Potential definitions--Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi Bruno Marchal Potential definitions : To Exist = to have objective being, to physically be, to be within spacetime, having spacial location and extension at time t - a thing such as a brain or object To Inhere = to have subjective being, to mentally or nonphysically be, that is, to be outside of spacetime, inextended (without spacial location at time t), such as thoughts, numbers, quanta, qualia, etc. Thus brain exists, mind inheres. An agent = An inherent control and observation center. A self = an agent Actual = to exist Real = either to exist or to inhere even without a self or agent to observe or control it. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-23, 11:16:38 Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'? == On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism). Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too). - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand relies on the architecture of the mind (the dreams of the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature? - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation among an infinity of computations. - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument). I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ? Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains
Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi Stephen, Any idea about whatever is outside of the mind (noumena, thing it itself as Kant named it)before it is experienced as phenomena is and will remain speculative forever. By definition. But this does not prohibit our speculations... 2012/9/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 9/23/2012 6:18 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hi Alberto, As I see it, the idea that the noumena are specific and definite without being given in association with phenomena is false as it implies that the things in themselves have innate properties for no reason whatsoever... 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
The unavoidable speculative nature of neumena makes existence uncertain to the most deep level. All we have is the phenomena, that are mental. So certainty of existence has meaning within an space of shared conscience of believers that have, by various mental processes, certainty of existence of somethig. 2012/9/24 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com Hi Stephen, Any idea about whatever is outside of the mind (noumena, thing it itself as Kant named it)before it is experienced as phenomena is and will remain speculative forever. By definition. But this does not prohibit our speculations... 2012/9/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 9/23/2012 6:18 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hi Alberto, As I see it, the idea that the noumena are specific and definite without being given in association with phenomena is false as it implies that the things in themselves have innate properties for no reason whatsoever... 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi Bruno, With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate. Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary machines or any kind of instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't? 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism). Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too). - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand relies on the architecture of the mind (the dreams of the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature? - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation among an infinity of computations. - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument). I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ? Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group.
Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi John Mikes At the time I thought to call the nonphysical realm life, but since decided to use a less red flag term, that the nonphysical domain inheres, while the physical realm exists. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Mikes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-22, 15:52:11 Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'? Dear Stephen and Bruno: (BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. ) I find it hard to believe that 'exist(ence?)' is depending on human thought/measurement/comprehension. If something fails to 'materialize'(?) into physical(?) existence it still can exist - in our thinking, or beyond that: in the part of the unlimited (complexity?) we never heard of. To restrict existence to our knowledge - especially quoting ancient thinkers who experienced so much less to think of- (e.g. Leibnitz, whom I respect no end, but over the more than 3 centuries humanity has learned SOMETHING??)? is counterscientific -there are less polite words - and Bruno's justification depends how we define that 'circle' - OOPS: life-living. And IF we aggrevate naturalists and materialists? so be it. (Spelling var: SOB-it). (Bruno again:? Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. Looks like Bruno's stance on the mind-body bases. I am not with that, I consider Descartes' dualism a defence against the danger to be burnt at the stake. I consider him smarter than dualistic. ? Stephen, I think(?) you waste your time arguing in such length against a differen belief system. It is like a political campaign in the US: everybody talks ONLY to their OWN constituents, the others do not even listen. All those billion $s (there) are wasted just as all those zillion posts here. Look at the double-meaning of your Wiki-quote. ((-? am one of those others-.)) ? Sorry I could not resist to reply. ? John M ? ? ? ? ? ? On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 2:05 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/22/2012 5:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Dear Roger, ?? I think the exact opposite. We should NEVER use the word exists in reference to what is merely the subject of human perception, aka physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. ?? Just a tad... ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. ?? Why might wish to consider that that extension is the result of observation and not independent of it. What I just wrote will be controversial, as it seems to make what exists subject to human whim, but I am trying to make a more subtle point. The physical world has properties that we can observe by performing observations and we have learned, from very careful experiment and logical analysis, that those properties cannot be definite prior to the measurements. This is not to say that measurements cause properties, no. Measurements select properties. Objects prior to measurement have a spectrum of possible properties and not definite properties. This is the lesson of QM that must be understood. To claim otherwise is to claim that nature has a preference for some basis. ?? We to understand that every single act of interaction that occurs in the universe is, at some level, an act of measurement. If we consider that there are a HUGE number of measurements occurring all around us continuously, that this and this alone is responsible for the appearance of a definite physical world that has properties objectively. It does this in the sense that that definiteness does not depend on the actions of any one individual observations or interaction; it depends on the sum over all of the acts of interaction. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. ?? You are not the only observer of the moon! There is a subtle passive-aggressive solipsism in this idea that the moon exists without me , as if to imply the possibility of the converse: the moon
Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi Stephen P. King What's in a name ? If you have a better word for what I have been calling physical existence, please say it. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-22, 14:05:04 Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'? On 9/22/2012 5:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Dear Roger, I think the exact opposite. We should NEVER use the word exists in reference to what is merely the subject of human perception, aka physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Just a tad... ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. Why might wish to consider that that extension is the result of observation and not independent of it. What I just wrote will be controversial, as it seems to make what exists subject to human whim, but I am trying to make a more subtle point. The physical world has properties that we can observe by performing observations and we have learned, from very careful experiment and logical analysis, that those properties cannot be definite prior to the measurements. This is not to say that measurements cause properties, no. Measurements select properties. Objects prior to measurement have a spectrum of possible properties and not definite properties. This is the lesson of QM that must be understood. To claim otherwise is to claim that nature has a preference for some basis. We to understand that every single act of interaction that occurs in the universe is, at some level, an act of measurement. If we consider that there are a HUGE number of measurements occurring all around us continuously, that this and this alone is responsible for the appearance of a definite physical world that has properties objectively. It does this in the sense that that definiteness does not depend on the actions of any one individual observations or interaction; it depends on the sum over all of the acts of interaction. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. You are not the only observer of the moon! There is a subtle passive-aggressive solipsism in this idea that the moon exists without me , as if to imply the possibility of the converse: the moon would not exist without me. No, By Leibniz' Monadology, all extensions are an appearance and not inherent or innate. The definiteness of the Moon follows from the mutual consistency required to occur between the percepts of each and every monad such that an incontrovertible (empty of inconsistency) relation can exist between them. This in the language of computer science is known as Satisfiability. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as well-founded phenomena. You can still stub your toe on phenomenological rocks. Yes, but Leibniz' position was that phenomenological appearance flowed strictly from the Pre-Established Harmony between monads and had no existence or reality otherwise. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence Existence has been variously defined by sources. In common usage, it is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. Others define it as everything that is, or simply everything. I am one of those others. We cannot conflate the definiteness of properties that we perceive with the bundling together of those properties in some particular location that results because of the requirement of mutual consistency of our physical universe. Existence, qua innate possibility to be, cannot be constrained by any a prior or contingent upon any a posteriori. It must simply be. So leave it alone. On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 9/24/2012 8:05 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King What's in a name ? If you have a better word for what I have been calling physical existence, please say it. Actuality. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
Hi Stephen P. King At least as far as the physical world goes, the grand project of science is to find out what the noumena are. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-24, 07:40:08 Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'? On 9/24/2012 6:46 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Stephen, Any idea about whatever is outside of the mind (noumena, thing it itself as Kant named it) before it is experienced as phenomena is and will remain speculative forever. By definition. But this does not prohibit our speculations... I agree. ;-) -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Potential definitions--Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 24 Sep 2012, at 12:26, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Potential definitions : To Exist = to have objective being, to physically be, to be within spacetime, having spacial location and extension at time t - a thing such as a brain or object But exists has simple meaning, when applied on what you assume to exist primitively. The words objective, physically, being, spacetime spatial, location, time, brain, object have no simple meaning that everyone can take for granted, when working on th TOE search, or when trying to get some light on the mind body problem. I thought you were a Platonist, even if a Leibnizian one, but now it seems you believe in primitive physical notion, like spacetime, so it becomes hard to figure out what are your sharable assumptions. To Inhere = to have subjective being, to mentally or nonphysically be, that is, to be outside of spacetime, inextended (without spacial location at time t), such as thoughts, numbers, quanta, qualia, etc. Thus brain exists, mind inheres. ? I don't see the logic leading to brain exist, from mind inhere. Brain exists, but with comp it can't be a primitive existence, and so brain exists is a pattern that we have to explain from an ontology with not assumed brain. An agent = An inherent control and observation center. A self = an agent Actual = to exist Real = either to exist or to inhere even without a self or agent to observe or control it. That can make sense in some context, but not when you search a theory *explaining* or enlightening the big picture. You need a criterion of existence for what you take as primitive, and then you can defined the many different sorts of existence which can be reduced to the primitive existence. But you betrayed yourself by insisting that we don't mix theology and science, where I think that the separation of theology and science is very big mistake, even if easily explainable by Darwin and human short term interests. I cannot convince you by reason, on something about which you decided to abandon reason. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 24 Sep 2012, at 13:03, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Bruno, With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate. Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary machines or any kind of instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't? You don't need this. You can define instruction sets and execution units with numbers and the + and * laws. That was Gödel did in his 1931 paper, and it is the root of theoretical computer science. Arithmetic implicitly defines all computations, and for the first person indeterminacy, those implicit definitions are enough to explain the orogin of the physical sensations and theories. Bruno 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism). Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too). - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand relies on the architecture of the mind (the dreams of the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature? - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation among an infinity of computations. - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument). I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ? Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 9/23/2012 6:18 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hi Alberto, As I see it, the idea that the noumena are specific and definite without being given in association with phenomena is false as it implies that the things in themselves have innate properties for no reason whatsoever... 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is my schema. Can you complete/ammend it? Things in themselves (noumena) - - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism). Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too). - Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the phisical world with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists) Things perceived (phenomena) - - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me) Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand relies on the architecture of the mind (the dreams of the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature? - The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation among an infinity of computations. - Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists) Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument). I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ? Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say yes to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain). That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 9/22/2012 5:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Dear Roger, I think the exact opposite. We should NEVER use the word exists in reference to what is merely the subject of human perception, aka physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Just a tad... ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. Why might wish to consider that that extension is the result of observation and not independent of it. What I just wrote will be controversial, as it seems to make what exists subject to human whim, but I am trying to make a more subtle point. The physical world has properties that we can observe by performing observations and we have learned, from very careful experiment and logical analysis, that those properties cannot be definite prior to the measurements. This is not to say that measurements cause properties, no. Measurements select properties. Objects prior to measurement have a spectrum of possible properties and not definite properties. This is the lesson of QM that must be understood. To claim otherwise is to claim that nature has a preference for some basis. We to understand that every single act of interaction that occurs in the universe is, at some level, an act of measurement. If we consider that there are a HUGE number of measurements occurring all around us continuously, that this and this alone is responsible for the appearance of a definite physical world that has properties objectively. It does this in the sense that that definiteness does not depend on the actions of any one individual observations or interaction; it depends on the sum over all of the acts of interaction. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. You are not the only observer of the moon! There is a subtle passive-aggressive solipsism in this idea that the moon exists without me , as if to imply the possibility of the converse: the moon would not exist without me. No, By Leibniz' Monadology, all extensions are an appearance and not inherent or innate. The definiteness of the Moon follows from the mutual consistency required to occur between the percepts of each and every monad such that an incontrovertible (empty of inconsistency) relation can exist between them. This in the language of computer science is known as Satisfiability. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as well-founded phenomena. You can still stub your toe on phenomenological rocks. Yes, but Leibniz' position was that phenomenological appearance flowed strictly from the Pre-Established Harmony between monads and had no existence or reality otherwise. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence Existence has been variously defined by sources. In common usage, it is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. Others define it as everything that is, or simply everything. I am one of those others. We cannot conflate the definiteness of properties that we perceive with the bundling together of those properties in some particular location that results because of the requirement of mutual consistency of our physical universe. Existence, qua innate possibility to be, cannot be constrained by any a prior or contingent upon any a posteriori. It must simply be. So leave it alone. On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. But Leibniz did not give us a complete and consistent ToE. His P.E.H. is deeply flawed and his explanation of the world that logically follows from the synchronization of the monad's perceptions http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.htmlwas woefully pedantic and flawed. I suspect that he simply did not want to try to speculate on the subject but his hand was forced by his need to defend his ideas against the savage attacks from the likes
Re: What is 'Existence'?
