Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Jul 2018, at 13:46, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> This is one reason I am not a big upholder of any particular quantum 
> interpretation. They all seem to lead to some intellectual cul de sac. The 
> MWI does seem to imply a kind of coordinate dependency, a dependency tied to 
> Hilbert space, that is outside of physical theory in a proper sense. Other 
> interpretations have their problems as well.

Everett makes clear that there is no base problem, and that the relative sates 
are independent of any choice of coordinate. 

The mind-body problem re-introduce special coordinate, but that is like going 
to the moon. In practice, brains and rockets needs some base, and there are 
some explanations, given by Zurek, why the position base has to play a more 
important role for (universal) machine to develop. But that choice play no role 
for the physical reality, only for the biological and psychological reality.

Everett theory is actually not an interpretation. It is the Copenhagen theory 
minus the projection postulate. Everett theory is just the (common) assumption 
that physicist obeys to the laws of physics. In this case, it means that they 
obey to quantum mechanics. Then, like Galilee did explain why we don’t feel 
like the Earth is moving, he explains in great details why we can’t see or feel 
macroscopic superposition, nor fell consciousness differentiating. 
"Many-histories” might seems strange, but not as nonsensical than FTL or 
physical 3p indeterminacy, Imo.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
> On Saturday, July 21, 2018 at 6:52:37 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 05:42:48AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
> > 
> > The world splitting "at once" runs into some funny issues with relativity. 
> > Does the world split at one by observer A's frame or B's frame? For that 
> > matter, it is hard to know how to assign the split in the local frame of an 
> > observer. I think in some ways this has a relationship to the illusion of 
> > there being a "now" or present moment in time. In fact it may in general 
> > point to the whole illusion of consciousness itself. QM may in fact unravel 
> > much of philosophy not only in our ideas of ontology and epistemology, but 
> > with Descarte's assertion of existential certainty with "I think, therefore 
> > I am." 
> 
> I would think each observer splits the worlds in er own reference 
> frame. Quite solipsistic, in a way, in the sense of there only being 
> one real observer per world. This pushes the problem into how the 
> disparate worlds come to interact - ie how does observer A compare 
> notes with observer B. We can note that from observer A's perspective, 
> observer B is a physical process (a human being, a brain, or even just 
> some words displayed on a computer screen), and thus compatible with 
> all other physical processes in A's world. Likewise for observer 
> B. For space-like separated observers, from A's perspective, the 
> physical process that is B is receipt of communication, more likely 
> the words displayed on the computer screen in the examples above. This 
> occurs at subluminal speed. The worlds splitting will be instantaneous 
> in observer A's reference frame (ditto a completely independent split 
> in observer B's reference frame). 
> 
> This does contrast with the point of view that MWI branching is more 
> of a physical process that proceeds at subluminal speeds a la David 
> Deutsch. But is there a problem with that picture? 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
>  
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>  
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

This is one reason I am not a big upholder of any particular quantum 
interpretation. They all seem to lead to some intellectual cul de sac. The 
MWI does seem to imply a kind of coordinate dependency, a dependency tied 
to Hilbert space, that is outside of physical theory in a proper sense. 
Other interpretations have their problems as well.

LC

On Saturday, July 21, 2018 at 6:52:37 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 05:42:48AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
> > 
> > The world splitting "at once" runs into some funny issues with 
> relativity. 
> > Does the world split at one by observer A's frame or B's frame? For that 
> > matter, it is hard to know how to assign the split in the local frame of 
> an 
> > observer. I think in some ways this has a relationship to the illusion 
> of 
> > there being a "now" or present moment in time. In fact it may in general 
> > point to the whole illusion of consciousness itself. QM may in fact 
> unravel 
> > much of philosophy not only in our ideas of ontology and epistemology, 
> but 
> > with Descarte's assertion of existential certainty with "I think, 
> therefore 
> > I am." 
>
> I would think each observer splits the worlds in er own reference 
> frame. Quite solipsistic, in a way, in the sense of there only being 
> one real observer per world. This pushes the problem into how the 
> disparate worlds come to interact - ie how does observer A compare 
> notes with observer B. We can note that from observer A's perspective, 
> observer B is a physical process (a human being, a brain, or even just 
> some words displayed on a computer screen), and thus compatible with 
> all other physical processes in A's world. Likewise for observer 
> B. For space-like separated observers, from A's perspective, the 
> physical process that is B is receipt of communication, more likely 
> the words displayed on the computer screen in the examples above. This 
> occurs at subluminal speed. The worlds splitting will be instantaneous 
> in observer A's reference frame (ditto a completely independent split 
> in observer B's reference frame). 
>
> This does contrast with the point of view that MWI branching is more 
> of a physical process that proceeds at subluminal speeds a la David 
> Deutsch. But is there a problem with that picture? 
>
>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 05:42:48AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> 
> The world splitting "at once" runs into some funny issues with relativity. 
> Does the world split at one by observer A's frame or B's frame? For that 
> matter, it is hard to know how to assign the split in the local frame of an 
> observer. I think in some ways this has a relationship to the illusion of 
> there being a "now" or present moment in time. In fact it may in general 
> point to the whole illusion of consciousness itself. QM may in fact unravel 
> much of philosophy not only in our ideas of ontology and epistemology, but 
> with Descarte's assertion of existential certainty with "I think, therefore 
> I am."

I would think each observer splits the worlds in er own reference
frame. Quite solipsistic, in a way, in the sense of there only being
one real observer per world. This pushes the problem into how the
disparate worlds come to interact - ie how does observer A compare
notes with observer B. We can note that from observer A's perspective,
observer B is a physical process (a human being, a brain, or even just
some words displayed on a computer screen), and thus compatible with
all other physical processes in A's world. Likewise for observer
B. For space-like separated observers, from A's perspective, the
physical process that is B is receipt of communication, more likely
the words displayed on the computer screen in the examples above. This
occurs at subluminal speed. The worlds splitting will be instantaneous
in observer A's reference frame (ditto a completely independent split
in observer B's reference frame).

This does contrast with the point of view that MWI branching is more
of a physical process that proceeds at subluminal speeds a la David
Deutsch. But is there a problem with that picture?



-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *smitra* mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>>


I guess I need to explain my point a bit better, so I'm starting from 
the beginning and will then address your points. We know that QM is 
non-deterministic as far as measurements results are concerned, one 
can ask if there exist hidden variables that would fix that problem in 
a local way using local hidden variables. Bell's theorem combined with 
the QM prediction (or you could invoke Aspect's experimental results 
confirming the predictions of QM) rules out any such fix.


So, all that Bell's theorem implies is that QM is incompatible with 
local hidden variables. This then means that measurements generate new 
information. If you measure the z-component of a spin polarized in the 
x-direction then after the measurement, one bit of information appears 
locally at your place (Bell's theorem rules out that this bit of 
information was not somehow already present locally at your place).


It is at this point where MWI differs from single World collapse 
theories. In the MWI, the state evolves into a superposition where 
both outcomes are realized, that superposition doesn't contain more 
information than the initial state. But each member of the 
superposition where there are definite measurement outcomes contain 
one bit of information more than the entire superposition. So, in the 
MWI, information appears due to copies of observers, analogous to what 
happens in Bruno's thought experiment, instead of really new 
information popping into existence physically as would be the case in 
a collapse interpretation.


New information 'pops into existence' for every observer in MWI, exactly 
as in a collapse model. So I don't see much significance in your point.


In case of entangled spins being measured at two space-like separated 
places with identical polarizer setting, only one bit of information 
will appear, but this will happen at two space-like separated places. 
In collapse interpretations this is a benign but strange non-local 
effect. Bertlmann's sock-type explanations don't work here because 
that would require the existence of information about the measurement 
results prior to the measurements already being present locally. 
Bells' theorem rules that out.


Actually, Bell's theorem does not rule out a local hidden variable 
account of the case for aligned polarizers. But this is not relevant for 
the general case of non-aligned polarizers. In that case Alice's 
measurement does not make one bit of information appear at Bob's 
location -- he can still get either up or down, and there is no way to 
tell which. What does change are the probabilities for these results. 
And those probabilities depend on the relative orientation of the 
polarizers, and that can only be known non-locally.


In the MWI things are different, because there is no new information 
that appears in the global final state. What happens is that the 
initial state evolves into a superposition that can be split into two 
components where the observers find their measurement results. These 
results are then correlated as a result of the evolution of the 
wavefunction.


As I keep saying. The wave function for the non-separable state is 
itself non-local. You cannot avoid non-locality by appealing to the 
evolution of the wave function.


You can then say that the wavefunction has non-local properties, 
therefore there is no difference between the MWI and collapse 
interpretations in this respect. However, in collapse interpretation 
the collapse is just an ad-hoc postulate without further explanation, 
while in the MWI it happens as a result of local dynamics, the 
non-local wavefunction involved here itself evolved allowing one to 
trace back the source of the non-locality right to the point where the 
entangled spins were created.


How does one do this trace-back? The reason that the EPR correlations 
cannot be explained locally is that the relative angle of the separated 
measurements cannot be accommodated in local hidden variables. Maudlin 
spends quite a lot of time exploring this in his book 'Quantum 
Non-Locality and Relativity'. Unless you have some means of determining 
the relative orientation of the polarizers in MWI that is not present in 
the single-world model, then you have not explained the correlations 
locally.


While one can then still argue that MWI does have non-local aspects to 
it because the branches do not split in a local way, for me what 
matters is that all such issues are explained by local dynamics,


Everett thought he had abolished all forms on non-locality when he 
discarded the collapse postulate. Schrödinger's concern about the 
non-locality of his wave theory was about precisely this -- pass a 
particle through a hole; the wave front expands spherically. But when it 
meets a screen, only one point is seen -- the rest of the wave appears 
to have mysteriously collapsed. Everett explains this by saying that 
things split into an (infinite) number of 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/18/2018 1:19 PM, smitra wrote:

On 18-07-2018 19:58, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/18/2018 6:45 AM, smitra wrote:
While one can then still argue that MWI does have non-local aspects 
to it because the branches do not split in a local way, for me what 
matters is that all such issues are explained by local dynamics, 
while in collapse interpretations you have more problems precisely 
due to the unexplained collapse. In collapse interpretations, new 
information appears right at the moment of collapse and does so 
non-locally in case of entangled spins. In the MWI, the branching is 
only an effective picture, the exact picture does not contain any 
branching. No new information appears in the global state. The 
self-localization of observers within this global state has 
non-local aspects to it, but there is an explanation for that that 
invokes only local dynamics.


But what are these "local dynamics" and how do they conspire across a
spacelike interval to ensure that only Alice and Bob with notebooks
violating Bell's theorem meet one another?

Brent



Consider the fact that in principle, you could program a giant quantum 
computer with a large number of qubits playing the role of 
environmental degrees of freedom causing an effective decoherence of 
local subsystems of qubits, but not of the entire quantum computer. 
Within such a setting one can consider all of Bruce's thought 
experiments using virtual Bob and virtual Alice, expand out everything 
in the basis where the logbooks of both are diagonal. We start with 
creating an entangled state of two qubits, and that eventually leads 
to entangled logbooks plus  their local environments.


But that doesn't seem to be local.  To diagonalize both logbooks means 
picking out spacelike correlations.  Of course you can do it in a 
computer simulating the process because the computer is not restricted 
to local dynamics.


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[smitra]

On 18-07-2018 19:58, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/18/2018 6:45 AM, smitra wrote:
While one can then still argue that MWI does have non-local aspects to 
it because the branches do not split in a local way, for me what 
matters is that all such issues are explained by local dynamics, while 
in collapse interpretations you have more problems precisely due to 
the unexplained collapse. In collapse interpretations, new information 
appears right at the moment of collapse and does so non-locally in 
case of entangled spins. In the MWI, the branching is only an 
effective picture, the exact picture does not contain any branching. 
No new information appears in the global state. The self-localization 
of observers within this global state has non-local aspects to it, but 
there is an explanation for that that invokes only local dynamics.


But what are these "local dynamics" and how do they conspire across a
spacelike interval to ensure that only Alice and Bob with notebooks
violating Bell's theorem meet one another?

Brent



Consider the fact that in principle, you could program a giant quantum 
computer with a large number of qubits playing the role of environmental 
degrees of freedom causing an effective decoherence of local subsystems 
of qubits, but not of the entire quantum computer. Within such a setting 
one can consider all of Bruce's thought experiments using virtual Bob 
and virtual Alice, expand out everything in the basis where the logbooks 
of both are diagonal. We start with creating an entangled state of two 
qubits, and that eventually leads to entangled logbooks plus  their 
local environments.


Saibal

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/18/2018 6:45 AM, smitra wrote:
While one can then still argue that MWI does have non-local aspects to 
it because the branches do not split in a local way, for me what 
matters is that all such issues are explained by local dynamics, while 
in collapse interpretations you have more problems precisely due to 
the unexplained collapse. In collapse interpretations, new information 
appears right at the moment of collapse and does so non-locally in 
case of entangled spins. In the MWI, the branching is only an 
effective picture, the exact picture does not contain any branching. 
No new information appears in the global state. The self-localization 
of observers within this global state has non-local aspects to it, but 
there is an explanation for that that invokes only local dynamics. 


But what are these "local dynamics" and how do they conspire across a 
spacelike interval to ensure that only Alice and Bob with notebooks 
violating Bell's theorem meet one another?


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[smitra]

On 18-07-2018 01:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: SMITRA 


On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming
up with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of
these phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just
concentrate on Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording
them in their lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There
are no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved worlds, and
Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does
not invalidate Bell's argument. In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem
would do no more than allow for the possibility of a local hidden
variable account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is
local -- that would still have to be established by developing such
a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date developed such a
theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, we do not
have to worry about such contingencies.

So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to
defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in
Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only
when we assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some
collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden variable).

No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing
what I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the
many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I was making to J.
Clark. Not sure why you defended it, especially that you have shown
implicitly that you have no problem with the step 3 of the Universal
Dovetailer Paradox. You might eventually understand that with
mechanism, Everett’s task is still incomplete, as we need to
justify the wave from all computations, as seen from some
self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by
incompleteness).


 Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
 that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

 Brent

 It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce
has been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that
you can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their
measurement results in their lab books, and that one should therefore
be allowed to apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other
branches do not exist and reach the same conclusion as in collapse
theories. However, one has to ask here what the violation of Bell's
inequalities implies. It only constrains extensions of "standard
instrumental QM".

 It has become clear that the real argument by advocates of MWI is
that many-worlds deflects Bell's theorem, so that its implications do
not apply in MWI. I have, as Saibal points out, been arguing against
this, and I still consider my proof that selecting one branch out of
the MWI superposition is sufficient to apply Bell's theorem in its
full rigour. Since the argument applies to any branch, it applies to
the superposition as a whole, and MWI does not avoid the implications
of Bell's theorem. The implication is that no local hidden variable
theory can account for the observed EPR-type correlations. In
particular, any common cause, or Bertlmann's socks type argument,
fails in MWI for the same reasons that it fails in a single world
account.

 I have no idea what Saibal means when he claims that Bell's theorem
only constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM". Saibal has
not offered any convincing counter argument to my proof that Bell's
theorem applies in MWI.


If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type
experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are
specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's
inequality implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must
necessarily be non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden
variable theory, so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these
grounds.


 That does not follow. Just because you think you have shown that
Bell's theorem does not apply, it does not follow that MWI is thereby
local, or that a local account of the correlations is available in
MWI. Similarly, the claim that there are no hidden variables says
nothing at all about whether reality is local or non-local.


Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on
entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and
they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local
hidden variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the
information about what Alice will find and the non-existence of
local hidden variables rules out that this piece of information is
not somehow present locally at Alice's location.


 ??


But this non-local effect is entirely due to a correlation mediated
by the entangled spins, in the MWI this is a common cause effect,


 Bell's theorem rules out Bertlmann's socks as an 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, July 18, 2018 at 5:15:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jul 2018, at 14:26, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 6:45:17 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
>> with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
>> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
>> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
>> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
>> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
>> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. In 
>> fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
>> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
>> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
>> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
>> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
>> we do not have to worry about such contingencies. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
>> defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
>> Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
>> assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s 
>> type of hidden variable). 
>> >> 
>> >> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what 
>> I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we 
>> do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
>> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
>> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
>> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
>> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
>> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
>> incompleteness). 
>> > 
>> > Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed 
>> that MWI does away with non-locality in QM. 
>>
>> Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 
>>
>> (Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL. 
>> (MW + Non locality) does not. 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>
> MWI does not negate nonlocality. 
>
>
>
> Indeed, but it makes it trivial. It cannot been used to FTL signalling, 
> nor possible non-signalling FTL influence.
>
>
I guess I fail to see how MWI makes entanglements trivial. That would tend 
to imply that entanglement is physics derived from MWI. I think instead 
that MWI is instead a sort of phenomenology imposed on superposition and 
entanglement nature of QM,

If you have two states, in fact it can be N states, given by some group H, 
then entanglement is a quotient system G/H = K, where the quotient group is 
given by some larger group G with all of the symmetries of H "modded out." 
In this way all physical aspects of the symmetries of the two systems are 
"hidden" or cease to exist. An example is where the fermionic spin states 
of two entangled electrons are replaced by the physical symmetries of the 
entangled state. 

I try to stress this point. The physical degrees of freedom of the states 
that enter into an entanglement are replaced by new degrees of freedom of 
the entangled state. We can probably be most accurate when we say in the 
case of bipartite entanglements of states that the two states simply no 
longer exist. 

MWI is a sort of observer phenomenology imposed on QM that seeks to recover 
the states which make up entanglements or to deconstruct superpositions by 
stating an observer, or maybe in general a set of einselected states, is 
assigned the states of this phenomenological decomposition. This is then an 
interpretation imposed on QM and not as I see it something more fundamental 
than QM.

As for below, one sentence got garbled, I meant "a reservoir as a set of 
states"

The world splitting "at once" runs into some funny issues with relativity. 
Does the world split at one by observer A's frame or B's frame? For that 
matter, it is hard to know how to assign the split in the local frame of an 
observer. I think in some ways this has a relationship to the illusion of 
there being a "now" or present moment in time. In fact it may in general 
point to the whole illusion of consciousness itself. QM may in fact unravel 
much of philosophy not only in our ideas of ontology and epistemology, but 
with Descarte's assertion of existential certainty with "I think, therefore 
I am."

LC
 

> With a collapse theory, or an hidden variable theory, there is still non 
> FTL signalling possible, but

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Jul 2018, at 14:26, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 6:45:17 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
> >>> with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
> >>> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
> >>> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
> >>> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
> >>> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
> >>> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. 
> >>> In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
> >>> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
> >>> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
> >>> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
> >>> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
> >>> we do not have to worry about such contingencies. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to defend 
> >> John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in Everett, when 
> >> the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we assume unique 
> >> outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden 
> >> variable). 
> >> 
> >> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what I 
> >> was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we 
> >> do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
> >> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
> >> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
> >> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
> >> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
> >> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
> >> incompleteness). 
> > 
> > Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed that 
> > MWI does away with non-locality in QM. 
> 
> Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 
> 
> (Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL. 
> (MW + Non locality) does not. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> MWI does not negate nonlocality.


Indeed, but it makes it trivial. It cannot been used to FTL signalling, nor 
possible non-signalling FTL influence.

With a collapse theory, or an hidden variable theory, there is still non FTL 
signalling possible, but the violation of Bell’s inequality needs 
non-signalling FTL influence.



