Hi Bruno Marchal  

In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world,
so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind,
but one critical difference. 

Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something 
in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has
to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind.
It is what causes motion and makes decisions.

Platonia always rules !


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/25/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-24, 10:52:42 
Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment 


On 24 Sep 2012, at 16:13, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> A computer being not conscious ? All computer operations 
> (to my mind,probably not yours) are actual (in spacetime). 
> But consciousness is an inherent (mental, not in spacetime) 
> activity. 

All right, in that sense a computer cannot think. I agree, but a brain  
cannot think too, nor any body. They can only manifest consciousness,  
which, we agree on this, is in Platonia. 

Computer can support a knowing self, like a brain, unless you decide  
not, but then it looks like arbitrary racism. You just decide that  
some entities cannot think, because *you* fail to recognize yourself  
in them. 

You could at least say that you don't know, or give argument, but you  
just repeat that brain can support consciousness and that silicon  
cannot, without giving an atom of justification. This can't be serious. 


> 
> Cs = subject + object 
> 
> A computer has no inherent realms, no conscious self or observer. 
> 
> Instead, a computer is all object (completely in the objective realm), 
> no subject. 

You can implement a self-transformative software on computers. 

You should be more careful and study a bit of computer science before  
judging computers, especially if you assert strong negative statements  
about them. 

Bruno 



> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 9/24/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-09-24, 09:52:34 
> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment 
> 
> 
> On 24 Sep 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
>> Hi Stathis Papaioannou 
>> 
>> Try to define consciousness. If you can't, 
>> how do you know that a computer is conscious ? 
> 
> Try to define consciousness. If you can't 
> how do you know that a computer is not conscious? 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 9/24/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> From: Stathis Papaioannou 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-09-24, 08:38:48 
>> Subject: Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment 
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:02 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>>> Hi Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> 
>>> You need a self or observer to be conscious, and computers 
>>> have no self. So they can't be conscious. 
>>> 
>>> Consciousness = a subject looking at, or aware of, an object. 
>>> 
>>> Computers have no subject. 
>> 
>> So where do you get the idea that computers have no self, no subject 
>> and can't be observers or be conscious? You may as well claim that 
>> women aren't conscious but just act as if they are conscious, like an 
>> advanced computer pretending to have a self. 
>> 
>> 
>> --  
>> Stathis Papaioannou 
>> 
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> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
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