Dear Stephen and Bruno: *(BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.* ) I find it hard to believe that 'exist(ence?)' is depending on human thought/measurement/comprehension. If something fails to 'materialize'(?) into physical(?) existence it still can exist - in our thinking, or beyond that: in the part of the unlimited (complexity?) we never heard of. To restrict existence to our knowledge - especially quoting ancient thinkers who experienced so much less to think of- (e.g. Leibnitz, whom I respect no end, but over the more than 3 centuries humanity has learned SOMETHING??) is counterscientific -there are less polite words - and Bruno's justification depends how we define that 'circle' - OOPS: *life-living*. And IF we aggrevate *naturalists* and *materialists*? so be it. (Spelling var: SOB-it). *(Bruno again: Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.* Looks like Bruno's stance on the mind-body bases. I am not with that, I consider Descartes' dualism a defence against the danger to be burnt at the stake. I consider him smarter than dualistic. Stephen, I think(?) you waste your time arguing in such length against a differen belief system. It is like a political campaign in the US: everybody talks ONLY to their OWN constituents, the others do not even listen. All those billion $s (there) are wasted just as all those zillion posts here. Look at the double-meaning of your Wiki-quote. ((- I am one of those others-.)) Sorry I could not resist to reply. John M On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 2:05 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 9/22/2012 5:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Dear Roger, I think the exact opposite. We should NEVER use the word exists in reference to what is merely the subject of human perception, aka physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Just a tad... ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. Why might wish to consider that that extension is the result of observation and not independent of it. What I just wrote will be controversial, as it seems to make what exists subject to human whim, but I am trying to make a more subtle point. The physical world has properties that we can observe by performing observations and we have learned, from very careful experiment and logical analysis, that those properties cannot be definite prior to the measurements. This is not to say that measurements cause properties, no. Measurements select properties. Objects prior to measurement have a spectrum of possible properties and not definite properties. This is the lesson of QM that must be understood. To claim otherwise is to claim that nature has a preference for some basis. We to understand that every single act of interaction that occurs in the universe is, at some level, an act of measurement. If we consider that there are a HUGE number of measurements occurring all around us continuously, that this and this alone is responsible for the appearance of a definite physical world that has properties objectively. It does this in the sense that that definiteness does not depend on the actions of any one individual observations or interaction; it depends on the sum over all of the acts of interaction. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. You are not the only observer of the moon! There is a subtle passive-aggressive solipsism in this idea that the moon exists without me , as if to imply the possibility of the converse: the moon would not exist without me. No, By Leibniz' Monadology, all extensions are an appearance and not inherent or innate. The definiteness of the Moon follows from the mutual consistency required to occur between the percepts of each and every monad such that an incontrovertible (empty of inconsistency) relation can exist between them. This in the language of computer science is known as Satisfiability. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions,
Re: What is 'Existence'?
On 9/22/2012 3:52 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stephen and Bruno: /*(BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.*/ ) I find it hard to believe that 'exist(ence?)' is depending on human thought/measurement/comprehension. If something fails to 'materialize'(?) into physical(?) existence it still can exist - in our thinking, or beyond that: in the part of the unlimited (complexity?) we never heard of. To restrict existence to our knowledge - especially quoting ancient thinkers who experienced so much less to think of- (e.g. Leibnitz, whom I respect no end, but over the more than 3 centuries humanity has learned SOMETHING??) is counterscientific -there are less polite words - and Bruno's justification depends how we define that 'circle' - OOPS: /*life-living*/. And IF we aggrevate *naturalists* and *materialists*? so be it. (Spelling var: SOB-it). */(Bruno again: Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible./* Looks like Bruno's stance on the mind-body bases. I am not with that, I consider Descartes' dualism a defence against the danger to be burnt at the stake. I consider him smarter than dualistic. Stephen, I think(?) you waste your time arguing in such length against a differen belief system. It is like a political campaign in the US: everybody talks ONLY to their OWN constituents, the others do not even listen. All those billion $s (there) are wasted just as all those zillion posts here. Look at the double-meaning of your Wiki-quote. ((- I am one of those others-.)) Sorry I could not resist to reply. John M Dear John, I try and I deeply appreciate your comment. You understand me sometimes. Sometimes I don't have any idea where the thoughts that I write come from or what they mean until later... -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
2011/2/12 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 11, 11:47 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/11 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 10, 5:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Stephen, On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false? The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of awareness in any way? I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. There is no usual sense. The usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this correctly, assuming comp. What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence? The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without integers already in the hat. However, they don't exist, so there is no mystery. You just have to pretend they do in order to play certain games. However they do exists... Proof? I can think about them. I exist. you don't have to pretend to play games... what does it mean to pretend something exists ? And you from the brithplace of Marcel Marceau! ? All your definitions of existing lies down to interaction with you (RITSTIAR)... You are so sure by what you mean by real, that it has so much sense that you could not look beyond... I don't need to. Existing abstract objects, ie numbers, explain nothing about our ability to think about abstract objects , since they can't interact with our brains. (Benacerraf) They interact with mine, I can think about them, that's an interaction, I don't invent them. I do not decide their properties. I don't agree with your definition even with RITSTIAR just because I don't know what makes me real and I don't know in what sense I'm more real than you or not... but I'm sure I'm more real than you from my own POV. I don't think I need to worry about how real I am for my argument to go through I think it does because you insist about RITSTIAR... and I don't know if you are Real In the sense that *I* am real... I don't know either in what sense I'm real, does it mean something beyond the fact that I can die and no more be real if it's what it is ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