> MWI just says that a shift in entanglement phase from a system to  an 
> reservoir of set according to some level of complexity results in the 
> phenomenological apparent splitting of worlds

That is a bit ambiguous. The world do not split at once, but at the decoherence 
speed, so to speak. It is only the superposition of states which propagates by 
interaction.




>  This has some ill-defined aspects to it,

The problem is in the word “world”, and splitting. It is is only subjective 
(conscious) differentiation.




> such as what is the level of complexity?

I see this with computationalism, actually. But for quantum mechanics the level 
of complexity does not play any role. It is more a question of isolation. Even 
Babbage machine is a quantum computer, and it would be usable if we could 
isolate some of its part, which of course is practically impossible.



> There must be some Kolmogoroff complexity threshold, but that is not defined. 
> However, this does not remove nonlocality and it does not mean there is some 
> nonlocal signalling in any form.


Bt without the MWI, some non-signalling FTL influence are needed? That is why I 
take Aspect experience (if not the two slit with one particle "experience”) as 
strong evidence of many worlds/histories.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *smitra* mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>>


On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like to think that this were the case, but you
keep coming up with irrelevancies that contradict the
straightforward account of these phenomena. If you forget
about the metaphysics and just concentrate on Alice and
Bob making real measurements and recording them in their
lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are
no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved
worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he
intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument.
In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than
allow for the possibility of a local hidden variable
account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is
local -- that would still have to be established by
developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has
to date developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem
has not been deflected, we do not have to worry about such
contingencies.



So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when
trying to defend John Clark who claimed that there are still
FTL influence in Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations
implies FTL only when we assume unique outcomes of the
experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden
variable).

No need of patronizing remark either, especially when
rephrasing what I was just saying. If you agree that there is
no FTL in the many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I
was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you defended it,
especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no
problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox.
You might eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s
task is still incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from
all computations, as seen from some self-referential modes
(fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Brent


It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce has 
been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that you 
can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their measurement 
results in their lab books, and that one should therefore be allowed 
to apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other branches do not 
exist and reach the same conclusion as in collapse theories. However, 
one has to ask here what the violation of Bell's inequalities implies. 
It only constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM".


It has become clear that the real argument by advocates of MWI is that 
many-worlds deflects Bell's theorem, so that its implications do not 
apply in MWI. I have, as Saibal points out, been arguing against this, 
and I still consider my proof that selecting one branch out of the MWI 
superposition is sufficient to apply Bell's theorem in its full rigour. 
Since the argument applies to any branch, it applies to the 
superposition as a whole, and MWI does not avoid the implications of 
Bell's theorem. The implication is that no local hidden variable theory 
can account for the observed EPR-type correlations. In particular, any 
common cause, or Bertlmann's socks type argument, fails in MWI for the 
same reasons that it fails in a single world account.


I have no idea what Saibal means when he claims that Bell's theorem only 
constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM". Saibal has not 
offered any convincing counter argument to my proof that Bell's theorem 
applies in MWI.



If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type 
experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are 
specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's inequality 
implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must necessarily 
be non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden variable 
theory, so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these grounds.


That does not follow. Just because you think you have shown that Bell's 
theorem does not apply, it does not follow that MWI is thereby local, or 
that a local account of the correlations is available in MWI. Similarly, 
the claim that there are no hidden variables says nothing at all about 
whether reality is local or non-local.



Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on 
entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and 
they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local hidden 
variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the informat

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[smitra]

On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of 
these phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just 
concentrate on Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording 
them in their lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There 
are no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved worlds, and 
Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does 
not invalidate Bell's argument. In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem 
would do no more than allow for the possibility of a local hidden 
variable account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is local 
-- that would still have to be established by developing such a local 
hidden variable theory. No one has to date developed such a theory. 
But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, we do not have to 
worry about such contingencies.



So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or 
Bohm’s type of hidden variable).


No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what 
I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the 
many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. 
Not sure why you defended it, especially that you have shown 
implicitly that you have no problem with the step 3 of the Universal 
Dovetailer Paradox. You might eventually understand that with 
mechanism, Everett’s task is still incomplete, as we need to justify 
the wave from all computations, as seen from some self-referential 
modes (fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Brent


It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce has 
been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that you 
can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their measurement 
results in their lab books, and that one should therefore be allowed to 
apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other branches do not exist 
and reach the same conclusion as in collapse theories. However, one has 
to ask here what the violation of Bell's inequalities implies. It only 
constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM".


If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type 
experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are 
specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's inequality 
implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must necessarily be 
non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden variable theory, 
so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these grounds.


Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on 
entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and 
they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local hidden 
variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the information 
about what Alice will find and the non-existence of local hidden 
variables rules out that this piece of information is not somehow 
present locally at Alice's location.


But this non-local effect is entirely due to a correlation mediated by 
the entangled spins, in the MWI this is a common cause effect, while in 
the Copenhagen interpretation it cannot be explained in that way. 
Bruce's elaborate argument about verifying the violation of Bell's 
inequality in single branches doesn't change that conclusion. Yes, you 
can verify that Bell's inequality is violated in single branches, but as 
pointed out above, that violation is part of the argument why in the MWI 
the non-local aspects of entangled states are completely trivial.


Saibal

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 6:45:17 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
> with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. In 
> fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
> we do not have to worry about such contingencies. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
> defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
> Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
> assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s 
> type of hidden variable). 
> >> 
> >> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what I 
> was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we 
> do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
> incompleteness). 
> > 
> > Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed 
> that MWI does away with non-locality in QM. 
>
> Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 
>
> (Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL. 
> (MW + Non locality) does not. 
>
> Bruno 
>

MWI does not negate nonlocality. MWI just says that a shift in entanglement 
phase from a system to  an reservoir of set according to some level of 
complexity results in the phenomenological apparent splitting of worlds 
 This has some ill-defined aspects to it, such as what is the level of 
complexity? There must be some Kolmogoroff complexity threshold, but that 
is not defined. However, this does not remove nonlocality and it does not 
mean there is some nonlocal signalling in any form.

LC

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up with 
>>> irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
>>> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
>>> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
>>> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
>>> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
>>> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. In 
>>> fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
>>> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
>>> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
>>> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
>>> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
>>> we do not have to worry about such contingencies.
>> 
>> 
>> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to defend 
>> John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in Everett, when 
>> the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we assume unique 
>> outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden 
>> variable).
>> 
>> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what I was 
>> just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we do 
>> agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
>> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
>> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
>> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
>> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
>> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
>> incompleteness).
> 
> Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed that 
> MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 

(Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL.
(MW + Non locality) does not.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of 
these phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just 
concentrate on Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording 
them in their lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There 
are no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved worlds, and 
Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does 
not invalidate Bell's argument. In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem 
would do no more than allow for the possibility of a local hidden 
variable account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is local 
-- that would still have to be established by developing such a local 
hidden variable theory. No one has to date developed such a theory. 
But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, we do not have to 
worry about such contingencies.



So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or 
Bohm’s type of hidden variable).


No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what 
I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the 
many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. 
Not sure why you defended it, especially that you have shown 
implicitly that you have no problem with the step 3 of the Universal 
Dovetailer Paradox. You might eventually understand that with 
mechanism, Everett’s task is still incomplete, as we need to justify 
the wave from all computations, as seen from some self-referential 
modes (fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed 
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 14:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>>> On 16 Jul 2018, at 03:57, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Other directions are irrelevant to the measurement. The state is not in a 
>>> superposition of eigenvectors of every possible orientation.
>> 
>> After the measurement is done, and this makes sense only with orthogonal 
>> measurement from Alice and Bob parts, if not, as I say above, the notion of 
>> belonging to the same world makes no sense. You tall like if a measurement 
>> determine which world they are both in, which is true only for particular 
>> case, when they made the measurement of the spin or polarisation in 
>> correspond direction.
> 
> This is simply wrong. The state is a superposition of up and down for both 
> observers, regardless of whether their measurements are along the same axis 
> or not. The measurement does determine the world in which they will find 
> themselves when they meet. Just think through the significance of the facts 
> that they record their measurements in their lab books as they go along; they 
> are in the same world when they meet; and they can't jump between worlds at 
> any point. The logical conclusion of this is that the correlated Alice/Bob 
> pair are always in the same world -- they can't be in any other world because 
> world-hopping is not allowed. When you can get this point, all the mystery of 
> EPR correlations vanishes -- they are still non-local, but that is just a 
> consequence of the non-separability of the singlet state.
> 
> All your worries about FTL are irrelevant -- as I have pointed out many 
> times. It is all a lot simpler than you seem to want to make it.
> 
> 
> ..
> 
>>> And then each tracks along a particular branching tree as recorded by the 
>>> sequence of up/down results recorded in their lab books. There is 
>>> absolutely no ambiguity here because neither Alice nor Bob can switch 
>>> between branches -- they must always be in the same branch.
>> 
>> But when non orthogonal measurement are done, this makes no sense.
> 
> It is the only thing that does make any sense. If you can't track back 
> through the history of your sequences of branches -- by referring to your lab 
> book if necessary -- then Everettian branching worlds make no sense. And it 
> does not matter whether the measurements are orthogonal or not -- they always 
> end up with Alice and Bob meeting in one world with sequences of measurements 
> made in that world. Once you can grasp this, Bruno, you might gain some 
> insight into both Everett and EPR.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> I did. I referred also to Pirce FAQ for a good approximation.
> 
> The Price account assumes non-locality -- as I have pointed out on many 
> occasions.
> 
>> You are the one invoking the FTL, so I think you are the one who should 
>> explain where that comes from, and how to test it experimentally. Aspect 
>> experience test non-locality or inseparability, not FTL.
> 
> You keep accusing me of invoking FTL. I have never done any such thing. All I 
> have talked about is the non-separability of the state and the fact that the 
> spin measurements are made non-locally. If you invoke FTL then you are 
> invoking a non-local hidden variable. I see no need to do this, and never 
> have done. Stop reading things into my arguments that are not there.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>> There are not an infinity of worlds, there are only 2^N of them. Of course 
>>> the correlations come out right for every Alice/Bob pair when they meet. 
>>> But you have not explained this locally.
>> 
>> That is exactly what the wave explains, when you dismiss all collapse. The 
>> wave evolves purely locally in the phase space, which is the real 
>> “mutiversal” reality (up to some gauge nuances).
> 
> The wave function, as Maudlin explains, is itself non-local. So you have not 
> magically restored locality by invoking the wave function. The wave function 
> for this state is non-separable = non-local.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In fact, the multi-branching tree forms a giant superposition, and we 
> have just singled out one component of this superposition. There is 
> nothing at all mysterious in this -- it is what physicists do all the 
> time when they perform calculations in momentum space -- on just one 
> component of the superposition that makes up a wave packet.
 
 That makes sense.
>>> 
>>> That is what I have been saying all along, and this is what removes your 
>>> worry about 'collapse models' -- they are just a branch from the 
>>> many-worlds superposition.
>> 
>> 
>> I don’t see how you would do that when Alice and Bob makes non orthogonal 
>> measurements. 
> 
> You don't understand the underlying quantum mechanics in that case.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>> The "giant superposition", in so far as it exists, has been spirited away 
>>> by just looking at a single branch. There is nothing the "giant 
>>

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 16 Jul 2018, at 03:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Other directions are irrelevant to the measurement. The state is not 
in a superposition of eigenvectors of every possible orientation.


After the measurement is done, and this makes sense only with 
orthogonal measurement from Alice and Bob parts, if not, as I say 
above, the notion of belonging to the same world makes no sense. You 
tall like if a measurement determine which world they are both in, 
which is true only for particular case, when they made the measurement 
of the spin or polarisation in correspond direction.


This is simply wrong. The state is a superposition of up and down for 
both observers, regardless of whether their measurements are along the 
same axis or not. The measurement does determine the world in which they 
will find themselves when they meet. Just think through the significance 
of the facts that they record their measurements in their lab books as 
they go along; they are in the same world when they meet; and they can't 
jump between worlds at any point. The logical conclusion of this is that 
the correlated Alice/Bob pair are always in the same world -- they can't 
be in any other world because world-hopping is not allowed. When you can 
get this point, all the mystery of EPR correlations vanishes -- they are 
still non-local, but that is just a consequence of the non-separability 
of the singlet state.


All your worries about FTL are irrelevant -- as I have pointed out many 
times. It is all a lot simpler than you seem to want to make it.



..

And then each tracks along a particular branching tree as recorded by 
the sequence of up/down results recorded in their lab books. There is 
absolutely no ambiguity here because neither Alice nor Bob can switch 
between branches -- they must always be in the same branch.


But when non orthogonal measurement are done, this makes no sense.


It is the only thing that does make any sense. If you can't track back 
through the history of your sequences of branches -- by referring to 
your lab book if necessary -- then Everettian branching worlds make no 
sense. And it does not matter whether the measurements are orthogonal or 
not -- they always end up with Alice and Bob meeting in one world with 
sequences of measurements made in that world. Once you can grasp this, 
Bruno, you might gain some insight into both Everett and EPR.







I did. I referred also to Pirce FAQ for a good approximation.


The Price account assumes non-locality -- as I have pointed out on many 
occasions.


You are the one invoking the FTL, so I think you are the one who 
should explain where that comes from, and how to test it 
experimentally. Aspect experience test non-locality or inseparability, 
not FTL.


You keep accusing me of invoking FTL. I have never done any such thing. 
All I have talked about is the non-separability of the state and the 
fact that the spin measurements are made non-locally. If you invoke FTL 
then you are invoking a non-local hidden variable. I see no need to do 
this, and never have done. Stop reading things into my arguments that 
are not there.





There are not an infinity of worlds, there are only 2^N of them. Of 
course the correlations come out right for every Alice/Bob pair when 
they meet. But you have not explained this locally.


That is exactly what the wave explains, when you dismiss all collapse. 
The wave evolves purely locally in the phase space, which is the real 
“mutiversal” reality (up to some gauge nuances).


The wave function, as Maudlin explains, is itself non-local. So you have 
not magically restored locality by invoking the wave function. The wave 
function for this state is non-separable = non-local.







In fact, the multi-branching tree forms a giant superposition, and 
we have just singled out one component of this superposition. There 
is nothing at all mysterious in this -- it is what physicists do 
all the time when they perform calculations in momentum space -- on 
just one component of the superposition that makes up a wave packet.


That makes sense.


That is what I have been saying all along, and this is what removes 
your worry about 'collapse models' -- they are just a branch from the 
many-worlds superposition.



I don’t see how you would do that when Alice and Bob makes non 
orthogonal measurements.


You don't understand the underlying quantum mechanics in that case.




The "giant superposition", in so far as it exists, has been spirited 
away by just looking at a single branch. There is nothing the "giant 
superposition" can add to the conclusions obtained from just one branch.


? It changes the result of further possible measurement, notably 
involving Alice and Bob possible amnesia, in theory. Collapse has to 
be non local to make sense, as Eistein made already clear in 1927. It 
is just worst with the singlet state, but here too, 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 03:57, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 12 Jul 2018, at 14:09, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> On 12 Jul 2018, at 04:04, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> There are no up' or down' branches.
 
 
 ? (That contradicts directly what you just said). A up-branch is just a 
 branch where Alice saw or would see “up”.
>>> 
>>> You were the one who introduce up-prime and down-prime branches. I maintain 
>>> that there are only two branches on each and every measurement, an 
>>> up-branch and a down-branch.
>> 
>> In which direction?
> 
> In the direction in which the measurement is made.

OK. But there are many, and if they are not orthogonal, there is no trans-world 
notion available. The first person indeterminacy selection remains local.



> One of your enduring mistakes is to confuse the rotational symmetry of the 
> singlet state with the single basis corresponding to the direction in which 
> the measurement will be made.

I don’t think so.



> Once a direction is chosen, the state can be represented as a superposition 
> of up and down eigenvectors in that direction.

No doubt on this.


> Other directions are irrelevant to the measurement. The state is not in a 
> superposition of eigenvectors of every possible orientation.

After the measurement is done, and this makes sense only with orthogonal 
measurement from Alice and Bob parts, if not, as I say above, the notion of 
belonging to the same world makes no sense. You tall like if a measurement 
determine which world they are both in, which is true only for particular case, 
when they made the measurement of the spin or polarisation in correspond 
direction.




> Quantum mechanics does not have any such superposition. The state is a 
> superposition of just two eigenvectors, although which eigenvectors depends 
> on the direction chosen.

The singlet state is not dependent of the choice of any spin direction. The 
singlet state is rotationally invariant. We could use any base.





> 
> 
>>> ..
> Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never meet or recombine.
 
 Because they both measure in the same direction (not sure how they do that 
 btw), but for Bell’s inequality, some measurement are not “orthogonal”. 
 Partial fusion is in play, which forbids ti associate each personal 
 experience with any definite Alice (Bob) in the branching.
>>> 
>>> Perhaps I was not sufficiently clear. I am considering a series of N trials 
>>> in which both Alice and Bob independently choose random magnet 
>>> orientations. So if the relative angle is theta, the probabilities for 
>>> combined results are:
>>> 
>>> Alice gets up: then Bob has  probability sin^2(theta/2) for up, and 
>>> probability cos^2(theta/2) for down.
>>> 
>>> Alice gets down: then Bob has probability cos^2(theta/2) for up, and 
>>> probability sin^2(theta/2) for down.
>>> 
>>> If theta = 0, then if Alice gets up then Bob down 100%.; Alice down then 
>>> Bob up 100%.
>>> If theta = 120 degrees, then if Alice gets up, then Bob gets up 75% 
>>> probability, and down 25% probability.
>>> And so on for other angles and combined results. It is these probabilities 
>>> that are crucial for getting the correct correlations when Alice and Bob 
>>> meet.
>>> 
>>> Now if you can get these correlations without the non-local knowledge of 
>>> this relative angle, then you have a local explanation. But you will never 
>>> be able to produce such a set of probabilities locally -- the relative 
>>> angles are set at random:  non-locally at space-like separations.
>> 
>> But the result of the measurement are determined by the singlet state. They 
>> just cannot known there local angles.
> 
> Of course they know their local angles -- they choose them! The point is that 
> Alice does not know Bob's chosen angle when she makes her measurement, and 
> neither does Bob know Alice's angle when he makes his measurement. The fact 
> that the probabilities depend on the relative angle between these random 
> non-local choices is the conundrum to be answered.
> 
> 
>> When they measure in non orthogonal “direction”, the probabilities depends, 
>> for all Alice-Bod couples, of that state, which is unknown to both of them.I 
>> am OK that it is non-local, but that does not entail that when Alice makes a 
>> measurement, she influence Bob’s outcome by a FTL influence. They just get 
>> aware locally of which sub partition they both belong.
> 
> That is just avoiding the issue. 'Sub-partition' as you use it here has no 
> meaning. Alice and Bob both know what world they are in -- the world in which 
> they got up that morning and had their breakfast. And they are in that 
> same world when they later meet after a series of trials -- they cannot 
> change worlds!

I don’t see th

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 12 Jul 2018, at 14:09, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 12 Jul 2018, at 04:04, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


There are no up' or down' branches.


? (That contradicts directly what you just said). A up-branch is 
just a branch where Alice saw or would see “up”.


You were the one who introduce up-prime and down-prime branches. I 
maintain that there are only two branches on each and every 
measurement, an up-branch and a down-branch.


In which direction?


