On 12/17/2018 4:30 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Possibly what I’m saying here is not much different from what you meant,
Yes. We mostly agree on the issues with some variations in terminology.
When I said "The categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of classifying
experiences in the
as he says on the
> same page; but I think it is clarified by Peirce’s statement (quoted above)
> that “a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency,
> must be compelled by its object” and without this compulsion, “the object
> is not the representamen's object.” The element of com
@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Gary F, Edwina, Jon AS
GF
> My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be
> regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness of
> Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, a
its object” and without this compulsion, “the object is not the
representamen's object.” The element of compulsion, i.e. secondness, has to be
genuine in order for Thirdness to be genuine.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 16-Dec-18 16:27
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the
Gary F, Edwina, Jon AS
GF
My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be
regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness
of Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is the
Thirdness of Form. As for Aristotelian Matter, it is simply
Gary F., List:
GF: My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be
regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness of
Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is the Thirdness of
Form.
If Aristotelian Form is a logical and/or metaphysical
discussion offlist in which you raised some other
important points, but I’ll have to leave that to you, as I’m
being called away right now …
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Dec-18 19:36
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
, but I’ll have to leave that to you, as I’m being called away right now …
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Dec-18 19:36
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Jerry C., List:
In this context, I understand "sufficiently complete&qu
Jerry C., List:
In this context, I understand "sufficiently complete" in two ways.
1. A pure Icon would signify something without denoting anything, while
a pure Index would denote something without signifying anything (cf. EP
2:307; 1904). Only a Symbol is *sufficiently complete* to
Helmut, List:
HR: Is "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad, in
the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?
Yes, as Peirce himself explicitly affirmed.
CSP: So then the division of Philosophy into these three grand departments
... turns out to be a division
Jon:
> On Dec 14, 2018, at 5:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
(From EP 2:203-204)
>
> In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete
> signifies characters, or qualities
But what is the meaning of this phrase?
In particular, when can we distinguish between a sign
Jon, list,
I am impressed, I never have seen the categories so accurately assigned, as you did:
"experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling, action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and conditional necessity in Metaphysics."
Now: Is
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}Gary R, list
Again - we'll just have to disagree.
1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of
'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As
such, the experience
Edwina, Jon, list,
Edwina wrote:
1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as a
subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to empirical
measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom - all of
which are subjective and not amenable
Edwina, List:
1ns as quality has nothing whatsoever to do with subjectivity or
non-measurability. It pertains to characters such as color (e.g., redness)
and shape (e.g., roundness) that are real possibilities in themselves, but
only exist where embodied.
In the passages that I have
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list
We will, as usual, continue to disagree.
1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical
ask, what is the nature of the action of the sign upon the
> quasi-mind when it determines the interpretant? The answer will be better
> understood if it is made disjunctive rather than general. ]]
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 13-Dec-18
Edwina, List:
As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's writings
where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with 3ns than 1ns,
but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among them. In my view,
it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and
t the temporal order of events.
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex
of events.
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in
literature, music
ually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?
List,
I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the
the interpretant? The answer will be better
understood if it is made disjunctive rather than general. ]]
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 13-Dec-18 23:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Gary F., Helmut, List:
GF: ... do you know of any text
consistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw:
The notion that either form or matter mean a hill of beans in terms of
triadic thinking assumes we know the nature of reality. Insofar as we know
what came first ir is first it is shrouded in mystery but it is most
certainly not all chance and formless. I do not know what Peirce had in
mind and I
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List:
I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
Gary F., Helmut, List:
GF: ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was
first and “matter” second?
I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to demonstrate
that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns,
rather than the other
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic
Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?
List,
I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way
round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form
requires matter
Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?
List,
I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form,
List,
I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and
Some further thoughts (from my blog,
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/12/sex-life-and-logic/ ) on the Aristotelian
matter/form distinction and the Peircean concept of “Growth”:
Merleau-Ponty refers to perception as the ‘coition, so to speak, of our body
with things’. The phrase ‘so to speak’ marks
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