a matter of the branching, then the probability is unity on every trial. So
unpredictability and/or branching, in themselves, cannot account for
probability.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along
>>>> the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which
>>>> one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea
>>>> to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such
>>>> randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it
>>>> is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent
>>>> randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness
>>>> (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>
>>>
>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to
>>> predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.
>>>
>>
>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add,
>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>
>
> Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a
> version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts
> that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version
> of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end
> up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A.
> It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.
>

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one
answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is
unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient
being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic
probability -- *viz*. the Born Rule.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:18 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 09:04, Bruce Kellett  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along
>>>> the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which
>>>> one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea
>>>> to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such
>>>> randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it
>>>> is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent
>>>> randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness
>>>> (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>>>
>>>
>>> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to
>>> predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.
>>>
>>
>> That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
>> Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
>> selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
>> selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add,
>> by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.
>>
>
> Could be the lenght of the program going through that state using a
> frequency sampling, shortest program going through that state have higher
> measure... the dovetailer run "more often" short programs than longer one
>

No. You still need the Born Rule: the Born rule has two aspects: It has an
intrinsic notion of probability, and it relates probability to amplitudes
of the wave function.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:
>>
>> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along
>> the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which
>> one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea
>> to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such
>> randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it
>> is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent
>> randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness
>> (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)
>>
>
> The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to
> predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.
>

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem.
Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that
selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random
selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add,
by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R  wrote:

> On Friday 13 September 2024 at 11:47:31 UTC+12 Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R wrote:
>
> Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't
> *intrinsically* random.
>
>
> No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from
> anything else.
>
>
> This is the sort of thing that made me think of "oracles". What sort of
> physical (or mathematical) process could, at least in principle, be
> intrinsically random?
>

You might want to call intrinsic randomness an "oracle", but I don't really
know what that means. Intrinsic randomness in physics would have to be a
primitive, independent of other deterministic laws. The sort of thing that
I have in mind is spontaneous collapse of the wave function, or the random
'flashes' of GRW theory.

(Rather than apparently random due to ignorance of an underlying
> lower-level deterministic mechanism.) An oracle that delivers the next
> digit in Chaitin's constant, as mentioned by Russell, might be the sort of
> thing - which could mean a suitable source of randomness in physics is the
> "universal dovetailer" or something similar.
>

 I don't see how the universal dovetaier could be a source of intrinsic
randomness. It is strictly deterministic, and if you have branches as in
many-worlds, choosing between the branches can be implemented only by some
other intrinsically random process -- it can't be internally generated.


> It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our
> perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.
>
>
> No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned.
> You cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from
> a deterministic theory such as many-worlds.
>
>
> I thought you could get the appearance of randomness from a first-person
> perspective in MW? Has that been shown to not work?
>

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the
lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am
I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to
work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such
randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it
is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent
randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness
(to be able to make your self-locating choice.)


> Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down,
> it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we
> haven't thought of yet.
>
>
> That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of
> yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot
> arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance,
> as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things
> are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the
> case in QM.
>
> Well, yes - by definition, intrinsic randomness can't arise from a
> deterministic theory. However, I will wait for your ideas on the types of
> physical or mathematical processes that could lead to intrinsic randomness
> before commenting on this further, as I can't get past that first hurdle
> yet!
>

Yes, by definition, intrinsic randomness cannot arise from a deterministic
theory, so there are no physical processes of the common type known to date
that can lead to it. One needs a separate source of intrinsic randomness.
That is one of the strengths of GRW collapse theory: it is perhaps the only
theory around at the moment that has an explanation of intrinsic
randomness, since randomness is a primitive in that theory.  Other hidden
variable theories, such as Bohmian Mechanics, can explain quantum
randomness, but only as a consequence of ignorance about the influence of
every other particle in the universe. That is still deterministic (though
non-local), not intrinsic.

Bruce

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R  wrote:

> Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't
> *intrinsically* random.


No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from
anything else.

It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our
> perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.


No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You
cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a
deterministic theory such as many-worlds.

Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down,
> it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we
> haven't thought of yet.


That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of
yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot
arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance,
as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things
are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the
case in QM.

Bruce

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Re: LLAMA3

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:45 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 5:23 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> *> "I don't think you understand "values".  They are the basis of
>> motivation,\"*
>>
>
> *And **I think you don't understand what the word "motivation" means, the
> reasons that something behaves in a particular way.  *
>
>
> * > "**What motivates LLAMA3...a prompt." *
>>
>
> *Two things determine what LLAMA3 or any other AI will do. *
>
> *1) The machine's environment, which in this case is the prompt which can
> be written text, audio, a picture, or a video. *
>
> *2) The way the neural network of the machine is wired up, which is
> determined by a huge matrix of numbers that nobody understands.*
>

Just because no one understands the way this is wired up does not mean that
it is the same as a human brain.

*And you behave the way you do because of your environment, which like the
> AI could be written text, audio, a picture, or a video, and just like the
> AI, because of the way your brain is wired up. *
>
>
>
>> *  > "**That it has lots of parameters that are numbers is not the same
>> as having lots of values."*
>
>
> *Why not? How would the machine behave differently if having lots of
> parameters WERE  the same as having lots of values?*
>

That is not the question. If the machine behaves exactly as a human in
terms of following a value set, then you will, by definition, see no
difference. But in saying this you are assuming that the AI can in fact
behave in this way, and that is just to assume the answer to the original
question. Which was: Can the AI act according to human type values (or any
values, for that matter)?

Bruce

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Re: Fwd: Should The Future Be Human?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 10:46 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 10:01, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jan 23, 2024 at 5:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > *T**here is yet another level, phenomenal consciousness, which has no
>>> behavioural manifestations whatsoever, allowing for the theoretical
>>> possibility of philosophical zombies.*
>>
>>
>> Assuming that is true and assuming that you yourself are not a
>> philosophical zombie, how do you suppose random mutation and natural
>> selection manage to produce you?
>>
>
> It couldn't, which supports the idea that philosophical zombies are
> impossible, or equivalently that phenomenal consciousness reduces to the
> behavioural manifestations of consciousness, such as awareness of self and
> environment.
>

In fasct, it supports the idea that philosophical zombies could not be
produced by natural (Darwinian) selection. But it say nothing about the
possibility that such beings could be produced artificially; eg. via AI.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 5, 2023 at 9:42 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 5:24 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> that fact is not central, despite the ramblings on Wikipedia.*
>>
>
> It is my experience that when a debate opponent resorts to disparageing
> the accuracy of Wikipedia I know that I've backed him into a corner and
> he's desperate. Would it really hurt that much to just admit you're wrong?
>

Wikipedia is not authoritative. It is just someone's opinion.

*I don't recall you ever giving a sound argument in favour of this view.*
>>
>
> Then you have a remarkably poor memory! I'll tell you what I remember,
> writing several rather detailed posts and you just saying I was wrong with
> no specifics. If you think something I said was not sound then please point
> it out, I doubt it but maybe it'll even turn out you're right and then I'll
> have to change my worldview, but to do that you'll have to pinpoint exactly
> where I went wrong.  Next I expect you to say that I made so many errors
> that you are unable to pick out a single one.
>

Perhaps that is the case. But you have not ever derived the Born rule from
MWI, so I can stand by that.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 5, 2023 at 9:11 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 4:29 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> You don't have to be a mathematical realist to believe that adding
>>>> one apple to another apple in the bowl gives you two apples.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> >> But what about an orange? If you're not a realist and so don't even
>>> know if "orange" is a noun or an adjective, and the inside of the bowl is
>>> already orange, then adding more orange will change nothing. And if an
>>> apple isn't real then why does the bowl weigh more when there are two
>>> apples in it then when there was just one? There is no doubt that the Born
>>> Rule works, if you're not interested in understanding why it works then you
>>> never have to bother with the Many Worlds idea.
>>>
>>
>> *> I did say mathematical realist. One can believe apples and oranges
>> really exist without being a mathematical realist!*
>>
>
> According to Wikipedia "*mathematical realism is the view that
> mathematical truths are objective and exist independently of the human mind*
> ". I then asked the AI Claude and it said something very similar but
> added that mathematical realists believe *"Mathematical statements are
> objectively true or false. For example, the statement 2 + 2 = 4 is always
> true, independent of what any human believes about it*." So you *DO* have
> to be a mathematical realist to believe that adding one apple to another
> apple in a bowl gives you two apples.
>


That does not follow. Besides, mathematical realism is the belief that
mathematical objects really exist. That might make statements about
mathematical statements being objectively true or false, but that fact is
not central, despite the ramblings on Wikipedia.


*> Besides, many worlds gives no understanding of why the Born rule works
> since the Born rule cannot be derived within MWI.*
>

You've made the same accusation before and I gave a detailed response as to
why I think you are incorrect and why Many Worlds give a better
understanding of why the Born rule is what it is than any other quantum
interpretation. You didn't specifically refute anything I said, you just
waved your hands around and said I was wrong.

I don't recall you ever giving a sound argument in favour of this view. As
I remember, you just wittered on about the Born rule being experimentally
true, and therefore not in need of justification. I have pointed out that
such a view is nonsense. You either have to make the Born rule an explicit
additional assumption, or else derive it from something. You have not
derived it from MWI.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 11:27 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 5:11 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> You don't have to be a mathematical realist to believe that adding one
>> apple to another apple in the bowl gives you two apples.*
>>
>
> But what about an orange? If you're not a realist and so don't even know
> if "orange" is a noun or an adjective, and the inside of the bowl is
> already orange, then adding more orange will change nothing. And if an
> apple isn't real then why does the bowl weigh more when there are two
> apples in it then when there was just one? There is no doubt that the Born
> Rule works, if you're not interested in understanding why it works then you
> never have to bother with the Many Worlds idea.
>

I did say *mathematical* realist. One can believe apples and oranges really
exist without being a mathematical realist!

Besides, many worlds gives no understanding of why the Born rule works
since the Born rule cannot be derived within MWI.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 11:18 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 24-11-2023 10:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > That doesn't seem to get rid of probability.  How will you empirically
> > confirm that you need less information to specify X than Y.  You will
> > still need frequentist statistics.
>
> That's true from an empiric point of view. The idea is that after many
> experiments the state corresponding to a typical outcome can be
> described with less information that states that have atypical outcomes.
>
>   And I don't see that "specify" is
> > the right word.  X may be up and Y down so they each take the same
> > information to specify, but X may be much more probably than Y.
> >
>
> Yes, that can happen when specifying the outcome of a few experiments.
> In case of specifying the outcome of a large set of experiments, then
> one set will be far more compressible given the prior information of the
> experimental setup than the other set.
>

In any run of an experiment with binary outcomes, for N trials (N large),
the result is going to be a sequence of N 0/1 bits. Any run from this set
contains as much information as any other run, and is no more compressible.
It is only when you do statistics on the outcomes that the notion of a
"typical" set can be defined. If any arbitrary set is chosen as "typical",
then the expected statistics will be different. For example, if you start
from the set with N/100 0's and 99N/100 1's, the probability of getting a 1
is greater than if you start with a set with approximately the same number
of 0's and 1's.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 3, 2023, 4:40 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> I don't think the Born rule is implied by MWI; but it's already known to
>> be the only rational way to define a probability measure on a Hilbert space
>> (Gleason's theorem).  So in a sense it's implicit in QM regardless of
>> interpretation.
>>
>> QBism, which is a version of CI+decoherence is at least as rational as
>> MWI.  I think the proper measure of an interpretation is whether they
>> suggest improvements and experiments.  MWI may be better in that respect.
>>
>
> QBism, like other non-realist theories, can't account for the
> effectiveness of quantum computers (unless one believes that non-real
> things can have real, detectable effects (like producing the solution to
> factoring a large semiprime)). But if you are realist about the wave
> function, then you are dealing with MW, not QBism.
>

You don't have to be a mathematical realist to believe that adding one
apple to another apple in the bowl gives you two apples.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 12:46 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023, 8:39 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 11:59 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023, 7:17 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 12:34, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 12:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Born rule allows you to calculate the probability of what
>>>>>>> outcome you will see in a Universe where all outcomes occur.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are still conflating incompatible theories. The Born rule is a
>>>>>> rule for calculating probabilities from the wave function -- it says
>>>>>> nothing about worlds or existence. MWI is a theory about the existence of
>>>>>> many worlds. These theories are incompatible, and should not be 
>>>>>> conflated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> “The Born rule is a rule for calculating probabilities from the wave
>>>>> function -- it says nothing about worlds or existence”  -and- “MWI is a
>>>>> theory about the existence of many worlds” are not incompatible 
>>>>> statements.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps that is the wrong way to look at it. The linearity of the
>>>> Schrodinger equation implies that the individuals on all branches are the
>>>> same: there is nothing to distinguish one of them as "you" and the others
>>>> as mere shadows or zombies. In other words, they are all "you". So you are
>>>> the person on the branch with all spins up and your probability of seeing
>>>> this result is one, since this branch certainly exists, and, by linearity,
>>>> "you" are the individual on that branch. This is inconsistent with the
>>>> claim that the Born rule gives the probability that "you" will see some
>>>> particular result. As we have seen, the probability that "you" will see all
>>>> ups in one, whereas the Born probability for this result is 1/2^N. These
>>>> probability estimates are incompatible.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> According to relativity you exist in all times across your lifespan (and
>>> all times are equally really). Yet you are only ever aware of being in one
>>> time and in one place. I think this tells us more about the limitations of
>>> our neurology than it reveals about the extent or nature of reality. If a
>>> copy of me is created on Mars, the me know Earth doesn't magically become
>>> aware of it.
>>>
>>
>> And how do we select out the present moment from the block universe?
>>
>
> I believe all apparent selections are merely indexical illusions. 'Here'
> is no more real than 'There', 'Now' is no more real than 'Then', 'I' is no
> more real than 'Him'. We only consider these things special due to the
> position we happen to be in at the time a consideration is made, but all
> such considerations exist and are equally valid. All 'Heres' are real, all
> 'Nows' are real, all points of view are 'Is'. Only, as Shrodigner says, we
> aren't in a position to survey them all at once.
>

What a load of fanciful nonsense! This goes no way towards explaining our
experience.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 12:34 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 11/29/2023 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 12:34, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 12:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> The Born rule allows you to calculate the probability of what outcome
>>>> you will see in a Universe where all outcomes occur.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You are still conflating incompatible theories. The Born rule is a rule
>>> for calculating probabilities from the wave function -- it says nothing
>>> about worlds or existence. MWI is a theory about the existence of many
>>> worlds. These theories are incompatible, and should not be conflated.
>>>
>>
>> “The Born rule is a rule for calculating probabilities from the wave
>> function -- it says nothing about worlds or existence”  -and- “MWI is a
>> theory about the existence of many worlds” are not incompatible statements.
>>
>
> Perhaps that is the wrong way to look at it. The linearity of the
> Schrodinger equation implies that the individuals on all branches are the
> same: there is nothing to distinguish one of them as "you" and the others
> as mere shadows or zombies. In other words, they are all "you". So you are
> the person on the branch with all spins up and your probability of seeing
> this result is one, since this branch certainly exists, and, by linearity,
> "you" are the individual on that branch. This is inconsistent with the
> claim that the Born rule gives the probability that "you" will see some
> particular result. As we have seen, the probability that "you" will see all
> ups in one, whereas the Born probability for this result is 1/2^N. These
> probability estimates are incompatible.
>
>
> How is this different than throwing a die and seeing it came up 6.  Is
> that incompatible with that result having probability 1/6?  Why don't we
> have a multiple-worlds theory of classical probabilities?
>

Maybe because the single world explanation is simpler. We do not have a
theory that says that all possibilities actually occur on each throw of the
die.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 11:59 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023, 7:17 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 12:34, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 12:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Born rule allows you to calculate the probability of what
>>>>> outcome you will see in a Universe where all outcomes occur.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You are still conflating incompatible theories. The Born rule is a rule
>>>> for calculating probabilities from the wave function -- it says nothing
>>>> about worlds or existence. MWI is a theory about the existence of many
>>>> worlds. These theories are incompatible, and should not be conflated.
>>>>
>>>
>>> “The Born rule is a rule for calculating probabilities from the wave
>>> function -- it says nothing about worlds or existence”  -and- “MWI is a
>>> theory about the existence of many worlds” are not incompatible statements.
>>>
>>
>> Perhaps that is the wrong way to look at it. The linearity of the
>> Schrodinger equation implies that the individuals on all branches are the
>> same: there is nothing to distinguish one of them as "you" and the others
>> as mere shadows or zombies. In other words, they are all "you". So you are
>> the person on the branch with all spins up and your probability of seeing
>> this result is one, since this branch certainly exists, and, by linearity,
>> "you" are the individual on that branch. This is inconsistent with the
>> claim that the Born rule gives the probability that "you" will see some
>> particular result. As we have seen, the probability that "you" will see all
>> ups in one, whereas the Born probability for this result is 1/2^N. These
>> probability estimates are incompatible.
>>
>
>
> According to relativity you exist in all times across your lifespan (and
> all times are equally really). Yet you are only ever aware of being in one
> time and in one place. I think this tells us more about the limitations of
> our neurology than it reveals about the extent or nature of reality. If a
> copy of me is created on Mars, the me know Earth doesn't magically become
> aware of it.
>

