Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> MGA 3 > > > > ... > > > >> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film > >> it

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/11/30 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Nov 29, 2008, at 7:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Threeness, computations and consciousness >> exist eternally and necessarily, and can't be created, destroyed or >> localised. > > I understand (I think) how threeness and computations exist

Re: Lost and not lost?

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Hey, Kim Jones wrote: > I think this idea is so momentous that I actually wish to compose a > piece of music - possibly a symphony - which seeks to represent this > idea in music. That would be cool! > Et pourquoi pas? Most of the great composers attempted to represent > the TRANSCENDENT

Re: Consciousness and free will

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi, > consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions, What about consciousness only bearing memories of wonderful actions? > either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism) Denying free will does not imply fatalism! The whole of Nietzsche's philosophy is a monument

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the > religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives? > As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative > is to deny that consciousness exists at all, whi

Re: Consciousness and free will

2008-11-30 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, I wanted to submit some reflections to M.A. but you did it better. Two words, however, I picked out: *1. bifurcate* I consider it a human narrowness to expect "anything" *to split in TWO*(only) - Nature (the existence?) does not 'count'. It has unlimited varants and the choices come under t

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 04:23, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: >> >>> Bruno, >>> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, > > My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual > behaviors during that time. ? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals. > And, moreover, if only part of the brain > were being run by a recording ... which lacks the counterfactual, ... > then

Platonia and causality

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi all, Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: Brent Meeker wrote: >But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an >implicit >assumption that digitally represented states form a sequen

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 11:57, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: >> >>> >>> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 >>> >>> ... >>> But this reason

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Hello Bruno, I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because it supervenes on the physical activity. MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the s

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the recording didn't

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following: We have the optical boolean graph: OBG -> this computes alice's dream. we make a movie of this computation. Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 16:31, Günther Greindl wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the >> religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the >> alternatives? >> As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the o

Re: Platonia and causality

2008-11-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Günther Greindl wrote: > Hi all, > > Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in > platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > >But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an > >implicit > >assumption that

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-30 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 30, 2008, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Yes, and I think of consciousness as an essential side-effect of the > computation, as addition is an essential side-effect of the sum of two > numbers. Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your concept of a comp

Re: Consciousness and free will

2008-11-30 Thread M.A.
Bruno, Thanks for the reply. I appreciate the detailed explanations. I'll post my responses in an interlinear manner using color to differentiate (if that's ok). M.A. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2008 3:

Re: Platonia and causality

2008-11-30 Thread Abram Demski
Günther, This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level, presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level. Perhaps we could see

Re: Consciousness and free will

2008-11-30 Thread M.A.
- Original Message - From: "Günther Greindl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2008 10:24 AM Subject: Re: Consciousness and free will Hi, > consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions, What about consciousness only bearing mem

Re: Platonia and causality

2008-11-30 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:53 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: > Kory wrote: > >> I have an intuition that causality >> (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for >> consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional >> Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox t

Re: Consciousness and free will

2008-11-30 Thread Kim Jones
On 01/12/2008, at 6:21 AM, M.A. wrote: > Is it the connotation of "schizophrenic" that you don't like? The term schizophrenic is an incredibly misused/misunderstood adjective. It specifically DOES NOT mean multiple personality (disorder) which is the common coin usage (ie not in a medico-

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: > I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms of cellular automata. Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but finite 2D grid of bits, an

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an > > absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the > > stationary film. > > > ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the