Re: Against Physics
2009/9/5 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of these is true in the case of dealing with a person who has committed a crime (I disdain the word criminal as if it were a separate species). Such a person may be deterred from further crimes by some punishment and more to the point other persons may be deterred by the example. Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). But there is a difference between punishment to serve some utilitarian end - reducing crime - and punishment as retribution. It's also interesting to consider what would happen if we could easily change people's character and motivations. Would it be better to forcibly change a violent psychopath's brain so that he becomes a nice person and thanks you for it afterwards, or would it be better to lock him up to prevent him re-offending? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/9/5 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of these is true in the case of dealing with a person who has committed a crime (I disdain the word criminal as if it were a separate species). Such a person may be deterred from further crimes by some punishment and more to the point other persons may be deterred by the example. Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). But there is a difference between punishment to serve some utilitarian end - reducing crime - and punishment as retribution. Ironically, government punishment as retribution was adopted for the utilitarian reason that it displaced private retribution which tended to feuds. A desire for retribution is probably something that is built in by evolution, but it is far less in some people than others. It's also interesting to consider what would happen if we could easily change people's character and motivations. Would it be better to forcibly change a violent psychopath's brain so that he becomes a nice person and thanks you for it afterwards, or would it be better to lock him up to prevent him re-offending I'd say it depends of how anti-social the person's character and motivations are and how precisely he could be changed. In the case of a violent psychopath who has murdered someoen we, at present (in the U.S.), can execute him - so it doesn't seem *less* ethical to change his personality even drastically. On the other hand there's a slippery slope here. If it's good to cure a violent psychopath is it also good to cure a pedophile, a petty thief, an obnoxious liar, a homosexual,...? Should a person be able to choose a cure for themselves? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 1:43 PM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ Dawkins has some good things to say on the subject I think: http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 1:43 PM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ Dawkins has some good things to say on the subject I think: http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of these is true in the case of dealing with a person who has committed a crime (I disdain the word criminal as if it were a separate species). Such a person may be deterred from further crimes by some punishment and more to the point other persons may be deterred by the example. Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of these is true in the case of dealing with a person who has committed a crime (I disdain the word criminal as if it were a separate species). Such a person may be deterred from further crimes by some punishment and more to the point other persons may be deterred by the example. Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). Brent If our goal is a criminal justice system that is rational, ethical, and efficient, then do you think that it helps or hurts to frame the discussion in terms of traditional words like morality, responsibility, and free will - with all of their religious and pre-scientific connotations and baggage? So, looking at your original Dennett quote: If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. So apparently what he is saying is that it is his evaluation that anyone who concludes that determinism precludes free-will is most likely making that conclusion BECAUSE they themselves wish to avoid being subjected to positive or negative reinforcement whose intent is to produce optimal social conditioning. BUT, if I am in fact supportive of the rational, ethical, and efficient application of positive and negative reinforcements whose intent is to induce socially optimal behavior (even if I am the one being targeted by these inducements), BUT I still don't believe in free will or moral responsibility in the sense that those words are traditionally used (e.g., to justify retribution, instead of only deterrence and rehabilitation), then haven't I shown Dennett to be wrong? I think the American criminal justice system is nowhere near rational, ethical, or efficient...and I think that Dennett's compatiblist word games are more likely to hinder attempts to correct this than to help. And the same goes for other areas, like addressing poverty and economic inequality. Not because Dennett's ENTIRE system leads to bad things, but because if you just look at parts of it without grasping the full context, then it seems to uphold the status quo approach of retribution first, deterrence second, and rehabilitation third if at all. And the idea that the system is fine, and that people *only* have themselves to blame for their poverty or other undesirable situation. And of course, as Stathis pointed out, Dennett isn't the first compatiblist, or the only compatibilist...but he's by far the most vocal and prominent. So...we've wandered way off topic. But Dennett really irks me. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). A further thought: the solution to crime in A Clockwork Orange has a similar problem...it's singular focus on the individual, while ignoring the problems of the system within which the individual developed. So obviously if you have a person who has committed a crime, some action has to be taken. And you can't hand out hardship waivers left and right just because the criminal can plausibly point to some event in his past as a causal factor. The crime was committed, and a credible threat of negative reinforcement has to be maintained for the sake of deterrence. But rehabiitation isn't necessarily punishment...it could even be viewed as positive reinforcement, AND it's in everyone's interest..perpetrator, society at large, as well as victims. Further, if there's some common denominator amongst perpetrators of crimes, such as poverty, and we want to reduce crime, why not raise the priority of programs to reduce poverty instead of building more prisons and passing 3-strikes type laws? Obviously nobody is pro-poverty, but I think framing the issue in terms of personal responsibility and free-will incorrectly pushes the debate away from systemic solutions towards an excessive focus on individuals. Though, obviously there are no perfect solutions, and violence will always be with us. BUT, Dawkins' tone in the link I sent sounds much closer to the right attitude than the vibe I get from Dennett. But again, Dennett is mainly interested in pushing his Bright agenda...showing that Atheists are just like everybody else. But if everybody else are somewhat less than admirable (or at the very least, less than rational) in their attitudes towards the maladjusted members of society, then I don't see this as a big win. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). A further thought: the solution to crime in A Clockwork Orange has a similar problem...it's singular focus on the individual, while ignoring the problems of the system within which the individual developed. So obviously if you have a person who has committed a crime, some action has to be taken. And you can't hand out hardship waivers left and right just because the criminal can plausibly point to some event in his past as a causal factor. The crime was committed, and a credible threat of negative reinforcement has to be maintained for the sake of deterrence. But rehabiitation isn't necessarily punishment...it could even be viewed as positive reinforcement, AND it's in everyone's interest..perpetrator, society at large, as well as victims. Further, if there's some common denominator amongst perpetrators of crimes, such as poverty, and we want to reduce crime, why not raise the priority of programs to reduce poverty instead of building more prisons and passing 3-strikes type laws? Of course the easiest, and 100% effective way to reduce crime is to repeal laws. About 1/3 of our prison population is there because of non-violent drug use crimes. Obviously nobody is pro-poverty, Actually I think some are. Note the outcry from various business groups when it is suggested that the way to stop illegal immigration is to punish those who hire them. Why would they want to have access to illegal aliens? Because illegal aliens are poor and they will therefore be willing to work cheap. but I think framing the issue in terms of personal responsibility and free-will incorrectly pushes the debate away from systemic solutions towards an excessive focus on individuals. I'd say it depends on whether we have systemic solutions or individual solutions. Though, obviously there are no perfect solutions, and violence will always be with us. BUT, Dawkins' tone in the link I sent sounds much closer to the right attitude than the vibe I get from Dennett. But again, Dennett is mainly interested in pushing his Bright agenda...showing that Atheists are just like everybody else. Seems like you're mainly interested in picking a fight with Dennett. I don't recall him mentioning either Brights or atheists in either Elbow Room or Freedom Evolves, his two books on compatibilist free will. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 12:43 AM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Obviously nobody is pro-poverty, but I think framing the issue in terms of personal responsibility and free-will incorrectly pushes the debate away from systemic solutions towards an excessive focus on individuals. Or, another way of saying it might be: I think framing the issue in terms of personal responsibility and free-will incorrectly pushes the debate away from preventative positive reinforcement for individuals who are in a group with a high demonstrated risk of committing crimes, towards an excessive focus on negative reinforcement for individuals what have been already been convicted of committing crimes. While there are limits to what is practically possible, I think we have been lax in pursuing this angle. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 1:04 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: But again, Dennett is mainly interested in pushing his Bright agenda...showing that Atheists are just like everybody else. Seems like you're mainly interested in picking a fight with Dennett. I don't recall him mentioning either Brights or atheists in either Elbow Room or Freedom Evolves, his two books on compatibilist free will. Probably you should check out Breaking The Spell, which I haven't read either, but I've seen him give interviews on it. I don't have any problem with Dennett per se...probably he's a fine person. He makes cider, and is a sculptor, and likes to sail. All sounds good. And I don't know what his views on all the various social issues are, like crime or immigration or universal healthcare, so I can't oppose him on any of those grounds...for all I know we agree on everything. AND he may even be right...if you convert everyone to atheism, then they may be more inclined to think rationally about things, and everything will improve as a result. Including my pet issues. BUT...to me it looks like he's going about it the wrong way. His views on free will look like unhelpful word games. Determinism is determinism and there's no way to make it compatible with the traditional meaning of free will. If you have an alternate definition of all the free will that's worth having, then we should come up with a new term for that. Bright-will maybe. And his views on qualia don't raise my opinion of him much either. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 1:04 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Of course the easiest, and 100% effective way to reduce crime is to repeal laws. About 1/3 of our prison population is there because of non-violent drug use crimes. Indeed, I'm on board with that. But, I don't see that happening anytime soon. Americans love to send people to prison. It's the national pastime. http://www.cato-unbound.org/2009/03/11/glenn-loury/a-nation-of-jailers/ I put the ultimate blame on an exaggerated emphasis on personal responsibility, plus a naive belief in libertarian free will. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 3:59 AM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing Asking whether free will is compatible with determinism is like asking whether unicorns are compatible with zebras. Dennett says Yes, unicorns ARE compatible with zebras. But by unicorns he really means regular horses with fake horns strapped to their foreheads. So, everything that Dennett says is true...from a certain point of view. All you have to do is accept his alternate set of definitions. Though, again, one has to wonder what Dennett's goal is in providing non-traditional definitions for very traditional words like responsibility, altruism, morals, and free will. To me it looks like social engineering. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ I was aware of these facts. But a good SEP article nonetheless, thanks! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
2009/9/2 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), BUT to show that determinism is compatible with continued social order and cohesion (which it is...probably). Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Flammarion wrote: On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing I think Dennett's point is that compatibilist free-will has all the chracteristics of free-will that people usually think are important - it's all the free-will worth having. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing I think Dennett's point is that compatibilist free-will has all the chracteristics of free-will that people usually think are important - it's all the free-will worth having. I'm not convinced by that either --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a result of the universe's constant pushiness. I AM responsible if we use Dennett's non-standard definition of responsible, however. No you are not, because none of the above hypothetical events were caused by who you are, your brains and experience and values. There would be no point in rewarding or punishing you for those actions because they are not instances of *your* behavior - unless you try to make yourself very big. So if you want to redefine responsibility in terms of the utilitarian applicability of positive and negative reinforcement with the goal of producing socially optimal behavior, that's fine with me. Redefine? You haven't defined it at all - you just assert examples and assert that they are common usage. I think my definition corresponds very well with common usage. But that's not the common usage. And I think it would be better to abandon the term responsibility and go with something less entangled with antediluvian notions of libertarian free will...which is basically consistent with the common usage. And again, my question stands with respect to why you introduced that quote into this thread. It seemed apropos of your view that determinism eliminates the self. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 2:17 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Redefine? You haven't defined it at all - you just assert examples and assert that they are common usage. Pshaw. You asked for an operational definition, and I gave you one. Perhaps you should reread my email. You may have missed it. All the brackets can get confusing. I think my definition corresponds very well with common usage. Ha! I disagree. You must hang out with a better educated crowd than I do. And again, my question stands with respect to why you introduced that quote into this thread. It seemed apropos of your view that determinism eliminates the self. How so? I don't see it. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 1 Sep, 03:52, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem will eventually be considered a philosophical curiosity like how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. If we learn to build machines, robots, artificial brains, that behave as if they were conscious we'll stop worrying about perceptual qualia and phenomenal self-reference and instead we'll talk about visual processing and memory access and other new concepts that'll be invented. Perhaps we could explore the consequences of this view for life as experienced. Given, presumably, that future changes in terminology or explanatory style won't fundamentally change the nature of our qualitative experience, how do you feel this might ultimately be accommodated in the explanatory scheme? David Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our conscious experience. It just is. Depends on what you want an explanation in terms of. So all that we have to work with are our observations, plus our innate reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these two things are not enough to determine what, if anything, really exists outside of our experience. At best, we can take our observations and apply our innate reasoning processes to produce theoretical models that are consistent with what we have observed. Right. Forget the really real and I'll settle for a good model. Kant covered all this I think. So first, the theories on offer, carried to their logical conclusions, don't take you anywhere. They all hit explanatory dead ends: Unless (my favorite) they're circular. The universe came into being uncaused, for no reason, and everything else follows. Or the universe exists eternally, but with no explanation for why this should be or why it takes the form that it does. Or the platonically existing infinities of computational relations between all the numbers do not just represent but inexplicably cause our conscious experience of a material universe. Why? Because that's the way it is. Second, even if any of these things are true, there's no way that *from inside that system* we can justify our belief that the theory is true (as opposed to just consistent with conscious observation). And third, even if true, the bottom line for all of them is, conscious experience just is what it is. The problem with that is that is applies equally to everything. So it's completely devoid of meaning. For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem will eventually be considered a philosophical curiosity like how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. If we learn to build machines, robots, artificial brains, that behave as if they were conscious we'll stop worrying about perceptual qualia and phenomenal self-reference and instead we'll talk about visual processing and memory access and other new concepts that'll be invented. In this case the bits of matter being in the particular configurations that they are in is just a bare fact. The universe, considered in its entirety, just is that way. So the conscious experience that goes with that particle configuration just is a bare fact. But, by all means, continue with your theoretical system building. We have to do something to pass the time, after all. But, to revisit your original question: Where are you trying to get? Okay, I gave you my answer. So, where are YOU trying to get? If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Right. If you define yourself as Well sure. That makes it easy, and that's what Dennett does. Just makes up arbitrary definitions that suit his ends. On the contrary he was criticizing that way of defining yourself. And of course definitions of words are arbitrary - we just chose the words. If things were that way, that's the way they'd be alright. But, the question is, are things that way?