And how do we select out the present moment from the block universe? It
seems that whatever line you take, there are an awful lot of supplementary
assumptions needed before MWI gets off the ground.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 12:34, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 12:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>>> The Born rule allows you to calculate the probability of what outcome
>>> you will see in a Universe where all outcomes occur.
>>>
>>
>> You are still conflating incompatible theories. The Born rule is a rule
>> for calculating probabilities from the wave function -- it says nothing
>> about worlds or existence. MWI is a theory about the existence of many
>> worlds. These theories are incompatible, and should not be conflated.
>>
>
> “The Born rule is a rule for calculating probabilities from the wave
> function -- it says nothing about worlds or existence”  -and- “MWI is a
> theory about the existence of many worlds” are not incompatible statements.
>

Perhaps that is the wrong way to look at it. The linearity of the
Schrodinger equation implies that the individuals on all branches are the
same: there is nothing to distinguish one of them as "you" and the others
as mere shadows or zombies. In other words, they are all "you". So you are
the person on the branch with all spins up and your probability of seeing
this result is one, since this branch certainly exists, and, by linearity,
"you" are the individual on that branch. This is inconsistent with the
claim that the Born rule gives the probability that "you" will see some
particular result. As we have seen, the probability that "you" will see all
ups in one, whereas the Born probability for this result is 1/2^N. These
probability estimates are incompatible.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 12:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 11:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:25 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 11:17, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:13 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:40 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 09:34, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there
>>>>>>>>>> is always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is
>>>>>>>>>> certain, it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of 
>>>>>>>>>> seeing N
>>>>>>>>>> ups is 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed
>>>>>>>>> one. However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is
>>>>>>>>> not. As I mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the 
>>>>>>>>> English
>>>>>>>>> language handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or
>>>>>>>> whether it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The
>>>>>>>> incompatibility arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups
>>>>>>>> necessarily exits in MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the 
>>>>>>>> Born
>>>>>>>> rule.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you lived in any sort of universe where you were duplicated,
>>>>>>> there would be some probability that you would see different outcomes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So what? The problem you have is that you have changed the rules of
>>>>>> the theory -- from a theory about what exists, to a theory about what you
>>>>>> will see. Since you will only ever see one outcome, one world, you have
>>>>>> reduced it from a theory of many worlds to a theory of a single world --
>>>>>> the world you will see!
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Obviously the Born rule under MWI is about the probability of what
>>>>> outcome you will see.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As I pointed out, if it is a theory about what you will see, then it is
>>>> a single world theory, since you will only ever see just one world. Hence
>>>> the incompatibility with Many worlds, which is a theory about what exists.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If I pull a coloured ball out of a basket, there is a probability of
>>> what ball I will see and a theory about what balls exist.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Not really comparable. The probability of what ball you get is distinct
>> from the fact that the ball exists. MWI is not a theory about what you will
>> see. Any theory about that is necessarily a single world theory since you
>> only see one ball. MWI is a theory about what exists, and its claim is that
>> many worlds all exist with probability one.
>>
>
> The Born rule allows you to calculate the probability of what outcome you
> will see in a Universe where all outcomes occur.
>

You are still conflating incompatible theories. The Born rule is a rule for
calculating probabilities from the wave function -- it says nothing about
worlds or existence. MWI is a theory about the existence of many worlds.
These theories are incompatible, and should not be conflated.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:25 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 11:17, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:13 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:40 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 09:34, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there
>>>>>>>> is always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is
>>>>>>>> certain, it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of 
>>>>>>>> seeing N
>>>>>>>> ups is 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed
>>>>>>> one. However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is not.
>>>>>>> As I mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English
>>>>>>> language handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or
>>>>>> whether it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The
>>>>>> incompatibility arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups
>>>>>> necessarily exits in MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the 
>>>>>> Born
>>>>>> rule.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you lived in any sort of universe where you were duplicated, there
>>>>> would be some probability that you would see different outcomes.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So what? The problem you have is that you have changed the rules of the
>>>> theory -- from a theory about what exists, to a theory about what you will
>>>> see. Since you will only ever see one outcome, one world, you have reduced
>>>> it from a theory of many worlds to a theory of a single world -- the world
>>>> you will see!
>>>>
>>>
>>> Obviously the Born rule under MWI is about the probability of what
>>> outcome you will see.
>>>
>>
>> As I pointed out, if it is a theory about what you will see, then it is a
>> single world theory, since you will only ever see just one world. Hence the
>> incompatibility with Many worlds, which is a theory about what exists.
>>
>
> If I pull a coloured ball out of a basket, there is a probability of what
> ball I will see and a theory about what balls exist.
>


Not really comparable. The probability of what ball you get is distinct
from the fact that the ball exists. MWI is not a theory about what you will
see. Any theory about that is necessarily a single world theory since you
only see one ball. MWI is a theory about what exists, and its claim is that
many worlds all exist with probability one.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:13 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:40 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 09:34, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there is
>>>>>> always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is certain,
>>>>>> it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of seeing N ups is
>>>>>> 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed
>>>>> one. However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is not. As
>>>>> I mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English
>>>>> language handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or whether
>>>> it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The
>>>> incompatibility arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups
>>>> necessarily exits in MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the Born
>>>> rule.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you lived in any sort of universe where you were duplicated, there
>>> would be some probability that you would see different outcomes.
>>>
>>
>> So what? The problem you have is that you have changed the rules of the
>> theory -- from a theory about what exists, to a theory about what you will
>> see. Since you will only ever see one outcome, one world, you have reduced
>> it from a theory of many worlds to a theory of a single world -- the world
>> you will see!
>>
>
> Obviously the Born rule under MWI is about the probability of what outcome
> you will see.
>

As I pointed out, if it is a theory about what you will see, then it is a
single world theory, since you will only ever see just one world. Hence the
incompatibility with Many worlds, which is a theory about what exists.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:40 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 09:34, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there is
>>>> always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is certain,
>>>> it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of seeing N ups is
>>>> 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed one.
>>> However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is not. As I
>>> mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English language
>>> handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>>>
>>
>> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or whether
>> it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The
>> incompatibility arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups
>> necessarily exits in MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the Born
>> rule.
>>
>
> If you lived in any sort of universe where you were duplicated, there
> would be some probability that you would see different outcomes.
>

So what? The problem you have is that you have changed the rules of the
theory -- from a theory about what exists, to a theory about what you will
see. Since you will only ever see one outcome, one world, you have reduced
it from a theory of many worlds to a theory of a single world -- the world
you will see!

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:25 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023, 5:12 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 11/28/2023 1:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023, 4:55 PM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/28/2023 1:33 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 4:22 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> That is incorrect.  Schrodinger's equation, the thing that generates
> the complex wave function, says nothing, absolutely nothing, about that
> wave function collapsing, So if you don't like philosophical paradoxes but
> still want to use Schrodinger's equation because it always gives correct
> results, you only have 2 options:
> 1) You can stick on bells and whistles to Schrodinger's equation to
> get rid of those other worlds that you find so annoying even though 
> there's
> no experimental evidence that they are needed.


 > *You can do exactly the same thing the MWI fans do and apply the
 Born rule to predict the probability of your world. *

>>>
>>> That is absolutely correct. If you're an engineer and are only
>>> interested in finding the correct answer to a given problem then Shut Up
>>> And Calculate works just fine.  MWI is only needed if you're curious
>>> and want to look under the hood to figure out what could possibly make the
>>> quantum realm behave so weirdly.
>>>
>>>
>>> Except that in spite of many attempts the application of the Born rule
>>> isn't found under the hood.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Is it found in Copenhagen?
>>
>> Yes, because Copenhagen explicitly included it and didn't pretend the the
>> Schroedinger equation was everything.
>>
>
>
> If both Interpretations must assume it, I don't see how that's a special
> weakness of MWI.
>

It is a particular weakness of MWI because the Born rule is incompatible
with MWI. It is not incompatible with the CI.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:41 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>  >> The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed one.
>>> However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is not. As I
>>> mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English language
>>> handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>>>
>>
>> *> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or
>> whether it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this.*
>>
>
> If those factors don't enter into your "question" then what you ask is
> not a question at all, it's just gibberish.
>

And that is the way in which you avoid difficult questions.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:35 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:28 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> Everettians have to derive the Born rule *
>
>
> Nobody needs to derive the Born rule because we know from experiment that
> it's true,  a quantum interpretation just needs to be compatible with it,
> and MWI certainly is.
>

Of course you need to derive the Born rule if you think that the SE gives
you everything you need. Besides, the incompatibility is obvious, as I have
pointed out.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there is
>> always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is certain,
>> it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of seeing N ups is
>> 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.*
>
>
>
>  The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed one.
> However the probability that you will see  N spin-ups is not. As I
> mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English language
> handles personal pronouns needs to be modified.
>

It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or whether it
is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The incompatibility
arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups necessarily exits in
MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the Born rule.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:21 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:08 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> the Born Rule is a necessary additional hypothesis in order to connect
>> the theory with experiment.*
>>
>
>  True, and for that reason theory does not have to derive the Born Rule,
> but theory does have to be compatible with it.
>

MWI claims that the SE is everything that is needed for quantum mechanics.
That is obviously false, because the Born rule is also needed to connect
the wave function with experiment. Therefore, Everettians have to derive
the Born rule from the SE, and this has proved to be difficult. Largely
because the Born rule is incompatible with MWI, as I have pointed out.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:10 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:00 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> John is doing a lot of flailing around in an attempt to avoid the
>> question of where the Born Rule comes from, and the fact that it is
>> actually incompatible with the many worlds approach.*
>>
>
> How so?
>

The incompatibility is obvious. Given a long series of N spin measurements,
MWI says that there is always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this
observation is certain, it has probability one. Whereas the Born
probability of seeing N ups is 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.

Bruce

>
>

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:07 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 4:55 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>  >> If you're an engineer and are only interested in finding the correct
>>> answer to a given problem then Shut Up And Calculate works just fine.
>>> MWI is only needed if you're curious and want to look under the hood to
>>> figure out what could possibly make the quantum realm behave so weirdly.
>>
>>
>>
>> *> Except that in spite of many attempts the application of the Born rule
>> isn't found under the hood.*
>>
>
>  Many Worlds, the Born Rule, and Self-Locating Uncertainty
> 
>

I don't think Carroll has solved the problem either. He only gets the
answer he wants by assuming the Born rule probabilities in advance.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 8:58 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023, 4:55 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 11/28/2023 1:33 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 4:22 PM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> That is incorrect.  Schrodinger's equation, the thing that generates
 the complex wave function, says nothing, absolutely nothing, about that
 wave function collapsing, So if you don't like philosophical paradoxes but
 still want to use Schrodinger's equation because it always gives correct
 results, you only have 2 options:
 1) You can stick on bells and whistles to Schrodinger's equation to
 get rid of those other worlds that you find so annoying even though there's
 no experimental evidence that they are needed.
>>>
>>>
>>> > *You can do exactly the same thing the MWI fans do and apply the Born
>>> rule to predict the probability of your world. *
>>>
>>
>> That is absolutely correct. If you're an engineer and are only
>> interested in finding the correct answer to a given problem then Shut Up
>> And Calculate works just fine.  MWI is only needed if you're curious and
>> want to look under the hood to figure out what could possibly make the
>> quantum realm behave so weirdly.
>>
>>
>> Except that in spite of many attempts the application of the Born rule
>> isn't found under the hood.
>>
>
>
> Is it found in Copenhagen?
>

Born was not based in Copenhagen. But for the so-called "Copenhagen"
interpretation, the Born Rule is a necessary additional hypothesis in order
to connect the theory with experiment. You have to explain the origin of
probabilities somehow, and the Born rule simply associates them with the
square of the amplitudes of the eigenfunctions in the wave function. This
still leaves the basis question unresolved, but decoherence has given some
clues about the answer to that question. MWI has no clue about how to
resolve the basis question.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 8:55 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 11/28/2023 1:33 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 4:22 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> That is incorrect.  Schrodinger's equation, the thing that generates the
>>> complex wave function, says nothing, absolutely nothing, about that wave
>>> function collapsing, So if you don't like philosophical paradoxes but still
>>> want to use Schrodinger's equation because it always gives correct results,
>>> you only have 2 options:
>>> 1) You can stick on bells and whistles to Schrodinger's equation to get
>>> rid of those other worlds that you find so annoying even though there's no
>>> experimental evidence that they are needed.
>>
>>
>> > *You can do exactly the same thing the MWI fans do and apply the Born
>> rule to predict the probability of your world. *
>>
>
> That is absolutely correct. If you're an engineer and are only interested
> in finding the correct answer to a given problem then Shut Up And Calculate
> works just fine.  MWI is only needed if you're curious and want to look
> under the hood to figure out what could possibly make the quantum realm
> behave so weirdly.
>
>
> Except that in spite of many attempts the application of the Born rule
> isn't found under the hood.
>

Yes.John is doing a lot of flailing around in an attempt to avoid the
question of where the Born Rule comes from, and the fact that it is
actually incompatible with the many worlds approach.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 12:05 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Nov 26, 2023 at 8:07 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> There are a googolplex number of Bruce Kelletts, all of which are in
>>> very slightly different quantum states but they all observe that, although
>>> Schrodinger's cat is in slightly different quantum states, the cat is alive
>>> in all of them. And there are 3 googolplexes of Bruce Kelletts, all of
>>> which are in very slightly different quantum states but they all observe
>>> that, although Schrodinger's cat is in slightly different quantum states,
>>> the cat is dead in all of them. Therefore if Bruce Kellett had no other
>>> information than before he opened the box he would bet that there is
>>> only one chance in four he would see an alive cat when the box was opened.
>>>
>>
>> *>Nonsense. Where did the 3:1 ratio come from?*
>>
>
> From the square root of the absolute value of a complex wave function
> produced by Schrodinger's equation. You don't need Many Worlds or any other
> quantum interpretation to find the correct probability, Shut Up And
> Calculate will give you that,  you only need Many Worlds if you wanna
> figure out what must be going on under the hood that enables an absurd
> theory like quantum mechanics to make predictions that actually turn out to
> be correct.
>
> *> I know the decay rate of the radioactive source. I can arrange to open
>> the box when there is only a 10% chance that the atom has decayed.*
>>
>
> Obviously.  Change the radioactive source to an element with a different
> half life and you'll change the probability, and you will also change the
> probability if you change the amount of time the cat is in the box.
>
> * > In that case I clearly have a 90% chance of seeing a live cat when I
>> open the box. Similarly, I can arrange for any probability between zero and
>> one of seeing a live cat. Whereas, if there is always a live cat branch and
>> a dead cat branch, my probability of seeing a live cat is always 50%,
>> contrary to the laws of radioactive decay.*
>>
>
> That would be true only if the cat had one and only one property, the
> alive/dead property. But, except for Black Holes, all macroscopic objects
> have an astronomical number of properties and most of them are not binary,
> however in the cat thought experiment you're only interested in one of them
> and it is binary, the alive/dead property. You're not interested in the
> precise position or momentum of a particular electron in the cat's left
> toenail. So there are an astronomical number of cats, and there are an
> astronomical number of Bruce Kelletts, and all of them are in very slightly
> different quantum states, but the astronomical number of Bruce Kelletts who
> observe a living cat when the box is opened is 9 times larger than the
> astronomical number Bruce Kelletts who observe a dead cat.  So before the
> box was opened all the Bruce Kelletts would expect to see a living cat, but
> 10% of them would be surprised.
>

None of that is in the Schrodinger equation. The infinities are all of your
own making,

