On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote:
I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one
Photon.
What would that mean precisely?
It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one
David Deutsch, but I am not sure the david deutsch can be OK with
this,
On 1 November 2014 04:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote:
I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon.
What would that mean precisely?
It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David
On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would
On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make
I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon.
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On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just
a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and
interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world.
The universe splits
On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with
discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people
would agree with,
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs
involve a temporary splitting into two or more
On 28 Oct 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble,
and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of
On 30 October 2014 05:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just
a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and
interferes
On 10/29/2014 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a
semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and
On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just
On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
That
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the
photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the
right slit in another universe. If after that the photons
There's only one
On 10/29/2014 6:54 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the
photon (or
electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 10:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
?? What kind of evidence do you refer to.
A interference pattern.
That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only.
Of course not it's would be the exact opposite, it's evidence the photon
went through
On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or
disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.
On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've
heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of
an individual
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true
then my consciousness is an illusion, period
Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a
deterministic universe surely? But
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this
world
the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world'
and perhaps every possibility in between.
So in the 3p view, all choices balance out.
Bruno
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with
discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state
what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.
Just saying it's
On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection
I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining
our concept of an individual person.
The entire
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection
I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it
is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period
Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in
On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice,
but I am afraid you might be conscious.
It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
just to
say that he doesn't care about
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet
from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already
crystal clear even
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if
you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was
unreasonable.
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree
with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But
yes, using that
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say
that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a
temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent -
differentiation or whatever).
But to say the
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com
wrote:
Liz,
I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with,
although they'd
On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a
temporary
splitting into two or more worlds,
On 25 October 2014 05:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
the only one giving ambiguity is you
In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is
giving ambiguity; in such a world
On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or
disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.
Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only
real (non-sarcastic,
On 27 October 2014 07:33, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the
last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn
about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit
about
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?
This point was originally about
On 26 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,
That is not relevant for the point you made.
On 27 Oct 2014, at 12:04, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
Geiger counter from a beta decay source is
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say
that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's
stated argument.
Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've
heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of
an individual person.
The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true
then my consciousness is an illusion, period
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
So far the only real
On 28 Oct 2014, at 1:10 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they
most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp
and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or
On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already
assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the
real world almost all integers are not
On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference
problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid
also about Everett QM,
Like I
On 24 Oct 2014, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask
what city will you be in?, all that can
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get
a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a
arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real
On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,
That is not relevant for the point you made.
Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about
2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,
That is not relevant for the point
Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the
last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn
about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit
about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti
monster
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 12:17:34AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true.
OK then comp is false. And now that
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has
an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one
gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of
time
On 26 Oct 2014, at 1:28 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
If you say so, but I don't care if COMP is dealt a serious blow or not.
John K Clark
You must care you bloody blowhard because you daily go to considerable lengths
to show just how important it is to you.
It’s
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 10:28:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has
an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one
gets a sequence
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
the only one giving ambiguity is you
In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is
giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used
with enormous care.
It has
On 23 Oct 2014, at 21:36, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,
Yes.
but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this
I believe it's you who has not integrated the
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true.
OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's
the point of talking about it anymore?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to
have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost
all integers are not computable too.
Any integer can be calculated with a
On 24 Oct 2014, at 01:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if
it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett
QM,
Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city
will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives
information
2014-10-24 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city
will you be in?,
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true.
OK then comp is false. And now that we
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true.
OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false
what's the point of talking about it
On 23 October 2014 13:23, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no
longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3
that I decided that
On 23 October 2014 13:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for
doing proofs and calculations.
So do you think there's a largest integer? If so,
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for
On 23 Oct 2014, at 03:41, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Wait? How long should I wait?
Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or
not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for
the search of a
On 23 Oct 2014, at 02:23, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could
no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in
step 3 that I decided that the entire thing
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
right of
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof
and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what
he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I
made the
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.
I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal
pronouns, and that is far more
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,
Yes.
but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this
I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness
not having a location. So
2014-10-23 21:21 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.
I assume you're referring to
On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that
every
integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
Quantum
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Quantum
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
that every integer has a successor. It's just a
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 01:08:37PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
the experiment
On 10/23/2014 10:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure
On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.
Richard
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/21/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish
On 21 Oct 2014, at 17:14, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague.
I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that
the simple algorithm consisting to run a
On 22 Oct 2014, at 05:05, LizR wrote:
On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
So you don't assume the real numbers
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.
Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the
position observable in a continuous
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no
longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3
that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some
other step,
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.
Why would it be different for the matrix.
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Wait? How long should I wait?
Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The
disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a
proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
the experiment have only had values at
On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.
Why
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.
Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the
values we put
On 18 Oct 2014, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Gödel shows that there are solution of Einstein's equation of
gravitation with closed timelike curves, making them consistent.
But only if you assume that the Universe is
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague.
I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the
simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wait if it stops or not
is enough
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So you don't assume the real numbers exist?
Indeed.
Interesting.
In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers,
much in
On 22 October 2014 04:14, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
Have I? I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I
could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in
step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in
some
On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
So you don't assume the real numbers exist?
Indeed.
Interesting.
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