I thought I'd ask list members what they thought about this. Here's my post on
the subject, in case it's of interest - I'd love to hear whether others on the
list agree.
Will which is compliant with Hanafi or Shafai or Wahabi or other schools
of Islamic jurisprudence, for example), the court could use this to trim
establishment claim standing.
On Nov 9, 2010, at 4:47 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I thought I'd ask list members what they thought about this. Here's my
unchallenged and unchallengeable for decades until
exactly the right case comes along.
Steve
On Nov 9, 2010, at 5:11 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I'm not sure whether Prof. Jamar is making a point about what
standing law should be, or what it is now. But as to the latter, as best I
-that-allegedly-endorse-or-disapprove-of-religion/#more-39151
.) But I thought I'd note it in any event.
Eugene
From: Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2010 2:41 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: TRO against Oklahoma no use of Sharia Law
...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2010 5:41 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: TRO against Oklahoma no use of Sharia Law
Perhaps I'm missing something here, but I
to allow the parade of horribles
that Eugene adumbrates (I certainly would).
Vance
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 2:09 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
(1) Yes, there's a 1982 case finding no standing with regard to that
Arkansas law.
(2) The Oklahoma
Well, the Catholic League minority reasoned that the parties
who are personally the subjects of the resolution, such as Cardinal Levada,
Archbishop Niederauer, and Catholic Charities, could demonstrate cognizable
harm, because they were singled out by name in the resolution; but
Well, it's not my view of standing - it's the Catholic Charities
minority's. The five judges thought that San Franciscans didn't have standing
to challenge the resolution simply on the theory that it allegedly conveyed a
message of hostility to their religion, or made them feel
There are two theories as to standing in this case, I think.
One is psychological injury standing; that’s what we’ve been discussing, and I
think that under the bulk of the circuit cases – with the exception of the
Catholic Charities majority – there is no standing to challenge
Well, if indeed the theory is that the court is not really
deciding what Sharia law calls for, but just what the testator wanted, then I
agree there might not be a First Amendment problem – but then I’m not sure that
the amendment would ban the consideration of such testimony.
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2010 3:45 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: FW: TRO against Oklahoma no use of Sharia Law
Well, if indeed the theory is that the court is not really
that a particular
religion
or doctrine is unwelcome is not a development to be welcomed or for that
matter tolerated by theories of standing that ignore real and intended
injuries .
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
I realize that this question is not one of the law of government and
religion as such, but it is relevant to the disposition of the Oklahoma
litigation, so I thought I'd ask. The judge's TRO enjoined defendants from
certifying the election results for State Question 755; presumably the
-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2010 2:09 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: TRO against Oklahoma no use of Sharia Law
(1) Yes, there's a 1982 case
But would the amendment actually apply to judicial enforcement of
religious arbitrations -- or arbitrations under the law of foreign countries --
so long as the court itself was only applying secular American law and not
religious or foreign law?
Eugene
-Original
I'm not sure whether 42 USC 1981 would apply to arbitral tribunals'
decisions about which witnesses to consider; but if it does, I wonder how it
would apply to Beth Dins. As I understand it, certain kinds of witnesses
before those tribunals must be adult, male, Sabbath observing Jews.
procedures were actually followed by the tribunal. Or am I missing something?
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 11, 2010 12:14 PM
-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 11, 2010 12:22 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious arbitration
I'm not sure whether 42 USC 1981 would apply to arbitral tribunals'
decisions about which
That's an excellent question, but wouldn't there be a First Amendment
problem here even in the absence of the Oklahoma provision? If the court has
to decide what Islamic law really calls for, then that, I think, would involve
a secular court impermissible deciding a religious question.