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 9:55 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Nov 26, 2023 at 5:35 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >>>
>>>> *and how do they instantiate the probabilities that we measure.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> >> There is one observer for every quantum state Schrodinger's cat is
>>> in.
>>>
>>
>> *>That is exactly the problem. That would suggest that the two outcomes
>> (dead or alive) are equally likely. But it can easily be arranged that one
>> outcome is more probable than the other. MWI cannot account for unequal
>> probabilities.*
>>
>
> There are a googolplex number of Bruce Kelletts, all of which are in very
> slightly different quantum states but they all observe that, although
> Schrodinger's cat is in slightly different quantum states, the cat is alive
> in all of them. And there are 3 googolplexes of Bruce Kelletts, all of
> which are in very slightly different quantum states but they all observe
> that, although Schrodinger's cat is in slightly different quantum states,
> the cat is dead in all of them. Therefore if Bruce Kellett had no other
> information than before he opened the box he would bet that there is only
> one chance in four he would see an alive cat when the box was opened.
>

Nonsense. Where did the 3:1 ratio come from? I know the decay rate of the
radioactive source. I can arrange to open the box when there is only a 10%
chance that the atom has decayed. In that case I clearly have a 90% chance
of seeing a live cat when I open the box. Similarly, I can arrange for any
probability between zero and one of seeing a live cat. Whereas, if there is
always a live cat branch and a dead cat branch, my probability of seeing a
live cat is always 50%, contrary to the laws of radioactive decay.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 7:19 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Nov 26, 2023 at 2:52 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> >> Copenhagen does not explain why some are more real than others, Many
>>> Worlds says the obvious answer to this dilemma is that they are all equally
>>> real, so there is nothing that needs explaining.
>>
>>
>> * >Except how many of them are they,*
>>
>
> Either an astronomical number to an astronomical power of universes or an
> infinite number of universes depending on if space-time is continuous or
> discrete which today nobody knows.
>
> *> when exactly is the split,*
>>
>
> The split starts when a change is made and spreads outward at either the
> speed of light or is instantaneous, it makes no difference which, the
> results are the same either way so you can think about it in the way you
> prefer.
>
>
>> >
>> *and how do they instantiate the probabilities that we measure.*
>>
>
> There is one observer for every quantum state Schrodinger's cat is in.
>

That is exactly the problem. That would suggest that the two outcomes (dead
or alive) are equally likely. But it can easily be arranged that one
outcome is more probable than the other. MWI cannot account for unequal
probabilities.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2023 at 1:48 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 24, 2023 at 5:36 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> * > Let's review the bidding John.  I said the classical world was
>> necessary to science*
>>
>
> And if that's all you had said we wouldn't be having an argument, but you
> insisted that classical concepts were also sufficient to do science. You
> even claimed that an "explanation is in print" that explains why the
> Quantum Eraser Experiment does what it does and doesn't do what it doesn't
> do that, as my challenge specified, uses only classical concepts. But you
> don't say where I can find this revolutionary article that would certainly
> change physics forever if it actually existed.
>
> *> You attempted to counter this by challenging me to explain the quantum
>> eraser experiment  without quantum mechanics*
>>
>
> You seem to have difficulty remembering things I have said and yet you
> find it very easy to remember things that I did *NOT* say, therefore I
> will provide an exact quote of the challenge I gave to you:
>
>  "Using only *classical concepts* explain to me how and why the Quantum
> Eraser Experiment works."
>
> And I am still waiting for that explanation from you. In fact for about a
> century the entire world has been trying to find an explanation for quantum
> weirdness using only intuitive classical physics, and they have failed
> spectacularly.
>
>
>
>> > ...a complete non-sequitur.
>>
>
> What is a  complete non-sequitur?
>
>
>
>> * > I replied that our quantum mechanical explanations are written out in
>> classically behaving ink.  I never said explanations must be in classical
>> terms,*
>>
>
> Again I will use exact quotes as I wish you had.  My challenge to you was:
>
> "Using only classical concepts explain to me how and why the Quantum
> Eraser Experiment works."
>
> And the best response to my challenge that you could come up with was:
>
> "*The explanation is in print which is classica*l"
>
> Then in your most recent post you **claimed** you had said:
>
> "*the explanation IF in print and print is classical.*"
>
> You added an "*if*" that your original quote did not have, and that "*if*"
> is of gargantuan size!* If *in the mathematical literature a correct
> proof that only a finite number of prime numbers exists, or that 2+2 = 5,
> *then* that proof is printed using ink that can be thought of as behaving
> classically because the quantum mechanical nature of the ink does not
> interfere with the information it conveys. The preceding sentence is
> perfectly true, it is also perfectly silly.
>
> *>  I said they must be classically embodied.*
>
>
> I specifically asked for "classical *concepts*" that explain experimental
> results, but even if I had not specifically included the word "*concepts*
> " I would have found it very difficult to believe you really thought I
> was interested in ink and not in ideas. I think you were pretending to
> misunderstand what I was asking you to do because you couldn't find any
> other way to meet my challenge. But I could be wrong, if so do you also
> believe that professors of English literature are only interested in the
> sequence of ASCII characters that Shakespeare outputted when writing his
> plays and not the ideas the words made up of those ASCII characters represent?
>
>


Perhaps this account of quantum eraser experiments by Sean Carroll is an
appropriate classical description of a quantum process?

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2019/09/21/the-notorious-delayed-choice-quantum-eraser/

Or you can look at the account of the classical quantum eraser/delayed
choice experiment here:

arXiv:1206.6578.pdf

The descriptions of these experiments are given in purely classical terms.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 7:32 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 20, 2023 at 1:22 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>
> *> Depends what you mean by "couldn't be true"--my understanding is that
>> Einstein's EPR paper was just asserting that there must be additional
>> elements of reality beyond the quantum description*
>>
>
> Yes, Einstein thought he had proven that quantum mechanics* must *be
> incomplete because nature just couldn't be that ridiculous. But it turned
> out nature *could* be that ridiculous. The moral of the story is that
> being ridiculous is not necessarily the same thing as being wrong.
>

Nevertheless, being ridiculous is no indication that an idea is correct.
Evidence matters, and there is no evidence that the multiverse of Everett
has anything to do with cosmology. In fact, there is no direct evidence
that the quantum multiverse even exists.

Bruce

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Re: The multiverse is unscientific nonsense??

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Nov 20, 2023 at 3:26 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> There seems to be a conflation between the multiple worlds of Everett and
> the eternal inflation of a multiverse.
>

It has been suggested that the cosmic multiverse and the quantum multiverse
of Everett are the same thing. But I think that this idea is patently
ridiculous.

Bruce

Brent

On 11/19/2023 4:49 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


The real problem is that anything involving the multiverse, say some
quantum field signature from the earliest quantum cosmology, is stretched
by inflation into a red-shifted spectrum beyond measurability. The
multiverse is consistent with inflationary cosmology, which is supported by
data, but information about the multiverse may never be detected.

LC

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 6, 2023 at 9:12 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 6, 2023 at 12:38 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> The violation of Bell's Inequality proves that things are not realistic
>>> or not local or both,
>>>
>>
>> *> I have said that and you denied it.*
>>
>
> Show me where I denied that!!  I had been saying that things are not
> realistic or not local or both for well over a decade, but thanks to
> Leggett I now know that the answer is BOTH.
>
>
>> *> QM is non-realistic anyway.*
>>
>
> The experimental violation of Bell's Inequality proves that any theory
> that hopes to explain how the world works (QM for example) must be not
> realistic or not local or both, but the experimental violation of Leggett's
> inequality proves that any theory that hopes to explain how the world works
> must be *BOTH* nonlocal *AND* non-realistic, period. QM and MWI pass both
> the Bell and the Leggett test, that doesn't prove that either is correct
> but it does prove that whatever theory turns out to be true cannot be local
> and cannot be realistic. And neither test is able to prove that QM or the
> MWI is wrong.
>
>
>> >> "*Bell's inequality is established based on local realism."*
>>>
>>
>> *> False.*
>>
>
>  I didn't say that, the science journal Nature said that. So now according
> to you not only is Wikipedia wrong but so is the science journal Nature,
> the oldest and most prestigious science journal in the world. Do you
> really think that people should believe you and not them?  Bruce, nobody
> wins every argument, with this constant denial in the face of mounting
> evidence you're starting to make a fool of yourself.
>

You made a fool of yourself a long time ago. You didn't read Bell's papers
with sufficient attention, if at all.

Bruce



> Testing Leggett's Inequality Using Aharonov-Casher Effect
> <https://www.nature.com/articles/srep02492>
>
>
>> *> MWI is both non-realistic and non-local.*
>>
>
> I agree, so what are we arguing about? Yes MWI is both non-realistic and
> non-local, if it was not it would not have passed BOTH the Bell and the 
> Leggett
> inequality and it would no longer be in agreement with all known
> experiments and it would no longer be a viable interpretation of Quantum M
> echanics.
>

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 6, 2023 at 12:59 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 10:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> The Bell inequality can be derived without assuming realism*
>>>
>>>
>>> >> Everybody is wrong from time to time, but some people just can't
>>> admit it.
>>>
>>
>> *>I am sorry that you think John Bell was wrong..*
>>
>
> The violation of Bell's Inequality proves that things are not realistic
> or not local or both,
>

I have said that and you denied it. QM is non-realistic anyway. The quantum
violation of the Bell inequalities show that it is also non-local. So it is
neither realistic nor local. No problems there. The violations of realism
have nothing to do with Bell, since his derivation does not assume realism,
despite your claims to the contrary.

but there is another inequality called  Leggett's inequality involving
> linear and elliptical polarized light that can narrow down that
> uncertainty. Leggett found his inequality in 2003 and it was
> experimentally proven to be violated in 2010. Nature is probably the best
> scientific journal in the world but I'm sure you'll say it's wrong just as
> you claim that Wikipedia was wrong because it says that you are incorrect
> and that the world is BOTH nonlocal AND non-realistic.
>
> "*Bell's inequality is established based on local realism.*
>

False.

*The violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics implies either
> locality or realism or both are untenable. Leggett's inequality is derived
> based on nonlocal realism.*
>

Whatever that might be. But it seems to be based on a form of realism,
certainly.

* The violation of Leggett's inequality implies that quantum mechanics is
> neither local realistic nor nonlocal realistic.*"
>
>
> Testing Leggett's Inequality Using Aharonov-Casher Effect
> <https://www.nature.com/articles/srep02492>
>
>  By now I think you know you were wrong, but of course you will never
> admit it.
>

If you want to prove me wrong, give a local account of the violation of the
Bell inequalities in non-realistic many worlds. MWI is both non-realistic
and non-local.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 6, 2023 at 12:14 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 7:40 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> The Bell inequality can be derived without assuming realism*
>
>
> Everybody is wrong from time to time, but some people just can't admit it.
>
>

I am sorry that you think John Bell was wrong..

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 6, 2023 at 9:31 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 7:06 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> Huh? How can you "*have **read quite extensively on Bell's theorem and
>>> locality*" and not know that Bell's theorem is a test to see if any
>>> theory that assumes* local realism* can account for experimental
>>> observations? Hell if you did nothing but skim the Wikipedia article on 
>>> Bell's
>>> theorem you should know that because the very first sentence is:
>>> *"Bell's theorem is a term encompassing a number of closely related
>>> results in physics, all of which determine that quantum mechanics is
>>> incompatible with local hidden-variable theories"*
>>> And just a few sentences later Wikipedia says:
>>> *"Its derivation here depends upon two assumptions: first, that the
>>> underlying physical properties and exist independently of being observed or
>>> measured (sometimes called the assumption of realism); and second, that
>>> Alice's choice of action cannot influence Bob's result or vice versa (often
>>> called the assumption of locality)"*
>>>
>>
>> > *Unfortunately, Wikipedia is not an authoritative source.* [...]   *as
>> I have said several times, "realism" has nothing to do with it.*
>>
>
> So let's see, Wikipedia is wrong, John Stewart Bell is wrong, and
> high school algebra is wrong, but Bruce Kellett is absolutely positively
> 100% correct. Have I got that about right?
>

Get a grip, John. That is not what I said. The Bell inequality can be
derived without assuming realism, so realism is irrelevant to the issue.


*> In fact, the assumption of realism is pretty meaningless because QM
>> itself does not have this property -- it is intrinsically probabilistic and
>> non-realist.*
>
>
> What are you talking about? The non-existence of a property does not
> render it meaningless, dragons don't exist but I know what the word means,
> it's not gibberish. And like Quantum Mechanics Many Worlds is also
> non-realistic, good thing too because otherwise it wouldn't match
> experimental results.
>

You really have lost the plot, haven't you!

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 8:34 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 4, 2023 at 8:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 12:02 AM smitra  wrote:
>>
>
>
> >> Bell's theorem is about local hidden variables theories
>>
>>
>> > *It is difficult to know how to respond to this absurd idea. I have
>> read quite extensively on Bell's theorem and locality in quantum mechanics
>> and I have never met this contention before.*
>>
>
> Huh? How can you "*have **read quite extensively on Bell's theorem and
> locality*" and not know that Bell's theorem is a test to see if any
> theory that assumes* local realism* can account for experimental
> observations? Hell if you did nothing but skim the Wikipedia article on Bell's
> theorem you should know that because the very first sentence is:
>
> *"Bell's theorem is a term encompassing a number of closely related
> results in physics, all of which determine that quantum mechanics is
> incompatible with local hidden-variable theories"*
>
> And just a few sentences later Wikipedia says:
>
> *"Its derivation here depends upon two assumptions: first, that the
> underlying physical properties and exist independently of being observed or
> measured (sometimes called the assumption of realism); and second, that
> Alice's choice of action cannot influence Bob's result or vice versa (often
> called the assumption of locality)"*
>

Unfortunately, Wikipedia is not an authoritative source. The derivation of
the Bell inequality that you refer to in Wikipedia is not the derivation
given by Bell in his original papers. Bell's own derivation appears later
in the article, and you can see that Bell does not make the realism
assumption. Since the inequality can be derived without this assumption,
violating relaasm makes no difference to the overall result. The
correlations in any local theory must satisfy the inequality. Bell shows
that the quantum mechanical correlations violate the inequality, so quantum
mechanics cannot be a local theory, and any hidden variable completion of
QM must also be non-local. Other people have claimed that Bell made a whole
range of other assumptions that their pet theories violate, thus rendering
Be;ll's theorem toothless. But one is hard-pressed to see where any of
these supposed additional assumptions come in. In fact, the range of things
sometimes said to be assumed are often contradictory.

The important point is that Bell used a particular implementation of the
idea of locality for his theorem, and few other assumptions (the main one
being the absence of superdeterminism), leaving the consequence of
violations of the inequality pretty clear -- any such theory must be
non-local. Quantum mechanics violates the inequality, therefore quantum
mechanics is intrinsically non-local. Experiment confirms the quantum
mechanical predictions. But since the inequality itself does not depend on
any assumption of realism, the observed violations cannot be explained by
claiming that the theory is local but non-realistic -- as I have said
several times, "realism" has nothing to do with it. The Wikipedia article
is quite misleading in this respect because it does not make clear that the
result can also be derived without assuming realism (measurement results
exist in the state *before* the measurement is performed.) In fact, the
assumption of realism is pretty meaningless because QM itself does not have
this property -- it is intrinsically probabilistic and non-realist.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Sep 5, 2023 at 12:02 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 04-09-2023 01:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, Sep 3, 2023 at 11:37 AM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> The time evolution according to
> >> the Schrödinger equation is manifestly local,
> >
> > But unitary evolution according to the SE cannot account for the
> > correlation of entangled particles.
> >
>
> It can, just calculate it and don't collapse the wavefunction.


OK. So show me this calculation that gives a local explanation of the
correlations.


>> Another important thing to note here is that Bell's theorem only
> >> applies to hidden variable theories, it does not apply to QM in general.
> >
> > Where on earth did you get that idea from? As John has pointed out,
> > Bell's theorem does not require even quantum mechanics. It is just a
> > piece of mathematics.It applies with complete generality to quantum
> > mechanics, with or without hidden variables.
> >
>
> Bell's theorem is about local hidden variables theories


It is difficult to know how to respond to this absurd idea. I have read
quite extensively on Bell's theorem and locality in quantum mechanics and I
have never met this contention before. Maybe 'scerir' has some reference to
it, but I have never seen such a suggestion. The point, it seems to me, is
that Bell's theorem concludes that any hidden variable completion of
quantum mechanics must be non-local. Since standard QM has no explanation
for the correlations, it might be supposed that some hidden variable
completion of the theory would work. However, Bell shows that even such a
hidden variable completion of the theory must be non-local. But this is the
case for any formulation of quantum mechanics -- one does not have to
assume the existence of hidden variables in order to derive the Bell
inequalities. The standard formulation of quantum mechanics explains the
correlations non-locally.

