On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
dialectically.
Mary,
My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it.
I apologize for my mistake.
Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising.
reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4
when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a D
Jerry,
I've been tied up with some critical deadlines, which require me
to curtail my email activities. I'll reply to your comments next
week. But I just wanted to mention an article in which I discuss
issues related to the following exchange:
Wittgenstein's language games represent the essen
On 5/23/2018 2:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on
chemistry failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical
logic now very clear, at least to me.
Peirce never used the term "based on". It would be better to say
"an analo
On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign.
Copula? Or predicate?
Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory,
should the “=“ sign be banned altogether?
Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple: T
On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
I think of it as Inductive Logic 101, and Peirce's Illustrations
on the Logic of Science as Induction 201.
I assume that would be true.
In any case, Venn's books could be considered as background
knowledge that Peirce would expect his educated readers
On 5/17/2018 3:34 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278:
Thanks for citing that passage. It reminded me of the value of checking
Peirce's sources and contemporaries in order to understand the context
of his writings. I found the book at
h
On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that
to disclude things is to complexify.
I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged
in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham
w
On 5/16/2018 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
So, at very least, the jury is still out on this question.
I certainly agree. Ray K's predictions about AI have usually
been unreliable or just wrong.
The inverse square law implies that the energy of electromagnetic
radiation falls off very rapidly
On 5/13/2018 2:48 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
You forgot Persephone. :)
She was the one who was abducted (not retroducted) by the Turk.
The farmers of Eleusis want the statue of St. Dimitra back.
Every spring, they would honor her by heaping manure around
the statue to ensure the fertility of t
On 5/13/2018 10:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Hey, John - you forgot: Happy Mother's Day.
[mutter, mutter, seethe, fume...if my kids ever did that..mutter, mutter].
Given the theme of this thread, I suspect that the ones who might
feel the most slighted would be Mary, Gaia, Hera, Demeter...
On 5/13/2018 8:50 AM, John Collier wrote:
I am afraid I do not find these arguments coherent with anything
I was taught to be God.
I recall a survey some years ago in which the interviewers asked
people two questions: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) How would
you describe God?
What they found
On 5/3/2018 10:40 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
why did Peirce write that pastness is relative? Maybe "pastness"
is the feeling, not the past?
When Peirce said "pastness itself obviously is relative", the
qualifier 'obviously' is important. J think he meant the simple
point that the past is relati
On 4/30/2018 2:50 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I think, that a memory of the past is not the same as the past itself
But that is true of everything.
Our experience of anything and everything (past or present) is not
the same as the thing itself.
What Peirce added: " To any memory [of] the past,
If you google "Peirce" and any topic of any kind, it's likely
to lead to something interesting. I came across some articles
and an expensive book. This is just FYI. I don't want to
start another long thread.
The Semiotics of Music: From Peirce to AI
https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/cctp-71
On 4/19/2018 11:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
According to [quantum mechanics] discrete points do form a continuum,
because they are blurred. Or something like that.
Maybe. But that would be a different ontology for time.
In any case, the distinction between Aristotle and Zeno
(or Peirce and C
Jerry,
I promised that I would stop.
JLRC: The emotions that different compositions raise in me
are not expressed in first order logic.
JFS: I certainly agree with that point...
I'll quit on this point of agreement.
But this morning I woke up with the realization that music
notation is based
On 4/18/2018 3:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The emotions that different compositions raise in me are
not expressed in first order logic.
I certainly agree with that point. Why didn't you say that
in the first place?
I will leave the last word to you.
I'll quit on this point of agreement
On 4/17/2018 4:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
I was referring to music, not merely a collection of notes.
I certainly agree that the same notes played by Jascha Heifetz
and the kid next door would not be comparable in quality.
Are your assertions, based on 7 notes in one measure, rather broad
On 4/16/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Maybe temporality, that what distinguishes "t" from "x,y,z",
is the essence of mind?
I think we've exhausted most of the issues.
If you want one word, I'd say semeiotic.
