subject:"Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations \?"

On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King  
wrote:

On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig  
Weinberg  wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.  
If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no  
consciousness.

>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,

 Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it  
has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like  
Dennett

and the materialist, try to deny its existence.

Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p  
aspect of anything.

This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and coherent  
with your idea that 2+2=5.

You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can  
hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth,  
and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of  
possible creatures.

Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.

The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative)  
experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public  
token views).

This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of  
theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String  
theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.).

Bruno

Craig

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Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:05, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 8:33 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Roger,
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as  
Penrose

and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness
itself allowing for emergence...
Seehttp://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
Richard

Hi Richard,

   I only have one beef with your thesis, you over rely on a  
"theory" that has yet to have a single physically testable  
prediction! IMHO, it would be better to think of all that super- 
geometry as nothing more than beautiful mathematics until that day  
that we actually find a squark or photino.


Hofstadter is 100% correct on Gödel.
Lucas and Penrose are incorrect on Gödel.

All details are in "conscience and mechanism".

In fact the löbian machine "naturally" refutes the Gödelian argument  
against mechanism.


But, I am OK, for obvious reason for those who have studied sane04 or  
my older papers that incompleteness plays a major role in both the  
explanation of consciousness and its origin, and the explanation where  
the laws of physics come from (and are divided into sharable first  
person plural quanta, and the non sharable qualia).


I use Solovay theorem, which gives the strongest precision possible on  
Gödel's incompleteness possible, as it characterize the logic of the  
true and provable self-reference (G) and the true but non provable  
self-referential statement (G*).


Bruno




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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-17 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:27:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.
>
>
> That is a form of idealism. 
>
> It pre"suppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in 
> understanding sense (and matter).
>

You already are sense and matter. There is no better way to understand it. 
Sense is not ideal, it is concretely real - all around us, within us. If I 
want to compute something, I have to count. If it's a complex computation, 
I need to enslave an inanimate object - because it's so incredibly 
antithetical to our nature. Counting is what we do to put ourselves to 
sleep, to hypnotize. Counting blows out the candle of 1p sense to reveal 
the shadows cast between 1p experiences.

>
> Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define computation 
> in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material-realities emerges 
> naturally in a testable manner.
>

To quote you - "That is a form of idealism." It pre-supposes arithmetic 
which I see clearly as a kind of sense - a feeling of augmentation or 
meta-augmentation in any particular context. It makes it completely 
circular as you smuggle consciousness in to begin with, but you don't 
recognize or acknowledge that you do. Instead of + and * just start with 
the entire canon of mathematics in the last 2000 years - what difference 
does it make? There is no more explanation for the appearance of * in the 
universe than there is for primitive matter. What's *? It's a sense-making 
relationship among concretely experienced ideas. It is a psychological 
mapping, not a causally efficacious metaphysical principle.

>
>
> If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no 
> consciousness. 
>
>
> Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the 
> first person indeterminacy.
>

I don't think I'm assuming anything. I'm saying that if you can drive a bus 
down the street without a 50 foot tall inflatable flamingo tied to the 
roof, then producing giant inflatable birds are probably not going to be a 
priority in a universe made of bus drivers.

Craig

>
> Bruno
>
>

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


Hi Roger,

On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex  
computations ?


No!



The short answer is that I am proposing that :

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.


No!



2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity.


No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has  
already shown this!



 Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed  
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not  
know enough

mathematics to be more specific.


Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also  
available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/


"Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its  
own soundness without becoming inconsistent."


I get only "page not found".

Bruno






A slightly more technical discussion here:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox



If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.




I will!




===
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent  
property"
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some  
questions:


A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for  
Penrose's condition of non-computability ?


http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent  
property of classical

computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental  
states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex  
temporally bind information,

and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational  
complexity among neurons."




That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...




B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear  
or emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is  
an emergent property of

the behavior of many minds.


Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind  
is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of  
closure under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem  
is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break  
the symmetry somehow!




IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a  
wiser position.


Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability,  
presumably that of Platonia as experienced.

All art and insight comes from such an experience.



No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on  
Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get  
it straight from the Horse's mouth.


http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf

This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:

"In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect
than the material world of our external experiences,
but just as real."

Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to  
be explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's  
COMP program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.



On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe  
that the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most  
complex entities.
He

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.

That is a form of idealism.

It pre"suppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in
understanding sense (and matter).

Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define
computation in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material-
realities emerges naturally in a testable manner.

If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no
consciousness.

Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the
first person indeterminacy.

Bruno

Craig

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex
computations ?

The short answer is that I am proposing that :

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-
directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
enough

mathematics to be more specific.

If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.

===
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent
property"

of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for
Penrose's condition of non-computability ?

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent
property of classical

computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
temporally bind information,

and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational
complexity among neurons."

B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or
emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is
an emergent property of

the behavior of many minds.

IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
position.

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability,
presumably that of Platonia as experienced.

All art and insight comes from such an experience.

On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe
that the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most
complex entities.
He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations
belong to the realm

of spin networks.

This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-
computability,

and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.

Instead, I propose the following:

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

mathematics to be more specific.
=

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions
constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of "Reality" is a
good example of this and it is why I define Reality as "what which
is incontrovertible for some collection N (N > 2) of observers
that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of
course the word "meaningful" is a bit ambiguous...


I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I 
was going to lay it out like this.


I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance.

I can consider the shimmering patch many things:

A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense:

  1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical 
conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation.


  2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection 
with the presence of life sustaining H2O.
  a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water 
of negated by its absence.
  b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing 
to the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection 
off of the surface of water.


B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense

  1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water)
  2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of 
a mirage)


C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense

  1) hope and salvation
  2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil.
  3) a dramatic point in the story

Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the 
lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do 
not simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the 
cellulose of a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is 
already ambiguous and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark 
night of the soul, it is an experience that already defines itself as 
unique and genuine (even if it's a genuine experience of being tricked).


Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free 
Will. If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is 
intended to substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage 
is an example of how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage 
only passes for simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't 
see a lot of insects or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only 
a simulation in one sense or set of senses. This is why AI simulation 
will fail to generate human subjectivity, because it only looks like a 
human if you program it to play Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc.


I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best 
simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can 
fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that 
thing for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being 
especially useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has 
potential within this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of 
that. The personal range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of 
voluntary participation in the sub-personal, super-personal, and 
impersonal ranges coincides with the decrease in the relevance of 
simulation, as the 'seems like' range of direct relation gives way to 
the 'simply is' range of indirect (second hand) perceptual inertia.


Craig



Hi Craig,

It occurs to me that we can only gain information from simulations 
if we (as observers thereof) are within the simulacra itself in some 
way. For example, the moving playing on my TV screen is a simulation of 
a jet plane flying through the air and not the "real thing" but I am not 
the only possible viewer of that "simulated jet plane". There are 
multiple observers possible and we are all "within" the same "reality".
It seems that for the bijective identity to hold between object and 
best possible simulation there can only be one observer of the 
simulation, the object itself, other wise there is the possibility of a 
distorted view of the object and thus the bijection fails This 
smells suspiciously like a definition of 1p!


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:24:07 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>  On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: 
>>
>> On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
>> > On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>>  wrote: 
>> >> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If 
>> you could 
>> >> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
>> >> >Craig 
>> >> > 
>> > Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
>> > and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
>> > have. But I missed it. 
>> > Richard 
>> Hi Richard, 
>>
>>  Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
>> what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
>> Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
>> is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
>> 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
>> and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 
>>
>
> Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of 
> anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
> qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
> public token views). 
>
> Craig
>  
>
> I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed 
> from many different 1p's. The idea of "Reality" is a good example of this 
> and it is why I define Reality as "what which is incontrovertible for some 
> collection N (N > 2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in 
> some meaningful way. Of course the word "meaningful" is a bit ambiguous...
>

I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I was 
going to lay it out like this.

