On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, >>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in >>>>> computer simulations of stories of them … >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >>>>> observable, you can infer that either: >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is false, or >>>>> You are dreaming, or >>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >>>>> >>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we >>>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. >>>> >>>> >>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical >>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so >>>> low >>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the >>>> observable >>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical >>>> to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta >>>> as the fundamental elements of nature. >>>> >>>> >>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an >>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without >>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if >>>> invisible horses pull the car? >>>> >>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of >>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not >>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is >>>> inconsistent with mechanism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing >>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) >>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. >>>> >>>> >>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary >>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail >>>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both >>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make >>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves. >>>> >>>> >>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the >>>> computationalist hypothesis. >>>> >>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To >>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a >>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, >>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as >>>> your use of many links illustrates). >>>> >>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in >>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go >>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary >>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, >>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves >>>> Mechanism. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would >>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) >>> >>> >>> >>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from >>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do >>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any >>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they >>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a >>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes >>> place in matter*. >>> >>> >>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to >>> rough for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory >>> implies it appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and >>> machine’s physics, it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism >>> false, but that is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and >>> conceptually unclear. It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, >>> to avoid an explanation. >>> >>> You added: <<A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once the >>> true nature of matter is appreciated.>>* >>> >>> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks >>> we avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely >>> phenomenological. >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming >> language theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT. >> >> Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will >> compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a whole >> bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It can >> have a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your >> semantics) could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational >> semantics, and then physical semantics (the power consumption of the >> apparatus, its graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the >> physical substrate of the program, and, potentially, its experiential >> semantics (as you yourself become immersed in its environment). >> >> The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type modal >> logics for agent programs, is an important part of (intelligent to >> conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT >> semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as agents >> will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic >> biology. >> >> As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder >> that we thought.” >> >> >> >> Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue >> what you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion >> (besides 1500 years of dogmatic brainwashing on it). >> >> If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s >> thesis, then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter >> consistent with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, >> on the contrary, the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we can >> test it. Today, the evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard about >> an evidence for materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are >> simplifying idea, useful methodologically in applied science, but they >> should not be taken literally when doing metaphysics with the scientific >> method. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > The ultimate dogmatic brainwashing of course is *Platonism* - the > Platonism of mathematics in particular - that mathematical objects have a > real existence. Generations of school children are brainwashed by Platonism. > > > Platonism (in metaphysics) is under the rug since 1500 years. The > platonism have escaped to the Middle-East, where Plato will not be > completely forgotten up to 1258. > > Platonism of mathematics should be called realism in mathematics, as the > relation with Plato’s philosophy is a complex domain. But I don’t see any > brainwashing here. It is not taught at all, and in europa, it is not even > well seen, as compared to Aristotle’s naturalism. > > Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, mechanism > restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This is > basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of me. > If you have a reason to doubt that, you can give it, but usually this is > not problematical. It is taught at primary school, and I have never heard > anyone contesting it outside philosophers who want to avoid metaphysical > consequences for reason of personal taste. > > Bruno > > >
Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
