'Implicit assumptions'? Jason seems to me as standing on the platform of
physical sciences - at least on a mthematical justification of theorems.
Even Bruno's "we see" is suspect: we *THINK* we see, in adjusted ways as we
can absorb phenomena, potentially including a lot more than we know about
'today'..

About Bruno's remark on 'agnosticism' (also callable: ignorance) : I don't
know (!) if a 'theory' (the partial one *within* our existent knowledge) is
working indeed, or it just SEEMS working within the limited circumstances.
Refuted? No one can include into a 'refutation' the totality, only the
elements of a content of the present model.
Finally: I don't consider agnosticism a philosophy (oxymoron). The
'practical' results we achieve in our limited science-technology are
commendable and useful, subject to Bruno's "just be cautious to not draw
conclusions". (Scientific humility?)
I may include a whole wide world beyond the mathematical computations into
the term of 'compute'. That is semantic and requires a wider vocabulary
than just ONE language.

John M


On Sat, Dec 21, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 21 Dec 2013, at 00:42, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Jason, you 'assume' a lot what I don't.
>
>
> Really. jason was assuming comp, and nothing more, it seems to me. Can you
> list the implicit assumptions?
>
>
>
> I learned those figments in college and applied in my conventional
> research - now reduced in my credibility (agnosticism) for phizix and its
> 'laws' - (in spite of the practical results which I use happily in my
> life-practice)  -  as  - some *explanatory sweat *to comply with (poorly
> if at all understood) phenomena  received in formats how the actual
> developmental level of our mentality could handle it.
>
> I would think twice to 'accept' an argument just to make another one
> acceptable.
> Science means doubtfulness and we have no access to "TRUTH" - we just
> think of it.
> Computability? good method to use our brain-functions(?) to get results. I
> mean more than that embryonic binary boardgame we use, however a 'wider' 
> *computability
> *may
> include logical domains we so far did not even hear about. So beware the
> word.
>
>
> Church thesis makes computability into an miraculous mathematical
> definition of an otherwise epistemic notion.
> yes, there is a sort of miracle there. Comp assumes it, although
> mathematically we can eliminate it.
>
>
>
>
> I do not like mathematicians (the old Greeks?) from before the time when
> zero was invented. (maybe Bruno's simple arithmetics is an exception?).
>
>
> ?
> It is the same arithmetic.
>
>
>
> I am not ready to debate my ideas: my "agnostic" thinking is NG for
> argumentation.
>
>
> Agnosticism invites to theorizing, and just be cautious to not draw
> conclusion when a theory is working (only when it is refuted).
>
> If not, agnosticism become another "don't ask" philosophy.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> John M
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:36 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Here is my tuppence about the *hoax-game* of the 
>>> *fantasy-play*'teleportation':
>>> It is what I said, never substantiated and placed into circumstances
>>> never substantiated or verified even within our imaginary physical(?)
>>> explanations.
>>> Wana play? be my guest.
>>> In a 'transportation' (cf: reincarnation-like?) one is supposed to
>>> receive new identity as fitting for the new circumstances, with memory
>>> arased of the old one.
>>> YOU2 is NOT YOU1. (Not even YOU1*).
>>>
>>
>> If you don't accept in step 1 then computationalism is false (which is
>> possible, but it was an explicit assumption on which the rest of the
>> reasoning is based).
>>
>> Why should we think computationalism is true?  Our particles are
>> substituted all the time through normal metabolism, so the particular parts
>> are not important so long as the pattern is preserved.  Further, no known
>> laws of physics are incomputable, so then the brain must use some, as of
>> yet, undiscovered physics in order to assert computationalism is false.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>>>  JM
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 3:02 PM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> I do not believe in #1 due to the no cloning theorem.
>>>> If comp produces QM it must also produce the no cloning theorem.
>>>> Richard
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 11:29 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Bruno: The question is: is it enough correct so that you would
>>>>>>> please us in answering step 4. If not: what is incorrect.
>>>>>>> John Clark: (No answer, deleted the question)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have not read step 4, however if it is built on the foundation of
>>>>>> the first 3 steps
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What is the error in step 3?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  (and I can't think why it would be called "step 4" if it were not)
>>>>>> then I can conclude that one thing wrong with step 4 (I don't claim it is
>>>>>> the only thing) is the previous 3 steps.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think if you read the whole set of steps (or even just the next few
>>>>> steps) you would see where things are going and wouldn't have so much
>>>>> trouble understanding the point of the third step.
>>>>>
>>>>> I will summarize them for you here:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1: Teleportation is survivable
>>>>> 2: Teleportation with a time delay is survivable, and the time delay
>>>>> is imperceptible to the person teleported
>>>>> 3. Duplication (teleportation to two locations: one intended and one
>>>>> unintended) is survivable, and following duplication there is a 50% chance
>>>>> of finding oneself at the intended destination
>>>>> 4. Duplication with delay changes nothing.  If duplicate to the
>>>>> intended destination, and then a year later duplicated to the unintended
>>>>> destination, subjectively there is still a 50% chance of finding oneself 
>>>>> at
>>>>> the intended destination
>>>>> 5. Teleportation without destroying the original is equivalent to the
>>>>> duplication with delay.  If someone creates a copy of you somewhere, there
>>>>> is a 50% chance you will find yourself in that alternate location.
>>>>> 6. If a virtual copy of you is instantiated in a computer somewhere,
>>>>> then as in step 5, there is a 50% chance you will find yourself trapped in
>>>>> that computer simulation.
>>>>> 7. A computer with enough time and memory, that iteratively executes
>>>>> all programs in parallel will "kidnap" everyone, since all observers
>>>>> everywhere (in all universes) will eventually find themselves to be in 
>>>>> this
>>>>> computer
>>>>> 8. There is no need to build the computer in step 7, since the
>>>>> executions of all programs exist within the relations between large
>>>>> numbers. Hence, arithmetical realism is a candidate TOE.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the "grand conclusion" you have been missing for all these
>>>>> years. I don't think this was obvious to Og the caveman.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jason
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to