Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, September 29, 2012 2:14:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the 
> brain 
> > does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we 
> participate 
> > in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same. 
> > Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, building 
> a 
> > car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is completely 
> > different. 
>
> But the atoms in the food I ate for dinner that will be incorporated 
> into my brain don't know what I'm going to do next month. All they 
> have to do is behave like every other carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen etc. 
> atom in the universe. Whatever my brain does, it does it with those 
> interchangeable components. 
>

At the level in which there are interchangeable components, there is no 
brain. At the level at which we can describe a brain, the context is a 
whole living organism. Your view conflates what I call the micro-impersonal 
level with higher impersonal levels and the perceptual frame of impersonal 
representations with the perceptual frame of personal presentations.

Craig 


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain
> does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate
> in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same.
> Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, building a
> car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is completely
> different.

But the atoms in the food I ate for dinner that will be incorporated
into my brain don't know what I'm going to do next month. All they
have to do is behave like every other carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen etc.
atom in the universe. Whatever my brain does, it does it with those
interchangeable components.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Sep 2012, at 11:56, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view:

1)  Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined
in the following way:  if the monad sees the appetite,
then the action is free will. If not, not.


I would have said that this is freedom, not free will.
To be franc, I still don't know how to interpret "monad".




2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter,


That's coherent with computationalism.



it
is a "fulgeration" of the All (the monad of monads),
to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure.
Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads,
nor in fact is the All.


OK.



L's causation is cooperative.
The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only
do so according to the monads' perceptions, according
to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected
by other monads. All changes in monads are actually
caused by their previous states.


Looks like monad might be interpreted in the comp theory by a  
computational state, or a relative number (relative to a universal  
system or number).





Since this must occur
according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down
to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for
monadic change.


It looks like a script describing (a part of) arithmetical truth.




Like the prices of stock market stocks,
it contains all you need or can know to predict
the future states of all monads, those being individually
given by their previous states. Since the previous states have
been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything
in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view.



That's not quite clear for me, sorry.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)


On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:


You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".
This has
already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding
ability (by
G?el "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency"
is pure
3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the
machine will
confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can
be aware
of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be
aware of its
non communicability, making it into a personal quale.

I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real,  
and

consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago
you did
understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of
brain and
matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another
role for
consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number
relations
being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes
notions of
causal efficacy meaningful to start with.


I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.


But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your
brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well
defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some
precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain
at all.

Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes,
with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a
role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked
by Craig.






Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science.


I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point
is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as
it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal
matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp
matter" and the QM matter.




This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe  
is

at the level of the simulation.


Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution
level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many
possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current
computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a
posteriori.
In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same
way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized
state (like I am in this well defined city).

Bruno

Re: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view:

1)  Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined 
in the following way:  if the monad sees the appetite,
then the action is free will. If not, not.

2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, it 
is a "fulgeration" of the All (the monad of monads),
to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. 
Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads,
nor in fact is the All. L's causation is cooperative.
The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only
do so according to the monads' perceptions, according 
to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected
by other monads. All changes in monads are actually
caused by their previous states. Since this must occur
according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down
to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for
monadic change. Like the prices of stock market stocks,
it contains all you need or can know to predict
the future states of all monads, those being individually 
given by their previous states. Since the previous states have
been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything
in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/28/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) 


On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 

> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote: 
> 
>> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".  
>> This has 
>> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding  
>> ability (by 
>> G?el "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency"  
>> is pure 
>> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the  
>> machine will 
>> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its 
>> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can  
>> be aware 
>> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be  
>> aware of its 
>> non communicability, making it into a personal quale. 
>> 
>> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and 
>> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago  
>> you did 
>> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of  
>> brain and 
>> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another  
>> role for 
>> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number  
>> relations 
>> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes  
>> notions of 
>> causal efficacy meaningful to start with. 
> 
> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 

But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your  
brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well  
defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some  
precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain  
at all. 

Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes,  
with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a  
role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked  
by Craig. 





> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> possible but it is contrary to all science. 

I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point  
is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as  
it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal  
matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp  
matter" and the QM matter. 



> This applies even if the 
> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> at the level of the simulation. 

Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution  
level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many  
possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current  
computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a  
posteriori. 
In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same  
way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized  
state (like I am in this well defined city). 

