Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi, So, with more detailed comments below, I think the key thing I'm still struggling with finding a way to articulate is the distinction between: . assignment/(re)delegation of responsibility . offloading work I think the proposal addresses the second. I believe the real problem is that the responsibility for the organization for which the person is ex-officio member is not readily reassigned *from* the person who is in the hotseat. We can agree it would be good if it *could* be done -- it would be good if the IAB Chair (for eg) was not the best/only person to know the nuances of all things going on in the IAB's space. But I don't believe we get there by pulling them out of the loop of administration (with only observer seat status). A few follow-ups, in-line: On 9/20/11 3:05 PM, John C Klensin wrote: --On Tuesday, September 20, 2011 14:16 -0400 Leslie Daigle les...@thinkingcat.com wrote: Hi, I had the comments below on a previous incarnation of how to fix the IAOC because Chairs are overloaded. I have to say -- I don't think the substantive points are addressed in the new proposal, which leaves the Chairs as spectators to the IAOC process. I don't think you can disagree with me that, with no vote (recognized voice) in a committee's work, there's even less possibility to find the hours to keep up with the substance of discussions and thus be able to contribute meaningfully to a discussion when the time comes. As ex-officio non-voting members, with the main responsibility for representing IAB and IESG views and needs resting with someone else, that seems ok to me. At the same time, I think you underestimate the ability of the people involved to read in really quickly if that is necessary/ important. I think I disagree about the likelihood of that working. Often times, the important thing is to detect there is an issue to address. Substantively -- this takes the Chairs off the IAOC, just as the original proposal did, and my comments/confusion/questions below are still current for me. I think I responded to most of these in a different subthread earlier this week. The remarks below are just a quick summary. Original Message Subject: Re: I-D Action:draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:06:07 -0400 From: Leslie Daigleles...@thinkingcat.com To: IETF discussion listietf@ietf.org CC: John C Klensinklen...@jck.com I'm having troubles reconciling a couple of things: 1/ Recent discussion (different draft) on the importance of the IAOC implementing IETF (and IAB) policy and admin requirements; not having the IAOC *setting* those requirements; 2/ Suggesting that the IAB IETF Chairs should not be on the IAOC. Leslie, You appear to be assuming that the proposal is somehow removing the IAB and IESG (and ISOC) representation/ presence on the IAOC and Trust. No one has suggested that. I recognize that is not the intent, but I am suggesting that is what will happen in practice. Especially since, at some point, an IAB or an IESG will decide it's politically correct to have a representative who is not currently serving as a member of the IESG or IAB. What has been suggested is that the determination of who is most able to effectively represent those bodies can sensibly be left up to them rather than assuming that the Chairs are somehow endowed with special knowledge and wisdom that no one else shares. Well, speaking only for myself, I think if they were truly wise, they would not find themselves sitting in the chair seat ;-) Rather than thinking the individuals are especially gifted, I believe they have more of the cross-breadth of information than any other committee member AND they wear the responsibility, like no other member does. I think it would be really stupid for the IESG, IAB, or ISOC leadership to put someone on the IAOC who wasn't thoroughly familiar with the thinking in those bodies about IASA issues and competent in the issues the IAOC and Trust address. I think we can trust those bodies to avoid being stupid (except possibly as a tradeoff against worse choices) and don't need to invent rules that ban stupidity. As it stands the IETF Chair is in a unique position to understand all the requirements of the IETF community and IETF administrative activities. There isn't someone else who can step in: all other IESG members are tasked, as a primary responsibility, with looking after their particular areas. Sometimes I feel as if the IETF Chair is tasked with doing a good Superman imitation -- understanding everything, knowing everything, leaping tall buildings... Despite my frequent role as a critic, I'm also impressed with how good a job recent incumbents have done at that. I agree on all points -- and have said in other contexts that I think it's a significant challenge for the IETF that it is more or less held hostage to being able to find such superman every 2, 4 or 6
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Brian: And to be clear, I (still the previous IETF Chair) think that some such change is needed, which is exactly why I wrote the above draft in 2006. Perhaps the difference is that I see the IAOC/Trust role as very hard to separate from the IETF Chair role - but more easily separable from the IESG Chair role. This is not my experience. There have been some decisions related to meetings where the IAOC and the IESG need to be in alignment. The last two IAB Chairs have not been active ex-officio members of the IESG, and they have let the liaisons between the IAB and the IESG cover these responsibilities. As a result, I have been the only IAOC member with insight into the IESG. This has been importing in these matters. Russ ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 2011-09-29 04:24, Russ Housley wrote: Brian: And to be clear, I (still the previous IETF Chair) think that some such change is needed, which is exactly why I wrote the above draft in 2006. Perhaps the difference is that I see the IAOC/Trust role as very hard to separate from the IETF Chair role - but more easily separable from the IESG Chair role. This is not my experience. There have been some decisions related to meetings where the IAOC and the IESG need to be in alignment. The last two IAB Chairs have not been active ex-officio members of the IESG, and they have let the liaisons between the IAB and the IESG cover these responsibilities. As a result, I have been the only IAOC member with insight into the IESG. This has been importing in these matters. Yes, there's no doubt that the IESG needs to have strong input into IASA decisions; there is no way round that. But it isn't clear to me that this must be the IESG Chair's job, if we had a model where the IETF Chair and IESG Chair were two different people. As long as it's one person, this is a zero-sum game. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Yes, there's no doubt that the IESG needs to have strong input into IASA decisions; there is no way round that. But it isn't clear to me that this must be the IESG Chair's job, if we had a model where the IETF Chair and IESG Chair were two different people. As long as it's one person, this is a zero-sum game. It seems to me that the basic problem with this whole argument is that you can't force people to pay attention by making rules, particularly if the attention shortage is due to lack of time rather than lack of interest. I would rather have somebody show up at my meetings who has delegated authority, enough time to pay attention and think about the issues, and a good working relationship with the chair than insist that a harried chair call in and mute his phone so everyone one else can't hear that he's answering e-mail about all the other stuff he has to do. R's, John ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 09/28/2011 17:55, John Levine wrote: I would rather have somebody show up at my meetings who has delegated authority, enough time to pay attention and think about the issues, and a good working relationship with the chair than insist that a harried chair call in and mute his phone so everyone one else can't hear that he's answering e-mail about all the other stuff he has to do. Fortunately those are not the only 2 options. :) I've followed this thread with interest, but haven't spoken up because I was not sure what the right answer was. I'm still not, but ... I am opposed to the current proposal. However I think that the symptoms Olaf has described are worth serious consideration. So I am in favor of what several people a lot smarter than me have already proposed, which is taking a step back and seriously examining: 1. What the chairs are *required* to do, 2. What they currently are doing, 3. and whether changes to 1 and/or 2 are necessary. Doug -- Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much. -- OK Go Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS. Yours for the right price. :) http://SupersetSolutions.com/ ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Monday, September 26, 2011 13:15 -0700 Bob Hinden bob.hin...@gmail.com wrote: John, I don't see how you took what I said and then interpreted it as suggesting that I was saying proposing an absolute dictatorship. You do have a good imagination :-) I didn't take your proposal that way at all. I was only trying to point out that maximizing organization efficiency -- or minimizing the risks of organizational problems-- may not be a very good success criterion. Also, I have been proposing some other ways of solving the I* overload problems as you suggested, except that I don't think the solution to the I* overload problem is in the IASA. There, we may just disagree. I can't speak for anyone else, but, if I have to make a decision about making one of the IESG, IAB, or IASA a less efficient in the interest of reducing load on critical and non-substitutable people, I'd be inclined to point to the IASA first. FWIW, I don't think that having the IASA bear all of the burden is right either -- I also want to look for changes that would reduce the IAB-caused and IESG-related loads. For example, I favor both letting the IAB choose who represents it on the IASA _and_ the Program model that implies, among other things, that the IAB Chair doesn't have to have first-hold involvement in everything. Interesting it is exactly the assumption that the IAB Chair will have first hand involvement in everything that the IAB does that is cited an example of why it is necessary to have the IAB Chair on the IASA. So, if the IAB succeeds in reducing the load on the IAB Chair in that way, the argument for forcing the IAB Chair to serve on the IAOC and Trust is reduced as well. I'd also like to see mechanisms explored within the IESG to reduce the load on the IETF Chair. To the extent to which being General Area AD adds significant work, I'd be happy to see that turned into a real area and handed off to someone else. I'm not even sure that it is critical that the IETF Chair take a lead (and voting) technical role in the IESG; perhaps the community should reevaluate the required skill set and determine whether that responsibility (which, of course, includes responsibility for document reviews, etc.) is really an optimal use of time and skills or whether we should eliminate it and look for a different balance of skills. I'm not recommending that -- I can see large disadvantages as well as advantages -- but I think it is within the range of options the community should understand and consider. If we (the community) are going to solve the I* overload problem, it would be good to have some actual data on how the I* chairs spend their time. It would be good to have a better understanding of the problem before proposing solutions. Yes. And a better understanding of how all sorts of people spend their time, if it could actually be obtained, would be helpful for all sorts of purposes (e.g,, I'm sure Nomcoms would love to know for priority-setting purposes in candidate selection)). But, having sat in one of those seats and had an up-close view of how several others have handled them, I think one of the things you would find is that each person who does those jobs sorts things out, and prioritizes them, a little bit differently (maybe a lot differently). From that perspective, the observation that we've got the current IETF Chair and the current and immediate past IAB Chairs, supporting this change ought to send a relatively strong message... unless, again, efficiency of the IASA is more important than efficiency of the IAB or IESG (and I want to stress that I don't think you have said that... if it just my inference about whether some of your arguments lead if carried to their logical conclusion). john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 2011-09-28 08:03, John C Klensin wrote: snip ... Interesting it is exactly the assumption that the IAB Chair will have first hand involvement in everything that the IAB does that is cited an example of why it is necessary to have the IAB Chair on the IASA. So, if the IAB succeeds in reducing the load on the IAB Chair in that way, the argument for forcing the IAB Chair to serve on the IAOC and Trust is reduced as well. I agree, and of course this goes with my bias against the IAB becoming the I Administration B, which imnsho is a slippery slope that we are already on. I'd also like to see mechanisms explored within the IESG to reduce the load on the IETF Chair. I agree with this phrasing. If Russ isn't too busy (joke), an update of draft-carpenter-ietf-chair-tasks might be of interest, especially http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-carpenter-ietf-chair-tasks-00#section-5 To the extent to which being General Area AD adds significant work, I'd be happy to see that turned into a real area and handed off to someone else. I'm not even sure that it is critical that the IETF Chair take a lead (and voting) technical role in the IESG; Indeed. In the above draft I also distinguished the IETF Chair role from the IESG Chair role, and whether they can be split is worth a discussion. perhaps the community should reevaluate the required skill set and determine whether that responsibility (which, of course, includes responsibility for document reviews, etc.) is really an optimal use of time and skills or whether we should eliminate it and look for a different balance of skills. I'm not recommending that -- I can see large disadvantages as well as advantages -- but I think it is within the range of options the community should understand and consider. If we (the community) are going to solve the I* overload problem, it would be good to have some actual data on how the I* chairs spend their time. It would be good to have a better understanding of the problem before proposing solutions. Yes. And a better understanding of how all sorts of people spend their time, if it could actually be obtained, would be helpful for all sorts of purposes (e.g,, I'm sure Nomcoms would love to know for priority-setting purposes in candidate selection)). But, having sat in one of those seats and had an up-close view of how several others have handled them, I think one of the things you would find is that each person who does those jobs sorts things out, and prioritizes them, a little bit differently (maybe a lot differently). From that perspective, the observation that we've got the current IETF Chair and the current and immediate past IAB Chairs, supporting this change ought to send a relatively strong message... And to be clear, I (still the previous IETF Chair) think that some such change is needed, which is exactly why I wrote the above draft in 2006. Perhaps the difference is that I see the IAOC/Trust role as very hard to separate from the IETF Chair role - but more easily separable from the IESG Chair role. unless, again, efficiency of the IASA is more important than efficiency of the IAB or IESG (and I want to stress that I don't think you have said that... if it just my inference about whether some of your arguments lead if carried to their logical conclusion). I think we need all three to be equally efficient; before IASA existed, we had burning administrative problems. I wouldn't like to have to rank the importance of the three. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
John, I don't see how you took what I said and then interpreted it as suggesting that I was saying proposing an absolute dictatorship. You do have a good imagination :-) Also, I have been proposing some other ways of solving the I* overload problems as you suggested, except that I don't think the solution to the I* overload problem is in the IASA. If we (the community) are going to solve the I* overload problem, it would be good to have some actual data on how the I* chairs spend their time. It would be good to have a better understanding of the problem before proposing solutions. Bob --On Friday, September 23, 2011 11:04 +0300 Bob Hinden bob.hin...@gmail.com wrote: I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth. That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs are members they may actually pay more attention (human nature and such) and that being effective at those item without being a member is tough. I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more separation there is the more likelihood for organizational problems. ... Bob, Of course. But that is just a corollary to an old principle that, if one wants a really efficient government, with minimal chances of organizational problems, the most efficient form is an absolute dictatorship (or an absolute monarchy) with one person in charge of, and responsible for, everything. As long as that person is competent and has the bandwidth, things are nothing if not efficient and, some aesthetic and moral issues aside, the only major disadvantages are that there is a single point of failure for the entire system and recruiting appropriate dictators (or monarchs) has a long history of being problematic. We have chosen, I think for really good reasons, to avoid that sort of model. That --almost inherently-- means that there will be some inefficiency and some risk of organizational problems. Frankly, I'd rather have that risk in the IASA, than having it affect the ability of the IAB and IESG to do substantive (standards and external relationship) work. That doesn't mean I want an inefficient and organizationally-troubled IASA, only that, if there is pain, I think that the IASA --which, should it become necessary, is also more easily reorganized without significant disruption to the IETF's work than the IESG or IAB-- is the right place to feel, and deal with, that pain. For that reason, I'd much prefer to to have IASA leaders saying well this might be bad for the IASA, but we've thought about it and these are ways to make the best of a bad situation rather than what often seem to be variations on a theme of the IASA (IAOC, Trust) are so much more important than anything else that, if something has to suffer inefficiency or organizational problems, it should obviously be the IAB and IESG. I don't think you really intend to say that, but it is what some of your (and other) comments come out sounding like. YMMD. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Friday, September 23, 2011 11:04 +0300 Bob Hinden bob.hin...@gmail.com wrote: I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth. That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs are members they may actually pay more attention (human nature and such) and that being effective at those item without being a member is tough. I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more separation there is the more likelihood for organizational problems. ... Bob, Of course. But that is just a corollary to an old principle that, if one wants a really efficient government, with minimal chances of organizational problems, the most efficient form is an absolute dictatorship (or an absolute monarchy) with one person in charge of, and responsible for, everything. As long as that person is competent and has the bandwidth, things are nothing if not efficient and, some aesthetic and moral issues aside, the only major disadvantages are that there is a single point of failure for the entire system and recruiting appropriate dictators (or monarchs) has a long history of being problematic. We have chosen, I think for really good reasons, to avoid that sort of model. That --almost inherently-- means that there will be some inefficiency and some risk of organizational problems. Frankly, I'd rather have that risk in the IASA, than having it affect the ability of the IAB and IESG to do substantive (standards and external relationship) work. That doesn't mean I want an inefficient and organizationally-troubled IASA, only that, if there is pain, I think that the IASA --which, should it become necessary, is also more easily reorganized without significant disruption to the IETF's work than the IESG or IAB-- is the right place to feel, and deal with, that pain. For that reason, I'd much prefer to to have IASA leaders saying well this might be bad for the IASA, but we've thought about it and these are ways to make the best of a bad situation rather than what often seem to be variations on a theme of the IASA (IAOC, Trust) are so much more important than anything else that, if something has to suffer inefficiency or organizational problems, it should obviously be the IAB and IESG. I don't think you really intend to say that, but it is what some of your (and other) comments come out sounding like. YMMD. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Mike, On Sep 22, 2011, at 9:02 PM, Michael StJohns wrote: Hi Bob - I actually think that delegating this to a co-chair or executive vice chair would work. The similar military model is commander/executive officer where the commander (chair) is responsible for strategic thinking and the XO (co-chair) is responsible for tactical execution. Also the commander tends to be outward facing and the XO inward facing. I don't know that the models are close enough to be a perfect fit, but they might suggest some ways of splitting up the load. I prefer something like this vs. the current proposal. The XO model is very tied in to the commander and it's reasonable to expect them to be in sync on important issues. He/she probably doesn't last long if there isn't a close tie in. Having the XO then be on the IAOC (and Trust) would work. If you wanted the chair to retain the IAOC/Trust, you'd have to be able to figure out what other responsibilities to parcel off to the co-chair. I'm not sure I agree with you that the IETF chair MUST be on the IAOC. In any case, I definitely think giving a co-chair the General Area would make sense. Maybe also sticking him/her with the document review responsibility (but leave the decision for the vote in the chair's hand but be based on the co-chairs recommendation). Yes, something like that. The other reason I suggested adding a co-chair is that our process of finding an IETF chair replacement is haphazard at best and criminally negligent at worst. I'd really like to get a few apprentices identified and qualified before Russ quits or dies from overwork. Having someone do part of the job and observe the rest seems to be a reasonable approach to meeting that (what I perceive as a ) need. I generally agree, but I would still have it be a nomcom decision. If they didn't think the XO was ready to be promoted (following your model) to commander, they could bring someone else in. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 22 September 2011 20:02, Michael StJohns wrote: I actually think that delegating this to a co-chair or executive vice chair would work. The similar military model is commander/executive officer where the commander (chair) is responsible for strategic thinking and the XO (co-chair) is responsible for tactical execution. Also the commander tends to be outward facing and the XO inward facing. I don't know that the models are close enough to be a perfect fit, but they might suggest some ways of splitting up the load. A general area with two ADs like all other areas, where one AD is the Chair, and the other AD the XO, sounds like a good idea. Do they decide who does what, and swap roles when they feel like it, or is that predetermined by NomCom? -Frank ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Frank, On Sep 23, 2011, at 10:45 AM, Frank Ellermann wrote: On 22 September 2011 20:02, Michael StJohns wrote: I actually think that delegating this to a co-chair or executive vice chair would work. The similar military model is commander/executive officer where the commander (chair) is responsible for strategic thinking and the XO (co-chair) is responsible for tactical execution. Also the commander tends to be outward facing and the XO inward facing. I don't know that the models are close enough to be a perfect fit, but they might suggest some ways of splitting up the load. A general area with two ADs like all other areas, where one AD is the Chair, and the other AD the XO, sounds like a good idea. Do they decide who does what, and swap roles when they feel like it, or is that predetermined by NomCom? I think the IESG defines it's structure (e.g., deciding on a new area, two ADs per area, etc), then Nomcom then fills the positions. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Jari, On Sep 21, 2011, at 5:50 PM, Jari Arkko wrote: Bob, Goggle translate was helpful here :-) Good... and next time when we meet over beer I can reveal the correct translation :-) Cool! I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) I am not sure what you mean by the members of the IAOC doing the actual work. The IAD does most of the work behind the scenes. That includes writing RFPs, motions, budgets, SOWs, agendas, works with the volunteer minute takers to produce the minutes, organizes contractor reviews, negotiates with contractors, works with ISOC finance department, works with legal council, organizes conference calls and meetings, etc., etc. The secretariat does the leg work to collect information on venues, costs, hotels, etc. The IAOC voting members review, comment, approve/disapprove things, but that's not where most of the real work is. The voting members are responsible for the decisions and actions. I want to make it clear that most of the actual work is not done by the voting members. Given the source of our members, we do tend to get involved in details for better or worse. The IAOC (and Trust chairs) have a bigger load than the rest of the voting members. This all sounds good. But do you agree that workload for the chairs is an issue? Because I thought Jonne was saying that it is an issue and the solutions should come from a better organization within the IAOC rather than from Olaf's proposal. But if I read the above, it almost sounds like you think everything is done pretty much as well as it can be done, and there's little to change. Up-leveling the discussion: I guess we need to agree about the problem statement before we can talk about the solutions. Firstly, I was correcting your assertion that the IAOC voting members were doing most of the work. I am sure things can be improved, but I don't think the work load of the IAOC voting members is onerous. Certainly, less than, for example, being on the IESG. It's not a full time job. I think there is a reasonable balance between what the IAD and contractors/staff do and the IAOC voting members, not perfect of course. It may be working better now than earlier. I do agree that there are issues with the load of the I* chairs. My issue is with this solution. Bob Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Olaf, On Sep 21, 2011, at 7:59 PM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: On Sep 21, 2011, at 4:27 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community. It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community. It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in the IAOC It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find important. Yes, but I don't understand your point. We get that today with the current makeup. Your proposal breaks these links. Oops..I did not finish the paragraph. That makes more sense :-) Retry: It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community. It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community. It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in the IAOC It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find important. I claim that the first two items are independent of I* chairs being voting members of the IAOC. I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth. That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs are members they may actually pay more attention (human nature and such) and that being effective at those item without being a member is tough. I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more separation there is the more likelihood for organizational problems. The point I am trying to make is that there needs to be close coordination between the IESG/IAB/ISOC and having a responsible person (currently the chairs, there are other possibilities as outlined in some other emails, XO model, etc.) taking voting responsibility is the best way to implement that. It won't happen if it's just another person the, for example, the IESG appoints as your proposal sugests. Likewise, I don't think having the chairs be non-voting members will work because the chairs are too busy for this to work over time. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Bob, I do agree that there are issues with the load of the I* chairs. My issue is with this solution. Clear now. Thanks. Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Sep 23, 2011, at 10:04 AM, Bob Hinden wrote: I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more separation there is the more likelihood for organizational problems. The point I am trying to make is that there needs to be close coordination between the IESG/IAB/ISOC and having a responsible person (currently the chairs, there are other possibilities as outlined in some other emails, XO model, etc.) taking voting responsibility is the best way to implement that. It won't happen if it's just another person the, for example, the IESG appoints as your proposal sugests. Likewise, I don't think having the chairs be non-voting members will work because the chairs are too busy for this to work over time. I do not yet see how the other proposal, which is about diluting responsibility over more person, will keep the persons that end up being chair better informed. But that is because I have not seen the details. Remember that my proposal started out with allowing the chairs to delegate. In a way the alternative proposals may be subject to the same critique. I am also not 100% sure that close coordination between the IESG/IAB/ISOC means that the chairs need to participate in each others meeting. It might be much more effective if they have a meeting among each other to exchange high-level information and 'heads-ups'. --Olaf (keeps listening) Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
FWIW, I had stopped reading this thread a while ago because I assumed our leaders would come up with The Right Solution without input from the entire peanut gallery. When I told someone this, they pointed out that the thread had taken on a completely different, much larger, subject in the past few days. After looking at a few of the recent messages from my Trash folder, I most certainly agree. If long-time IETFers such as those commenting now cannot remember when to change the Subject line when a topic completely changes, how can we expect typical IETF participants to do so? --Paul Hoffman ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
What is needed is someone who is fully engaged in the IAOC. Having a vote doesn't automatically get you that. Indeed, I would assume most votes are a formality, with decisions reached mostly by consensus. If, in fact, votes are close on a regular basis, the IAOC likely has bigger problems, IMO. Seems to me that having an I* chair vote is designed to force them to pay attention and be accountable. The key quesion, IMO, is whether it is acceptable to have an I* chair offload the responsibility for paying attention and being engaged. I'm hearing some say yes and others say no. Thomas ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 7:40 AM, Thomas Narten nar...@us.ibm.com wrote: What is needed is someone who is fully engaged in the IAOC. Having a vote doesn't automatically get you that. Indeed, I would assume most votes are a formality, with decisions reached mostly by consensus. Both the IAOC and the Trust do in practice run on consensus. I believe that the number of close votes, in the entire history of both organizations, could be counted on the figure of one hand. Regards Marshall If, in fact, votes are close on a regular basis, the IAOC likely has bigger problems, IMO. Seems to me that having an I* chair vote is designed to force them to pay attention and be accountable. The key quesion, IMO, is whether it is acceptable to have an I* chair offload the responsibility for paying attention and being engaged. I'm hearing some say yes and others say no. Thomas ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Mike, On Sep 22, 2011, at 2:01 AM, Michael StJohns wrote: I've been watching this with interest. I'm especially in agreement with Leslie's comments about chair load. Because of the legal issues with respect to the IETF trust and the implementing documents for the IAOC, its going to be pretty difficult to come up with a way to remove some of the responsibilities from the Chairs (meeting attendance, voting, etc) without also removing the authority. We're arguing somewhat in circles. I agree with Bob's comments below that the leadership of the IESG and the IAB need to be involved in the operation of the IAOC, but I no longer think there are enough hours in the day for the IETF and IAB chairs to be able to do everything they need to do. I hesitate to suggest this, but its probably time: Let's add a position to the IESG - Executive Vice-Chair or Co-Adjutor Chair. Basically, either the chair's personal representative (Executive Vice-Chair) or their replacement in waiting (Co-Adjutor Chair). Have the IAB select a vice-chair when they select the chair. Modify the various documents to describe the various responsibilities for the Vice-chairs - suggestions for the IETF co-chair would be to stick him/her with the IAOC, the Trust and at least half of the Administrivia.. For the IAB - ditto plus liaison and appeals. Modify the IAOC documents to permit either of the two co-chairs to be designated for a year at a time as IAOC members by the respective chairs choice (but can't be pulled off once on). No modificiations to the Trust legal document, but probably modify the administrative document to require the chair and co-chair for the IAB and IETF be invited to all non-closed meetings. Job description to the Nomcom - for the IETF, the co-chair is a chair-in-training with the expectation they may make a decent Chair when and if the time comes. Maybe rotate that job every two years regardless to ensure a couple of people with some of the chair experience are in the pool. Maybe even every year. I think something like you propose would be better than what the current draft proposes. I think the three chair positions we are discussing are different and need different solutions. For example: ISOC CEO/President This responsibility can't be delegated to just anyone. It needs to be an officer of ISOC. For example the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or Chief Operating Officer (COO). It's very different from the board selecting another IAOC member, there needs to be someone from ISOC who has fiduciary responsibility in ISOC. While I don't think having the CFO or COO would be good as having CEO, it would be workable. IAB Chair The IAB chair is selected by the IAB, it's not an nomcom selected position. As you propose, if the IAB created another leadership position, maybe analogous to an IAB COO that could work. It would have to be a leadership position in the IAB with real responsibility, including being a voting member of the IAOC and IETF Trust. If the IAB doesn't want to do this, then the IAB should consider ways of reducing it's load. It has taken on more responsibility in recent years. I think some of that could be moved out of the IAB. For example, the IAB could more fully delegate decision making to the RSOC and only deal with appeals. IETF Chair The IETF chair is chosen by the nomcom. The job requirements are clear in advance. Anyone applying is aware of the job. I don't think the IETF Chair position on the IAOC and IETF Trust can be delegated to anyone else without serious risk to the overall IETF standards operation. The IETF chair needs to be a voting IAOC and IETF Trust member. Too much of the IETF operation for it's successful operation is tied to the IETF chair for he/she to delegate it to anyone else. It's just part of the job. I think we should look for other ways to reduce the load on IETF chair, like giving up the general area (have a separate AD for that), or a more comprehensive change to the IESG where more of the decisions are moved to individual areas (e.g., add an other level to the IESG). The IESG is getting large for a flat management structure. Bob Mike At 10:27 AM 9/21/2011, Bob Hinden wrote: I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Why? So we don't have the IESG and IAB having disputes with the IAOC. Having the IETF and IAB chairs share the decisions avoids a lot of this. I think you are aware of a few times where we got close to this and I think the current structure helped avoid it. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Regarding the delegating the IETF chair participation in the IAOC, On 9/22/2011 8:55 AM, Bob Hinden wrote: IETF Chair The IETF chair is chosen by the nomcom. The job requirements are clear in advance. Anyone applying is aware of the job. I don't think the IETF Chair position on the IAOC and IETF Trust can be delegated to anyone else without serious risk to the overall IETF standards operation. The IETF chair needs to be a voting IAOC and IETF Trust member. Too much of the IETF operation for it's successful operation is tied to the IETF chair for he/she to delegate it to anyone else. It's just part of the job. I think we should look for other ways to reduce the load on IETF chair, like giving up the general area (have a separate AD for that), or a more comprehensive change to the IESG where more of the decisions are moved to individual areas (e.g., add an other level to the IESG). The IESG is getting large for a flat management structure. Bob When I read this, I feel like I am missing something. When I saw the first note along these lines, I understood it. Since then, there have been notes raising substantive disagreements with this. It has been observed that a new IETF chair does not bring the very things that are asked for. it has been observed that one of the important parts of the IAOC participation by the IETF Chair is bringing information back to the IESG. And that such would often be better done by someone else. It has been observed that having a different participant would provide more manpower with more time to actually participate in the IAOC. It has been observed that having another individual charged with bringing the broad perspective does not seem inherently impossible. I would like some understanding of how these factors play into the view that only the IETFC chair can do this job. Yours, Joel ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
For Mike, Marshall, and for others who might be noodling on this ... I hesitate to suggest this, but its probably time: Let's add a position to the IESG - Executive Vice-Chair or Co-Adjutor Chair. Basically, either the chair's personal representative (Executive Vice-Chair) or their replacement in waiting (Co-Adjutor Chair). In addition to about a billion other responsibilities, Russ is actually on the hook for the responsibilities we're discussing because he was selected by NomCom to be the - IETF Chair, - IESG Chair, and - General Area Director Mike is suggesting a change for the IESG Chair responsibility. Marshall (earlier in this thread) suggested a change for the General Area Director responsibility. I'm not offering an opinion about these proposals (or other proposals that someone might suggest), but it might be helpful to consider all three responsibilities as a set, when considering these proposals. Spencer ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi Bob - I actually think that delegating this to a co-chair or executive vice chair would work. The similar military model is commander/executive officer where the commander (chair) is responsible for strategic thinking and the XO (co-chair) is responsible for tactical execution. Also the commander tends to be outward facing and the XO inward facing. I don't know that the models are close enough to be a perfect fit, but they might suggest some ways of splitting up the load. If you wanted the chair to retain the IAOC/Trust, you'd have to be able to figure out what other responsibilities to parcel off to the co-chair. I'm not sure I agree with you that the IETF chair MUST be on the IAOC. In any case, I definitely think giving a co-chair the General Area would make sense. Maybe also sticking him/her with the document review responsibility (but leave the decision for the vote in the chair's hand but be based on the co-chairs recommendation). The other reason I suggested adding a co-chair is that our process of finding an IETF chair replacement is haphazard at best and criminally negligent at worst. I'd really like to get a few apprentices identified and qualified before Russ quits or dies from overwork. Having someone do part of the job and observe the rest seems to be a reasonable approach to meeting that (what I perceive as a ) need. Mike At 08:55 AM 9/22/2011, Bob Hinden wrote: The IETF chair needs to be a voting IAOC and IETF Trust member. Too much of the IETF operation for it's successful operation is tied to the IETF chair for he/she to delegate it to anyone else. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
From: Michael StJohns mstjo...@comcast.net The other reason I suggested adding a co-chair is that our process of finding an IETF chair replacement is haphazard at best and criminally negligent at worst. I'd really like to get a few apprentices identified and qualified Excellent point. The IETF has long been too important to wing it the way we do. Noel ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 at 11:09 PM, Brian E Carpenter brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com wrote: On 2011-09-21 05:44, Olaf Kolkman wrote: snip The Trust would need to commit to allowing these advisors to join their meetings too. But that can be done in other ways than the Trust Agreement. (so yes, I agree with this line of thought) Obviously this all assumes there is a consensus for changing the I* chairs role ...exactly. I'm far from convinced about that. I think the real need is to figure out how to make the IAOC an Oversight committee rather than it getting involved in executive decisions, and to figure out how to make the IAB an Architecture board instead of getting involved in administrative matters. I'm new to this level of innerworking in the IETF, and a bit more confused after this thread. I did ask what was the core problem sort of and got two excellent answers but none of the convinced me that the draft/proposal at hand are the right answer to an obvious problem. However, Brian's suggestion above looks like a better road ahead since it get closer to the core of the problem, the workload and address that. -- Roger Jorgensen | rog...@gmail.com | - IPv6 is The Key! http://www.jorgensen.no | ro...@jorgensen.no ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Evolutionary culture change (was: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility])
At 22:47 20-09-2011, Olaf Kolkman wrote: For the IAOC and IAB these will be difficult challenges that cannot be enforced externally but also need an evolutionary culture change. Not only in the I* bodies themselves but also how the NOMCOM. The IAOC has been around for six years. The IESG has been around for 25 years and the IAB for 27 years. Half of IESG and IAB are picked by the community each year. As this is the IETF, it's a bit more complicated than that (see NomCom). The community only have a say on one quarter of the IAOC. The current NomCom looks like an inverted image of NomCom from a cultural perspective. NomCom will make a safe bet this year. If the community wants to force an IAOC change, it would have to be done by BCP. In a way, the draft is attempting to do that. The comments posted by Roger Jørgensen are more interesting than the politics surrounding the change. He mentioned being a bit more confused after this thread. It took 20 years for the IETF to take control over its administrative operations. The functions cover setting meeting fees, deciding how far you should fly to attend a meeting, deciding on how to prevent the IETF from being sued, etc. It is unlikely that an evolutionary culture change will come from within the IAOC. Being kicked by the ARSE is not an evolutionary change. :-) Regards, -sm ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Jari, On Sep 19, 2011, at 4:10 PM, Jari Arkko wrote: Bob, I appreciate your view on this, particularly when you are day-to-day seeing how the current system works with IAOC. Thanks. I also note that several past IAOC chairs have expressed concern about this proposal as well. That should be given some weight. That being said, I do think it is important to give some flexibility to chairs on organizing their work. And it is important to provide tools for them to manage their time, including ability to delegate some tasks. For sure, but why only address this aspect of their jobs? We should be talking about the general problem before evaluating a point solution. We don't normally take this approach when chartering working groups, their usually has to be a discussion of the problems before proposing specific solutions. I understand the point about chairs being involved. But I'm also sure there will never be an IAB/IETF chair who would ignore important IAOC business. This draft is about the ability (but not a requirement) of the chairs to delegate most of the day-to-day business and just stay on for the important stuff. One practical issue is that if the chairs under today's rules would stay out of the day-to-day business, that would mean missing one voting member. I'm not sure that is desirable either, and I really don't think you want to force them to be in every meeting. I don't think it so easy to distinguish between important IAOC business vs. day to day. Day to day decisions can have unexpected consequences. It's just not that black and white. Also, different chairs get involved in different things. The IETF chair is very involved in tools, secretariat related issues, venues, the IAB chair is involved in RFC editor related issues, the ISOC CEO is very involved in the budget. It's not all the same. Their involvement varies a lot depending on the topic and their role. The proposal treats them all the same. I also understand the point about chairs sharing the responsibility for decisions. I just don't think the suggested new scheme would affect that. The IAOC would for sure still listen to a message from the chairs very carefully. And if you are in any board with multiple people having voting power, if the rest of the board ignores your opinion it really doesn't matter if you lost by 1-9 or by 0-9... (and again, any of the chairs would for sure still be behind the decisions anyway.) Having a vote is very different from just being an advisor. I also think that over time, the chairs will become less involved in the IAOC because they are busy. It doesn't make sense to me to say on one hand that the chairs are too busy to be voting members of the IAOC, but at the same time they will have enough time to effect important decisions. It doesn't work that way in practice. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Jari, A few comments on your email to Jonne. On Sep 19, 2011, at 9:36 PM, Jari Arkko wrote: Jonne, First, I want to thank you for the clear expression in Finnish. (Maheeta! Vaikka näiden muutosten läpivienti alkaa kyllä tuntua siltä kuin jäitä polttelisi, saa odottaa perse ruvella että kukaan olisi samaa mieltä mistään, 'kele!) Too bad the English version was not as graphic. Goggle translate was helpful here :-) Anyway, I like your description of the issue and it helps me understand the concerns. That being said, I could probably construct a similar argument for all of the bodies that an IETF chair, for instance, has to attend. Are we really saying that under all circumstances, the chairs have to attend everything that IAOC deals with? And be voting members? And if that is too much then the entire IAOC has to delegate more of its work? Really? And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting members in IAB and IESG? I have some trust in the chairs ability to prioritize, delegate and engage in the important discussions. They do that today. I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) I am not sure what you mean by the members of the IAOC doing the actual work. The IAD does most of the work behind the scenes. That includes writing RFPs, motions, budgets, SOWs, agendas, works with the volunteer minute takers to produce the minutes, organizes contractor reviews, negotiates with contractors, works with ISOC finance department, works with legal council, organizes conference calls and meetings, etc., etc. The secretariat does the leg work to collect information on venues, costs, hotels, etc. The IAOC voting members review, comment, approve/disapprove things, but that's not where most of the real work is. The voting members are responsible for the decisions and actions. I want to make it clear that most of the actual work is not done by the voting members. Given the source of our members, we do tend to get involved in details for better or worse. The IAOC (and Trust chairs) have a bigger load than the rest of the voting members. Bob Jari On 19.09.2011 15:35, jonne.soini...@renesasmobile.com wrote: Hi Olaf, I went through the draft just now, and I have some quite strong feelings about it. I'm sorry I'm sending my comments so late in the game. A disclaimer first: I was the chairman of the IAOC some years back, but I haven't been actively involved with IETF administration after that. Therefore, my reactions are based on the history, and I don't necessarily have the up-to-date information of today, anymore. Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other ways. However, I think the solution is a bit menemistä perse edellä puuhun (== putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management, asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the president and CEO of ISOC). The Trust on the other hand is everything the IETF has (as ownership - the biggest asset the IETF has is of course the community). It owns the fruits of the labour of the whole community - the intellectual property that the community creates. I think it is very clear that the main stakeholders (the I* chairs) and the main responsible for the administrator of the trust (the president/CEO of ISOC) have to be trustees and show ownership of the trust - you just cannot delegate that. Like said, I understand the problem: The IAOC is a lot of work for people who already have a lot to do. However, I think that problem should be managed without reducing the oversight of the IETF leadership over the IETF financials, assents, and other important activities. Perhaps, the IAOC should think how to reorganize, and strengthen the operational part of the IETF to reduce the burden of the IAOC. This might mean increasing the level of investment to the operations of the IETF to make sure the IAOC members do not have to be part of the operational stuff, but can concentrate on making just the strategic decisions and doing the oversight. If I would have to summarize this all into one sentence: The workload problem is a problem only