On Feb 12, 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/12 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com However, they don't exist, so there is no mystery. You just have to pretend they do in order to play certain games. However they do exists... Proof? I can think about them. I exist. you don't have to pretend to play games... what does it mean to pretend something exists ? And you from the brithplace of Marcel Marceau! ? I'm pretending I'm walking into the wind...now I'm pretending I'm in a glass box... All your definitions of existing lies down to interaction with you (RITSTIAR)... You are so sure by what you mean by real, that it has so much sense that you could not look beyond... I don't need to. Existing abstract objects, ie numbers, explain nothing about our ability to think about abstract objects , since they can't interact with our brains. (Benacerraf) They interact with mine, Interesting. How do you know? I mean, the idea that abstract objects don't interact with concrete object is usually regarded as a logical truth (and one that realists concede as well as anti realists, which makes Benacerraf's argument powerful. But, hey, if you know better) I can think about them, that's an interaction, I don't invent them. I do not decide their properties. I don't agree with your definition even with RITSTIAR just because I don't know what makes me real and I don't know in what sense I'm more real than you or not... but I'm sure I'm more real than you from my own POV. I don't think I need to worry about how real I am for my argument to go through I think it does because you insist about RITSTIAR... I am in less doubt about my own reality than anything else...It don't need to throw insistence at it to *make*it true.. and I don't know if you are Real In the sense that *I* am real Maybe you don't. But the point is that you don't have to believe that I am real...from your perspective, the point is you are real. And that your reality is not the result of the usual mathematical sense of existence ... I don't know either in what sense I'm real, It doesn't matter what sense. It is some non-zero sense, so any argument about my reality must assume something about reality. does it mean something beyond the fact that I can die and no more be real if it's what it is ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
On Feb 10, 5:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Stephen, On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false? The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of awareness in any way? I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. There is no usual sense. The usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this correctly, assuming comp. What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence? The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without integers already in the hat. However, they don't exist, so there is no mystery. You just have to pretend they do in order to play certain games. I have the idea that your reasoning behind your argument is a very deep and subtle version of Goedel's diagonalization. Is this true? Only the translation (AUDA) of the reasoning in arithmetic (with the classical theory of knowledge). The reasoning itself is made possible by the closure of the class of partial computable functions for the diagonalization, and that runs deep, indeed. But that's part of arithmetical truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
On Feb 11, 11:47 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/11 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 10, 5:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Stephen, On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false? The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of awareness in any way? I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. There is no usual sense. The usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this correctly, assuming comp. What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence? The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without integers already in the hat. However, they don't exist, so there is no mystery. You just have to pretend they do in order to play certain games. However they do exists... Proof? you don't have to pretend to play games... what does it mean to pretend something exists ? And you from the brithplace of Marcel Marceau! All your definitions of existing lies down to interaction with you (RITSTIAR)... You are so sure by what you mean by real, that it has so much sense that you could not look beyond... I don't need to. Existing abstract objects, ie numbers, explain nothing about our ability to think about abstract objects , since they can't interact with our brains. (Benacerraf) I don't agree with your definition even with RITSTIAR just because I don't know what makes me real and I don't know in what sense I'm more real than you or not... but I'm sure I'm more real than you from my own POV. I don't think I need to worry about how real I am for my argument to go through -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false? The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of awareness in any way? What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence? I have the idea that your reasoning behind your argument is a very deep and subtle version of Goedel's diagonalization. Is this true? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is Existence?
Hi Stephen, On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false? The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of awareness in any way? I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. The usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this correctly, assuming comp. What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence? The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without integers already in the hat. I have the idea that your reasoning behind your argument is a very deep and subtle version of Goedel's diagonalization. Is this true? Only the translation (AUDA) of the reasoning in arithmetic (with the classical theory of knowledge). The reasoning itself is made possible by the closure of the class of partial computable functions for the diagonalization, and that runs deep, indeed. But that's part of arithmetical truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