Bruno 




> 
>> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-  
>> will. This 
>> would be correct if we 

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:29:12 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire 
> >> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. 
> > 
> > 
> > If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in 
> > response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict 
> them 
> > without predicting a person's entire life? 
>
> When you replace the spark plugs in your car you don't need to know 
> everywhere the car is going to go for the duration of its existence. 
> You just need to know how the spark plugs respond to voltage, current, 
> temperature and so on. If you can't predict this even in theory then 
> your car has magical spark plugs and you won't be able to replace 
> them. Same with your brain. 
>

The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain 
does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we 
participate in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the 
same. Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, 
building a car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is 
completely different.

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/27/2012 10:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:

>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or
other
>> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical
laws.
>> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
>> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even
if the
>> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we
observe is
>> at the level of the simulation.
>
>
> That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and
others on this
> many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to
happen in the
> brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that
physics has
> nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly
begin firing
> in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care.
Can neurons
> fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and
intentions
> directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course.
Obviously.
> Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than
we would a
> wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is
that experience
> is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.


If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity 
in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics 
predict them without predicting a person's entire life?


Craig


Good point! Physical systems are completely blind to their history, 
or so we are told...


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
>> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
>
>
> If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in
> response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them
> without predicting a person's entire life?

When you replace the spark plugs in your car you don't need to know
everywhere the car is going to go for the duration of its existence.
You just need to know how the spark plugs respond to voltage, current,
temperature and so on. If you can't predict this even in theory then
your car has magical spark plugs and you won't be able to replace
them. Same with your brain.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> >> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 
> >> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> >> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the 
> >> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> >> at the level of the simulation. 
> > 
> > 
> > That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on 
> this 
> > many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the 
> > brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics 
> has 
> > nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin 
> firing 
> > in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can 
> neurons 
> > fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions 
> > directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. 
> > Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would 
> a 
> > wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that 
> experience 
> > is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. 
>
> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire 
> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. 
>

If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in 
response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them 
without predicting a person's entire life? 

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
>> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
>> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
>> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the
>> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
>> at the level of the simulation.
>
>
> That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this
> many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the
> brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has
> nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing
> in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons
> fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions
> directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously.
> Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a
> wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience
> is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".  
This has
already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding  
ability (by
Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency"  
is pure
3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the  
machine will

confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can  
be aware
of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be  
aware of its

non communicability, making it into a personal quale.

I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago  
you did
understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of  
brain and
matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another  
role for
consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number  
relations
being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes  
notions of

causal efficacy meaningful to start with.


I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.


But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your  
brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well  
defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some  
precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain  
at all.


Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes,  
with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a  
role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked  
by Craig.







Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science.


I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point  
is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as  
it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal  
matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp  
matter" and the QM matter.





This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
at the level of the simulation.


Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution  
level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many  
possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current  
computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a  
posteriori.
In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same  
way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized  
state (like I am in this well defined city).


Bruno






I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- 
will. This
would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level,  
but we are
not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we  
live, and
unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer  
god", not
the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self- 
consistency, and

cannot know its local future.



--
Stathis Papaioannou

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think the only difference in what you are saying and what I am 
saying, is I say look the zombies can do these things (by their 
definition), so they must be conscious and there is the inconsistency, 
whereas you say zombies cannot do these things since they are 
not conscious (by their definition), so then zombie behavior cannot be 
indistinguishable to a third party.


It works out to the same conclusion, either zombies are conscious, or 
zombies can't behave indistinguishably, and hence the definition of a 
zombie that is non-conscious but has identical behavior is flawed.



Hi Jason,

I am fine with identity of the two if and only if there is no 
distinguishable difference in behavior, as this gives us a 3p 
definition, but to only see that case as the whole of the gamut of 
possibilities is a mistake. My claim is that the zombie idea can cause 
as much confusion as it's proponents intended to solve. Ideas are two 
edged things Otherwise they are just meaningless noise.


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


This is to equate reasoning to automatically following an
algorithm. This implies perfect predictability at some level and
thus the absence of any 1p only aspects. Additionally, the recipe
is some thng that needs explanation. How was it found...?
This kind of zombie reasoning is an oxymoron as it assumes the
possibility of evaluations and yet disallows the very possibility.
Zombies have no qualia and thus cannot represent anything to
itself. It has no "self" and thus lacks the capacity to impress
anything upon that non-existent self.


Here, I disagree.  If a you ask a zombie to solve a riddle, and it 
ponders it for several minutes and then gives you the correct answer, 
how can you say it was not reasoning?  It is like saying a computer is 
not multiplying when you ask it what 4*4 is and it gives you 16.