Re: Against Physics
On 31 Aug, 20:51, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say something like that and have it mean something entirely different than it would under common usage. The goal being to convince people that a deterministic world-view doesn't drastically change anything, and therefore they shouldn't be alarmed by it. All the moral and ethical beliefs you had before are still basically true! (IF you redefine all the words so that they mean something different than what you took them to mean before.) Rex, (a lot) earlier on in this thread you responded sympathetically to my suggestion that our 'ownership' of willing and acting is necessarily borrowed or inherited from the generalised context from which our self-concept is abstracted. Broadly, this is the brunt of Dennett's aphorism. Whereas I part company with him on experiential eliminativism on quite separate grounds, I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. The key to this I think is avoidance of any notion that as 'individuals' we are other than metaphorically distinguishable from the generalised context which is our larger 'personality'. Any such idea of separation immediately seems to put our will and action into conflict with its will and action. But in fact there is no such separation of I and it, there is simply a theatre of willing and acting. Furthermore, common usage can still be retained in this comprehension of our personal theatre of action as a subset of the whole, in that when we examine our inherited responsibility, we find ourselves to be neither more nor less constrained, and by no different considerations, than under any 'dualistic' conception. David On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the actuality of doing so. Your formulation divorces you from from everything and leaves you as a kind of ghost. Well, that's physicalism for you. I'm not saying that it's my view...which is why I said assuming physicalism. Brent If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say something like that and have it mean something entirely different than it would under common usage. The goal being to convince people that a deterministic world-view doesn't drastically change anything, and therefore they shouldn't be alarmed by it. All the moral and ethical beliefs you had before are still basically true! (IF you redefine all the words so that they mean something different than what you took them to mean before.) Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. It's all just sophistry, to advance his Bright agenda. Which I have nothing against per se...a world full of Brights would be an improvement over the current situation I think. But his Bright propaganda isn't at all helpful in trying to understand the underlying nature of reality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give interviews. So that sounds like Dennett alright - rearranging deck chairs, redefining words, whatever it takes. From the wikipedia article on Freedom Evolves: In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term. So, as I said, you can't read quote of Dennett and accept it at face value, because Dennett doesn't restrict himself to traditional definitions of terms. You have to interpret Dennett's quotes within the context of his web of alternate, non-traditional compatibilist word definitions. Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with free will (which it isn't), BUT to show that determinism is compatible with continued social order and cohesion (which it is...probably). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, based on the initial conditions of the universe plus the laws of physics. Given those two things, my choice is a forgone conclusion. Assuming UDA/platonism...the same holds true. My experience of choosing exists eternally amongst the infinities of computational relations between all the numbers. Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:10 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/11 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the right to whisk a mysteriously powerless ghost of it back later by sleight of intuition) is clearly false (incomplete is the more politic term). Why can't self-access be existent but non-fundamental? Because in that case self-access is just a term of convenience for the more fundamental processes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 31 Aug, 19:15, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not some external force pulling your strings based on the initial conditions of the universe plus the laws of physics. Given those two things, my choice is a forgone conclusion. Assuming the laws of the universe are deterministic Assuming UDA/platonism...the same holds true. My experience of choosing exists eternally amongst the infinities of computational relations between all the numbers. Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, based on the initial conditions of the universe plus the laws of physics. Given those two things, my choice is a forgone conclusion. Assuming UDA/platonism...the same holds true. My experience of choosing exists eternally amongst the infinities of computational relations between all the numbers. Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the actuality of doing so. Your formulation divorces you from from everything and leaves you as a kind of ghost. Brent If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/11 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the right to whisk a mysteriously powerless ghost of it back later by sleight of intuition) is clearly false (incomplete is the more politic term). Why can't self-access be existent but non-fundamental? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:30 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not some external force pulling your strings Let me put it this way: Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my brain up for me. In other words, assuming physicalism, my brain will do what my brain is going to do given that the state of the universe and the laws of physics are what they are. Assuming physicalism, experience is just an acausal aspect of matter and energy. There is no me except as a term of convenience for particular configurations of matter and energy. Physicalism is based on the principle of sufficient reason, under which nothing happens that isn't caused. The interactions of matter and energy are apparently do not have special exceptions for consciousness to influence how the system develops. So, under physicalism there either is no consciousness (except as a term of convenience), or consciousness is epiphenemonal...caused but acausal. I'll leave it to you to translate that into terms of pulling strings. Indeterminism doesn't get you any further, as it just inserts a roll-of-the-dice element into the rules that govern (or describe) the evolution of the system along its time dimension (whatever time is). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:30 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not some external force pulling your strings Let me put it this way: Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my brain up for me. In other words, assuming physicalism, my brain will do what my brain is going to do given that the state of the universe and the laws of physics are what they are. Assuming physicalism, experience is just an acausal aspect of matter and energy. There is no me except as a term of convenience for particular configurations of matter and energy. Physicalism is based on the principle of sufficient reason, under which nothing happens that isn't caused. Quantum mechanics is probabilistic - many events are not caused in the sense of sufficient reason. The interactions of matter and energy are apparently do not have special exceptions for consciousness to influence how the system develops. So, under physicalism there either is no consciousness (except as a term of convenience), or consciousness is epiphenemonal...caused but acausal. I'll leave it to you to translate that into terms of pulling strings. Indeterminism doesn't get you any further, Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Brent as it just inserts a roll-of-the-dice element into the rules that govern (or describe) the evolution of the system along its time dimension (whatever time is). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the actuality of doing so. Your formulation divorces you from from everything and leaves you as a kind of ghost. Well, that's physicalism for you. I'm not saying that it's my view...which is why I said assuming physicalism. Brent If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say something like that and have it mean something entirely different than it would under common usage. The goal being to convince people that a deterministic world-view doesn't drastically change anything, and therefore they shouldn't be alarmed by it. All the moral and ethical beliefs you had before are still basically true! (IF you redefine all the words so that they mean something different than what you took them to mean before.) Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. It's all just sophistry, to advance his Bright agenda. Which I have nothing against per se...a world full of Brights would be an improvement over the current situation I think. But his Bright propaganda isn't at all helpful in trying to understand the underlying nature of reality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the actuality of doing so. Your formulation divorces you from from everything and leaves you as a kind of ghost. Well, that's physicalism for you. I'm not saying that it's my view...which is why I said assuming physicalism. Brent If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say something like that and have it mean something entirely different than it would under common usage. The goal being to convince people that a deterministic world-view doesn't drastically change anything, and therefore they shouldn't be alarmed by it. All the moral and ethical beliefs you had before are still basically true! (IF you redefine all the words so that they mean something different than what you took them to mean before.) Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Brent It's all just sophistry, to advance his Bright agenda. Which I have nothing against per se...a world full of Brights would be an improvement over the current situation I think. But his Bright propaganda isn't at all helpful in trying to understand the underlying nature of reality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our conscious experience. It just is. So all that we have to work with are our observations, plus our innate reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these two things are not enough to determine what, if anything, really exists outside of our experience. At best, we can take our observations and apply our innate reasoning processes to produce theoretical models that are consistent with what we have observed. Kant covered all this I think. So first, the theories on offer, carried to their logical conclusions, don't take you anywhere. They all hit explanatory dead ends: The universe came into being uncaused, for no reason, and everything else follows. Or the universe exists eternally, but with no explanation for why this should be or why it takes the form that it does. Or the platonically existing infinities of computational relations between all the numbers do not just represent but inexplicably cause our conscious experience of a material universe. Why? Because that's the way it is. Second, even if any of these things are true, there's no way that *from inside that system* we can justify our belief that the theory is true (as opposed to just consistent with conscious observation). And third, even if true, the bottom line for all of them is, conscious experience just is what it is. For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. In this case the bits of matter being in the particular configurations that they are in is just a bare fact. The universe, considered in its entirety, just is that way. So the conscious experience that goes with that particle configuration just is a bare fact. But, by all means, continue with your theoretical system building. We have to do something to pass the time, after all. But, to revisit your original question: Where are you trying to get? Okay, I gave you my answer. So, where are YOU trying to get? If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Right. If you define yourself as Well sure. That makes it easy, and that's what Dennett does. Just makes up arbitrary definitions that suit his ends. If things were that way, that's the way they'd be alright. But, the question is, are things that way? And if you say so, what's your full reasoning? I mean your reasoning that takes into account the entire ontological stack of what exists, of course -- since I don't see any discussing an arbitrary subset of what exists that you've conveniently carved out to make some rhetorical point about what seems perfectly straightforward to you given some particular context. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our conscious experience. It just is. Depends on what you want an explanation in terms of. So all that we have to work with are our observations, plus our innate reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these two things are not enough to determine what, if anything, really exists outside of our experience. At best, we can take our observations and apply our innate reasoning processes to produce theoretical models that are consistent with what we have observed. Right. Forget the really real and I'll settle for a good model. Kant covered all this I think. So first, the theories on offer, carried to their logical conclusions, don't take you anywhere. They all hit explanatory dead ends: Unless (my favorite) they're circular. The universe came into being uncaused, for no reason, and everything else follows. Or the universe exists eternally, but with no explanation for why this should be or why it takes the form that it does. Or the platonically existing infinities of computational relations between all the numbers do not just represent but inexplicably cause our conscious experience of a material universe. Why? Because that's the way it is. Second, even if any of these things are true, there's no way that *from inside that system* we can justify our belief that the theory is true (as opposed to just consistent with conscious observation). And third, even if true, the bottom line for all of them is, conscious experience just is what it is. The problem with that is that is applies equally to everything. So it's completely devoid of meaning. For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem will eventually be considered a philosophical curiosity like how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. If we learn to build machines, robots, artificial brains, that behave as if they were conscious we'll stop worrying about perceptual qualia and phenomenal self-reference and instead we'll talk about visual processing and memory access and other new concepts that'll be invented. In this case the bits of matter being in the particular configurations that they are in is just a bare fact. The universe, considered in its entirety, just is that way. So the conscious experience that goes with that particle configuration just is a bare fact. But, by all means, continue with your theoretical system building. We have to do something to pass the time, after all. But, to revisit your original question: Where are you trying to get? Okay, I gave you my answer. So, where are YOU trying to get? If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Right. If you define yourself as Well sure. That makes it easy, and that's what Dennett does. Just makes up arbitrary definitions that suit his ends. On the contrary he was criticizing that way of defining yourself. And of course definitions of words are arbitrary - we just chose the words. If things were that way, that's the way they'd be alright. But, the question is, are things that way? And if you say so, what's your full reasoning? You're the one who keeps saying it is what it is. Brent I mean your reasoning that takes into account the entire ontological stack of what exists, of course -- since I don't see any discussing an arbitrary subset of what exists that you've conveniently carved out to make some rhetorical point about what seems perfectly straightforward to you given some particular context. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our conscious experience. It just is. Depends on what you want an explanation in terms of. I want an explanation that explains what's really real and how that connects to my conscious experience. BUT, I see now that this apparently isn't possible, even in principle. And even if physicalism or platonism were answers to what's really real...those answers don't mean anything. So. That's a bummer. So all that we have to work with are our observations, plus our innate reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these two things are not enough to determine what, if anything, really exists outside of our experience. At best, we can take our observations and apply our innate reasoning processes to produce theoretical models that are consistent with what we have observed. Right. Forget the really real and I'll settle for a good model. Hmmm. Well, apparently that's as good as it gets. So I reckon you have the right attitude. And third, even if true, the bottom line for all of them is, conscious experience just is what it is. The problem with that is that is applies equally to everything. So it's completely devoid of meaning. Yep. I don't see it as a problem. That's just the way it is. For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem will eventually be considered a philosophical curiosity like how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. If we learn to build machines, robots, artificial brains, that behave as if they were conscious we'll stop worrying about perceptual qualia and phenomenal self-reference and instead we'll talk about visual processing and memory access and other new concepts that'll be invented. I'd say that when we actually have such robots will be when interest in the hard problem will peak. We're just in the early stages of this process now. But, I think there is no answer to the hard problem, and at some point you just have to get on with things. So practical considerations will ultimately rule the day. If it's convenient to treat such robots as conscious entities then we will, otherwise we won't. It seems unlikely that we would design a robot to feel much suffering, and certainly not to display human-like signs of suffering...so can you be cruel or abusive to something that doesn't suffer? Seems unlikely. So maybe there is no robot parallel to the animal-rights type ethics to worry about. If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Right. If you define yourself as Well sure. That makes it easy, and that's what Dennett does. Just makes up arbitrary definitions that suit his ends. On the contrary he was criticizing that way of defining yourself. And of course definitions of words are arbitrary - we just chose the words. Right. And Dennett is choosing his words carefully, so as to advance his social re-engineering agenda. He want's to keep the idea of responsibility for utilitarian reasons..it's hard to keep a society going without it, and so he redefines it's meaning to be compatible with determinism. It's not responsiblity in the common usage, it's Dennettian compatibilist responsibility. He just shortens the latter to plain responsibility in an attempt to mislead the unwary. The common usage of responsibility may not be logical, but it has a definite meaning, and it's not the meaning that Dennett assigns to it in that quote. Dennett knows this, but he wants society to adopt his terminology and view point, so he keeps throwing it out there in the hopes that it'll stick. If determinism is true, then there is no responsibility (common usage). My acts are an inevitable result of the initial state of the universe and the laws that govern its evolution...neither of which are my doing. I get neither credit nor blame for anything, as events could not have transpired other than they did. You (and Dennett) can redefine responsiblity and then say, there, you have that. But this is a change from the common usage...and so effectively a new word. As far as I know Dennett isn't contesting
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our conscious experience. It just is. Depends on what you want an explanation in terms of. I want an explanation that explains what's really real and how that connects to my conscious experience. BUT, I see now that this apparently isn't possible, even in principle. And even if physicalism or platonism were answers to what's really real...those answers don't mean anything. So. That's a bummer. So all that we have to work with are our observations, plus our innate reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these two things are not enough to determine what, if anything, really exists outside of our experience. At best, we can take our observations and apply our innate reasoning processes to produce theoretical models that are consistent with what we have observed. Right. Forget the really real and I'll settle for a good model. Hmmm. Well, apparently that's as good as it gets. So I reckon you have the right attitude. And third, even if true, the bottom line for all of them is, conscious experience just is what it is. The problem with that is that is applies equally to everything. So it's completely devoid of meaning. Yep. I don't see it as a problem. That's just the way it is. For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from this? None. Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem will eventually be considered a philosophical curiosity like how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. If we learn to build machines, robots, artificial brains, that behave as if they were conscious we'll stop worrying about perceptual qualia and phenomenal self-reference and instead we'll talk about visual processing and memory access and other new concepts that'll be invented. I'd say that when we actually have such robots will be when interest in the hard problem will peak. We're just in the early stages of this process now. But, I think there is no answer to the hard problem, and at some point you just have to get on with things. So practical considerations will ultimately rule the day. If it's convenient to treat such robots as conscious entities then we will, otherwise we won't. It seems unlikely that we would design a robot to feel much suffering, and certainly not to display human-like signs of suffering...so can you be cruel or abusive to something that doesn't suffer? Seems unlikely. So maybe there is no robot parallel to the animal-rights type ethics to worry about. If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room Every word in your quote, except for, has to be considered in the context of Dennett's special terminology. Seems prefectly straightforward to me. If you define yourself as something apart from the physical processes that move your arms and legs then you avoid responsibility for what your arms and legs do. Right. If you define yourself as Well sure. That makes it easy, and that's what Dennett does. Just makes up arbitrary definitions that suit his ends. On the contrary he was criticizing that way of defining yourself. And of course definitions of words are arbitrary - we just chose the words. Right. And Dennett is choosing his words carefully, so as to advance his social re-engineering agenda. He want's to keep the idea of responsibility for utilitarian reasons..it's hard to keep a society going without it, and so he redefines it's meaning to be compatible with determinism. It's not responsiblity in the common usage, Sure it is. It's what justifies reward and punishment. it's Dennettian compatibilist responsibility. He just shortens the latter to plain responsibility in an attempt to mislead the unwary. The common usage of responsibility may not be logical, but it has a definite meaning, and it's not the meaning that Dennett assigns to it in that quote. And what meaning is that? Can you give an operational definition, an ostensive definition, any definition other than it is what it is? Dennett knows this, but he wants society to adopt his terminology and view point, so he keeps throwing it out there in the hopes that it'll stick. If determinism is true, then there is no responsibility (common usage). My acts are an inevitable result of the initial state of