I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance.

I can consider the shimmering patch many things:

A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense:

  1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical 
conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation.

  2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection with 
the presence of life sustaining H2O.
  a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water of 
negated by its absence.
  b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing to 
the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection off of 
the surface of water.

B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense

  1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water)
  2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of a 
mirage)

C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense

  1) hope and salvation
  2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil.
  3) a dramatic point in the story

Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the 
lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do not 
simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the cellulose of 
a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is already ambiguous 
and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark night of the soul, it is 
an experience that already defines itself as unique and genuine (even if 
it's a genuine experience of being tricked).

Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free Will. 
If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is intended to 
substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage is an example of 
how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage only passes for 
simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't see a lot of insects 
or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only a simulation in one sense 
or set of senses. This is why AI simulation will fail to generate human 
subjectivity, because it only looks like a human if you program it to play 
Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc.

I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best 
simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can 
fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that thing 
for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being especially 
useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has potential within 
this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of that. The personal 
range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of voluntary participation in 
the sub-personal, super-personal, and impersonal ranges coincides with the 
decrease in the relevance of simulation, as the 'seems like' range of 
direct relation gives way to the 'simply is' range of indirect (second 
hand) perceptual inertia.

Craig

>
> -- 
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig
Weinberg>  wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of
sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no
consciousness.
>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,

 Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it
has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like
Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.

Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect 
of anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
public token views).

Craig

I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed 
from many different 1p's. The idea of "Reality" is a good example of 
this and it is why I define Reality as "what which is incontrovertible 
for some collection N (N > 2) of observers that can communicate (or 
interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word "meaningful" is a 
bit ambiguous...

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
> > On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig 
> > Weinberg> 
>  wrote: 
> >> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
> could 
> >> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
> >> >Craig 
> >> > 
> > Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
> > and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
> > have. But I missed it. 
> > Richard 
> Hi Richard, 
>
>  Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
> what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
> Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
> is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
> 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
> and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 
>

Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of 
anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
public token views). 

Craig


> -- 
> Onward! 
>
> Stephen 
>
>
>

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
> could 
> > have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
> > Craig 
> > 
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
> have. But I missed it. 
>

This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the 
word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be 
reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense 
in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, 
pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment.

Craig
 

> Richard 
> > 
> > On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
> computations 
> >> ? 
> >> 
> >> The short answer is that I am proposing that : 
> >> 
> >> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
> >> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
> >> 
> >> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
> >> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
> >> range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted 
> >> upward-directed 
> >> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
> platonic 
> >> reason, 
> >> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know 
> >> enough 
> >> mathematics to be more specific. 
> >> 
> >> If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> === 
> >> A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
> >> Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent 
> >> property" 
> >> of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 
> >> 
> >> A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
> >> condition of non-computability ? 
> >> 
> >> 
> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
> >> 
> >> "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent 
> property 
> >> of classical 
> >> computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
> >> The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 
> >> 
> >> 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
> >> 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
> >> temporally bind information, 
> >> and 
> >> 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational 
> complexity 
> >> among neurons." 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 
> >> 
> >> Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or 
> >> emerge through looking at a phenomenon 
> >> at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an 
> >> emergent property of 
> >> the behavior of many minds. 
> >> 
> >> IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
> >> position. 
> >> 
> >> Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 
> >> 
> >> http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
> >> 
> >> One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, 
> presumably 
> >> that of Platonia as experienced. 
> >> All art and insight comes from such an experience. 
> >> 
> >> On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that 
> the 
> >> universe is made up of 
> >> quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most 
> complex 
> >> entities. 
> >> He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations 
> belong 
> >> to the realm 
> >> of spin networks. 
> >> 
> >> This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of 
> >> non-computability, 
> >> and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
> >> to escape i

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
>have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>Craig
>

Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
have. But I missed it.
Richard

Hi Richard,

Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 8:33 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Roger,
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness
itself allowing for emergence...
Seehttp://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
Richard

Hi Richard,

I only have one beef with your thesis, you over rely on a "theory" 
that has yet to have a single physically testable prediction! IMHO, it 
would be better to think of all that super-geometry as nothing more than 
beautiful mathematics until that day that we actually find a squark or 
photino.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
could have computation without sense, then there would be no 
consciousness.