Note that I think we agree (some forms of reasoning probably require 
consciousness), which only provides another reason to doubt the 
consistency of the definition of zombies.  I don't think reasoning is 
normally assumed to require consciousness, which is why someone who 
defines zombies as non-conscious may still hold that they have a 
reasoning ability.


Hi Jason,

OK, but isn't that the point I made? Automaton behavior is 
per-scripted. It is not the result from an internal self-model. Is there 
some point where the two are identical in the 3p sense. Certainly! But 
only in that special case does your claim follow, but it does not follow 
generally as we need to take into account "novel" behavior.


--
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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
> events
> > or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing
> the
> > forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> > consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
> saying
> > human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market.
>  Of
> > course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
> interactions,
> > but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are
> real
> > and do make a difference.
>
> The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal
> power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry,
> biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to
> say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and
> psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even
> if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by
> analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong
> emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but
> fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties.
>

I agree with your distaste for strong emergence, but I think that you can
no more take the consciousness out of the brain, then you could take out
the chemical reactions.  Each is a fundamental part of what it is and does.



>
> >> We can't observe the
> >> experience itself.
> >
> >
> > I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
> defining
> > the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and
> > consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
> implements
> > the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind.  By
> > tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it
> is
> > and isn't aware of.
> >
> > Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> > scans what people are seeing:
> >
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>
> We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to
> read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea
> what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all.
>
>
Maybe they could know what we experience.  If they moved their minds to
alternate substrates they might have much greater neural plasticity and
this could allow them to alter their own minds and know what we experience.
 Perhaps with enough practice doing this with different creatures from all
over the galaxy they could develop some pretty accurate theories about
what processing patterns of information lead to what first person
experiences.



> >> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
> >> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
> >> conscious,
> >
> >
> > Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensations,
> > thoughts, surrounds, etc."  Awareness is defined as "having knowledge".
>  So
> > we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations,
> thoughts,
> > surroundings, etc.
>
> The "merely" makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel
> Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible
> as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing
> that goes on in brains.


Zombies are logically impossible precisely because consciousness is not an
epiphenomenon.

Dennett explains his position on epiphenomenalism here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxqXdzMv7Io&feature=BFa&list=PL9D673C673BC85C3E&t=7m10s

He is "flabbergasted that anyone takes this view seriously"

Jason

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 27, 2012 9:09:12 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This 
> has 
> > already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability 
> (by 
> > Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is 
> pure 
> > 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine 
> will 
> > confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its 
> > self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be 
> aware 
> > of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of 
> its 
> > non communicability, making it into a personal quale. 
> > 
> > I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and 
> > consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did 
> > understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain 
> and 
> > matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for 
> > consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number 
> relations 
> > being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions 
> of 
> > causal efficacy meaningful to start with. 
>
> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 
> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the 
> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> at the level of the simulation. 
>

That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this 
many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the 
brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has 
nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin 
firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can 
neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and 
intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. 
Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than 
we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is 
that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

Craig
 

>
> > I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. 
> This 
> > would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we 
> are 
> > not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, 
> and 
> > unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer god", 
> not 
> > the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, 
> and 
> > cannot know its local future. 
>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:01:12 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>  On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>  
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
>> 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch 
>>> > 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the 
>>> pain
>>> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>>>
>>>  There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
>>> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
>>> completely explains the observable behaviour.
>>
>>
>>  But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical 
>> events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be 
>> missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the 
>> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like 
>> saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock 
>> market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic 
>> interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, 
>> which are real and do make a difference.
>>
>>
Exactly Jason. The moment we conflate  "physical events" with "painful 
stimulus" we have lost the war. If we assume that physical events can 
possibly be defined as full of 'pain', or that they stimulate (i.e. are 
received and responded to as a signifying experience - which is causally 
efficacious in changing observed behavior), then we are already begging the 
question of the explanatory gap. To assume that there can be a such thing 
as a purely physical event which nonetheless is full of pain and power to 
influence behavior takes the entirety of sense and awareness for granted 
but then fails to acknowledge that it was necessary in the first place. 
Once you have the affect of pain and the effect of behavioral stimulation, 
you don't need a brain as far as explaining consciousness - you already 
have consciousness on the sub-personal level.

