Jason, John, and Bruno,

One must distinguish here between consciousness itself (the subject of the Hard 
Problem), and the contents of consciousness and their structure (the subjects 
of the Easy Problems).

The contents and their structure are most certainly computed by the minds of 
organisms, but the fact that the results of these computations are conscious is 
due to the self-manifesting immanent nature of reality as I explained in more 
detail in a post yesterday....

Edgar



On Dec 22, 2013, at 10:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Dec 22, 2013 at 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> 
> On 21 Dec 2013, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:
> 
>> 'Implicit assumptions'? Jason seems to me as standing on the platform of 
>> physical sciences -
> 
> I let Jason answer, but this is not my feeling. It seems to me that Jason is 
> quite cautious on this, and open to put physics on an arithmetical platform 
> instead. 
> 
> 
> 
> John's initial critique was that I seemed to be assuming a lot that he doe 
> not.  I replied to ask what specifically he thinks I am assuming which he was 
> not.  To clarify, I was assuming arithmetical truth and the idea that the 
> correct computation can instantiate our consciousness.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
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