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Olaf, On Sep 20, 2011, at 1:51 PM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: Thanks Bob, I appreciate your thoughts on the matter! Thanks. Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. There were many comments on your earlier draft and I don't see how these changes resolve all of issues raised. The new draft is different, but I think the main issues remain. Could you show how the issues raised are solved by the current draft? For example, there seemed to me to be a rough consensus in the discussion on the earlier draft that the IETF Chair should not be included in the proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal? I did not see that rough consensus, but let us not argue that, I believe it is up for Jari to say were the consensus is. To repeat what I said, I didn't see the new draft resolving issues that I and other raised on the list. The new draft is a different approach, but as Leslie pointed out, it might be worse. In the old draft, the I* chairs were allowed to appoint someone to represent them, in the new one they are non-voting advisors. Busy people being busy, will tend to not follow or attend the meetings. Many small decisions can have unintended consequences. To the substance of that point: there is an argument to be made that if the IETF Chair has full voting power than the IAB chair should so to. I believe that it is beneficial for the organization if there is some symmetry there. For completeness, and in relation to that symmetry argument. Jari wrote in another mail: And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting members in IAB and IESG? The IETF Chair is voting (full) member of the IAB (see section 1.1 of RFC 2850) The IAB Chair is ex-officio member of the IESG (see RFC3710 section 2) but for Decision making the IAB chair is excluded from the consensus process (RFC3710 section 3.1 2nd paragraph). The obvious reason for that is that the IAB is in the appeal chain. I am not sure I understand the point here. Further, isn't this cross membership another cause of I* chair overload? Why not eliminate that too? Why are you only considering the IAOC roles? Why is the IETF chair a member of the IAB and why does the IAB chair attend IESG meetings? Wouldn't the reduce their load too? They could appoint a liaison? Same for the ISOC CEO. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. As I said earlier, I continue to think this is a bad idea. We now have a system that works well. Certainly not perfect, but I am concerned your proposed changes will make it work worse. At some point I'd be perfectly happy to agree to disagree on the merit of the idea. But I want to understand the motivation and make sure there is nothing actionable on my side. Other than dropping the proposal :-) I agree there is a problem with I* chair overload, but you have proposed a point solution without having the general discussion. It would be better if the community had that discussion before evaluating solutions. In my time as IAOC chair, the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. For example, there are weekly calls in the months before an IETF meeting that the host, NOC team, IAD, host, and other people attend. I don't think an I* chair has been involved at this level. Also, the IAOC has several subcommittees (e.g., meetings, budget, specific RFPs, and Tools). I* chair attendance in these varies. The IETF chair is very active in the RFP subcommittee and Tools. The ISOC chair has reduced her attendance in the subcommittees. There is no requirement that members of committees are IAOC members, is there? It's usually a mix of IAOC members and invited members. The subcommittees make recommendations to the IAOC, the IAOC make the decision. I think the I* chairs bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than other appointees would not have. In order for the I* chairs to be effective, they will need to be involved. If they are involved, then they might as well be voting members. With the changes you propose we could end up with an IAOC that none of the I* chairs participate. As you point out, they are all busy and will have a
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Bob, Goggle translate was helpful here :-) Good... and next time when we meet over beer I can reveal the correct translation :-) I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) I am not sure what you mean by the members of the IAOC doing the actual work. The IAD does most of the work behind the scenes. That includes writing RFPs, motions, budgets, SOWs, agendas, works with the volunteer minute takers to produce the minutes, organizes contractor reviews, negotiates with contractors, works with ISOC finance department, works with legal council, organizes conference calls and meetings, etc., etc. The secretariat does the leg work to collect information on venues, costs, hotels, etc. The IAOC voting members review, comment, approve/disapprove things, but that's not where most of the real work is. The voting members are responsible for the decisions and actions. I want to make it clear that most of the actual work is not done by the voting members. Given the source of our members, we do tend to get involved in details for better or worse. The IAOC (and Trust chairs) have a bigger load than the rest of the voting members. This all sounds good. But do you agree that workload for the chairs is an issue? Because I thought Jonne was saying that it is an issue and the solutions should come from a better organization within the IAOC rather than from Olaf's proposal. But if I read the above, it almost sounds like you think everything is done pretty much as well as it can be done, and there's little to change. Up-leveling the discussion: I guess we need to agree about the problem statement before we can talk about the solutions. Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dear Jari; On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:50 AM, Jari Arkko jari.ar...@piuha.net wrote: Bob, Goggle translate was helpful here :-) Good... and next time when we meet over beer I can reveal the correct translation :-) I fear it might be too much information. I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) I am not sure what you mean by the members of the IAOC doing the actual work. The IAD does most of the work behind the scenes. That includes writing RFPs, motions, budgets, SOWs, agendas, works with the volunteer minute takers to produce the minutes, organizes contractor reviews, negotiates with contractors, works with ISOC finance department, works with legal council, organizes conference calls and meetings, etc., etc. The secretariat does the leg work to collect information on venues, costs, hotels, etc. The IAOC voting members review, comment, approve/disapprove things, but that's not where most of the real work is. The voting members are responsible for the decisions and actions. I want to make it clear that most of the actual work is not done by the voting members. Given the source of our members, we do tend to get involved in details for better or worse. The IAOC (and Trust chairs) have a bigger load than the rest of the voting members. This all sounds good. But do you agree that workload for the chairs is an issue? The Chairs think that is it, which is enough evidence for me. Because I thought Jonne was saying that it is an issue and the solutions should come from a better organization within the IAOC rather than from Olaf's proposal. But if I read the above, it almost sounds like you think everything is done pretty much as well as it can be done, and there's little to change. Up-leveling the discussion: I guess we need to agree about the problem statement before we can talk about the solutions. Here is the problem as I see it. It is all well and good to say that the IAOC should be more oversight and less administrative, but there is 5 years of running code to the contrary. (I seem to remember a certain IETF Chair predicting the withering away of the IAOC's workload as soon as the CNRI transition was worked through.) I frankly just don't see that changing with the IETF structured the way it is, and I do not see a fundamental reorganization coming soon. In addition, the work of the IAOC (and Trust) is greatly improved by the input of the Chairs. Yes, they represent bodies with multiple members, but while each member may have equal status, they do not all have equal interest in operational matters. (I know, for example, that some ADs are not that interested in hotel contracts.) Plus, a lot of that benefit comes from immersion in the issues and (to be blunt) immersion is motivated by responsibility. So, how to reduce the load on the Chairs ? This in my opinion a governance issue, and, as it happens, we have some 5000 years of governance experience to draw from. This problem is very common in governments (or companies) as they grow - positions that formerly took one person become impossible for one person to do. The typical way to deal with that is to grant responsibility to another person or persons, in other words, to delegate the responsibility. That was more the approach of the first draft of this I-D, and so I like that part of it better. My chief reaction to the first draft was that it wasn't followed through. It created basically new positions, but had little to make sure that their holders would have the knowledge, responsibility and authority for the job. So, to be specific, here is a proposal. Create a second Area Director in the General Area. Have this second AD be primarily responsible for operational matters, and be the IESG ex-officio member of the IAOC / Trustee of the Trust. This could be a new person, or the IESG could have a tradition that an outgoing AD from another area serve in the post. (The IETF Chair should be able to offload more responsibilities than just IAOC meetings to this person, but that is an IESG / IETF Chair matter.) The IAB is not so usefully subdivided, but it could likewise create a vice-chair, which it could call something different. The point is that, if the Chair is not going to undertake the role, there should be someone who agrees that, not only will they serve on some committee, but also that they will take responsibility for that service with their sponsoring organization. I don't think that just having a new IAB or IESG nominated member, by itself, is going to accomplish that. Regards Marshall Jari
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Sep 21, 2011, at 4:27 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community. It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community. It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in the IAOC It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find important. Yes, but I don't understand your point. We get that today with the current makeup. Your proposal breaks these links. Oops..I did not finish the paragraph. Retry: It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community. It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community. It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in the IAOC It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find important. I claim that the first two items are independent of I* chairs being voting members of the IAOC. I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth. That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs are members they may actually pay more attention (human nature and such) and that being effective at those item without being a member is tough. --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Bob, Olaf, On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 05:27:11PM +0300, Bob Hinden wrote: To repeat what I said, I didn't see the new draft resolving issues that I and other raised on the list. The new draft is a different approach, but as Leslie pointed out, it might be worse. In the old draft, the I* chairs were allowed to appoint someone to represent them, in the new one they are non-voting advisors. Busy people being busy, will tend to not follow or attend the meetings. Many small decisions can have unintended consequences. I reviewed the new draft and I agree with Leslie and Bob that the new draft seems to be a step in the wrong direction. The critical thing is that we don't loose the participation of the IETF chair, IAB chair and ISOC President/CEO while at the same time finding a way to lighten their workload. From the discussion we had on the previous draft, it seemed to me that a differentation between these positions is actually very important. There was very little support to have the IETF chair delegating the full job of his/her IAOC membership. At the same time, there were much less strong feelings about this for the IAB chair and ISOC CEO/president. I agree with the sentiment that the IETF chair should remain a full voting member of the IAOC. However, I don't object if the IETF chair would have a designated backup for the voting role when he/she cannot attend to IAOC business. I believe it would be useful for the designated backup to be a non voting permanent IAOC member in order to make sure the backup understands what is going on. However, the important thing is that the vote is still a vote that the IETF chair is responsible for. Furthermore, I am not sure whether there is a real need to do a similar setup for the Trust as well. And finally, for full disclosure, I have been present myself at IAOC meetings as a guest from the IAB. This allowed for an IAB perspective to be present when the IAB chair couldn't make it to the IAOC meetings but of course I had no voting power etc. I'll leave it up to the current IAOC members and the IAB chair to comment on that experience. David Kessens --- ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 21/09/2011 21:03, David Kessens wrote: The critical thing is that we don't loose the participation of the IETF chair, IAB chair and ISOC President/CEO while at the same time finding a way to lighten their workload. I think one of the questions to be answered is: do we want participation of the I* chair or do we want participation of the related I* group. If I look back at my years on the IAOC, then I think that it is very important that the opinions of the I* groups is known in the IAOC and it is equally important that the I* groups have a vote when decisions are to be made. I'm not at all convinced though that the person doing this needs to be the chair. A model where the I* selects one of them to represent the I* on the IAOC (with full voting rights for that person) would work equally well, of course, assuming that the representative talks to the other members of the I* group. A model where the I* can send 1 person, rather than just the chair, will make it easier for the I* to distribute the work amongst the people. That is an improvement. However, I don't object if the IETF chair would have a designated backup for the voting role when he/she cannot attend to IAOC business. I believe it would be useful for the designated backup to be a non voting permanent IAOC member in order to make sure the backup understands what is going on. Well, I have been on committees with designated backups and it just does not work: if a backup only looks at the ongoing issues when it is clear that the first person cannot attend, he will miss a lot of background and cannot sensibly participate. If the backup follows everything that is going on, then the amount of work to be done doubles. Again, from personal experience, I'd much rather see that the unavailable person comments by mail beforehand or even asks for a discussion to be postponend, than having a backup for a single meeting. Henk -- -- Henk Uijterwaal Email: henk(at)uijterwaal.nl http://www.uijterwaal.nl Phone: +31.6.55861746 -- There appears to have been a collective retreat from reality that day. (John Glanfield, on an engineering project) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 21/09/2011 16:50, Jari Arkko wrote: But do you agree that workload for the chairs is an issue? Yes, at least all the chairs I know say so, that makes it an issue for me. Henk -- -- Henk Uijterwaal Email: henk(at)uijterwaal.nl http://www.uijterwaal.nl Phone: +31.6.55861746 -- There appears to have been a collective retreat from reality that day. (John Glanfield, on an engineering project) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Henk, If I look back at my years on the IAOC, then I think that it is very important that the opinions of the I* groups is known in the IAOC and it is equally important that the I* groups have a vote when decisions are to be made. I'm not at all convinced though that the person doing this needs to be the chair. A model where the I* selects one of them to represent the I* on the IAOC (with full voting rights for that person) would work equally well, of course, assuming that the representative talks to the other members of the I* group. A model where the I* can send 1 person, rather than just the chair, will make it easier for the I* to distribute the work amongst the people. That is an improvement. Yes. Also, there is some experience from the other direction: sometimes it has happened that the chair talks with the IAOC and they come up with some conclusion, but when he talks to the rest of us in an IESG meeting we bring up additional points that may change the conclusion. So whether or not it is the chair that is in the IAOC meeting, it is important that there is a discussion with the rest of the body. Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Thursday, September 22, 2011 00:12 +0300 Jari Arkko jari.ar...@piuha.net wrote: ... Also, there is some experience from the other direction: sometimes it has happened that the chair talks with the IAOC and they come up with some conclusion, but when he talks to the rest of us in an IESG meeting we bring up additional points that may change the conclusion. So whether or not it is the chair that is in the IAOC meeting, it is important that there is a discussion with the rest of the body. Yes. And while how much will differ with the individuals involved and the dynamics of the IAOC, the claims that the Chairs someone have exclusive knowledge, exclusive perspective, and/or exclusive understanding are essentially arguments that the kind of consultation Jari describes is really unnecessary. I, for one, believe that have IESG and IAB insight (and input) into what is going on in the IAOC/Trust is at least as important as having IAOC/Trust insight into what is going on in the IESG and IAB. And I believe that an appointed member --who might be the Chair but need not be-- is actually likely to help facilitate that two-way communication by making it more clear that the IAB and IESG are expected to maintain some visibility and insight. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
I've been watching this with interest. I'm especially in agreement with Leslie's comments about chair load. Because of the legal issues with respect to the IETF trust and the implementing documents for the IAOC, its going to be pretty difficult to come up with a way to remove some of the responsibilities from the Chairs (meeting attendance, voting, etc) without also removing the authority. We're arguing somewhat in circles. I agree with Bob's comments below that the leadership of the IESG and the IAB need to be involved in the operation of the IAOC, but I no longer think there are enough hours in the day for the IETF and IAB chairs to be able to do everything they need to do. I hesitate to suggest this, but its probably time: Let's add a position to the IESG - Executive Vice-Chair or Co-Adjutor Chair. Basically, either the chair's personal representative (Executive Vice-Chair) or their replacement in waiting (Co-Adjutor Chair). Have the IAB select a vice-chair when they select the chair. Modify the various documents to describe the various responsibilities for the Vice-chairs - suggestions for the IETF co-chair would be to stick him/her with the IAOC, the Trust and at least half of the Administrivia.. For the IAB - ditto plus liaison and appeals. Modify the IAOC documents to permit either of the two co-chairs to be designated for a year at a time as IAOC members by the respective chairs choice (but can't be pulled off once on). No modificiations to the Trust legal document, but probably modify the administrative document to require the chair and co-chair for the IAB and IETF be invited to all non-closed meetings. Job description to the Nomcom - for the IETF, the co-chair is a chair-in-training with the expectation they may make a decent Chair when and if the time comes. Maybe rotate that job every two years regardless to ensure a couple of people with some of the chair experience are in the pool. Maybe even every year. Mike At 10:27 AM 9/21/2011, Bob Hinden wrote: I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Why? So we don't have the IESG and IAB having disputes with the IAOC. Having the IETF and IAB chairs share the decisions avoids a lot of this. I think you are aware of a few times where we got close to this and I think the current structure helped avoid it. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 7:01 PM, Michael StJohns mstjo...@comcast.netwrote: I've been watching this with interest. I'm especially in agreement with Leslie's comments about chair load. Because of the legal issues with respect to the IETF trust and the implementing documents for the IAOC, its going to be pretty difficult to come up with a way to remove some of the responsibilities from the Chairs (meeting attendance, voting, etc) without also removing the authority. We're arguing somewhat in circles. I agree with Bob's comments below that the leadership of the IESG and the IAB need to be involved in the operation of the IAOC, but I no longer think there are enough hours in the day for the IETF and IAB chairs to be able to do everything they need to do. I hesitate to suggest this, but its probably time: Let's add a position to the IESG - Executive Vice-Chair or Co-Adjutor Chair. Basically, either the chair's personal representative (Executive Vice-Chair) or their replacement in waiting (Co-Adjutor Chair). Have the IAB select a vice-chair when they select the chair. Modify the various documents to describe the various responsibilities for the Vice-chairs - suggestions for the IETF co-chair would be to stick him/her with the IAOC, the Trust and at least half of the Administrivia.. For the IAB - ditto plus liaison and appeals. Modify the IAOC documents to permit either of the two co-chairs to be designated for a year at a time as IAOC members by the respective chairs choice (but can't be pulled off once on). No modificiations to the Trust legal document, but probably modify the administrative document to require the chair and co-chair for the IAB and IETF be invited to all non-closed meetings. Job description to the Nomcom - for the IETF, the co-chair is a chair-in-training with the expectation they may make a decent Chair when and if the time comes. Maybe rotate that job every two years regardless to ensure a couple of people with some of the chair experience are in the pool. Maybe even every year. I have suggested this verbally several times, and so would support it, but each time it has gotten shot down as not the IETF/IESG/IAB way. Regards Marshall Mike At 10:27 AM 9/21/2011, Bob Hinden wrote: I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Why? So we don't have the IESG and IAB having disputes with the IAOC. Having the IETF and IAB chairs share the decisions avoids a lot of this. I think you are aware of a few times where we got close to this and I think the current structure helped avoid it. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On 20/09/2011 00:30, Brian E Carpenter wrote: [...] the I* Chairs would remain as Trustees. Since that is (in my experience) a large part of an IAOC member's time commitment, the problem you're trying to solve would not be solved, IMHO, unless the Trust amended the Trust Agreement too. That's all I wanted to point out. My experience is different: the Trust is little work on average but there are huge spikes, in particular when legal provisions are being discussed. However, there are issues that are typically also discussed in the IESG or IAB, the I* chairs are already involved with their I* hat, and the additional workload to discuss it in the Trust is small. Henk -- -- Henk Uijterwaal Email: henk(at)uijterwaal.nl http://www.uijterwaal.nl Phone: +31.6.55861746 -- There appears to have been a collective retreat from reality that day. (John Glanfield, on an engineering project) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Thanks Bob, I appreciate your thoughts on the matter! Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. There were many comments on your earlier draft and I don't see how these changes resolve all of issues raised. The new draft is different, but I think the main issues remain. Could you show how the issues raised are solved by the current draft? For example, there seemed to me to be a rough consensus in the discussion on the earlier draft that the IETF Chair should not be included in the proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal? I did not see that rough consensus, but let us not argue that, I believe it is up for Jari to say were the consensus is. To the substance of that point: there is an argument to be made that if the IETF Chair has full voting power than the IAB chair should so to. I believe that it is beneficial for the organization if there is some symmetry there. For completeness, and in relation to that symmetry argument. Jari wrote in another mail: And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting members in IAB and IESG? The IETF Chair is voting (full) member of the IAB (see section 1.1 of RFC 2850) The IAB Chair is ex-officio member of the IESG (see RFC3710 section 2) but for Decision making the IAB chair is excluded from the consensus process (RFC3710 section 3.1 2nd paragraph). The obvious reason for that is that the IAB is in the appeal chain. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. As I said earlier, I continue to think this is a bad idea. We now have a system that works well. Certainly not perfect, but I am concerned your proposed changes will make it work worse. At some point I'd be perfectly happy to agree to disagree on the merit of the idea. But I want to understand the motivation and make sure there is nothing actionable on my side. In my time as IAOC chair, the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. For example, there are weekly calls in the months before an IETF meeting that the host, NOC team, IAD, host, and other people attend. I don't think an I* chair has been involved at this level. Also, the IAOC has several subcommittees (e.g., meetings, budget, specific RFPs, and Tools). I* chair attendance in these varies. The IETF chair is very active in the RFP subcommittee and Tools. The ISOC chair has reduced her attendance in the subcommittees. There is no requirement that members of committees are IAOC members, is there? I think the I* chairs bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than other appointees would not have. In order for the I* chairs to be effective, they will need to be involved. If they are involved, then they might as well be voting members. With the changes you propose we could end up with an IAOC that none of the I* chairs participate. As you point out, they are all busy and will have a hard time to following the issues if their involvement is optional. This will result in an IAOC that is disconnected from the community. I do not buy that argument. If the I* chairs are vital for the connect with the community we have a different problem. It is important for the I* chairs to be connected with the community. It is important for the IAOC to be connected with the community. It is important for the I* chairs to be informed about what is happening in the IAOC It is important for the IAOC to be informed about what the I* chairs find important. I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Why? Same for the IETF Trust, your proposal would result in the I* chairs not being members of the IETF Trust (unless the Trust was changed, another issue in itself). The current structure with the I* chairs being voting members of the IAOC has worked well. The I* members are involved in the important decisions, share the responsibility for the decisions, and keep the IAOC/IASA connected to the community. I am sympathetic to the issue this draft is attempting to resolve, but I think there are better ways to reduce the load we put on the I* chairs, than what this draft proposes. It would help if you would