John
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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List
Stephen and Jerry LRC,
I changed the subject line of this note to replace "related systems"
with "Musement", which is closer to the word 'Spiel' in Wittgenstein's
'Sprachspiel' than to the word 'game' in 'language game'.
Stephen, if you lost my previous note, just look at the copy that is
includ
Edwina and Stephen,
ET
what's the difference between a 'language game' and
a 'grammatical sentence'?
A sentence is just one move in a language game.
For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
Natural and
Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
a given syntax and vocabulary.
He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
years before Chomsky made an outrageous
On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
scientific parsing of the truth or
/science/article/pii/0898122192901285
John F. Sowa, Conceptual graphs as a universal knowledge representation
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901377
But the following article from 2014 is much better than the above:
From existential graphs to conceptual graphs
http
On 4/12/2018 6:51 AM, Charles Pyle wrote:
*Phonemes and letters are types that are represented by tokens
in the medium of sound or visual marks respectively. *
I agree.
The representations could be considered to be physical, but
are categories physical?
The categories designated by the word
On 4/10/2018 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As for societies, I view them as compositions of matter [made up of
ecological biomes and population size and economic mode], held together
by conceptual Thirdness.
Yes. But a society is like a pet cat. You can recognize the people
or the cat, but
On 4/10/2018 12:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I... view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as
an actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal
unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations
with other Signs/morphological units. So, for me, this Sign
On 4/8/2018 4:12 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
I am particular anxious to compare his vision of logic to that of CSP,
Whitehead, Tarski, Beziau, and others.
Actually, he doesn't go into that much detail about any particular
version of logic. He is mainly talking about psychological issues,
and
On 4/8/2018 3:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Attached is another speculative diagram, this time attempting to
illustrate the relations of determination among the semiotic Correlates,
My primary concern is that it's too deterministic. When Peirce wrote
his example of sign replicas (e.g., the ma
Philip Johnson-Laird, a psycholinguist, has written books and articles
about mental models and their relationship to language and reasoning.
In 2002, he wrote the following article about Peirce's existential
graphs as a promising direction for psychology and neuroscience:
Johnson-Laird, Philip N.
I strongly agree with Mike B and Gary R.
MB
I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical
domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ.
GR
I have always thought... that those who want to promote Peirce's
philosophy in the world at large ought at
On a related issue, the page that Gary R cited contained a reference
to a 2017 article by Higuera & Kull on "The Semiotic Threshold":
https://www.academia.edu/32620524/The_Semiotic_Threshold
This is a hot topic in biosemiotic research.
Some excerpts below.
John
_
ks/ppe.pdf
For more discussion, see the following combination of two notes
I sent to Ontolog Forum in February.
For even more discussion, take any phrase from them, put it in
quotes, and Google it. That should lead to the archives for
Ontolog Forum, which contains all the gory details of
On 3/26/2018 8:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
My comment is that I think that a communication line
[Subject-Verb-Object] or even A gives Y to B, is very different
from the Peircean triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant,
or, in subgroups: DO-[IO-R-II]- DI-FI.
I agree.
But there are severa
nt will be critiqued and
Peirce’s contention defended.
Preprint: http://apa-pacific.org/framed/download.php?file=281.pdf
Commentator: John F. Sowa, "Triads or Triadic Relations"
Slides: http://jfsowa.com/talks/triads.pdf
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "
On 3/25/2018 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I think that it's very difficult to correlate theory to model to
the real world - and I think that Peirce specifically didn't want
to do such a thing, not because of the difficulty but because of
the resultant 'lack of truth' in these correlations.
On 3/25/2018 3:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I would suggest that Peirce's 'haziness' and 'fuzzy logic' have
a great deal in common.
I agree, but there is one important difference. See the article on
"What is the source of fuzziness?" : http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
In 1965, Zadeh began wi
Gary R, Jon AS, and Edwina,
JFS: My only point is that if any of those definitions are precise, then
they cannot be the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define.
If so, Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's
term -- they should choose a different word
On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in
time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important
three-way distinction" there would seem to
On 3/21/2018 8:02 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I’d better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those
looking for more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open.