I would think that, under Lukumi Babalu and McDaniel, the
government may not authorize the enforcement of secular arbitrations but refuse
to enforce religious arbitrations. Whatever the scope of permitted
discrimination against religion might be under Locke v. Davey, I don't see
(1) I take it that the argument isn’t really that courts
shouldn’t “enforce religiously motivated obligations.” Presumably no court
would or should scrutinize the motivations for a person’s obligation, and then
refuse to enforce the obligation because it stems from the person’s
I'm not sure I understand. Jones v. Wolf expressly says
(emphasis added):
Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of
private-law systems in general-flexibility in ordering private rights and
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.
Any thoughts on this story? See also Sen. Inhofe Rep. Lucas's response, at
http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleasesContentRecord_id=f5d51d96-f7ff-cb88-e863-3b8dfc32eacc
http://www.koco.com/r/26162860/detail.html
A small-town bank in Oklahoma said the
/article/3524584?custom_click=headlines_widget
Kevin Pybas
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2010 3:09 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject
Christian
symbols and messages from their desks and workstations?
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2010 3:37 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE
Alan: Can you flesh out the discrimination theory more? I take
it that the claim is that requiring everyone to display something would
constitute discrimination (not just failure to accommodate religious beliefs,
or creation of an allegedly hostile environment), and that this
The likelier example involves someone driving a truck for Jesus Is
Lord Carpentry Services or some such. Could he demand a transfer to another
task at the company (for which he might not be qualified), or tape over the
slogan on the truck, so that it would no longer be easily
Michael: How religious does the statement have to be before requiring
it becomes religious discrimination (which is per se forbidden, unless religion
is treated as a BFOQ, a high bar) as opposed to absence of religious
accommodation (which may be permissible, if an accommodation is an
(voice)
masin...@nova.edu954.262.3835 (fax)
Quoting Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu:
Michael: How religious does the statement have to be before
requiring it becomes religious discrimination (which is per se
forbidden, unless religion is treated
That's the issue lurking in In re Aramco Servs.
Co.http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11521915190435651264, now on
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. DynCorp and Aramco Services (both of which
were at the time Delaware corporations headquartered in Houston, though Aramco
Services is a
On Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 10:06 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
That's the issue lurking in In re Aramco Servs.
Co.http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11521915190435651264, now on
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. DynCorp and Aramco Services (both
...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 11:46 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant
toan arbitration
My view is that being a Muslim is not a limitation on being an
arbitrator that a court may properly enforce, given the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause.
I don't think there's any constitutional difficulty with a
court's deciding whether someone
academic knowledge of religion
sue for discrimination if she's denied such employment?
On Jan 3, 2011, at 1:11 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I'm not sure whether BFOQ doctrine as to religion helps us much as to the
First Amendment analysis. That private entities aren't barred
: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 4:19 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators,
pursuant
Eugene,
In your mind does the constitutional difficulty arise from the court choosing a
Muslim arbitrator under the contract or from the enforcement of a contract
involving religious terms?
The former; I don't see any inherent problem in enforcing the
results of a religious
on
specific religious qualifications to attend to the specific needs of an
identifiable
group. Under the hypo we're dealing with here it seems to me that's all the
court is being asked to do. If it isn't objectionable in one context, why is
it in
another?
On Jan 3, 2011, at 1:31 PM, Volokh, Eugene
I wrote:
I'm no great fan of the more expansive readings of Shelly. But
when a government actor is deciding who gets a particular (lucrative) position
based on that person's religion, it seems to me that state action is eminently
present, or more specifically that the
A subsidiary of a Saudi government agency (Aramco) entered into
a contract with an American company, having to do with conduct in Saudi Arabia.
I take it that we'd have no problem with a subsidiary of a French government
agency providing that disputes with it would be arbitrated
I'm not sure I quite understand Eric's point. If the contract
says that Muslim arbitrators are to be chosen, but there's a dispute about
who's a Muslim, and the result is that the court can't act, then that's
another way of saying that the contract is not enforceable by the
Let me deal in this post with Eric's query about the entanglement
issues raised by contracts that call for judges to appoint Muslim arbitrators.
