On 21 Dec 2013, at 10:43, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 5:42 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote:
Jason, you 'assume' a lot what I don't.
What specifically?
The UDA states two assumptions: computationalism and arithmetical
realism. All the rest is a logical deduction (proof) from there.
Yes. Although, if you indulge the nitpicking, i would say that
aithmetical realism is part of comp (even part of Church thesis).
Computationalism needs the notion of computation, which needs the
notion of computational steps, which needs arithmetical realism (to
say, for example, that a running machine stop or does not stop.
I learned those figments in college and applied in my conventional
research - now reduced in my credibility (agnosticism) for phizix
and its 'laws' - (in spite of the practical results which I use
happily in my life-practice) - as - some explanatory sweat to
comply with (poorly if at all understood) phenomena received in
formats how the actual developmental level of our mentality could
handle it.
I would think twice to 'accept' an argument just to make another one
acceptable.
You need not "accept" or "believe in" these assumptions for them to
be useful to progress. Bruno shows only that if P and Q are true,
it implies R. We can look at R and see if it agrees with what we
see, and use it as evidence for or against (P & Q).
Science means doubtfulness and we have no access to "TRUTH" - we
just think of it.
Computability? good method to use our brain-functions(?) to get
results. I mean more than that embryonic binary boardgame we use,
however a 'wider' computability may
include logical domains we so far did not even hear about. So beware
the word.
I do not like mathematicians (the old Greeks?) from before the time
when zero was invented. (maybe Bruno's simple arithmetics is an
exception?).
I am not ready to debate my ideas: my "agnostic" thinking is NG for
argumentation.
I don't think agnosticism or doubt should inhibit argumentation.
I agree and said so. John Mikes often talk like if we were pretending
that something is true, which no (serious) scientists ever do.
We just argue *in* the frame of some theories. As scientists we doubt
all theories.
You can, for instance, show how given certain assumptions (without
believing they are true), might they lead to consequences that are
either absurd or generally accepted. Of course, whether some idea
is considered absurd or not might be matter of someone's beliefs.
Yes. We can mention our personal belief ... at the pause café. We
better do that when people get the "scientific" (sharable) point, so
as not mixing what is proved to everybody, and the degree of
plausibility of our assumptions.
Bruno
Jason
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:36 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote:
Here is my tuppence about the hoax-game of the fantasy-play
'teleportation':
It is what I said, never substantiated and placed into circumstances
never substantiated or verified even within our imaginary
physical(?) explanations.
Wana play? be my guest.
In a 'transportation' (cf: reincarnation-like?) one is supposed to
receive new identity as fitting for the new circumstances, with
memory arased of the old one.
YOU2 is NOT YOU1. (Not even YOU1*).
If you don't accept in step 1 then computationalism is false (which
is possible, but it was an explicit assumption on which the rest of
the reasoning is based).
Why should we think computationalism is true? Our particles are
substituted all the time through normal metabolism, so the
particular parts are not important so long as the pattern is
preserved. Further, no known laws of physics are incomputable, so
then the brain must use some, as of yet, undiscovered physics in
order to assert computationalism is false.
Jason
JM
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 3:02 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>
wrote:
I do not believe in #1 due to the no cloning theorem.
If comp produces QM it must also produce the no cloning theorem.
Richard
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 11:29 AM, John Clark <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Bruno: The question is: is it enough correct so that you would
please us in answering step 4. If not: what is incorrect.
John Clark: (No answer, deleted the question)
I have not read step 4, however if it is built on the foundation of
the first 3 steps
What is the error in step 3?
(and I can't think why it would be called "step 4" if it were not)
then I can conclude that one thing wrong with step 4 (I don't claim
it is the only thing) is the previous 3 steps.
I think if you read the whole set of steps (or even just the next
few steps) you would see where things are going and wouldn't have so
much trouble understanding the point of the third step.
I will summarize them for you here:
1: Teleportation is survivable
2: Teleportation with a time delay is survivable, and the time delay
is imperceptible to the person teleported
3. Duplication (teleportation to two locations: one intended and one
unintended) is survivable, and following duplication there is a 50%
chance of finding oneself at the intended destination
4. Duplication with delay changes nothing. If duplicate to the
intended destination, and then a year later duplicated to the
unintended destination, subjectively there is still a 50% chance of
finding oneself at the intended destination
5. Teleportation without destroying the original is equivalent to
the duplication with delay. If someone creates a copy of you
somewhere, there is a 50% chance you will find yourself in that
alternate location.
6. If a virtual copy of you is instantiated in a computer somewhere,
then as in step 5, there is a 50% chance you will find yourself
trapped in that computer simulation.
7. A computer with enough time and memory, that iteratively executes
all programs in parallel will "kidnap" everyone, since all observers
everywhere (in all universes) will eventually find themselves to be
in this computer
8. There is no need to build the computer in step 7, since the
executions of all programs exist within the relations between large
numbers. Hence, arithmetical realism is a candidate TOE.
This is the "grand conclusion" you have been missing for all these
years. I don't think this was obvious to Og the caveman.
Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
