Re: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 11/5/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Craig Weinberg > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-11-05, 09:01:1

Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Time: 2012-11-05, 06:53:07 Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem Roger says "that mind and body are completely contrary substances" Richard replies "what is dualism if not that?" On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Cloug

Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Time: 2012-11-05, 09:22:15 Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a conclusion. Craig On Monday, November 5, 2012 8

Re: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

r the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 09:01:10 Subject: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it see

Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a conclusion. Craig On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg What they say about economists is also appropriate to say abo

Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

- Receiving the following content - > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 > Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem > > > > > On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rc

Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

ecially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5

Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take > them too seriously. > > But keep in mind: > > IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid. > Instead, they are phoney attem

Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Roger says "that mind and body are completely contrary substances" Richard replies "what is dualism if not that?" On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Craig Weinberg > > The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take > them too seriously. > > But keep in mind: >

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On May 12, 8:00 pm, Richard Ruquist wrote: > On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > > > > > > > > >  On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote: > > >> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans. > >> >Evgenii >

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 5/15/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Do you mean that when all chemists accept the multiverse interpretation, they will start work

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 14 May 2012, at 22:41, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse. When you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

Hi Stephen, On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno March

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse. When you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start thinking about it. On reality, usually all humans

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhag

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory ar

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. But as Shimon

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 13 May 2012, at 04:38, meekerdb wrote: On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian Kent ha

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse th

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 13.05.2012 04:38 meekerdb said the following: On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian Kent ha

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian Kent has proposed a one-universe theory which doesn't

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote: > >> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans. >> >Evgenii >> >> H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990)

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir > wrote: >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans. >Evgenii H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports a 1927 discussion bet

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote: > >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans. > >Evgenii > > H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports > a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what > actually gives rise to the so called "coll

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following: Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave leads to many difficulties, like non local hidd

Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

Evgenii, All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non computationalist dualist theories. But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave leads to many difficulties, like non local hidden variables in physics, or solipsism in philosop

Re: Dualism?

Stephen: 2 corrections and a remark to my own text: #1: I wrote: "*are those "laws' really so true, or only a (statistical) deduction of data we so far happened to observe?"* I would add: ...and explained according to THAT level of knowldge... #2: I really believ that Descartes 'invented' and 'a

Re: Dualism?

On 8/29/2011 6:05 PM, John Mikes wrote: Stephen and Jason, interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning. Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and explain to the level of "present" theories. A violation of the laws of physics asks: are those

Re: Dualism? Yes!

Hi Jason, Interleaving... On 8/29/2011 8:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Aug 29, 2011, at 12:00 AM, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What about substance monism precludes any life form from

Re: Dualism?

Stephen and Jason, interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning. Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and explain to the level of "present" theories. A violation of the laws of physics asks: are those "laws' really so true, or only a (statistic

Re: Dualism?

On Aug 29, 2011, at 12:00 AM, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What about substance monism precludes any life form from existing? Also are you saying you are a substance dualist? Hi,

Re: Dualism?

On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What about substance monism precludes any life form from existing? Also are you saying you are a substance dualist? Hi, Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism? Maybe you migh

RE: briefly wading back into the fray - re: dualism

So far the responses here have not been as hostile as I feared :) --- On Sat, 2/7/09, Jesse Mazer wrote: > are you open to the idea > that there might be truths about subjectivity (such as > truths about what philosophers call 'qualia') which > cannot be reduced to purely physical statements? Ar

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le 24-juin-05, à 22:43, Pete Carlton a écrit : (Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..) On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno wrote There are two *physical* issues here. 1) The simplest one is that if you

Re: Dualism and the DA

(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of th

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Actually, it occurred to me lately that saying "everything happens" may be the same as the paradox of the "set of all sets". That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in set theories, and today

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM To: Pete Carlton Cc: EverythingList Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit : Now, if you

Re: Dualism and the DA

Brent Meeker: >The fact that all these metaphysical problems and bizarre results are predictedby assuming *everything happens* implies to me that *everything happens* islikely false. I'm not sure what the best alternative is, but I like RolandOmnes view point that QM is a probabilistic theory and

RE: Dualism and the DA

>-Original Message- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM >To: Pete Carlton >Cc: EverythingList >Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA > > > >Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit : > >> I think the

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit : I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I disagree that it points to a fundamental metaphysical difference.  I think what appears to be a metaphysical difference is just the breakdown of our folk concept of "I".  Imagine a pr

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: -- we don't need to posit any  kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept  of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic.  We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destroying them in our th

Re: Dualism and the DA

Pete Carlton writes: > I think the second question, "where will I be in the next > duplication", is also meaningless. I think that if you know all the > 3rd-person facts before you step into the duplicator - that there > will be two doubles made of you in two different places, and both > d

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Whatis it like to be a bat?" still has meaning, but is probablyunanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable,contra Nagel!)Dennett considers it answerable, but he

RE: Dualism and the DA

Jonathan Colvin writes: > This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and > your) reference class can not be merely "conscious observers" or "all > humans", but must be something much closer to "someone (or thing) discussing > or aware of the DA). I note that this refer

Re: Dualism and the DA (and torture once more)