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
--On Monday, September 19, 2011 17:58 -0500 Jorge Contreras cntre...@gmail.com wrote: ... Brian's interpretation is correct. If someone is an IAOC member, voting or not, then he/she is a Trustee with full fiduciary duties. To change this, the Trust Agreement would need to be amended. Once again, the provisions that make amending the Trust Agreement particularly problematic have expired. Let's figure out what the Right Thing is to do from the standpoint of the IETF and the community, then figure out what needs to be fixed up and and fix it. Making decisions on the basis of, e.g., not modifying the Trust Agreement, even when contrary decisions are in the best interests of the IETF and the broader community would violate the fundamental requirements that the IASA and, insofar as it is separate, the Trust, serve the best interests of the IETF and the Community. Regardless of what is said about fiduciary duties, I believe that if the Trust or its membership ever start to believe that the Trust has interests separate from the interests of the IETF (including that make the Internet work better goal) and an obligation to favor those Trust interests over the IETF one, then we would have a really serious problem in need of fixing. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
Dear Brian, Olaf; On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 6:30 PM, Brian E Carpenter brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com wrote: On 2011-09-19 20:05, Olaf Kolkman wrote: snip Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Yes, it is incorrectly titled. As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. If the chairs should be trustees (are you arguing that?) then I agree, a trust agreement modification is needed. The Trust Agreement and *only* the Trust Agreement defines who is a Trustee. At the moment it says that members of the IAOC under BCP 101 are Trustees, without any qualification such as voting. The Trust Agreement is at http://iaoc.ietf.org/docs/IETF-Trust-Agreement-Executed-12-15-05.pdf It says (Section 3.1) that Eligible persons are those IAOC members duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101, RFC 4071 (April 2005), and any duly approved successor documents, updates, or amendments thereto. The draft says This document updates BCP101 http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp101 ([RFC4071 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4071] and [RFC4371 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4371]). Assuming it goes forward, it would thus eventually become an update or amendment to BCP101, and so by just changing who the IAOC members are, and thus who the Trustees are, would NOT IMO require a change to the Trust Agreement. It would be automatic. All Trustees are currently voting trustees. I would note that the ISOC Board of Trustees has at least one non-voting Trustee, and the Trust Amendment could in theory be modified in a similar fashion. (Modifying the TA can now be done with a majority vote of the Trustees currently in office.) However, the Trust Agreement (TA) is a legal document. I would not underrate the difficulty (and legal expense) of modifying it, and of not introducing bugs while modifying it. Even though the Trustees _can_ now do this, I would not actually do it if avoidable, and I think that it is in this case. Note that the Trust Agreement says almost nothing about meetings. The Trust Administrative Procedures (TAP) could easily be modified to allow for permanent Ex-Officio liaisons, and the TAP is not a legal document of the same standing as the TA. So, what I would recommend is that - Olaf's draft create new IAOC members with full powers, as it currently does. These would, assuming the draft progresses, automatically become Trustees, without any modification of the Trust Agreement. - Olaf's wording be changed to make the IAB Chair, IETF Chair and ISOC CEO into ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons to the IAOC and the Trust. - The TAP then be modified to recognize the status of these new ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons. These Liaisons are not IAOC members, thus not Trustees. With this procedure, I see no reason to modify the Trust Agreement. Regards Marshall So if we make the I* Chairs non-voting members of the IAOC by formally updating BCP 101, the I* Chairs would remain as Trustees. Since that is (in my experience) a large part of an IAOC member's time commitment, the problem you're trying to solve would not be solved, IMHO, unless the Trust amended the Trust Agreement too. That's all I wanted to point out. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On Sep 20, 2011, at 6:25 PM, Marshall Eubanks wrote: - Olaf's wording be changed to make the IAB Chair, IETF Chair and ISOC CEO into ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons to the IAOC and the Trust. - The TAP then be modified to recognize the status of these new ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons. These Liaisons are not IAOC members, thus not Trustees. I would not call them liaisons (as they do not liaise) but advisors. With this procedure, I see no reason to modify the Trust Agreement. The Trust would need to commit to allowing these advisors to join their meetings too. But that can be done in other ways than the Trust Agreement. (so yes, I agree with this line of thought) Obviously this all assumes there is a consensus for changing the I* chairs role --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 at 1:44 PM, Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl wrote: On Sep 20, 2011, at 6:25 PM, Marshall Eubanks wrote: - Olaf's wording be changed to make the IAB Chair, IETF Chair and ISOC CEO into ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons to the IAOC and the Trust. - The TAP then be modified to recognize the status of these new ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons. These Liaisons are not IAOC members, thus not Trustees. I would not call them liaisons (as they do not liaise) but advisors. WFM With this procedure, I see no reason to modify the Trust Agreement. The Trust would need to commit to allowing these advisors to join their meetings too. But that can be done in other ways than the Trust Agreement. (so yes, I agree with this line of thought) Obviously this all assumes there is a consensus for changing the I* chairs role Yes. And that should include prior agreement by the Trustees to make this change. (As with any last call, if the Trustees have objections, they should be dealt with before the RFC is published.) I would be glad to schedule such a discussion and vote at an appropriate time, assuming I am still Chair at that time. Regards Marshall --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi, I had the comments below on a previous incarnation of how to fix the IAOC because Chairs are overloaded. I have to say -- I don't think the substantive points are addressed in the new proposal, which leaves the Chairs as spectators to the IAOC process. I don't think you can disagree with me that, with no vote (recognized voice) in a committee's work, there's even less possibility to find the hours to keep up with the substance of discussions and thus be able to contribute meaningfully to a discussion when the time comes. Substantively -- this takes the Chairs off the IAOC, just as the original proposal did, and my comments/confusion/questions below are still current for me. Leslie. Original Message Subject: Re: I-D Action:draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:06:07 -0400 From: Leslie Daigle les...@thinkingcat.com To: IETF discussion list ietf@ietf.org CC: John C Klensin klen...@jck.com I'm having troubles reconciling a couple of things: 1/ Recent discussion (different draft) on the importance of the IAOC implementing IETF (and IAB) policy and admin requirements; not having the IAOC *setting* those requirements; 2/ Suggesting that the IAB IETF Chairs should not be on the IAOC. As it stands the IETF Chair is in a unique position to understand all the requirements of the IETF community and IETF administrative activities. There isn't someone else who can step in: all other IESG members are tasked, as a primary responsibility, with looking after their particular areas. The IAB Chair similarly sits at the confluence of all the issues hitting the IAB, and is specifically responsible for tracking them so that they get addressed by the IAB. While the IAB Chair can, in theory, delegate actions on particular topics, it at least used to be the case that some tasks are too tricky or unappealing to get other involvement(too admin, not enough architectural content). And, even with successful delegation of individual tasks, the IAB Chair retains the perspective across all the activities -- technical, IANA, RFC Editor, etc. I'm not going to disagree that the jobs are heavily loaded, and that it's a problem for the IETF that the organization relies heavily on finding a solid candidate for each of these complex positions. However, I think taking them off the IAOC is *not* the place to start. It makes more sense to me to sort out the organizational challenges (of the IESG/IETF, and of the IAB) that cause overloading of these positions, and *then* see what makes sense in terms of identifying IAOC participation. Pulling these positions off the IAOC would succeed in weakening the IAOC, even as it increases the stress levels in the positions as the respective Chairs try to figure out what is going on with the administrative support for the balls they are trying to keep moving. My $0.02cdn Leslie. On 9/19/11 4:05 AM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: Brian, So far you are the only person that has responded with substance. Other feedback was promised but never arrived. I hope to rev this document shortly so that we can finalize it before the Taiwan meeting. I wrote: Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. You responded: And it therefore removes the two Chairs' shared responsibility for decisions of the IAOC and the IETF Trust. I am still far from convinced that this is a good thing. That is correct, under this proposal the chairs don't have voting responsibilities in the IAOC. And while I argue that the chairs can 'steer' as ex-officio I understand that is something you are either convinced off or not. Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Yes, it is incorrectly titled. As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Tuesday, September 20, 2011 14:16 -0400 Leslie Daigle les...@thinkingcat.com wrote: Hi, I had the comments below on a previous incarnation of how to fix the IAOC because Chairs are overloaded. I have to say -- I don't think the substantive points are addressed in the new proposal, which leaves the Chairs as spectators to the IAOC process. I don't think you can disagree with me that, with no vote (recognized voice) in a committee's work, there's even less possibility to find the hours to keep up with the substance of discussions and thus be able to contribute meaningfully to a discussion when the time comes. As ex-officio non-voting members, with the main responsibility for representing IAB and IESG views and needs resting with someone else, that seems ok to me. At the same time, I think you underestimate the ability of the people involved to read in really quickly if that is necessary/ important. Substantively -- this takes the Chairs off the IAOC, just as the original proposal did, and my comments/confusion/questions below are still current for me. I think I responded to most of these in a different subthread earlier this week. The remarks below are just a quick summary. Original Message Subject: Re: I-D Action:draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:06:07 -0400 From: Leslie Daigle les...@thinkingcat.com To: IETF discussion list ietf@ietf.org CC: John C Klensin klen...@jck.com I'm having troubles reconciling a couple of things: 1/ Recent discussion (different draft) on the importance of the IAOC implementing IETF (and IAB) policy and admin requirements; not having the IAOC *setting* those requirements; 2/ Suggesting that the IAB IETF Chairs should not be on the IAOC. Leslie, You appear to be assuming that the proposal is somehow removing the IAB and IESG (and ISOC) representation/ presence on the IAOC and Trust. No one has suggested that. What has been suggested is that the determination of who is most able to effectively represent those bodies can sensibly be left up to them rather than assuming that the Chairs are somehow endowed with special knowledge and wisdom that no one else shares. I think it would be really stupid for the IESG, IAB, or ISOC leadership to put someone on the IAOC who wasn't thoroughly familiar with the thinking in those bodies about IASA issues and competent in the issues the IAOC and Trust address. I think we can trust those bodies to avoid being stupid (except possibly as a tradeoff against worse choices) and don't need to invent rules that ban stupidity. As it stands the IETF Chair is in a unique position to understand all the requirements of the IETF community and IETF administrative activities. There isn't someone else who can step in: all other IESG members are tasked, as a primary responsibility, with looking after their particular areas. Sometimes I feel as if the IETF Chair is tasked with doing a good Superman imitation -- understanding everything, knowing everything, leaping tall buildings... Despite my frequent role as a critic, I'm also impressed with how good a job recent incumbents have done at that. But I also think it is an unreasonable expectation along both the knowledge and time dimensions and that there are usually people on the IESG (and elsewhere) who can do parts of the job (including broad understanding and perspective) as well. I also note that nothing in any of these proposals prevents the IESG from appointing the Chair to the voting position on the IAOC if they conclude that is the best choice after all tradeoffs are considered and the Chair has the available cycles.The proposal increases flexibility; it need not actually change the membership of the IAOC even if some of us assume that it would. The IAB Chair similarly sits at the confluence of all the issues hitting the IAB, and is specifically responsible for tracking them so that they get addressed by the IAB. While the IAB Chair can, in theory, delegate actions on particular topics, it at least used to be the case that some tasks are too tricky or unappealing to get other involvement(too admin, not enough architectural content). And, even with successful delegation of individual tasks, the IAB Chair retains the perspective across all the activities -- technical, IANA, RFC Editor, etc. I can't speak for you, Olaf, or Bernard, but I just don't believe it. There are often people who have perspectives as good as the Chair. That is likely to get more differentiated over time as the Program model permits more tasks to be spread around, probably with the IAB Chair not intimately involved in some of them. Indeed, if any member of the IAB is guaranteed to have the perspective you are asking for, it would be the Exec Dir, not the Chair. ... Pulling these positions off the IAOC would succeed in weakening the IAOC, even as it increases the stress levels in the
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On 2011-09-21 05:44, Olaf Kolkman wrote: On Sep 20, 2011, at 6:25 PM, Marshall Eubanks wrote: - Olaf's wording be changed to make the IAB Chair, IETF Chair and ISOC CEO into ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons to the IAOC and the Trust. - The TAP then be modified to recognize the status of these new ex-officio and non-voting Liaisons. These Liaisons are not IAOC members, thus not Trustees. I would not call them liaisons (as they do not liaise) but advisors. With this procedure, I see no reason to modify the Trust Agreement. Agreed, and it would be cheaper to do it this way, but... The Trust would need to commit to allowing these advisors to join their meetings too. But that can be done in other ways than the Trust Agreement. (so yes, I agree with this line of thought) Obviously this all assumes there is a consensus for changing the I* chairs role ...exactly. I'm far from convinced about that. I think the real need is to figure out how to make the IAOC an Oversight committee rather than it getting involved in executive decisions, and to figure out how to make the IAB an Architecture board instead of getting involved in administrative matters. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
Hi Brian, On 9/21/11 12:09 AM, Brian E Carpenter brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com wrote: [snip] The Trust would need to commit to allowing these advisors to join their meetings too. But that can be done in other ways than the Trust Agreement. (so yes, I agree with this line of thought) Obviously this all assumes there is a consensus for changing the I* chairs role ...exactly. I'm far from convinced about that. I think the real need is to figure out how to make the IAOC an Oversight committee rather than it getting involved in executive decisions, and to figure out how to make the IAB an Architecture board instead of getting involved in administrative matters. I totally agree. In addition, if the people that have been given at least theoretically highest positions in the IETF leadership would not like to take the responsibility of the trust, who then would? These people are trustees in my mind as the puck of responsibility ends at them. I repeat what I said earlier, I believe the problem is real and needs to be addressed. I think it is good, Olaf, you brought it up. However, I believe this is a matter of organizing *internally* in the IAOC rather than changing the rules. Perhaps they have to hire help, or get even more of it from the ISOC. Cheers, Jonne. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On Sep 20, 2011, at 11:09 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: ...exactly. I'm far from convinced about that. I think the real need is to figure out how to make the IAOC an Oversight committee rather than it getting involved in executive decisions, and to figure out how to make the IAB an Architecture board instead of getting involved in administrative matters. On the IAB: I do not agree that the focus needs to be on the A of architecture. There is not a lot that the IAB does that is not in its charter. I believe that the focus needs to be on the B of board. In other words, just as in the IAOC more oversight. During my tenure we took a number of steps to move the handy work into programs and initiatives in which the execution of projects could take place so that the IAB members themselves could oversee but that journey was far from complete. For the IAOC and IAB these will be difficult challenges that cannot be enforced externally but also need an evolutionary culture change . Not only in the I* bodies themselves but also how the NOMCOM. --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Brian, So far you are the only person that has responded with substance. Other feedback was promised but never arrived. I hope to rev this document shortly so that we can finalize it before the Taiwan meeting. I wrote: Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. You responded: And it therefore removes the two Chairs' shared responsibility for decisions of the IAOC and the IETF Trust. I am still far from convinced that this is a good thing. That is correct, under this proposal the chairs don't have voting responsibilities in the IAOC. And while I argue that the chairs can 'steer' as ex-officio I understand that is something you are either convinced off or not. Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Yes, it is incorrectly titled. As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. If the chairs should be trustees (are you arguing that?) then I agree, a trust agreement modification is needed. --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 2:52 PM, Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl wrote: Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership I still do not understand the basic problem that trigger/cause that propsal. Have been alot of discussion and suggestion and problems but nothing that made me understand why, what is the underlaying cause. (it could be that I'm just slow, we shouldn't rule that out :-) ) -- Roger Jorgensen | rog...@gmail.com | - IPv6 is The Key! http://www.jorgensen.no | ro...@jorgensen.no ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Roger, I still do not understand the basic problem that trigger/cause that propsal. Have been alot of discussion and suggestion and problems but nothing that made me understand why, what is the underlaying cause. It is very simple. Both the IAB and IETF chair duties are extensive, and several people believe that it would be useful to provide some freedom not just for the current but also future chairs in how they organize their work. This would probably make the chairs' job a little bit easier, and might even increase the number of people available for these jobs. It is of course essential that the chairs stay in touch of critical administrative discussions in the IAOC, for instance, but it may not be necessary for them to participate all the time or always be a voting member. (But if a particular chair feels that they want to, they can still be a voting member by having the IAB or IESG appoint them.) Olaf: /2.3 IAOC membership/2.3 Trust membership/ and s/two member /two members /g Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Olaf, On Jul 26, 2011, at 3:52 PM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. There were many comments on your earlier draft and I don't see how these changes resolve all of issues raised. The new draft is different, but I think the main issues remain. Could you show how the issues raised are solved by the current draft? For example, there seemed to me to be a rough consensus in the discussion on the earlier draft that the IETF Chair should not be included in the proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal? I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. As I said earlier, I continue to think this is a bad idea. We now have a system that works well. Certainly not perfect, but I am concerned your proposed changes will make it work worse. In my time as IAOC chair, the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. For example, there are weekly calls in the months before an IETF meeting that the host, NOC team, IAD, host, and other people attend. I don't think an I* chair has been involved at this level. Also, the IAOC has several subcommittees (e.g., meetings, budget, specific RFPs, and Tools). I* chair attendance in these varies. The IETF chair is very active in the RFP subcommittee and Tools. The ISOC chair has reduced her attendance in the subcommittees. I think the I* chairs bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than other appointees would not have. In order for the I* chairs to be effective, they will need to be involved. If they are involved, then they might as well be voting members. With the changes you propose we could end up with an IAOC that none of the I* chairs participate. As you point out, they are all busy and will have a hard time to following the issues if their involvement is optional. This will result in an IAOC that is disconnected from the community. I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Same for the IETF Trust, your proposal would result in the I* chairs not being members of the IETF Trust (unless the Trust was changed, another issue in itself). The current structure with the I* chairs being voting members of the IAOC has worked well. The I* members are involved in the important decisions, share the responsibility for the decisions, and keep the IAOC/IASA connected to the community. I am sympathetic to the issue this draft is attempting to resolve, but I think there are better ways to reduce the load we put on the I* chairs, than what this draft proposes. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi Olaf, I went through the draft just now, and I have some quite strong feelings about it. I'm sorry I'm sending my comments so late in the game. A disclaimer first: I was the chairman of the IAOC some years back, but I haven't been actively involved with IETF administration after that. Therefore, my reactions are based on the history, and I don't necessarily have the up-to-date information of today, anymore. Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other ways. However, I think the solution is a bit menemistä perse edellä puuhun (== putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management, asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the president and CEO of ISOC). The Trust on the other hand is everything the IETF has (as ownership - the biggest asset the IETF has is of course the community). It owns the fruits of the labour of the whole community - the intellectual property that the community creates. I think it is very clear that the main stakeholders (the I* chairs) and the main responsible for the administrator of the trust (the president/CEO of ISOC) have to be trustees and show ownership of the trust - you just cannot delegate that. Like said, I understand the problem: The IAOC is a lot of work for people who already have a lot to do. However, I think that problem should be managed without reducing the oversight of the IETF leadership over the IETF financials, assents, and other important activities. Perhaps, the IAOC should think how to reorganize, and strengthen the operational part of the IETF to reduce the burden of the IAOC. This might mean increasing the level of investment to the operations of the IETF to make sure the IAOC members do not have to be part of the operational stuff, but can concentrate on making just the strategic decisions and doing the oversight. If I would have to summarize this all into one sentence: The workload problem is a problem only the IAOC can fix, and cannot be done by reorganizing the IAOC. Sorry for the long e-mai. Cheers, Jonne. -- Jonne Soininen Renesas Mobile Tel: +358 40 527 4634 E-mail: jonne.soini...@renesasmobile.com On 9/19/11 11:05 AM, Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl wrote: Brian, So far you are the only person that has responded with substance. Other feedback was promised but never arrived. I hope to rev this document shortly so that we can finalize it before the Taiwan meeting. I wrote: Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. You responded: And it therefore removes the two Chairs' shared responsibility for decisions of the IAOC and the IETF Trust. I am still far from convinced that this is a good thing. That is correct, under this proposal the chairs don't have voting responsibilities in the IAOC. And while I argue that the chairs can 'steer' as ex-officio I understand that is something you are either convinced off or not. Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Yes, it is incorrectly titled. As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. If the chairs should be trustees (are you arguing that?) then I agree, a trust agreement modification is needed. --Olaf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Bob, I appreciate your view on this, particularly when you are day-to-day seeing how the current system works with IAOC. That being said, I do think it is important to give some flexibility to chairs on organizing their work. And it is important to provide tools for them to manage their time, including ability to delegate some tasks. I understand the point about chairs being involved. But I'm also sure there will never be an IAB/IETF chair who would ignore important IAOC business. This draft is about the ability (but not a requirement) of the chairs to delegate most of the day-to-day business and just stay on for the important stuff. One practical issue is that if the chairs under today's rules would stay out of the day-to-day business, that would mean missing one voting member. I'm not sure that is desirable either, and I really don't think you want to force them to be in every meeting. I also understand the point about chairs sharing the responsibility for decisions. I just don't think the suggested new scheme would affect that. The IAOC would for sure still listen to a message from the chairs very carefully. And if you are in any board with multiple people having voting power, if the rest of the board ignores your opinion it really doesn't matter if you lost by 1-9 or by 0-9... (and again, any of the chairs would for sure still be behind the decisions anyway.) Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Monday, September 19, 2011 10:37 +0200 Roger Jørgensen rog...@gmail.com wrote: Have been alot of discussion and suggestion and problems but nothing that made me understand why, what is the underlaying cause. (it could be that I'm just slow, we shouldn't rule that out :-) ) Roger, The problem is that, over time, the IAB and IETF Chair positions have become full time (or more) jobs. Not only does that require a huge time commitment, but the roles require a broader range of skills and interests than are typically present in members of the IETF community. That situation, in turn, has several nasty effects. As three examples: -- If there are conflicting priorities and demands on time, something is going to get less attention than it deserves. The right people to decide what is most important in a particular case are the IAB and IESG, not a six-year-old document that doesn't allow for individual cases. -- Unless we have started believing in kings --even kings who, once elected, serve more or less as long as they are willing before stepping down-- the IETF Chair should not be lots more important, nor should we assume he or she is inherently more skilled in any given matter, than a consensus conclusion of the IESG. The IAB Chair should be even less so. These people are given roles of leadership and responsibility, not someone anointed with infinite wisdom and time -- or even absolute knowledge of what is good for the IETF and the Internet -- at the time they assume those positions. -- The pool of plausible candidates for the positions is significantly reduced because, especially in difficult economic times, there aren't very many people who can find sufficient support for a long-term (nominally two years but four or more in practice) full time commitment plus a large expense account for a lot of travel, etc. Unless we want to be in a situation in which candidates for those positions are selected almost entirely on the basis of who has the resources, we had better be looking for ways to reduce the scope of the positions. While I think Olaf's current proposal is better in several ways --including the provision that enables the Chairs to participate as ex-officio members when they think it is appropriate, if you are interested in a more lengthy discussion of basic cause, there is a more extended discussion of the issues (and largely the same core proposal) in the now-rather-old http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Olaf == Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl writes: Olaf Dear Colleagues, Olaf I have just chartered a very short draft that intends to Olaf update BCP101. It can be found at: Olaf http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Olaf The draft is very short and contains only a few sentences of Olaf substance: OlafThe IETF chair, the IAB chair, and the ISOC President/CEO Olaf may delegate their responsibilities to other persons. The Olaf delegations by the IETF chair and the IAB chair need to be Olaf confirmed by the IESG and IAB respectively. The terms of Olaf delegation is for a longer term for instance aligned with the Olaf IESG and IAB appointment cycles (roughly anual). I'm strongly in favor of the principle behind this draft. Presumably the delegate would be subject to recall through the normal recall process (as are all IAOC members today except for the ISOC president) You should spell out things like whether the delegating IAOC member may recall their delegation and whether the body (IAB/IESG) may recall the delegate. You should consider whether the IAOC needs to accept the delegate. I think the above issues should be considered. No specific results to the consideration of those issues would be blocking for me. I think this is a great idea! I do think a mechanism like this could be used badly. So we should be responsible:-) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 11:05 AM, Sam Hartman hartmans-i...@mit.edu wrote: Olaf == Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl writes: Olaf Dear Colleagues, Olaf I have just chartered a very short draft that intends to Olaf update BCP101. It can be found at: Olaf http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Olaf The draft is very short and contains only a few sentences of Olaf substance: OlafThe IETF chair, the IAB chair, and the ISOC President/CEO Olaf may delegate their responsibilities to other persons. The Olaf delegations by the IETF chair and the IAB chair need to be Olaf confirmed by the IESG and IAB respectively. The terms of Olaf delegation is for a longer term for instance aligned with the Olaf IESG and IAB appointment cycles (roughly anual). I'm strongly in favor of the principle behind this draft. Presumably the delegate would be subject to recall through the normal recall process (as are all IAOC members today except for the ISOC president) You should spell out things like whether the delegating IAOC member may recall their delegation and whether the body (IAB/IESG) may recall the delegate. Note that the current draft does not mention the word delegate, except to note that it was removed. These would be full members, with the full fiduciary responsibility of membership. That means, for example, that they might feel compelled to vote against the desires of their nominating body. Recall is not mentioned by the draft, and thus it would follow the rules of BCP 101 and RFC 3777. Note that, according to BCP 101 IAOC members are not, however, subject to recall by the bodies that appointed them. This draft does not change that. You should consider whether the IAOC needs to accept the delegate. These would be full members, neither the IAOC nor the Trust would have any discretion in accepting them. Regards Marshall I think the above issues should be considered. No specific results to the consideration of those issues would be blocking for me. I think this is a great idea! I do think a mechanism like this could be used badly. So we should be responsible:-) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
For what it's worth, I largely agree with John's statement of the justification for Olaf's proposal. Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. I could be in the rough on whether this specific proposal is the right thing to do, but I'd feel better about rejecting it if the people who insisted that the IAOC and IETF Trust responsibilities could not be delegated, could make a counteroffer on how the overall workload for these positions could be reduced in a way that IS acceptable. It would be helpful if we could organize to reduce the time commitment for these roles. If not these responsibilities, what? Tugging at the various corners of a full-size fitted sheet on a queen-sized bed doesn't actually result in completely covering the mattress - it only wears out the sheet! Spencer p.s. in the interests of full disclosure, I am mentioned in the acknowledgements section of the draft John mentioned in his post, along with Joel Halpern, but I had completely forgotten about that until I saw my name :-) Have been alot of discussion and suggestion and problems but nothing that made me understand why, what is the underlaying cause. (it could be that I'm just slow, we shouldn't rule that out :-) ) Roger, The problem is that, over time, the IAB and IETF Chair positions have become full time (or more) jobs. Not only does that require a huge time commitment, but the roles require a broader range of skills and interests than are typically present in members of the IETF community. That situation, in turn, has several nasty effects. As three examples: -- If there are conflicting priorities and demands on time, something is going to get less attention than it deserves. The right people to decide what is most important in a particular case are the IAB and IESG, not a six-year-old document that doesn't allow for individual cases. -- Unless we have started believing in kings --even kings who, once elected, serve more or less as long as they are willing before stepping down-- the IETF Chair should not be lots more important, nor should we assume he or she is inherently more skilled in any given matter, than a consensus conclusion of the IESG. The IAB Chair should be even less so. These people are given roles of leadership and responsibility, not someone anointed with infinite wisdom and time -- or even absolute knowledge of what is good for the IETF and the Internet -- at the time they assume those positions. -- The pool of plausible candidates for the positions is significantly reduced because, especially in difficult economic times, there aren't very many people who can find sufficient support for a long-term (nominally two years but four or more in practice) full time commitment plus a large expense account for a lot of travel, etc. Unless we want to be in a situation in which candidates for those positions are selected almost entirely on the basis of who has the resources, we had better be looking for ways to reduce the scope of the positions. While I think Olaf's current proposal is better in several ways --including the provision that enables the Chairs to participate as ex-officio members when they think it is appropriate, if you are interested in a more lengthy discussion of basic cause, there is a more extended discussion of the issues (and largely the same core proposal) in the now-rather-old http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
I think the draft would be improved by explicitly considering these issues and not remaining silent, even if the decision is to say that these are full members; existing processes for recall etc apply; at the time of writing that means blah. I think that would lead to better discussion and review of these issues than remaining silent. I don't have a particular problem if the answer is that the recall procedure can be used, these people can vote against the interests of the person whose place they are taking, the IAOC need not accept them, etc. I would prefer the issues be discussed by the community and that written down, possibly in a non-normative section rather than the draft remain silent. I would strongly prefer that if we restate things implied from other documents we do so in a non-normative manner. Again, my primary point remains this is a great idea! ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 9/19/2011 8:35 AM, Spencer Dawkins wrote: Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. Anything? I believe you do not believe that statement, but I think it accurately summarizes the focus of this thread, so far. The problem is with how absolute your language is. It declares one criterion as entirely dominating all others. What is needed is to consider this issue in terms of tradeoffs. So far, the thread hasn't, except a bit dismissively. The issue that Bob has raised about the special capabilities of I* folk within IAOC discussions is not minor. Unfortunately, it does seem to be a bit subtle. For example, it took me awhile to understand. (We can count that as a weak proof...) Equally, how it gets applied is subtle. It seems to be important spontaneously. So, for example, a view that the I* will get involved in discussions where their perspectives are needed is based on an inaccurate model of how and when those perspectives come into play. It presumes the ability to plan for the need. But what really happens is that most IAOC discussions need to wander over a broad range of issue and sometimes when they do, they trigger a connection in an I* member due to their perspective. Such triggers cannot be planned. I don't know how to resolve this with a high level of certainty and safety. So I made a guess. The proposal that Olaf has put forward is one attempt, by way of keeping I* Chairs involved, but relying on them less to attend every discussion and carry all the detail. Whether that's produces a sufficient balance is an open question. d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dear Spencer; On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 11:35 AM, Spencer Dawkins spen...@wonderhamster.org wrote: For what it's worth, I largely agree with John's statement of the justification for Olaf's proposal. Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. I could be in the rough on whether this specific proposal is the right thing to do, but I'd feel better about rejecting it if the people who insisted that the IAOC and IETF Trust responsibilities could not be delegated, could make a counteroffer on how the overall workload for these positions could be reduced in a way that IS acceptable. There are two broad issues with delegation as I see it : - New Trust members have to be full Trustees, with a fiduciary responsibility to protect the Trust's (and the IETF's) assets. In other words, these new Trustees represent their appointing body, but they are not mere liaisons from it. This is very clear for the Trust, and I would argue it should also be the case for the IAOC. This is just a detail, but an important one. - If the IAOC or the Trust requires knowledge of IESG or IAB plans, intentions, thinking, etc.. the new member / Trustee will not have the knowledge of the corresponding I* Chair. This will lower the efficiency of the IAOC and Trust, almost proportionally to the time saved. (If the I* chair is in every meeting, then there is no loss of efficiency but also no savings of time.) If the loss of efficiency is bad enough, this may not be sustainable. I, for one, would be willing to try the experiment (assuming I am returned to the IAOC / Trust and that the details are all worked out) and see how it goes. Regards Marshall It would be helpful if we could organize to reduce the time commitment for these roles. If not these responsibilities, what? Tugging at the various corners of a full-size fitted sheet on a queen-sized bed doesn't actually result in completely covering the mattress - it only wears out the sheet! Spencer p.s. in the interests of full disclosure, I am mentioned in the acknowledgements section of the draft John mentioned in his post, along with Joel Halpern, but I had completely forgotten about that until I saw my name :-) Have been alot of discussion and suggestion and problems but nothing that made me understand why, what is the underlaying cause. (it could be that I'm just slow, we shouldn't rule that out :-) ) Roger, The problem is that, over time, the IAB and IETF Chair positions have become full time (or more) jobs. Not only does that require a huge time commitment, but the roles require a broader range of skills and interests than are typically present in members of the IETF community. That situation, in turn, has several nasty effects. As three examples: -- If there are conflicting priorities and demands on time, something is going to get less attention than it deserves. The right people to decide what is most important in a particular case are the IAB and IESG, not a six-year-old document that doesn't allow for individual cases. -- Unless we have started believing in kings --even kings who, once elected, serve more or less as long as they are willing before stepping down-- the IETF Chair should not be lots more important, nor should we assume he or she is inherently more skilled in any given matter, than a consensus conclusion of the IESG. The IAB Chair should be even less so. These people are given roles of leadership and responsibility, not someone anointed with infinite wisdom and time -- or even absolute knowledge of what is good for the IETF and the Internet -- at the time they assume those positions. -- The pool of plausible candidates for the positions is significantly reduced because, especially in difficult economic times, there aren't very many people who can find sufficient support for a long-term (nominally two years but four or more in practice) full time commitment plus a large expense account for a lot of travel, etc. Unless we want to be in a situation in which candidates for those positions are selected almost entirely on the basis of who has the resources, we had better be looking for ways to reduce the scope of the positions. While I think Olaf's current proposal is better in several ways --including the provision that enables the Chairs to participate as ex-officio members when they think it is appropriate, if you are interested in a more lengthy discussion of basic cause, there is a more extended discussion of the issues (and largely the same core proposal) in the now-rather-old http://tools.ietf.org/id/**draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.**txthttp://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-klensin-iaoc-member-00.txt john __**_ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/ietfhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dave == Dave CROCKER d...@dcrocker.net writes: Dave On 9/19/2011 8:35 AM, Spencer Dawkins wrote: Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. Dave Anything? I believe you do not believe that statement, but I Dave think it accurately summarizes the focus of this thread, so Dave far. Dave The problem is with how absolute your language is. It Dave declares one criterion as entirely dominating all others. Dave, thanks for a very thoughtful response to the issue. I think you brig up s that we should carefully consider. I believe that I had considered issues generally similar to yours before indicating support for the proposal. I've considered your specific concerns and that does not change my belief that providing the IAB and IETF chairs this tool is a good idea. I think they should be evaluated in part on whether they use the tool responsibly, but I'm happy to trust them to do so. However I do believe these are important things to think about. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Jonne, First, I want to thank you for the clear expression in Finnish. (Maheeta! Vaikka näiden muutosten läpivienti alkaa kyllä tuntua siltä kuin jäitä polttelisi, saa odottaa perse ruvella että kukaan olisi samaa mieltä mistään, 'kele!) Too bad the English version was not as graphic. Anyway, I like your description of the issue and it helps me understand the concerns. That being said, I could probably construct a similar argument for all of the bodies that an IETF chair, for instance, has to attend. Are we really saying that under all circumstances, the chairs have to attend everything that IAOC deals with? And be voting members? And if that is too much then the entire IAOC has to delegate more of its work? Really? And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting members in IAB and IESG? I have some trust in the chairs ability to prioritize, delegate and engage in the important discussions. I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) Jari On 19.09.2011 15:35, jonne.soini...@renesasmobile.com wrote: Hi Olaf, I went through the draft just now, and I have some quite strong feelings about it. I'm sorry I'm sending my comments so late in the game. A disclaimer first: I was the chairman of the IAOC some years back, but I haven't been actively involved with IETF administration after that. Therefore, my reactions are based on the history, and I don't necessarily have the up-to-date information of today, anymore. Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other ways. However, I think the solution is a bit menemistä perse edellä puuhun (== putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management, asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the president and CEO of ISOC). The Trust on the other hand is everything the IETF has (as ownership - the biggest asset the IETF has is of course the community). It owns the fruits of the labour of the whole community - the intellectual property that the community creates. I think it is very clear that the main stakeholders (the I* chairs) and the main responsible for the administrator of the trust (the president/CEO of ISOC) have to be trustees and show ownership of the trust - you just cannot delegate that. Like said, I understand the problem: The IAOC is a lot of work for people who already have a lot to do. However, I think that problem should be managed without reducing the oversight of the IETF leadership over the IETF financials, assents, and other important activities. Perhaps, the IAOC should think how to reorganize, and strengthen the operational part of the IETF to reduce the burden of the IAOC. This might mean increasing the level of investment to the operations of the IETF to make sure the IAOC members do not have to be part of the operational stuff, but can concentrate on making just the strategic decisions and doing the oversight. If I would have to summarize this all into one sentence: The workload problem is a problem only the IAOC can fix, and cannot be done by reorganizing the IAOC. Sorry for the long e-mai. Cheers, Jonne. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Monday, September 19, 2011 14:04 -0400 Marshall Eubanks marshall.euba...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Spencer; On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 11:35 AM, Spencer Dawkins spen...@wonderhamster.org wrote: For what it's worth, I largely agree with John's statement of the justification for Olaf's proposal. Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. ... There are two broad issues with delegation as I see it : - New Trust members have to be full Trustees, with a fiduciary responsibility to protect the Trust's (and the IETF's) assets. In other words, these new Trustees represent their appointing body, but they are not mere liaisons from it. This is very clear for the Trust, and I would argue it should also be the case for the IAOC. This is just a detail, but an important one. Marshall, I agree that this is a detail. I agree that it is an important one. However, I also note that the window during which we could not make changes to the Trust agreement closed some time ago. More important, if we get to the point at which the Trust and/or IAOC tails have started to wag the IETF dog, we are, IMO, in rather serious trouble... and certainly outside the original intent for either one. - If the IAOC or the Trust requires knowledge of IESG or IAB plans, intentions, thinking, etc.. the new member / Trustee will not have the knowledge of the corresponding I* Chair. This will lower the efficiency of the IAOC and Trust, almost proportionally to the time saved. (If the I* chair is in every meeting, then there is no loss of efficiency but also no savings of time.) If the loss of efficiency is bad enough, this may not be sustainable. FWIW, I don't think this follows. My earlier proposal required the IAB and IESG appointees to be IAB and IESG members, just not necessarily the Chairs. The current proposal creates that option, but doesn't require it. Even if someone other than a sitting IAB or IESG member is chosen, it would be entirely reasonable for the IAB or IESG to choose a recently-departed member, a scribe, or something else they have invited to sit in on their meetings. In addition, while Russ was already a sitting IESG member when selected as IETF Chair, that has not been the historical norm: I haven't gone back and checked the data, but I believe the majority of post-Kobe IETF Chairs have not been IESG members when appointed. If so, for at least the first few months after the first IETF of a calendar year, a separate appointment might actually give the IAOC and Trust more continuity and knowledge of IESG thinking than dropping a brand-new Chair into the job. While I think it would be reasonable to add a few paragraphs to this proposal reminding the IESG, IAB, and ISOC how important continuity of knowledge is, I think we can actually trust all three of those bodies to figure that out and act sensibly. Do you disagree? I didn't mention it explicitly in my earlier note but I think we should consider the possibility that this isn't just an unload the chairs proposal. It is also a improve the effectiveness of the IAOC and Trust by having more people in voting seats who have the time, interest, and ability to pay full attention... perhaps more than the various Chairs have had. ... best, john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi, Dave, Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. Anything? I believe you do not believe that statement, but I think it accurately summarizes the focus of this thread, so far. Thanks for the wake-up call, of course. Now, it's Monday AFTERNOON in my time zone. I am carefully reading the notes that were posted after I posted. I noticed that John Klensin says not JUST an offload proposal - and I get that - and I hadn't fully grokked the fiduciary responsibility point Marshall made. So, yes, I overspoke. Like I said - I'm fine being in the rough on this proposal, but I would like us to think about if not this, what gets offloaded? Spencer ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 9/19/2011 12:26 PM, Spencer Dawkins wrote: but I would like us to think about if not this, what gets offloaded? +1 There is a real problem to solve. I* folk are, in fact, seriously overloaded. Besides being inherently unreasonable, it makes it harder to find candidates for the jobs... d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Monday, September 19, 2011 14:26 -0500 Spencer Dawkins spen...@wonderhamster.org wrote: Anything? I believe you do not believe that statement, but I think it accurately summarizes the focus of this thread, so far. ... I am carefully reading the notes that were posted after I posted. I noticed that John Klensin says not JUST an offload proposal - and I get that - and I hadn't fully grokked the fiduciary responsibility point Marshall made. So, yes, I overspoke. Like I said - I'm fine being in the rough on this proposal, but I would like us to think about if not this, what gets offloaded? I'm not willing to try to defend anything. But I'd suggest two other observations as we are thinking about tradeoffs: (1) Is the larger perspective on strategic issues associated with the IETF and IAB Chairs (I'm not prepared to speak to the ISOC situation, which I think may be a little different) inherent in either the people who are selected for those jobs or in the fact that they hold those jobs? (Remember that, while there are extensive religious and magical traditions associated with specific powers passing to a new King along with the crown or other symbols of office, we've never made claims like that around the IETF, at least yet.) If the answer is, as I believe it is, really no, not inherent, those people acquire that perspective as part of doing their jobs, then aren't we better off trying to get others to acquire the same level of perspective? After all, it would provide some protection against truck fade (or even vacations) of the Chairs and some disruption-reducing training for possible succession, so that is part of the tradeoff too. FWIW, in my tenures on the IESG and IAB, there were often folks who had a lot less long-term perspective on those bodies, the IETF, and the Internet than the Chairs and some who had as much or more. Unless we are willing to make the magical assumption, I don't think Chair has knowledge and perspective, no one else is likely to is really justified as a presumption, even though it could be a reasonable consideration when looking at tradeoffs. (2) As a different tradeoff to think about, suppose we answer Spencer's question with nothing gets offloaded because, for every single responsibility we have placed on the Chairs (or they, in their reasonable judgment of the best interests of the community, have taken on themselves) someone can make a plausible argument about why one Chair or the other is the best-qualified to do it. Now suppose the IAB looks around for its next Chair and says who has the resources to do this and gets dead silence? Or the Nomcom looks around for IETF Chair candidates, asks for volunteers, and gets no one who has the resources and is even plausibly acceptable (to make that exercise particularly lurid, assume that all of the volunteers are members of your favorite pool of trolls and/or residents of some other planet)? My impression is that we've come pretty close to one or both of those scenarios, with a few available choices but not many. But, if we were to actually get there what happens? I don't know the answer other than being pretty sure that such problems are better prevented than solved once the crisis has occurred. Again, I see both as tradeoffs, not absolutes, and I won't say do anything. But I see those scenarios as sufficiently scary and sufficiently plausible that it wouldn't take much to get me to almost anything. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Mon, 19 Sep 2011, Spencer Dawkins wrote: Hi, Dave, Anything that the IETF can do, to make the IAB and IETF Chair positions less of a full-time (or more) job, is a good thing. Anything? I believe you do not believe that statement, but I think it accurately summarizes the focus of this thread, so far. Thanks for the wake-up call, of course. Now, it's Monday AFTERNOON in my time zone. I am carefully reading the notes that were posted after I posted. I noticed that John Klensin says not JUST an offload proposal - and I get that - and I hadn't fully grokked the fiduciary responsibility point Marshall made. So, yes, I overspoke. Like I said - I'm fine being in the rough on this proposal, but I would like us to think about if not this, what gets offloaded? As a former IAOC chair there is another set of questions I would ask here: Who picks up the load? How might this change community dynamics and expectations around IAOC/Trust related work items? Some of the business related decisions that the IAOC must make are already quite contentious and delegation won't help. Finding volunteers willing to step up to chair like responsibility is already hard. I suspect that this will put additional pressure on the IAOC and IETF Trust chairs as well as the volunteers who step into the IETF/IAB seats. For better or worse the IAOC is seen as a housekeeping function but, as Jonne and Marshall have pointed out, there are serious responsibilities and major assets under management here. The existing balance of leadership and community participation has worked well. Swapping in other IESG or IAB members may serve as well, but this just adds load to another set of over-burdened folk. Moving to a system that is largely drawn from the broader community may have unexpected results for both the IAOC and the volunteers. If the community adopts this new model we must also be willing to ensure that the very best candidates have an incentive to pick up the administrative burdens. There is not a lot of glory and a fair amount of pain associated with the IAOC work and we could quickly find ourselves with a shortage of folks willing to do the dishes unless we find ways to support and reward this kind of community service. - Lucy Spencer ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
At 01:05 19-09-2011, Olaf Kolkman wrote: As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. The IETF Administrative Director serves, ex officio, as a non-voting member of the IAOC. He is still considered as part of the IAOC membership and is an eligible person. As such he is permitted to become a Trustee. Section 2.1 of draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-01 states that: They are not members of the Trust. Section 2.3 of the draft defines who are the trustees. The IAD makes the matter somewhat complicated if you want the fix to be through BCP 101. I suggest asking the IETF Counsel for advice about the correct fix. Section 2.1 mentions that: They are explicity invited to all of the IAOC and Trust activities, including executive sessions, and have the right to advice, solicited or not. The IETF Trust side may be a problem. Once again, I suggest asking IETF Counsel for advice. The IETF Trust monthly meetings last around 15 minutes. Given that it is the body responsible for handling DMCA Take Down Notices (curiously, the IAOC seems to be dealing with that), it is hard to say whether it is important or not for the IAB Chair, the IETF Chair and the ISOC President to be trustees. At 05:17 19-09-2011, Bob Hinden wrote: For example, there seemed to me to be a rough consensus in the discussion on the earlier draft that the IETF Chair should not be included in the proposal. Why did you not remove the IETF chair from the proposal? If I recall correctly, Russ said that he can put in the time. With the changes you propose we could end up with an IAOC that none of the I* chairs participate. As you point out, they are all busy and will have a hard time to following the issues if their involvement is optional. This will result in an IAOC that is disconnected from the community. I think it's very important for the I* chairs to share the responsibility for IAOC decisions by being voting members. Same for the IETF Trust, your proposal would result in the I* chairs not being members of the IETF Trust (unless the Trust was changed, another issue in itself). If I understand the argument, it is about having the I* chairs share the responsibility through their vote. draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-00 was based on delegation. This revision gives the I* chairs the same standing as the IAD. At 05:35 19-09-2011, jonne.soini...@renesasmobile.com wrote: Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other ways. However, I think the solution is a bit menemistä perse edellä puuhun (== putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management, asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the president and CEO of ISOC). This is odd. IASA was described as an administrative support structure. The above argues that it should act as a board of the IETF. It looks like two diametrically opposed perspectives. I don't think that the IAOC is the right forum to decide on policies about compliance with government regulations. At 06:10 19-09-2011, Jari Arkko wrote: I understand the point about chairs being involved. But I'm also sure there will never be an IAB/IETF chair who would ignore important IAOC business. This draft is about the ability (but not a requirement) of the chairs to delegate most of the day-to-day business and just stay on for the important stuff. One practical issue is that if the chairs under Appendix A.1 lists a change from a delegation model to ex-officio non-voting. At 08:05 19-09-2011, Sam Hartman wrote: Presumably the delegate would be subject to recall through the normal recall process (as are all IAOC members today except for the ISOC president) You should spell out things like whether the delegating IAOC member may recall their delegation and whether the body (IAB/IESG) may recall the delegate. The bodies which appointed IAOC members cannot recall them. A Recall is a strong action. Given that the IAOC makes decisions by committee, it would be difficult to pinpoint the responsibility for a decision on an individual. You can always recall the IAOC Chair. However, I'll point out that he has one vote and there isn't much he can do if the majority is against him. The IAOC does not require consensus. At 11:04 19-09-2011, Marshall Eubanks wrote: - If the IAOC
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
John, FWIW, in my tenures on the IESG and IAB, there were often folks who had a lot less long-term perspective on those bodies, the IETF, and the Internet than the Chairs and some who had as much or more. Unless we are willing to make the magical assumption, I don't think Chair has knowledge and perspective, no one else is likely to is really justified This is also my view. The chairs are always very experienced (and I would expect them to be). I only have seen the workings of the IESG, but in general, there is always a mixture of people with different experiences in the organization. As a datapoint, there are 3 people in the current IESG with 5 years on the job and 3 people with half a year on the job (see http://www.arkko.com/tools/admeasurements/stat/adterm_4.html), and outside the IESG I count 10 people who are still active in the IETF with 5 years of IESG experience. Many of these people have experience from various other bodies inside and outside the IETF. And it could well be that a newbie to the IESG has far better views and experience about a administrative issues or even regular IETF attendee worries than someone who has dealt with the technical stuff for a long time in the IESG. I'd say there is enough expertise and experience to pick other people as well. For sure. Don't worry about it. Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi Jari, On 9/19/11 9:36 PM, Jari Arkko jari.ar...@piuha.net wrote: Jonne, First, I want to thank you for the clear expression in Finnish. (Maheeta! Vaikka näiden muutosten läpivienti alkaa kyllä tuntua siltä kuin jäitä polttelisi, saa odottaa perse ruvella että kukaan olisi samaa mieltä mistään, 'kele!) Too bad the English version was not as graphic. Mun mielestäni tämä homma on menossa väärään suuntaan ja ihan reisille. Pitää funtsia, mitä ollaan korjaamassa, jottei heitetä lapsia pesuveden mukana. I wish people good luck trying to use machine translate all this.. Anyway, I like your description of the issue and it helps me understand the concerns. That being said, I could probably construct a similar argument for all of the bodies that an IETF chair, for instance, has to attend. Are we really saying that under all circumstances, the chairs have to attend everything that IAOC deals with? And be voting members? And if that is too much then the entire IAOC has to delegate more of its work? Really? And if the chairs have to be voting members in IAOC, why aren't they voting members in IAB and IESG? I have some trust in the chairs ability to prioritize, delegate and engage in the important discussions. Jari, it is a bit difficult to say what other groups (outside their own) the I* chairs have to attend. However, I don't think I said people have to go to every single meeting or be active in everything that IAOC decides to do. Already when I was in the IAOC, the work was organized (at least partly) into committees. Not everybody was active in every committee. So, you don't have to be involved in everything in the IAOC. In addition, you make it sound like we would have made people be active in the IAOC at gun point. Those instances were few and far apart! Actually, already then some things were being delegated. For instance, we had Greg Kapfer (CFO of ISOC) in the finance committee representing (in a sense of the word) ISOC. I want to be very clear: Sometimes it is just fine to delegate work. I think this is a completely internal matter for the IAOC to think how they organize themselves as long as the things get done. I actually think they should delegate more of the operational work! However, I don't think it is appropriate to delegate responsibility. Moving the chairs and the CEO/President of ISOC to a non-voting position is just that. I do like your idea that IAOC itself needs to work smarter though. It should really be just a board, not the guys doing the actual work. As an outsider, it sometimes feels like you guys are doing too much. In any case, if you and Bob think this would be a good direction for the IAOC to take, can you comment how feasible it is? Has it been tried, could it be tried? (And shouldn't it already be done if it was easy?) Just answering one of your questions above, but I just wanted to tie it to this thing here as well. You asked if the whole IAOC has to re-prioritize if the chairs are overwhelmed. I think your question is wrong. Theoretically, the IAOC should concentrate on doing decisions on the direction of the administration of the IETF. This means approving the budget, approving meetings, etc. There are few decisions to be made for the IETF, but those decisions are extremely important. However, there are multiple reasons why the IAOC is still very involved in the details. Partly this is also because the community expects them to be on top of many details with little importance - even on the frequency and the size of the cookie service during an IETF meetings. There are other reasons as well, of course. Cheers, Jonne. Jari On 19.09.2011 15:35, jonne.soini...@renesasmobile.com wrote: Hi Olaf, I went through the draft just now, and I have some quite strong feelings about it. I'm sorry I'm sending my comments so late in the game. A disclaimer first: I was the chairman of the IAOC some years back, but I haven't been actively involved with IETF administration after that. Therefore, my reactions are based on the history, and I don't necessarily have the up-to-date information of today, anymore. Anyways, I thank Olaf of bringing up this real problem: the IAOC is a lot of work measured in time, and effort. At least, when I was there, I think it was too much work for people who were already busy in so many other ways. However, I think the solution is a bit menemistä perse edellä puuhun (== putting the cart before the horse): The IAOC should be a _strategic_ body that gives a direction for the administration of the IETF. Basically IAOC is the closest you have to the board of the IETF (financial management, asset management, management of the operations). Therefore, by design, you have the stakeholders represented in the body (the main chairs, the president and CEO of ISOC). The Trust on the other hand is everything the IETF has (as ownership - the biggest asset the IETF has is of course the community). It owns the fruits of the labour of the
Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
On 2011-09-19 20:05, Olaf Kolkman wrote: snip Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Yes, it is incorrectly titled. As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. If the chairs should be trustees (are you arguing that?) then I agree, a trust agreement modification is needed. The Trust Agreement and *only* the Trust Agreement defines who is a Trustee. At the moment it says that members of the IAOC under BCP 101 are Trustees, without any qualification such as voting. So if we make the I* Chairs non-voting members of the IAOC by formally updating BCP 101, the I* Chairs would remain as Trustees. Since that is (in my experience) a large part of an IAOC member's time commitment, the problem you're trying to solve would not be solved, IMHO, unless the Trust amended the Trust Agreement too. That's all I wanted to point out. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: Trust membership [Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility]
As far as I understand the trust agreement the voting members and the IAD are members of the trust. If the 'chairs' are non-voting members of the IAOC then the idea is that they would not be trustees and a modification of the trust agreement is not needed. That can be clarified. If the chairs should be trustees (are you arguing that?) then I agree, a trust agreement modification is needed. The Trust Agreement and *only* the Trust Agreement defines who is a Trustee. At the moment it says that members of the IAOC under BCP 101 are Trustees, without any qualification such as voting. So if we make the I* Chairs non-voting members of the IAOC by formally updating BCP 101, the I* Chairs would remain as Trustees. Since that is (in my experience) a large part of an IAOC member's time commitment, the problem you're trying to solve would not be solved, IMHO, unless the Trust amended the Trust Agreement too. That's all I wanted to point out. Brian Brian's interpretation is correct. If someone is an IAOC member, voting or not, then he/she is a Trustee with full fiduciary duties. To change this, the Trust Agreement would need to be amended. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 2011-07-27 00:52, Olaf Kolkman wrote: Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. And it therefore removes the two Chairs' shared responsibility for decisions of the IAOC and the IETF Trust. I am still far from convinced that this is a good thing. Also, the new section 2.3, which is incorrectly titled but presumably is intended to be IETF Trust membership seems to me to be inconsistent with the Trust Agreement. The Trust Agreement states that the Eligible Persons (to become Trustees) are each a then-current member of the IAOC, duly appointed and in good standing in accordance with the procedures of the IAOC established pursuant to IETF document BCP 101 [as amended]. That doesn't exclude the non-voting members of the IAOC, which is why the IAD is already a Trustee. To change this, the Trust would have to change the Trust Agreement. To be clear, I'm not saying this can't be done, but it can't be ignored either. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