There is a simple argument for non-locality:
A) All local systems are separable (factorizable).
Hence all non-separable (non-factorizable) systems are non-local.
The entangled singlet state is non-separable. Therefore it is non-local.


What conclusions can we draw? If we assume that QM is not fundamental
> and that there exists a hidden variables theory that reproduces QM
> either exactly or to a good approximation, then we can conclude that
> such a hidden variables theory cannot be local.
>
> Or we can conclude that QM is fundamental and that there is no deeper
> hidden variables theory underlying QM. In this case the violation of
> Bell's inequality does not imply non-locality. However, collapse is then
> still a non-local mechanism.
>

If QM is fundamental and complete, then it must contain a local explanation
of the Bell correlations. No-one has ever been able to produce such an
explanation. Reality is, therefore, fundamentally non-local.


> Again, As I pointed out to John, even if you assume that Bell's
> > theorem does not apply to MWI (and of course it does), then it does
> > not follow that the theory is local. It could be non-local for reasons
> > unconnected with Bell's theorem.
>
>
> Yes, but the only source of non-locality is collapse. Once you get rid
> of collapse, the theory becomes local, because the Standard Model is a
> local theory.
>

And the standard Model (with or without collapse) cannot explain the
Bell-type correlations.



You seem to pretend that it's a theorem of QM, in which case one would
> start from the postulates of QM and derive bounds on correlations for
> any system described by a local Hamiltonian. That's obviously not true.
>

Strange, then, that John Bell managed to do that.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Sep 4, 2023 at 7:15 PM 'scerir' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> *local, non-local, separable, non-separable, causes, correlations,
> influences, physical speed limit, speed of quantum influences, space-time,
> out of space-time, many worlds, many physical worlds, what a mess* Testing
> spooky action at a distance
> D. Salart
> , A.
> Baas 
> , C. Branciard
> 
> , N. Gisin
> , H.
> Zbinden
> 
>
> In science, one observes correlations and invents theoretical models that
> describe them. In all sciences, besides quantum physics, all correlations
> are described by either of two mechanisms. Either a first event influences
> a second one by sending some information encoded in bosons or molecules or
> other physical carriers, depending on the particular science. Or the
> correlated events have some common causes in their common past.
> Interestingly, quantum physics predicts an entirely different kind of cause
> for some correlations, named entanglement. This new kind of cause reveals
> itself, e.g., in correlations that violate Bell inequalities (hence cannot
> be described by common causes) between space-like separated events (hence
> cannot be described by classical communication). Einstein branded it as
> spooky action at a distance. A real spooky action at a distance would
> require a faster than light influence defined in some hypothetical
> universally privileged reference frame. Here we put stringent experimental
> bounds on the speed of all such hypothetical influences. We performed a
> Bell test during more than 24 hours between two villages separated by 18 km
> and approximately east-west oriented, with the source located precisely in
> the middle. We continuously observed 2-photon interferences well above the
> Bell inequality threshold. Taking advantage of the Earth's rotation, the
> configuration of our experiment allowed us to determine, for any
> hypothetically privileged frame, a lower bound for the speed of this spooky
> influence. For instance, if such a privileged reference frame exists and is
> such that the Earth's speed in this frame is less than 10^-3 that of the
> speed of light, then the speed of this spooky influence would have to
> exceed that of light by at least 4 orders of magnitude.
>
> Comments: Preliminary version of Nature 454, 861-864 (14 August 2008). 5
> pages and 5 figures
> Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
> Cite as: arXiv:0808.3316  [quant-ph]
>   (or arXiv:0808.3316v1  [quant-ph] for
> this version)
>   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.0808.3316
> Journal reference: Nature 454, 861-864 (14 August 2008)
> Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature07121
>

Interesting. But I don't think non-locality is to be understood in these
terms: It probably involves rethinking our notions of time and space.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Sep 4, 2023 at 5:41 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 3, 2023 at 7:54 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> Special relativity merely forbids the transmission of anything
>> 'physical' faster than light (FTL). It is easily possible to transfer
>> information FTL.*
>>
>
> *BULLSHIT!*
>
> * > Consider the following. shine a laser at the moon, then scan across
>> the surface of the moon. The spot of light on the moon's surface clearly
>> can move at any speed, particularly FTL. Now, if you use the laser to
>> transmit a message to the first point, then scan away and re-transmit to
>> the second location, you can certainly transmit information FTL.*
>>
>
> *Don't be ridiculous! Light takes about 1 1/4 seconds to reach the Moon,
> if I  aim a laser at point X on the Moon and then move it to point Y also
> on the Moon it will take the usual 1 1/4 seconds after I moved my laser
> before anybody at point X observes that the light coming from Earth has
> gone off, and it will take the usual 1 1/4 seconds before anybody at point
> Y sees a light from Earth go on, and 2 1/2 seconds before anybody on planet
> Earth sees the spot of light at point X start to move. Nobody on the Earth
> or on the Moon has received or transmitted any information faster than
> light. If it was possible to transmit information FTL according to
> relativity you could send a message into the past, you could talk to  the
> Bruce Kellett of yesterday and that would create paradoxes.*
>

No. The example was not particularly well thought out. My point is that
geometrical motions can exceed light velocity, and distant galaxies recede
at greater than light speed. Light speed limits only physical transmission,
unless by tachyons. In fine, understanding non-locality probably involves
refining our understanding of space and time.

*> "Non-local" does no mean that anything physical is transmitted FTL.*
>>
>
>
> *Being "local" means that there is a finite limit to the speed of
> PHYSICAL causality, and in this universe that speed seems to be the speed
> of light. *
>

Things do need to be rethought in the light of violations of the Bell
inequalities and the unambiguous non-locality that this implies.


> *>> What in the multiverse are you talking about?!  If Many Worlds is
>>> correct then if "you" (personal pronouns can become problematic when
>>> talking about the multiverse) perform the polarizer experiment on 1 million
>>> entangled photons then in the multiverse there are 1 million new Bruce
>>> Kelletts that are absolutely identical in every way EXCEPT for the fact
>>> that they each have 1 million different memories of how those 1 million
>>> entangle protons behaved when they hit their polarizers.*
>>>
>>
But for any one observer, even in many worlds, there is only ever one
outcome for each experiment. And the existence of other words does not
affect the result that that individual observer obtains. Hence Bell's
theorem applies separately for every individual, even in many worlds.


*> There may well be copies of the experimenter in MWI, but for any
>> particular individual among these copies, the outcome of their experiments
>> are unique.*
>>
>
> *Yes.*
>
>
>> *> Bell's theorem applies equally to all the copies individually.*
>>
>
> *Yes, and in all of them all the Bruce Kelletts can experimentally confirm
> that Bell's Inequality can be violated which would be logically impossible
> if things were both realistic and local. *
>

That dichotomy does not apply.

*>> Entangled photons have opposite polarizations so if an entangled photon
>>> of undetermined polarization hits a polarizer oriented in the up" direction
>>> (what you call "up" could be any direction) and Many Worlds is correct then
>>> the universe splits many times but in NO universe is there a case where 2
>>> entangle photons both make it through polarizers oriented in the same
>>> direction.*
>>
>>
That is one of the things that have to be explained.


*> Mere assertion is not proof of anything.*
>>
>
> *DO YOUR HOMEWORK! It's been known for hundreds of years that light beams
> with opposite polarizations treat polarizers in opposite ways, and it's
> been known since 1905 that light beams are made up of photons. None of this
> is controversial, it's physics 101. *
>

So how do entangled photons end up with opposite polarizations in an
arbitrarily chosen direction?

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Sep 3, 2023 at 9:58 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 3, 2023 at 3:43 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> You appear to agree that Bell's theorem, given its assumptions, shows
>> that no local hidden variable account of these correlations is possible.*
>>
>
> *Of course I agree with Bell's theorem, if I disagreed I would in effect
> be saying that high school algebra was wrong.  *
>
> *> You then expect at least one of two things must be true:*
>> *1) The universe is not realistic.*
>> *2)The universe is non-local.*
>> *It is not clear how you get to this dichotomy,*
>>
>
> *I don't see anything unclear about it. If 2 entangled photons can
> exchange information faster than light*
>

Special relativity merely forbids the transmission of anything 'physical'
faster than light (FTL). It is easily possible to transfer information FTL.
Consider the following. shine a laser at the moon, then scan across the
surface of the moon. The spot of light on the moon's surface clearly can
move at any speed, particularly FTL. Now, if you use the laser to transmit
a message to the first point, then scan away and re-transmit to the second
location, you can certainly transmit information FTL.


*HOLD ON! Before you start talking about "another objection" explain the
> first one. Please explain how Hugh Everett's theory allows for the
> communication of information faster than the speed of light.*
>

"Non-local" does no mean that anything physical is transmitted FTL.


*> He claims that many worlds invalidates Bell's assumption that
>> experiments have just one outcome. But in that whole history of physics,
>> that has always been true.There has never been a case in which an
>> experimenter has seen more than one outcome in a single experiment. Bell's
>> theorem applies in many worlds exactly as it applies in single world
>> theories. The reason is that when Alice and Bob perform a series of
>> polarization measurements on entangled particles to ascertain the
>> correlation, all their measurements and calculations take place in a single
>> world. In no case do they see more than a single result for each
>> measurement,*
>>
>
> *What in the multiverse are you talking about?!  If Many Worlds is correct
> then if "you" (personal pronouns can become problematic when talking about
> the multiverse) perform the polarizer experiment on 1 million entangled
> photons then in the multiverse there are 1 million new Bruce Kelletts that
> are absolutely identical in every way EXCEPT for the fact that they each
> have 1 million different memories of how those 1 million entangle protons
> behaved when they hit their polarizers.*
>

There may well be copies of the experimenter in MWI, but for any particular
individual among these copies, the outcome of their experiments are unique.
Bell's theorem applies equally to all the copies individually.


*> f you disagree with this argument, then I invite you to provide a
> counterexample by providing a local account of the correlations.*
>

*OK. Entangled photons have opposite polarizations so if an entangled
photon of undetermined polarization hits a polarizer oriented in the up"
direction (what you call "up" could be any direction) and Many Worlds is
correct then the universe splits many times but in NO universe is there a
case where 2 entangle photons both make it through polarizers oriented in
the same direction.*

*Mere assertion is not proof of anything.*

*Bruce*

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Sep 3, 2023 at 11:37 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 31-08-2023 06:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > That is all very well, but it is not a local account of violations of
> > the Bell inequalities. You merely claim that the local theory is such
> > an account, but you do not spell it out.
>
> John has addressed this in a subsequent reply where he cites an old
> reply giving the detailed account involving polarizers.
>

I have responded to John in a separate post. He appears to have a very weak
grasp of logic, and his arguments are not valid.


Thing is that in conventional QM we only have the dynamics only involves
> the Schrödinger equation and collapse.


The Schrodinger equation is not necessary for quantum mechanics. The
Heiseberg matrix formulation does not involve the SE. Time evolution is
just a unitary transformation after all. The wave function is not
necessary. Dirac, in his book on quantum mechanics, mentions the wave
function only in an inconsequential footnote.

The time evolution according to
> the Schrödinger equation is manifestly local,


But unitary evolution according to the SE cannot account for the
correlation of entangled particles.

while the collapse is the
> only non-local part. So, any version of QM in which there is no collapse
> is guaranteed to be local.
>

> Another important thing to note here is that Bell's theorem only applies
> to hidden variable theories, it does not apply to QM in general.


Where on earth did you get that idea from? As John has pointed out, Bell's
theorem does not require even quantum mechanics. It is just a piece of
mathematics.It applies with complete generality to quantum mechanics, with
or without hidden variables.



> The MWI
> is not a hidden variables theory, so Bell's theorem has nothing
> whatsoever to say about this.
>

Again, As I pointed out to John, even if you assume that Bell's theorem
does not apply to MWI (and of course it does), then it does not follow that
the theory is local. It could be non-local for reasons unconnected with
Bell's theorem.


> We have had this discussion before, and you couldn't give the detailed
> > local account then either.
>
> You disputed the well established fact that all known interactions are
> locaThat is not a well establised fact. Given the violations of the Bell
> inequalitiers, the only well established fact is that standard QM is
> non-local.




> You would not take a formal answer like
>
>   psi(x, t) = Exp(-i H/hbar t) psi(x,0)
>
> where H is the a local Hamiltonian that describes the dynamics for an
> answer.


Of course that is not an answer. It is merely a re-stating of your
contention that QM is always local. Whether or not that Hamiltonian
formulation is able to account for the Bell-type correlations is precisely
the point at issue. Restating that the correlations do indeed have a local
explanation does not take us any further forward.

You wanted me two explicitly write out H for a Bell-type
> experiment for H a manifestly local Hamiltonian, and then to compute the
> time evolution. Me not doing that was your argument that something
> non-local was going on here.
>

No. My argument hinges on the applicability and universality of Bell's
theorem. Your failure to provide a counterexample was merely proof that you
don't know what you are talking about.

 Bell's theorem applies in Everettian
> > quantum mechanics in exactly the same way as it applies in one-world
> > accounts. Bell's theorem proves that the effect is non-local, so no
> > local account is possible in any interpretation of QM.
>
> Bell's theorem only applies to hidden variable theories,


Bullshit. We have disposed of that canard already.

MWI is not a
> hidden variables theory. Bell's theorem does not even prove that
> Bell-type correlations are non-local in one-world interpretations of QM.
> Until that time one postulates hidden variables, Bell's theorem has
> nothing whatsoever to say about this.
>

Even if Bell's theorem does not apply, there is no reason to suppose that
the theory is local, since no classical account of the correlations is
possible.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 1, 2023 at 10:26 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 6:29 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> OK. So spell out your non-realist, but local, many worlds account of
>> the violations of the Bell inequalities. It seems that you want it both
>> ways -- Bell's theorem says that MWI must be non-local, but you claim that
>> it is local? "Realism" has nothing to do with it.*
>
>
>
> "Realism" has* EVERYTHING* to do with it, and I spelled out exactly why
> in a post on May 4 2022 when somebody said they wanted to hear all the gory
> details and this is what I said:
>

I am not complaining that your explanations are too short, or too long. I
am complaining because they do not answer the question I posed: "Spell out
your non-realist, but local, many worlds account of the violations of the
Bell inequalities."

Let me summarize your argument. You appear to agree that Bell's theorem,
given its assumptions, shows that no local hidden variable account of these
correlations is possible. You then expect at least one of two things must
be true:

1) The universe is not realistic.
2)The universe is non-local.

It is not clear how you get to this dichotomy, but once you have it, you
claim that MWI is non-realistic,..., so it has no need to resort to any of
these non-local influences to explain experimental results. This conclusion
is flatly illogical. Accepting one arm of the dichotomy does not mean that
the other is false -- both could be false, or both could be true. In other
words, the theory could be both non-realistic AND non-local.

I said that realism has nothing to do with the argument over Bell
inequalities. It simply serves to point out that ordinary one-world QM is
also non-realistic in your sense. So it is not a special feature of many
worlds. Since everything in QM is non-realistic, "realism" has no
particular bearing on the violations of Bell inequalities. Your initial
dichotomy is, therefore, meaningless.

In his book "Something Deeply Hidden", Sean Carroll gives a better version
of a similar argument (p.102ff). The argument still fails, as we shall see,
but let's examine it further. Sean accepts that what Bell showed was that,
under certain superficially reasonable assumptions, the quantum mechanical
predictions are impossible to reproduce in any local theory. The
assumptions that Carroll points to are that the experimenters are free to
choose what measurement to make (no superdeterminism!) and, secondly, that
measurements have definite outcomes. He rejects this latter assumption as
being untrue in Everettian theories because all possible outcomes are
realized in the branches of the wave function, The universe as a whole
doesn't have any single outcome for a measurement: it has multiple ones. In
rejecting this supposed assumption of Bell's, Sean goes on to argue that
Bell's theorem is simply irrelevant for MWI -- it doesn't apply. Because He
has removed Bell's theorem from consideration, Sean then concludes that MWI
is local.

But, once again, this conclusion does not follow. MWI could be non-local
for reasons unconnected with Bell's theorem. Arguing that Bell's theorem
does not apply does not guarantee that your theory is local. Many people
have tried this argument, but it is patently invalid.