In the direction in which the measurement is made. One of your enduring 
mistakes is to confuse the rotational symmetry of the singlet state with 
the single basis corresponding to the direction in which the measurement 
will be made. Once a direction is chosen, the state can be represented 
as a superposition of up and down eigenvectors /in that direction/. 
Other directions are irrelevant to the measurement. The state is not in 
a superposition of eigenvectors of every possible orientation. Quantum 
mechanics does not have any such superposition. The state is a 
superposition of just two eigenvectors, although which eigenvectors 
depends on the direction chosen.




..

Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never meet or recombine.


Because they both measure in the same direction (not sure how they 
do that btw), but for Bell’s inequality, some measurement are not 
“orthogonal”. Partial fusion is in play, which forbids ti associate 
each personal experience with any definite Alice (Bob) in the branching.


Perhaps I was not sufficiently clear. I am considering a series of N 
trials in which both Alice and Bob independently choose random magnet 
orientations. So if the relative angle is theta, the probabilities 
for combined results are:


Alice gets up: then Bob has  probability sin^2(theta/2) for up, and 
probability cos^2(theta/2) for down.


Alice gets down: then Bob has probability cos^2(theta/2) for up, and 
probability sin^2(theta/2) for down.


If theta = 0, then if Alice gets up then Bob down 100%.; Alice down 
then Bob up 100%.
If theta = 120 degrees, then if Alice gets up, then Bob gets up 75% 
probability, and down 25% probability.
And so on for other angles and combined results. It is these 
probabilities that are crucial for getting the correct correlations 
when Alice and Bob meet.


Now if you can get these correlations without the non-local knowledge 
of this relative angle, then you have a local explanation. But you 
will never be able to produce such a set of probabilities locally -- 
the relative angles are set at random: non-locally at space-like 
separations.


But the result of the measurement are determined by the singlet state. 
They just cannot known there local angles.


Of course they know their local angles -- they choose them! The point is 
that Alice does not know Bob's chosen angle when she makes her 
measurement, and neither does Bob know Alice's angle when he makes his 
measurement. The fact that the probabilities depend on the relative 
angle between these random non-local choices is the conundrum to be 
answered.



When they measure in non orthogonal “direction”, the probabilities 
depends, for all Alice-Bod couples, of that state, which is unknown to 
both of them.I am OK that it is non-local, but that does not entail 
that when Alice makes a measurement, she influence Bob’s outcome by a 
FTL influence. They just get aware locally of which sub partition they 
both belong.


That is just avoiding the issue. 'Sub-partition' as you use it here has 
no meaning. Alice and Bob both know what world they are in -- the world 
in which they got up that morning and had their breakfast. And they 
are in that same world when they later meet after a series of trials -- 
they cannot change worlds!



So the Alice that meets a Bob over coffee after the N trials is the 
Alice with one particular branching history.


Again, this begins to be too much ambiguous, if not non sensical for me.


This is the heart of the matter. If you don't understand this, then 
you don't understand how the correlations are formed.


From entanglement.


That is meaningless without further explication. The straightforward 
explication in quantum physics is that the probabilities for each 
outcome are determined by the non-local relative angle between their 
measurements. If you want a local account, you have to give it 
explicitly -- stop just waving your hands about and appealing to some 
'entanglement' magic.





The Bob she meets is necessarily in the same world,


At the moment of the meeting, yes. But that is a far cry to say that 
it is the “physical Bob” she started with, in the case of "non 
orthogonal measurements”. But OK, for this scenario.


We assume randomly non-orthogonal measurements. And neither Alice nor 
Bob can switch between branches,


? They don’t know whi

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Jul 2018, at 14:09, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>> On 12 Jul 2018, at 04:04, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> There are no up' or down' branches.
>> 
>> 
>> ? (That contradicts directly what you just said). A up-branch is just a 
>> branch where Alice saw or would see “up”.
> 
> You were the one who introduce up-prime and down-prime branches. I maintain 
> that there are only two branches on each and every measurement, an up-branch 
> and a down-branch.

In which direction?





> 
> ..
>>> Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never meet or recombine.
>> 
>> Because they both measure in the same direction (not sure how they do that 
>> btw), but for Bell’s inequality, some measurement are not “orthogonal”. 
>> Partial fusion is in play, which forbids ti associate each personal 
>> experience with any definite Alice (Bob) in the branching.
> 
> Perhaps I was not sufficiently clear. I am considering a series of N trials 
> in which both Alice and Bob independently choose random magnet orientations. 
> So if the relative angle is theta, the probabilities for combined results are:
> 
> Alice gets up: then Bob has  probability sin^2(theta/2) for up, and 
> probability cos^2(theta/2) for down.
> 
> Alice gets down: then Bob has probability cos^2(theta/2) for up, and 
> probability sin^2(theta/2) for down.
> 
> If theta = 0, then if Alice gets up then Bob down 100%.; Alice down then Bob 
> up 100%.
> If theta = 120 degrees, then if Alice gets up, then Bob gets up 75% 
> probability, and down 25% probability.
> And so on for other angles and combined results. It is these probabilities 
> that are crucial for getting the correct correlations when Alice and Bob meet.
> 
> Now if you can get these correlations without the non-local knowledge of this 
> relative angle, then you have a local explanation. But you will never be able 
> to produce such a set of probabilities locally -- the relative angles are set 
> at random:  non-locally at space-like separations.

But the result of the measurement are determined by the singlet state. They 
just cannot known there local angles. When they measure in non orthogonal 
“direction”, the probabilities depends, for all Alice-Bod couples, of that 
state, which is unknown to both of them.I am OK that it is non-local, but that 
does not entail that when Alice makes a measurement, she influence Bob’s 
outcome by a FTL influence. They just get aware locally of which sub partition 
they both belong.





> 
> 
> 
>>> So the Alice that meets a Bob over coffee after the N trials is the Alice 
>>> with one particular branching history.
>> 
>> Again, this begins to be too much ambiguous, if not non sensical for me.
> 
> This is the heart of the matter. If you don't understand this, then you don't 
> understand how the correlations are formed.

>From entanglement.


> 
>>> The Bob she meets is necessarily in the same world,
>> 
>> At the moment of the meeting, yes. But that is a far cry to say that it is 
>> the “physical Bob” she started with, in the case of "non orthogonal 
>> measurements”. But OK, for this scenario.
> 
> We assume randomly non-orthogonal measurements. And neither Alice nor Bob can 
> switch between branches,

? They don’t know which branches they are in, right at the start. That is 
equivalent to belonging to many threads at once. Only later will they get more 
precision on this. The singlet state explains why they will observe the 
correlations when coming back together, without having to have any FTL. Once a 
superposition exist, it never disappear, and the correlations just reflect the 
type of interaction they did have to prepare the singlet state. 



> so the Bob that Alice meets has a set of measurement made all in this same 
> world -- the world in which Alice has made her measurements.

But there is an infinity of such world, where Alice find any possible results. 
Same for Bob. The results are correlated, because they are in the right 
corresponding relations, in all of them.
My feeling is that you introduce some collapse somewhere.




> In fact, the multi-branching tree forms a giant superposition, and we have 
> just singled out one component of this superposition. There is nothing at all 
> mysterious in this -- it is what physicists do all the time when they perform 
> calculations in momentum space -- on just one component of the superposition 
> that makes up a wave packet.

That makes sense.



> 
> 
>>> and he has a similar particular branching  history corresponding to just 
>>> one world. There are 2^N such meetings, each with unique branching 
>>> histories. The wonder of the singlet state is that for all these Alice/Bob 
>>> meetings, comparison of the data recorded in their lab books always gives 
>>> correlations that agree with quantum theory and violate the Bell 
>>> inequalities.
>> 
>> To get them, they need non orthogonal measurement, 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 12 Jul 2018, at 04:04, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


There are no up' or down' branches.


? (That contradicts directly what you just said). A up-branch is just 
a branch where Alice saw or would see “up”.


You were the one who introduce up-prime and down-prime branches. I 
maintain that there are only two branches on each and every measurement, 
an up-branch and a down-branch.


..

Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never meet or recombine.


Because they both measure in the same direction (not sure how they do 
that btw), but for Bell’s inequality, some measurement are not 
“orthogonal”. Partial fusion is in play, which forbids ti associate 
each personal experience with any definite Alice (Bob) in the branching.


Perhaps I was not sufficiently clear. I am considering a series of N 
trials in which both Alice and Bob independently choose random magnet 
orientations. So if the relative angle is theta, the probabilities for 
combined results are:


Alice gets up: then Bob has  probability sin^2(theta/2) for up, and 
probability cos^2(theta/2) for down.


Alice gets down: then Bob has probability cos^2(theta/2) for up, and 
probability sin^2(theta/2) for down.


If theta = 0, then if Alice gets up then Bob down 100%.; Alice down then 
Bob up 100%.
If theta = 120 degrees, then if Alice gets up, then Bob gets up 75% 
probability, and down 25% probability.
And so on for other angles and combined results. It is these 
probabilities that are crucial for getting the correct correlations when 
Alice and Bob meet.


Now if you can get these correlations without the non-local knowledge of 
this relative angle, then you have a local explanation. But you will 
never be able to produce such a set of probabilities locally -- the 
relative angles are set at random:  non-locally at space-like separations.




So the Alice that meets a Bob over coffee after the N trials is the 
Alice with one particular branching history.


Again, this begins to be too much ambiguous, if not non sensical for me.


This is the heart of the matter. If you don't understand this, then you 
don't understand how the correlations are formed.



The Bob she meets is necessarily in the same world,


At the moment of the meeting, yes. But that is a far cry to say that 
it is the “physical Bob” she started with, in the case of "non 
orthogonal measurements”. But OK, for this scenario.


We assume randomly non-orthogonal measurements. And neither Alice nor 
Bob can switch between branches, so the Bob that Alice meets has a set 
of measurement made all in this same world -- the world in which Alice 
has made her measurements. In fact, the multi-branching tree forms a 
giant superposition, and we have just singled out one component of this 
superposition. There is nothing at all mysterious in this -- it is what 
physicists do all the time when they perform calculations in momentum 
space -- on just one component of the superposition that makes up a wave 
packet.



and he has a similar particular branching  history corresponding to 
just one world. There are 2^N such meetings, each with unique 
branching histories. The wonder of the singlet state is that for all 
these Alice/Bob meetings, comparison of the data recorded in their 
lab books /always/ gives correlations that agree with quantum theory 
and violate the Bell inequalities.


To get them, they need non orthogonal measurement, with different 
probabilities (cos^2(some angle)), and your identity relations does no 
more work.


We have assumed non-orthogonal measurements, ones with the relative 
angles set randomly at spacelike separation, ie., non-locally.


Bruce


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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Jul 2018, at 04:04, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 9 Jul 2018, at 14:07, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in standard QM, because 
>>> Alice's measurement collapses the state so that only the correlated part is 
>>> available to Bob. It is that part of the explanation that is lacking in 
>>> your account. You do not see any non-locality, basically because you are 
>>> assuming it with being aware of what you are doing. Don't despair -- many 
>>> other highly trained physicists do exactly the same thing. But this does 
>>> mean that you have not explained anything -- you have simply assumed the 
>>> result. The individual measurements of Alice and Bob do influence each 
>>> other, or else no correlation could ever arise.
>> 
>> If there was a collapse? OK. But without collapse, the correlation are just 
>> due to the fact that the singlet state put Alice and Bob in infinities of 
>> branches, and only when they make a measurement they know in 
>> which branches they are. Up-down + down-up is the same state as up’-down 
>> +down’-up’. That is what you are not taking into account, I think.
> 
> There are no infinities of branches. There are only two branches for each 
> measurement, when Alice and Bob can only ever get 'up' or 'down', two 
> possibilities on each measurement.

I can make sense, after the measurement, but not before. 




> After N trials, there are 2^N possible histories for Alice and 2^N histories 
> for Bob.

OK.



> There are no infinities, and no branches are created for magnet orientations 
> in which no one made a measurement. In the words of Asher Peres: "Unperformed 
> experiments have no results." There are no counterfactuals, all that is ever 
> used is actual data obtained by actual experimenters. When they make a 
> measurement, they create the branching.


Which propagate from there, and Alice and Bob will meet only their 
corresponding person on each branches. That explains the correlations, without 
needing FTL.



> Because the result of the measurement is unknown to them beforehand (no 
> superdeterminism), they locate on either the up or down branch.

OK.



> There are no up' or down' branches.

? (That contradicts directly what you just said). A up-branch is just a branch 
where Alice saw or would see “up”.



> You are just making this up.

?


> 
> Each copy of Alice has a unique history consisting of a sequence of up and 
> down results recorded in her lab book. Similarly for Bob.

OK.


> All of these results were obtained in the same branch of the ever-branching 
> Everettian tree.

That is ambiguous, but I can make sense of this. 





> Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never meet or recombine.


Because they both measure in the same direction (not sure how they do that 
btw), but for Bell’s inequality, some measurement are not “orthogonal”. Partial 
fusion is in play, which forbids ti associate each personal experience with any 
definite Alice (Bob) in the branching.




> So the Alice that meets a Bob over coffee after the N trials is the Alice 
> with one particular branching history.

Again, this begins to be too much ambiguous, if not non sensical for me.



> The Bob she meets is necessarily in the same world,

At the moment of the meeting, yes. But that is a far cry to say that it is the 
“physical Bob” she started with, in the case of "non orthogonal measurements”. 
But OK, for this scenario.



> and he has a similar particular branching  history corresponding to just one 
> world. There are 2^N such meetings, each with unique branching histories. The 
> wonder of the singlet state is that for all these Alice/Bob meetings, 
> comparison of the data recorded in their lab books always gives correlations 
> that agree with quantum theory and violate the Bell inequalities.

To get them, they need non orthogonal measurement, with different probabilities 
(cos^2(some angle)), and your identity relations does no more work. 




> This mystery of many branches that always give the correct results is the 
> mystery that is to be explained. Introducing infinities of branches, and 
> infinities of measurements that were never made and therefore have no results 
> does not offer any explanation.

The explanation is the local development of the “universal wave”. The point is 
that there is no FTL which have been shown in any branches, only the illusion 
of them if we abstract from the existence of the others branches, where 
measurements are done, but get different.



> In fact, it is just plain silly. We only ever have data from experiments that 
> were actually performed by real people. There is no fantasy data, and no 
> fantasy branches floating around that have to be eliminated by some magic or 
> the other.  The magic of the singlet state is that no results counter to 
> quantum mechanics can ever be

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 9 Jul 2018, at 14:07, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in standard QM, because 
Alice's measurement collapses the state so that only the correlated 
part is available to Bob. It is that part of the explanation that is 
lacking in your account. You do not see any non-locality, basically 
because you are assuming it with being aware of what you are doing. 
Don't despair -- many other highly trained physicists do exactly the 
same thing. But this does mean that you have not explained anything 
-- you have simply assumed the result. The individual measurements of 
Alice and Bob do influence each other, or else no correlation could 
ever arise.
If there was a collapse? OK. But without collapse, the correlation are 
just due to the fact that the singlet state put Alice and Bob in 
infinities of branches, and only when they make a measurement they 
know in which branches they are. Up-down + down-up is the same state 
as up’-down +down’-up’. That is what you are not taking into account, 
I think.


There are no infinities of branches. There are only two branches for 
each measurement, when Alice and Bob can only ever get 'up' or 'down', 
two possibilities on each measurement. After N trials, there are 2^N 
possible histories for Alice and 2^N histories for Bob. There are no 
infinities, and no branches are created for magnet orientations in which 
no one made a measurement. In the words of Asher Peres: "Unperformed 
experiments have no results." There are no counterfactuals, all that is 
ever used is actual data obtained by actual experimenters. When they 
make a measurement, they create the branching. Because the result of the 
measurement is unknown to them beforehand (no superdeterminism), they 
locate on either the up or down branch. There are no up' or down' 
branches. You are just making this up.


Each copy of Alice has a unique history consisting of a sequence of up 
and down results recorded in her lab book. Similarly for Bob. All of 
these results were obtained in the /same branch/ of the ever-branching 
Everettian tree. Each measurement splits a branch, but branches never 
meet or recombine. So the Alice that meets a Bob over coffee after the N 
trials is the Alice with one particular branching history. The Bob she 
meets is necessarily in the same world, and he has a similar particular 
branching  history corresponding to just one world. There are 2^N such 
meetings, each with unique branching histories. The wonder of the 
singlet state is that for all these Alice/Bob meetings, comparison of 
the data recorded in their lab books /always/ gives correlations that 
agree with quantum theory and violate the Bell inequalities. This 
mystery of many branches that always give the correct results is the 
mystery that is to be explained. Introducing infinities of branches, and 
infinities of measurements that were never made and therefore have no 
results does not offer any explanation. In fact, it is just plain silly. 
We only ever have data from experiments that were actually performed by 
real people. There is no fantasy data, and no fantasy branches floating 
around that have to be eliminated by some magic or the other.  The magic 
of the singlet state is that no results counter to quantum mechanics can 
ever be generated. And this can only be explained non-locally. All other 
attempts flounder on stupidities.


Bruce



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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/9/2018 5:07 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Where you are going wrong is in saying that they were in the right 
branch at the start -- due to the properties of the singlet state. 
This is misleading you, because you are not explaining how the 
correlations arise at spacelike separations when the polarizer angles 
are set at random. Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in 
standard QM, because Alice's measurement collapses the state so that 
only the correlated part is available to Bob. It is that part of the 
explanation that is lacking in your account. You do not see any 
non-locality, basically because you are assuming it with being aware 
of what you are doing. Don't despair -- many other highly trained 
physicists do exactly the same thing. But this does mean that you 
have not explained anything -- you have simply assumed the result. 
The individual measurements of Alice and Bob do influence each other, 
or else no correlation could ever arise. This a logical consequence 
of a correlation between two independent events. /Independent/ means 
/no correlation/. Here we have spacelike separated events that do 
show a correlation. Consequently, the assumption of locality is not 
tenable, even though we appear to have only local interactions. 
Whatever you say about branching or Everett is not going to alter the 
basic logic of this situation.


This is where I see a different possible story. That all the branching 
world lines of Alice and Bob exist in the same Hilbert space and that 
only those that have consistent measurements can meet, those with 
inconsistent measurements are the off diagonal terms of the density 
matrix.  This is still non-local because the Alice and Bob that can 
meet have this element of coherent results which allows them to be in 
the same "world"; this coherence came from measurements which were 
space-like events.  So are there Alice/Bob pairs that are 
inconsistent.  Sure, if they're measuring a singlet state there's (per 
MWI) an Alice-up and a Bob-down that are consistent and there's also 
an Alice-down and a Bob-up who are consistent.  But that implies that 
the other two pairings, Alice-up/Bob-up and Alice-down/Bob-down, exist 
but are inconsistent.  Bruce says they never exist, because the wf is 
a single non-local object that doesn't allow those measurement events; 
which I understand.  But is it any different to say the incoherence of 
wrong pairings just prevents them existing in the same world, i.e. 
zeroes them out as part of the of diagonal terms?  I'll have to see if 
I can make the math work.


I thought it was clear that when you work back from the meeting pf Alice 
and Bob, their lab books contain all possible measurement results -- 
there are no sets of measurements that  Alice can make are not in one or 
other of the 2^N 'Alice' log books. Similarly there is no set of 
measurements that a Bob can make that is not in one of the 2^N 'Bob' log 
books. So there is nothing off diagonal to be zeroed out -- even if that 
concept makes any sense at all.


I wish you luck with trying to get the maths to work out on that 
one. Incompatible pairings of up/up or down/down for aligned 
polarizers have zero probability in the wave function, so they do not occur.