Le 19-juin-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : I'm sure the one in Moscow will also answer that he feels really to be the one in Moscow. OK. But what you haven't answered is in what way the universe is any different under circumstance (A) than (B). This is because there is surely *no* d

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote: > Russell Standish wrote: > > > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like to be a bat" is > > > equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like > > if I had > > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very h

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russell Standish wrote: > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like to be a bat" is > > equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like > if I had > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very hard to see what the answer > > could be. Suppose you > > *had* been a bat ra

Re: Dualism and the DA

I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or position,

Re: Dualism and the DA (and torture once more)

Le Dimanche 19 Juin 2005 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : > the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd > person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as > "real", there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to > discard the 3rd person universe. I'd like to know h

RE: Dualism and the DA (and torture once more)

>> Bruno wrote: > >>> Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly >>> equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in >>> Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a >>> God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.). > >>

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russell Standish wrote: >On "What would it be like to have been born someone else", how >does this differ from "What is it like to be a bat?" > >Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter >question is meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed. > >I still find it hard to understand

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le 17-juin-05, à 19:44, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : Bruno wrote: Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate

Re: Dualism and the DA

se it 'thinks' for the future. Of course sometimes it is hard to shake off the firm handcuffs in thinking by traditional terms. We all have been brainwashed into them. Please, excuse my unorthodoxy John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL

Re: Dualism and the DA

On "What would it be like to have been born someone else", how does this differ from "What is it like to be a bat?" Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed. I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Wha

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote: Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had happened? Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase "Who would I have been", uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way for expressing a third-per

RE: Dualism and the DA

Hal Finney wrote: >Jonathan Colvin writes: >> In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it >> seems my objection has been independantly discovered (some >time ago). >> See http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html >> >> In particular, I note the following section, which seems to

RE: Dualism and the DA

Hal Finney wrote: >It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably >or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is >completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a >different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught >in that traffic jam. We aren't th

RE: Dualism and the DA

It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught in that traffic jam. We aren't thrown into a maelstrom of ex

RE: Dualism and the DA

Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to figure out). If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I a

Re: Dualism and the DA

Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.). Bruno Le 16-juin-05, à 23:02, Quent

RE: Dualism and the DA

Jonathan Colvin writes: > In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my > objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See > http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html > > In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my > argument rather pre

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russell Standish wrote: >> >> Well, actually I'd say the fist *is* identical to the hand. >> >At least, >> >> my fist seems to be identical to my hand. >> >> >> >Even when the hand is open >> >> Define "fist". You don't seem to be talking about a "thing", >but some >> sort of Platonic for

Re: Dualism

Dear Jonathan, - Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 9:15 PM Subject: RE: Dualism snip [SPK] The same kind of mutual constraint that

RE: Dualism

Stephen Paul King wrote: >>>Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of >>>dualism require that one side of the duality has properties and >>>behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of the duality, >>>as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced souls"? >>>

RE: Dualism and the DA

Quentin wrote: >> Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm >> conscious (feels like I am, anyway). >I think you do not see the real question, which can be >formulated (using your >analogy) by : > >Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather >Jonathan Colvin ? I

Re: Dualism and the DA

Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : > Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious > (feels like I am, anyway). Hi Jonathan, I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your analogy) by : Why (me as) Russell Standish is

RE: Dualism and the DA

>> Russell Standish wrote: >> >> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is >> >> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to >the body. >> >> >> > >> >These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say >that the fist >> >is separate from the hand. Yet

Re: Dualism

Dear Joanthan, - Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 1:14 AM Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA Stephen Paul King wrote: Pardon the

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Thu, Jun 16, 2005 at 01:02:11AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote: > Russell Standish wrote: > >> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is > >> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body. > >> > > > >These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russell Standish wrote: >> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is >> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body. >> > >These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that >the fist is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not >identic

Re: Dualism and the DA

On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote: > > Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is separate > from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body. > These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist is separate from the

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russel Standish wrote: >> It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced >souls, whether >> or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a >> species of dualism. > >Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that >minds and brains are distinct orthogonal

RE: Dualism and the DA

Stephen Paul King wrote: >Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form >of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties >and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of >the duality, as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced souls"? >The ide

RE: Dualism and the DA

Russel Standish wrote: >> Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think >> anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to >> define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to >> rescue the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly >emplac

Re: Dualism and the DA

Dear Jonathan, Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced souls"? The idea that all dual

Re: Dualism

At 15:38 16/01/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: Is Chalmers really a dualist? Although he does label his views this way at times, from his writings he does not seem to believe in "matter" per se, rather he thinks the fundamental stuff of reality is likely to be something like "information" which h

Re: dualism

: Saturday, January 17, 2004 12:40 AM Subject: RE: dualism > On 17 January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote: > > *quote* > Norman and Bruno: I myself am not defending a dualist position (body + > soul, mind, whatever). I am prepared to say the body is the only substance > that exists.

RE: dualism

On 17 January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote: *quote* Norman and Bruno: I myself am not defending a dualist position (body + soul, mind, whatever). I am prepared to say the body is the only substance that exists. That does not mean its behavior is explainable in terms of physics alone. Yes, I woul