On 30 Sep 2013, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/30/2013 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2013, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2013 12:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As he knows in advance that he will feel, whoever he is, live
only one (again, from The 1-pov).
But that sentence is hard to parse. "Whoever he is" implies there
is only one "he",
It implies there is two 3-he. as indeed it is the case.
the point is that both 3-he lives a unique 1-me (in W, and in M).
as if he is a soul that goes to either Moscow or Washington but
not both. Yet the assumption of comp is that this soul is
duplicated and so "he" has no unique reference.
Well that's was a reply to a point made by Clark.
We know that with comp, both the W-guy and the M-guy *are* the same
person as the Helsinki guy.
But that depends on having a theory of personal identity, which you
deny having used. It seems to me that you're using "have the same
memories (or diary)".
I do not use more identity theory than what is needed to understand
the duplication question, and it is quite less than a theory of
identity per se. And I use it sometimes only to make the argument
shorter. You are just asked to push on a button, and then to open a
door, and the question is "assuming comp, what do you expect". It is
not related to "who do you thing you really are?".
The point is that both the W-guy and the M-guy were not able to
predict in Helsinki that they would have the W experience, or the M
experience. Both see that they get only one of them.
Yes. But suppose you and I are in Helsinki. We each get into a
teleporter and random device sends one of us to Moscow and the other
to Washington. It's equally unpredictable, by me and by you, where
we will experience. So why is the fact that we are not the same
person, don't share the same memories, significant?
In this case you have to use a 3p random input. When you are
duplicated, we stay in the 3p deterministic frame, yet we can predict
(assuming comp) that we live an indeterminacy from the 1p view.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.