On 9/30/2013 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2013, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2013 12:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As he knows in advance that he will feel, whoever he is, live only one (again, from
But that sentence is hard to parse. "Whoever he is" implies there is only one
It implies there is two 3-he. as indeed it is the case.
the point is that both 3-he lives a unique 1-me (in W, and in M).
as if he is a soul that goes to either Moscow or Washington but not both. Yet the
assumption of comp is that this soul is duplicated and so "he" has no unique reference.
Well that's was a reply to a point made by Clark.
We know that with comp, both the W-guy and the M-guy *are* the same person as the
But that depends on having a theory of personal identity, which you deny having used. It
seems to me that you're using "have the same memories (or diary)".
The point is that both the W-guy and the M-guy were not able to predict in Helsinki that
they would have the W experience, or the M experience. Both see that they get only one
Yes. But suppose you and I are in Helsinki. We each get into a teleporter and random
device sends one of us to Moscow and the other to Washington. It's equally unpredictable,
by me and by you, where we will experience. So why is the fact that we are not the same
person, don't share the same memories, significant?
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