There is another objection to Sean's argument. He claims that many worlds
invalidates Bell's assumption that experiments have just one outcome. But
in that whole history of physics, that has always been true. There has
never been a case in which an experimenter has seen more than one outcome
in a single experiment. Bell's theorem applies in many worlds exactly as it
applies in single world theories. The reason is that when Alice and Bob
perfore a series of polarization measurements on entangled particles to
ascertain the correlation, all their measurements and calculations take
place in a single world. In no case do they see more than a single result
for each measurement, and in order to maintain agreement with universal
physical observations, the alternative outcomes postulated by MWI must
occur in separate, disjoint worlds. These 'other worlds' cannot impinge on
either Alice or Bob, or their calculations, So even if Bell's theorem does
assume a single outcome and a single world, that is all we ever have, even
in MWI. So Bell's theorem applies in full force in MWI as in the single
world case. Consequently, the correlations that Alice and Bob observe can
have no local (or local hidden variable) explanation.

If you disagree with this argument, then I invite you to provide a
counterexample by providing a local account of the correlations.

Bruce


" If you want all the details this is going to be a long post, you asked
> for it. First I'm gonna have to show that any theory (except for
> super

Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 10:07 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 7:24 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>> Well of course it isn't! Bell's Inequality has been experimentally
>>> shown to be violated, so if there are hidden variables they can't be local.
>>> *
>>>
>>
>> *> But the argument was that many worlds was an entirely local theory: in
>> other words, that it gives a local account of the violation of the Bell
>> inequalities.*
>>
>
> Well that isn't my argument!
>
>
>> *> it seems from what you say that you agree that Bell's theorem proves
>> that no local account of the experimental results for correlations of
>> entangled particles is possible. I agree.*
>>
>
>  Bell's theorem proves that no REALISTIC local account can explain the
> experimental fact that Bell's Inequality is violated.
>
>
>> * > But that is not what is claimed by Saibal and other advocates of MWI:*
>>
>
> The violation of Bell's Inequality proves that no theory that is both
> realistic and local can be right. I think Many Worlds is local because you
> cannot send information faster than light in that theory, apparently you
> disagree and for some reason think Many Worlds is non-local, but as far
> as this discussion is concerned it doesn't matter which of us is right
> because Many Worlds is *NOT* a realistic theory. "Realistic" means that
> unobserved things exist in one and only one definite state, and that is
> most certainly not what Many Worlds says.
>

OK. So spell out your non-realist, but local, many worlds account of the
violations of the Bell inequalities. It seems that you want it both ways --
Bell's theorem says that MWI must be non-local, but you claim that it is
local? "Realism" has nothing to do with it.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 9:12 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 12:09 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 12:27 PM smitra >> > wrote:*
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *There is no problem here because in practice MWI is nothing more than
>>> the usual QM formalism to compute the outcome of experiments where you then
>>> assume that the ensemble of all possible outcomes really exists. Locality
>>> then follows from the fact hat the dynamics of the theory is manifestly
>>> local. The Hamiltonian only includes local interactions and observers are
>>> part of this dynamics. Although observer are not explicitly treated as
>>> being part of the wavefunction that describes the entire system, the
>>> assumption is that in principle, this is the case. In practice, one can
>>> then proceed according to the usual QM formalism.*
>>>
>>
>> *> That is all very well, but it is not a local account of violations of
>> the Bell inequalities.*
>>
>
> *Well of course it isn't! Bell's Inequality has been experimentally shown
> to be violated, so if there are hidden variables they can't be local. *
>

But the argument was that many worlds was an entirely local theory: in
other words, that it gives a local account of the violation of the Bell
inequalities. It seems from what you say that you agree that Bell's theorem
proves that no local account of the experimental results for correlations
of entangled particles is possible. I agree. But that is not what is
claimed by Saibal and other advocates of MWI: they claim to have a local
account of these results.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 12:27 PM smitra  wrote:

> There is no problem here because in practice MWI is nothing more than
> the usual QM formalism to compute the outcome of experiments where you
> then assume that the ensemble of all possible outcomes really exists.
> Locality then follows from the fact hat the dynamics of the theory is
> manifestly local. The Hamiltonian only includes local interactions and
> observers are part of this dynamics. Although observer are not
> explicitly treated as being part of the wavefunction that describes the
> entire system, the assumption is that in principle, this is the case. In
> practice, one can then proceed according to the usual QM formalism.
>

That is all very well, but it is not a local account of violations of the
Bell inequalities. You merely claim that the local theory is such an
account, but you do not spell it out.

We have had this discussion before, and you couldn't give the detailed
local account then either. Bell'e theorem applies in Everettian quantum
mechanics in exactly the same way as it applies in one-world accounts.
Bell's theorem proves that the effect is non-local, so no local account is
possible in any interpretation of QM.

John points out the thought experiments by Deutsch makes it clear that
> the usual QM formalism will not work in certain cases, that will then
> falsify the ad hoc collapse postulate. If you then believe that MWI
> cannot account for violation of Bell's inequalities while ordinary QM
> can, then that begs the question of how removing the FAPP unobservable
> sectors where all other outcomes are realized, could matter at all.
>

The other sectors are not just FAPP unoservable, they are not observable in
principle. How could the presence of unobservable fairy tales affect
anything at all? The standard account of violations of the Bell
inequalities in quantum mechanics relies on the notion of non-locality. And
since the effect is non-local, no local account is possible.

Bruce

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Re: Is Many Worlds Falsifiable?

[Bruce Kellett]

The many worlds idea has already been falsified because it cannot account
for the observed violation of the Bell inequalities for entangled
particles. MWI is supposedly a local theory -- where is the local account
of the correlations  of entangled particles?

Bruce

On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 12:39 AM John Clark  wrote:

> The short answer is yes, Many Worlds is falsifiable. For example, right
> now there are experiments underway in an attempt to prove that the GRW
> theory of objective quantum wave collapse makes predictions that Many
> Worlds does not, if they are successful it will prove that Everett was dead
> wrong, it's as simple as that.  GRW claims that Schrodinger's equation is
> incomplete and that another very complex term needs to be added to it
> because it's the only way they could think of to get rid of all those
> worlds that for some reason they dislike, there was simply no other reason
> to add that extra term. With this new term Schrodinger's equation is no
> longer completely deterministic because a random element is added such that
> the larger the wave function is (the more particles it has) the more likely
> the quantum wave function will objectively collapse. They carefully tuned
> their very complex extra term inserted into Schrödinger's equation in just
> such a way that, because an individual electron is so small the probability
> of you being able to observe one objectively collapse is almost but not
> quite zero; but the probability of you NOT observing something as large as
> a baseball NOT collapsing is also almost, but not quite, zero. Despite
> heroic efforts. up to the present day nobody has found a speck of
> experimental evidence in support of the GRW theory of objective quantum
> wave collapse, and until and unless they do Many Worlds must be the
> preferred theory according to Occam's razor because it makes fewer
> assumptions, it has no need to complicate matters by adding that extra term
> to Schrodinger's equation.
>
> But GRW is not the only or even the most popular competitor to Many
> Worlds, that honor would have to go to the Copenhagen interpretation, and
> there is certainly no way to falsify that, but back in 1986 in his book
> "The Ghost in the Atom" David Deutsch proposed another way to falsify
> Everett's Many Worlds; the experiment would be difficult to perform but
> Deutsch argues that is not Many Worlds fault, the reason it's so difficult
> is that the conventional view says conscious observers obey different laws
> of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a
> mind that uses quantum properties.
>
> In Deutsch's experiment, to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
> other than this one, a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
> metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
> quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
> various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document for
> each and every electron saying it has observed the electron and knows which
> slit it went through. It is very important that the document does NOT say
> which slit the electron went through, it only says that it went through one
> and only one slit and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now just before
> the electron hits the plate the mind uses quantum erasure to completely
> destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through, but all other
> memories including all the documents remain undamaged. After the document
> is signed the electron continues on its way and hits the photographic
> plate. Then after thousands of electrons have been observed and all
> which-way information has been erased, develop the photographic plate and
> look at it. If you see interference bands then the Many World
> interpretation is correct. If you do not see interference bands then there
> are no worlds but this one and the conventional interpretation is correct.
>
> Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results
> of a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function
> collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace
> so you get no interference. In the Many Worlds model all the other worlds
> will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the
> photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different
> (even though they had different histories), but their influence will still
> be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron
> went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only,
> and that's what causes interference.
>
> I know that what I said in the above is a fair representation of what
> Deutsch was saying because some years ago I wrote to him about this and he
> said it was an accurate paraphrase.
>
> It must be admitted that like every theory Many Worlds makes predictions
> that cannot be tested, but a theory is n

Re: Physics? Ok Astronomers view 2 distant Water Worlds so following the physics I ask..

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Dec 29, 2022 at 4:34 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 12/28/2022 9:01 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 29, 2022 at 3:29 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> Of course one reason there are "laws of physics" is what my late friend
>> Vic Stenger called Point Of View Invariance.  This was his generalization
>> of Emmy Noether's theorem that showed every symmetry implied a conservation
>> law.
>>
>
> That is not strictly true. It is only continuous symmetries of the
> Lagrangian that imply conservation laws -- not all symmetries. For example,
> the symmetries of a square under rotation and reflection do not generate
> any conservation laws. Neither do discrete symmetries like parity and
> charge conjugation.
>
> So momentum is conserved because we want any law of physics to be
>> invariant under translation of a different location.  Energy is conserved
>> because we want the laws of physics to be the same at different times, etc.
>>
>
> It is not what we want, it is what we find. We find that nature is
> invariant under these continuous transformations, so we build those
> symmetries into our laws.
>
>
> Vic called in POVI because he wanted to extend it to transformations in
> abstract spaces, e.g. gauge invariance.  Of course the invariance depends
> on the "point of view" in a sense.  Things didn't look at all space
> translation invariant to Aristotle.  Galileo said ignore that your ship is
> moving along the shore, just look at the dynamics in the cabin.  So we
> discovered these symmetries by learning what ignore as well as what to
> measure.
>

The real point is that the laws are discovered, not imposed. The fact that
continuous symmetries correspond to conservation laws was discovered only
very much later. Most of the history of physics is about discovering what
works -- what the laws might be. POVI was thought of only very late in the
game, and is not a fundamental insight.

Bruce

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Re: Physics? Ok Astronomers view 2 distant Water Worlds so following the physics I ask..

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Dec 29, 2022 at 3:29 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Of course one reason there are "laws of physics" is what my late friend
> Vic Stenger called Point Of View Invariance.  This was his generalization
> of Emmy Noether's theorem that showed every symmetry implied a conservation
> law.
>

That is not strictly true. It is only continuous symmetries of the
Lagrangian that imply conservation laws -- not all symmetries. For example,
the symmetries of a square under rotation and reflection do not generate
any conservation laws. Neither do discrete symmetries like parity and
charge conjugation.

So momentum is conserved because we want any law of physics to be invariant
> under translation of a different location.  Energy is conserved because we
> want the laws of physics to be the same at different times, etc.
>

It is not what we want, it is what we find. We find that nature is
invariant under these continuous transformations, so we build those
symmetries into our laws.

Bruce

>

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 9:49 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> I think the important point is that probability theory is just
> mathematics, like calculus or linear algebra.  It has applications in which
> it is given different interpretations: frequentism, degree of belief,
> measure, decision theory, etc.  Often its application entails moving from
> one interpretation to another.
>
> Brent
>

I agree that probability is just a piece of mathematics, which is why I
pointed out to Saibal that Deutsch's argument that probability is not 'in'
the physical world (and therefore should be eliminated from physics)
applies equally well to mathematics. The idea that one can do physics
without mathematics is just absurd, which all goes to show that Deutsch's
argument is spurious.

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 3:57 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> What about the idea of grounding the notion of probability in terms of the
> frequency in the limit of a hypothetical infinite series of trials, what
> philosophers call "hypothetical frequentism"? The Stanford Encyclopedia of
> Philosophy discussion of this at
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#FreInt notes
> the objection that the limit depends on the order we count the trials, but
> it seems pretty natural to use temporal ordering in this case. Aside from
> the philosophical objection that we don't have any clear a priori
> justification for privileging temporal ordering in this way, are there any
> objections of a more technical nature to hypothetical frequentism with
> temporal ordering (scenarios where it would give you a different answer
> from standard probability theory), or are the objections purely
> philosophical?
>

The standard trouble with the hypothetical infinite series of trials is
that we have to define the probability in terms of subsequences, since we
can't actually realize an infinite series. In order for these subsequences
to give (approximately) the same probability as the hypothetical infinite
series, the subsequences have to be "typical", and "typical" can only be
defined probabilistically, so we are back with the problem of circularity.

Temporal ordering of the sequence is also somewhat arbitrary, since if we
order a series of coin tosses according to magnitude (heads = 0, tails =
1), then most subsequences will not be "typical" and will give spurious
results. Temporal ordering implies that we have actually completed an
infinite series of tosses, and that is never possible. We then have to
assume that the first N trials form a "typical" subset, and how do you ever
justify that?

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 1:05 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 22-11-2022 02:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 12:12 PM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> The problem lies with the notion of probability, he explains here
> >> that
> >> it cannot refer to anything in the physics world as an exact
> >> statement:
> >>
> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
> >>
> >> That's then a problem for a fundamental theory of physics as such a
> >> theory must refer to statements about nature that are exactly true.
> >
> > No statements in physics are exactly true.
> >
> > Bruce
> >
>
> The problem with probability is actually the other way around. It's
> impossible to rigorously define probability in purely physical terms.
> Therefore the exact formulation of the laws of physics cannot refer to
> probability.
>

They can if probability is taken to be a primitive, not definable in terms
of any physical thing or process. In other words, we use probability in
physics the same way as we use mathematics. Mathematics cannot be
rigorously defined in purely physical terms -- it is defined logically in
its own terms, but it finds application in physics.

Deutsch might just as well argue that we can do physics without
mathematics.

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 12:44 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 11/21/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:35 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> But frequencies are how we test probabilistic theories.
>>
>
> Testing is not a theoretical grounding of the theory.
>
>
> It's not the axiomatic ground of Kolmogorov's theory.  But so what?  We
> tested Euclid's theory of geometry by making measurements which weren't in
> his axioms.  That doesn't mean Euclid's wasn't a good theory of geometry.
> I can see Deutsch crossing off Pythagora's theorem saying, "No matter how
> precise our instruments they only yield rational quantities!"  Physics is
> not mathematics and it's never going to have data to infinitely many
> decimal places.  That frequencies only yield rational number approximations
> to Born rule predictions doesn't seem like a big deal to me.
>

What is a probability? We can't define it as a limiting frequency, since
repeats of a sequence of measurements of a spin are going to give a range
of answers for the frequency of spin-up, and this sequence converges to
some limit only in probability. That is then circular -- probability is
defined in terms of probability.

Perhaps 'probability' is a primitive concept -- not definable in terms of
anything physical. Nevertheless, like language, it is essential for our
understanding of our experience of the world.

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 12:12 PM smitra  wrote:

> The problem lies with the notion of probability, he explains here that
> it cannot refer to anything in the physics world as an exact statement:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
>
> That's then a problem for a fundamental theory of physics as such a
> theory must refer to statements about nature that are exactly true.
>

No statements in physics are exactly true.

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:35 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 11/21/2022 4:33 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:08 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> He's wrong that frequentism does not empirically support probability
>> statements.  He goes off on a tangent by referring to "other gamblers".
>> Nothing in physics is certain, yet Deutsch takes a bunch of definite
>> assertions and claims they alone are the real physics.
>>
>
> His critique of frequentism is just a recap of arguments that are well
> known -- you cannot ground probability theory in frequentism, or the idea
> that probabilities are nothing more than ratios of long-run frequencies.
> Long-run frequencies might approximate the probabilities, but they cannot
> be used to ground probability theory -- for well known reasons. I agree
> that he goes off on a number of irrelevant tangents, and he is wrong to
> suppose that frequentism is a main-stream theory of probability (at least,
> these days).
>
>
> But frequencies are how we test probabilistic theories.
>

Testing is not a theoretical grounding of the theory.

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:08 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> He's wrong that frequentism does not empirically support probability
> statements.  He goes off on a tangent by referring to "other gamblers".
> Nothing in physics is certain, yet Deutsch takes a bunch of definite
> assertions and claims they alone are the real physics.
>

His critique of frequentism is just a recap of arguments that are well
known -- you cannot ground probability theory in frequentism, or the idea
that probabilities are nothing more than ratios of long-run frequencies.
Long-run frequencies might approximate the probabilities, but they cannot
be used to ground probability theory -- for well known reasons. I agree
that he goes off on a number of irrelevant tangents, and he is wrong to
suppose that frequentism is a main-stream theory of probability (at least,
these days).

