:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Stephen,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world
I am currently in the middle of rewriting my cell re Alastair's Agreed
Fundamentals project along the lines of my recent posts. I attach a draft
below because to an extent I believe it is similar to some of what Bruno is
saying. "Arithmetic truth" is a component of "all potential to divide"
[
Hi John:
Thanks for the message.
Perhaps one could call the incompleteness of the "Nothing" a "vacuum
energy" because it always has and always will drive the dynamic of my system.
Hal
At 06:56 PM 5/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
before the time when we met on another list I tackled 'similar'
concerns. V
Hi Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi George,
I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presen
Hi George,
I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presentation in 11 steps, or to the on
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
Interleaving.
-
Original Message -
From:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer
Hi Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you
don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp
plenitude.
[That such
Dear George and CMR,
Whops! My apologies. But does this
cancel out what I wrote?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
CMR
To: Stephen Paul King
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 6:02
PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive
I'd love to take credit for George's arguments (he
probably knows more than me, after all) but that wouldn't be ethical
(and I don't think we want to revisit THAT thread!)
cheers!
Dear George,
Interleaving.
[CMR]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishab
Dear George,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: Stephen Paul King
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00
PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?
Stephen, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George
Dear
CMR,
- Original
Message -
From: "CMR"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything
List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, May
12, 2004 10:22 AM
Subject: Re: Are we
simulated by some massive computer?
> >
[SPK]
> > IMHO, this
At 15:59 11/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
I remember discussing this topic but I do not remember you calling me
silly. Oh sorry you were only thinking it. Thank you :-)
You are welcome. You know on these matters we can never be sure :-)
Now when you say that the first person is all there i
> IMHO, this latter situation seem to be what D. Deutsch proposes as a test
for his MWI. If we can create a physical implementation of a quantum
computation >that has greater computational power than that allowed by the
classical (as per the Copenhagen Interpretation or other interpretations)
case,
principle?
I am missing something. :_(
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: Everything List
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 1:12
AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?
Hi StephenStephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
My take of Russell's post is:
Unless the creature had some experience that
was not dismissible as a hallucination (1st person) and/or was witness
by others (a proxy of 3rd person?) that lead him to the conclusi
on or
other interpretations) case, then it would verify MWI. A failure of such would
be a falsification.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: Everything List
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:57 PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
ma
Russell
Remember the creature must be consistent with the world it observes and
vice versa. An unchanging one bit world does not seem to be able to
support the existence of a consistent conscious entity - at
least not with our kind of consciousness.
Let's move the creature up to a richer worl
Russell
OK. You are suffering from 3rd person thinking which leads you to these
conclusions:
1) As a scientist experimenting with this simulated creature, you
have absolutely no evidence that this creature is conscious.
2) You believe that the creature (conscious or unconscious) is
st
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all
things.
But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that
the UD
is the origin of
TECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 9:59 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive
computer?
>
At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:> > > BM: But
you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.> >GL: No I don't agree.
I don't agree that the UD is th
At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that the UD
is the origin of all things.
This is ty
I saw the documentary movie "Tibet: Cry of the Snow Lion" the other day.
In one scene, a group of monks is sitting around in a circle, and the
Dalai Llama is
overseeing.
The monks are industriously and methodically placing individual tiny
coloured
beads (there are maybe 4 or 5 colours)
around
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 03:51:34PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
> >But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
>
> No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
> This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase:
>
> "In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1)
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where
the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with th
At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the
transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
"observer-state." Note how t
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the
transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
"observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
conscio
At 23:02 06/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
of the universal dovetailer
sage -
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:43 PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> The following is a combination of several of my previous ideas which
forces
> me to raise a question re "
The following is a combination of several of my previous ideas which forces
me to raise a question re "measure" in this thread.
1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
definition of a "Nothing". Any definition process simultaneously defines
two entities. The de
I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable t
This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
first and third person points of view.
It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. H
Hi Kory,
Are you still there? I got "funny" responses" from the webposter, it looks
there is a problem with your mail address.
Hoping to hear about you soon,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
p://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1417.html
and in the neighborhood.
Bruno
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:37
wow..