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:12 AM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room If determinism is true, then there is no responsibility (common usage). My acts are an inevitable result of the initial state of the universe and the laws that govern its evolution...neither of which are my doing. I get neither credit nor blame for anything, as events could not have transpired other than they did. If you push me, and I stumble and fall into a guy who then ends up in getting run over by a train...I am not responsible (common usage) for his death. If you push me, and I stumble and fall into a guy who then ends up falling into a pile of money which he gets to keep...I'm not responsible (common usage) for his new wealth. Assuming determinism, the universe has been pushing me since the moment I was conceived, and at every instant I have responded in the *only way* that it was physically possible for me to respond. In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a result of the universe's constant pushiness. I AM responsible if we use Dennett's non-standard definition of responsible, however. No you are not, because none of the above hypothetical events were caused by who you are, your brains and experience and values. There would be no point in rewarding or punishing you for those actions because they are not instances of *your* behavior - unless you try to make yourself very big. Brent Because he has specifically crafted his definition for this purpose, as a means to an end of making determinism more palatable to the masses. Or maybe because he doesn't like the logically inconsistent common usage and he just wants people to adopt his usage, but he has no other agenda. But, either way, common usage responsibility and Dennettian compatibilist responsibility are not the same. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Right. And Dennett is choosing his words carefully, so as to advance his social re-engineering agenda. He want's to keep the idea of responsibility for utilitarian reasons..it's hard to keep a society going without it, and so he redefines it's meaning to be compatible with determinism. It's not responsiblity in the common usage, Sure it is. It's what justifies reward and punishment. In the common usage it is what justifies the death penalty. In the common usage, responsibility justifies vengence, as well as deterrence and rehabilitation. it's Dennettian compatibilist responsibility. He just shortens the latter to plain responsibility in an attempt to mislead the unwary. The common usage of responsibility may not be logical, but it has a definite meaning, and it's not the meaning that Dennett assigns to it in that quote. And what meaning is that? Can you give an operational definition, an ostensive definition, any definition other than it is what it is? In the common usage responsibility implies that the buck stops here. Not because it's convenient, not because you choose not to pass the buck, but because it literally stops here. The causal chain should not be traced further back. We don't need to worry about your childhood conditions, or how much your mommy and daddy loved you, or whether you are a good person, or hoped for better things. There's no point in examining the conditions that led to your action, because YOU are responsible for that action, and you will bear the full weight of the consequences. Not because you will learn something. Not because it will produce better behavior in the future. Not because it will deter others from acting as you did. But because you are responsible. That's the common usage. And, given determinism, I say there's no such thing. Given determinism, the whole concept is crazy. Dennett also says there's no such thing, but he wants to claim the word and re-purpose it for his own uses. Not because it's such a great word that rolls off the tongue, but because he wants to pull a slight of hand, and keeps it's law-and-order, no-nonsense, tough-on-crime-tough-on-criminals connotations while changing it's actual definition. Dennett knows this, but he wants society to adopt his terminology and view point, so he keeps throwing it out there in the hopes that it'll stick. If determinism is true, then there is no responsibility (common usage). My acts are an inevitable result of the initial state of the universe and the laws that govern its evolution...neither of which are my doing. I get neither credit nor blame for anything, as events could not have transpired other than they did. First, some things may be random (like the way your brain developed). Not given determinism, right? And Dennett isn't arguing against determinism. He's arguing FOR compatibilism. Second, the utilitarian definition of responsibility - something that justifies you being punished or rewarded for you actions - applies *only* if what you do is determined by your experience. I know. Animal training basically. Social conditioning. But that's not the common usage. In my experience at least. Usage determines meaning. Otherwise there would be no justification for giving you the experience of reward or punishment. Reward and punishment probably aren't the right words. Probably we should say positive and negative reinforcement. You (and Dennett) can redefine responsiblity and then say, there, you have that. But this is a change from the common usage...and so effectively a new word. You haven't defined it at all. In fact you seem to assert it doesn't exist and hence no one is allowed to define it. I actually would rather not have it used. The word responsibility carries too much moralistic libertarian free will baggage I think. I think the common usage of responsibility is nonsense, and trying to redefine it more logically while keeping the old connotations just results in confusion and continued irrational thinking amongst the Old Testament-inclined. SO, with that in mind...what were you implying when you added that quote? What was your motivation? What were you accusing me of? In short...why did you introduce that Dennett quote into this thread? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 1:17 AM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: SO, with that in mind...what were you implying when you added that quote? What was your motivation? What were you accusing me of? In short...why did you introduce that Dennett quote into this thread? Probably I should have started with this question in my initial response! Ha! But Dennett is my pet peeve. The guy really irks me. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a result of the universe's constant pushiness. I AM responsible if we use Dennett's non-standard definition of responsible, however. No you are not, because none of the above hypothetical events were caused by who you are, your brains and experience and values. There would be no point in rewarding or punishing you for those actions because they are not instances of *your* behavior - unless you try to make yourself very big. So if you want to redefine responsibility in terms of the utilitarian applicability of positive and negative reinforcement with the goal of producing socially optimal behavior, that's fine with me. But that's not the common usage. And I think it would be better to abandon the term responsibility and go with something less entangled with antediluvian notions of libertarian free will...which is basically consistent with the common usage. And again, my question stands with respect to why you introduced that quote into this thread. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 26 Aug 2009, at 05:26, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 9:50 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness recently, and I realised - I think for the first time - that his own double-aspect theory of information is effectively a reformulation, in less 'professionally-embarrassing' lingo, of eastern metaphysics! Indeed, Chalmers' double-aspect theory of information seemed like a good starting point when I first read it 18 months or so ago, but I guess the question is where do you go from there? Chalmers did a great job of articulating the mind-body problem, and I think in defending his initial position, but he doesn't seem to have made much progress in the 14 or so years since then. BUT, then...I guess that's the hard part for you. Though, just in the last month, I think I've kind of shifted gears here. Why should consciousness be an aspect of information (or anything else)? Why not consider information an aspect of consciousness? In an earlier thread, Brent mentioned Hume, and in response you referenced Kant, BUT I'm not very familiar with either. But just in the last week I've discovered that Kant has already given some thought to this topic, and kindly summarized his views in A Critique of Pure Reason! Who knew??? So now I'm interested in reading up on Kant, and particularly G. E. Schulze's subsequent response in Aenesidemus. SO...if you've already been down this path, then I'd be interested to hear your thoughts. Though, obviously since A Critique of Pure reason was written in 1781, and yet we're still here discussing it almost 230 years later, it didn't offer any conclusive answers...but still... Of course even before Hume and Kant, we have Leibniz in Monadology (1714): Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. BUT, I think my general criticism is that we seem to be mistaking descriptions of what we are conscious of, with an explanation of consciousness itself. So, for instance, if Bruno is correct in his mathematical theory of the origins of consciousness...what does that mean, really? Ultimately, how is it different than saying consciousness exists uncaused, but by pure chance there are these interesting patterns that can be seen in this record of our past observations. Chance is also a sort of filling-gap explanations. Assuming mechanism, chance cannot work. It cannot explain regularities. It cannot explain why we remain in stable realities. Be it matter or consciousness we may try theories, instead of postulating an absence of explanation at the start. Some theories can then explain why some phenomenological gaps have to exist, due to our embedding in reality/realities. SO...I dunno. Bruno made the dreaded accusation of solipsism, but I'm not sure how you avoid ending up there (at least in the epistemological sense of there being a limit to what can be known), regardless of which direction you go. You can take the long way, or you can take the short way, but all roads do seem to ultimately lead to some variety of solipsism. The only question is what kind of scenery will you get along the way. H. All babies are solipsist. We start from solipsism. Solipsism is correct, from the first person point of view. But science begins when we start betting in a third or perhaps a zero-person view, a transcendental reality, be it a universe, a god, a way (tao). We need this if only to be able to accept other minds, other consciousness, other people. Then we can make theories. Now, all universal machine does have that solipsist part, and we can explain why, and what exists beyond. A lot of what you say makes sense, but more as a description of important data, than as an attempt toward an explanation. Once you accept that something else (third person) can have a first person view, be it a machine, an animal, a human, an extraterrestrial entity or a god, you have to accept that solipsism, although an accurate feature of consciousness, is inaccurate as a fundamental explanation. We can believe in something greater than ourself. Somehow, the belief in matter is an intermediate between the correct, but third person pointless solipsism, and the many incorrect, but corrigible, pointers toward
Re: Against Physics
On 17 Aug, 01:02, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Rex Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness recently, and I realised - I think for the first time - that his own double-aspect theory of information is effectively a reformulation, in less 'professionally-embarrassing' lingo, of eastern metaphysics! AFAICS he's basically saying that a) 'intrinsic' existence is qualitative; and b) the 'physical' is based on second-order 'causal relations' derived from an 'extrinsic' viewpoint embedded in a). It's worth quoting his short excursion into metaphysical speculation at the end: This could answer a concern about the causal relevance of experience - a natural worry, given a picture on which the physical domain is causally closed, and on which experience is supplementary to the physical. Hm... Worrying indeed! He goes on to say: The informational view allows us to understand how experience might have a subtle kind of causal relevance in virtue of its status as the intrinsic nature of the physical. This metaphysical speculation is probably best ignored for the purposes of developing a scientific theory, but in addressing some philosophical issues it is quite suggestive. Of course, he could as well have said: The informational view allows us to understand how the physical might have a subtle kind of causal relevance in virtue of its status as the extrinsic nature of experience. This metaphysical speculation is probably best ignored for the purposes of developing a scientific theory, but in addressing some philosophical issues it is quite suggestive. So IOW the subtle causal relevance of what he terms the intrinsic is in constituting what exists. Not so subtle perhaps ;-) And the - no doubt equally subtle? - relevance of the extrinsic is in being the shareable account of what happens after that. I guess one might indeed find this suggestive! http://consc.net/papers/facing.html David On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I exist could be, perhaps, tautological. But Reality? I don't think so. Certainly not from inside. What is reality, beyond our conscious experience of existence? The conclusion will be that consciousness, or anything apprehended by a person in some stable way has to be realted to an infinity of relations between numbers. And most are not caused by a rule- following system. Given an infinity of relations between numbers to work with, wouldn't pretty much everything be representable? If so, then what is the significance of being able to represent the contents of our conscious experience, including a represention of our lack of comprehension as to how a symbolic self-representing relation individuate into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia? In fact, here, this pen on my desk. To me, that pen now represents my lack of comprehension as to how a symbolic self-representing relation individuates into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia. There, that wasn't so hard. What is the significance of this? If there's no significance to my pen representing this, then what is the significance of using relations between numbers to represent the same thing? So I can (sort of) see how a logical machine might symbolically represent reality in this way. BUT, this doesn't answer the question of why there should be a conscious experience associated with the machine symbolically representing reality this way. Does it? It does not. That is why it is the assumption of the theory. The working hypothesis. The light in the dark. Okay this is related to my point above and is the core of my problem with your view, and with physicalism due to it's similar assumption. And then, the beauty of it, is that, ONCE the assumption is done, we can understand fully and rationally why we cannot understand how a symbolic self-representing relation individuate into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia. Your understanding boils down to: here is a mathematical model that represents our situation, and which may have some practical use in predicting what we will observe in the future. Why will it correctly predict what we observe? Because that's the way things are. Will it always predict what we will observe? Well, either it will or it won't. We can't know in advance. We'll see. What we CAN be sure of is that with an infinity of relations between numbers at our disposal, if at some point we observe something that is inconsistent with the predictions of this model, we can find a NEW model that is consistent with both old and new observations! So, please see my last response to Brent about subjective explanations and virtual-gas, I think it's relevant! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 9:50 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness recently, and I realised - I think for the first time - that his own double-aspect theory of information is effectively a reformulation, in less 'professionally-embarrassing' lingo, of eastern metaphysics! Indeed, Chalmers' double-aspect theory of information seemed like a good starting point when I first read it 18 months or so ago, but I guess the question is where do you go from there? Chalmers did a great job of articulating the mind-body problem, and I think in defending his initial position, but he doesn't seem to have made much progress in the 14 or so years since then. BUT, then...I guess that's the hard part for you. Though, just in the last month, I think I've kind of shifted gears here. Why should consciousness be an aspect of information (or anything else)? Why not consider information an aspect of consciousness? In an earlier thread, Brent mentioned Hume, and in response you referenced Kant, BUT I'm not very familiar with either. But just in the last week I've discovered that Kant has already given some thought to this topic, and kindly summarized his views in A Critique of Pure Reason! Who knew??? So now I'm interested in reading up on Kant, and particularly G. E. Schulze's subsequent response in Aenesidemus. SO...if you've already been down this path, then I'd be interested to hear your thoughts. Though, obviously since A Critique of Pure reason was written in 1781, and yet we're still here discussing it almost 230 years later, it didn't offer any conclusive answers...but still... Of course even before Hume and Kant, we have Leibniz in Monadology (1714): Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. BUT, I think my general criticism is that we seem to be mistaking descriptions of what we are conscious of, with an explanation of consciousness itself. So, for instance, if Bruno is correct in his mathematical theory of the origins of consciousness...what does that mean, really? Ultimately, how is it different than saying consciousness exists uncaused, but by pure chance there are these interesting patterns that can be seen in this record of our past observations. So Brent made the assertion that The ability to predict is an excellent measure of understanding. But if your predictions are all *caused* by the same system that you are making predictions about, and that same system is also then *causing* your judgments about the accuracy of the predictions, then I don't think that his assertion is necessarily true. You could not have understood other than you did, you could not have predicted other than you did, and you could not have judged the accuracy of the prediction other than you did. There was no freedom in any of these things. In effect...there was no understanding, there was no prediction, and there was no judgement...it was all just the system going through it's motions, which for some reason resulted in an epiphenomenal EXPERIENCE of understanding, prediction, and judgement. And I think that this was part of the discussion between Kant, Reinhold, Schulze, et al. For example: As determined by the Critique of Pure Reason, the function of the principle of causality thus undercuts all philosophizing about the where or how of the origin of our cognitions. All assertions on the matter, and every conclusion drawn from them, become empty subtleties, for once we accept that determination of the principle as our rule of thought, we could never ask, 'Does anything actually exist which is the ground and cause of our representations?'. We can only ask, 'How must the understanding join these representations together, in keeping with the pre-determined functions of its activity, in order to gather them as one experience?' -- Gottlob Ernst Schulze SO...I dunno. Bruno made the dreaded accusation of solipsism, but I'm not sure how you avoid ending up there (at least in the epistemological sense of there being a limit to what can be known), regardless of which direction you go. You can take the long way, or you can take the short way, but all roads do seem to ultimately lead to some variety of solipsism. The only question is what kind of scenery will you get along the way. H.