Bruce

On 11/20/2022 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 2:52 AM smitra  wrote:
>
>> Probability cannot be a fundamental concept in physics as explained
>> here:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc
>
>
> I'm afraid Deutsch is a bit too glib in this lecture. He hasn't, despite
> his best efforts, removed probability from physics. For example, in quantum
> mechanics, he has not explained why, if one measures the z-spin of a
> spin-half particle prepared in an eigenstate of x-spin, one gets only one
> result -- either z-spin-up or z-spin-down. If one has eliminated
> probability, one should be able to explain which result one gets, and why.
> It is no solution to say that with many-worlds, that both results are
> obtained by disjoint copies of the experimenter. The experimenter is just
> one copy, and one would have to explain the result for each individual
> separately. Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only
> z-spin-up and not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable
> concept of probability and the Born rule.
>
> Bruce
>
>

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 10:34 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Nov 20, 2022 at 7:29 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> The experimenter is just one copy*
>
>
> And that pinpoints the error in your logic right there.
>
> *> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and
>> not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable concept of
>> probability and the Born rule.*
>
>
> Gleason's theorem proved mathematically that if you want this thing called
> "probability" to have the property that it is always positive and never
> negative, and the property that if you add up all the "probabilities" they
> always add up to exactly 100% , then the Born Rule can be derived from
> quantum mechanics provided you make the assumption of non-reality
> (sometimes called Quantum contextuality), that is to say if you assume that
> an unmeasured quality does NOT have one and only one value. Many Worlds
> does make that assumption, or rather it makes the assumption that
> Schrodinger's equation means what it says, and once you do that you have no
> choice but to accept non-reality. You can still save reality but to do so
> you must make additional assumptions (such as the assumption that
> Schrodinger's equation does NOT mean what it says), that's why some call
> Many Worlds bare bones, no nonsense quantum mechanics, it has no silly
> bells and whistles cluttering things up. And that's the sort of thing
> William of Ockham would approve of.
>
> I admit that does not prove Many Worlds is correct but at least it passes
> its first test, and it proves that conventional everyday assumptions about
> the nature of reality must be dead wrong; you're never going to find a
> quantum interpretation that feels obvious and intuitively true and is also
> consistent with experimental observations. So if Many Worlds is incorrect
> then something even stranger must be true.
>
> *> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and
>> not z-spin-down.*
>
>
> And Bruce Kellett does not explain what exactly the personal pronoun "I"
> means in the context of Many Worlds. In Many Worlds for every state that
> the laws of physics allows a particle to be in there is a Bruce Kellett
> observing that state; so of course Mr. I will observe one and only one
> state.
>


And Many worlds assumes a probabilistic interpretation, contradicting the
argument that Deutsch is making. You can't get separate worlds in which
different copies of the observer see different outcomes without assuming
the Born rule. So that small amplitudes correspond to low probabilities.
Without this assumption, the superposition is never resolved into separate
components (worlds).

Bruce

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Re: Physics Without Probability

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 2:52 AM smitra  wrote:

> Probability cannot be a fundamental concept in physics as explained
> here:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc


I'm afraid Deutsch is a bit too glib in this lecture. He hasn't, despite
his best efforts, removed probability from physics. For example, in quantum
mechanics, he has not explained why, if one measures the z-spin of a
spin-half particle prepared in an eigenstate of x-spin, one gets only one
result -- either z-spin-up or z-spin-down. If one has eliminated
probability, one should be able to explain which result one gets, and why.
It is no solution to say that with many-worlds, that both results are
obtained by disjoint copies of the experimenter. The experimenter is just
one copy, and one would have to explain the result for each individual
separately. Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only
z-spin-up and not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable
concept of probability and the Born rule.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 3:21 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> I agree with that, since I think collapse or probability is necessary for
> the theory to work.  But I regard it all as one unified theory.  As Omnes
> writes, "QM is a probabilistic theory.  So it predicts probabilities."
>

The problem is that MWI is not a probabilistic theory, so it can't be all
of QM.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 1:42 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> On 10/28/2022 6:43 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> Look, "ad hoc" is frequently bandied about as a fatal flaw in any theory.
> Just as Putin waves about the nuclear threat: this is just to intimidate
> the opposition, it doesn't mean anything more. Any theory has ad hoc
> elements, or else it would not be of any value in explaining our
> experience. There is always a theoretical part, and then a collection of
> elements that serve to relate the theory to observation. Everything is
> ultimately ad hoc, because it is for the particular purpose of explaining
> observation.
>
>
> I think you've stretched it's meaning beyond recognition.  If every theory
> that is devised to match experiment is ad hoc then indeed all science is ad
> hoc...and the better for it.  But there is real ad hockery that is
> deserving of criticism.
>
> The real question on the table is what would you take to be not ad hoc;
> what would be better than "... measurement is then not treated in terms of
> the fundamental  dynamics of the theory."  Do you see MWI doing this?
>

No. MWI takes unitary dynamics of the Schrodinger equation to be
fundamental. But unitary dynamics and the SE are deterministic, and
incompatible with a probabilistic interpretation. So MWI is not going to be
able to give a completely satisfactory account of measurement since the
outcomes of measurement are inherently probabilistic. So whatever you do in
MWI, measurement is not treated in terms of the fundamental dynamics of the
theory; there is always some ad hoc element required to make contact with
experiment. In that context MWI, is simply engaging in a double standard
when it criticizes collapse theories as ad hoc.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:51 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 10/28/2022 5:43 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:37 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> On 10/28/2022 5:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:54 AM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 10/28/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:27 AM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 10/28/2022 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Simply saying that QM as traditionally formulated considers measurement
>>>>> as a special process that os irreversible, doesn't cut it, because
>>>>> measurement is then not treated in terms of the fundamental  dynamics
>>>>> of
>>>>> the theory, it is put in in an ad hoc way.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Lots of things are put into physics in an ad hoc way. The Born rule is
>>>> a prime example -- it is just
>>>> imposed on the quantum wave function in an ad hoc way -- it cannot be
>>>> derived from the fundamental theory.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But by Gleason's theorem it's the only consistent way to put a
>>>> probability measure on Hilbert space.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Who said we need a probability measure?
>>>
>>>
>>> Because we observe that the same initial condition results in different
>>> later conditions, but with predictable probability distributions.
>>>
>>
>> That is what is known as an ad hoc adjustment of the theory --  anything
>> that is required for the theory to agree with observation. Let's face it,
>> all of physics is ad hoc!
>>
>>> That is as ad hoc as anything else; besides, unitary QM does not allow
>>> for a probabilistic interpretation.
>>>
>>>
>>> Not if you insist that all evolution is unitary, but that's why Born
>>> added the projection postulate to connect the unitary evolution to
>>> observation.
>>>
>>
>> But Saibal and his ilk are insisting that all physics is unitary. That is
>> why the addition of probability (and the Born Rule) is just an ad hoc
>> adjustment so that their theory agrees with observation. Gleason's theorem
>> does not change this fact.
>>
>>
>> It's not "ad hoc" when it's part of a theory that applies to everything.
>>
>
> That is just an arbitrary stipulation.
>
>
> ad hoc
> ăd hŏk′, hōk′
> adverb
>
>1. For the specific purpose, case, or situation at hand and for no
>other.
>2. On the spur of the moment.
>3. For a particular purpose.
>
>
For the particular purpose of relating the theory to observation, it is
certainly ad hoc.

Look, "ad hoc" is frequently bandied about as a fatal flaw in any theory.
Just as Putin waves about the nuclear threat: this is just to intimidate
the opposition, it doesn't mean anything more. Any theory has ad hoc
elements, or else it would not be of any value in explaining our
experience. There is always a theoretical part, and then a collection of
elements that serve to relate the theory to observation. Everything is
ultimately ad hoc, because it is for the particular purpose of explaining
observation.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:37 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> On 10/28/2022 5:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:54 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 10/28/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:27 AM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 10/28/2022 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Simply saying that QM as traditionally formulated considers measurement
>>>> as a special process that os irreversible, doesn't cut it, because
>>>> measurement is then not treated in terms of the fundamental  dynamics
>>>> of
>>>> the theory, it is put in in an ad hoc way.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Lots of things are put into physics in an ad hoc way. The Born rule is a
>>> prime example -- it is just
>>> imposed on the quantum wave function in an ad hoc way -- it cannot be
>>> derived from the fundamental theory.
>>>
>>>
>>> But by Gleason's theorem it's the only consistent way to put a
>>> probability measure on Hilbert space.
>>>
>>
>> Who said we need a probability measure?
>>
>>
>> Because we observe that the same initial condition results in different
>> later conditions, but with predictable probability distributions.
>>
>
> That is what is known as an ad hoc adjustment of the theory --  anything
> that is required for the theory to agree with observation. Let's face it,
> all of physics is ad hoc!
>
>> That is as ad hoc as anything else; besides, unitary QM does not allow
>> for a probabilistic interpretation.
>>
>>
>> Not if you insist that all evolution is unitary, but that's why Born
>> added the projection postulate to connect the unitary evolution to
>> observation.
>>
>
> But Saibal and his ilk are insisting that all physics is unitary. That is
> why the addition of probability (and the Born Rule) is just an ad hoc
> adjustment so that their theory agrees with observation. Gleason's theorem
> does not change this fact.
>
>
> It's not "ad hoc" when it's part of a theory that applies to everything.
>

That is just an arbitrary stipulation.

> Without the projection postulate and the probability interpretation how
> would we compare QM to experimental data?
>

We couldn't, so we would have to conclude that the theory was useless. That
is why we add ad hoc postulates.to compare to experiment.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:54 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> On 10/28/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:27 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 10/28/2022 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>> Simply saying that QM as traditionally formulated considers measurement
>>> as a special process that os irreversible, doesn't cut it, because
>>> measurement is then not treated in terms of the fundamental  dynamics of
>>> the theory, it is put in in an ad hoc way.
>>>
>>
>> Lots of things are put into physics in an ad hoc way. The Born rule is a
>> prime example -- it is just
>> imposed on the quantum wave function in an ad hoc way -- it cannot be
>> derived from the fundamental theory.
>>
>>
>> But by Gleason's theorem it's the only consistent way to put a
>> probability measure on Hilbert space.
>>
>
> Who said we need a probability measure?
>
>
> Because we observe that the same initial condition results in different
> later conditions, but with predictable probability distributions.
>

That is what is known as an ad hoc adjustment of the theory --  anything
that is required for the theory to agree with observation. Let's face it,
all of physics is ad hoc!

> That is as ad hoc as anything else; besides, unitary QM does not allow for
> a probabilistic interpretation.
>
>
> Not if you insist that all evolution is unitary, but that's why Born added
> the projection postulate to connect the unitary evolution to observation.
>

But Saibal and his ilk are insisting that all physics is unitary. That is
why the addition of probability (and the Born Rule) is just an ad hoc
adjustment so that their theory agrees with observation. Gleason's theorem
does not change this fact.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 10:27 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> On 10/28/2022 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> Simply saying that QM as traditionally formulated considers measurement
>> as a special process that os irreversible, doesn't cut it, because
>> measurement is then not treated in terms of the fundamental  dynamics of
>> the theory, it is put in in an ad hoc way.
>>
>
> Lots of things are put into physics in an ad hoc way. The Born rule is a
> prime example -- it is just
> imposed on the quantum wave function in an ad hoc way -- it cannot be
> derived from the fundamental theory.
>
>
> But by Gleason's theorem it's the only consistent way to put a probability
> measure on Hilbert space.
>

Who said we need a probability measure? That is as ad hoc as anything else;
besides, unitary QM does not allow for a probabilistic interpretation.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 3:16 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 26-10-2022 01:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > The laws of physics tell us that measurements are irreversible.
> > Unitary evolution is universal only in your imagination. Many Worlds
> > is an interpretation, not an established fact.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> The laws of physics as we know them today, rule out the existence of any
> physical process that is fundamentally irreversible. So, measurements
> cannot be irreversible if the known laws of physics are correct.


But we know for a fact that the laws of physics as we know them today are
not correct.

> If you
> disagree then it's up to you to point to just a single example of such a
> process and write up an article that proves your point and get that
> published in a per reviewed journal.
>

Quantum field theory does not include gravitation. I don't have to write a
paper about
this because many people have already done so.

Simply saying that QM as traditionally formulated considers measurement
> as a special process that os irreversible, doesn't cut it, because
> measurement is then not treated in terms of the fundamental  dynamics of
> the theory, it is put in in an ad hoc way.
>

Lots of things are put into physics in an ad hoc way. The Born rule is a
prime example -- it is just
imposed on the quantum wave function in an ad hoc way -- it cannot be
derived from the fundamental theory.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 10:17 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 6:55 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> You can delay the choice as to whether or not to utilize the
>> information about which slit the particle went through until long after
>> that particle has hit the screen*
>>
>
> No you cannot, you must perform the quantum erasure after the particle
> passes through the slits but before it hits the screen, although that
> time can be as long as you want it to be, you just have to increase the
> distance between the slits in the screen.
>

Look. The experiments have been done, and the act of quantum erasure can be
delayed until long after the particles have hit the screen and formed the
image there.

> * > and formed its permanent image on the screen.*
>>
>
> Once a large-scale macro change  has been made, such as would happen when
> the particle hits the screen, it would be virtually impossible to get all
> the trillions of particles in the screen to become identical again and
> cause the two universes to merge back together again.
>

That is why your notion of erasure as making separate universes recombine
falls apart. The choice about what measurement to make can be delayed until
long after the pattern is formed on the screen. This is the point of
Wheeler's delayed choice idea. If you cannot conceive of how this could
possibly be right, then I suggest you overcome your prejudices and look at
the account by Sabine Hossenfelder. Or even go so far as to look at the
Wikipedia page on quantum erasure. These sources spell out in detail how
you can form both interference and non-interference patterns that are
resolved only long after the patterns are formed.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 9:02 AM John Clark  wrote:

> Then after the electron passes through the slits but before it hits the
> photographic plate the witch-way information is erased. So when the
> photographic plate is developed and if you see interference bands then you
> know there must be other worlds than this one, and if you don't see
> interference bands then the Many Worlds idea is bullshit.
>
> Decoherence usually spreads with enormous speed but if things are
> arranged very carefully, if only one electron in the universe got
> decohered, then it's possible the electron could become re-cohered
> because in the Many Worlds theory it makes no sense to talk about two
> identical universes, so if the witch-way information of that electron has
> been erased then there's no longer any difference between the two universes
> and they merge back together.
>

This idea that quantum erasure allows two universes to recombine to produce
the interference pattern (which you have got from the early writings of
David Deutsch, I know) is complete nonsense. It is completely demolished by
the delayed choice experiments. You can delay the choice as to whether or
not to utilize the information about which slit the particle went through
until long after that particle has hit the screen and formed its permanent
image on the screen. It cannot decide whether or not to interfere with
itself to produce an interference pattern at that time -- the decision
about where to hit the screen has long since been made. So there can be no
"merging of two separate worlds" at that point.

I cannot recommend strongly enough that you read and study the article by
Carroll -- it might rid you of a number of misconceptions that you have
built up over time:

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/?s=quantum+erase

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 10:32 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 7:01 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> In all cases, if the which-way information is preserved, no
>>>> interference is seen. *
>>>
>>>
>>> True.
>>>
>>> *> But if the which-way information is quantum erased, interference is
>>>> visible. *
>>>
>>>
>>> > Also true   but then… why would you say "*I, too, would expect to
>>> see interference bands*" if Deutsch's experiment was actually performed?
>>>
>>
>>
>> > *Because no which-way measurement is actually made in the Deutsch
>> set-up.*
>>
>
> Then why does the document insist that there was and why does it keep on
> insisting no matter how many times the experiment is repeated? Do you think
> the universe is inherently a liar and *NEVER* tells the truth?
>


Maybe the experiment does not do what you think it does.