There are many questions that Peirce "left open". I believe that the
most promising ones to pursue are those
I came across the following paper by Ahti Pietarinen:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271419583_Two_Papers_on_Existential_Graphs_by_Charles_Peirce
In that article, Ahti includes and comments on two papers.
The first is "a paper prepared and read for the National
Academy of Sciences, Wash
On 3/17/2018 3:59 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
what anything is, according to Peirce, accords with the final opinion.
So, the two statements make a paradox or not depending on whether
alterations of things are ultimately bounded by some overarching law or not.
Your suggestion led me to check the ori
I have been traveling and working on a tight deadline, so I haven't
been able to read, much less comment on the discussions. But I
fail to understand why people think that CP 5.555 and CP 5.565 are
inconsistent. (Excerpts below)
In CP 5.555, Peirce is talking about "the act of knowing a real ob
Gene, Edwina, and Stephen,
I have been traveling and working on some tight deadlines. So I have
not been able to read, much less comment on, most of the discussions.
But I am reluctant to make long chains of questionable inferences
from Peirce's writings and get into heated arguments about the
Stephen and Helmut,
SCR
I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown.
I did not say 'breakdown'. I said 'fragmentation'.
SCR
The civilization the two men aimed at philosophically is an
integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with science,
arriving at a post-religious s
udes a longer note from last July. It addresses some similar
issues.
John
Forwarded Message
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Concepts, properties, views, events
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 09:44:53 -0500
From: John F Sowa
To: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com
On 3/1/2018 7:26 AM, KI wr
Dan,
Thanks for the pointer to your article.
On a related issue, I came across a Ted talk by Susan Savage-Rumbaugh
who showed some video clips about the remarkable abilities of bonobos
who learned symbols to communicate. They also learned to understand
a subset of spoken English that includes t
On 2/18/2018 7:40 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
As far as the silicon molecule is concerned, the stone has no context
that is relevant to it. The silicon molecule receives no cue from the
stone as to what its properties should be.
That is not true. A silicon atom behaves in very different ways i
On 2/14/2018 12:32 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
About Peirce’s formulations of the pragmatic maxim, I’m pretty
sure there are more than two in his writings
In his reply to Kirsti, Jon A cited his web page with 7 quotations:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
When one
On 2/10/2018 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I have recently received a few complaints and two requests to
be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as
list moderator that naturally concerns me.
Since the beginning o
I came across MS 831 in which Peirce mentions "the minds of the lower
animals" -- using the word 'mind' not 'quasi-mind'. Among them,
he mentioned birds, bees, and beavers. He also wrote "Such phenomena
evince an element of self-criticism, and therefore of reasoning."
That implies a fairly compl
Jon AS,
Thanks for the references from 1891 and 1896. That is evidence
for Peirce's thoughts about minds or quasi-minds prior to 1903.
But it would be useful to see more explicit mention of animals.
On related issues, following is an excerpt from a note that I sent
to Ontolog Forum about the ne
On 1/22/2018 10:55 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I didn’t realize that you were looking for advocacy of biosemiotics
in Peirce’s writings. I don’t think he ever used the term,
I was asking about the development of Peirce's thought (as shown
by the content and dates of his MSS), not about the ex
On 1/21/2018 3:52 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as
a source of conscious thinking?
No, not at all.
In the 19th century, some philosophers claimed that the validity
of logic depended on human psychology. But the mainstream of
logic fro
On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained
from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application of
logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains.
But advocating anti-psychologism is indepe
On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
What change in terminology are you referring to?
I was thinking about the following point:
Gary F
Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”
which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures
may represen
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
Edwina
I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex
or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.
Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted
Edwina and Gary R,
I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that
Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living
things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby:
CSP, MS 463 (1908)
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something el
Gary,
Thanks for the reference.
It’s a 2015 article, “*Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The
immediate object of a sign”*,
http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152.
But Bellucci is inconveniently prolific for my file system.