Craig

Hi Craig,

I agree, you would have the "zombie" without sense. By definition!

--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


Hi Roger,

On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
computations ?


No!


The short answer is that I am proposing that :
1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.


No!


2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity.


No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has 
already shown this!



 Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know 
enough

mathematics to be more specific.


Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also 
available from 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/


"Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own 
soundness without becoming inconsistent."


A slightly more technical discussion here: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%27s_paradox>



If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.


I will!


===
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent 
property"

of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for 
Penrose's condition of non-computability ?


http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
<http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html%20>


"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent 
property of classical

computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
temporally bind information,

and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational 
complexity among neurons."




That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...




B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or 
emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an 
emergent property of

the behavior of many minds.


Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind is 
only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure 
under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all 
about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the 
symmetry somehow!




IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
position.


Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
<http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html%20>


One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, 
presumably that of Platonia as experienced.

All art and insight comes from such an experience.



No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on 
Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it 
straight from the Horse's mouth.


http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf

This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:

"In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect
than the material world of our external experiences,
but just as real."

Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to be 
explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP 
program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.



On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that 
the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks&qu

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
> have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
> Craig
>
Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
have. But I missed it.
Richard
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>>
>> Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations
>> ?
>>
>> The short answer is that I am proposing that :
>>
>> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
>> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>>
>> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
>> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
>> range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted
>> upward-directed
>> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
>> reason,
>> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
>> enough
>> mathematics to be more specific.
>>
>> If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ===
>> A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
>> Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent
>> property"
>> of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
>>
>> A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
>> condition of non-computability ?
>>
>> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
>>
>> "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property
>> of classical
>> computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
>> The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
>>
>> 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
>> 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
>> temporally bind information,
>> and
>> 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
>> among neurons."
>>
>>
>>
>> B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
>>
>> Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or
>> emerge through looking at a phenomenon
>> at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an
>> emergent property of
>> the behavior of many minds.
>>
>> IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
>> position.
>>
>> Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
>>
>> http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
>>
>> One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
>> that of Platonia as experienced.
>> All art and insight comes from such an experience.
>>
>> On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the
>> universe is made up of
>> quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex
>> entities.
>> He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong
>> to the realm
>> of spin networks.
>>
>> This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of
>> non-computability,
>> and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
>> to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
>>
>> Instead, I propose the following:
>>
>> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
>> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>>
>> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
>> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
>> range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted
>> upward-directed
>> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
>> reason,
>> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
>> enough
>> mathematics to be more specific.
>> =
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
>> 10/16/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribe

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

Roger,
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness
itself allowing for emergence...
See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
Richard

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
>
> The short answer is that I am proposing that :
>
> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>
> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
> range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
> reason,
> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
> mathematics to be more specific.
>
> If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
>
>
>
>
> ===
> A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
> Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent property"
> of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
>
> A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
> condition of non-computability ?
>
> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
>
> "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of
> classical
> computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
> The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
>
> 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
> 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
> temporally bind information,
> and
> 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
> among neurons."
>
>
>
> B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
>
> Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or emerge
> through looking at a phenomenon
> at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an
> emergent property of
> the behavior of many minds.
>
> IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
> position.
>
> Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
>
> http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
>
> One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
> that of Platonia as experienced.
> All art and insight comes from such an experience.
>
> On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the
> universe is made up of
> quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex
> entities.
> He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong to
> the realm
> of spin networks.
>
> This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,
> and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
> to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
>
> Instead, I propose the following:
>
> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>
> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
> range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
> reason,
> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
> mathematics to be more specific.
> =
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?