Bruce




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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/9/2018 5:07 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Where you are going wrong is in saying that they were in the right 
branch at the start -- due to the properties of the singlet state. 
This is misleading you, because you are not explaining how the 
correlations arise at spacelike separations when the polarizer angles 
are set at random. Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in 
standard QM, because Alice's measurement collapses the state so that 
only the correlated part is available to Bob. It is that part of the 
explanation that is lacking in your account. You do not see any 
non-locality, basically because you are assuming it with being aware 
of what you are doing. Don't despair -- many other highly trained 
physicists do exactly the same thing. But this does mean that you have 
not explained anything -- you have simply assumed the result. The 
individual measurements of Alice and Bob do influence each other, or 
else no correlation could ever arise. This a logical consequence of a 
correlation between two independent events. /Independent/ means /no 
correlation/. Here we have spacelike separated events that do show a 
correlation. Consequently, the assumption of locality is not tenable, 
even though we appear to have only local interactions. Whatever you 
say about branching or Everett is not going to alter the basic logic 
of this situation.


This is where I see a different possible story.  That all the branching 
world lines of Alice and Bob exist in the same Hilbert space and that 
only those that have consistent measurements can meet, those with 
inconsistent measurements are the off diagonal terms of the density 
matrix.  This is still non-local because the Alice and Bob that can meet 
have this element of coherent results which allows them to be in the 
same "world"; this coherence came from measurements which were 
space-like events.  So are there Alice/Bob pairs that are inconsistent.  
Sure, if they're measuring a singlet state there's (per MWI) an Alice-up 
and a Bob-down that are consistent and there's also an Alice-down and a 
Bob-up who are consistent.  But that implies that the other two 
pairings, Alice-up/Bob-up and Alice-down/Bob-down, exist but are 
inconsistent.  Bruce says they never exist, because the wf is a single 
non-local object that doesn't allow those measurement events; which I 
understand.  But is it any different to say the incoherence of wrong 
pairings just prevents them existing in the same world, i.e. zeroes them 
out as part of the of diagonal terms?  I'll have to see if I can make 
the math work.


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> You claim otherwise by identifying the persons who meet with the original 
>> person, which would indeed force some FTL in Everett to make sense. I just 
>> say that with Everett, + covariance, this has to be false.
> 
> You don't like the conclusion so you assert that it has to be false. That is 
> not a very open minded or scientific attitude.

OK. Here it looks like that, but I was summarising my argument. You were using 
an first-person-third person identity thesis which makes no sense in Everett + 
covariance, but I have shown and often explained in this list that such an 
identity thesis breaks already down with “simple Mechanism”.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
> 
>> That provides an interpretation of QM entirely local, despite Bell’s 
>> theorem. It is also what we get when developing the linearities 
>> of the SWE and tensor products, which is exemplified by Price on its FAQ.
> 
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jul 2018, at 14:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> We both agree that there is FTL signalling. What I say is that there is no 
>> FTL influence at all, in EPR, when developed in the Everett theory. I don’t 
>> see it. When they are space-separated, given they don’t know in which branch 
>> they are, they can find result which would violate Bell’s inequality, but 
>> this means that they will never met. Each Alice and Bob will only met those 
>> correlated to them. All interactions are local. No mysterious magic forcing 
>> the result of Bob or Alice to influence the outcome of the others. We need 
>> to take into account the many numbers of Alice (Bob), because none knows in 
>> which branch they are. They know only that they are correlated, and that 
>> means only that when they come back they will observe those correlations, 
>> but as there has not been any collapse, that is explained entirely by local 
>> interactions, as they were in the right branch at the start, due to the 
>> preparation of the singlet state. 
> 
> I think you mean 'no' FTL signalling in the first sentence.

Right.



> 
> It is not really a matter of branches when looked at from the point at which 
> Alice and Bob meet. They bring to this meeting a world line -- a personal 
> history, a path through these branching events. They are each like someone 
> who has undergone multiple duplications, ending in either M or W each time. 
> Each diary will contain some sequence of WWMWMM and so on. There are 2^N 
> such sequences for N duplications, each of the 2^N copies at the end of this 
> has one sequence. It is exactly the same for a sequence of binary quantum 
> measurements in MWI. At the end, when an Alice and a Bob meet, they carry 
> with them their world lines -- their particular sequences of '1' and '0' 
> results.
> 
> By starting from the final meeting point, we can unravel the chain of events 
> without getting confused as to which branch anyone is in. After N trials, 
> there are 2^N such meetings. The recording in lab books and walking to the 
> meeting between the experimenters is all local. No question about this. And 
> in every such meeting, the comparison of lab books will reveal results that 
> always agree with the quantum correlations and violate the Bell inequalities. 
> There are no surplus branches that have to be discarded by some mechanism. 
> All branches at this stage are good.
> 
> Where you are going wrong is in saying that they were in the right branch at 
> the start -- due to the properties of the singlet state. This is misleading 
> you, because you are not explaining how the correlations arise at spacelike 
> separations when the polarizer angles are set at random.


If Alice find up, she knows that she is in the branch where Bob will or has 
found down. The correlation are like Belman socks, with the MWI. The violation 
of Bell’s inequality are due to the fact they none can know chip branches they 
are in. The singlet state does not allow to single out the direction where a 
result would be definite.






> Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in standard QM, because Alice's 
> measurement collapses the state so that only the correlated part is available 
> to Bob. It is that part of the explanation that is lacking in your account. 
> You do not see any non-locality, basically because you are assuming it with 
> being aware of what you are doing. Don't despair -- many other highly trained 
> physicists do exactly the same thing. But this does mean that you have not 
> explained anything -- you have simply assumed the result. The individual 
> measurements of Alice and Bob do influence each other, or else no correlation 
> could ever arise.

If there was a collapse? OK. But without collapse, the correlation are just due 
to the fact that the singlet state put Alice and Bob in infinities of branches, 
and only when they make a measurement they know in which branches they are. 
Up-down + down-up is the same state as up’-down +down’-up’. That is what you 
are not taking into account, I think. 




> This a logical consequence of a correlation between two independent events. 
> Independent means no correlation. Here we have spacelike separated events 
> that do show a correlation. Consequently, the assumption of locality is not 
> tenable, even though we appear to have only local interactions. Whatever you 
> say about branching or Everett is not going to alter the basic logic of this 
> situation.
> 
> I think that after all these exchanges it is unlikely that you are ever going 
> to be able to accept this fact. But I do assure you that it is a fact.

The fact that Bob and Alice can measure the “spin" in non “orthogonal” 
directions can provide them clue about which partition of the multiverse they 
are in, and were at the start, but only among infinitely many directions. You 
talk like if there is one Alice with a definite spin, but

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


You claim otherwise by identifying the persons who meet with the 
original person, which would indeed force some FTL in Everett to make 
sense. I just say that with Everett, + covariance, this has to be false.


You don't like the conclusion so you assert that it has to be false. 
That is not a very open minded or scientific attitude.


Bruce


That provides an interpretation of QM entirely local, despite Bell’s 
theorem. It is also what we get when developing the linearities of the 
SWE and tensor products, which is exemplified by Price on its FAQ.


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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


We both agree that there is FTL signalling. What I say is that there 
is no FTL influence at all, in EPR, when developed in the Everett 
theory. I don’t see it. When they are space-separated, given they 
don’t know in which branch they are, they can find result which would 
violate Bell’s inequality, but this means that they will never met. 
Each Alice and Bob will only met those correlated to them. All 
interactions are local. No mysterious magic forcing the result of Bob 
or Alice to influence the outcome of the others. We need to take into 
account the many numbers of Alice (Bob), because none knows in which 
branch they are. They know only that they are correlated, and that 
means only that when they come back they will observe those 
correlations, but as there has not been any collapse, that is 
explained entirely by local interactions, as they were in the right 
branch at the start, due to the preparation of the singlet state.


I think you mean 'no' FTL signalling in the first sentence.

It is not really a matter of branches when looked at from the point at 
which Alice and Bob meet. They bring to this meeting a world line -- a 
personal history, a path through these branching events. They are each 
like someone who has undergone multiple duplications, ending in either M 
or W each time. Each diary will contain some sequence of WWMWMM and 
so on. There are 2^N such sequences for N duplications, each of the 2^N 
copies at the end of this has one sequence. It is exactly the same for a 
sequence of binary quantum measurements in MWI. At the end, when an 
Alice and a Bob meet, they carry with them their world lines -- their 
particular sequences of '1' and '0' results.


By starting from the final meeting point, we can unravel the chain of 
events without getting confused as to which branch anyone is in. After N 
trials, there are 2^N such meetings. The recording in lab books and 
walking to the meeting between the experimenters is all local. No 
question about this. And in every such meeting, the comparison of lab 
books will reveal results that /always/ agree with the quantum 
correlations and violate the Bell inequalities. There are no surplus 
branches that have to be discarded by some mechanism. All branches at 
this stage are good.


Where you are going wrong is in saying that they were in the right 
branch at the start -- due to the properties of the singlet state. This 
is misleading you, because you are not explaining how the correlations 
arise at spacelike separations when the polarizer angles are set at 
random. Sure, this is a property of the singlet state in standard QM, 
because Alice's measurement collapses the state so that only the 
correlated part is available to Bob. It is that part of the explanation 
that is lacking in your account. You do not see any non-locality, 
basically because you are assuming it with being aware of what you are 
doing. Don't despair -- many other highly trained physicists do exactly 
the same thing. But this does mean that you have not explained anything 
-- you have simply assumed the result. The individual measurements of 
Alice and Bob do influence each other, or else no correlation could ever 
arise. This a logical consequence of a correlation between two 
independent events. /Independent/ means /no correlation/. Here we have 
spacelike separated events that do show a correlation. Consequently, the 
assumption of locality is not tenable, even though we appear to have 
only local interactions. Whatever you say about branching or Everett is 
not going to alter the basic logic of this situation.


I think that after all these exchanges it is unlikely that you are ever 
going to be able to accept this fact. But I do assure you that it is a fact.


Bruce

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jul 2018, at 04:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 7 Jul 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 
 On 6 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell 
>> > > wrote:
>> 
>>> John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
>>> predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily 
>>> nonlocal.
>> 
>> Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
>> “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence (even 
>> if they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL influence 
>> seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not yet seen a 
>> proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell 
>> assumes that experiments gives univocal results.
> 
> You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we abandon 
> the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such proof can be 
> given.
> 
> Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large number 
> of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large spacelike 
> separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and gives a '1' for 
> 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result. Both record the 
> sequence of such results that they obtain in their individual lab books, 
> together with the corresponding polarizer orientations. Their lab books 
> then contain a random sequence of say N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N 
> possible such sequences in the many-worlds case, but since each observer 
> keeps the same lab book for the whole sequence, each series of 
> measurements is necessarily made in the same one world.
 
 I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
 space-like separated.
>>> 
>>> Who said anything like that?
>> 
>> You it seems to me, if only to say that Bob and Alice (but which one)
>> 
> Alice and Bob both split whenever they make a spin measurement.


I think Deutsch is right, at least on the pedagogy, when he says that the 
parallel worlds were already there, and that they just differentiate. It is 
only their consciousness which differentiates. This + the absence of collapse, 
assures non FTL influence. 





> All copies that measured that entangled pair meet.

But they meet with their counterpart. They don’t not meet with the others who 
get the non correlated values, which all exist. When space-separated, that 
needs a weaker identity thesis than the one we use in our everyday life.




> So for arbitrary polarization angles, their are four meetings per run.

Abstracting for the infinitely many others, unless they can calibrate their 
angles, which is not sure we can do, without adding a third observer in the 
instersection of the light cone. That leads to different waves, and again, all 
interaction being local, at no point we need to rely on any FTL influence.



> 
>> will measure correlated spins, by sharing an EPR channel. But with Everett 
>> pr even just with computationalism you have first person aches only to your 
>> the Alice (res. Bob) you can access in the future. You would need a very 
>> special decoherence to be able to meet the “physically” original Bob (which 
>> I am not sure is not even definable).
> 
> I am not sure why you are worried about the physically original Bob. The only 
> Bob and Alice that I am concerned with are the pair that meet up to compare 
> note -- and there are 2^N such meetings -- just pick any one!

I can do that. But neitherAlice nor Bob can do that, as they cannot know their 
result in advance.





> 
>> That is why in quantum teleportation of one qubit, they still need the 
>> information on which partition of the multiverse they are in, and this 
>> requires at least two classical bits. 
>> 
>> In Everett + any reasonable quantum theory of space, states are relative, 
>> not to the environment, which makes no sense, but to the locally accessible 
>> environment. A wave is always the sum of its front local wave, similarly, 
>> withe universal wave, our current worlds get shared by the accessible others 
>> at the speed of light.
> 
> Who claimed otherwise

You claim otherwise by identifying the persons who meet with the original 
person, which would indeed force some FTL in Everett to make sense. I just say 
that with Everett, + covariance, this has to be false. That provides an 
interpretation of QM entirely local, despite Bell’s theorem. It is also what we 
get when developing the linearities of the SWE and tensor products, which is 
exemplified by Price o

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jul 2018, at 02:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 6 Jul 2018, at 20:52, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/6/2018 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the 
 mutilverse, but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has needed to 
 propagate after than light. The non-locality, or better inseparability, 
 just assures that whatever differentiation will occur locally, they will 
 have the correlated spin, but at no point are we assured that Alice meet 
 something like the original Bob. The differentiation of the universe 
 develops locally.
>>> 
>>> No, it differentiates in a coordinated, space-like way, keeping that Alice 
>>> with that Bob so that only the correctly correlated Alice and Bob can meet, 
>>> i.e. be in the same world at the same time and place.
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> That my point. But that is why we don’t need FTL influence. In the 
>> multiverse, they remains the same, but the inequality of Bells assured them 
>> of not knowing in which branch they are.
> 
> Brent's comment is a misleading way to put it. There are no multiple copies 
> of Alice and Bob that do not have the correct correlations and have to be 
> eliminated.

Before they measure their spin, that does not make sense. You keep using an 
identity thesis which just don’t make sense, neither in Everett-QM, nor with 
Mechanism (on which Everett-QM relies). 




> Every Alice copy meets every Bob copy, and they all have the correct 
> correlations.

OK.



> It is explaining how this happens that is the whole point of the exercise. 
> This can only happen if the probability that any Bob copy gets 'up' when 
> Alice gets 'up', or the probabilities of any of the other three possible 
> combinations, are all correct. Getting these probabilities correct requires 
> non-local knowledge of the relative polarizer angles. If you don't understand 
> this, then you have not understood the basic quantum mechanics.

If “non-local” means FTL, I disagree. Only Non-local + definite unique outcome 
implies FTL. That is what the violation of Bell’s inequality shows. But with 
Everett, we keep the non-locality, but without any FTL. 

I have followed some years ago a very nice talk by Bob Cooke (a quantum 
physicist) using category theory to explicitly show that in EPR and 
teleportation, the flux of information is local. No action at a distance, as 
long as no physical collapse occurs. Yu might find the slide of the conference 
by googling on "Bob Cooke teleportation”.





> 
> 
 Once Alice and Bob are space-light separated, they will never meet again 
 after they made local measurement.
>>> 
>>> But they do meet again.  Only events are space-like separated.  People have 
>>> persistent world-lines which are both space-like  and time-like depending 
>>> on the events chosen.  But "meeting", being at the same events, is 
>>> invariant.
>>> 
 Each will meet only the corresponding (correlated) person, but there is no 
 reason we can identify them in any single word.
>>> 
>>> You can identify whomever meets as being in a single world.  That's the 
>>> point of Bruce's exposition.
>> 
>> I am not sure I see your or Bruce point. I am not sure which Alice and Bob 
>> you are talking about, nor if what you say would entail any FTL in a single 
>> world. Entanglement just correlate infinities of Alice with infinities of 
>> Bob. There is no notion of one Bob, once Alice and Bob are separated by a 
>> sufficiently great distance.
> 
> There are no infinities of Alice or Bob. There are no such infinities in 
> quantum mechanics, or in the Schrödinger equation.

Just an atom of hydrogen implies this infinity in the position base. The 
“electronic” cloud is the map of all the worlds you are in and will access to 
if you measure the position of the electron. It might be finite in some 
“loop-gravity”like theory, but with the “classical” SWE, even just one 
particles diffuse in different place in infinitely many histories.





> Once you set a base, there are only two copies of each experimenter.

FAPP, but that is going on the slope of abusing of the  identity thesis.



> And the base is set by choosing what to measure. Once that choice is made, 
> the other possible bases drop out of consideration.

OK.



> When Alice and Bob meet, they are in the one world, even if there are four 
> possible such meetings. You then follow back according to the sequences of 
> observations recorded in their lab books -- this is exactly like the W/M 
> duplication experiment. So you follow back a particular world line -- there 
> is no ambiguity.
> 
> 
>> May be you could elaborate. You believe that physical single world - FTL 
>> influence exist? I think you will need more than a violation of Bell inquiry 
>> for this.
> 
> There is no FTL signalling, and that is all that is required for L

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 7 Jul 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 6 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily 
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, 
because “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL 
influence (even if they cannot be used to transmit information), 
but such FTL influence seems to me suspicious. Some might 
disagree, but I have not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists 
when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that 
experiments gives univocal results.


You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we 
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such 
proof can be given.


Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large 
number of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at 
large spacelike separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, 
and gives a '1' for 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite 
result. Both record the sequence of such results that they obtain 
in their individual lab books, together with the corresponding 
polarizer orientations. Their lab books then contain a random 
sequence of say N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such 
sequences in the many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps 
the same lab book for the whole sequence, each series of 
measurements is necessarily made in the same one world.


I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
space-like separated.


Who said anything like that?


You it seems to me, if only to say that Bob and Alice (but which one)

Alice and Bob both split whenever they make a spin measurement. All 
copies that measured that entangled pair meet. So for arbitrary 
polarization angles, their are four meetings per run.


will measure correlated spins, by sharing an EPR channel. But with 
Everett pr even just with computationalism you have first person aches 
only to your the Alice (res. Bob) you can access in the future. You 
would need a very special decoherence to be able to meet the 
“physically” original Bob (which I am not sure is not even definable).


I am not sure why you are worried about the physically original Bob. The 
only Bob and Alice that I am concerned with are the pair that meet up to 
compare note -- and there are 2^N such meetings -- just pick any one!


That is why in quantum teleportation of one qubit, they still need the 
information on which partition of the multiverse they are in, and this 
requires at least two classical bits.


In Everett + any reasonable quantum theory of space, states are 
relative, not to the environment, which makes no sense, but to the 
locally accessible environment. A wave is always the sum of its front 
local wave, similarly, withe universal wave, our current worlds get 
shared by the accessible others at the speed of light.


Who claimed otherwise


They end up in the same world when they meet.


I have some doubt that this makes sense.


Or do you disagree with that as well?


Yes.



Think again. If you and I are talking across a coffee, we are in the 
same Everettian branch or world.



Each time one of them makes a measurement, they are localising 
themselves in different worlds. The pair state only entails that 
their measurement will fit accordingly,


How?



Because they have to share information at at least one “space-time” 
point. They don’t which branch they share, but they know they share it 
for sure.


That is not an answer to the "how?" question. That is just assuming the 
result that you have to prove or explain.



You are just assuming the non-local result that you are claiming is 
local. You are not consistent.


The point is that the apparent non-locality is an illusion because we 
think that Alice and Bob are “world-identifiable”, but with the 
relative sate theory (in QM or arithmetic) that does not make sense. 
You are using a mind-brain identity thesis too strong, for both QM or 
or just Mechanism.