I already had Bellucci15, Belluc
On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions
have immediate objects.
I was searching Bellucci's book. He makes many comments about
propositions, but i couldn't find one that says exactly that.
Could you quote a passage in wh
On 1/16/2018 7:25 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I’m relieved that we’ve put the debate over “polyversity” behind us.
Yes, indeed.
I could quibble about various points in your note,
but I promised that I wouldn't.
John
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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
Gary,
We have both wasted too much time in debating the word polyversity.
I did read your chapter, and I'll make a recommendation. But you,
as the author, are free to accept or reject my comments as you
please. I promise that I won't complain one way or the other.
no part of my definition of
t;I don't believe in word senses."
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 17:43:03 -0500
From: John F Sowa
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Gary,
I just read your article. Peirce, Kilgarriff, Atkins, and I would
not agree with the following claim:
I dealt with polysemy extensively in /Turning Signs/ — and
Dan, Gary, and Jerry,
Dan, thanks for your summaries of what the great majority
of linguists and lexicographers believe.
Gary, I'm delighted that you agree with Dan. And so do I.
I assume that means you agree with his definition:
polylogy and polysemy would by hyponyms of the hypernym polyvers
On 1/13/2018 11:37 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I introduced the term “polyversity” and defined it in Chapter 2 of
/Turning Signs/,
Before I sent that note, I had searched that web page for every
occurrence of 'polyversity': http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm
That web page has seven occurre
Gary,
I wonder what it could mean to be “bound by” a symbol introduced
by somebody else, if (as you wrote) “the purpose of the person who
coins a word should not constrain the way that others may use it.”
To avoid confusion, anyone who uses a word should be consistent
with its definition. My
Gary,
With some qualifications, I agree with your one paragraph summary,
and so would Kilgarriff, Atkins, and Peirce. And I have always
agreed with Peirce's ethics of terminology.
Some comments on what the four of us (AK, SA, CSP, and me) agree with:
I think my main point is clear enough, “al
Gary,
I admit that I was annoyed by your note -- because you were dismissing
or belittling experts in lexicography and other fields such as NLP.
Many people working on NLP have PhDs and research contributions in
philosophy, linguistics, logic, and mathematics -- fields in which
Peirce was a major
Gary,
Continuity in meaning is fundamental to the flexibility of natural
languages (NLs). But the formal languages of logic, mathematics,
and computer science gain precision by reducing or eliminating that
flexibility. They do so by severely restricting the range of meanings.
Since teachers us
Gary,
I just read your article. Peirce, Kilgarriff, Atkins, and I would
not agree with the following claim:
I dealt with polysemy extensively in /Turning Signs/ — and went beyond
it in Chapter 2 (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm) by coining the
word “polyversity” to include not only polyse
On 1/9/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I haven’t found time to read the article you cite, John
Please read that article. It's worth the time.
John
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to this message. PEIRCE-L
On 1/8/2018 5:14 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is
a philosopher somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher
somehow too, especially Nietzsche.
You can make a similar claim about almost any word in any
language. For an analysis of t
I was rereading Peirce's 1885 article "On the Algebra of Logic",
in which he presented the algebraic notation that was adopted
by Schröder, Peano, Russell, Whitehead, and the rest of the world.
In the final paragraph of that article (csp85p202.jpg), he wrote
It is plain that by a more iconical a
On 1/3/2018 3:17 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
[JFS] I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle:
"Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has
also become clearer."
I would make that same comment about Peirce.
[JR] Then is it obvious to you that Peirce
On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:
I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of
the opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions
after they pop up only on the basis that they are written by him.
I agree. But Peirce would also insist that readers should
make
Jerry and Auke,
In the Worlds article, my primary goal was to convince readers
that a definition of modality in terms of laws and facts is
more fruitful than a definition in terms of possible worlds.
The final paragraph of that article summarizes what I was trying
to show. (See below.) What Pe
On 12/31/2017 7:14 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:
I am unsure about the place of modality, but maybe it just
boils down to a firstness and secondness view on the issue.