Re: Against Physics
On 17 Aug 2009, at 02:02, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I exist could be, perhaps, tautological. But Reality? I don't think so. Certainly not from inside. What is reality, beyond our conscious experience of existence? This is what we are supposed to be interested. I believe in the consciousness of someone different for me, for example. I believe in math and in our ability to share it. The conclusion will be that consciousness, or anything apprehended by a person in some stable way has to be realted to an infinity of relations between numbers. And most are not caused by a rule- following system. Given an infinity of relations between numbers to work with, wouldn't pretty much everything be representable? What makes you believe that all relations between numbers are representable? It is just false by Cantor theorem (soon (re)explained). But if you don't believe in some amount of math, Cantor theorem will not help. You position look closer and closer to solipsism. If so, then what is the significance of being able to represent the contents of our conscious experience, including a represention of our lack of comprehension as to how a symbolic self-representing relation individuate into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia? In fact, here, this pen on my desk. To me, that pen now represents my lack of comprehension as to how a symbolic self-representing relation individuates into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia. There, that wasn't so hard. What is the significance of this? If there's no significance to my pen representing this, then what is the significance of using relations between numbers to represent the same thing? The significance comes from the computationalist hypothesis. See my url for detailed explanations. But, again, if you think that sentences like there is an infinity of prime numbers depends on consciousness, then it will not help. So I can (sort of) see how a logical machine might symbolically represent reality in this way. BUT, this doesn't answer the question of why there should be a conscious experience associated with the machine symbolically representing reality this way. Does it? It does not. That is why it is the assumption of the theory. The working hypothesis. The light in the dark. Okay this is related to my point above and is the core of my problem with your view, and with physicalism due to it's similar assumption. It is problem you will have with all non-solipsists. Well, even with other solipsists. And then, the beauty of it, is that, ONCE the assumption is done, we can understand fully and rationally why we cannot understand how a symbolic self-representing relation individuate into an incommunicable, non doubtable, lived qualia. Your understanding boils down to: here is a mathematical model that represents our situation, and which may have some practical use in predicting what we will observe in the future. Why will it correctly predict what we observe? It is not a model. It is the theory/guess/hypothesis.assumption. It is the widespread belief that the brain/body is locally a machine, or that it is turing emulable. I am studying its consequences. I'm afraid you are solipsist. This is an irrefutable position, true by definition as lived by any first person, and false once we bet on a reality independent of oneself (as usual in science and society). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
I'm afraid you are solipsist. Ha! Ouch! But it's not quite as simple as that. I don't deny that there MAY be something that causes consciousness, BUT if there is...this ultimately doesn't matter. In the final view, the conclusion is the same...consciousness experience just is what it is. Further, I definitely don't deny the existence of conscious experiences other than mine. And there's nothing I've said that implies this. In fact, I've explicitly said the exact opposite in a response to David in this very thread. So, if I'm a solipsist, so are you, and so is basically everyone EXCEPT those who believe (somehow) in libertarian free will. Which you and I and David at least have all disavowed as being a nonsensical concept. SO, in our last couple of emails we focused on the explanatory gap...which is really just the wakeup call that something's out of whack with our view of reality. It's not part of the core argument I'm making. My main argument is not even really *against* your theory...my argument relates to what your theory means if it is true (which it may be, who knows): If numbers and their relations exist timeless and uncaused, and our consciousness is (to use your description) the view from inside a local summary of the infinities of computational relations between all the numbers, THEN our conscious experiences are also objectively timeless, aren't they? And so they can all be viewed as existing simultaneously, even if they have the subjective feel of being sequential when experienced from the inside. If these conscious experiences all exist necessarily as a consequence of the infinities of computational relations between all the numbers (TIOCRBAN), then they just exist. There is no reason that TIOCRBAN have this conscious aspect, it's just the way arithmetical reality is. So, why do you feel the desire to understand conscious experience? Well, this desire is a timeless and eternal consequence of TIOCRBAN. This conscious experience of desire that you feel in this moment has always existed and will always exist in TIOCRBAN. Will you succeed in your quest? Trick question! The future already exists! If you succeed, this success already exists timelessly and eternally in TIOCRBAN. In fact, maybe a Bruno experience of success AND of failure both exist somewhere within TIOCRBAN. The entire collection of Bruno's conscious experiences just exist. And they just are what they are. This feeling of effort that you have of working towards your goal...it just exists. There is no effort, only the experience of effort. The feeling of understanding when you learn something new? There is no understanding OR learning...there is only the experience of these things, caused by the intrinsic nature of TIOCRBAN, and like TIOCRBAN existing timelessly and eternally. If TIOCRBAN causes your conscious experiences, then TIOCRBAN do all of the work. Your conscious experience is just along for the ride as an aspect, a facet, of TIOCRBAN. Further, if TIOCRBAN just exists, uncaused and timeless, then your experiences also just exist as an aspect of TIOCRBAN and thus also uncaused and timeless. If there is no reason behind the nature of TIOCRBAN, then there is no reason behind the nature of your conscious experiences. No explanation is possible, only description. Right? How could it be otherwise? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex, (I guess the unsigned text below came from you) thanks for your one-liner gemstone of a definition on Conscious Experience! John Mikes On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:04 PM, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. I think a facet/gemstone analogy is appropriate here: The facet doesn't exist separate from the gemstone, and can't be considered independently of the gemstone. Neither can the gemstone be considered independently of it's facets. Conscious experience being the gemstone, and 'meaning' be a facet of that gemstone, of course. (Just trying to reduce the target size for Brent's one-line zingers!) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 17, 2009 at 5:20 PM, John Mikesjami...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, (I guess the unsigned text below came from you) thanks for your one-liner gemstone of a definition on Conscious Experience! John Mikes Indeed! Thanks John, glad you liked it! On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:04 PM, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. I think a facet/gemstone analogy is appropriate here: The facet doesn't exist separate from the gemstone, and can't be considered independently of the gemstone. Neither can the gemstone be considered independently of it's facets. Conscious experience being the gemstone, and 'meaning' be a facet of that gemstone, of course. (Just trying to reduce the target size for Brent's one-line zingers!) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. This has no meaning for me. It is like saying don't ask. Hm. You don't at all see what I'm trying to say? Okay, how about this: Reality is tautological. I exist could be, perhaps, tautological. But Reality? I don't think so. Certainly not from inside. So if our conscious experience is caused by a rule-following system, based on a sequence of determinisitc transforms applied to an initial state...and this is true of both physicalism and your theory I think...then our conscious experience just is what it is. Tautology. Everything that follows was implicit in the setup. It is hard for me to understand. First in the comp theory, consciousness is not caused by a rule- following system. The most we can say is that my consciousness is preserved through a local substitution of my body. This can be done with remaining agnostic on what is and where consciousness comes from. The conclusion will be that consciousness, or anything apprehended by a person in some stable way has to be realted to an infinity of relations between numbers. And most are not caused by a rule- following system. And there's no obvious reason that the unpacked version, where what follows is made *explicit*, shouldn't be considered as a whole - with the beginning, middle, and end states seen as existing simultaneously and timelessly. This makes the view that it just is what it is even more obvious. Well, I can accept this for the true relations between numbers, and that is a motivation for a comp-like theory. But neither consciousness nor matter are tautological there. Important, and certainly fundamental in some sense: yes. But secondary and emerging from the numbers. Also, what do your theory say about accepting or not an artificial brain? IF consciousness is caused, then whether you accept or not is a forgone conclusion, implicit in the initial setup (initial state + transformation rules) of the system that caused your conscious experience. I think, with all my respect, that you missed the movie-graph argument. Consciousness is not caused or produced by anything which could be described by a system or a theory. Consciousness is more a view from inside. It is a view of the border between the mechanical and the non mechanical, and it is not something caused by something. Locally it is more something causing something. So there is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. If consciousness is UNCAUSED and fundamental, then...same answer. There is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. I have the same opinion on the notion of causality and of free-will. Those are higher-order logical/semantical construction. More generally, how do you see the relation between brain and conscience? Brains only exist as something that we consciously perceive. If by we you mean the universal machine, and really all of them, then I can make sense from your sentence. If by we you mean the animal of the planet earth, I doubt it. In our plausibly shared long history, the moebas invented the cable even before going out of the sea. Remember that with comp a brain is not a physical object. It is local summary of infinities of computational (in the math sense) relations between all the numbers. I'm sure that my brain can be viewed as representing the contents of my experience. And I'm sure that a computer program could also be written that would represent the contents of my conscious experience and whose representational state would evolve as the program ran so that it continued to match the contents of my experience over time. But this would not mean that the program was conscious, or that my brain is the source of my consciousness. We are in complete agreement here. But then you can say yes to the doctor, and follows the consequence of the hypothesis that your personal consciousness don't see any change. You see Rex, I have never been happy with the idea of those who say that matter or physics, is fundamental-basic, and to say that consciousness is fundamental-basic seems to me the same sort of don't ask principle. The living brain and the executing computer program both just represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way that a map represents the actual terrain. Assuming comp there is a big difference, which is that when you say yes to the doctor, you don't say yes because he put the right map in your skull, you say yes because it put the right relevant relative number. The artificial brain will just simulate your biological brain, but it will, supposing the doctor has choose the right level,
Re: Against Physics
2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are real. Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences. I deeply disagree here. Even to understand a word like content I have to believe in some more basic entities which are not conscious. Ah. This may even be the subtlest point of all. The context is conscious 'of' the content. The content isn't itself conscious 'of'. But since both context and content are 'constructed' of the same basic entities, this can't be a fundamental distinction. Hence the distinction must be one of relation. To introduce a new vocabulary is difficult. I would like to talk in terms of mutual access and mutual relativisation as being basic to entities and their relations. What is conscious 'of' what, can then be understood in terms of the evolution such basic entities towards mutually-relating, mutually-accessing levels of content-in-context. Why, if we are machine, there must be a quale (an incommunicable but feelable measure) related to some modal apprehension of ourself relatively to other universal number. PS I would be pleased if someone can suggest a better wording for feelable? The distinction looked for is between what is directly apprehendable-in-context, and what is communicable out-of-context. This distinction is of course absolutely crucial - consequently often missed - and hence the source of continual and widespread confusion. The context in question is that of the knower. What is in-context is both what the knower knows, and the terms in which it is known. What is communicable is what can be abstracted, or 'taken out-of-context'. What is lost in the abstraction is precisely the terms in which it is known; these can only be restored in the context of another knower. So, the 'feelable' seems to be the context in which the knowable is known. Perhaps we could say that the feelable is the contextual self-measure, of which the communicable is the abstractable content. David http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote: ... Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. ? I can't accept this, because I am interested in the how and why of complexity of things and happenings. So you can look for patterns in what you observe, and interesting ways to represent what you have observed in the past. Not just that. I look for understanding. I criticize enough the scientists who confuse description and prediction with explanation. I disagree that this a confusion. A description of something you don't understand in terms of something you do understand is one form of explanation. The ability to predict is an excellent measure of understanding. I think the only confusion comes from conflating different kinds of explanation or thoughtlessly switching from one to another. I would say that your explanation of the world is a descriptive one and basing it on arithmetic is appealing because we understand arithmetic. And I think you agree that if it makes false predictions it fails as an explanation. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. I think a facet/gemstone analogy is appropriate here: The facet doesn't exist separate from the gemstone, and can't be considered independently of the gemstone. Neither can the gemstone be considered independently of it's facets. Conscious experience being the gemstone, and 'meaning' be a facet of that gemstone, of course. (Just trying to reduce the target size for Brent's one-line zingers!) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 16 Aug 2009, at 18:35, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote: ... Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. ? I can't accept this, because I am interested in the how and why of complexity of things and happenings. So you can look for patterns in what you observe, and interesting ways to represent what you have observed in the past. Not just that. I look for understanding. I criticize enough the scientists who confuse description and prediction with explanation. I disagree that this a confusion. A description of something you don't understand in terms of something you do understand is one form of explanation. The ability to predict is an excellent measure of understanding. OK. I think the only confusion comes from conflating different kinds of explanation or thoughtlessly switching from one to another. OK. I would say that your explanation of the world is a descriptive one and basing it on arithmetic is appealing because we understand arithmetic. And I think you agree that if it makes false predictions it fails as an explanation. Absolutely so. Note that comp gives a lot of choice, besides arithmetic, for the ontic, and justify that independence. From the ontic view there are equivalent. From the epistemological view, also, but for the internal view themselves, things get different, if only due to history and geography. The contingent hides the necessary. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. But weren't you were arguing that your view of explanation and meaning as 'uncaused', in some ultimate sense, rendered them pointless? My rejoinder was that the point of departure for any existential encounter is always contextual - or situated - and our task is to explore ways of relating meaningfully to this situation; hence to deplore the lack of an appeal to 'external' justification amounts to 'false consciousness'. Do you agree? As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. Well, meaning is a facet of our mutual situation, which is revealed in consciousness. David I think a facet/gemstone analogy is appropriate here: The facet doesn't exist separate from the gemstone, and can't be considered independently of the gemstone. Neither can the gemstone be considered independently of it's facets. Conscious experience being the gemstone, and 'meaning' be a facet of that gemstone, of course. (Just trying to reduce the target size for Brent's one-line zingers!) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. But weren't you were arguing that your view of explanation and meaning as 'uncaused', in some ultimate sense, rendered them pointless? My rejoinder was that the point of departure for any existential encounter is always contextual - or situated - and our task is to explore ways of relating meaningfully to this situation To find subjective meaning in the situation, sure. It's pointless, but we have to do something to pass the time. And I mean have to in the sense that we are compelled to...either by causes beyond ourselves (e.g., as a side effect of electrons and quarks going about their business), or just because that's what our conscious experience is of and so we are tautologically dragged along behind it. ; hence to deplore the lack of an appeal to 'external' justification amounts to 'false consciousness'. Do you agree? Uhh. I don't think so, but you lost me after the semi-colon. As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. Well, meaning is a facet of our mutual situation, which is revealed in consciousness. Mutual??? I'm looking around in my conscious experience and I don't see YOUR conscious experience anywhere! What's this mutual stuff? You presume too much David! When it comes to conscious experience, you're on your own, buddy. So I know my conscious experience exists. So clearly conscious experience is possible. I don't know of any reason why other conscious experiences can't exist, so I'm willing to believe that another conscious experience exists which is qualitatively similar to mine, though apparently different in content (since we aren't writing the same emails and agreeing on every point). But, I don't draw any further conclusions than that. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 5:08 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: There seems to be a lot switching back and forth between cause and meaning and explanation as though were interchangable. And even those have different modes, e.g. first cause, effective cause, proximate cause,... Meaning=standing for something else. Meaning=having inherent value (to someone). Are you saying that you find my argument to be incoherent? Or that you get the gist of what I'm saying, but that my presentation left a lot to be desired? In the latter case: Point taken. I will try to be more careful in my use of those terms. In the former case: Well. Hmm. I agree that one can always ask Why? as children sometimes do; and the ultimate answer is, Because I say so. So you may well say, Things are just what they are. So, a nice rhetorical flourish in comparing me to a child, but at a substantive level there's a significant difference between Because I say so and things just are what they are, right? Things just are what they are means that no further explanation is possible, even in principle. And at some point that actually becomes the case. Wouldn't you say? It can be said and meant literally. Because I say so. Well, I'm not sure what this means. Obviously it's not meant to be taken literally. Right? Or do you suffer from a god-complex of some sort? If so, my condolences for your affliction. (see? I can be condescending too!) that doesn't mean that we cannot have and explanation of QM and gravity and consciousness, and after than an explanation of the explanation ad infinitum. Well, with respect to QM and gravity, I think this is in keeping with my previous point about putting conscious experience at the base of the ontological/epistemological stack, rather than at the top. So yes, I agree with you are saying here. It seems reasonable that the explanatory process could go on ad infinitum, where by explanatory process I mean the process of generating narratives that are consistent with what we observe. And this process doesn't depend on what really exists. It only depends on what we observe. If we are in a physical world, a computer simulation, or Platonia, the process is the same. The process is one of generating narratives that are meaningful in the context of your subjective consciously experienced observations. The process is a subjective process. The meaning that you get from the process is subjective meaning...it means something TO YOU. It means nothing in an absolute sense. If it meant something in an objective, absolute sense then the process wouldn't produce the same results in a physical world, a computer simulation, and in Platonia. As for consciousness, the above applies, but let me also take this opportunity to deploy this great argument that I heard somewhere: An explanation must be of something less known in terms of something better known. Since nothing can be better known than our own subjective experience, it cannot be explained. So I guess I'm unclear on your point. Are you advising that we give up all explanation and just chant It is what it is. So originally I came to this list to clarify my thinking on what causes conscious experience. BUT, as a result of the discussions here and elsewhere, I have concluded that if consciousness is caused, then it just is what it is. Which, incidentally is also true of consciousness if it is uncaused. This point is most clear if you think of the physical universe in static block time terms (regardless of whether it is actually static in this way). The block in it's entirety just exists, with whatever properties it came into being with. If it is all that exists, then you can't go outside of it for further explanation. Nothing more can be said. Maybe it has a regular, predictable structure that extends all the way through. Maybe it is riddled with random uncaused transitions (QM anyone?). But either way, there's no explanation for these things. Only description. And if this physical universe is the cause of our conscious experiences, then they also just exist. So as for the chanting, well no. The scientific narrative process that we engage in (described above), caused or uncaused, will continue or it won't...we have no choice in that, or in anything else. But under all imaginable circumstances I think it is clear that it is a subjective process with subjective meaning. It provides no access to the absolute view of what actually exists...the pursuit of such access is futile. The veil of conscious experience (if it is a veil covering something more basic, and isn't itself fundamental as I believe), can't be pierced, even theoretically. Yes, I know it's circular. Thats the point. But I think it can be a virtuous rather than a vicious circle, and the wider the circle the more virtuous. I don't think my views as outlined above are necessarily in direct conflict with this. It just depends on
Re: Against Physics
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. But weren't you were arguing that your view of explanation and meaning as 'uncaused', in some ultimate sense, rendered them pointless? My rejoinder was that the point of departure for any existential encounter is always contextual - or situated - and our task is to explore ways of relating meaningfully to this situation To find subjective meaning in the situation, sure. It's pointless, but we have to do something to pass the time. And I mean have to in the sense that we are compelled to...either by causes beyond ourselves (e.g., as a side effect of electrons and quarks going about their business), or just because that's what our conscious experience is of and so we are tautologically dragged along behind it. When you qualify meaning as 'subjective' - which I would prefer to render as inter-subjective or contextual - this again implies the expectation that meaning must be legitimated from some notionally 'objective' pole - i.e. external to the context in which it is situated. My point is not merely that this *isn't* so, but that it *can't* be. Also, recall the insight that explanatory entities such as those you cite are not transcendent, but intrinsic, to our own natures. These aren't causes beyond ourselves: 'their' business is intrinsically *our* business. By the way, the idea of 'non-interactive' parallelism is one of the more toxic dualistic by-products of the confusion over the participatory nature of our presence in the scheme of things. It falls victim to Occam at every turn. In particular, consider why evolution would select highly complex self-reflecting discriminators to exploit a sentient relation that was merely an illusory coincidence. If you re-read Chalmers in this light I think you will see that it is precisely the notion that physics (or any explanatory schema) can be 'causally closed' independent of sentience that leads to such a pusillanimous and (literally) disempowering conclusion. ; hence to deplore the lack of an appeal to 'external' justification amounts to 'false consciousness'. Do you agree? Uhh. I don't think so, but you lost me after the semi-colon. The burden of my argument is that when we see that meaning is *inescapably* contextual we can also see that it is not life that is 'pointless', but rather the whole idea that the 'point' is something that must be derived from something absolutely transcendent, or 'outside' the system. This is not merely of tangential interest, either: it's the confusion that is central to the on-going dispute between fundamentalism and the spirit of liberal enquiry. As I think my virtual-gas example illustrated, meaning is subjective, like conscious experience. That shared property of subjectivity is significant I think. What I think I can safely say is: meaning is a facet of conscious experience, not something that exists separately from (or independent of) conscious experience. Well, meaning is a facet of our mutual situation, which is revealed in consciousness. Mutual??? I'm looking around in my conscious experience and I don't see YOUR conscious experience anywhere! What's this mutual stuff? You presume too much David! When it comes to conscious experience, you're on your own, buddy. So I know my conscious experience exists. So clearly conscious experience is possible. I don't know of any reason why other conscious experiences can't exist, so I'm willing to believe that another conscious experience exists which is qualitatively similar to mine, though apparently different in content (since we aren't writing the same emails and agreeing on every point). But, I don't draw any further conclusions than that. ;-) Permit me to smile (in friendly good humour!) I think that the level of engagement you display demonstrates a stronger intuition of mutuality than your analysis implies. Best David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Brent and 1Z (the twins...a dynamic duo of blunt skepticism): On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back to it's ultimate source. That's silly. If my wife's car won't start and I explain that it's out of gas, that's really an explanation even if I don't know why it's out of gas. he operational definition of an explanation of an event is what you would do to effect or prevent that event. Oh. Is that what we're interested in here? Operationally defined explanations? I apologize. I had not realized. I thought we were discussing deeper issues. So sure, if you want to stick to operational explanations, things are pretty straightforward. Physics is indeed the language for operational explanations and perhaps we should confine ourselves to discussions of the latest developments in physics. I propose a name change, from the Everything List to Everything Physics-related List. Though, actually, I thought that we were discussing the *ultimate* underlying nature of reality. Not operational explanations that provide us with strategies for avoiding car problems in that reality. So, upon further reflection, I think I'm in the right list. You, however, may not be. Okay, sarcasm over, though I think my point above is valid. BUT, actually I do very much appreciate your response, as it forces me to examine, clarify, and articulate my own thoughts. Which is the whole point of this exercise I think. So, the only thing worse than a negative response is no response! Ha! In general there are multiple things you could do and hence multiple causes of an event. There are many ways the history of the world could have played out differently that would have resulted in your wife's car not having an empty gas tank (many of them quite gruesome) but if physicalism is correct then there's only ONE way the world DID play out...and that is the causal structure that led to your wife's situation. The image of a causal chain leading back to an ultimate link is misleading - it is more like causal chain mail that branches out as you trace it back. I follow your meaning, but it just means that the chain is a directed acyclic (presumably!) graph, that can be divided into layers, with each layer viewed as a link in the chain. But there must be a base layer, right? An infinite past is a possibility too, I suppose, but I don't think that negates my argument, it just changes the wording a bit. But let's not go there just yet. But just because you can't trace it back to a single ur-cause doesn't nullify my advice to my wife to put gas in the tank. Okay, two scenarios: 1) Physicalism is true, you're in the real world, and your wife ran out of gas. 2) Physicalism is true, you're in a computer simulation of the real world, and your virtual-wife ran out of virtual-gas. SO, in both scenarios, your operational approach to explanation is useful. But it isn't meaningful in the context of what I take us to be discussing: the underlying nature of reality. Your operational explanations have SUBJECTIVE MEANING. Not absolute meaning. If they had absolute meaning, then they wouldn't apply in both scenario 1 and scenario 2. My point is that there IS NO absolute meaning. And where there is no meaning, there can be no explanation. In an absolute sense, things just are what they are. Tautology. BUT if we take an identical block of granite to be something that just exists uncaused, like our universe, then there can be no explanation. There can in the same way QM explains the decay of unstable nuclei. That's what cosmogonists are searching for. Same argument as above. QM is a theoretical framework that is consistent with our observations. As such, it has subjective meaning, since observations are subjective. Anywhere you subjectively make the same types of observations that you make here on earth, then QM will be a good framework to use when attempting to anticipate future events. Even if you are *really* in a computer simulation. What are unstable nuclei? They are nuclei that have lower energy configurations that they can relatively easily be jostled into. Why are those other configurations lower energy? Why the relative ease of jostling? Why does there exist a phenomenon capable of jostling in the right way? Because that's the way things work in this universe. Apparently. But if the laws of physics were different, then what we observed would be different. If physicalism is true, maybe there are yet other universes with different physical laws out there where all nuclei are stable. Unstable nuclei just cannot form under those alternate laws. Seems possible, right? The existence of unstable nuclei is consistent with our observations. Even if they don't actually exist, using them as theoretical constructs
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: Brent and 1Z (the twins...a dynamic duo of blunt skepticism): On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back to it's ultimate source. That's silly. If my wife's car won't start and I explain that it's out of gas, that's really an explanation even if I don't know why it's out of gas. he operational definition of an explanation of an event is what you would do to effect or prevent that event. Oh. Is that what we're interested in here? Operationally defined explanations? I apologize. I had not realized. I thought we were discussing deeper issues. So sure, if you want to stick to operational explanations, things are pretty straightforward. Physics is indeed the language for operational explanations and perhaps we should confine ourselves to discussions of the latest developments in physics. I propose a name change, from the Everything List to Everything Physics-related List. Though, actually, I thought that we were discussing the *ultimate* underlying nature of reality. Not operational explanations that provide us with strategies for avoiding car problems in that reality. So, upon further reflection, I think I'm in the right list. You, however, may not be. Okay, sarcasm over, though I think my point above is valid. BUT, actually I do very much appreciate your response, as it forces me to examine, clarify, and articulate my own thoughts. Which is the whole point of this exercise I think. So, the only thing worse than a negative response is no response! Ha! In general there are multiple things you could do and hence multiple causes of an event. There are many ways the history of the world could have played out differently that would have resulted in your wife's car not having an empty gas tank (many of them quite gruesome) but if physicalism is correct then there's only ONE way the world DID play out...and that is the causal structure that led to your wife's situation. The image of a causal chain leading back to an ultimate link is misleading - it is more like causal chain mail that branches out as you trace it back. I follow your meaning, but it just means that the chain is a directed acyclic (presumably!) graph, that can be divided into layers, with each layer viewed as a link in the chain. But there must be a base layer, right? An infinite past is a possibility too, I suppose, but I don't think that negates my argument, it just changes the wording a bit. But let's not go there just yet. But just because you can't trace it back to a single ur-cause doesn't nullify my advice to my wife to put gas in the tank. Okay, two scenarios: 1) Physicalism is true, you're in the real world, and your wife ran out of gas. 2) Physicalism is true, you're in a computer simulation of the real world, and your virtual-wife ran out of virtual-gas. SO, in both scenarios, your operational approach to explanation is useful. But it isn't meaningful in the context of what I take us to be discussing: the underlying nature of reality. Your operational explanations have SUBJECTIVE MEANING. Not absolute meaning. If they had absolute meaning, then they wouldn't apply in both scenario 1 and scenario 2. My point is that there IS NO absolute meaning. And where there is no meaning, there can be no explanation. In an absolute sense, things just are what they are. Tautology. There seems to be a lot switching back and forth between cause and meaning and explanation as though were interchangable. And even those have different modes, e.g. first cause, effective cause, proximate cause,... Meaning=standing for something else. Meaning=having inherent value (to someone). I agree that one can always ask Why? as children sometimes do; and the ultimate answer is, Because I say so. So you may well say, Things are just what they are. but that doesn't mean that we cannot have and explanation of QM and gravity and consciousness, and after than an explanation of the explanation ad infinitum. So I guess I'm unclear on your point. Are you advising that we give up all explanation and just chant It is what it is. Incidentally, there is a different form of explanation/cause which people schooled in logic tend to reject at first sight, but which I think actually has merit. Bruno wrote it once as: NUMBERS - MACHINE DREAMS - PHYSICAL - HUMANS - PHYSICS - NUMBERS Yes, I know it's circular. Thats the point. But I think it can be a virtuous rather than a vicious circle, and the wider the circle the more virtuous. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Against Physics