I am doing nothing of the sort. I am using no more that Everettian QM. 
Non-locality is real in every branch of the multiverse.





I know it is shocking, because this leads to a short-timed solipsism.


What on earth is "short-timed solipsism"?

But some experience by hardy, mixing temporal and spatial violation of 
Bell’s inequality suggest this has to happen, to keep up covariance 
and locality, indeed.


In other words, he cannot avoid the non-locality.

It is shocking, but computatdnalism simply predict this, and quantum 
mechanism, once we abandon the collapse and all attem

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 6 Jul 2018, at 20:52, Brent Meeker > wrote:



On 7/6/2018 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the 
mutilverse, but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has 
needed to propagate after than light. The non-locality, or better 
inseparability, just assures that whatever differentiation will 
occur locally, they will have the correlated spin, but at no point 
are we assured that Alice meet something like the original Bob. The 
differentiation of the universe develops locally.


No, it differentiates in a coordinated, space-like way, keeping 
*/that Alice /*with /*that Bob*/ so that only the correctly 
correlated Alice and Bob can meet, i.e. be in the same world at the 
same time and place.


?

That my point. But that is why we don’t need FTL influence. In the 
multiverse, they remains the same, but the inequality of Bells assured 
them of not knowing in which branch they are.


Brent's comment is a misleading way to put it. There are no multiple 
copies of Alice and Bob that do not have the correct correlations and 
have to be eliminated. Every Alice copy meets every Bob copy, and they 
all have the correct correlations. It is explaining how this happens 
that is the whole point of the exercise. This can only happen if the 
probability that any Bob copy gets 'up' when Alice gets 'up', or the 
probabilities of any of the other three possible combinations, are all 
correct. Getting these probabilities correct requires non-local 
knowledge of the relative polarizer angles. If you don't understand 
this, then you have not understood the basic quantum mechanics.



Once Alice and Bob are space-light separated, they will never meet 
again after they made local measurement. 


But they do meet again.  Only events are space-like separated.  
People have persistent world-lines which are both space-like  and 
time-like depending on the events chosen.  But "meeting", being at 
the same events, is invariant.


Each will meet only the corresponding (correlated) person, but there 
is no reason we can identify them in any single word.


You can identify whomever meets as being in a single world.  That's 
the point of Bruce's exposition.


I am not sure I see your or Bruce point. I am not sure which Alice and 
Bob you are talking about, nor if what you say would entail any FTL in 
a single world. Entanglement just correlate infinities of Alice with 
infinities of Bob. There is no notion of one Bob, once Alice and Bob 
are separated by a sufficiently great distance.


There are no infinities of Alice or Bob. There are no such infinities in 
quantum mechanics, or in the Schrödinger equation. Once you set a base, 
there are only two copies of each experimenter. And the base is set by 
choosing what to measure. Once that choice is made, the other possible 
bases drop out of consideration. When Alice and Bob meet, they are in 
the one world, even if there are four possible such meetings. You then 
follow back according to the sequences of observations recorded in their 
lab books -- this is exactly like the W/M duplication experiment. So you 
follow back a particular world line -- there is no ambiguity.



May be you could elaborate. You believe that physical single world - 
FTL influence exist? I think you will need more than a violation of 
Bell inquiry for this.


There is no FTL signalling, and that is all that is required for Lorentz 
invariance. Adding extra requirements is your fantasy, not physics.


Bruce

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jul 6, 2018 at 7:54 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

*​>​You are starting to sound like John Clark in refusing to accept the
> consequences of duplication. In your duplication thought experiments*


​What ​
consequences of duplication
​ have I refused to accept?  ​

*​>​Maudlin wrote a whole book on the reconciliation of non-locality with
> special relativity.*
>

Special Relativity is not compatible with non-locality but that's not a
problem because 10 years later Einstein came up with General Relativity
and, although its certainly not demanded, its OK with non-locality because
you can't transmit information faster than light with just correlations
​.​

​John K Clark ​



.








>

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jul 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> On 6 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell 
 >>> > wrote:
 
> John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
> predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily nonlocal.
 
 Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
 “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence (even 
 if they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL influence 
 seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not yet seen a 
 proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell 
 assumes that experiments gives univocal results.
>>> 
>>> You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we abandon 
>>> the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such proof can be 
>>> given.
>>> 
>>> Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large number of 
>>> entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large spacelike 
>>> separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and gives a '1' for 
>>> 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result. Both record the sequence 
>>> of such results that they obtain in their individual lab books, together 
>>> with the corresponding polarizer orientations. Their lab books then contain 
>>> a random sequence of say N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such 
>>> sequences in the many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same 
>>> lab book for the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily 
>>> made in the same one world.
>> 
>> I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
>> space-like separated.
> 
> Who said anything like that?

You it seems to me, if only to say that Bob and Alice (but which one) will 
measure correlated spins, by sharing an EPR channel. But with Everett pr even 
just with computationalism you have first person aches only to your the Alice 
(res. Bob) you can access in the future. You would need a very special 
decoherence to be able to meet the “physically” original Bob (which I am not 
sure is not even definable).
That is why in quantum teleportation of one qubit, they still need the 
information on which partition of the multiverse they are in, and this requires 
at least two classical bits. 

In Everett + any reasonable quantum theory of space, states are relative, not 
to the environment, which makes no sense, but to the locally accessible 
environment. A wave is always the sum of its front local wave, similarly, withe 
universal wave, our current worlds get shared by the accessible others at the 
speed of light. 




> They end up in the same world when they meet.


I have some doubt that this makes sense.





> Or do you disagree with that as well?


Yes. 



> 
>> Each time one of them makes a measurement, they are localising themselves in 
>> different worlds. The pair state only entails that their measurement will 
>> fit accordingly,
> 
> How?


Because they have to share information at at least one “space-time” point. They 
don’t which branch they share, but they know they share it for sure.





> You are just assuming the non-local result that you are claiming is local. 
> You are not consistent.


The point is that the apparent non-locality is an illusion because we think 
that Alice and Bob are “world-identifiable”, but with the relative sate theory 
(in QM or arithmetic) that does not make sense. You are using a mind-brain 
identity thesis too strong, for both QM or or just Mechanism. 




> 
>> but Alice will meet the Bobs she is correlated with, and vice versa. It does 
>> not make sense to say that Alice will meet the original Bob, or something 
>> like that.
> 
> Who is the original Bob? You are starting to sound like John Clark in 
> refusing to accept the consequences of duplication. In your duplication 
> thought experiments (as in step 3 of the UDA) you talk about each duplicate 
> keeping a diary and recording W or M as appropriate.

OK.




> After a long sequence of duplications, each resulting copy will have a diary 
> with a long sequence of Ws and Ms at random.


Nice to ear that.




> This is exactly what is happening with the lab books in my example above. One 
> copy of Alice meets with one copy of Bob. But when they meet, they are in the 
> same world, and their lab books record the experiences of that particular 
> realization of the long chain of Alices and Bobs. You should remember that 
> there are 2^N such chains of experiences, and after the 2^N runs of the 
> experiment, when any Alice copy meets the corresponding Bob copy, the same 
> argument holds-- they are in the same world, and their lab bo

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Jul 2018, at 20:52, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/6/2018 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the mutilverse, 
>> but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has needed to propagate 
>> after than light. The non-locality, or better inseparability, just assures 
>> that whatever differentiation will occur locally, they will have the 
>> correlated spin, but at no point are we assured that Alice meet something 
>> like the original Bob. The differentiation of the universe develops locally.
> 
> No, it differentiates in a coordinated, space-like way, keeping that Alice 
> with that Bob so that only the correctly correlated Alice and Bob can meet, 
> i.e. be in the same world at the same time and place.

?

That my point. But that is why we don’t need FTL influence. In the multiverse, 
they remains the same, but the inequality of Bells assured them of not knowing 
in which branch they are.



> 
>> Once Alice and Bob are space-light separated, they will never meet again 
>> after they made local measurement.
> 
> But they do meet again.  Only events are space-like separated.  People have 
> persistent world-lines which are both space-like  and time-like depending on 
> the events chosen.  But "meeting", being at the same events, is invariant.
> 
>> Each will meet only the corresponding (correlated) person, but there is no 
>> reason we can identify them in any single word.
> 
> You can identify whomever meets as being in a single world.  That's the point 
> of Bruce's exposition.

I am not sure I see your or Bruce point. I am not sure which Alice and Bob you 
are talking about, nor if what you say would entail any FTL in a single world. 
Entanglement just correlate infinities of Alice with infinities of Bob. There 
is no notion of one Bob, once Alice and Bob are separated by a sufficiently 
great distance.

May be you could elaborate. You believe that physical single world - FTL 
influence exist? I think you will need more than a violation of Bell inquiry 
for this. 

Bruno 




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


It is early Sunday evening in midwinter Melbourne, and I have been out 
all afternoon drinking with friends. so a couple of bottles of prime 
Australian red wine later, I will try to answer you points sensibly..



On 7/6/2018 11:27 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 7/6/2018 8:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote

From: *Brent Meeker* >
As I understand Zurek's quantum Darwinism there are many (e.g. 
~10^30) quantum threads corresponding to each sequence of entries 
in Alice's notebooks.  A probable entry sequence has more threads 
and hence more measure than an improbable one.


That can't be right. The number of copies of a result left in the 
environment cannot determine the probability of that result. The 
probability is given by the square of the amplitude in the wave 
function. And if the environment is sparse, the system may not even 
properly decohere. I think that Zurek's quantum Darwinism is much 
more about establishing robust classical states after a quantum event.


But he also proposes to recover the Born rule.  A classical world is 
an equivalence class over many quantum states.  We don't suppose that 
every K40 decay in your blood puts you into a different world, even 
though it decoheres into a definite decayed state.  When a quantum 
measurement gets recorded in its environment, that environment 
consists of many classically equivalent, but quantum inequivalent, 
states.  So the decoherence with these states can realize relative 
measures satisfying the Born rule.


Zurek does not try to recover the Born rule from quantum Darwinism. His 
idea is that the Born rule comes from entanglement assisted invariance, 
or envariance. When a state can be transformed by a unitary operator 
acting on that state, the action can be undone by another unitary 
operator acting on the environment states. This leads to swaps of states 
and equal probabilities. He develops this to establish the Born rule 
from envariance. Quantum Darwinism is totally different, and is 
concerned with the transition from the quantum to the classical state. 
So I think your contention here is a misreading of Zurek.



 So "Alice and her notebook reading u,u,d,u...d,u,d,d,d" is a 
classical thing that exists as many quantum threads that are 
classically indistinguishable and so constitute one FAPP classical 
world.


That is regarding the lab book as a classical object. But it always 
was a decohered classical onject -- unaffected by the measurements 
Alice makes, at least until she write her result in the book. 


Unaffected by the measurement we're considering. But it is maintained 
as being classical by continual measurement-like interactions with the 
environment.


That may be the case, but it is irrelevant in this context.

The decoherence is in the pointer state that reveals up or down, and 
many copies of this result are written to the environment, making it 
stable and classical. But this does not affect probabilities, or what 
ALice writes in her book/


 Similarly for Bob.  So where the forward light cones of their last 
measurements overlap, most of these quantum threads must trace out 
to zero and leave only those whose measures satisfy both the Born 
rule and the correlations that violate Bell. This "tracing out" is 
what adjusts the relative proportion of Alice/Bob pair meetings so 
that the proper statistics are realized.


No, this idea is quite wrong. Once the measurements have been made 
and the results recorded, everything between Alice and Bob is 
completely classical. There are not some mystical "quantum threads" 
that reach out into the environment to determine probabilities. That 
is a total misreading of Zurek.


I don't think so.  But whether it is or not, you need to take into 
account that the "completely classical" is somehow constructed from 
the underlying quantum.  I don't think you can just isolate the 
quantum to the lab measurement, and use decoherence to get a needle 
state, but neglect the constraints that puts on decoherence, i.e. that 
the classical (decohered) results satisfy certain statistics.


There are no such constraints on decoherence. The statistics satisfied 
by the state are a property of the state itself, not a property of 
decoherence.


The statistics of the joint results that form the correlations are a 
result of the original singlet wave function itself, They have 
nothing to do with the subsequent decoherence and onset of 
classicality. Unless the probabilities of 'up' and 'down' at the two 
ends of the experiment are properly correlated from the start, 
nothing in the environment is going to make things come out right. 
The trace over ignored environmental degrees does not make the 
'incorrect' matches between the lab books 'zero out'. 


But if you assume each measurement is local, i.e. not influenced by 
the spacelike measurement of it's partner, th

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/6/2018 11:27 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/6/2018 8:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
From: *Brent Meeker* >


On 7/6/2018 4:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world 
when space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when 
they meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Certainly the two people who meet are in the same quasi-classical 
world.  But when decoherence happened to the two people who were 
space-like separated wasn't that decoherence at Alice in general 
different from the decoherence at Bob?  From Zurek's quantum 
Darwinism view, at each end there will be a very large number of 
different states reached by decoherence (Zurek proposes to recover 
the Born rule as statistices over these) but the decoherence 
effects will spread at roughly the speed of light and eventually 
overlap.  When they overlap they will in general be incompatible so 
the Alice and Bob corresponding to those, can never meet.  Only 
those, if there are any, which decohered compatibly AND have the 
contra-Bell correlations in their notebooks can meet. What happened 
to those that decohered incompatibly?...they are traced out to zero?


Decoherence is a local phenomenon, spreading at the speed of light 
or less. But that does not necessarily mean that the spacelike 
separated people are in different worlds. At any particular instant 
of GMT, you in California are spacelike separated from me in 
Australia. But that does not mean we are in different worlds, and 
does not prevent us from meeting at some time in the future. 
Consequently, when the decoherence from an event at Alice meets the 
decoherence from another event at Bob, they may or may not be in the 
same world. It is not the compatibility of the decoherence that is 
at issue, but the branches of the wave function on which the 
particular measurement results put them that can be incompatible. 
Separate decohered branches can never meet. It is not that they are 
traced out to zero -- it is that they are separate disjoint worlds.


There is an additional complication present in the measurements on 
EPR pairs. Given that Alice measured 'up', either 'up' or 'down' for 
Bob is compatible if the polarizers are aligned at some intermediate 
angle. So Alice _up and Bob_up can be in the same world. And 
Alice_up and Bob_down can be in the same world. But since Bob has 
split, these cannot be the same worlds overall. The crucial point 
for recovering the quantum correlations is the corresponding 
probabilities -- the probability for Bob to have recorded 'up' when 
Alice's lab book shows 'up' is generally different from the 
probability that Bob's book shows 'down' in this situation. For any 
particular trial, there is no way of knowing these probabilities, or 
of knowing which of the two Bob-worlds are compatible with the 
Alice-world. This only shows up in the expectation values over a 
large sequence of trials. It is explaining the origin of these 
probabilities that is the challenge for any proposed local account 
of the EPR correlations. And many-worlds signally fails to provide 
any such explanation. Many-worlders are content with waving their 
hands over multiple entanglements and incompatible worlds, but they 
never get down to the nitty-gritty of explaining the probabilities.


As I understand Zurek's quantum Darwinism there are many (e.g. 
~10^30) quantum threads corresponding to each sequence of entries in 
Alice's notebooks.  A probable entry sequence has more threads and 
hence more measure than an improbable one.


That can't be right. The number of copies of a result left in the 
environment cannot determine the probability of that result. The 
probability is given by the square of the amplitude in the wave 
function. And if the environment is sparse, the system may not even 
properly decohere. I think that Zurek's quantum Darwinism is much more 
about establishing robust classical states after a quantum event.


But he also proposes to recover the Born rule.  A classical world is an 
equivalence class over many quantum states.  We don't suppose that every 
K40 decay in your blood puts you into a different world, even though it 
decoheres into a definite decayed state.  When a quantum measurement 
gets recorded in its environment, that environment consists of many 
classically equivalent, but quantum inequivalent, states.  So the 
decoherence with these states can realize relative measures satisfying 
the Born rule.




 So "Alice and her notebook reading u,u,d,u...d,u,d,d,d" is a 
classical thing that exists as many quantum threads that are 
classically indistinguishable and so constitute one FAPP classical world.


That is regarding the lab book as a classical object. But it always 
was a decohered classical onject -- unaffected by the measurements 
Alice makes, at least until she write her 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/6/2018 8:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/6/2018 4:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world 
when space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when 
they meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Certainly the two people who meet are in the same quasi-classical 
world.  But when decoherence happened to the two people who were 
space-like separated wasn't that decoherence at Alice in general 
different from the decoherence at Bob?  From Zurek's quantum 
Darwinism view, at each end there will be a very large number of 
different states reached by decoherence (Zurek proposes to recover 
the Born rule as statistices over these) but the decoherence effects 
will spread at roughly the speed of light and eventually overlap.  
When they overlap they will in general be incompatible so the Alice 
and Bob corresponding to those, can never meet.  Only those, if 
there are any, which decohered compatibly AND have the contra-Bell 
correlations in their notebooks can meet.  What happened to those 
that decohered incompatibly?...they are traced out to zero?


Decoherence is a local phenomenon, spreading at the speed of light or 
less. But that does not necessarily mean that the spacelike separated 
people are in different worlds. At any particular instant of GMT, you 
in California are spacelike separated from me in Australia. But that 
does not mean we are in different worlds, and does not prevent us 
from meeting at some time in the future. Consequently, when the 
decoherence from an event at Alice meets the decoherence from another 
event at Bob, they may or may not be in the same world. It is not the 
compatibility of the decoherence that is at issue, but the branches 
of the wave function on which the particular measurement results put 
them that can be incompatible. Separate decohered branches can never 
meet. It is not that they are traced out to zero -- it is that they 
are separate disjoint worlds.


There is an additional complication present in the measurements on 
EPR pairs. Given that Alice measured 'up', either 'up' or 'down' for 
Bob is compatible if the polarizers are aligned at some intermediate 
angle. So Alice _up and Bob_up can be in the same world. And Alice_up 
and Bob_down can be in the same world. But since Bob has split, these 
cannot be the same worlds overall. The crucial point for recovering 
the quantum correlations is the corresponding probabilities -- the 
probability for Bob to have recorded 'up' when Alice's lab book shows 
'up' is generally different from the probability that Bob's book 
shows 'down' in this situation. For any particular trial, there is no 
way of knowing these probabilities, or of knowing which of the two 
Bob-worlds are compatible with the Alice-world. This only shows up in 
the expectation values over a large sequence of trials. It is 
explaining the origin of these probabilities that is the challenge 
for any proposed local account of the EPR correlations. And 
many-worlds signally fails to provide any such explanation. 
Many-worlders are content with waving their hands over multiple 
entanglements and incompatible worlds, but they never get down to the 
nitty-gritty of explaining the probabilities.


As I understand Zurek's quantum Darwinism there are many (e.g. ~10^30) 
quantum threads corresponding to each sequence of entries in Alice's 
notebooks.  A probable entry sequence has more threads and hence more 
measure than an improbable one.


That can't be right. The number of copies of a result left in the 
environment cannot determine the probability of that result. The 
probability is given by the square of the amplitude in the wave 
function. And if the environment is sparse, the system may not even 
properly decohere. I think that Zurek's quantum Darwinism is much more 
about establishing robust classical states after a quantum event.


 So "Alice and her notebook reading u,u,d,u...d,u,d,d,d" is a 
classical thing that exists as many quantum threads that are 
classically indistinguishable and so constitute one FAPP classical world.