>  
>>
>>> We can't observe the
>>> experience itself.
>>
>>
>>  I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even 
>> defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of 
>> minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process 
>> implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a 
>> mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know 
>> what it is and isn't aware of.
>>
>>  Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from 
>> brain scans what people are seeing:
>>
>> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>>
>>
This may not be what we are seeing at all, but rather what we are looking 
at. There was a recent study on the visual cortex which showed the same 
activity whether the subject actually saw something or not. There may be no 
activity in the brain at all which directly translates into any conscious 
experience that we have, only the event horizon where we interface with our 
body and the body's world. We aren't in there...we're in here. We are not 
extended across public spaces, we are intended within private times.  They 
are orthogonal sense modalities of the same essential process on multiple 
levels, each of which are cross-juxtaposed with ever other. (This means One 
group of cells in my body can get my full attention, or that I can think 
abstractly without consciously considering any cells or bodies or 
conditions in the world).

  
>>
>>> If the experience had separate causal powers we
>>> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
>>> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
>>> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>>>
>>
>>  It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or 
>> interactionism is true ( 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
>>  ). 
>>  Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.
>>
>>
Yes, I agree they are both because they both fail to recognize the symmetry 
of extended public space and intended private time. It's understandable 
because we are inherently biased as being completely steeped in our privacy 
to the point that it seems largely transparent to us. Our ability to make 
sense of public space phenomena is so powerful and clear that we are, at 
least in the West, seduced into believing that the interior too surely must 
be nothing but a clever arrangement of exteriors. It isn't. The symmetry is 
the thing. Levels and symmetry are the answer, not linear functions. There 
is no magic required at all, unless you deny your own private experience 
from the start, which of course 'saws off the branch that you are sitting 
on' and logically disqualifies

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This has
> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability (by
> Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is pure
> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will
> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware
> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its
> non communicability, making it into a personal quale.
>
> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did
> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and
> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for
> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations
> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of
> causal efficacy meaningful to start with.

I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
at the level of the simulation.

> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This
> would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are
> not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and
> unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer god", not
> the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and
> cannot know its local future.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events
> or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the
> forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying
> human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market.  Of
> course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions,
> but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real
> and do make a difference.

The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal
power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry,
biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to
say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and
psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even
if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by
analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong
emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but
fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties.

>> We can't observe the
>> experience itself.
>
>
> I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even defining
> the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and
> consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements
> the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind.  By
> tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is
> and isn't aware of.
>
> Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> scans what people are seeing:
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html

We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to
read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea
what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all.

>> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
>> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
>> conscious,
>
>
> Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensations,
> thoughts, surrounds, etc."  Awareness is defined as "having knowledge".  So
> we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations, thoughts,
> surroundings, etc.

The "merely" makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel
Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible
as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing
that goes on in brains.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Sep 2012, at 04:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the  
pain

they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?


There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the
experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.

I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating:  
if it
were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have  
proposed it.  If
consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it  
and the
resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non- 
shareable.
In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all  
its
intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So  
then who is
it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the  
mystery of
conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious  
experiencer.
The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the  
theory of
epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in  
no way is

effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether  
it

experienced something or if it were a zombie.


The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.

Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that  
epiphenominalism
(and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things  
that have
never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its core  
assumption is

wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?


The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious.


You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".  
This has already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding  
ability (by Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self- 
consistency" is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get  
consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self- 
consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will  
introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough  
cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non  
communicability, making it into a personal quale.


I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and  
consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you  
did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of  
brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives  
another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities  
through number relations being selected (non causally, here).  
Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to  
start with.


I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will.  
This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level,  
but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level  
where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns  
only the "outer god", not the "inner one" which can *know* a part of  
its local self-consistency, and cannot know its local future.


Bruno






It is
emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or
epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the
problem of other minds and zombies would not exist.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained  
entirely

> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number  
which

makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if  
consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make  
more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into  
physical realism?


It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to  
computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.


Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it  
obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness  
is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth.


Consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth, "seen  
from inside".




If the latter, then it sounds like you are saying that some  
arithmetic functions can only be expressed as pain or blue...


No. You confuse "Turing emulable", and "first person indeterminacy  
recoverable". Pain and blue have no arithmetical representations.






in which case, how are they really arithmetic.


They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical.
Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This  
needs a bit of "model theory" to be explained formally.





Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create  
blueness.


It would not lake sense to "see" that. Brain and electromagnetic  
fields or any 3p notion cannot turn blue. "Blue" is a singular  
informative global experienced by first person.








I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to  
organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or  
physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even  
what that would mean.


This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.

If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a  
common sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more  
of it.


Did you understand the first person indeterminacy? Tell me if you  
understand the seven first steps of the UDA, in

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html








Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already  
computable?