There is one error that must be fixed, and several nits. Otherwise, WFM. Marshall There is a big typo in Section 2.1 The ISOC board of Trustees, the IAB, and the IAOC will appoint two s/IAOC/IESG/ Nits Section 1 an integrated perspective about their bodies work to the IAOC. s/bodies/body's/ Section 2.2 s/Two member /Two members / on 3 bulleted lines. Section 2.3, title 2.3. IAOC membership * * * * * * s/IAOC/IETF Trust/ On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 8:52 AM, Olaf Kolkman o...@nlnetlabs.nl wrote: Dear Colleagues, Based on the discussion I've updated the draft: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership Essentially I incorporated Dave Crocker's proposal to 1) replace the 'chairs' by voting members appointed by the respective bodies. 2) allow the chairs to participate in all meetings and provide (unsolicited) advice. I believe that allows chairs to exercise their responsibilities of keeping a coherent perspective of the organization an allow them to steer outcomes if needed, but doesn't require the day-to-day involvement that is required from a diligent voting member. --Olaf Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 4/20/2011 2:21 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, Why? What happens if the person in that role is not specifically accountable? And by the way, what does it mean to be accountable in the way that you consider so important? What actions flow from that accountability? d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 4/21/11 10:38 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote: On 4/20/2011 2:21 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, Why? What happens if the person in that role is not specifically accountable? We have the potential for disconnect between the business of the ietf and the business of running the ietf. We had that before so it's not a hypothetical scenario. And by the way, what does it mean to be accountable in the way that you consider so important? It means that the ability to perform the iaoc function is a consideration for filling and retaining the role of ietf chair. What actions flow from that accountability? d/ ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 2011-04-22 05:49, Joel Jaeggli wrote: On 4/21/11 10:38 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote: On 4/20/2011 2:21 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, Why? What happens if the person in that role is not specifically accountable? We have the potential for disconnect between the business of the ietf and the business of running the ietf. We had that before so it's not a hypothetical scenario. Exactly. My personal experience as IETF Chair was that the administrative work, which we engineers have a lordly tendency to dismiss as trivial, is truly vital to making the IETF work properly. I just can't conceive of an IETF Chair decoupling from the chain of responsibility for this. Just to repeat myself: the IAOC workload represents a substantial *reduction* of the IETF Chair workload (and stress load) compared to the pre-IAOC situation. And by the way, what does it mean to be accountable in the way that you consider so important? It means that the ability to perform the iaoc function is a consideration for filling and retaining the role of ietf chair. Exactly. An IETF Chair who doesn't see this as fundamental would be a bad choice. What actions flow from that accountability? Failure in this part of the role would be a strong signal to NomCom if the Chair wants to re-up, and dramatic failure would be potential grounds for recall. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:49 -0700 Joel Jaeggli joe...@bogus.com wrote: On 4/21/11 10:38 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote: On 4/20/2011 2:21 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, Why? What happens if the person in that role is not specifically accountable? We have the potential for disconnect between the business of the ietf and the business of running the ietf. We had that before so it's not a hypothetical scenario. But, if it is the business of running the IETF that we are after, why is it better to try to blame/ hold accountable one individual than to hold the IESG accountable and let them manage the question of who goes to IAOC meetings as they (with the Chair's active participation in the IESG discussions) think fit? There is nothing in any of our document that either crowns the IETF Chair King or endows him or her with divine guidance or wisdom. And by the way, what does it mean to be accountable in the way that you consider so important? It means that the ability to perform the iaoc function is a consideration for filling and retaining the role of ietf chair. And that takes us back around the loop of requiring that the criteria for selection of the IETF Chair include a combination of skills and interests that we are unlikely to find, ability to devote unlimited time and attention to the job (and I mean unlimited as in ability to create and utilize 32 hour days), and resources to match. It also suggests that Nomcoms are able to understand all of those skills and optimize for all of them at once, choosing from the relatively small number of people who meet the criteria. Noting that Russ has done, IMO, a superhuman job of balancing the various tasks and demands that we've placed on him but is still feeling overloaded, you will forgive me if my reaction to imposing those requirements as minimum conditions on future candidates is a little skeptical. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi Bob, At 14:04 19-04-2011, Bob Hinden wrote: But that may not always be the case that all IAOC members have a lot of IETF experience. We need to have a governance model that works into the future. Yes, it may happen that some IAOC members may not have a lot of IETF experience. How do you ensure that the IAOC members have a lot of IETF experience? You can tweak the governance model. The IETF community also have to be convinced that it is the better model or else it will be changed. There are some safeguards in the IETF model that I won't get into. It's merely a matter of time for that to change. I'll list the names of the people who have participated on this thread: Dave Crocker Lucy Lynch John Klensin Russ Housley Jari Arkko Olaf Kolkman Brian Carpenter Henk Uijterwaal Leslie Daigle Ole Jacobsen Marshall Eubanks Joe Touch Joel Jaeggli Steve Crocker Michael Richardson Barry Leiba Spencer Dawkins Bert Wijnen The people listed below were part of NomCom: Gregory Cauchie Mehmet Ersue Dorothy Gellert Tony Hansen Suresh Krishnan Dirk Kroeselberg Jan Seedorf Pete St. Pierre Rolf Winter You may notice that there isn't any intersection with the previous list. It would certainly give the IAOC chair a broader view, but still not the views of the I* chair. Also, if the I* chairs (3 of 9 voting members) regularly didn't attend, it would be much harder to get a quorum for a meeting and pass motions. I did not comment on getting a quorum previously as it's only adding one more problem to the mix. The IAOC decides the details about its decision-making rules, including its rules for quorum, conflict of interest, and breaking of ties. I agree with you that the views of the I* Chairs are important. It also helps avoid back and forth discussion between I* bodies; e.g. is this an IESG decision or can the IAOC decide. I don't think that the IAB or the IESG can be absolved from the responsibility if the IAOC takes a negative turn as each of them chooses an IAOC member. If the ex-IAB Chair and the IESG Chair ask for a change to the model due to the workload, is it on a whim? This is where people walk away from a problem because they tried and got stone-walled. If the IETF believes that it is appropriate to mince everything they can get out of a person in the name of good governance, so be it. Regards, -sm ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 4/19/2011 12:53 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: 1. ISOC, IAB and IESG each appoint one person currently. Change this to be two each, the same as Nomcom. Each year, they would appoint one person. 2. Move the I* Chairs to be non-voting ex-officio participants, the same as the IETF Administrative Director. They are welcome to participate or be explicitly invited to all IAOC/Trust activities. This produces the continuity that is needed for the admin work, but also retains access to the expertise of the I* chairs. I don't agree. Appointing two people (or more?) doesn't solve the problem I am concerned about, it still doesn't bring the chairs perspective. It also significantly changes the governance model by changing the balance between between nomcom, iab, iesg, and ISOC appointed members. Also, adding six people (still counting the chairs) will make the IAOC much larger and unwieldy. For clarification: 1. The IAB, IESG and ISOC each put two voting people onto the IAOC/Trust today. My proposal preserves that. 2. The intent behind moving the I* Chairs to non-voting status, like the IAD, is to ensure that they can continue to participate but remove from the the requirement for daily IAOC/Trust activities. The presumption is that they dive in for the big stuff, of the sort you cited, but do not have the burden of regular participation. For emphasis: As SM notes, my starting point is two of these folk saying they have to have a change. Looking at the list of their duties, no one should be surprised that they feel (and are) overloaded. So, they looked over their current duties and decided this is the one they'd like to change. I don't have -- and haven't heard anyone else suggest -- that some other change in their duties would be more appropriate. So I see the relevant question as how to make a change, not whether. d/ ps. As for the broader concern about having a sufficient base of experience on the IAOC/Trust, that applies for all appointments to all of our management groups. Worse, we have a continuing challenge to select for the right kinds of experience. For example, merely hanging around the IETF for a long time does not mean one knows how to manage an area or manage a budget. (I'm stating the obvious. The reason is that I don't see the current effort to change I* Chair participation in the IAOC/Trust as changing this issue.) -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dave CROCKER d...@dcrocker.net wrote: On 4/19/2011 12:53 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: [Dave CROCKER d...@dcrocker.net wrote:] 1. ISOC, IAB and IESG each appoint one person currently. Change this to be two each, the same as Nomcom. Each year, they would appoint one person. 2. Move the I* Chairs to be non-voting ex-officio participants, the same as the IETF Administrative Director. They are welcome to participate or be explicitly invited to all IAOC/Trust activities. This produces the continuity that is needed for the admin work, but also retains access to the expertise of the I* chairs. I always respect Dave's suggestions. (Of course, I don't always agree with them... ;^) I don't agree. Appointing two people (or more?) doesn't solve the problem I am concerned about, it still doesn't bring the chairs perspective. I usually respect Bob's suggestions, but I don't always understand them. (In particular, he's lost me here.) It also significantly changes the governance model by changing the balance between between nomcom, iab, iesg, and ISOC appointed members. The change in balance seems rather minimal -- but that could certainly be fine-tuned. Also, adding six people (still counting the chairs) will make the IAOC much larger and unwieldy. That I understand. Perhaps we shouldn't be adding any... However, Russ Olaf seem to think there's work they have been expected to do. How will that work get done? Is the proposal first floated simply telling them the work is their responsibility -- and they need to find volunteers to do it? Us hoi-polloi aren't getting these details! For clarification: 1. The IAB, IESG and ISOC each put two voting people onto the IAOC/Trust today. My proposal preserves that. 2. The intent behind moving the I* Chairs to non-voting status, like the IAD, is to ensure that they can continue to participate but remove from the the requirement for daily IAOC/Trust activities. The presumption is that they dive in for the big stuff, of the sort you cited, but do not have the burden of regular participation. I have a slightly different view: that the IAOC is entitled to try to entice them into participation, but they would have the right to say No. For emphasis: As SM notes, my starting point is two of these folk saying they have to have a change. Looking at the list of their duties, no one should be surprised that they feel (and are) overloaded. So, they looked over their current duties and decided this is the one they'd like to change. I don't have -- and haven't heard anyone else suggest -- that some other change in their duties would be more appropriate. So I see the relevant question as how to make a change, not whether. I agree. Hopefully most of us can agree. Charging them to find someone to do the work feels wrong to me. Moving them to non-voting status feels right. Enabling them to participate in areas they feel critical feels right. Adding other individuals with voting status seems reasonable, but not-exactly-right. Perhaps the most important change would be simply not counting them for purposes of quorum... -- John Leslie j...@jlc.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 2011-04-20 21:13, SM wrote: Hi Bob, At 14:04 19-04-2011, Bob Hinden wrote: But that may not always be the case that all IAOC members have a lot of IETF experience. We need to have a governance model that works into the future. ... You may notice that there isn't any intersection with the previous list. I think you are overlooking that some of the people in the first list have been in liaison positions in NomCom; in terms of understanding NomCom's challenges, that is sufficient. In any case, the difficulty of finding available candidates is quite apparent. ... I agree with you that the views of the I* Chairs are important. In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, and therefore should be a voting member as a matter of principle. I don't believe that argument applies to the IAB Chair - we should IMHO have a collective goal to sharply reduce the IAB's involvement in administrative issues, so that it can do its architectural and liaison jobs properly. Delegating the IAB Chair role in the IAOC would be a step in that direction, along with appointing the permanent RFC Series Editor. We haven't discussed the third proposed delegation, that of the ISOC President's seat, very much. Assuming it was delegated to another officer of ISOC, that would seem reasonable too. But it shouldn't be delegated to just anybody, IMHO. Brian Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Brian, If we are going to do this, then I tend to agree with your conclusions. I agree with you that the views of the I* Chairs are important. In the case of the IETF Chair I believe the issue is that it's highly desirable, from a governance viewpoint, that the IETF Chair has *personal* responsibility in IAOC decisions, and therefore should be a voting member as a matter of principle. My preference is that the IETF not delegate this responsibility. One additional reason for this is that the IETF chair is appointed by the nomcom (vs. the IAB who appoints their own chair). It is part of the job and an important part. I don't believe that argument applies to the IAB Chair - we should IMHO have a collective goal to sharply reduce the IAB's involvement in administrative issues, so that it can do its architectural and liaison jobs properly. Delegating the IAB Chair role in the IAOC would be a step in that direction, along with appointing the permanent RFC Series Editor. In the case of the IAB, I would prefer that the IAB selected it's representative to the IAOC and that they become the full IAOC voting member (and a member of the IETF trust). That is, it be completely delegated for a fixed term. The IAB could consider this person as a vice-chair or even a co-chair. The both represent other ways to reduce the load on the chair. We haven't discussed the third proposed delegation, that of the ISOC President's seat, very much. Assuming it was delegated to another officer of ISOC, that would seem reasonable too. But it shouldn't be delegated to just anybody, IMHO. Also agree. I think it should be limited to the CFO or COO. I think, as above with the IAB, it should be fully delegated. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
--On Saturday, April 16, 2011 07:51 -0700 Lucy Lynch lly...@civil-tongue.net wrote: The implication is that the people sitting in the positions of IAB Chair and IETF Chair are essential to the good operation of the IAOC/Trust. Someone else from their groups or even someone else that they appoint from outside cannot perform the task of IAOC/Trust member adequately. I think this is the wrong question. I don't think this is about the people who sit on the IAOC or the Trust, it is about the roles. Their participation is part of the chain of accountability to the community. The IAOC was crafted to include both the IAB and IETF Chairs as well as the ISOC CEO in their respective roles and not as Fred, Harold, and Lynn (as members of the IETF community). Why? What are the specific contributions (insights and skills) that these roles regularly perform, in the conduct of the IAOC/Trust that cannot be performed adequately by others? see above. One more point here: as a former Chair of the IAOC (IAB appointed member from the community) I'm sympathetic the the overload arguments but I'll note that absent the IAB/IETF chairs the work of the IAOC chair and the weight put on that role may increase in unexpected ways. I agree with many of the points that Bob, Brian, Leslie, and Jari have made in earlier posts and think that we need to take a broader view of the problems we're trying to solve here. Role overload is an on-going problem but I'm not sure we solve this by moving the administrative accountability we gained through BCP 101 to additional volunteers. At the risk of agreeing violently with Dave, I think the series of comments above, and referenced above, are missing something. None of this familiy of delegation or someone else proposals requires that the IAB or IESG Chairs not serve on the IAOC. If they think that is sensible and they have the time, they are free to do that. We might even strongly encourage it. However, if those people conclude that limited available time is better spent in other ways or that, if they take the IAOC position, they would not be able to devote adequate attention to it, aren't we better off giving them the flexibility and discretion to make that decision? Similarly, if someone tells the appointing body I have the time and resources to take on the IAB Chair or IETF Chair position but only if that position does not include the responsibility of sitting on the IAOC isn't it better to give those bodies the option of considering that person rather than limiting the choices to those who can sign up for all of the job? At least from my perspective, broadening the flexibility available to already-appointed IAB and IETF Chairs and to the bodies that appoint them is the real issue here. _Requiring_ that they serve on the IAOC does not create more time or resources, it just limits the range of people who can take those positions or, more likely, raises the odds of getting someone onto the IAOC who won't be able to pay full (or even adequate) attention. So. in addition to the questions Dave posed, the question I would address to you and Bob is whether, given a hypothetical choice of someone sitting on the IAOC ex-officio but not being able to really pay attention because he or she concludes that there are more pressing priorities and having someone representing the IAB or IESG who really can pay attention, which one you would pick. In the worst case, if you prefer to have the Chairs nominally present but not paying complete attention, then keep insisting that they are the only ones who can possibly occupy the IAOC slot. As part of that, figure out how you are going to convince the Nomcom and the IAB that selecting people for the Chair roles should have will give IAOC first priority regardless of their judgment about the importance of other aspects of their roles as an absolute criterion and/or how you are going to convince the community to recall anyone in the Chair roles who does not give the IAOC that priority. best, john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Bob, et al, On 4/18/2011 2:25 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: I didn't say no one else could do the job adequately. I said would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF. Right. And my second sentence did go farther than I meant. However rejecting an effort to change the current arrangement -- especially when it is initiated by a principal -- means that alternatives are not acceptable, which translates roughly to saying the alternatives will not produce adequate performance. Otherwise it looks like a difference between 'adequate' and perhaps perfect? There is a core reality, here, that the I* Chairs are overburdened. This is obvious from looking at the list of their duties and underscored by the source of the current initiative. We can choose to defer doing anything, under the guise of taking a 'holistic' view or we can try to help with the specific burden that is the focus of the overburdened folk. On the average, we do better with incremental change and this is the one before us now. If I generalize this, I would say that the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. ... I think the I* chairs, in my view bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than another person would not have. My own simplistic summary: For some topics it is extremely helpful to have the broader knowledge and insight that can be provided by an I* chair. For many topics, this is not needed, but for some it makes a significant difference. To that end, here's a very simple proposal that resolves the issue cleanly: 1. ISOC, IAB and IESG each appoint one person currently. Change this to be two each, the same as Nomcom. Each year, they would appoint one person. 2. Move the I* Chairs to be non-voting ex-officio participants, the same as the IETF Administrative Director. They are welcome to participate or be explicitly invited to all IAOC/Trust activities. This produces the continuity that is needed for the admin work, but also retains access to the expertise of the I* chairs. d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Hi Bob, At 14:25 18-04-2011, Bob Hinden wrote: I didn't say no one else could do the job adequately. I said would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF. Some examples where an I* chair had a significant influence on a decision that IAOC made include: - The hiring of the Transitional RSE - Many of the Beijing meeting issues (prior and post signing the MOU) - Specific venue selections (in one case avoiding a less than ideal venue) - The need for transparency in certain IAOC actions (day passes, venue rotation) - Discussion of what policy decisions that the IAOC can make vs. the IESG vs. community - Discussion about when to get community feedback - Secretariat contract (RFP, bidders review, selection, etc.) - RFC Publisher and Publisher contracts (RFP, bidders review, selection, etc.) Some of these decision might have been different without one or more I* chairs being directly involved in the decision. Please review the minutes for more detail. From RFC 4071: The IAOC shall be accountable to the IETF community for the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the IASA. In a personal note that Olaf posted ( http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg66161.html ), it is mentioned that it takes 0.7 FTE. I do not believe that the decisions mentioned above are unimportant. However, you have to consider which decisions require your attention when you have a limited amount of time available. The current members of the IAOC, excluding ex officio, are: Eric Burger Dave Crocker Marshall Eubanks Bob Hinden Ray Pelletier (non-voting) None of them are new to the IETF. If it requires I* Chairs for the IAOC to be transparent, something is not right. I think the I* chairs, in my view bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than another person would not have. If I understand your arguments, it is also about avoiding a disconnect between the administrative side of the IETF and the IAB/IESG. draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-00 argues for a change to reduce the workload and make the I* Chair positions more attractive. Would it help if the IAOC Chair has a liaison position on the IAB and IESG? The IAB and IESG Chairs can use their discretion to determine which IAOC meetings they should attend. The IAOC Chair gets a broader view. The above pushes the workload around instead of addressing the problem. If this trend continues, the best fit people will turn down I* positions. Regards, -sm ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dave, On Apr 19, 2011, at 10:33 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote: Bob, et al, On 4/18/2011 2:25 PM, Bob Hinden wrote: I didn't say no one else could do the job adequately. I said would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF. Right. And my second sentence did go farther than I meant. However rejecting an effort to change the current arrangement -- especially when it is initiated by a principal -- means that alternatives are not acceptable, which translates roughly to saying the alternatives will not produce adequate performance. Otherwise it looks like a difference between 'adequate' and perhaps perfect? We don't get perfect :-) There is a core reality, here, that the I* Chairs are overburdened. This is obvious from looking at the list of their duties and underscored by the source of the current initiative. We can choose to defer doing anything, under the guise of taking a 'holistic' view or we can try to help with the specific burden that is the focus of the overburdened folk. On the average, we do better with incremental change and this is the one before us now. Then let's talk about the overall problem and not a point solution. If I generalize this, I would say that the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. ... I think the I* chairs, in my view bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than another person would not have. My own simplistic summary: For some topics it is extremely helpful to have the broader knowledge and insight that can be provided by an I* chair. For many topics, this is not needed, but for some it makes a significant difference. I agree, and it is representative of the level of current participation of I* chairs. To that end, here's a very simple proposal that resolves the issue cleanly: 1. ISOC, IAB and IESG each appoint one person currently. Change this to be two each, the same as Nomcom. Each year, they would appoint one person. 2. Move the I* Chairs to be non-voting ex-officio participants, the same as the IETF Administrative Director. They are welcome to participate or be explicitly invited to all IAOC/Trust activities. This produces the continuity that is needed for the admin work, but also retains access to the expertise of the I* chairs. I don't agree. Appointing two people (or more?) doesn't solve the problem I am concerned about, it still doesn't bring the chairs perspective. It also significantly changes the governance model by changing the balance between between nomcom, iab, iesg, and ISOC appointed members. Also, adding six people (still counting the chairs) will make the IAOC much larger and unwieldy. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