That is regarding the lab book as a classical object. But it always was 
a decohered classical onject -- unaffected by the measurements Alice 
makes, at least until she write her result in the book. The decoherence 
is in the pointer state that reveals up or down, and many copies of this 
result are written to the environment, making it stable and classical. 
But this does not affect probabilities, or what ALice writes in her book/



 Similarly for Bob.  So where the forward light cones of their last 
measurements overlap, most of these quantum threads must trace out to 
zero and leave only those whose measures satisfy both the Born rule 
and the correlations that violate Bell.  This "tracing out" is what 
adjusts the relative pro

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/6/2018 8:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/6/2018 4:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when they 
meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Certainly the two people who meet are in the same quasi-classical 
world.  But when decoherence happened to the two people who were 
space-like separated wasn't that decoherence at Alice in general 
different from the decoherence at Bob?  From Zurek's quantum 
Darwinism view, at each end there will be a very large number of 
different states reached by decoherence (Zurek proposes to recover 
the Born rule as statistices over these) but the decoherence effects 
will spread at roughly the speed of light and eventually overlap.  
When they overlap they will in general be incompatible so the Alice 
and Bob corresponding to those, can never meet.  Only those, if there 
are any, which decohered compatibly AND have the contra-Bell 
correlations in their notebooks can meet. What happened to those that 
decohered incompatibly?...they are traced out to zero?


Decoherence is a local phenomenon, spreading at the speed of light or 
less. But that does not necessarily mean that the spacelike separated 
people are in different worlds. At any particular instant of GMT, you 
in California are spacelike separated from me in Australia. But that 
does not mean we are in different worlds, and does not prevent us from 
meeting at some time in the future. Consequently, when the decoherence 
from an event at Alice meets the decoherence from another event at 
Bob, they may or may not be in the same world. It is not the 
compatibility of the decoherence that is at issue, but the branches of 
the wave function on which the particular measurement results put them 
that can be incompatible. Separate decohered branches can never meet. 
It is not that they are traced out to zero -- it is that they are 
separate disjoint worlds.


There is an additional complication present in the measurements on EPR 
pairs. Given that Alice measured 'up', either 'up' or 'down' for Bob 
is compatible if the polarizers are aligned at some intermediate 
angle. So Alice _up and Bob_up can be in the same world. And Alice_up 
and Bob_down can be in the same world. But since Bob has split, these 
cannot be the same worlds overall. The crucial point for recovering 
the quantum correlations is the corresponding probabilities -- the 
probability for Bob to have recorded 'up' when Alice's lab book shows 
'up' is generally different from the probability that Bob's book shows 
'down' in this situation. For any particular trial, there is no way of 
knowing these probabilities, or of knowing which of the two Bob-worlds 
are compatible with the Alice-world. This only shows up in the 
expectation values over a large sequence of trials. It is explaining 
the origin of these probabilities that is the challenge for any 
proposed local account of the EPR correlations. And many-worlds 
signally fails to provide any such explanation. Many-worlders are 
content with waving their hands over multiple entanglements and 
incompatible worlds, but they never get down to the nitty-gritty of 
explaining the probabilities.


As I understand Zurek's quantum Darwinism there are many (e.g. ~10^30) 
quantum threads corresponding to each sequence of entries in Alice's 
notebooks.  A probable entry sequence has more threads and hence more 
measure than an improbable one.  So "Alice and her notebook reading 
u,u,d,u...d,u,d,d,d" is a classical thing that exists as many quantum 
threads that are classically indistinguishable and so constitute one 
FAPP classical world. Similarly for Bob.  So where the forward light 
cones of their last measurements overlap, most of these quantum threads 
must trace out to zero and leave only those whose measures satisfy both 
the Born rule and the correlations that violate Bell.  This "tracing 
out" is what adjusts the relative proportion of Alice/Bob pair meetings 
so that the proper statistics are realized.


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 7/6/2018 4:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when they 
meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Certainly the two people who meet are in the same quasi-classical 
world.  But when decoherence happened to the two people who were 
space-like separated wasn't that decoherence at Alice in general 
different from the decoherence at Bob?  From Zurek's quantum Darwinism 
view, at each end there will be a very large number of different 
states reached by decoherence (Zurek proposes to recover the Born rule 
as statistices over these) but the decoherence effects will spread at 
roughly the speed of light and eventually overlap.  When they overlap 
they will in general be incompatible so the Alice and Bob 
corresponding to those, can never meet.  Only those, if there are any, 
which decohered compatibly AND have the contra-Bell correlations in 
their notebooks can meet.  What happened to those that decohered 
incompatibly?...they are traced out to zero?


Decoherence is a local phenomenon, spreading at the speed of light or 
less. But that does not necessarily mean that the spacelike separated 
people are in different worlds. At any particular instant of GMT, you in 
California are spacelike separated from me in Australia. But that does 
not mean we are in different worlds, and does not prevent us from 
meeting at some time in the future. Consequently, when the decoherence 
from an event at Alice meets the decoherence from another event at Bob, 
they may or may not be in the same world. It is not the compatibility of 
the decoherence that is at issue, but the branches of the wave function 
on which the particular measurement results put them that can be 
incompatible. Separate decohered branches can never meet. It is not that 
they are traced out to zero -- it is that they are separate disjoint worlds.


There is an additional complication present in the measurements on EPR 
pairs. Given that Alice measured 'up', either 'up' or 'down' for Bob is 
compatible if the polarizers are aligned at some intermediate angle. So 
Alice _up and Bob_up can be in the same world. And Alice_up and Bob_down 
can be in the same world. But since Bob has split, these cannot be the 
same worlds overall. The crucial point for recovering the quantum 
correlations is the corresponding probabilities -- the probability for 
Bob to have recorded 'up' when Alice's lab book shows 'up' is generally 
different from the probability that Bob's book shows 'down' in this 
situation. For any particular trial, there is no way of knowing these 
probabilities, or of knowing which of the two Bob-worlds are compatible 
with the Alice-world. This only shows up in the expectation values over 
a large sequence of trials. It is explaining the origin of these 
probabilities that is the challenge for any proposed local account of 
the EPR correlations. And many-worlds signally fails to provide any such 
explanation. Many-worlders are content with waving their hands over 
multiple entanglements and incompatible worlds, but they never get down 
to the nitty-gritty of explaining the probabilities.


Bruce


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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/6/2018 4:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when they 
meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Certainly the two people who meet are in the same quasi-classical 
world.  But when decoherence happened to the two people who were 
space-like separated wasn't that decoherence at Alice in general 
different from the decoherence at Bob?  From Zurek's quantum Darwinism 
view, at each end there will be a very large number of different states 
reached by decoherence (Zurek proposes to recover the Born rule as 
statistices over these) but the decoherence effects will spread at 
roughly the speed of light and eventually overlap. When they overlap 
they will in general be incompatible so the Alice and Bob corresponding 
to those, can never meet.  Only those, if there are any, which decohered 
compatibly AND have the contra-Bell correlations in their notebooks can 
meet.  What happened to those that decohered incompatibly?...they are 
traced out to zero?


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 6 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily 
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
“non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence 
(even if they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL 
influence seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have 
not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon the 
collapse postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives univocal 
results.


You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we 
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such 
proof can be given.


Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large 
number of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large 
spacelike separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and 
gives a '1' for 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result. 
Both record the sequence of such results that they obtain in their 
individual lab books, together with the corresponding polarizer 
orientations. Their lab books then contain a random sequence of say 
N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such sequences in the 
many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same lab book for 
the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily made 
in the same one world.


I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when 
space-like separated.


Who said anything like that? They end up in the same world when they 
meet. Or do you disagree with that as well?


Each time one of them makes a measurement, they are localising 
themselves in different worlds. The pair state only entails that their 
measurement will fit accordingly,


How? You are just assuming the non-local result that you are claiming is 
local. You are not consistent.


but Alice will meet the Bobs she is correlated with, and vice versa. 
It does not make sense to say that Alice will meet the original Bob, 
or something like that.


Who is the original Bob? You are starting to sound like John Clark in 
refusing to accept the consequences of duplication. In your duplication 
thought experiments (as in step 3 of the UDA) you talk about each 
duplicate keeping a diary and recording W or M as appropriate. After a 
long sequence of duplications, each resulting copy will have a diary 
with a long sequence of Ws and Ms at random. This is exactly what is 
happening with the lab books in my example above. One copy of Alice 
meets with one copy of Bob. But when they meet, they are in the same 
world, and their lab books record the experiences of that particular 
realization of the long chain of Alices and Bobs. You should remember 
that there are 2^N such chains of experiences, and after the 2^N runs of 
the experiment, when any Alice copy meets the corresponding Bob copy, 
the same argument holds-- they are in the same world, and their lab 
books record the sequence of results that the obtained in the world that 
they happen to inhabit.



Basically, this is because the worlds are disjoint, and the observers 
and/or lab books cannot move between worlds.


Any measurement entails new differentiation.



When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials,


Each of Alice and Bob will meet only the Bob and Alice prescribed by 
the result of their measurement. You need to look at the entire wave 
function.


Why? An Alice copy meets a Bob copy and they compare notes. Any time 
this happens the results in their lab books must confirm the quantum 
correlations. Or do you not agree with this? The trick is to understand 
how this happens. You are not giving an explanation -- you are relying 
on some unspecified magic!



they take their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly 
in the same Everettian branch.


“They” is ambiguous here.


Think about it and the ambiguity will disappear. "They" are any of the 
2^N copies of Alice and Bob. (But the copies are, themselves correlated.)



And since their lab books cannot have jumped between branches, the 
sequence of results that they each bring must also have all been 
recorded in this same one branch. So when they come to use their data 
to calculate the correlations between the measurements on their 
individual particles of the entangled pairs, they are in exactly the 
same situation as they would be if they had assumed a collapse model 
from the outset.


It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the 
mutilverse, but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has needed 
to propagate after than light. The non-locality, or better inseparability,


You are ch

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *smitra* mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>>


On 06-07-2018 14:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: BRUNO MARCHAL mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell
mailto:goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>> wrote:

John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is
necessarily
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term “inseparable”,
because “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL
influence (even if they cannot be used to transmit
information), but
such FTL influence seems to me suspicious. Some might
disagree, but
I have not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon
the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives
univocal
results.


 You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such
proof can be given.

 Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large
number of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large
spacelike separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and
gives a '1' for 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result.
Both record the sequence of such results that they obtain in their
individual lab books, together with the corresponding polarizer
orientations. Their lab books then contain a random sequence of say N,
'1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such sequences in the
many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same lab book for
the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily made in
the same one world. Basically, this is because the worlds are
disjoint, and the observers and/or lab books cannot move between
worlds.

 When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials, they
take their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly in the
same Everettian branch. And since their lab books cannot have jumped
between branches, the sequence of results that they each bring must
also have all been recorded in this same one branch. So when they come
to use their data to calculate the correlations between the
measurements on their individual particles of the entangled pairs,
they are in exactly the same situation as they would be if they had
assumed a collapse model from the outset. The correlations they
observe are necessarily single-world correlations. So the conditions
of Bell's theorem are exactly satisfied, and since the correlations
violate the Bell inequalities, their experiment has demonstrated the
impossibility of a local hidden variable account. They have
demonstrated that the quantum correlations require non-locality, even
with Everett's many-worlds, just as Bell proved.

 And all this happens whether they assume many-worlds or a collapse
model.

 Bruce


Alice's lab book is not located in a single branch of Bob's lab book 
and vice versa.


It is when they meet. Unless you want to pretend that when two people 
meet they are not in the same world!


If you consider the entire wavefunction of Alice's sector, including 
her lab book and Bob's sector and his lab book, then this is a 
complicated entangled wavefunction. If you trace out the environments 
on both sides and only consider the contents of the lab books, you're 
left with correlated lab books where each entry of one lab book is 
correlated with the corresponding entry of the other lab book.


Maybe that is the point. How did the lab book entries come to be 
correlated? You are offering word salad -- not an explanation of the 
correlations.


Bell's theorem in general without assuming many or single words, 
doesn't directly imply nonlocality,  the way the correlations depend 
on the relative polarizer orientation shows that there are no local 
hidden variables that would have specified the outcome of the 
measurements. That leaves us with two options. Either there exists 
nonlocal hidden variables, or there are no hidden variables at all. 
What matters is that before any measurement where there are multiple 
possible outcomes (whether or not that involves entangled pairs where 
someone else is measuring the other component), the information about 
the result of the outcome is not already present locally.


So what? What is the point you are trying to make? I agree that Bell 
showed that if there are hidden variables (QM is not complete as it 
stands) then they must be non-local.  If there are no hidden variables, 
that does not remove the non-locality. The non-separable quantum state 
is still intrinsically non-local.


So, when Alice measures her spin, she gains one bit on information and 
that bit of information was not present in her local environment. In 
ca

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/6/2018 6:51 AM, smitra wrote:

On 06-07-2018 14:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: BRUNO MARCHAL 


On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell
 wrote:


John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term “inseparable”,
because “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL
influence (even if they cannot be used to transmit information), but
such FTL influence seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but
I have not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon
the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives univocal
results.


 You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such
proof can be given.

 Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large
number of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large
spacelike separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and
gives a '1' for 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result.
Both record the sequence of such results that they obtain in their
individual lab books, together with the corresponding polarizer
orientations. Their lab books then contain a random sequence of say N,
'1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such sequences in the
many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same lab book for
the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily made in
the same one world. Basically, this is because the worlds are
disjoint, and the observers and/or lab books cannot move between
worlds.

 When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials, they
take their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly in the
same Everettian branch. And since their lab books cannot have jumped
between branches, the sequence of results that they each bring must
also have all been recorded in this same one branch. So when they come
to use their data to calculate the correlations between the
measurements on their individual particles of the entangled pairs,
they are in exactly the same situation as they would be if they had
assumed a collapse model from the outset. The correlations they
observe are necessarily single-world correlations. So the conditions
of Bell's theorem are exactly satisfied, and since the correlations
violate the Bell inequalities, their experiment has demonstrated the
impossibility of a local hidden variable account. They have
demonstrated that the quantum correlations require non-locality, even
with Everett's many-worlds, just as Bell proved.

 And all this happens whether they assume many-worlds or a collapse
model.

 Bruce



Alice's lab book is not located in a single branch of Bob's lab book 
and vice versa. If you consider the entire wavefunction of Alice's 
sector, including her lab book and Bob's sector and his lab book, then 
this is a complicated entangled wavefunction. If you trace out the 
environments on both sides and only consider the contents of the lab 
books, you're left with correlated lab books where each entry of one 
lab book is correlated with the corresponding entry of the other lab 
book.


And is that not exactly like collapse eliminating all the branches which 
get traced out to zero (FAPP).





Bell's theorem in general without assuming many or single words, 
doesn't directly imply nonlocality,  the way the correlations depend 
on the relative polarizer orientation shows that there are no local 
hidden variables that would have specified the outcome of the 
measurements. That leaves us with two options. Either there exists 
nonlocal hidden variables, or there are no hidden variables at all. 
What matters is that before any measurement where there are multiple 
possible outcomes (whether or not that involves entangled pairs where 
someone else is measuring the other component), the information about 
the result of the outcome is not already present locally.


That last sentence seemed like a trivial statement that the theory is 
probabilistic until you added the word "locally".  Are you implying that 
the information did exist "globally"?




So, when Alice measures her spin, she gains one bit on information and 
that bit of information was not present in her local environment.
In case of entangled pairs that information would have been present at 
a spacelike separation, but only if one assumes a single world 
interpretation. 


I think this is misleading though.  It implies that in a mulitiple-world 
interpretation there is no information in correlations.  But that is 
only the case if the world's in which Bell's theorem is true also 
exist.  The fact that some lab book correlations don't exist constitutes 
non-local information.


Brent

The thought experiment with lab books doesn't change this conclusion 
because the lab books end up in an entangled superposition with each 
other, as well as with the local 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/6/2018 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the 
mutilverse, but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has needed 
to propagate after than light. The non-locality, or better 
inseparability, just assures that whatever differentiation will occur 
locally, they will have the correlated spin, but at no point are we 
assured that Alice meet something like the original Bob. The 
differentiation of the universe develops locally.


No, it differentiates in a coordinated, space-like way, keeping */that 
Alice /*with /*that Bob*/ so that only the correctly correlated Alice 
and Bob can meet, i.e. be in the same world at the same time and place.


Once Alice and Bob are space-light separated, they will never meet 
again after they made local measurement. 


But they do meet again.  Only events are space-like separated. People 
have persistent world-lines which are both space-like  and time-like 
depending on the events chosen.  But "meeting", being at the same 
events, is invariant.


Each will meet only the corresponding (correlated) person, but there 
is no reason we can identify them in any single word.


You can identify whomever meets as being in a single world.  That's the 
point of Bruce's exposition.


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Jul 2018, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>>> John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental predictions 
>>> identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily nonlocal.
>> 
>> Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
>> “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence (even if 
>> they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL influence seems 
>> to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not yet seen a proof that 
>> any FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that 
>> experiments gives univocal results.
> 
> You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we abandon the 
> collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such proof can be given.
> 
> Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large number of 
> entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large spacelike 
> separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and gives a '1' for 'up' 
> or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result. Both record the sequence of 
> such results that they obtain in their individual lab books, together with 
> the corresponding polarizer orientations. Their lab books then contain a 
> random sequence of say N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such 
> sequences in the many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same lab 
> book for the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily made 
> in the same one world.

I am not sure I understand the idea of being in the same world when space-like 
separated. Each time one of them makes a measurement, they are localising 
themselves in different worlds. The pair state only entails that their 
measurement will fit accordingly, but Alice will meet the Bobs she is 
correlated with, and vice versa. It does not make sense to say that Alice will 
meet the original Bob, or something like that.



> Basically, this is because the worlds are disjoint, and the observers and/or 
> lab books cannot move between worlds.

Any measurement entails new differentiation. 


> 
> When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials,

Each of Alice and Bob will meet only the Bob and Alice prescribed by the result 
of their measurement. You need to look at the entire wave function.




> they take their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly in the 
> same Everettian branch.

“They” is ambiguous here. 




> And since their lab books cannot have jumped between branches, the sequence 
> of results that they each bring must also have all been recorded in this same 
> one branch. So when they come to use their data to calculate the correlations 
> between the measurements on their individual particles of the entangled 
> pairs, they are in exactly the same situation as they would be if they had 
> assumed a collapse model from the outset.

It is like they find themselves in the relevant partition of the mutilverse, 
but as there has not been any collapse, nothing has needed to propagate after 
than light. The non-locality, or better inseparability, just assures that 
whatever differentiation will occur locally, they will have the correlated 
spin, but at no point are we assured that Alice meet something like the 
original Bob. The differentiation of the universe develops locally. Once Alice 
and Bob are space-light separated, they will never meet again after they made 
local measurement. Each will meet only the corresponding (correlated) person, 
but there is no reason we can identify them in any single word.




> The correlations they observe are necessarily single-world correlations.

That comes true after their measurement. But the world have differentiated 
before.




> So the conditions of Bell's theorem are exactly satisfied,

I don’t think so. All outcomes are realised (assuming the singlet state, and 
measurement in any direction). Each Bob and Alice have localised themselves in 
the corresponding branches, and will met only their corresponding partners, due 
to the local further separation obtained by their local measurement. That is 
inseparability. It does not require simultaneous action at a distance.