On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. This has no meaning for me. It is like saying don't ask. Hm. You don't at all see what I'm trying to say? Okay, how about this: Reality is tautological. So if our conscious experience is caused by a rule-following system, based on a sequence of determinisitc transforms applied to an initial state...and this is true of both physicalism and your theory I think...then our conscious experience just is what it is. Tautology. Everything that follows was implicit in the setup. And there's no obvious reason that the unpacked version, where what follows is made *explicit*, shouldn't be considered as a whole - with the beginning, middle, and end states seen as existing simultaneously and timelessly. This makes the view that it just is what it is even more obvious. Also, what do your theory say about accepting or not an artificial brain? IF consciousness is caused, then whether you accept or not is a forgone conclusion, implicit in the initial setup (initial state + transformation rules) of the system that caused your conscious experience. So there is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. If consciousness is UNCAUSED and fundamental, then...same answer. There is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. More generally, how do you see the relation between brain and conscience? Brains only exist as something that we consciously perceive. I'm sure that my brain can be viewed as representing the contents of my experience. And I'm sure that a computer program could also be written that would represent the contents of my conscious experience and whose representational state would evolve as the program ran so that it continued to match the contents of my experience over time. But this would not mean that the program was conscious, or that my brain is the source of my consciousness. The living brain and the executing computer program both just represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way that a map represents the actual terrain. Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. ? I can't accept this, because I am interested in the how and why of complexity of things and happenings. So you can look for patterns in what you observe, and interesting ways to represent what you have observed in the past. But this is as far as you can go I think. For the reasons outlined above. Your observations just are what they are. There's no real explanation for them...only pseudo-explanations. No explanation can be given for uncaused fundamental events or entities. But what are your assumptions about those entities? You theory does look like what the guardian G* tells to the enlightened machine G: you will not prove your consistency. But the machine can prove that IF she is consistent, then G* is right about that. So, on one level, I understand why you say so, and at another level I explain why you say so. So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are real. Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences. I don't have any assumptions about them. They just are what they are, because the conscious experience that contains them is what it is. Tautology. I *think* I'm leaning towards saying that a lot of this stuff about knowing is just a type of qualia. But I'm not sure. I'm still thinking that part out. understanding is a complex notion. Theories are not build to understand, but to get a coherent (hopefully correct) picture. So I think it's reasonable to speak as though quarks and electrons are real, if that helps the process of developing mathematical/narrative models that fit our observations. There are *useful fictions*, and then there's what actually is. Quarks and electrons are useful fictions. Conscious experience is what actually is. I think this is more obvious if you look at the system as a block universe, where time is treated as a sort of spatial dimension, and so all states of the system exist simultaneously, like my previous example of the block of granite. Why does state B follow state A? Why is slice B adjacent to slice A? Because that's just the way this uncaused system is. It is big amorphous blob. Weird theory. I don't see the relation with the universe, nor even with consciousness. So I'm saying that IF physicalism is true, then our universe is just like that. If physicalism is true then how else could it be? And if this physical universe is what causes our conscious experience, then our conscious experience is just like that. Why would arithmetical relationships result in conscious
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. This has no meaning for me. It is like saying don't ask. Hm. You don't at all see what I'm trying to say? Okay, how about this: Reality is tautological. So if our conscious experience is caused by a rule-following system, based on a sequence of determinisitc transforms applied to an initial state...and this is true of both physicalism and your theory I think...then our conscious experience just is what it is. Tautology. Everything that follows was implicit in the setup. And there's no obvious reason that the unpacked version, where what follows is made *explicit*, shouldn't be considered as a whole - with the beginning, middle, and end states seen as existing simultaneously and timelessly. This makes the view that it just is what it is even more obvious. Also, what do your theory say about accepting or not an artificial brain? IF consciousness is caused, then whether you accept or not is a forgone conclusion, implicit in the initial setup (initial state + transformation rules) of the system that caused your conscious experience. So there is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. If consciousness is UNCAUSED and fundamental, then...same answer. There is no real choice to accept or decline. Only the conscious experience of a choice. More generally, how do you see the relation between brain and conscience? Brains only exist as something that we consciously perceive. I'm sure that my brain can be viewed as representing the contents of my experience. And I'm sure that a computer program could also be written that would represent the contents of my conscious experience and whose representational state would evolve as the program ran so that it continued to match the contents of my experience over time. But this would not mean that the program was conscious, or that my brain is the source of my consciousness. The living brain and the executing computer program both just represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way that a map represents the actual terrain. When you set fire to a map the land doesn't burn. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 3:21 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: The living brain and the executing computer program both just represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way that a map represents the actual terrain. When you set fire to a map the land doesn't burn. If you set fire to the computer running the simulation of my brain and it's virtual environment, would my conscious experience burn? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Brent, On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every explanation needs to be a causal one. Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back to it's ultimate source. Or if you do, the ultimate source is itself uncaused. So, if you rephrase the answer in terms of ultimate causes, you end up inserting either unknown or uncaused everywhere. So causal explanations are subjective...only meaningful within a limited context. Going back to my granite block example: Let's consider two adjacent specks of white and gray found within a block of granite. Why are they adjacent? What caused them to be adjacent? Well, if we consider this block of granite within the context of our universe, then we can say that there is a reason in that context as to why they are adjacent. There is an explanation, which has to do with the laws of physics and the contingent details of the geologic history of the area where this block of granite was formed (which is in turn derived from the contingent details of the initial state of our entire universe). BUT if we take an identical block of granite to be something that just exists uncaused, like our universe, then there can be no explanation. The two specks are just adjacent. That's it. No further explanation is possible. So in the first case, the geologic explanation makes sense in a local subjective way, but not in an absolute way, because the universe that provides the context for the geologic explanation has no reason behind its initial state or it's governing laws of physics. The universe just is the way it is. Therefore, ultimately the block of granite just is the way it is. And being uncaused doesn't prevent explanation - for example decay of an unstable nucleus is uncaused, i.e. it is random, but it is still explained by quantum mechanics. So you can explain it within the context of the laws of our universe, but this just raises the question of why the laws of our universe are what they are. Ultimately your answer is: unstable nuclei decay because that's what unstable nuclei do. Tautology. I think you point is better made by observing that an explanation must be of something less known in terms of something better known. Since nothing can be better known than our own subjective experience, it cannot be explained. Well, that is pretty good. I'll file it away for future use. Thanks! So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. Now you've introduced another term meaningful explanation. If one can understand it, it must be meaningful. So when people find hidden messages in the Old Testament using the Bible Code, these are meaningful messages? Really? If something means something to me...that's subjective. It means something TO ME. I have a conscious experience of finding that thing meaningful. There's something that it's like to find it meaningful. Qualia. I'm not sure where I'm going with this point, but...I think it means something. To me. Ha! And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own uncaused rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. You seem to take the position that because knowledge isn't certain no knowledge is possible. Well, no. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the conscious experience of knowing is somehow more fundamental and important than what is known. If conscious experience is uncaused and acausal, then in some sense knowledge is irrelevant. Your uncaused experience could be of believing that you know something which is actually false (e.g., that 121 is prime). If conscious experience is caused, then knowledge is...still irrelevant. But for a different reason...in this case what you *can* know is determined by those external causes. You could be caused to believe that you *know something which is actually false (e.g., that 121 is prime). But if you then trace the causal chain back, you will never find what ultimately caused you to be wrong...when you phrase your answer in terms of the ultimate causes, it will just be I was wrong because that's the way the universe is. Do you see what I'm getting at with all of this uncaused stuff, and the equivalence between an uncaused universe and just an isolated uncaused conscious experience? At all? Anyone? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 3:21 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: The living brain and the executing computer program both just represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way that a map represents the actual terrain. When you set fire to a map the land doesn't burn. If you set fire to the computer running the simulation of my brain and it's virtual environment, would my conscious experience burn? No, it would cease. But note that you've changed to a virtual environment in which the whole world is simulated - not just your brain interacting with an external world. I think that's relevant. Intelligence and consciousness only exist relative to an environment because to be conscious is to be conscious of something, i.e. to have a point-of-view. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 14 Aug, 09:51, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Brent, On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every explanation needs to be a causal one. Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back to it's ultimate source. That doesn't mean anything else fares better. If conscious experience is uncaused and acausal, then in some sense knowledge is irrelevant. Your uncaused experience could be of believing that you know something which is actually false (e.g., that 121 is prime). It could if experience is causal, too. For instance ingesting LSD could cause you to believe that. Alternaitvely, if there is no causality guaranteeing that you believe the truth, maybe there is something else, such as Descartes' God implanting clear and distinct ideas in your head. If conscious experience is caused, then knowledge is...still irrelevant. But for a different reason...in this case what you *can* know is determined by those external causes. You could be caused to believe that you *know something which is actually false (e.g., that 121 is prime). But if you then trace the causal chain back, you will never find what ultimately caused you to be wrong...when you phrase your answer in terms of the ultimate causes, it will just be I was wrong because that's the way the universe is. You can still find out that you are wrong, often quite quickly. Knowiing that you re wrong is not the same as knowing ultimately why. I don't see how this adds up to the irrelevance of knowledge at all, Do you see what I'm getting at with all of this uncaused stuff, and the equivalence between an uncaused universe and just an isolated uncaused conscious experience? At all? Anyone? No me. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: Brent, On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every explanation needs to be a causal one. Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back to it's ultimate source. That's silly. If my wife's car won't start and I explain that it's out of gas, that's really an explanation even if I don't know why it's out of gas. The operational definition of an explanation of an event is what you would do to effect or prevent that event. In general there are multiple things you could do and hence multiple causes of an event. The image of a causal chain leading back to an ultimate link is misleading - it is more like causal chain mail that branches out as you trace it back. But just because you can't trace it back to a single ur-cause doesn't nullify my advice to my wife to put gas in the tank. Or if you do, the ultimate source is itself uncaused. So, if you rephrase the answer in terms of ultimate causes, you end up inserting either unknown or uncaused everywhere. So causal explanations are subjective...only meaningful within a limited context. Going back to my granite block example: Let's consider two adjacent specks of white and gray found within a block of granite. Why are they adjacent? What caused them to be adjacent? Well, if we consider this block of granite within the context of our universe, then we can say that there is a reason in that context as to why they are adjacent. There is an explanation, which has to do with the laws of physics and the contingent details of the geologic history of the area where this block of granite was formed (which is in turn derived from the contingent details of the initial state of our entire universe). BUT if we take an identical block of granite to be something that just exists uncaused, like our universe, then there can be no explanation. There can in the same way QM explains the decay of unstable nuclei. That's what cosmogonists are searching for. The two specks are just adjacent. That's it. No further explanation is possible. So in the first case, the geologic explanation makes sense in a local subjective way, but not in an absolute way, because the universe that provides the context for the geologic explanation has no reason behind its initial state or it's governing laws of physics. The universe just is the way it is. Therefore, ultimately the block of granite just is the way it is. And being uncaused doesn't prevent explanation - for example decay of an unstable nucleus is uncaused, i.e. it is random, but it is still explained by quantum mechanics. So you can explain it within the context of the laws of our universe, but this just raises the question of why the laws of our universe are what they are. Ultimately your answer is: unstable nuclei decay because that's what unstable nuclei do. Tautology. No, it's not a tautology because there is an underlying theory that explains why some nuclei are stable and some aren't and exactly how unstable they are. I think you point is better made by observing that an explanation must be of something less known in terms of something better known. Since nothing can be better known than our own subjective experience, it cannot be explained. Well, that is pretty good. I'll file it away for future use. Thanks! So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. Now you've introduced another term meaningful explanation. If one can understand it, it must be meaningful. So when people find hidden messages in the Old Testament using the Bible Code, these are meaningful messages? Really? If something means something to me...that's subjective. It means something TO ME. I have a conscious experience of finding that thing meaningful. There's something that it's like to find it meaningful. Qualia. I'm not sure where I'm going with this point, but...I think it means something. To me. Ha! And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own uncaused rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. You seem to take the position that because knowledge isn't certain no knowledge is possible. Well, no. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the conscious experience of knowing is somehow more fundamental and important than what is known. Was the conscious experience of knowing the Earth is flat more fundamental and important than the fact that the Earth is spherioidal? If conscious experience is uncaused and acausal, then in
Re: Against Physics
I owe Bruno and Brent a response also...it's in the works! David: On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 11:38 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The standard view of physics is that things are causally closed 'out there', and this seems to rule out that such causation can in any sense be 'owned' by us. Exactly. This is a good way of putting it. In this case our choices would be 'owned' by the physical universe as whole. Not just the bits of matter that had some causal influence on the choice, but also the physical laws by which that causal influence was transmitted. Illusions, it should be recalled, are not incorrect perceptions; the perceptions are correct, even if the object of perception is other than we imagine. And here it is precisely the ownership self-evidently present to us that requires explanation. I agree with this also. I think. The feeling of free will is a type of qualia. There's something that it's like to be in pain. There's something that it's like to make a decision. BUT I don't think this free will issue is a particularly crucial point. I could say more about it, but it seems like a tangent. Not entirely unrelated, but not central either. So I'll move on. My contention is that any causal schema must have these features even to begin to account for our presence in the context of what we observe. Causality. Causality. Causalty. Hmmm. So really I am arguing against causal explanations. I think this the core of my current argument. The feeling that something is happening *NOW* is just another example of qualia I think. The certainty of feeling that *that* caused *this*...more qualia. Causality doesn't get you anywhere, because it doesn't start cleanly. This is why I keep bringing up uncaused beginnings. If *this* happened because of *that*, then why did *that* happen? You can't get to the start of it in a way that makes sense. If you have the starting conditions (which are uncaused) and the laws that govern the evolution of the system (also uncaused), then the rest is basically a given, right? A mere formality. Anything that follows was implicit within the starting conditions and the governing laws. Every step in the evolution of the system can be seen as existing simultaneously with it's beginning. And as such the entire system JUST EXISTS. Uncaused. Acausal. Fundamental. If you exist within such a system, your entire experience exists as a result of the starting conditions and governing laws, and exists simultaneously with the system's beginning and all it's subsequent states. Again, there is no answer to any question of why in reference to the system. The system just is the way it is. It's starting conditions are axiomatic, it's governing rules are inferential, it's results are tautological. The reason this isn't more widely understood rests of course on the prestige of science, the authority of which has reached the point where we're apparently willing to take seriously the absurdity that the universe is a sterile pointless farago that could as well play out in the absence of all experience. I agree. A lot of inconvenient questions seem to have gotten swept under the rug. So as I've mentioned, it seems to me that science's role is to construct theoretical models that accurately match what we have observed. That's it. Nothing more, nothing less. But obviously they've had great success with this, thus their authority. But, as I mentioned above, it is what it is. Things will play out the way they play out. Tautology. BTW Rex, your recent presence on the list has been welcome and thought-provoking. Ah! Thanks, glad to hear it! It would be interesting to know a little about the background you bring to your thinking. Well, I have a BS in computer systems engineering, and 2 years of graduate school in the same, though I never quite got around to finishing my thesis, so no MSCSEG degree to show for my efforts. And I've been a computer programmer for 15 years, in various areas...mainly cartography, communications, business accounting software, web development, and gaming. So not to go into too much detail, but probably the key moments in the development of my philosophical world view were: 1) Realizing that deterministic classical physics meant no libertarian free will when I was 21 years old or so, about 2 minutes before a professor wrote on the chalk board in big letters NO FREE WILL. For those 2 minutes though, I was really thunderstruck. I thought Holy crap, this is incredible! Am I the first person to realize this??? So I spent the next 9 years or so trying to come to grips with the implications of that, which was hard, because I really wanted to take full credit for all the great things I'd done. But, then as my 30th birthday came and went, I decided maybe I didn't have that many great things to take credit for after all, so screw free will. Who needs it anyway. 2) My introduction to functionalism