I think the matter is complex, and involves an interaction between First
Amendment no-entanglement doctrine and First Amendment
I have one more response to Eric's points, though this is one on which
my views are especially tentative, because it relies on a line of cases -- the
Court's peremptory challenge decisions -- the scope of which is uncertain.
The Court has made clear that courts may not allow
Let me try to respond to Eric's arguments, in several parts. I'll
discuss the entanglement who-is-a-Muslim? Issue in a separate e-mail, and try
to focus on the discrimination issue here.
1. To begin with, it's not that unlikely to say to a potential
arbitrator, you aren't
defense of such hate
mongering?
Steve
On Jan 13, 2011, at 6:51 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
Jesper Langballe apparently wrote, Of course Lars Hedegaard shouldn't have
said that there are Muslim fathers who rape their daughters when the truth
instead seems to be that they make do with killing
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2011 4:34 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Danish MP guilty of the crime of insult[ing] or denigrat[ing]
Muslims
This wasn't an academic study with empirical conclusions.
On Jan 13, 2011, at 7:28 PM, Volokh
Mark Scarberry asked me to pass it along:
http://www.aals.org/documents/sections/lawandreligion/LawReligionDec2010.pdf
Eugene
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
in the face of the mourners at the funeral service.)
On Thu, Mar 3, 2011 at 7:55 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I don't think harassment is a sufficiently well-defined legal
term to be helpful here. To be sure, it is defined - though vaguely
the right result if there were no such time/place law, but the
protest was right in the face of the mourners at the funeral service.)
On Thu, Mar 3, 2011 at 7:55 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I don't think harassment is a sufficiently well-defined
contest?
Or am I barking up a telephone pole here?
Ed Darrell
Dallas
--- On Fri, 3/4/11, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
Subject: RE: Harassment
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Date: Friday, March 4, 2011
is a sufficient source of the
outrageousness, thereby ameliorating the risk of viewpoint discrimination in
the outrageousness verdict. (Note the qualifier and where it chose to say
it in the paragraph.)
In sum --
On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 1:06 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol
...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 04, 2011 9:50 AM
To: Eric Segall
Cc: Volokh, Eugene; Law Religion issues for Law Academics;
conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: IIED applied to speech that violates a content-neutral restriction
To make Eric's hypothetical close to Snyder, the church involved would
Well, again, wouldn't NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware be pretty
squarely on point here? If one could campaign to get people to shun their
neighbors for simply shopping at white-owned stores, I would think that one
could campaign to get a professor fired for a wide variety of
Folks: Any thoughts on this case? It struck me that the
court’s statement went beyond just trying to determine the likely wishes of
Joan Zornow, who had been a quite devout Catholic, and made assertions about
what Catholics should think, not just about what this Catholic did
under Islamic law, may a judge decide what
Islamic law requires, and then decide whether the arbitration was consistent
with that?
Eugene
From: Rick Garnett [mailto:rgarn...@nd.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 9:06 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Cc: Volokh, Eugene
This bill was sent to the Arizona Governor for signature on Monday:
http://www.azleg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1288s.htmSession_ID=102http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1288s.htmSession_ID=102
Be it enacted by the Legislature of
Perhaps, but Cutter v. Wilkinson did involve a square
Establishment Clause challenge to RLUIPA, and yet Justice Stevens joined the
Court's opinion upholding RLUIPA against such a challenge.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On
I'm puzzled by the statement that RFRA was not ... held
unconstitutional solely on federalism grounds -- as I understand the majority
opinion, it cited only the federalism objections to RFRA, and not the
Establishment Clause. (Justice Stevens' solo concurrence mentioned the
to the 14th Am.
Sec. 5 context and therefore to a federalist interpretation, but which could
be read more broadly.
Dan Conkle
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2011 4
So held a Kansas state trial judge in Purdum v. Purdum, 2011 WL 1430279 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 11, 2011), which dealt with a slander claim based on statements
made in a church annulment proceeding. I doubt that this is right; I would
think that the First Amendment ban on religious decisions by
I’m not sure why TRFRA is the likeliest claim; I would think
that the strongest claim would be a Title VII one. Nor does the “you knew the
job required this when you took it” defense work for Title VII; maybe it
should, but that’s not the way the law stands now.