> and since the correlations violate the Bell inequalities, their experiment 
> has demonstrated the impossibility of a local hidden variable account.

I agree with this. That is indeed why a world or an entire history is more  
like a global “hidden variable”, making sense of those correlation in a local 
way, with differentiation occurring locally, but always ensuing the existence 
of the correlation.




> They have demonstrated that the quantum correlations require non-locality, 
> even with Everett's many-worlds, just as Bell proved.

I can be OK with this conclusion, unless you imply that in Everett there is 
still som

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[smitra]

On 06-07-2018 14:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: BRUNO MARCHAL 


On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell
 wrote:


John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term “inseparable”,
because “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL
influence (even if they cannot be used to transmit information), but
such FTL influence seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but
I have not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon
the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives univocal
results.


 You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such
proof can be given.

 Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large
number of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large
spacelike separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and
gives a '1' for 'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result.
Both record the sequence of such results that they obtain in their
individual lab books, together with the corresponding polarizer
orientations. Their lab books then contain a random sequence of say N,
'1's and '0's. There are 2^N possible such sequences in the
many-worlds case, but since each observer keeps the same lab book for
the whole sequence, each series of measurements is necessarily made in
the same one world. Basically, this is because the worlds are
disjoint, and the observers and/or lab books cannot move between
worlds.

 When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials, they
take their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly in the
same Everettian branch. And since their lab books cannot have jumped
between branches, the sequence of results that they each bring must
also have all been recorded in this same one branch. So when they come
to use their data to calculate the correlations between the
measurements on their individual particles of the entangled pairs,
they are in exactly the same situation as they would be if they had
assumed a collapse model from the outset. The correlations they
observe are necessarily single-world correlations. So the conditions
of Bell's theorem are exactly satisfied, and since the correlations
violate the Bell inequalities, their experiment has demonstrated the
impossibility of a local hidden variable account. They have
demonstrated that the quantum correlations require non-locality, even
with Everett's many-worlds, just as Bell proved.

 And all this happens whether they assume many-worlds or a collapse
model.

 Bruce



Alice's lab book is not located in a single branch of Bob's lab book and 
vice versa. If you consider the entire wavefunction of Alice's sector, 
including her lab book and Bob's sector and his lab book, then this is a 
complicated entangled wavefunction. If you trace out the environments on 
both sides and only consider the contents of the lab books, you're left 
with correlated lab books where each entry of one lab book is correlated 
with the corresponding entry of the other lab book.



Bell's theorem in general without assuming many or single words, doesn't 
directly imply nonlocality,  the way the correlations depend on the 
relative polarizer orientation shows that there are no local hidden 
variables that would have specified the outcome of the measurements. 
That leaves us with two options. Either there exists nonlocal hidden 
variables, or there are no hidden variables at all. What matters is that 
before any measurement where there are multiple possible outcomes 
(whether or not that involves entangled pairs where someone else is 
measuring the other component), the information about the result of the 
outcome is not already present locally.


So, when Alice measures her spin, she gains one bit on information and 
that bit of information was not present in her local environment. In 
case of entangled pairs that information would have been present at a 
spacelike separation, but only if one assumes a single world 
interpretation. The thought experiment with lab books doesn't change 
this conclusion because the lab books end up in an entangled 
superposition with each other, as well as with the local environments.


Saibal

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily 
nonlocal.


Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
“non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence 
(even if they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL 
influence seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not 
yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse 
postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives univocal results.


You might not have seen a proof that non-locality remains when we 
abandon the collapse postulate, but that does not mean that no such 
proof can be given.


Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are given a large number 
of entangled pairs, which they measure when they are at large spacelike 
separation. Each measurement is made at some angle, and gives a '1' for 
'up' or 'passed', and '0' for the opposite result. Both record the 
sequence of such results that they obtain in their individual lab books, 
together with the corresponding polarizer orientations. Their lab books 
then contain a random sequence of say N, '1's and '0's. There are 2^N 
possible such sequences in the many-worlds case, but since each observer 
keeps the same lab book for the whole sequence, each series of 
measurements is necessarily made in the same one world. Basically, this 
is because the worlds are disjoint, and the observers and/or lab books 
cannot move between worlds.


When Alice and Bob meet up at the end of the run of N trials, they take 
their lab books with them. When they meet they are clearly in the same 
Everettian branch. And since their lab books cannot have jumped between 
branches, the sequence of results that they each bring must also have 
all been recorded in this same one branch. So when they come to use 
their data to calculate the correlations between the measurements on 
their individual particles of the entangled pairs, they are in exactly 
the same situation as they would be if they had assumed a collapse model 
from the outset. The correlations they observe are necessarily 
single-world correlations. So the conditions of Bell's theorem are 
exactly satisfied, and since the correlations violate the Bell 
inequalities, their experiment has demonstrated the impossibility of a 
local hidden variable account. They have demonstrated that the quantum 
correlations require non-locality, even with Everett's many-worlds, just 
as Bell proved.


And all this happens whether they assume many-worlds or a collapse model.

Bruce

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, July 5, 2018 at 3:09:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Jul 2018, at 15:09, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of 
>> Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can 
>> halt or not. This is a form of the Berry paradox and similar "unnameable 
>> number" results similar to Cantor diagonalization. Such a thing really does 
>> not exist.
> 
> 
> Indeed. But I do not see the relevance here. It means only that we cannot 
> recognise a program from its behaviour in general, still less from its code. 
> But everyone knows who he is locally, and that is only what we need to get 
> the first person duplication when done (by definition/assumption) at the 
> right level. That explains the “many-world” internal interpretation in 
> arithmetic or Turing equivalent. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> This was in response to something Clark wrote. 

OK. 



> 
> When it comes to interpretations I think Wittgenstein is advised with a 
> paraphrased quote that which we can't speak we pass over in silence.

Yes. But Wittgenstein’s remark was self-defeating, and invite the question 
“what are you talking about?”. Lol.
I made a comparative study of Wittgenstein, Lao-Ze and the Universal Machine in 
the long version of my thesis. What Wittgenstein missed is that the machine are 
aware of their incompleteness, conditionalized on their consistency.






> I think it best to think according to quantum spectra with some "Gödel 
> numbering" between quantum numbers and solutions to Diophantine equations. 
> John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental predictions 
> identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily nonlocal.

Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term  “inseparable”, because 
“non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence (even if 
they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL influence seems to 
me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not yet seen a proof that any 
FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that 
experiments gives univocal results.




> Complete nonlocality would eventually encompass everything in the universe, 
> including ourselves, giving rise to bizarre self-referential logical truths.

If mechanism is true, the Universe if the mind of the universal machine, and 
the observable part of it is a sort of projective limit internal to arithmetic. 
Note this is close to Wittgenstein statement that the objective is the border 
of the subjective.




> The latter are not usually considered to be in the realm of physics. 
> Experimental outcomes are never considered with respect to such 
> self-referential loops.


It appears with Galilee, Einstein, Everett. Mechanism pushes this to its 
logical limit.




> However, this is because as with ψ-epistemic interpretations the quantum and 
> classical worlds are considered distinct. Heisenberg however showed there is 
> a problem with understanding the cut between the two. This leads to 
> Schödinger's cat problem. MWI is ψ-ontic, and in effect invokes nonlocal 
> variables that are the other worlds. Nonlocality in ψ-ontic interpretations 
> are instead of being a formal feature of QM as described topologically by 
> quotient groups and spaces is rather laden down with hidden variables. These 
> problems may be due to the fact we avoid looking at nonlocality in its 
> complete glory, and that the measurement problem and related issues of 
> quantum-classical dichotomy may be due to the fact an observer is really just 
> a part of a quantum system observing itself.

The quantum itself is due to the arithmetical reality observing itself. With p 
being a sigma-1 sentences, incompleteness imposes the following variants:

p truth
[]p   belief
[]p & p  knowledge
[]p & <>t  observable.   (And it explains the quantum formally and intuitively 
with the many-histories).
[]p & <>t & p sensitive

The whole physicalness comes from the universal machine observable mode. The 
“<>t” assures it makes probabilistic sense. It avoids the cul-de-sac world 
where probabilities makes no sense (intuitively and formally).



> 
> The Davis, Matiyasevich, Putnam, Robinson (DMPR) theorem proves that the 
> solutions for any general element of a Diophantine set is Turing halting, but 
> that any other element may not be. This means the solutions to Diophantine 
> equations are recursively enumerable, and there is a Gödel theorem aspect to 
> this.

Recursively enumerable, and creative, in Elis Post sense. All programs, 
including all quantum computer, can be simulated exactly (emulated) by one 
degree 4 Diophantine equation. 




> Now if we have some scheme for Gödel numbering quantum eigenvalues gn(λ) → 
> P(a, x_1, x_2, ..., x_n), for λ an eigenvalue with a code mapped to the 
> solution of a Diophantine equation. 
> 
> The non-so

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, July 5, 2018 at 3:09:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Jul 2018, at 15:09, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of 
> Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can 
> halt or not. This is a form of the Berry paradox and similar "unnameable 
> number" results similar to Cantor diagonalization. Such a thing really does 
> not exist.
>
>
>
> Indeed. But I do not see the relevance here. It means only that we cannot 
> recognise a program from its behaviour in general, still less from its 
> code. But everyone knows who he is locally, and that is only what we need 
> to get the first person duplication when done (by definition/assumption) at 
> the right level. That explains the “many-world” internal interpretation in 
> arithmetic or Turing equivalent. 
>
> Bruno
>

This was in response to something Clark wrote. 

When it comes to interpretations I think Wittgenstein is advised with a 
paraphrased quote that which we can't speak we pass over in silence. I 
think it best to think according to quantum spectra with some "Gödel 
numbering" between quantum numbers and solutions to Diophantine 
equations. John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental 
predictions identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily nonlocal. 
Complete nonlocality would eventually encompass everything in the universe, 
including ourselves, giving rise to bizarre self-referential logical 
truths. The latter are not usually considered to be in the realm of 
physics. Experimental outcomes are never considered with respect to such 
self-referential loops. However, this is because as with ψ-epistemic 
interpretations the quantum and classical worlds are considered distinct. 
Heisenberg however showed there is a problem with understanding the cut 
between the two. This leads to Schödinger's cat problem. MWI is ψ-ontic, 
and in effect invokes nonlocal variables that are the other worlds. 
Nonlocality in ψ-ontic interpretations are instead of being a formal 
feature of QM as described topologically by quotient groups and spaces is 
rather laden down with hidden variables. These problems may be due to the 
fact we avoid looking at nonlocality in its complete glory, and that the 
measurement problem and related issues of quantum-classical dichotomy may 
be due to the fact an observer is really just a part of a quantum system 
observing itself.

The Davis, Matiyasevich, Putnam, Robinson (DMPR) theorem proves that the 
solutions for any general element of a Diophantine set is Turing halting, 
but that any other element may not be. This means the solutions to 
Diophantine equations are recursively enumerable, and there is a Gödel 
theorem aspect to this. Now if we have some scheme for Gödel numbering 
quantum eigenvalues gn(λ) → P(a, x_1, x_2, ..., x_n), for λ an eigenvalue 
with a code mapped to the solution of a Diophantine equation. 

The non-solutions may then be the emergence of classicality. Quantum 
physics does not predict chaotic behavior, and chaotic behavior is in 
principle an endless recursion of orbits and "filigree" that is recursively 
enumerable. This may then be a way to think about the relationship between 
quantum mechanics and the emergence of classical physics with einselection.

LC

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Jul 2018, at 18:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 9:09 AM, Lawrence Crowell 
> mailto:goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> ​> ​These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul 
> of Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can 
> halt or not.
> 
> Yes, Turing said you can never determine if every program will stop, but that 
> doesn’t mean you can’t determine if some programs will stop. And I think you 
> would agree not every string of ASCII characters is a question even if it has 
> a question mark at the end. If a question about tomorrow can't be answered 
> even in principle the day after tomorrow

But it can. You said it yourself. In W the guy write W in the diary, and if 
that was not predicted in the diary, he has to admit he was unable to predict 
what he is personally living right now, and the same for the other guy. 
You reasoning would entail the absence of any probabilities in QM-without 
collapse, which is correct for the 3p global prediction, but empirically false 
for all living entities obeying to the SWE. 

Bruno





> then the utterance made the day before yesterday was gibberish and the reason 
> it has no answer is the same as the reason a burp has no answer, neither was 
> a question.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Jul 2018, at 18:30, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​>​Both copies knows perfectly well how to answer them after.
> 
> ​And both answers I not only correctly predicted yesterday without the 
> slightest trace if indeterminacy I did so easily; I said the guy who would 
> see Moscow would answer "I see Moscow" and the guy who would see  Washington 
> would  answer  "I see Washington". OK that is not very profound I admit but 
> its your thought experiment not mine.


But so you have to agree that the guy in Moscow has to admit that he has not 
succeeded to predict in Helsinki yesterday  that very personal experience lived 
today, and accordingly the same for the guy in Washington, given that if their 
diary contains your (3p) symmetrical description, it cannot have worked for the 
FIRST PERSON prediction. You just proved my point.

Bruno




>  
> ​> ​You reiterates once more your intensional confusion
> 
> So says the man who does not even know the referent to a simple personal 
> pronoun VERY frequently used in his key thought experiment.  
> 
> 
> ​John K Clark​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> we can suspect, between fist person and third person. Repeating an argument 
> ad nauseam will not make it true.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> ​>>​And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, 
>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged 
>> either way. 
>> 
>> ​>​That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in 
>> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals
>>  
>> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless of 
>> if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do 
>> with any existing mathematics much less physics. 
>> 
>> ​John K Clark​
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Jul 2018, at 15:09, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of 
> Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can 
> halt or not. This is a form of the Berry paradox and similar "unnameable 
> number" results similar to Cantor diagonalization. Such a thing really does 
> not exist.


Indeed. But I do not see the relevance here. It means only that we cannot 
recognise a program from its behaviour in general, still less from its code. 
But everyone knows who he is locally, and that is only what we need to get the 
first person duplication when done (by definition/assumption) at the right 
level. That explains the “many-world” internal interpretation in arithmetic or 
Turing equivalent. 

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
> On Tuesday, July 3, 2018 at 6:52:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Jul 2018, at 20:46, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> ​>​you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live 
>> after a self-duplication.
>> I have an algorithm that can detect gibberish and gibberish questions have 
>> no answer. The algorithm works this way, if even after the exparament is 
>> over its STILL impossible to say what the prediction was suposed to be about 
>> then the question about the future was gibberish.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Both copies knows perfectly well how to answer them after. You reiterates 
> once more your intensional confusion, we can suspect, between fist person and 
> third person. Repeating an argument ad nauseam will not make it true.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> ​>>​And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, 
>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged 
>> either way. 
>> 
>> ​>​That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in 
>> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals
>>  
>> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless of 
>> if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do 
>> with any existing mathematics much less physics. 
>> 
>> ​John K Clark​
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 9:09 AM, Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

​> ​
> These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of
> Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can
> halt or not.


Yes, Turing said you can never determine if every program will stop, but
that doesn’t mean you can’t determine if some programs will stop. And I
think you would agree not every string of ASCII characters is a question
even if it has a question mark at the end. If a question about tomorrow
can't be answered even in principle the day after tomorrow then the
utterance made the day before yesterday was gibberish and the reason it has
no answer is the same as the reason a burp has no answer, neither was a
question.

John K Clark

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>​
> *Both copies knows perfectly well how to answer them after.*
>

​
And both answers I not only correctly predicted yesterday without the
slightest trace if indeterminacy I did so easily; I said the guy who would
see Moscow would answer "I see Moscow" and the guy who would see
 Washington would  answer  "I see Washington". OK that is not very profound
I admit but its your thought experiment not mine.


> ​> ​
> *You reiterates once more your intensional confusion*
>

So says the man who does not even know the referent to a simple personal
pronoun VERY frequently used in his key thought experiment.

​John K Clark​














> we can suspect, between fist person and third person. Repeating an
> argument ad nauseam will not make it true.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ​>>​
>>> And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not,
>>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged
>>> either way.
>>
>>
>> ​>*​*
>> *That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in
>> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals*
>>
>
> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless
> of if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do
> with any existing mathematics much less physics.
>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>>
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of 
Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can 
halt or not. This is a form of the Berry paradox and similar "unnameable 
number" results similar to Cantor diagonalization. Such a thing really does 
not exist.

LC

On Tuesday, July 3, 2018 at 6:52:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Jul 2018, at 20:46, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> *​>​you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live 
>> after a self-duplication.*
>
> I have an algorithm that can detect gibberish and gibberish questions have 
> no answer. The algorithm works this way, if even after the exparament is 
> over its STILL impossible to say what the prediction was suposed to be 
> about then the question about the future was gibberish.
>
>
> Both copies knows perfectly well how to answer them after. You reiterates 
> once more your intensional confusion, we can suspect, between fist person 
> and third person. Repeating an argument ad nauseam will not make it true.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ​>>​
>>> And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, 
>>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged 
>>> either way. 
>>
>>
>> ​>*​*
>> *That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in 
>> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals*
>>
>  
> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless 
> of if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do 
> with any existing mathematics much less physics. 
>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>>
> -- 
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>
>
>

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Jul 2018, at 20:46, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​>​you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live 
> after a self-duplication.
> I have an algorithm that can detect gibberish and gibberish questions have no 
> answer. The algorithm works this way, if even after the exparament is over 
> its STILL impossible to say what the prediction was suposed to be about then 
> the question about the future was gibberish.
> 
> 

Both copies knows perfectly well how to answer them after. You reiterates once 
more your intensional confusion, we can suspect, between fist person and third 
person. Repeating an argument ad nauseam will not make it true.

Bruno





> ​>>​And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, 
> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged either 
> way. 
> 
> ​>​That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in 
> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals
>  
> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless of 
> if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do with 
> any existing mathematics much less physics. 
> 
> ​John K Clark​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Jason Resch]

John,

See the paper I linked recently  in the "Solomonoff's induction" thread:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf

In particular, it describes the same first person indeterminacy in the form
of a faulty teleporter device thought experiment, and shows why this is an
important and fundamental notion when explaining physical reality as we
know it.

Jason

On Monday, July 2, 2018, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> *​>​you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live
>> after a self-duplication.*
>
> I have an algorithm that can detect gibberish and gibberish questions have
> no answer. The algorithm works this way, if even after the exparament is
> over its STILL impossible to say what the prediction was suposed to be
> about then the question about the future was gibberish.
>
>> ​>>​
>>> And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not,
>>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged
>>> either way.
>>
>>
>> ​>*​*
>> *That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in
>> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals*
>>
>
> Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless
> of if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do
> with any existing mathematics much less physics.
>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
>
>> --
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*​>​you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live
> after a self-duplication.*

I have an algorithm that can detect gibberish and gibberish questions have
no answer. The algorithm works this way, if even after the exparament is
over its STILL impossible to say what the prediction was suposed to be
about then the question about the future was gibberish.

> ​>>​
>> And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not,
>> because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged
>> either way.
>
>
> ​>*​*
> *That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in
> quantum gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals*
>

Cantor's theorem about large cardinals would remain unchanged regardless of
if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, in fact it has nothing to do
with any existing mathematics much less physics.

