On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, >>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in >>>> computer simulations of stories of them … >>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >>>> observable, you can infer that either: >>>> >>>> Mechanism is false, or >>>> You are dreaming, or >>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >>>> >>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we >>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. >>> >>> >>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical >>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low >>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable >>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical >>> to me. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as >>> the fundamental elements of nature. >>> >>> >>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an >>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without >>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if >>> invisible horses pull the car? >>> >>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of >>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not >>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is >>> inconsistent with mechanism. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing >>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) >>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. >>> >>> >>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary >>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail >>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both >>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make >>> up stories about vampires and werewolves. >>> >>> >>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist >>> hypothesis. >>> >>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To >>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a >>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, >>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as >>> your use of many links illustrates). >>> >>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in >>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go >>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary >>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, >>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves >>> Mechanism. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be >> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) >> >> >> >> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from >> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do >> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any >> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they >> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws. >> >> >> >> >> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a >> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes >> place in matter*. >> >> >> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough >> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it >> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, >> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that >> is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. >> It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an >> explanation. >> >> You added: <<A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once the >> true nature of matter is appreciated.>>* >> >> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks >> we avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely >> phenomenological. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming > language theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT. > > Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will > compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a whole > bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It can > have a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your > semantics) could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational > semantics, and then physical semantics (the power consumption of the > apparatus, its graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the > physical substrate of the program, and, potentially, its experiential > semantics (as you yourself become immersed in its environment). > > The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type modal > logics for agent programs, is an important part of (intelligent to > conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT > semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as agents > will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic > biology. > > As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder > that we thought.” > > > > Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue > what you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion > (besides 1500 years of dogmatic brainwashing on it). > > If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s > thesis, then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter > consistent with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, > on the contrary, the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we can > test it. Today, the evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard about > an evidence for materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are > simplifying idea, useful methodologically in applied science, but they > should not be taken literally when doing metaphysics with the scientific > method. > > Bruno > > > > The ultimate dogmatic brainwashing of course is *Platonism* - the Platonism of mathematics in particular - that mathematical objects have a real existence. Generations of school children are brainwashed by Platonism.
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