> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>> 
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>>> infer that either:
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>> 
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>> 
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to 
>> me.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>> 
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
>> pull the car?
>> 
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>> 
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>> 
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>> 
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>> 
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
>> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
>> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
>> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
>> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
> 
> 
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>> place in matter.
> 
> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
> this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
> before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
> almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 
> 
> You added: <<A better way: Matter does explain consciousness, once the true 
> nature of matter is appreciated.>>
> 
> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
> avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely 
> phenomenological.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming language 
> theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT.
> 
> Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will 
> compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a whole 
> bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It can have 
> a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your semantics) 
> could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational semantics, and 
> then physical semantics (the power consumption of the apparatus, its 
> graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the physical substrate of 
> the program, and, potentially, its experiential semantics (as you yourself 
> become immersed in its environment).
> 
> The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type modal 
> logics for agent programs, is an important part of  (intelligent to 
> conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT 
> semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as agents 
> will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic 
> biology. 
> 
> As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder that 
> we thought.”


Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue what 
you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion (besides 1500 
years of dogmatic brainwashing on it).

If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s thesis, 
then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter consistent 
with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, on the contrary, 
the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we can test it.  Today, the 
evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard about an evidence for 
materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are simplifying idea, useful 
methodologically in applied science, but they should not be taken literally 
when doing metaphysics with the scientific method.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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