​John K Clark​



>

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Jul 2018, at 04:22, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Jul 1, 2018 at 8:00 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>> ​>​>>​ ​If “0 things exist” is true, I don’t see how “0 things exist” can 
>> exist.
>>  
>> ​>>​If if “0 things exist” is true then “0 things exist” exists,
> ​>​That does not follow. If the universe is empty, i.e. u = { },
> 
> The null set is something, my nothing does not contain a set of any sort.
> 
> ​>​So you agree with Jason that the “nothing theory” is inconsistent?​ ​I am 
> not sure it is inconsistent, but I am sure it is false.
> 
> So you think "nothing" could be a grammatically correct fictional story with 
> no plot holes written in the language of mathematics. You could be right.
> 
>> >​>>​ I think we should distinguish well between “being true” and existence.
>> 
>> ​>>​If there is a difference between  “being true” and existence then 
>> either: 
>> 
>> 1) Some things are true but don't exist. In other words some things are 
>> logically consistent but are self contained and have nothing to do with 
>> physics or physical reality in general.
> 
> ​>​Assuming Aristotle's theology. 
> 
> Sometimes i have the feeling I'm debating with a chatbot that has been 
> programmed to throw in the word Aristotle, theology, Plato or Greek at least 
> once every 250 words. 
> 
> ​>>​Or in still other words some mathematical stories are fictional and much 
> of modern abstract mathematics has no deeper meaning than a Harry Potter 
> novel and the fanfiction stories that spawn off from it.
> 
> ​>​That is inconsistent with mechanism,
> 
> I see no reason to to think that must be true.

Because you claim to have an algorithm able to predict what anyone could live 
after a self-duplication. But you have never given that algorithm, except “W & 
M” which is refuted immediately by both copies. So, it is hardly astonishing 
you can get this point.





> You can write a story in the English language that is grammatical and 
> contains no logical plot holes but that never happened, why can't the same 
> thing be done in the mathematical language?   

Because if the story is consistent and based on some computation, some 
computation in arithmetic will emulate it, and no Turing machine can see 
immediately the difference.





>  
> ​>​but also pretty ridiculous.
> 
> I'm just trying to follow the consequences of your statement "we should 
> distinguish well between “being true” and existence".
>  
> If 1+1 = 2 is fiction, then,​ [...]​
> 
> I didn't say every consistent mathematical statement was fiction! I'm sure 
> 1+2=2 is nonfiction,

You worry me.I guess it is a typo.



> I'm less sure that Cantor's Theorem on transfinite sets is.

With mechanism, it is. That is the whole difference between cantor Diagonal and 
Kleene diagonal, which I did explain many times here.




> And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or not, because 
> all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged either way. 

That is not obvious. Some key theorem on knots, which have been used in quantum 
gravitation were based on some studies on large cardinals (until someone found 
more “elementary” proof). 
It is hard to tell in advance if some math will or not been applicable in some 
other science. Hardy was “proud” that number theory did not have application 
and he thought it would never add, but he was wrong. 




> 
> ​>​In logic, logicians have tools to delineate precisely the difference 
> between truth and existence. Existence os when an existential proposition is 
> true,
> 
> ​So logicians have concluded that ​existence exists when its true that 
> existence exists? 


Not at all. Logicians said that a theory proves an existence when they can 
prove with the theory some formula F(t), where t is a closed term of the 
theory. They use the inference rule

F(t)
——   (or some others, more sophisticated to be valid in the intuitionist 
frame).
ExT(x)


And, as they don’t do metaphysics, they add nothing. Obviously in metaphysics, 
the situation if far more complex, and we have to distinguish between 
ontological or primitive existence and phenomenological appearance of 
existence. Incompleteness already imposes such nuances all by itself.

Bruno 




> 
> ​John K Clark
> 
>  ​
> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 1, 2018 at 8:00 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​If “0 things exist” is true, I don’t see how “0 things exist” can exist.
>>
>>
>
> ​>>​
>> If if “0 things exist” is true then “0 things exist” exists,
>
> ​>​
> That does not follow. If the universe is empty, i.e. u = { },
>

The null set is something, my nothing does not contain a set of any sort.

​>​
> So you agree with Jason that the “nothing theory” is inconsistent?
> ​ ​
> I am not sure it is inconsistent, but I am sure it is false.
>

So you think "nothing" could be a grammatically correct fictional story
with no plot holes written in the language of mathematics. You could be
right.

*>​>>​ I think we should distinguish well between “being true” and
>>> existence.*
>>
>> ​>>​
>> If there is a difference between  “being true” and existence then either:
>>
>> 1) Some things are true but don't exist. In other words some things are
>> logically consistent but are self contained and have nothing to do with
>> physics or physical reality in general.
>>
>
> ​>​
> Assuming Aristotle's theology.
>

Sometimes i have the feeling I'm debating with a chatbot that has been
programmed to throw in the word Aristotle, theology, Plato or Greek at
least once every 250 words.

​>>​
>> Or in still other words some mathematical stories are fictional and much
>> of modern abstract mathematics has no deeper meaning than a Harry Potter
>> novel and the fanfiction stories that spawn off from it.
>
>
> ​>​
> *That is inconsistent with mechanism,*
>

I see no reason to to think that must be true. You can write a story in the
English language that is grammatical and contains no logical plot holes but
that never happened, why can't the same thing be done in the mathematical
language?


> ​>​
> *but also pretty ridiculous.*
>

I'm just trying to follow the consequences of your statement "we should
distinguish well between “being true” and existence".


> If 1+1 = 2 is fiction, then,
> ​ [...]​
>

I didn't say every consistent mathematical statement was fiction! I'm sure
1+2=2 is nonfiction, I'm less sure that Cantor's Theorem on transfinite
sets is. And physics doesn't care if the Continuum hypothesis is true or
not, because all the mathematics that physicists use would remain unchanged
either way.

​>*​*
> *In logic, logicians have tools to delineate precisely the difference
> between truth and existence. Existence os when an existential proposition
> is true,*
>

​So logicians have concluded that ​existence exists when its true that
existence exists?

​John K Clark

 ​

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Jun 2018, at 01:27, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​> ​If “0 things exist” is true, I don’t see how “0 things exist” can exist.
>  
> If if “0 things exist” is true then “0 things exist” exists,

That does not follow. If the universe is empty, i.e. u = { }, that does not 
entail u = {{ }}, unless you implicit theory is closed for set theoretical 
reflexion. 




> so if its true then it's not true. If its not true then something exists. And 
> from that we can conclude that something is rotten in the state of Denmark , 
> or rather in the sate of Nothing. 

So you agree with Jason that the “nothing theory” is inconsistent? I am not 
sure it is inconsistent, but I am sure it is false.



> ​
> ​> ​It is clear that the theory “nothing exist” is refuted by anyone claiming 
> to believe that theory.
> 
> ​There is no doubt something exists everybody believes that its true, the 
> existential question is why its true. ​ 

We need to assume one universal system. We cannot drive the existence of a 
universal system without assuming some universal system. That can be proved to 
be impossible.  So we will never know why existence has to be true, although we 
can explain all the mode of existence once we assume elementary arithmetic 
(which is indeed a natural universal system to start from, although any other 
would do the job).




> 
> > It can be true, but it does not need to be expressed to be true.
> 
> Expressed? I don't see what communicating something to others has to do with 
> it unless you think a fact doesn't exist unless somebody knows it. And 
> besides, you seemed to need to express it because you just did.


Sure, but when the assumption is that nothing exists, it is automatically made 
wrong if expressed, but it is not automatically inconsistent if not expressed. 
In fact, only a theory can be inconsistent or false.




> 
> > I think we should distinguish well between “being true” and existence.
> If there is a difference between  “being true” and existence then either: 
> 
> 1) Some things are true but don't exist. In other words some things are 
> logically consistent but are self contained and have nothing to do with 
> physics or physical reality in general.


Assuming Aristotle's theology.  Better to be agnostic on this when working on 
the mind-body problem, 




> Or in still other words some mathematical stories are fictional and much of 
> modern abstract mathematics has no deeper meaning than a Harry Potter novel 
> and the fanfiction stories that spawn off from it.

That is inconsistent with mechanism, but also pretty ridiculous. If 1+1 = 2 is 
fiction, then, even with materialism or physicalism,  all laws of physics are 
fictions too, as they all assume at least RA, and actually much more.





> 
> 2) Some things exist but aren't true.  In other words paradoxes can actually 
> exist and all Reductio ad absurdum proofs are rendered invalid.


If the paradox is a contradiction, all proofs are rendered invalid, absolutely 
all proofs.

Your expression “paradox exist” is of course ambiguous. I assume you mean that 
a physical contradiction exist.

In logic, logicians have tools to delineate precisely the difference between 
truth and existence. Existence os when an existential proposition is true, and 
that notion is always relative to some theory and its (standard or not) 
model(s).

Bruno



> 
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> 
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*​> ​If “0 things exist” is true, I don’t see how “0 things exist” can
> exist.*
>

If if “0 things exist” is true then “0 things exist” exists, so if its true
then it's not true. If its not true then something exists. And from that we
can conclude that something is rotten in the state of Denmark , or rather
in the sate of Nothing.
​

> ​>* ​*
> *It is clear that the theory “nothing exist” is refuted by anyone claiming
> to believe that theory.*
>

​There is no doubt something exists everybody believes that its true, the
existential question is why its true. ​


*> It can be true, but it does not need to be expressed to be true.*


Expressed? I don't see what communicating something to others has to do
with it unless you think a fact doesn't exist unless somebody knows it. And
besides, you seemed to need to express it because you just did.

*> I think we should distinguish well between “being true” and existence.*

If there is a difference between  “being true” and existence then either:
1) Some things are true but don't exist. In other words some things are
logically consistent but are self contained and have nothing to do with
physics or physical reality in general. Or in still other words some
mathematical stories are fictional and much of modern abstract mathematics
has no deeper meaning than a Harry Potter novel and the fanfiction stories
that spawn off from it.

2) Some things exist but aren't true.  In other words paradoxes can
actually exist and all Reductio ad absurdum proofs are rendered invalid.

John K Clark

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

I am not going to argue this from the perspective of logic, but rather 
physics. The grand symmetry of the universe is a set of transformation on a 
vacuum state that keeps it a vacuum. The vacuum is as close to nothing as 
we can find in physics at this time. The grand symmetry, which I think is 
E8×E8 or three E8s in a Jordan 3×3 matrix system, is what keeps the vacuum 
still a vacuum. This is fine so long as the vacuum is positive energy. If 
not and it is negative you have tachyon states that are signatures of an 
unstable vacuum. So a "piece of dust" enters the picture and the vacuum 
collapses. This collapse breaks this symmetry into E8×E8/E8, which is a 
Toda system with 8 massive weight states with masses determined by the 
Zamoldchikov spectrum of near Planck mass particles. 

The anti-de Sitter spacetime is where quantum gravitation really exists, 
which has a negative vacuum energy. The AdS with its causal regions defined 
by null surfaces, in two dimensions that correspond to arcs, has a junction 
conditions across these null surfaces. These null surfaces define a 
holographic screen with a positive energy junction, and the observable 
universe is on such a holographic screen. The bosonic string world sheet is 
essentially an AdS_2, and this has two tachyonic states that have negative 
energy. The vacuum energy is negative, which means an unstable vacuum. Out 
of this vacuum should come a fountain of quantum states. For AdS_5 the 
quantum states that emerge might then be given by the Petrov types and are 
then perturbed FLRW or de Sitter spacetimes. This endless production might 
then define these junction conditions. This would have connections of edge 
states and symmetry protected topological states.

The false vacuum of quantum cosmology is unstable because it is negative, 
and it collapses into more negative energy and then generates these 
positive vacuum junction condition at holographic screens. We in our 
spacetime cosmology as then on a holographic screen in AdS_5 of 5 
dimensions and this is then reduced to 4 dimensions. Our local world on 
this boundary obeys a conformal field theory, gravitation is a weak field 
(ideally of zero strength but there is symmetry breaking) and this is dual 
to the bulk AdS_5 with gravitation. The CFT in our world is local and this 
is dual to a nonlocal gravity in this AdS_5 bulk.

LC

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Jason Resch]

My goal is not necessarily trying to show how to get something from
nothing, but to show nothing is inconsistent.

Below you say there can be no truth or facts about nothing if there is
absoltely nothing, which is perhaps one way of showing that such an
absolutist nothing is itself inconsistent. "If it's not true that nothing
exists" then something exists.

To define a consistent nothing and admit facts about it seems the next most
minimal step.  But it's hard to prevent such truth statements or the
numbers from getting out of control and creating something.

Jason


On Friday, June 29, 2018, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 8:21 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>> ​> *​*
>> *You presume there can be no true facts about nothing?*
>>
>
> If a fact existed about nothing then there is something. Maybe you think
> I'm being unfair but I want a nothing on steroids, and I'm not doing
> anything that others didn't do to physicists when they showed how the
> vacuum could produce something and they said all that showed was that a
> vacuum was something and Leibniz's nothing wasn't nothing enough. The
> guiding principle here is that if anyone finds a way to make something from
> nothing then you can always find a better nothing.
>
>
>>
>>
>> *> I guess what I am asking is:> Can nothing be defined without
>> presupposing logic?> Can nothing be defined without presupposing math?*
>
> It doesn't matter, even if you found a way to do without either of those
> things you've still got to use some thing to go from nothing to something;
> and whatever that thing is it's not nothing. It's conceivable to me that
> sometime within the next 30 years or so we may discover a few relatively
> simple *physical* rules that could lead to the creation of a universe, and
> I think that is as close as we will ever get to answering the question why
> there is something rather than nothing. It may not be nothing enough for
> some people to be happy but you can't always get what you want.
>
> ​  ​
> John K Clark
>
> ​
>
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 8:21 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:


> ​> *​*
> *You presume there can be no true facts about nothing?*
>

If a fact existed about nothing then there is something. Maybe you think
I'm being unfair but I want a nothing on steroids, and I'm not doing
anything that others didn't do to physicists when they showed how the
vacuum could produce something and they said all that showed was that a
vacuum was something and Leibniz's nothing wasn't nothing enough. The
guiding principle here is that if anyone finds a way to make something from
nothing then you can always find a better nothing.


>
>
> *> I guess what I am asking is:> Can nothing be defined without
> presupposing logic?> Can nothing be defined without presupposing math?*

It doesn't matter, even if you found a way to do without either of those
things you've still got to use some thing to go from nothing to something;
and whatever that thing is it's not nothing. It's conceivable to me that
sometime within the next 30 years or so we may discover a few relatively
simple *physical* rules that could lead to the creation of a universe, and
I think that is as close as we will ever get to answering the question why
there is something rather than nothing. It may not be nothing enough for
some people to be happy but you can't always get what you want.

​  ​
John K Clark

​

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Jun 2018, at 19:24, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> ​>​1. Premise: No thing (nothing) exists.
> 2. By "1" it follows that "0 things exist" is true. 
> 
> ​If ​ ​"​"0 things exist" is true​"​ then "0 things exits" exists;


?

If “0 things exist” is true, I don’t see how “0 things exist” can exist. It can 
be true, but it does not need to be expressed to be true. That is a bit like if 
Earth exploded: that would not make the headline!





> but if its true then it can't exist exist.

I think we should distinguish well between “being true” and existence. 
Something exists only if “Ex (…x…)” is true. 




>  
> ​> ​Further it also follows that​ [...]​
> 
> Nothing can follow something that doesn't exist. And two can play this game, 
> even if you found a way to make it work that very fact that you made it work 
> would only prove that your nothing was not nothing enough because it still 
> had the potential of producing something.

It is clear that the theory “nothing exist” is refuted by anyone claiming to 
believe that theory. But we might be able to conceive that nothing exist, like 
having a physicalist theory of the universe with its complete annihilation in 
some future, or something. Of course, we might doubt this will make the prime 
numbers disappear, because those are simply not physical entities, and even 
without any universe, most would agree that “there is no biggest prime number” 
would still be true, as such truth are not concerned with any physical things. 
Then, the interesting question is what exist fundamentally? We cannot derive 
any existence without assuming some existence. That is why I have still to 
assume primitive objects like S and K and their combinations, or 0 and the 
successors, … WE cannot derive those from logic alone.

Bruno




> 
> ​John K Clark​
>  
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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Jun 27, 2018 at 12:24 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *​>​1. Premise: No thing (nothing) exists.*
>> *2. By "1" it follows that "0 things exist" is true. *
>>
>
> ​If ​
>
> ​"​
> "0 things exist" is true
> ​"​ then "0 things exits" exists; but if its true then it can't exist
> exist.
>


So any true or false statement is enough to destroy the philosopher's
nothing? You presume there can be no true facts about nothing?

If there are no true facts about nothing, what preserves the nothing? E.g.,
if true can become false then "nothing exists = true" could become "nothing
exists = false"


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> *Further it also follows that*
>> *​* [...]​
>>
>
> Nothing can follow something that doesn't exist. And two can play this
> game, even if you found a way to make it work that very fact that you made
> it work would only prove that your nothing was not nothing enough because
> it still had the potential of producing something.
>
>
I guess what I am asking is:

Can nothing be defined without presupposing logic?

Can nothing be defined without presupposing math?


Jason

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

*​>​1. Premise: No thing (nothing) exists.*
> *2. By "1" it follows that "0 things exist" is true. *
>

​If ​

​"​
"0 things exist" is true
​"​ then "0 things exits" exists; but if its true then it can't exist exist.


> ​> ​
> *Further it also follows that*
> *​* [...]​
>

Nothing can follow something that doesn't exist. And two can play this
game, even if you found a way to make it work that very fact that you made
it work would only prove that your nothing was not nothing enough because
it still had the potential of producing something.

​John K Clark​

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Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Jason Resch]

In another thread Brent suggested the "philosopher's nothing" was
incoherent.  I was wondering if anyone had any ideas on
establishing/proving its inconsistency. Thereby proving that something must
exist.  Here is some idea I had:

1. Premise: No thing (nothing) exists.

2. By "1" it follows that "0 things exist" is true.  Further it also
follows that the previously quoted statement must always be true and never
become false, for them something would exist.

3. Since the truth of that statement must always be true true and never
false, (as otherwise "0 things exist" would be violated), then there must
be a permanent and meaningful distinction between "true" and "false".

4. Since "0 things exist" is true, it follows that an infinite number of
trivial statements also follow, such as: "< 1 thing exists", "< 2 things
exist", "< 3 things exist", and these are all true.

5. It also follows that an infinite number of trivially false statements
follow, such as "> 0 things exist", "> 1 things exist", "> 2 things exist".

6. All of these infinite statements must remain true, or else something
would exist.

7. An infinite number slightly less trivial statements must also always
remain true, for nothing to exist:
"(3 - 3) things exist"
"(the number of even primes > 3) things exist"
"(the number of even integer factors of 7) things exist"

8. An infinite number of statements concerning solutions to Diophantine
equations must also be true, and always remain true, for no thing to exist:
"x is even when for integers (x, n), (2*x - n) is the number of things that
exist"
"x is a perfect square when, when for integers (x, n), (x*x - n) is the
number of things that exist"

9. Much more complex Diophantine equations exist, for example, those which
compute any possible computable function, and either have 1 solution if F
halts, or 0 solutions when F does not halt.  Then it follows that when F is
a non-halting program:
"(the number of solutions to the equation given F) things exist"

10. Let's say F is a non-halting program which computes the evolution of
the wave function for our Hubble volume, let's call this equation our world
equation "W". Then it follows that:
"(the number of solutions to W) things exist"

11. If 10 is true, that W is a non-halting program. If W is a non-halting
program, it means that the execution of W goes on forever.

12. If the execution of W goes on forever, then W computes our apparent
universes, including you and me, and other observers who believe in and see
"things".  Thus the original premise that no thing exists is contradicted.

Jason

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