>
> 2) A "Nothing" has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
> meaningful question about itself. Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
> question a "Nothing" would be incomplete. An inescapable meaningful
> question is its own stability. This is not only meaningful it i
The following is a combination of two of my previous ideas which together
simplify my attempt to "prove" that a computer is a good model of the
substrate of a multi universe venue for our apparent sequence of states.
1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
defini
30, 2004 10:05 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> Dear Stephen,
>
> At 13:44 29/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>
>
> > But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not
my
> >point.
>
>
> It is good it is
How about: "self"? is it a good enoug "1st person" "soul"?
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, April 30,
Ok Stathis, thanks for the precision.
Anyway you give me the temptation to identify the soul by the first person.
We will be able to prove (with the comp hyp) that not only the soul exists
but (I forget to say) also that from the *correct* soul point of view, the soul
is NOT a machine.
But perhaps
Dear Stephen,
At 13:44 29/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not my
point.
It is good it is not your point because there are delay in Platonia,
at least in the sense I was using the word. A delay relative to a
computational
On 29 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul.
Indeed.
I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout
At 09:25 29/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:
Bruno,
I am sorry if my poorly chosen words irritated you, that was
the farthest from my intentions. I can see, they did.
Yes but that's ok. Thanks for caring. You give me the opportunity
to take a new look to the Bochenski book. I did search that book
for
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:09 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> Hi Stephen,
>
> At 12:15 28/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>
> >I struggle to find the right words to express the difficulty that I
see.
> >My problem is that your
Hi Kory,
So we met two important theories or machines:
Classical Logic CL and Peano Arithmetic PA.
As collection of theorems, the first is a subset of
the second:
PA
|
|
|
CL
Now I have chosen PA to set the things. Any theory
asking FOR, I am asking a question, seeking opinions.
I got yours, thank you
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 11:06 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Hi Stephen,
At 12:15 28/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I struggle to find the right words to express the difficulty that I see.
My problem is that your work ignores the computational complexity
(NP-Completeness) of grading (defining measures) the relationships.
This is due to the fact
: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> >There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
> >personal identity: the belief in a soul.
>
> Indeed.
[SPK]
This seems
Hi Kori,
At 10:55 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
At 10:17 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Don't worry, I will try NOT to give
a 120h course in
mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk &
black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think
how to do it. It will help
At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul.
Indeed.
I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible fo
At 11:03 27/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:
Bruno:
I really TRY to catch up with the discussions -
Thanks for telling.
however I can't help feeling
that what's going on is a physicalistic (?)
I guess you are trying to provoke me here, isn't it?
(I mean you are aware that I pretend (at least) tha
On 27 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:
But you will be dead in the same sense that you will
be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand
when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at
all in the presence of any possible threats, no?
Yes, you could say that we die every
mathematically illiterate planet?
Can't we do better?
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 6:08 AM
Subject: Re: Are we
At 10:17 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Don't worry, I will try NOT to give a 120h course in
mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk &
black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think
how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris
and Amsterdam so
At 08:34 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book "Reasons
and Persons") that we are "token". I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be "type".
That means we cannot been made singular. The on
At 08:23 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
Hi Bruno,
At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The important point is that once we keep up comp
through the eight points, we see that the laws of
physics, whatever they are, must be given
by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds.
I'm pretty sur
At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book "Reasons
and Persons") that we are "token". I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be "type".
That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument
Parfit gives for our token self
Hi Bruno,
At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The important point is that once we keep up comp
through the eight points, we see that the laws of
physics, whatever they are, must be given
by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds.
I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me c
At 13:55 27/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000
different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999
of these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone
speaks French. You don't know
On 26 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:
I am definitely not claiming that only one of the copies is the "real me".