SM, Eric Burger Dave Crocker Marshall Eubanks Bob Hinden Ray Pelletier (non-voting) None of them are new to the IETF. If it requires I* Chairs for the IAOC to be transparent, something is not right. But that may not always be the case that all IAOC members have a lot of IETF experience. We need to have a governance model that works into the future. I think the I* chairs, in my view bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than another person would not have. If I understand your arguments, it is also about avoiding a disconnect between the administrative side of the IETF and the IAB/IESG. Yes draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-00 argues for a change to reduce the workload and make the I* Chair positions more attractive. Would it help if the IAOC Chair has a liaison position on the IAB and IESG? The IAB and IESG Chairs can use their discretion to determine which IAOC meetings they should attend. The IAOC Chair gets a broader view. The above pushes the workload around instead of addressing the problem. If this trend continues, the best fit people will turn down I* positions. It would certainly give the IAOC chair a broader view, but still not the views of the I* chair. Also, if the I* chairs (3 of 9 voting members) regularly didn't attend, it would be much harder to get a quorum for a meeting and pass motions. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Dave, On 4/14/2011 9:51 AM, Bob Hinden wrote: My concern is that this proposed change would likely make the IAOC work worse. That is, I think it would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF and that is why I am concerned. Bob, That is a concrete and basic assertion. Please put some flesh on its bones so that the basis for your view can be understood better. The implication is that the people sitting in the positions of IAB Chair and IETF Chair are essential to the good operation of the IAOC/Trust. Someone else from their groups or even someone else that they appoint from outside cannot perform the task of IAOC/Trust member adequately. I didn't say no one else could do the job adequately. I said would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF. Some examples where an I* chair had a significant influence on a decision that IAOC made include: - The hiring of the Transitional RSE - Many of the Beijing meeting issues (prior and post signing the MOU) - Specific venue selections (in one case avoiding a less than ideal venue) - The need for transparency in certain IAOC actions (day passes, venue rotation) - Discussion of what policy decisions that the IAOC can make vs. the IESG vs. community - Discussion about when to get community feedback - Secretariat contract (RFP, bidders review, selection, etc.) - RFC Publisher and Publisher contracts (RFP, bidders review, selection, etc.) Some of these decision might have been different without one or more I* chairs being directly involved in the decision. Please review the minutes for more detail. If I generalize this, I would say that the I* chairs have been actively involved in the most significant decisions the IAOC makes, they tend to be less active in many of the day to day operational issues. For example, there are weekly calls in the months before an IETF meeting that the host, NOC team, IAD, and a few other people attend. I don't think an I* chair has every been involved at this level. I think the I* chairs, in my view bring a broad view of the community and operational needs based on what's involved in doing their jobs than another person would not have. Why? What are the specific contributions (insights and skills) that these roles regularly perform, in the conduct of the IAOC/Trust that cannot be performed adequately by others? I think it because the role has the individual doing the job getting involved in the many related activities that gives them more insight than someone else, even a member of the same group. To cite an example, I was on the IAB in the past, but I wouldn't claim to have the same total understanding of the IAB (and the things the IAB is responsible for) as the IAB chair at the time. It's not the skill per se, it's being involved in the all of the topics that the chair is naturally involved in. d/ ps. Reminder: I've just joined the IAOC/Trust, which means I've attended a few meetings and seen some operation. As always, my comments have nothing to do with the individuals; this is about organizational design. My concern is as you say about the organizational design, not the current set of individuals. I want to make sure this keeps working well with the next set of leaders and the set after that. Bob ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Sat, 16 Apr 2011, John C Klensin wrote: snip At the risk of agreeing violently with Dave, I think the series of comments above, and referenced above, are missing something. None of this familiy of delegation or someone else proposals requires that the IAB or IESG Chairs not serve on the IAOC. If they think that is sensible and they have the time, they are free to do that. We might even strongly encourage it. However, if those people conclude that limited available time is better spent in other ways or that, if they take the IAOC position, they would not be able to devote adequate attention to it, aren't we better off giving them the flexibility and discretion to make that decision? Similarly, if someone tells the appointing body I have the time and resources to take on the IAB Chair or IETF Chair position but only if that position does not include the responsibility of sitting on the IAOC isn't it better to give those bodies the option of considering that person rather than limiting the choices to those who can sign up for all of the job? I'm not arguing that any of the IETF/IAB/etc hat wearers are inexhaustible resources, I'm saying that the AdminRest process looked hard at the composition and duties of the IAOC and if the needs have changed, or the community concerns have shifted, we should approach the current problems in a holistic manner and not engineer short term solutions on the fly. I'll point you at your own last paragraph here; http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg33932.html At least from my perspective, broadening the flexibility available to already-appointed IAB and IETF Chairs and to the bodies that appoint them is the real issue here. _Requiring_ that they serve on the IAOC does not create more time or resources, it just limits the range of people who can take those positions or, more likely, raises the odds of getting someone onto the IAOC who won't be able to pay full (or even adequate) attention. certainly one possible outcome So. in addition to the questions Dave posed, the question I would address to you and Bob is whether, given a hypothetical choice of someone sitting on the IAOC ex-officio but not being able to really pay attention because he or she concludes that there are more pressing priorities and having someone representing the IAB or IESG who really can pay attention, which one you would pick. In the worst case, if you prefer to have the Chairs nominally present but not paying complete attention, then keep insisting that they are the only ones who can possibly occupy the IAOC slot. I would of course prefer full attention and skilled participation. I'd also like the full confidence of the community in the process. As part of that, figure out how you are going to convince the Nomcom and the IAB that selecting people for the Chair roles should have will give IAOC first priority regardless of their judgment about the importance of other aspects of their roles as an absolute criterion and/or how you are going to convince the community to recall anyone in the Chair roles who does not give the IAOC that priority. New/old problem that may require additional revision on several fronts - not just the IAOC. - Lucy best, john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 4/16/2011 7:51 AM, Lucy Lynch wrote: On Fri, 15 Apr 2011, Dave CROCKER wrote: That is a concrete and basic assertion. Please put some flesh on its bones so that the basis for your view can be understood better. Let me take a run at this. Back in the pre-history of BCP 101 we had very little control over many of the ... I do not see anything in the extended history you provide that explains Bob's assertion of what is needed now. Perhaps I missed it. If so, please point to the specific requirements that apply now. Better still, let's let Bob explain his own assertion of the requirement. (It's of course fine for you to explain your own view, but Bob is the current chair of the IAOC and speaks from a different, current vantage point than anyone else.) The implication is that the people sitting in the positions of IAB Chair and IETF Chair are essential to the good operation of the IAOC/Trust. Someone else from their groups or even someone else that they appoint from outside cannot perform the task of IAOC/Trust member adequately. I think this is the wrong question. I don't think this is about the people who sit on the IAOC or the Trust, it is about the roles. That's what I was referring to. No idea how my text appears to say otherwise. However roles do not perform. People occupying those roles do. Why? What are the specific contributions (insights and skills) that these roles regularly perform, in the conduct of the IAOC/Trust that cannot be performed adequately by others? see above. That's unfortunately circular and ambiguous reference. What text specifically provide the answer to this question? One more point here: as a former Chair of the IAOC (IAB appointed member from the community) I'm sympathetic the the overload arguments but I'll note that absent the IAB/IETF chairs the work of the IAOC chair and the weight put on that role may increase in unexpected ways. This is another assertion without providing substance. My original note asked for the substance so that the discussion can include more than expert assertions of agreement or disagreement. Folks need to note some rather basic points: 1. Things are working fine, except that they aren't. This entire thread comes from a proposal from folk who are overloaded and who need things to change. When someone says I cannot keep doing the task I've been assigned either they are not competent to the task or the nature or terms of task need to change. I don't see any basis for considering the former, which leaves us with the latter. By any reasonable measure, the IETF has concentrated far too much work onto its two Chairs. For an organization devoted to an industry based on distributed control, we have a remarkable dislike to distributing control within the organization. One effect of this is to dramatically reduce the pool of people available for those concentrated jobs. Here we have a request for a particular reduction. If that reduction is not tolerable, we need to understand why? Separately, of course, we need to consider the details of the change and consider tradeoffs for alternative solutions. To do that, we need to understand the requirements that are at issue. Hence my questions to Bob. 2. The view that no change should occur without a holistic review is a consistently effective way to kill any change effort. We have plenty of experience with its effectiveness. Note that the most effective enhancements to successful IETF work is by incremental change, not holistic re-evaluation. Here we have a proposal from those experiencing the problem. A proposal states the problem and offers a solution. My original question to Bob was to help us assess the assertion of the problem and the assertion of the solution. (One or another notes implies that I've stated an opinion about the proposal, but I haven't. For now, I'm trying to get source data, including performance requirements and the logic behind the proposal.) d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On Fri, 15 Apr 2011, Dave CROCKER wrote: On 4/14/2011 9:51 AM, Bob Hinden wrote: My concern is that this proposed change would likely make the IAOC work worse. That is, I think it would have a negative impact on the operations of the IETF and that is why I am concerned. Bob, That is a concrete and basic assertion. Please put some flesh on its bones so that the basis for your view can be understood better. Let me take a run at this. Back in the pre-history of BCP 101 we had very little control over many of the administrative functions that support the actual work of the IETF. We had a single long term relationship with an organization that run the meetings and collected fees on behalf of the the IETF and performed many of the secretariat functions. Over time, this relationship had frayed considerably (on both sides) and the community become increasingly restive, looking for more autonomy and a better understanding of our own internal business processes. There were a number of drivers for the (extended) discussions about process and one of these was overload on the volunteers in the leadership roles. Among the solutions crafted up were the creation of the IASA and the hiring of our first paid employee (IAD). We also ended our relationship with the existing secretariat and moved to a process of contracting for services through the IAD with over site from what became the IAOC. The termination of our relationship with CNRI then spawned the creation of the IETF Trust. All of this took an enormous amount of community time and energy and a lot of tough questions had to be asked and answered. I'll just highlight a couple: - an all volunteer organization hired it's first paid employee. note that this can be a slippery and expensive slope and there was always a risk that this might change the volunteer culture - the IASA/IAOC/IETF Trust were tasked with stewardship for the administrative health of the IETF. - the Trust formalized the future disposition of IETF assets and allowed an orderly transition from claims from previous administrations. My belief at the time was that the primary concerns in all of this were a desire for greater transparency and organizational autonomy. There was a clear demand from many that the IETF own it's own processes. The implication is that the people sitting in the positions of IAB Chair and IETF Chair are essential to the good operation of the IAOC/Trust. Someone else from their groups or even someone else that they appoint from outside cannot perform the task of IAOC/Trust member adequately. I think this is the wrong question. I don't think this is about the people who sit on the IAOC or the Trust, it is about the roles. Their participation is part of the chain of accountability to the community. The IAOC was crafted to include both the IAB and IETF Chairs as well as the ISOC CEO in their respective roles and not as Fred, Harold, and Lynn (as members of the IETF community). Why? What are the specific contributions (insights and skills) that these roles regularly perform, in the conduct of the IAOC/Trust that cannot be performed adequately by others? see above. One more point here: as a former Chair of the IAOC (IAB appointed member from the community) I'm sympathetic the the overload arguments but I'll note that absent the IAB/IETF chairs the work of the IAOC chair and the weight put on that role may increase in unexpected ways. I agree with many of the points that Bob, Brian, Leslie, and Jari have made in earlier posts and think that we need to take a broader view of the problems we're trying to solve here. Role overload is an on-going problem but I'm not sure we solve this by moving the administrative accountability we gained through BCP 101 to additional volunteers. - Lucy d/ ps. Reminder: I've just joined the IAOC/Trust, which means I've attended a few meetings and seen some operation. As always, my comments have nothing to do with the individuals; this is about organizational design. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
Olaf, Thanks for posting this analysis. I'm on travel but will have a careful look in a few days. Brian On 2011-04-15 04:25, Olaf Kolkman wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Certainly the IASA/IAD/IAOC reorganisation produced a noticeable reduction in the IETF Chair workload, but what has changed since http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-carpenter-ietf-chair-tasks-00 ? It would be good to have a similar analysis for the IAB chair role. Below is a copy from a note I mailed to the IAB dd Feb 17, 2011. It wis a variation on a note that I mailed to the Nomcom in 2009. It may not map exactly to what you are asking, but I believe it is close enough. Also, my wish to remove the _must_ in the 'iChiefs must be a member of the IAOC' best current practice is not a cherry picking act. The IAB has hired secretarial assistance for the agenda keeping, todo-list maintenance, minutes, etc. It is pushing forward the 'programs and initiatives' model that allows for subgroups to do a lot of actual work without the chair driving that (i.e. much more formal delegation of activities to sub-groups with possibly external members). Starting off with a personal note. As you know the IAB chair is selected by and from the IAB membership on a yearly basis. I first volunteered for the role of chair in March 2007. When I volunteered the first time I committed myself for 3 to 5 years (obviously subject to Nomcom and IAB decision). A minimum of 3 years because anything shorter is almost not worth the investment in the learning curve and the personal network that is needed to do the job effectively. Not longer than 5 years because of the fact that(much) longer terms tend to result in strong identification of a person with the role, sharpness and creativity decline, and possibly forms of mannerism in dealing with issues. From my perspective the most ideal scenario was (remember I wrote this in 2009) that I'd be allowed by the Nomcom and the IAB to serve as a chair for one more year and then be around for another to allow for continuity. In any case I think that it would be good for the Nomcom to look out for 'chair material'. The main reason why I want to step down now is that there have been some developments in the NLnet Labs situation that need my attention as director of that organization that can not be combined with a 0.7 FTE that I seem to be putting in at the moment. As for the responsibilities of the chair. ∙ A number of 'mechanical/managerial' tasks: ∙ Managing and organizing the IAB work-flow both on architectural and organizational items ∙ Setting priorities, planning activities to be aligned, identify actionable items and make sure next steps are taken ∙ Set up various meetings, manage agendas ∙ Track minutes creation and publication ∙ A chair's job can be relieved by having an executive director that complements a chairs talents in organizing these activities. ∙ Drive discussions ∙ defining goals ∙ moderate discussions ∙ call consensus ∙ Identify work items ∙ Incoming appeals ∙ Specific questions to the IAB from external bodies ∙ Track (or make sure they are tracked) various developments that may have impact on the IETF. ∙ IASA/IAOC and Trust ∙ As ex-officio membership, to represent IAB (and IRTF) matters Because the chair is involved in all these activities (s)he becomes a de-facto information hub, besides because the chair often act as spokes person there isa tendency for all major organizational work items to gravitate towards the chair, specifically if the interests of the other members are mostly architectural. There are arguments that the load on the IAB chair is to high and it causes the job to be more than a half-time position (depending on personal effectively, delegation skill, organizational skills and the quality of an executive director[*], it may even be closer to 3 quarters). And I believe that there are some structural questions one can ask, such as in the ex-officio membership of the IASA/IOAC. If we manage to get the Programs ran as more or less autonomous motors that produce recommendations to the IAB it may be that the chairs job becomes relatively bearable. While I think that with the Programs we have put a good structure in place it will need serious efforts of the next chair and the NEW IAB to make working with programs part of the common mindset. I think, and I realize that I am biased, that an IAB chair has some of the following skills, properties: ∙ Organizational: tracking actions, poking people, planning the work load. A good Executive Director can be of tremendous help ∙ Moderating and motivating: The ability to herd cats where occasionally a cat will have its claws
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Apr 15, 2011, at 1:19 AM, Leslie Daigle wrote: Speaking as an individual, but an individual who helped set up this structure and who sat in the non-delegated ex officio IAB Chair position on the IAOC (and IETF Trust) for a couple of years, let me offer some comments. As Bob noted, elsewhere in the thread, your draft does not describe how to delegate responsibilities, it describes how to allow alternatively fill the positions. And I believe that is a fatal flaw. The discussion on this thread certainly indicates that there isn't a clear grasp of what the responsibilities are for the positions in question. The responsibilities are not: show up for meetings/telecons, offer opinions about how to administer the IETF, and put in a vote when called upon, although those certainly are the functions expected. You described the IAB Chair as hub as if that was a bad thing. Certainly not my intention to qualify it as 'bad'. The note was written from the perspective of what is the work load and what are the tasks. Not from the perspective of what are the responsibilities of the chair. In fact, the one thing the Chair (of the IAB -- but it applies in analog to the IETF) needs to do is to support the IAB's functioning (through leadership, organization, note-taking, cajoling, listening, etc). That doesn't mean the IAB Chair has to do the work of the whole IAB, but it does mean that an overall perspective is critical, and each Chair has to best organize her/himself to achieve the one task. Agreed, being informed (as 'information hub') seems to be a prerequisite for gaining that overall perspective. In setting up the IAOC as it is, the intent was to inject the IAB Chair's overall perspective into the IAOC's discussions, including the support for IAB activities. It was not a question of simply finding more credible people to put on the IAOC. If change is needed, the one path away from the fatal flaw seems to be to articulate the actual responsibilities of the IAB Chair (and IETF Chair and ISOC CEO, as appropriate) in the intended ex officio positions, such that it is possible to get agreement and external confirmation that the role is being properly fulfilled by whomever is selected to perform them. Fair enough, and in addition, as a take-away from the thread so far: those responsibilities go two ways: incoming and outgoing. It is not only the general perspective that the iChiefs bring to the IAOC but also what they take out of it. For instance; getting informed about the general state and health of things. I guess I have some homework to do because at the moment I am not able to formulate the responsibility in a way that goes beyond (for the IAB role): providing the IAB perspective into IAOC decisions; and getting informed about IAOC activities that are relevant for the IAB and the activities it oversees. - --Olaf PS: Why does the following phrase come to mind: when in a hole stop digging... Olaf M. KolkmanNLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ I will start to use a new PGP key (ID 0x3B6AAA64) at the beginning of May 2011. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: This message is locally signed. Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iEYEARECAAYFAk2oCPwACgkQtN/ca3YJIofdBgCgquirmPwR35riQZRzBvkPaoqb tGEAoPkbV6MfxzEaPcp+2/gz9sea5AVr =ncXX -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
A couple of observations from my personal viewpoint. I tend to agree with others that we need to think about this in a top-down fashion, i.e. start from what is the problem that we intend to solve. I do have a serious concern about the workload for the people involved, particularly the chairs. But I wanted to make a couple of additional points. First, I would not necessarily take it for granted that we have an infinite supply of people for various tasks. Finding an IESG member with enough time on their hands to participate the IAOC is not a given. We could of course always choose from outside the IESG, but again, most of the IETF participants are not here for administrative work, so while many can do it, I'm guessing some arm twisting would be required. Second, even if you do find one, its not given that it provides the kind of connection between the chair and the IAOC that we want. Olaf pointed out that its bidirectional information transfer. Only a very small part of the IESG work is actually talking about IAOC matters, so I'm guessing that even if the delegate is another AD, the chair would still have to arrange extra time with this other AD in order to ensure that information transfer happens. Third, I forget if it was Bob who noted that if we are strained by the tasks that we are doing, perhaps its time to outsource a bigger part of it to paid employees or businesses. For instance, I'm kind of hoping that 99% of the meeting selection load is on the IAD and the secretariat, not on the IAOC members. The members should set the policy, adjust the policy, and monitor implementation. If you are meeting every two weeks and deciding details then maybe you are on the wrong track. It should be the board, not the work horse. Fourth, I think we are bringing on some of the load by our own actions. We have increased the number of entities that need to have a board and increased the amount of coordination needed. For instance, the RFC Editor was at one time one person, and today I'm honestly not sure I know how many entities it consists of. Of course, we needed much of this restructuring as the IETF has grown and has changed its operational mode also in other ways. But we should also watch it and avoid creating unnecessary structure where none is needed. I'm a little bit scared that adding a layer of delegation may cause the collective us to have more meetings, not less. I also had a couple of thoughts on possible alternative directions to reducing the problem. Outsourcing more is one approach. Another one is to not have more people from the IESG and IAB attend the IAOC, but have people from the IAOC bring more information to these bodies. For instance, in the IESG we always have an IAB report but we don't normally have a Trust or IAOC report. Should we? A third direction is separating the role of the chairs as *working* members of the IAOC from their ability to attend and vote where needed. Would this detach the chairs too much? I don't know, but I think there might actually be less detaching than if you delegated your role away for a year. Russ, Olaf, how much do you normally participate the IAOC work? Are you in the subcommittees, do you work on details of agreements with our service providers? Jari ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IAOC: delegating ex-officio responsibility
On 14/04/2011 23:26, Bob Hinden wrote: This prompts me to ask a question. Who would the IETF Chair delegate this responsibility to? The draft doesn't specify. I would say one of the (nomcom appointed) members of the IESG (or IAB). An Area Director is the obvious answer, except from what I understand ADs are also extremely busy. This trades one problem for another. The IESG chair definitely has more tasks than any of the AD's and I think it would be helpful if there were options to distribute work over the IESG, rather than assume that the chair can do them all. This is not only a matter of time, but also of expertise and personal interests. (The same applies to the IAB chair). Henk -- -- Henk Uijterwaal Email: henk(at)uijterwaal.nl RIPE NCC http://www.xs4all.nl/~henku Phone: +31.6.55861746 -- There appears to have been a collective retreat from reality that day. (John Glanfield, on an engineering project) ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