Historical note: Aristotle claimed that necessity and possibility
are determined by the laws of nature. Leibniz introduced poss
On 12/30/2017 2:35 PM, Ben Novak wrote:
Ben
I have long been wondering why there is so little discussion
of relating Peirce's concepts and methodologies to concrete
examples, or other 20th and even 21st century thinkers.
I strongly with that criticism.
Regarding this, it seems something i
Ben, Helmut, Peter, and Edwina,
Ben
I have long been wondering why there is so little discussion
of relating Peirce's concepts and methodologies to concrete
examples, or other 20th and even 21st century thinkers.
I strongly with that criticism.
To understand Peirce's writings and their implic
On 12/29/2017 11:24 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
My own view is that I think that this is getting into a
complex over-intellectualized outline of what is actually
a simple, basic analogy.
I strongly agree. There is nothing special about nativity
scenes that differs in any significant way from o
On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate,
but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is
somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it
has one “subject” or several.
But
Kirsti and Gary F,
K
Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which
has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of
the earlier STIGME .
GF
By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον
for point before Euclid. [And from web site] Accor
Jerry,
Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
for making a stronger claim:
For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with
On 12/17/2017 3:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Now, do you think that there is chirality also in other contexts
than molecules, e.g. in signs?
To illustrate that issue, consider the analogs in 2 dimensions
and 3 dimensions.
For example, any circle on a plane can be made congruent with any
other
On 12/16/2017 12:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
It appears to me that there is a natural progression of sorts. The
polarity of a dyadic relation can be represented as positive and
negatives on a line in one dimension. The order in the complexity of the
correlates in a triadic relation can
On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active substances.”
But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those substances which
rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.” What would those
be called by chemists today?
On 12/14/2017 12:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
This link appears to be broken.
I apologize. I am so used to typing .pdf, that I forgot that
this file is .htm. Correct URL:
For more about these issues, see Alonzo Church's talk about
"The Ontological Status of Women and Abstract Entities":
h
Kirsti,
My point is that both Peirce and Molière ridiculed the question
- answer sequence...
Molière ridiculed it, but Peirce was very serious. He discussed
that example and others like it in many of his writings. See
for example, CP 4.463. As another example,"A pear is ripe."
Therefore, Th
Kirsti and Edwina,
K
Your example (opium) seems somewhat simplistic and misleading.
Peirce and I would certainly agree that there's more to say. But he
used that example as the starting point for a much longer discussion.
And by the way, nominalists such as Carnap, Quine... don't even
make t
Kirsti,
I changed the subject line to "Contexts in language and logic"
That was the title of the slides I cited, and I'm sorry that I
forgot to include the name of the directory, "talks". Following
is the correct URL: http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf
So a little note on the wording in:
On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:
‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn’t
On 12/1/2017 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Many aspects of Peirce's alpha graphs can be clarified by
seeing how they relate to the corresponding Venn diagrams.
I strongly agree. In fact, I would generalize that point
to *all* versions of EGs and *all* versions of diagrams.
The full power of EGs
On 11/29/2017 4:00 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I gather that your reason for concluding that the 1909/11 rendition
of EGs was “preferred” by Peirce is that he knew that his letter
to Kehler would be widely circulated among Lady Welby’s circle and
thought that they could gain more recognition
Gary,
Please look at the attached diagram egprim.gif. EGs are truly
diagrammatic: Every syntactic feature can be shown without any use
of language. This is slide 4 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf .
I apologize for the mistake about 'spot'. I checked Don Roberts' book,
which I first re
On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911
(unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."
There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment.
Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov. 27:
Jon A and Kirsti,
Jon, replying to JFS
[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.
In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.
Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion
On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.
Ther
Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list,
In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs.
He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169).
I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it
for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 v
On 11/25/2017 8:21 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
Plants don’t have brains because the choices that they make
from their Umwelts are simple, and in “slow motion”.
Yes, but every cell from bacteria on up has memory and can
signal neighboring cells via chemical excretions. When a cell
is attacked, i
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