Every copy is the "real me" from its own perspective. But to each one of
those copies, all the other copies are *different people*. This is true
from any perspective, including the thir
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Kory Heath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Verzonden: Monday, April 26, 2004 03:00 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> At 10:48 AM 4/25/04, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >This is the &#x
I remember discussing this with you a few months ago. I am still not
convinced though :-)
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Verzonden: Sunday, April 25, 2004 06:19 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Are we simulated by
Hi Kory,
(Recall: the 1-9 points we mention can be find by clicking on
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5384.html )
At 00:04 24/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the
intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, i
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Lets go over this again. There is a 100% chance that some copy of Kory
Heath will find himself in the non-bizarre world, even though there will be
one billion copies which find themselves in the bizarre worlds. If that
single, lucky copy is not *you*, then who is he?
Forwarded at the request of the author:
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:
QUOTE-
Yes, your theory states that the chances are 100% that some copy will find
itself in the non-bizarre world. But the theory also states that the
chances are very low
At 10:48 AM 4/25/04, Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
I don't believe there are any grounds for assuming that, so
At 10:16 AM 4/25/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you are allowed. The
theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings of the world in
the next second, with each branch containing a person who shares all your
memories up to that point
A little earlier I posted what I called a "left wing proof" that an ongoing
computer output of a random succession of normal reals is a reasonable
model for the dynamic boundary between the definitional pair "Nothing" and
"Everything". [I got "left wing proof" from an article by Keith Devlin on
- Original Message -
From: "Kory Heath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <>
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 2:45 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> At 10:36 AM 4/24/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >Does the fact that we never find
What Jesse and Saibal write is the key, I think. While all successor
states are possible,
only very few are "experiencable and memorable by a coherent brain
(computer) and mind
(software decision path in your brain).
I think that the only factor that makes these "anything can happen/is
happeni
Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
con
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
consider the whole
On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:
QUOTE-
Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the
Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how
likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states
from my current state. (For simpl
At 10:36 AM 4/24/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Does the fact that we never find ourselves in one of the bizarre,
inconsistent worlds that are postulated to exist in Platonia cast doubt on
the reality of these worlds and the validity of the underlying theory?
Not yet. We know that the bizarre, in
On 24 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote (in response to Bruno Marchal's post of 13
April 2004):
QUOTE-
Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a
self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of
next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The cha
Bruno -
Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the
intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, if we analyze the
structure of all possible 1st-person histories of all possible
self-aware-subsystems in Platonia, we would find that histories that
exhibit t
At 05:27 21/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote a 10-point argument about determining whether or not
we are simulated by some massive computer. Here is point 9 from that post:
9) Now, from computer science and logic, startlingly enough perhaps,
we can isolate a measure on the 1-p
Bruno Marchal wrote a 10-point argument about determining whether or not we
are simulated by some massive computer. Here is point 9 from that post:
9) Now, from computer science and logic, startlingly enough perhaps,
we can isolate a measure on the 1-person comp histories, and this
give us the la
At 09:58 13/04/04 -0400, Ben Goertzel wrote:
> 6) This shows that if we are in a massive computer running in
> a universe, then (supposing we know it or believe it) to
> predict the future of any experiment we decide to carry one
> (for example testing A or B) we need to take into account all
> r
At 13:08 13/04/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Put in another way, *either* the massive computer simulates the exact
laws of physics (exact with comp = the laws extractible from the
measure on all 1-computations) in which case we belong to it but
in that case we belong also to all its "copy" in Plato
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Put in another way, *either* the massive computer simulates the exact
laws of physics (exact with comp = the laws extractible from the
measure on all 1-computations) in which case we belong to it but
in that case we belong also to all its "copy" in Platonia, and our
predicti
Ben Goertzel writes:
> So, in my view, we are faced with a couple different ways of introducing
> the arbitrary assumptions needed to justify induction:
>
> 1) make an arbitrary assumption that the apparently real physical
> universe is real
>
> 2) make an arbitrary assumption that simpler hypothes
> 6) This shows that if we are in a massive computer running in
> a universe, then (supposing we know it or believe it) to
> predict the future of any experiment we decide to carry one
> (for example testing A or B) we need to take into account all
> reconstitutions at any time of the compute
At 12:17 11/04/04 +0100, Brett Hall (FOR-LIST) wrote:
How?
(I was saying:
More shortly: if we are living in a massive computer then we are
living
> in arithmetic-platonia, and by the church thesis and other
computer-science
> theoretical constraints, this is testable.)
Actually this is the wh
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