Re: Against Physics
2009/8/13 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: Causality. Causality. Causalty. Hmmm. So really I am arguing against causal explanations. I think this the core of my current argument. The feeling that something is happening *NOW* is just another example of qualia I think. The certainty of feeling that *that* caused *this*...more qualia. Causality doesn't get you anywhere, because it doesn't start cleanly. This is why I keep bringing up uncaused beginnings. If *this* happened because of *that*, then why did *that* happen? You can't get to the start of it in a way that makes sense. I think there's the all-too-present risk of getting hung up on vocabulary here. Perhaps the sense of 'causal' you're having a problem with is summed up in Wittgenstein's (other ) well-known dictum: Not how the world is, but that it is, is the mystery. The sense in which I've been using it focuses on 'how', not 'that', which at least leaves us something to say. 1) Realizing that deterministic classical physics meant no libertarian free will when I was 21 years old or so, about 2 minutes before a professor wrote on the chalk board in big letters NO FREE WILL. For those 2 minutes though, I was really thunderstruck. I thought Holy crap, this is incredible! Am I the first person to realize this??? So I spent the next 9 years or so trying to come to grips with the implications of that, which was hard, because I really wanted to take full credit for all the great things I'd done. But, then as my 30th birthday came and went, I decided maybe I didn't have that many great things to take credit for after all, so screw free will. Who needs it anyway. Indeed. It doesn't get that much better after thirty either. But as we've said, the real insight only comes when we see *whose* will we're talking about. What we choose is ours; that part we can be sure of - the freedom bit is more of an exploration. But as they say, the sign of maturity is taking ownership. And exploring can be fun. 2) My introduction to functionalism and computationalism and some of the related issues like the strange implications of multiple realizeability via Hans Moravec's book Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind in the late 1990s. This gave me something to think about in my spare time for several years. Fascinating stuff. You've no doubt perused the ongoing and recent discussion of this stuff here and elsewhere. Bruno's work sheds real light on this, I believe. Again, if the 'ownership' issues aren't faced head-on: confusion and paradox. 3) AND, most recently, about 18 months ago, when I finally got around to reading David Chalmers' paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. I'd heard a little about the hard problem of consciousness prior to that, and I was familiar with the basic issues, but I didn't fully understand until that moment. It wasn't quite the shock that my free will discovery had been, but it was still a moment of revelation, where one second I didn't see the problem at all, and the next second I couldn't believe that I had failed to see it for so long. Yes, Chalmers' work has been a great stimulus, although in the end I think he finks out. He doesn't seem to get that the whole zombie thing is caused by his dogmatic assumption of the 'causal closure' of physics. He's still mesmerised by an epistemology he takes to have been incontrovertibly established as the unique ontological substrate (Theory of Everything - what a great slogan!) Or rather he seems to glimpse the problem - and what the fix is - but in the end he backs away into yet another version of epiphenomenal psycho-physical parallelism. This is what I mean by paradox and confusion. Since then I've put a lot more time into trying to understand what it all means. And I'm leaning towards concluding that it doesn't mean anything. It just is. Which is a strange conclusion to come to after 18 months of pretty intense thought... Yes, it can seem that it doesn't mean anything. But *you* mean something, don't you? Hang on though - just who is this 'you' anyway? Didn't we conclude earlier on that 'you' - your point of view, your experience, your intentions, your very 'self' - are just on loan from 'it'? Mightn't that suggest that 'it' has rights of possession on anything of 'yours'? Hmm... Still sure it doesn't mean anything? David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
thinking. David ~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ This message is part of the topic Against Physics in the Google Group Everything List for which you requested email updates. To stop receiving email updates for this topic, please visit the topic at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/t/62db6d02732f6725 -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 11 Aug 2009, at 07:13, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for the sake of the argument. So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm conscious OF are complex and structured, my conscious experience of these things is singular and indivisible. I can be OK with this. As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. This has no meaning for me. It is like saying don't ask. Also, what do your theory say about accepting or not an artificial brain? More generally, how do you see the relation between brain and conscience? Given that conscious experience is uncaused, it can't be explained in terms of other things, like quarks and electromagnetism or numbers and arithmetic. But quarck and electromanetism have been unified, and can be explain from more primitive things (group theory, invariance, etc.). Natural numbers are the rare object which we cannot derive from anything simpler. And natural numbers + addition and multiplication can explain why it has to be like that. This is indeed an argument for accepting numbers, or theories as rich as numbers, as giving the simplest primitive elements. And since Skolem, Gödel, etc. we know that arithmetical truth is *big*. Bigger that what any machine can really explore, but machine can dream about it, and get genuine big picture of it. Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. ? I can't accept this, because I am interested in the how and why of complexity of things and happenings. No explanation can be given for uncaused fundamental events or entities. But what are your assumptions about those entities? You theory does look like what the guardian G* tells to the enlightened machine G: you will not prove your consistency. But the machine can prove that IF she is consistent, then G* is right about that. So, on one level, I understand why you say so, and at another level I explain why you say so. understanding is a complex notion. Theories are not build to understand, but to get a coherent (hopefully correct) picture. And further, no meaningful explanation can be given for events or entities that are themselves *wholly* caused by uncaused events. These things just are. So let's say a closed system of entities comes into being uncaused. Any properties that the individual components of this system have are also uncaused, and the ways that the components interact are uncaused as well. This system is a universe unto itself. So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. You put something which cannot be explained in the hat. You get something which cannot be explained in the hat. The meaningless of it's initial state means that all subsequent states are equally meaningless in an absolute sense. All that we can do is describe what the system does. But description is not explanation. OK. Further, even if the system seems predictable, there is no reason to think that it will continue in it's predicitablity. And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own uncaused rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. I think this is more obvious if you look at the system as a block universe, where time is treated as a sort of spatial dimension, and so all states of the system exist simultaneously, like my previous example of the block of granite. Why does state B follow state A? Why is slice B adjacent to slice A? Because that's just the way this uncaused system is. It is big amorphous blob. Weird theory. I don't see the relation with the universe, nor even with consciousness. Looking for meaning in the system is like looking for hidden messages in randomly generated character strings. You may find them, but the messages can not have any real meaning, no matter how meaningful they look. In the conclusion I don't understand the last sentence, which seems to me a proposition for abandoning theorizing in that field. Well, the search for a theoretical model that is fully consistent what what we consciously observed is still a reasonable goal in terms of challenging intellectual endeavor. And if that's what your future conscious experiences hold for you, then that's what you will do (no free will here). Free will is an oxymoron. Free will makes sense for numbers. Machines are more fundamental than consciousness? Or machines are just a way of representing conscious experience?
Re: Against Physics
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for the sake of the argument. So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm conscious OF are complex and structured, my conscious experience of these things is singular and indivisible. As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. Given that conscious experience is uncaused, it can't be explained in terms of other things, like quarks and electromagnetism or numbers and arithmetic. Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every explanation needs to be a causal one. And being uncaused doesn't prevent explanation - for example decay of an unstable nucleus is uncaused, i.e. it is random, but it is still explained by quantum mechanics. I think you point is better made by observing that an explanation must be of something less known in terms of something better known. Since nothing can be better known than our own subjective experience, it cannot be explained. I'm not sure I buy that, but I understand it. Brent So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. No explanation can be given for uncaused fundamental events or entities. And further, no meaningful explanation can be given for events or entities that are themselves *wholly* caused by uncaused events. These things just are. So let's say a closed system of entities comes into being uncaused. Any properties that the individual components of this system have are also uncaused, and the ways that the components interact are uncaused as well. This system is a universe unto itself. So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. Now you've introduced another term meaningful explanation. If one can understand it, it must be meaningful. The meaningless of it's initial state means that all subsequent states are equally meaningless in an absolute sense. All that we can do is describe what the system does. But description is not explanation. It can be if it's a description of something you don't understand in terms of something you do. Further, even if the system seems predictable, there is no reason to think that it will continue in it's predicitablity. If it has been predictable in the past, that is a reason to think it will be predictable in the future. That's virtuous circularity. And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own uncaused rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. You seem to take the position that because knowledge isn't certain no knowledge is possible. I think this is more obvious if you look at the system as a block universe, where time is treated as a sort of spatial dimension, and so all states of the system exist simultaneously, like my previous example of the block of granite. Why does state B follow state A? Why is slice B adjacent to slice A? Because that's just the way this uncaused system is. The block universe is model we use for thinking about some problems. It's not a good one for thinking about whether to have a cup of coffee. Looking for meaning in the system is like looking for hidden messages in randomly generated character strings. You may find them, but the messages can not have any real meaning, no matter how meaningful they look. In the conclusion I don't understand the last sentence, which seems to me a proposition for abandoning theorizing in that field. Well, the search for a theoretical model that is fully consistent what what we consciously observed is still a reasonable goal in terms of challenging intellectual endeavor. And if that's what your future conscious experiences hold for you, then that's what you will do (no free will here). Machines are more fundamental than consciousness? Or machines are just a way of representing conscious experience? Machines/numbers cannot represent conscious experiences. You are correct, I misspoke. I should have said machines are just a way of representing the CONTENTS of conscious experience. Comp can make the conscious experience much more fundamental than the Aristotelian materialist usually think, yet consciousness is arithmetically caused. It is an attribute of universal machine (in an even weaker sense than usual) related to their ideal self- consistency. It generates the belief in a reality, and the infinities of corrections which ensue. To me this has as much of an explanatory gap as
Re: Against Physics
On 9 Aug, 07:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, just a few general points on your posts. The various 'existence' arguments I've been putting forward recently are intended precisely to show how our first-person world of meaning and intention is embedded in a more general environment that is congruent with, rather than alien to, these self-evident features. What of course is striking about your proposals is that in reality nobody behaves as though they believe this sort of thing: which is not of course to say that this makes it uninteresting. In fact exactly the opposite: the very fact that the world according to physics presents itself in this chilling way makes challenging its assumptions all the more urgent. Hence my attempts to pump intuitions about the source of the presence, self-access and self-motivation inherent in the ontologically real, as contrasted with the provisional and fundamentally epistemological status of the theoretical constructions of physics. By ontologically real I mean of course what is self-evident in the form of the ontological first person. And in fact it really doesn't take that much intuitive tweaking to achieve this, whether applied to the putative primitive entities of physics, comp, or any other schema. Essentially the intuition is that these primitives reduce in the final analysis to the self-encounter of a primary, self-evident continuum: i.e. a primitive self-relativisation that collapses both perception (primitive self-access) and intention (primitive self-action) Such a self-relativising duality of continuousness and discreteness is indispensable to any personal account of 'owned' experience and action, via the inheritance of such ownership from the primitive context. From this it can naturally follow that whatever is perceived is MY perception, whatever is done is MY action, and whatever is determined is MY determination. The key to seeing this is a simple appeal to the reductio ad absurdum. Just assume the opposite (as the dogma asserts) and - pouf! - the very appearance and sensation of anything whatsoever is irretrievably lost. And it turns out that this assuming of the opposite is quite unjustified by the facts. It is merely the dogmatic adoption of the externalised 'view from nowhere' - a useful heuristic in context - as a universal alethiometer. Of course, these basic concepts find historic kinship with Vedantic and Buddhist insights, and in the Western tradition via Plotinus, Kant, et al - and even in the world-views of practising physicists such as Schroedinger and Eddington.. I wonder if I can encourage you to take a break from contemplating the block universe 'out there' and meditate on the intrinsic inwardness that lies all around us? David On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism. Ha! Well, maybe. What is the flaw that you see in my reasoning? I think that both the argument and conclusion are rational, just not intuitive. So earlier you asked this: By the way, what is the status of your theory with respect to comp? Which in part prompted this new thread. So I think that one of the things that we can be conscious of is a descriptive theory referred to as comp that attempts to map the contents of our conscious experience over time to mathematically/logically defined machines. And, I will not be surprised if you or someone else is ultimately successful in doing so. But while this would be interesting, I don't think that it means anything deeper. All that it will mean is look, here's an interesting way of representing the contents of your conscious experience over time. It would just be a way of representing what is. By which I mean: It would just be a way of representing conscious experience. I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power. A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each other. This doesn't sound like a reason to me. It sounds like an observation, along the lines of adjacent gray and white veins exist within this block of granite (from my original post). A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest. This purpose would only exist as part of someone's conscious experience. The desire for truth and/or satisfaction are things that only exist in the context of conscious experience. A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like all power)). I'm not sure what you mean by
Re: Against Physics
