'Implicit assumptions'? Jason seems to me as standing on the platform of physical sciences - at least on a mthematical justification of theorems. Even Bruno's "we see" is suspect: we *THINK* we see, in adjusted ways as we can absorb phenomena, potentially including a lot more than we know about 'today'..
About Bruno's remark on 'agnosticism' (also callable: ignorance) : I don't know (!) if a 'theory' (the partial one *within* our existent knowledge) is working indeed, or it just SEEMS working within the limited circumstances. Refuted? No one can include into a 'refutation' the totality, only the elements of a content of the present model. Finally: I don't consider agnosticism a philosophy (oxymoron). The 'practical' results we achieve in our limited science-technology are commendable and useful, subject to Bruno's "just be cautious to not draw conclusions". (Scientific humility?) I may include a whole wide world beyond the mathematical computations into the term of 'compute'. That is semantic and requires a wider vocabulary than just ONE language. John M On Sat, Dec 21, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Dec 2013, at 00:42, John Mikes wrote: > > Jason, you 'assume' a lot what I don't. > > > Really. jason was assuming comp, and nothing more, it seems to me. Can you > list the implicit assumptions? > > > > I learned those figments in college and applied in my conventional > research - now reduced in my credibility (agnosticism) for phizix and its > 'laws' - (in spite of the practical results which I use happily in my > life-practice) - as - some *explanatory sweat *to comply with (poorly > if at all understood) phenomena received in formats how the actual > developmental level of our mentality could handle it. > > I would think twice to 'accept' an argument just to make another one > acceptable. > Science means doubtfulness and we have no access to "TRUTH" - we just > think of it. > Computability? good method to use our brain-functions(?) to get results. I > mean more than that embryonic binary boardgame we use, however a 'wider' > *computability > *may > include logical domains we so far did not even hear about. So beware the > word. > > > Church thesis makes computability into an miraculous mathematical > definition of an otherwise epistemic notion. > yes, there is a sort of miracle there. Comp assumes it, although > mathematically we can eliminate it. > > > > > I do not like mathematicians (the old Greeks?) from before the time when > zero was invented. (maybe Bruno's simple arithmetics is an exception?). > > > ? > It is the same arithmetic. > > > > I am not ready to debate my ideas: my "agnostic" thinking is NG for > argumentation. > > > Agnosticism invites to theorizing, and just be cautious to not draw > conclusion when a theory is working (only when it is refuted). > > If not, agnosticism become another "don't ask" philosophy. > > Bruno > > > > > John M > > > > On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:36 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Here is my tuppence about the *hoax-game* of the >>> *fantasy-play*'teleportation': >>> It is what I said, never substantiated and placed into circumstances >>> never substantiated or verified even within our imaginary physical(?) >>> explanations. >>> Wana play? be my guest. >>> In a 'transportation' (cf: reincarnation-like?) one is supposed to >>> receive new identity as fitting for the new circumstances, with memory >>> arased of the old one. >>> YOU2 is NOT YOU1. (Not even YOU1*). >>> >> >> If you don't accept in step 1 then computationalism is false (which is >> possible, but it was an explicit assumption on which the rest of the >> reasoning is based). >> >> Why should we think computationalism is true? Our particles are >> substituted all the time through normal metabolism, so the particular parts >> are not important so long as the pattern is preserved. Further, no known >> laws of physics are incomputable, so then the brain must use some, as of >> yet, undiscovered physics in order to assert computationalism is false. >> >> Jason >> >> >> >>> JM >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 3:02 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> I do not believe in #1 due to the no cloning theorem. >>>> If comp produces QM it must also produce the no cloning theorem. >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 11:29 AM, John Clark <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Bruno: The question is: is it enough correct so that you would >>>>>>> please us in answering step 4. If not: what is incorrect. >>>>>>> John Clark: (No answer, deleted the question) >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I have not read step 4, however if it is built on the foundation of >>>>>> the first 3 steps >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What is the error in step 3? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> (and I can't think why it would be called "step 4" if it were not) >>>>>> then I can conclude that one thing wrong with step 4 (I don't claim it is >>>>>> the only thing) is the previous 3 steps. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think if you read the whole set of steps (or even just the next few >>>>> steps) you would see where things are going and wouldn't have so much >>>>> trouble understanding the point of the third step. >>>>> >>>>> I will summarize them for you here: >>>>> >>>>> 1: Teleportation is survivable >>>>> 2: Teleportation with a time delay is survivable, and the time delay >>>>> is imperceptible to the person teleported >>>>> 3. Duplication (teleportation to two locations: one intended and one >>>>> unintended) is survivable, and following duplication there is a 50% chance >>>>> of finding oneself at the intended destination >>>>> 4. Duplication with delay changes nothing. If duplicate to the >>>>> intended destination, and then a year later duplicated to the unintended >>>>> destination, subjectively there is still a 50% chance of finding oneself >>>>> at >>>>> the intended destination >>>>> 5. Teleportation without destroying the original is equivalent to the >>>>> duplication with delay. If someone creates a copy of you somewhere, there >>>>> is a 50% chance you will find yourself in that alternate location. >>>>> 6. If a virtual copy of you is instantiated in a computer somewhere, >>>>> then as in step 5, there is a 50% chance you will find yourself trapped in >>>>> that computer simulation. >>>>> 7. A computer with enough time and memory, that iteratively executes >>>>> all programs in parallel will "kidnap" everyone, since all observers >>>>> everywhere (in all universes) will eventually find themselves to be in >>>>> this >>>>> computer >>>>> 8. There is no need to build the computer in step 7, since the >>>>> executions of all programs exist within the relations between large >>>>> numbers. Hence, arithmetical realism is a candidate TOE. >>>>> >>>>> This is the "grand conclusion" you have been missing for all these >>>>> years. I don't think this was obvious to Og the caveman. >>>>> >>>>> Jason >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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