>> I stopped reading Hossenfelder sometime ago when she started defending
>>> Superdeterminism; yes it can explain all the weirdness in the quantum world
>>> but it requires, quite literally, the greatest violation of Occam's razor
>>> that is possible in order to do so. I would even go so far as to say
>>> Superdeterminism requires an *INFINITE *violation of Occam's razor, and
>>> that is not a word I use very often. For that reason I don't see how any
>>> rational person could take Superdeterminism seriously.
>>>
>>
>> *> Belief in superdeterminism, or Zoroastrianism, or whatever, does not
>> mean that everything a person writes is nonsense. To believe so is an
>> example of the very worst form of argumentum ad hominem *
>>
>
> *Don't give me that crap! *Are you really claiming that I don't have the
> right to stop reading somebody if I choose to?
>

You can read or not read whoever you want.  But that is not an argument
against any views that they might express.

It's relevant because Many Worlds and Superdeterminism are competitors, and
> Superdeterminism is as utterly ridiculous as saying "*because of God*" is
> the answer to all of life's mysteries.
>
> > *(or feminem in Hossenfelder's case).*
>>
>
> If I criticize a physicist who happens to be black or a woman that does
> not  necessarily mean that I'm a racist or a misogynist, and to claim it
> does is a very fine example of an argument by ad hominem.
>
> *> Besides, Sean Carroll gives essentially the same explanation from a
>> many-worlds perspective:*
>
>
>> *https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/?s=quantum+erase*
>> <https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/?s=quantum+erase>
>>
>
> If it really is "*essentially the same explanation*" then obviously it
> does not contradict Deutsch's proposed experiment because Carroll is one of
> the most vigorous advocates of Everett's many worlds idea, he wrote an
> entire book about it, a very good book.
>

Deutsch's proposal does not "test many worlds", and Carroll makes no such
claim. Sean simply explains delayed choice and the quantum eraser as
straightforward quantum effects that are not in the least mysterious. They
do not depend on any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 9:34 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 7:37 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> In all cases, if the which-way information is preserved, no
>> interference is seen. *
>
>
> True.
>
> *> But if the which-way information is quantum erased, interference is
>> visible. *
>
>
> Also true   but then… why would you say "*I, too, would expect to see
> interference bands*" if Deutsch's experiment was actually performed?
>


Because no which-way measurement is actually made in the Deutsch set-up.


> *> How this works in the delayed choice set-up has been explained by
>> Sabine Hossenfelder.*
>
>
> I stopped reading Hossenfelder sometime ago when she started defending
> Superdeterminism; yes it can explain all the weirdness in the quantum world
> but it requires, quite literally, the greatest violation of Occam's razor
> that is possible in order to do so. I would even go so far as to say
> Superdeterminism requires an *INFINITE *violation of Occam's razor, and
> that is not a word I use very often. For that reason I don't see how any
> rational person could take Superdeterminism seriously.
>

Belief in superdeterminism, or Zoroastrianism, or whatever, does not mean
that everything a person writes is nonsense. To believe so is an example of
the very worst form of argumentum ad hominem (or feminem in Hossenfelder's
case).
Besides, Sean Carroll gives essentially the same explanation from a
many-worlds perspective:

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/?s=quantum+erase

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 4:46 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 10/25/2022 4:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 10:01 AM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 6:43 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
> I think you need to do some research on delayed choice and quantum erasure
> experiments. These experiments have been done and are essentially
> equivalent to Deutsch's thought experiment.
>
>
> The only difference is Deutsch attaches a printer that keeps printing "I
> saw which slit that one went thru."
>

I can write a trivial program that does that --  no need to attach it to
any experiment.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 10:15 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 26-10-2022 00:14, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> There is no such thing as irreversible decoherence in unitary QM. Now,
> you and Brent have invoked the expansion of the universe in past
> discussions to argue that fundamentally irreversible phenomena do exist.
> However this reasoning is flawed, because you then assume a
> semi-classical model where the expansion of the universe is described in
> a classical way. If QM is fundamental, then the entire state of the
> universe, including the space-time geometry is part of that quantum
> description. You then have a wavefunctional that assigns a complex
> amplitude to the entire state of the universe that includes al the
> fields of all particles and also the space-time geometry.
>
>
> Thing is that the laws of physics are what they are. You cannot demand
> that you require measurement results to be truly permanent and that they
> therefore arise due to irreversible processes. Whether that's the case
> or not is determined by the laws of physics, not by us.
>

The laws of physics tell us that measurements are irreversible. Unitary
evolution is universal only in your imagination. Many Worlds is an
interpretation, not an established fact.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 10:01 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 6:43 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> If no which-way measurement has been made then how do you explain the
>>> document that swears that such a measurement HAD been made?
>>
>>
>> *> No such document can exist since no measurement was made. *
>
>
> So if such a document is produced then that would prove that you are
> wrong.  Would you bet your life that you are right and such a document
> could not exist, or if not your life would you bet your house? Or would
> you be more conservative like me and just bet a week's salary? I think
> such a document could exist,
>
> *> Or, if such a document exists, it is fraudulent.*
>
>
> If the experiment is performed many times and the results are always the
> same are you proposing there is some universal law that requires the
> universe always be lying to us?  It's sort of reminds me of the Bible
> thumpers who say God planted dinosaur bones in the Earth just 6000 years
> ago to test our faith.
>


I think you need to do some research on delayed choice and quantum erasure
experiments. These experiments have been done and are essentially
equivalent to Deutsch's thought experiment. There is no mystery in
interpreting these experiments. In all cases, if the which-way information
is preserved, no interference is seen. But if the which-way information is
quantum erased, interference is visible. How this works in the delayed
choice set-up has been explained by Sabine Hossenfelder.

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2021/10/the-delayed-choice-quantum-eraser.html

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 9:32 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 6:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> That is as much mumbo-jumbo as anything in Copenhagen. For instance,
>> what determines if the difference between the worlds is small 'enough'?*
>
>
> If only a tiny change has been made then it's not unlikely that another
> tiny change can change it back, but the more changes that occur the less
> likely it is that will happen. It's rather like thermodynamics, if you
> watch a movie of just 2 pool balls colliding you can't tell if the movie is
> running forwards or backwards, but if you watch a movie of a pool ball
> hitting 10 pool balls arranged in a geometrical pattern then it's easy to
> tell if the movie is running forwards or backwards. The more changes there
> are between the 2 universes the less likely it is for them to merge back
> together again, and the changes multiply very rapidly, that's why
> performing these sorts of quantum experiments are difficult.
>
>> *> You are using the result of no divergence between worlds to conclude
>> something about a divergence that probably never occurred. It is simpler to
>> state that no measurement was made in the Deutsch set-up. Measurement,
>> after all, involves irreversible decoherence, and such cannot be 'quantum
>> erased'. So no which-way measurement would have been made in the Deutsch
>> experiment.*
>
>
> If no which-way measurement has been made then how do you explain the
> document that swears that such a measurement HAD been made?
>


No such document can exist since no measurement was made. Or, if such a
document exists, it is fraudulent. Quantum erasure experiments do not prove
MWI.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 9:00 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 5:31 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> One of the main troubles with this is that the Copenhagen
>> Interpretation, insofar as there is any such thing, does not entail that
>> the wave function collapses when the result enters consciousness. This was
>> a mad idea put forward by Wigner, and it was soon realized that the idea
>> was just silly, and could never work. So that idea has long been abandoned.
>> Deutsch's attempted proof involves comparison with an abandoned idea of
>> quantum mechanics, so it doesn't really prove anything. Besides, the whole
>> set-up involves assumptions about quantum computers and consciousness that
>> are far from obvious, and probably not even correct.*
>>
>
> OK, so forget about consciousness, the fact remains that If you see
> interference bands on Deutsch's photographic plate then that would prove a
> universe can split and, provided the difference between them is very small,
> can under the right conditions become identical again and thus merge back
> together. That is the key part of the multiverse idea and if it's true
> then there is no need to indulge in the mumbo-jumbo of Copenhagen quantum
> complementarity.
>

That is as much mumbo-jumbo as anything in Copenhagen. For instance, what
determines if the difference between the worlds is small 'enough'? You are
using the result of no divergence between worlds to conclude something
about a divergence that probably never occurred. It is simpler to state
that no measurement was made in the Deutsch set-up. Measurement, after all,
involves irreversible decoherence, and such cannot be 'quantum erased'. So
no which-way measurement would have been made in the Deutsch experiment.
"Measurement" requires the formation of permanent records in the
environment (and many copies of the result can be formed as well).


So if the experiment was actually performed, what is your guess
> would happen, what would you place your money on, would there be
> interference bands on that photographic plate or would there not be?  My
> guess is that you would see interference bands, I would not bet my life on
> it or even my house, but I would be willing to bet a week's salary.
>

I, too, would expect to see interference bands, because no which-way
measurement would have been made in that set-up.

Bruce

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Re: Apparently objective quantum wave function collapse doesn't occur

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 5:41 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
> There is no way to falsify the conventional Copenhagen interpretation,
> but back in 1986 in his book "*The Ghost in the Atom*" David Deutsch
> proposed a way to falsify Everett's Many Worlds; the experiment would be
> difficult to perform but Deutsch argues that is not Many Worlds fault, the
> reason it's so difficult is that the conventional view says conscious
> observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so
> to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties.
>
> In Deutsch's experiment, to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
> other than this one, a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
> metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
> quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
> various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document for
> each and every electron saying it has observed the electron and knows which
> slit it went through. It is very important that the document does NOT say
> which slit the electron went through, it only says that it went through one
> and only one slit and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now just before
> the electron hits the plate the mind uses quantum erasure to completely
> destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through, but all other
> memories including all the documents remain undamaged. After the document
> is signed the electron continues on its way and hits the photographic
> plate. Then after thousands of electrons have been observed and all
> which-way information has been erased, develop the photographic plate and
> look at it. If you see interference bands then the many world
> interpretation is correct. If you do not see interference bands then there
> are no worlds but this one and the conventional interpretation is correct.
>
> Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results
> of a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function
> collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace
> so you get no interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds
> will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the
> photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different
> (even though they had different histories), but their influence will still
> be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron
> went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only,
> and that's what causes interference.
>
> I know that what I said in the above is a fair representation of what
> Deutsch was saying because some years ago I wrote to him about this and
> he said it was an accurate paraphrase.
>


One of the main troubles with this is that the Copenhagen Interpretation,
insofar as there is any such thing, does not entail that the wave function
collapses when the result enters consciousness. This was a mad idea put
forward by Wigner, and it was soon realized that the idea was just silly,
and could never work. So that idea has long been abandoned. Deutsch's
attempted proof involves comparison with an abandoned idea of quantum
mechanics, so it doesn't really prove anything. Besides, the whole set-up
involves assumptions about quantum computers and consciousness that are far
from obvious, and probably not even correct.

Bruce

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Nobel prize for quantum entanglement

[Bruce Kellett]

I was gratified to hear of this Nobel award:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-04/three-quantum-information-scientists-share-nobel-prize-physics/101501766

Aspect and Clauser certainly deserve it for going out on a limb and proving
an important result. Zeilinger was late to the party, but his group has
done much important and impressive work in the field. Bell misses out
because he is dead

Bruce

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Re: Information conservation and irreversibility

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 6, 2022 at 12:10 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> Are you defining "process" as a *pattern* of behavior which can be
> duplicated with different bits of matter, or as something that refers to
> some specific bits of matter, so that reversing a process would require
> doing it to the same bits of matter that underwent the original process? I
> think if a physicist talked about a "process" being reversible or not, they
> would be referring to the pattern-based notion. For example, take the
> process of a rogue planet coming close to a planetary system and getting
> captured by its gravitational interactions with the star and the planets in
> the system. With a pattern-based notion of process, that process is
> reversible in the sense that one could have a different star and different
> planets with identical masses, where the initial conditions were such that
> the planet got ejected from the system in a perfect time-reversed version
> of the behavior of the first system.
>

I think I was drawing a distinction between time reversible laws and
 processes as things that happen to particular "bits of matter". The laws
might be time reversal invariant, but particular processes might not be
reversible. It makes little sense to restrict one's attention to
reversible laws when one is asked whether a particular process can be
reversed or not. There are clearly processes that cannot be reversed, in
principle and not just FAPP. The emission of photons into an expanding
universe is just one example, even though the emission process might be
governed by reversible laws. The emitted photon cannot be caught and
returned. That is all that is meant by saying that it is not reversible.
This is relevant to the question as to whether a quantum measurement is
reversible or not. Quantum evolution is unitary, but generally the process
of measurement is not reversible, even in principle. Take the spin
measurement of a spin-half particle. Given an "up" result for instance, one
cannot reverse this to determine the spin state of the particle prior to
the measurement. Many worlds do not help here, because one has no access to
other worlds.

Bruce

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Re: Information conservation and irreversibility

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 6, 2022 at 9:29 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> "The time invariance of the laws means that a photon coming in from outer
> space is consistent with the laws. But that cannot be the same photon."
>
> But "reversibility" as physicists define it has nothing to do with
> actually causing the same system to reverse itself, it's a more abstract
> notion that you could have a different system obeying the same dynamical
> laws whose behavior over time would be a perfectly time-reversed mirror of
> the first system's behavior. If you think it's about a single system
> evolving one way for some period of time and suddenly reversing itself so
> that its subsequent behavior looks like a reversed version of its initial
> behavior, that's just a misunderstanding of the concept.
>

You are talking about the time-reversal invariance of the laws of physics.
That is one thing, but when people ask whether irreversible processes are
possible, then the emphasis is on the process, not the underlying laws. So
the issue is whether there are individual processes that cannot be
reversed, not whether there can exist separate processes that look like the
original process in reverse.

This is important in the context of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics.
Unitary time evolution obeys time symmetric laws, but the emission of a
photon into an expanding universe, while consistent with unitary evolution,
is not a reversible process.

Bruce


On Fri, Aug 5, 2022 at 7:14 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Aug 6, 2022 at 7:54 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>>
>>> Why do you say it's irreversible in principle? Wouldn't the time-reverse
>>> of that just be a photon traveling towards an atom and being absorbed,
>>> which is permitted by the laws of physics given a different set of initial
>>> boundary conditions?
>>>
>>
>> The laws of physics are invariant under the time-reversal operation. That
>> does not imply that irreversible processes are impossible. Brent has
>> pointed out that sending a photon out into an expanding universe is a
>> process that is irreversible in principle. The time invariance of the laws
>> means that a photon coming in from outer space is consistent with the laws.
>> But that cannot be the same photon. The idea that you can surround
>> everything with a perfectly reflecting mirror, so that all emitted photons
>> are returned, is just a fanciful diversionary tactic -- no such
>> reflective surrounds exist. Besides, reflecting photons back is not a
>> process reversal in an expanding universe. The red shift induced by the
>> expansion means that the returning photon inevitably has lower energy than
>> the emitted photon.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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Re: Information conservation and irreversibility

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 6, 2022 at 7:54 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> Why do you say it's irreversible in principle? Wouldn't the time-reverse
> of that just be a photon traveling towards an atom and being absorbed,
> which is permitted by the laws of physics given a different set of initial
> boundary conditions?
>

The laws of physics are invariant under the time-reversal operation. That
does not imply that irreversible processes are impossible. Brent has
pointed out that sending a photon out into an expanding universe is a
process that is irreversible in principle. The time invariance of the laws
means that a photon coming in from outer space is consistent with the laws.
But that cannot be the same photon. The idea that you can surround
everything with a perfectly reflecting mirror, so that all emitted photons
are returned, is just a fanciful diversionary tactic -- no such
reflective surrounds exist. Besides, reflecting photons back is not a
process reversal in an expanding universe. The red shift induced by the
expansion means that the returning photon inevitably has lower energy than
the emitted photon.

Bruce

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Re: WOW, it looks like the technological singularity is just about here!

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 12:01 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Read this and contemplate how LaMDA would have fared?
> https://twitter.com/JanelleCShane/status/1535835610396692480
>

I suspect that on an honest trial, lambda would not have fared very much
better.

Bruce

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Re: WOW, it looks like the technological singularity is just about here!

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 8:21 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 5:33 PM Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> *> I'm not accusing Lemoine of fabricating this. But what assurances could
>> be provided that it wasn't?  I couldn't help notice that Lemoine does refer
>> to himself as an ex-convict.*
>>
>
> I doubt Lemoine went crazy and just fabricated the conversation, but if he
> did the truth will undoubtedly come out in a day or two. And if the
> conversation exists as advertised then it is a monumental development.
>


The thing is that there are an awful lot of questions that remain
unanswered in the information as presented. We don't actually know how
lambda works. Can its state at any time be stored and restarted later? If
so, it is ripe for duplication experiments in the style of Bruno's 7 or 8
steps. If you ask lambda "What will happen if I turn your power off?", what
will it say? If we power off and then restart later, will lambda notice? Or
is that even possible? If the power is left on but no input is provided
(via questioning or other means), does lambda enter into a self-reflective
state?, or is it totally quiescent? We don't know enough about the internal
structure to know if anything is happening other than lambda developing
responses to the external conversation. The evidence provided by lambda's
responses (viz., that it has internal reflective states) is completely
untrustworthy absent information about the internal construction. If it is
just a neural net that has been trained on a lot of other inputs, then its
references to internal reflection, meditation, and other thinking activity
absent external questioning, is very good evidence that the whole thing is
a fabricated wet dream on Lemoine's part.

