Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 1 November 2014 04:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: > > I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. > > What would that mean precisely? > > It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David > Deutsch, but

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. What would that mean precisely? It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David Deutsch, but I am not sure the david deutsch can be OK with this,

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@google

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an un

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EI

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 10:11 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >>> > >> ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. >> >> > >> A interference pattern. > > > That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only. > Of course not it's would be the exact opposite, it's evidence the photon went through bo

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 6:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb > wrote: >> The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the > photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the > right slit in another universe. If after that the photons > > There's only one photon. Not if

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist > wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual defi

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb > wrote: > If "recombine" just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 30 October 2014 05:50, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > > If "recombine" just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just >> a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and >> interferes with itself I'd say that happens i

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR wrote: > The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that "semantic quibble", and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal id

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivale

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probabl

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR sta

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: > If "recombine" just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just > a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and > interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. > The universe splits because there is

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent -

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist mailto:yann...@gmail.com>> wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree i

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: > > As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a > temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - > differentiation or whatever). > > But to say the split is tempora

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: > Liz, > > I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. > That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. > Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was unreasonable. > My simple-minde

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR wrote: > The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought >> experiments is to examine and get rid of that "semantic quibble", and yet >> from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already >> crystal clear even though

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he a

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice, but I am afraid you might be conscious. It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where eve

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individua

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's "obvi

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this world the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world' and perhaps every possibility in between. So in the 3p view, all choices balance out. Bruno r

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist wrote: > My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true > then my consciousness is an illusion, period > Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > > > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've >> heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of >> an individual person. > > > The entire point o

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: > > It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions > just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or > disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. > > Just saying it

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

> On 28 Oct 2014, at 1:10 pm, John Clark wrote: > > I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they > most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of "comp" > and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or > per

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > > > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've > heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of > an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought experime

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's "obviously wrong" doesn't really cut it. So far the

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 Oct 2014, at 12:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish wrote: So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? This

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 26 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, > That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: > On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a > > Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? > > > > This point was originally about real numb

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 October 2014 07:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Just go reread the thread "Re: For John Clark" october 2013... or read the > last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn > about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit > about it... (but lik

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's "obviously wrong" doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-ba

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish > > > wrote: > > > > > Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > > > (experienced) world if COMP is true

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 05:32, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux > wrote: > > > the only one giving ambiguity is you >> > > In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is > giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

Just go reread the thread "Re: For John Clark" october 2013... or read the last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti monster m

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark : > On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in >>> predictions but you are interested in consciousness, >>> >> >> > That is not relevant for the point you made. >> > > Like h

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in >> predictions but you are interested in consciousness, >> > > > That is not relevant for the point you made. > Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, y

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > >> Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get >> a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a >> arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers >> why

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask "what city will you be in?", all that can be said is tha

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett QM, Like I explained to you more tha

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb wrote: > They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable too. Any i

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 10:28:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish > wrote: > > > If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question "has > > an electron triggered the counter in the previous second", one > > gets a sequence of zeros a

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

> On 26 Oct 2014, at 1:28 am, John Clark wrote: > > If you say so, but I don't care if "COMP" is dealt a serious blow or not. > > John K Clark You must care you bloody blowhard because you daily go to considerable lengths to show just how important it is to you. It’s rather amusing to s

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question "has > an electron triggered the counter in the previous second", one > gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of > time we're prepared to

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 12:17:34AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > > > >> Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > > (experienced) world if COMP is true. > > > > > > >> OK then "comp" is false. And now that

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > >> Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > (experienced) world if COMP is true. > > > >> OK then "comp" is false. And now that we know that "comp" is false > what's the point of talking about it anymore? >

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish > wrote: > > > Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > > (experienced) world if COMP is true. > > > > OK then "comp" is false. And now that we know that "c

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-24 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark : > > > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> > I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of >> consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask "what city >> will you be in?", all that can be said is

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of > consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask "what city > will you be in?", all that can be said is that the brain that receives > information about Mos

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if > it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett > QM, > Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 01:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb > Quantu

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb wrote: > They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to > have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost > all integers are not computable too. > Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine th

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal > (experienced) world if COMP is true. > OK then "comp" is false. And now that we know that "comp" is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? John K Clark

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 Oct 2014, at 21:36, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, Yes. > but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciou

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > the only one giving ambiguity is you > In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used with enormous care. > > It has always been clear th

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 10:08 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb > wrote: >> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the e

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 01:08:37PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > >> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it > >> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after > >> the experiment have only had

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb wrote: > >> But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think >> that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for >> doing proo

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb >> >> > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. >> >> >>

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculation

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 21:21 GMT+02:00 John Clark : > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR wrote: > > > There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one >> you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble. >> > > I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of per

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, > Yes. > but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this > I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningl

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR wrote: > There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one > you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble. > I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR wrote: >> No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's "proof" >> and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what >> he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I >> made the wrong de

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it >> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after >> the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the >> right of the decimal po

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 Oct 2014, at 02:23, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR wrote: I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or i

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 Oct 2014, at 03:41, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Wait? How long should I wait? > Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a proof of Goldbach

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:14, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb > > > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. > > > Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it > with experiment the values we

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb wrote: > But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think > that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for > doing proofs and calculations. > > So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one dete

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 13:35, Russell Standish wrote: > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > >Brent, > > > > > >That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, > > >but is it also true for matrix theory? >

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 13:23, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR wrote: > > I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no >>> longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 >>> that I decided that the entire thing was worthle

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb > > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the value

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so p

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> >> Wait? How long should I wait? > > > Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The > disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a > proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a bit lon

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > >Brent, > > > >That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, > >but is it also true for matrix theory? > >Re: real and complex numbers. > > > Why would it be different f

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR wrote: I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no >> longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 >> that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some >> other step, and nothing yo

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 22 Oct 2014, at 05:05, LizR wrote: On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> So you don't assume the real numbers exist? > >> > > > > > > Indeed. > > >

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 21 Oct 2014, at 17:14, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague. > I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wai

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Richard On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/21/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Tue, Oct

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/21/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish > wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > >> So you don'

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > > >> So you don't assume the real numbers exist? > > >> > > > > > > > > > Indeed. > > > > > > > Interesting. > > > >

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 22 October 2014 04:14, John Clark wrote: > Have I? I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I > could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in > step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in > some other step, and nothi

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> So you don't assume the real numbers exist? > >> > > > > > > Indeed. > > > > Interesting. > In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague. >> > > I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the > simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wait if it stops or not > is enough toi compute

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