To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done,  
relatively to the situation you are in.
Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that  
I can pay it?".


Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable  
that I have paid for the beer in the future?


It is not arithmetically inevitable. In some stories you don't pay.  
Comp, like QM, leads to a continuum of futures, and your decisions and  
acts "here-and-now" determine the general features of your normal  
(majority) futures. That is why life and discussion forums have some  
sense.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

>  On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
>> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>>
>>  There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
>> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
>> completely explains the observable behaviour.
>
>
>  But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
> events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be
> missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
> saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock
> market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
> interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon,
> which are real and do make a difference.
>
>
>> We can't observe the
>> experience itself.
>
>
>  I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
> defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of
> minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
> implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a
> mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know
> what it is and isn't aware of.
>
>  Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> scans what people are seeing:
>
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>
>
>> If the experience had separate causal powers we
>> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
>> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
>> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>>
>
>  It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or
> interactionism is true (
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
>  ).
>  Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.
>
>
> Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the y
> are false.
>
>
>
>  Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have
> effects.  After all, no violations of physics are required for human
> psychology to have effects on stock prices.
>
>
> Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena!
>
>
>
Well, it at least shows emergent things can have effects.  A truck is an
emergent phenomenon, but it can still run you over.  So though
consciousness might be emergent we can't plainly rule out that it can have
no effects.


>
>
>>
>> > I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if
>> it
>> > were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed
>> it.  If
>> > consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
>> the
>> > resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
>> non-shareable.
>> > In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
>> > intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then
>> who is
>> > it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery
>> of
>> > conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
>> experiencer.
>> > The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the
>> theory of
>> > epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no
>> way is
>> > effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
>> > non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
>> > experienced something or if it were a zombie.
>>
>>  The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
>> is the definition of a zombie.
>
>
>  Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that
> zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any sense.
>  Do you?
>
>
> These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is where
> they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same basic
> primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible.
>

Right, and I think the converse is also true.  If zombies are not possible,
then dualism must be wrong.


> Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind of)
> a mind.
>
>
>
>
>> I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
>> that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.
>>
>
>  If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie,
> and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be
> sure.
>
>
> How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no qualia
> thus no ability to reason about qu

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about
the pain
> they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour.


But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical 
events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be 
missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. 
 Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain 
may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves 
of the stock market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in 
terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of 
higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference.


We can't observe the
experience itself.


I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even 
defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding 
of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain 
process implements the right combination of processes to have what we 
would call a mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, 
we might even know what it is and isn't aware of.


Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from 
brain scans what people are seeing:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html 



If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.


It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or 
interactionism is true ( 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation 
 ). 
 Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.


Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the 
y are false.




Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have 
effects.  After all, no violations of physics are required for human 
psychology to have effects on stock prices.


Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena!



> I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be
self-defeating: if it
> were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have
proposed it.  If
> consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of
it and the
> resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
non-shareable.
> In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with
all its
> intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So
then who is
> it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the
mystery of
> conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
experiencer.
> The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that
the theory of
> epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which
in no way is
> effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of
whether it
> experienced something or if it were a zombie.

The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie.


Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that 
zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any 
sense.  Do you?


These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is 
where they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same 
basic primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible. 
Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind 
of) a mind.



I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.


If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, 
and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could 
not be sure.


How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no 
qualia thus no ability to reason about qualia!




This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as 
possessing information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie 
brains.  Both brains have identical information content, so they both 
know exactly the same things.


Then what makes a zombie a zombie???

 They both know what red 

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>
> There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
> completely explains the observable behaviour.


But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be
missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock
market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon,
which are real and do make a difference.


> We can't observe the
> experience itself.


I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of
minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a
mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know
what it is and isn't aware of.

Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
scans what people are seeing:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html


> If the experience had separate causal powers we
> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>

It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or
interactionism is true (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
).
 Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.

Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have effects.
 After all, no violations of physics are required for human psychology to
have effects on stock prices.


>
> > I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
> > were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.
>  If
> > consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
> the
> > resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable.
> > In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
> > intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then
> who is
> > it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of
> > conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
> experiencer.
> > The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory
> of
> > epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no
> way is
> > effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> > non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
> > experienced something or if it were a zombie.
>
> The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
> is the definition of a zombie.


Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that
zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any sense.
 Do you?


> I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
> that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.
>

If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, and
still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be
sure.

This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as possessing
information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie brains.  Both brains
have identical information content, so they both know exactly the same
things.  They both know what red is like, they both know what pain is like.
  It's just there is some magical notion of there being a difference
between them which is completely illogical.  Zombies don't make sense, and
therefore neither do dualist theories such as epihenominalism.