What exactly does settlement or extortion? mean in this
context? (I'm not saying there can't be such a distinction, but I'm just
curious what it is.) Is it that the lawsuit was a sure loser? (If so, do we
know whether it was? For instance, was another driver available, so
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2011 6:07 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Settlement or extortion?
Sandy: Can you explain, please, exactly why you think the bus
driver has a sure loser case, given that nurses who
This case involved, I think, not a bus route driver, but a sort
of bus-driver-as-taxi service. In that situation, there might often be other
drivers who could be dispatched (depending on the total number of drivers in
the department and depending on how many are generally
Here’s one thing that has puzzled me about the “settlement or
extortion?” thread. Many critics of tort law and employment law – largely
conservatives and libertarians – have long argued that our legal system often
leads to unmeritorious claims being settled to avoid risk and to
Indeed: Not everyone who goes into Planned Parenthood goes in
for an abortion; in fact, most don't. But I'm not sure how this is relevant to
the Title VII question, or the still-undefined settlement or extortion?
issue. Religious accommodation rules protect ludicrous religious
In many religious accommodation controversies, the claimants
object to doing something because they think such an act would make them
accomplices to sin. The bus driver / Planned Parenthood case is one example;
another is some landlords' objection to renting to unmarried couples
: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 11:04 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Religious accommodation and accomplice objections
In many religious accommodation
I'm puzzled about the analogy Marci is drawing in the post
quoted below. Alan wrote, in the post to which Marci is referring:
In many situations, the rationale for not doing something that by itself is not
technically wrongful is the idea one's conduct may be misperceived by
bumper sticker on her desk, and she sued for wrongful discharge, and
the employer's insurance company settled for $21,000, even though the law of
the relevant state was very unlikely to support the woman's claim. Call me
cynical.
Art Spitzer
On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
It seems to me that Marci's argument really is a full-on attack
on much of Title VII religious accommodation law. An employee wants Saturdays
off - but what if everyone wanted Saturdays off? A nurse doesn't want to
participate in abortions - but what if all the nurses want
I’m not sure this is quite right.
1. Federal public accommodation law is grounded on the
Commerce Clause, but it applies to a very limited set of places of public
accommodation (setting aside disability discrimination law, which is a separate
matter) –
Any thoughts about the case below? I think I'd raised this question before on
the list, but the case offers an especially concrete example:
In Alkhafaji v. TIAA-CREF Individual and Instit. Services LLC, 2010 WL 1435056
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2010), Prof. Abbass
See the Religion Clause blog post below; the court also applied
the post-Smith “individualized exemption exception” under the federal Free
Exercise Clause.
As best I can tell, this means the states now break down as
follows:
State decisions
, but it is somewhat misleading to refer to
state rfras because many don't sweep across all laws like RFRA did. Eg, PA
excludes laws involving crimes against children.
Thanks--Marci
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
Surely they must be able to - just as Lutherans could decide
who's really Protestant enough for them, or Christians can decide that Mormons
aren't really Christians - since otherwise secular courts would have to decide
the true boundaries of Judaism, which I take it that they
The discussion of bans on sexual orientation discrimination suggests that it's
important what one analogizes sexual orientation to. Obviously, opponents of
such discrimination bans analogize it to discrimination based on nonreligious
personal conduct, which generally (though not in all states)
That's what the Ohio Court of Appeals (State v.
Daleyhttp://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2011/2011-ohio-3584.pdf,
decided yesterday) said happened in the court below; the appellate court
reversed the trial court's mental incompetence finding.
Daley was charged in March 2010 with
of Strittmater, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d
205 (1947.)
Judy Baer
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2011 6:05 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Man declared mentally
I just came across this 1926 opinion, which I hadn't heard, and which I thought
might be of interest.