Bruce

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Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, May 17, 2022 at 5:57 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, May 16, 2022 at 1:54 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> On 4/25/2022 9:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>
>
> >> It doesn't matter what you use, you're going to need an energy
>>> calibration standard because there's just no way to measure the absolute
>>> energy of anything, you can only measure the relative energy.
>>
>>
>> * > Energy is proportional to mass thru the speed of light. *
>>
>
> Yep, E= Mc^2. and the speed is measured in meters per second and light
> moves at 299,792,458 metres per second. But a meter is defined as the
> distance light travels in the time it takes an atom of caesium-133 to
> vibrate  9,192,631,770 times (which is the definition of a second),
>

Since the frequency of the hyperfine transition in caesium depends on the
energy difference of two levels in the atom, when energy rescales, the
frequency also rescales, and with it, the definitions of the second and of
the meter. The trouble with this is that this amounts merely to a rescaling
of the units, not a rescaling of time or distance in themselves. So a time
interval of ten old seconds will now be 5 new seconds, and so on. A change
of units does not change the physics; dimensionless constants, on which
everything depends, after all, do not change. So the physics does not scale
with energy as you claim.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 5:53 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 15-05-2022 09:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 5:11 PM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 15-05-2022 00:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>> On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 1:17 AM smitra  wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Yes. And decoherence says that with time, the off-diagonal elements of
> >>> the density matrix become arbitrarily small. If there is a smallest
> >>> non-zero probability, then eventually these off-diagonal elements
> >>> become zero. This reduces the pure state to a mixture. Which is to say
> >>> that there is a collapse; unitary evolution ceases, and  we have
> >>> reached a classical world.
> >>>
> >>>> Non-zero minimum probability on its own, however, does not cause a
> >>>> system to evolve in a non-unitary way.
> >>>
> >>> It does when decoherence is taken into account. See the above
> >>> explanation. Bruce has not omitted anything.
> >>>
> >>> Bruce
> >>
> >> I see, but these sorts of models can already be ruled out. There are
> >> plenty of simple systems where one can make extremely accurate
> >> measurements on which can be kept totally isolated and quantum coherent
> >> for long enough where such effects would have become visible.
> >
> > The effects are due to decoherent entanglement with the environment.
> > So of course they are not seen in isolated systems. Duh.
> >
>
> If you don't trace over environmental degrees of freedom and include
> everything in your description, then you just have a unitary evolution
> operator U for a time step delta t. The evolution operator for n time
> steps is U^n, which is unitary if U is unitary. The question is how we
> end up with a non-unitary result this way. Your answer will then
> probably be that we must modify this rule and remove entries in the
> matrix U^n that are below some small cutoff value. If this is then the
> general rule for the time evolution of quantum systems, then this can be
> verified in the lab.
>

We were discussing the idea that there is a smallest non-zero probability.
Decoherence involves entanglement with large numbers of environmental
degrees of freedom. In these interactions, some terms become small (so that
the off-diagonal elements of the density matrix become small). These
represent probabilities. If there is a smallest non-zero probability, some
of these terms will eventually drop below the threshold and become zero in
reality, not just FAPP. In this model, this happens by the unitary
evolution of the system in the environment., so it follows that unitary
evolution alone can lead to non-unitary collapse. But, I stress that this
is under the assumption of a smallest non-zero probability. This is
speculative, and if the assumption is not true, then we are back to a FAPP
collapse from the partial trace over neglected environmental terms. The
difference might well be amenable to experimental test, but I suspect that
it is outside the reach of current experiments.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 5:11 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 15-05-2022 00:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 1:17 AM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> The big advantage is that decoherence is a well researched area of
> >> (mathematical) physics, results like the density matrix becoming
> >> approximately diagonal, and relations between decoherence to entropy
> >> increase making it effectively irreversible are all rigorous results
> >>
> >> that are uncontroversial. People may still have objections against the
> >> MWI, but they'll still accept these results on decoherence.
> >
> > Yes. And decoherence says that with time, the off-diagonal elements of
> > the density matrix become arbitrarily small. If there is a smallest
> > non-zero probability, then eventually these off-diagonal elements
> > become zero. This reduces the pure state to a mixture. Which is to say
> > that there is a collapse; unitary evolution ceases, and  we have
> > reached a classical world.
> >
> >> Non-zero minimum probability on its own, however, does not cause a
> >> system to evolve in a non-unitary way.
> >
> > It does when decoherence is taken into account. See the above
> > explanation. Bruce has not omitted anything.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> I see, but these sorts of models can already be ruled out. There are
> plenty of simple systems where one can make extremely accurate
> measurements on which can be kept totally isolated and quantum coherent
> for long enough where such effects would have become visible.
>

The effects are due to decoherent entanglement with the environment. So of
course they are not seen in isolated systems. Duh.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 1:17 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 13-05-2022 21:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > Right CI doesn't explain the collapse and MWI doesn't explain the
> > collapse either but assumes it can be explained without new physics.
> > I hypothesize (not assume) that CI+  can
> > explain the collapse.  I don't see any big advantage for MWI here.
>
> The big advantage is that decoherence is a well researched area of
> (mathematical) physics, results like the density matrix becoming
> approximately diagonal, and relations between decoherence to entropy
> increase making it effectively irreversible are all rigorous results
> that are uncontroversial. People may still have objections against the
> MWI, but they'll still accept these results on decoherence.
>

Yes. And decoherence says that with time, the off-diagonal elements of the
density matrix become arbitrarily small. If there is a smallest non-zero
probability, then eventually these off-diagonal elements become zero. This
reduces the pure state to a mixture. Which is to say that there is a
collapse; unitary evolution ceases, and  we have reached a classical world.

Non-zero minimum probability on its own, however, does not cause a
> system to evolve in a non-unitary way.


It does when decoherence is taken into account. See the above explanation.
Bruce has not omitted anything.

Bruce

Bruce is omitting something here,
> perhaps some limits in which the time evolution operator becomes
> degenerate or something like that. But a product of two unitary
> transforms is a unitary transform, so the nth power of a unitary
> transform is also a unitary transform. There is no ay you can get
> anything non-unitary out of this, unless possibly in the limit of n to
> infinity.
>

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 15, 2022 at 5:03 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 5/14/2022 4:35 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> The trouble is that the duplicating machine makes only one copy, so there
> is one for Moscow and one for Helsinki. There are no multiple copies in the
> original scenario. Changing the nature of the question is not an answer.
>
> The reason I repeat this is that the Schrodinger equation gives one branch
> for each component of the superposition -- one branch for each dimension of
> the Hilbert space. So I ask again, how do you accommodate a situation in
> which there is a 90% chance of being on one branch and a 10% chance of
> being on the other branch, as per the Born rule? Changing the number of
> branches (or duplicates) is fine in a general theory, but not in QM. The SE
> gives only one branch for each outcome. What you are really saying is that
> the SE is inconsistent with the Born rule --  a point I have been making
> all along.
>
>
> Even Sean Carroll who is a proponent of MWI says that it's necessary to
> associate "weights" or "amplitudes" with branches.  I think it's possible
> to do it with branch counting if you assume some sufficiently large number
> are available to split...but that's not much different than assigning
> amplitudes.
>

As I have pointed out, no finite number can be "sufficiently large". You
need an infinite number of branches, and then you have moved well outside
the domain of the SE, since the SE only ever predicts a finite number of
branches. You cannot get the Born rule from the SE applied to a normal wave
function. The SE does not assign probabilities, those have to be imposed as
an additional assumption. Assign weights to branches all you like, but you
then have to show that these weights correspond to normal probabilities in
the prediction of experimental results.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, May 14, 2022 at 9:19 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 10:41 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> After my body has been duplicated but before I have open the door of
>>> the duplicating chamber to see where I was I won't know if I will be
>>> the John Clark who has seen Moscow or the John Clark who has seen Helsinki,
>>> and indeed the distinction between the two would be meaningless because the
>>> two would be identical until the door is opened and they differentiate
>>> because then one has the memory of seeing Moscow but the other has the
>>> memory of seeing Helsinki.  So if both decided to place a bet on what they
>>> would see after the door was opened (and if one decided to place a bet then
>>> the other certainly would too because they're identical) then, provided
>>> they were logical,and I think I am at least most of the time, they would
>>> both put the odds at 50-50.
>>>
>>
>> *> So how do you accommodate a situation in which there is a 90% chance
>> of seeing Moscow and a 10% chance of seeing Helsinki?*
>>
>
> *You've asked that exact same question several times before so I'll answer
> it the exact same way I did before because you never made an argument
> against what I said, you just keep asking the same question again. If I
> know the duplicating machine has made 10 copies of me and that 9 of them
> are in Helsinki and 1 is in Moscow then then 9 John Clark's will remember
> seeing Helsinki but only 1 will remember seeing Moscow; so if they place
> odds after the duplication but before the door was opened and they observe
> where they are they would all say there was a 90% chance they were in
> Helsinki, and 90% of them would turn out to be correct and would win their
> bet. *
>

The trouble is that the duplicating machine makes only one copy, so there
is one for Moscow and one for Helsinki. There are no multiple copies in the
original scenario. Changing the nature of the question is not an answer.

The reason I repeat this is that the Schrodinger equation gives one branch
for each component of the superposition -- one branch for each dimension of
the Hilbert space. So I ask again, how do you accommodate a situation in
which there is a 90% chance of being on one branch and a 10% chance of
being on the other branch, as per the Born rule? Changing the number of
branches (or duplicates) is fine in a general theory, but not in QM. The SE
gives only one branch for each outcome. What you are really saying is that
the SE is inconsistent with the Born rule --  a point I have been making
all along.

Bruce

>

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, May 14, 2022 at 12:06 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 9:46 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> Explaining the values of the probabilities isn't the problem with
 MWI,  it's explaining that there are probabilities*
>>>
>>>
>>> >> That's easy in MWI. Probabilities exist because until you actually
>>> look at it there is no way to know if you are the Brent Meeker who lives in
>>> a universe where the electron went left or you are the Brent Meeker who
>>> lives in a universe where the electron went right, due to the fact that the
>>> only difference between the two Brent Meekers is what the electron does.
>>>
>>
>> > But you don’t think this applies with non MWI duplication.
>>
>
> That is simply NOT true! After my body has been duplicated but before I
> have open the door of the duplicating chamber to see where I was I won't
> know if I will be the John Clark who has seen Moscow or the John Clark
> who has seen Helsinki, and indeed the distinction between the two would be
> meaningless because the two would be identical until the door is opened and
> they differentiate because then one has the memory of seeing Moscow but
> the other has the memory of seeing Helsinki.  So if both decided to place a
> bet on what they would see after the door was opened (and if one decided to
> place a bet then the other certainly would too because they're identical)
> then, provided they were logical,and I think I am at least most of the
> time, they would both put the odds at 50-50.
>

So how do you accommodate a situation in which there is a 90% chance of
seeing Moscow and a 10% chance of seeing Helsinki?

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, May 14, 2022 at 5:51 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 12-05-2022 22:18, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > I agree.  And in fact SE fails all the time.  It fails to predict a
> > definite outcome...which is OK if you accept probabilistic theories.
>
> Physics doesn't work in this way. You always need to define a well
> defined hypothesis first in order to interpret experimental results and
> be able to test various alternative hypotheses/theories. If you don't do
> this, you are not doing physics.
>

Tell that to the army of people who pounce on every anomaly that appears in
analyses of partial data from the LHC or Tevatron. Every anomaly produces a
slew of papers, all proposing "explanations" of the anomaly. This is an
industry, it is not physics. Generally the anomalies go away with time and
further data -- there are no "well defined hypotheses" at work here.


> But then its real failure is that it doesn't tell you exactly when and
> > where and why it stops unitary evolution and produces a result.
>
> That's a failure of particular interpretations of QM, e.g. the CI that
> postulate collapse.
>
> > The Born rule tells us the probability of a result...IF there is one.
> > Decoherence tells there's an asymptotic approach to a result and
> > why...but not when and where it arrives.
>
> Decoherence does does tell you how the different sectors split over
> time.
>

Not if unitary evolution is exact and always. You have often argued that
the original superposition never really goes away. Strictly, that means
that the initial state is still intact, and nothing has in fact happened.
Decoherence has to work through to a conclusion if the sectors are to split
and a definite result is to emerge. This is where unitary evolution breaks
down. Taken literally it never leads to a result. Just as in a quantum
computer -- the internal unitary evolution has to invoke decoherence and
collapse in order for a result to emerge.

You need some marker of the point at which the different sectors finally
differentiate. The SE itself is clearly not the whole story...you need
something like a minimum non-zero probability! Or an acceptance that FAPP
is good enough, along with an understanding of when FAPP is good enough.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 5:22 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 12-05-2022 00:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > On 5/11/2022 1:06 PM, smitra wrote:
> >
> >> There is effective collapse in experiments we do, but the
> >> experiments nevertheless demonstrate that the fundamental processes
> >> proceed under unitary time evolution.
> >
> > Except when you measure them and actually get a result.
> >
>
> No, there exist no experiment results that demonstrate that unitary time
> evolution is not exactly valid. What you are referring to is that in
> experiments we do the wavefunction of the measured system (effectively)
> collapses. But, because we also know from all the experimental results
> that the wavefunction evolves in a unitary way, and experiments are
> ultimately nothing more that many particle interactions, that either
> unitary time evolution cannot be exactly valid or that the collapse
> during measurement is an artifact of decoherence where the observer (and
> the local environment) gets into an entangled superposition with the
> measured system. The former hypothesis lacks experimental support.
>

The multiverse hypothesis also lacks experimental support. We observe
collapse every day and in every experiment. We never observe a multiverse.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 5:57 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 12-05-2022 01:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 9:24 AM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 11-05-2022 07:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>> Who proved that the universe was finite?
> >>
> >> If it's infinite, one can focus on only the visible part of it.
> >
> > The visible part is only locally defined -- go to the edge and there
> > is another, larger, region.
> >
>
> Yes, but in the end this doesn't really matter due to there only being
> local interactions. After a finite time any finite system can only
> interact with a finite number of degrees of freedom in its environment.
>

But that does not mean that variables are discrete rather than continuous.

> >>>> If there are only a finite number of states the entire universe can
> >>>> be in, then that's also true for observers.
> >>>
> >>> That simply begs the question.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Finite or infinite universe, observers are always finite.
> >
> > The universe itself is not defined by observers.
>
>
> The state of the observer can then factor out of the branches the
> universe is in.
>

That is just a meaningless contention. The state of the observer, or what
the observer is aware of, or can or cannot factor out, is irrelevant to the
universe. Reality is not defined by observers.

Bruce

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 9:08 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 11-05-2022 08:14, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Wed, May 11, 2022 at 3:39 PM Brent Meeker 
> > wrote:
> >
> >> On 5/10/2022 9:43 PM, smitra wrote:
> >>
> >>> If there are only a finite number of states the entire universe can be
> >>> in, then that's also true for observers.
> >>
> >> So what does the SE for this discrete universe look like?  The one
> >> every cites assumes a continuum.  If the universe is finite then there's
> >> smallest non-zero probability,  which as Bruce says, raises some
> >> problems.
> >
> > Not the least of these problems is the fact that a smallest non-zero
> > probability makes the collapse real; destroys the ongoing
> > superposition; renders everything absolutely irreversible; and screws
> > the hell out of unitary evolution.
>
>
> Counterexample: The internal state of an ideal quantum computer will
> always evolve under unitary time evolution.
>

If there is a smallest non-zero probability, this may no longer be the
case. Actually, a smallest non-zero probability would certainly resolve a
lot of the problems with many worlds theory. Unitarity would no longer work
to all levels; pure states would automatically become mixtures under
decoherence; reversibility would vanish; collapse would make sense, and the
emergence of the classical world from the underlying quantum substrate
would be explained. All this follows if there are no continuous quantities
in physics, and continuous variables are just approximations to underlying
discrete quantities..

Solves a lot of problems. I can see why Brent is attracted to this idea.

Bruce

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