On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> MGA 3
> >
> > ...
> >
> >> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film
> >> it
2008/11/30 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> On Nov 29, 2008, at 7:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Threeness, computations and consciousness
>> exist eternally and necessarily, and can't be created, destroyed or
>> localised.
>
> I understand (I think) how threeness and computations exist
Hey,
Kim Jones wrote:
> I think this idea is so momentous that I actually wish to compose a
> piece of music - possibly a symphony - which seeks to represent this
> idea in music.
That would be cool!
> Et pourquoi pas? Most of the great composers attempted to represent
> the TRANSCENDENT
Hi,
> consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions,
What about consciousness only bearing memories of wonderful actions?
> either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism)
Denying free will does not imply fatalism! The whole of Nietzsche's
philosophy is a monument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the
> religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives?
> As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative
> is to deny that consciousness exists at all, whi
Bruno,
I wanted to submit some reflections to M.A. but you did it better.
Two words, however, I picked out:
*1. bifurcate*
I consider it a human narrowness to expect "anything" *to split in
TWO*(only) - Nature (the existence?) does not 'count'.
It has unlimited varants and the choices come under t
On 30 Nov 2008, at 04:23, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
perspective. If
Abram,
>
> My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual
> behaviors during that time.
? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals.
> And, moreover, if only part of the brain
> were being run by a recording
... which lacks the counterfactual, ...
> then
Hi all,
Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in
platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts:
Brent Meeker wrote:
>But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an
>implicit
>assumption that digitally represented states form a sequen
On 30 Nov 2008, at 11:57, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
MGA 3
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
But this reason
Hello Bruno,
I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the
projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because
it supervenes on the physical activity.
MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the s
Bruno,
No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
recording didn't
Bruno,
I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following:
We have the
optical boolean graph: OBG -> this computes alice's dream.
we make a movie of this computation.
Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation
correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in
On 30 Nov 2008, at 16:31, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the
>> religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the
>> alternatives?
>> As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the o
Günther Greindl wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in
> platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an
> >implicit
> >assumption that
On Nov 30, 2008, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Yes, and I think of consciousness as an essential side-effect of the
> computation, as addition is an essential side-effect of the sum of two
> numbers.
Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your
concept of a comp
Bruno,
Thanks for the reply. I appreciate the detailed explanations. I'll
post my responses in an interlinear manner using color to differentiate (if
that's ok). M.A.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2008 3:
Günther,
This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA
to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level
need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level,
presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level.
Perhaps we could see
- Original Message -
From: "Günther Greindl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2008 10:24 AM
Subject: Re: Consciousness and free will
Hi,
> consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions,
What about consciousness only bearing mem
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:53 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> Kory wrote:
>
>> I have an intuition that causality
>> (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for
>> consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional
>> Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox t
On 01/12/2008, at 6:21 AM, M.A. wrote:
> Is it the connotation of "schizophrenic" that you don't like?
The term schizophrenic is an incredibly misused/misunderstood
adjective. It specifically DOES NOT mean multiple personality
(disorder) which is the common coin usage (ie not in a medico-
On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms
of cellular automata.
Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but
finite 2D grid of bits, an
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
> > absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the
> > stationary film.
>
>
> ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the
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