Eugene
31 W. Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 344
Office of the Attorney General
State of West Virginia
March 15, 1926
SCHOOLS-Pupils Cannot be Excused During School Periods to attend Religious
rather vague language, but the WV one doesn't seem to do. Oh well, I guess back
in the 20s they didn't have modern doctrines like Originalism.
Vance
On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 8:53 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I just came across this 1926 opinion, which I
Any thoughts on this incident? It sounds to me like the church
should win in Widmar v. Vincent – if a university can’t exclude religious
worship from a designated public forum, it surely can’t exclude it from a
traditional public forum, no? Indeed, the baptism would presumably
?
Well ... Don't forget Rehnquist's play in the joints from Locke v. Davey,
also a Washington case, by the way. Te state's position seems like a perfectly
respectable old-time separationist view.
Randy Bezanson
U Iowa
Sent from my iPad
On Aug 14, 2011, at 11:24 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
I've never seen the force of concerns about confusion about
government endorsement created by equal access proposals, especially when
there's time to explain things to the confused people. Schools' job is to
dispel confusion among students about various things. They have lots
Locke
seems apt.
Randy
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2011 9:45 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Widmar v
:43 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Well, the state constitutional defense for the exclusion was
raised in Widmar as well and rejected; and the worship-nonworship line was
rejected, too. So I don’t think the play-in-the-joints argument
I’m with Doug on this: It’s hard for the school to honestly
disclaim endorsement and preferential treatment when it deliberately invites a
member of the clergy, precisely because he is a member of the clergy. It’s
much easier to make clear to people that there is no
in Pinette) -- disclaimers
explicable to young students (more of a challenge than Eugene suggests); and
perhaps even make special efforts to ensure that an array of groups, religious
and nonreligious, are encouraged to make use of the school.
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 12:40 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
Any thoughts on this?
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/18/florida.teacher.facebook/
Lake County Schools Communications Officer Chris Patton said school officials
received a complaint Tuesday about the content on Mount Dora High School
teacher Jerry Buell's personal Facebook page CNN
on that).
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2011 4:56 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post
Any thoughts
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 9:37 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post
that this post
realistically (without the fuss caused by the suspension itself) would have
caused harm to gay students or disrupted the school generally?
Steve Sanders
University of Michigan Law School
On Aug 18, 2011, at 6:56 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Any
of liability) is remote enough
that the state is justified in withholding whatever administrative machinery is
put in place by the statute?
Vance
On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Washington antidiscrimination law,
http://apps.leg.wa.gov
I agree with Doug on this, and want to add one item: The
Sherbert/Yoder regime put courts in the position of having to evaluate a vast
range of laws -- antidiscrimination laws, animal cruelty laws, assisted suicide
bans, child labor laws, compelled testimony laws, copyright laws, drug
the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from taking over the financing of religion
(even if it funds some secular institutions while doing so.)
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent
1) It's hard to see how the Court's decision has thrown
[laws] into limbo. The Court took pretty much the same view taken for years
by many lower courts; whatever doubt the Court's decision casts on these laws
had already been cast on them by lower court decisions.
Alan: Doesn't that return us to the perennial question of whether
Witters was rightly decided, whether the GI Bill should have been
unconstitutional, and whether the Court has been right in saying that tax
exemptions are generally a form of subsidy? After all, under Witters, the GI
Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2012 1:24 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Supreme Court sides with church on decision to fire employee
It seems to me that Justice Scalia not only meant what he said
in Smith, but signed on in Hosanna-Tabor to an opinion that followed what
Justice Scalia said. Scalia in Smith:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral,
was
in FAIR? If not, why not?
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 11:04 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
It seems to me that complicity is a very complicated matter for all legal and
moral systems, religious and otherwise. It requires all these systems to draw
lines that are often not easy to defend, and that turn on symbolism that others
don't share. Consider how our own legal system deals with
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