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for the sake of the argument. So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm conscious OF are complex and structured, my conscious experience of these things is singular and indivisible. As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. Given that conscious experience is uncaused, it can't be explained in terms of other things, like quarks and electromagnetism or numbers and arithmetic. Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. No explanation can be given for uncaused fundamental events or entities. And further, no meaningful explanation can be given for events or entities that are themselves *wholly* caused by uncaused events. These things just are. So let's say a closed system of entities comes into being uncaused. Any properties that the individual components of this system have are also uncaused, and the ways that the components interact are uncaused as well. This system is a universe unto itself. So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. The meaningless of it's initial state means that all subsequent states are equally meaningless in an absolute sense. All that we can do is describe what the system does. But description is not explanation. Further, even if the system seems predictable, there is no reason to think that it will continue in it's predicitablity. And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own uncaused rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. I think this is more obvious if you look at the system as a block universe, where time is treated as a sort of spatial dimension, and so all states of the system exist simultaneously, like my previous example of the block of granite. Why does state B follow state A? Why is slice B adjacent to slice A? Because that's just the way this uncaused system is. Looking for meaning in the system is like looking for hidden messages in randomly generated character strings. You may find them, but the messages can not have any real meaning, no matter how meaningful they look. In the conclusion I don't understand the last sentence, which seems to me a proposition for abandoning theorizing in that field. Well, the search for a theoretical model that is fully consistent what what we consciously observed is still a reasonable goal in terms of challenging intellectual endeavor. And if that's what your future conscious experiences hold for you, then that's what you will do (no free will here). Machines are more fundamental than consciousness? Or machines are just a way of representing conscious experience? Machines/numbers cannot represent conscious experiences. You are correct, I misspoke. I should have said machines are just a way of representing the CONTENTS of conscious experience. Comp can make the conscious experience much more fundamental than the Aristotelian materialist usually think, yet consciousness is arithmetically caused. It is an attribute of universal machine (in an even weaker sense than usual) related to their ideal self- consistency. It generates the belief in a reality, and the infinities of corrections which ensue. To me this has as much of an explanatory gap as materialism. Consciousness is caused by arithmetical relationships? Why would this be? Why would arithmetical relationships result in conscious experience? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 8:35 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote What of course is striking about your proposals is that in reality nobody behaves as though they believe this sort of thing: which is not of course to say that this makes it uninteresting. You speak as if though we have a choice as to how we behave! This I can't see at all. Whether our behavior is caused subatomic particles or arithmetic, or is completely uncaused, there is no room for libertarian free will. I wonder if I can encourage you to take a break from contemplating the block universe 'out there' and meditate on the intrinsic inwardness that lies all around us? Well, I'm just using the block universe as a way of trying to make my point more clear. My point being that consciousness is fundamental and uncaused. My secondary point being that even if consciousness is NOT fundamental, then it is STILL ultimately uncaused if it results from any system that is itself uncaused... My tertiary point being that if we have no evidence which points one way or the other between consciousness being fundamental or not, the default position would seem to be that it is fundamental. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
Brent, BTW, this was intended as a (mostly) sincere response to your point. On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:55 AM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. Your advice is beneficial only to those who receive it and benefit from it. Please keep this in mind in the future, if that is what is in your future. On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Against Physics Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my conclusion: ... So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. Brent Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism. Ha! Well, maybe. What is the flaw that you see in my reasoning? I think that both the argument and conclusion are rational, just not intuitive. So earlier you asked this: By the way, what is the status of your theory with respect to comp? Which in part prompted this new thread. So I think that one of the things that we can be conscious of is a descriptive theory referred to as comp that attempts to map the contents of our conscious experience over time to mathematically/logically defined machines. And, I will not be surprised if you or someone else is ultimately successful in doing so. But while this would be interesting, I don't think that it means anything deeper. All that it will mean is look, here's an interesting way of representing the contents of your conscious experience over time. It would just be a way of representing what is. By which I mean: It would just be a way of representing conscious experience. I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power. A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each other. This doesn't sound like a reason to me. It sounds like an observation, along the lines of adjacent gray and white veins exist within this block of granite (from my original post). A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest. This purpose would only exist as part of someone's conscious experience. The desire for truth and/or satisfaction are things that only exist in the context of conscious experience. A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like all power)). I'm not sure what you mean by this. Physicists explain by finding elegant laws relating the quanta we can measure, but fail indeed linking those quanta to the qualia we live, and fail saying where those quanta comes from. But computer science suggest a solution, we are universal machine mirroring doing science automatically betting on big picture all the time, relatively to other possible universal machines. So our machineness precedes our conscious experience? Machines are more fundamental than consciousness? Or machines are just a way of representing conscious experience? Then theoretical computer science can explain why we feel consciousness unexplainable and explain its reason, purpose and power. I don't see that it explains anything. Though it may be a useful/enjoyable way of thinking about the contents of our conscious experience. This explains the mind, but we get the problem of justifying the computability and the existence of the physical laws from a vast set of computations. The white rabbits and white noises. So it seems to me that you aren't explaining the fact that we have experiences. It seems to me that you are focused entirely on finding a way of generating mathematical/logical representations of what you and I experience that doesn't also generate representations of strange white-rabbit experiences. Those universal machine are self-multiplying and self- differencing infinitely often in arithmetic. This is a big price: if we are machine (a theory which explains consciousness as an unconscious bet on a reality), we have to explain the physical laws from computer science and logic alone. The physical laws can't be explained except in terms of other unexplained laws, as mentioned in my previous post. Though, I'd say that physical laws can't be explained because they only exist in our perceptions, which are themselves uncaused and therefore unexplainable. But now that explanation can be tested in nature, making that theory refutable. And this illustrates we don't have to abandon rationalism. I think the rational conclusion from what we perceive is that conscious experience is fundamental and uncaused. You are saying that consciousness is NOT fundamental, and thus it IS caused. By...numbers? I think that you are mistaking representation for causation. Even if numbers exist in some platonic sense, and can be related in a way that can be seen as mirroring, representing, or even predicting my conscious experience...I think that all this shows is that math/logic is a really flexible tool for representing processes, relationships, patterns, etc. As far as the significance of accurate predictions, I refer you back to the last paragraph of my original post. You read the part about the granite block, right? Though, I do need to find some
Re: Against Physics
On 09 Aug 2009, at 08:41, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism. Ha! Well, maybe. What is the flaw that you see in my reasoning? I think that both the argument and conclusion are rational, just not intuitive. I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for the sake of the argument. In the conclusion I don't understand the last sentence, which seems to me a proposition for abandoning theorizing in that field. So earlier you asked this: By the way, what is the status of your theory with respect to comp? Which in part prompted this new thread. So I think that one of the things that we can be conscious of is a descriptive theory referred to as comp that attempts to map the contents of our conscious experience over time to mathematically/logically defined machines. No, comp is a theology in which you believe that you can survive a concrete artificial brain/body transplants. comp does not attempt this, it presupposes a level where it can be done. Among the first consequences appears the fact that such an attempt provably necessitates an act of faith. And, I will not be surprised if you or someone else is ultimately successful in doing so. Being successful here means only being able to explain (physical) observations. It is already successful in explaining the existence of sensations, and in situating quanta with respect to qualia. But while this would be interesting, I don't think that it means anything deeper. All that it will mean is look, here's an interesting way of representing the contents of your conscious experience over time. Not at all, the comp theory, thanks to its Church Thesis part, and some mathematical logic, is particularly cautious in distinguishing the representation and the represented, and what will and will not depend on the choice of representations. By definition of comp we bet that there is a digital representation correct with respect to the most probable local universal number, or computation, but the comp theory, which is just computer science/number theory/mathematical logic will still take the many nuances into account. For example: it is a theorem, not depending of the choice of any representation that all universal machines have to have a local representation to develop a third person notion. It would just be a way of representing what is. By which I mean: It would just be a way of representing conscious experience. Comp explains, or if you prefer, the Löbian machine can already explains, about simpler Löbian machines, why those simpler machine cannot represent their notions of truth and consciousness. Consciousness of machine M is not representable by machine M. Comp provides a theory of consciousness, and this theory prevents us to represent our consciousness, except by betting on a sufficiently low level description and making an act of faith. A Löbian machine, I recall, is a universal machine which can prove (in technical weak sense) that she is universal. Most known Löbian machine are Peano Arithmetic and Zermelo Frankel Set Theory. I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power. A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each other. This doesn't sound like a reason to me. It sounds like an observation, along the lines of adjacent gray and white veins exist within this block of granite (from my original post). It is a theorem in arithmetic. It is a reason, in the sense that if you agree with some axioms of arithmetic, you can agree that those universal numbers exist, and contemplate a sequence of unexpected facts about them. A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest. This purpose would only exist as part of someone's conscious experience. The desire for truth and/or satisfaction are things that only exist in the context of conscious experience. OK. No problem. A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like all power)). I'm not sure what you mean by this. Hmm... I refer often to another result by Gödel, or similar discovered by Blum and others in computer science, that universal machine/number are infinity accelerable, and that lobian machine can shorten arbitrarily the length of infinities of theorems. Consciousness can be related by the inference of self-consistency, and it makes the machine able
Against Physics
Against Physics Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my conclusion: So the world that I perceive seems pretty orderly. When I drive to work, it's always where I expect it to be. The people are always the same. I pick up where I left off on the previous day, and life generally proceeds in an orderly and predictable way. Even when something unexpected happens, I can generally trace back along a chain of cause and effect and determine why it happened, and understand both why I didn't expect it and why I probably could have. In my experience thus far, there have been no Alice in Wonderland style white rabbits that suddenly appear in a totally inexplicable way, make a few cryptic remarks while checking their pocket watch, and then scurry off. Why do I never see such white rabbits? Well, at first glance, something like physicalism seems like the obvious choice to explain my reality's perceived order - to explain both what I experience AND what I *don't* experience. The world is reducible to fundamental particles (waves, strings, whatever) which have certain properties (mass, velocity, spin, charge, etc) that determine how they interact, and it all adds up to what I see. In this view, what I see is ultimately determined by the starting conditions of the universe, plus the physical laws that govern the interaction of the fundamental elements of the universe, applied over how-many-ever billions of years. While no explanation is given for the initial conditions, or why the fundamental laws of physics are what they are, if you get past that then from a cause-and-effect stand point physicalism offers a pretty solid explanation for why my world is orderly and predictable, and why I don't see white rabbits. And in the form of functionalism/computationalism + evolution it even offers a pretty good foundation for explaining the existence and mechanism of human behavior and ability. But physicalism has a major drawback: It doesn't obviously explain the experience of consciousness that goes with human behavior and ability. Particles, waves, mass, spin, velocity...no matter how you add them up, there doesn't seem to be any way to get conscious experience. Which is a problem, since consciousness is the portal through which we access everything else. My conscious experience is what I know. I know of other things only when they force themselves (or are forced) into my conscious awareness. So, physicalism does explain why we see, what we see, and why we don't see white rabbits. But it doesn't seem to explain the conscious experience OF seeing what we see. Further, by positing an independently existing and well ordered external universe to explain our orderly perceptions, we have just pushed the question back one level. The new questions are, why does this external universe exist and why is it so orderly? BUT, this initially seems justified by the fact that physicalism explains how it is possible for us to make correct predictions. BUT, actually it explains nothing. Nothing has been explained because we are PART of the system that we are trying to explain by appealing to physicalism. If the order and predictability of our experiences are due to the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of physics, then we inhabit a universe whose entire future, including our existence and all of our activities and experiences, is fixed. Frozen in place by unbreakable causal chains. Effectively (and maybe actually), the entire future of the universe can be seen as existing simultaneously with its beginning. We could just as well say that the entire past, present, and future came into being at one instant, and we are just experiencing our portion of it in slices. But there is no explanation here. This block universe just IS. It just exists. It came into being for no reason, for no purpose, with no meaning. It exists in the form that it does, and there is no answer to the question why?. We are part of that universe, existing entirely within it and contained by it. Therefore we also just exist. For no reason, for no purpose, with no meaning, our future history also frozen in place by causal chains. What is true for the universe as a whole is true for it's contents. Any explanation we derive is purely local to our particular viewpoint. In reality there is no explanation. Explanations are as subjective as experience. Of course this doesn't mean that I get to pick my preferred explanations, BUT I don't get to pick my experiences either. To try an make what I'm saying more clear: let's imagine a real block. Say, a block of speckled granite. Now let's consider two adjacent specks of white and gray. Why are they adjacent? What caused them to be adjacent? Well, if we consider this block of granite within the context of our universe, then we can say that there is a reason in that context as to why they are adjacent. There is an explanation, which has to do with the laws
Re: Against Physics
On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism. I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power. A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each other. A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest. A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like all power)). Physicists explain by finding elegant laws relating the quanta we can measure, but fail indeed linking those quanta to the qualia we live, and fail saying where those quanta comes from. But computer science suggest a solution, we are universal machine mirroring doing science automatically betting on big picture all the time, relatively to other possible universal machines. Then theoretical computer science can explain why we feel consciousness unexplainable and explain its reason, purpose and power. This explains the mind, but we get the problem of justifying the computability and the existence of the physical laws from a vast set of computations. The white rabbits and white noises. Those universal machine are self-multiplying and self- differencing infinitely often in arithmetic. This is a big price: if we are machine (a theory which explains consciousness as an unconscious bet on a reality), we have to explain the physical laws from computer science and logic alone. But now that explanation can be tested in nature, making that theory refutable. And this illustrates we don't have to abandon rationalism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Against Physics Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my conclusion: ... So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. Brent Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't do that, since it wouldn't be in my future. Your advice is beneficial only to those who receive it and benefit from it. Please keep this in mind in the future, if that is what is in your future. On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Against Physics Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my conclusion: ... So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that our conscious experience just exists. If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer considerable advantage. Brent Why are my perceptions orderly and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious experience exists uncaused. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