>
> > Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that
> epiphenominalism
> > (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that
> have
> > never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its core assumption is
> > wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
> > consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
> > efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?
>
> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
> conscious,


Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensation

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the
experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.

> I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
> were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.  If
> consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the
> resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable.
> In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
> intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then who is
> it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of
> conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer.
> The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of
> epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is
> effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
> experienced something or if it were a zombie.

The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.

> Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism
> (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have
> never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its core assumption is
> wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
> consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
> efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?

The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious. It is
emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or
epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the
problem of other minds and zombies would not exist.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>>
>> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
>> > wrote: 
>> > 
>> >> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able   
>> >> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. 
>> > 
>> > The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely 
>> > as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying 
>> > qualia. 
>>
>> With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and   
>> machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication   
>> way). 
>> Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made   
>> on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). 
>> We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,   
>> is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. 
>>
>> Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the   
>> physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is   
>> the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which   
>> makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the   
>> physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as   
>> the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal   
>> reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial   
>> relations). 
>>
>
> We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness 
> is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see 
> arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into physical realism? 
>
>
> It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to 
> computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.
>

Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it 
obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness is 
specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth. If the latter, then it 
sounds like you are saying that some arithmetic functions can only be 
expressed as pain or blue...in which case, how are they really arithmetic. 
Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create blueness.
 

>
>
> I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to 
> organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical 
> realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would 
> mean. 
>
>
> This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.
>

If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a common 
sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more of it.
 

>
>
> Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?
>
>
> To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, 
> relatively to the situation you are in.
> Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can 
> pay it?".
>

Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable that I 
have paid for the beer in the future?

Craig
;' 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)   
>> inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- 
>> accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of   
>> all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by   
>> infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural   
>> personal) self-selection. 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>> > By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball 
>> > entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or 
>> > some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this 
>> > property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without 
>> > causal efficacy of its own. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > -- 
>> > Stathis Papaioannou 
>> > 
>> > -- 
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
>> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com 
>> > . 
>> > For more options, visit this group at 
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
>> > . 
>> > 
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if  
consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make  
more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into  
physical realism?


It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to  
computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.



I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to  
organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical  
realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that  
would mean.


This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.



Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?


To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done,  
relatively to the situation you are in.
Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that I  
can pay it?".


Bruno





Craig


If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)
inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self-
accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of
all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by
infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural
personal) self-selection.

Bruno



> By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
> entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has  
qualia or

> some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
> property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal,  
without

> causal efficacy of its own.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
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li...@googlegroups.com

> .
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> .
>

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>
> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> > > 
>   
> > wrote: 
> > 
> >> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able   
> >> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. 
> > 
> > The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely 
> > as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying 
> > qualia. 
>
> With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and   
> machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication   
> way). 
> Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made   
> on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). 
> We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,   
> is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. 
>
> Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the   
> physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is   
> the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which   
> makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the   
> physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as   
> the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal   
> reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial   
> relations). 
>

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is 
the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see 
arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into physical realism? I can 
easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize 
itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would 
possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. Why execute 
a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?

Craig


> If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)   
> inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- 
> accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of   
> all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by   
> infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural   
> personal) self-selection. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
> > By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball 
> > entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or 
> > some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this 
> > property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without 
> > causal efficacy of its own. 
> > 
> > 
> > -- 
> > Stathis Papaioannou 
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
> > To post to this group, send email to 
> > everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-li...@googlegroups.com  
> > . 
> > For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
> > . 
> > 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able  
to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.


The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
qualia.


With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and  
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication  
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made  
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,  
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.


Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the  
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is  
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which  
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the  
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as  
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal  
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial  
relations).


If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)  
inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- 
accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of  
all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by  
infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural  
personal) self-selection.


Bruno




By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
causal efficacy of its own.


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Stathis Papaioannou

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
> > Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able to
> talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
> entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
> some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
> property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
> causal efficacy of its own.
>

If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.
If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
non-shareable.  In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness
with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.
So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain
the mystery of conscious experience?  It can't be the causally
inefficacious experiencer.  The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can
offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally
efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences.  It might as
well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same
regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie.

Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that
epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by
things that have never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its
core assumption is wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion
threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are
causally efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about
them?

Jason

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Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able to talk 
> about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.

The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
causal efficacy of its own.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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