On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, >>>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in >>>>>> computer simulations of stories of them … >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >>>>>> observable, you can infer that either: >>>>>> >>>>>> Mechanism is false, or >>>>>> You are dreaming, or >>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >>>>>> >>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we >>>>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical >>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so >>>>> low >>>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the >>>>> observable >>>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical >>>>> to me. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta >>>>> as the fundamental elements of nature. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an >>>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without >>>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if >>>>> invisible horses pull the car? >>>>> >>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of >>>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not >>>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which >>>>> is >>>>> inconsistent with mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing >>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) >>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary >>>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would >>>>> entail >>>>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both >>>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make >>>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the >>>>> computationalist hypothesis. >>>>> >>>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. >>>>> To avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a >>>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, >>>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as >>>>> your use of many links illustrates). >>>>> >>>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in >>>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts >>>>> go >>>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary >>>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, >>>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves >>>>> Mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would >>>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from >>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I >>>> do >>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any >>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that >>>> they >>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical >>>> laws. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a >>>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which >>>> *takes >>>> place in matter*. >>>> >>>> >>>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to >>>> rough for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory >>>> implies it appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and >>>> machine’s physics, it will make sense to suppose some matter, and >>>> mechanism >>>> false, but that is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and >>>> conceptually unclear. It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, >>>> to avoid an explanation. >>>> >>>> You added: <<A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once >>>> the true nature of matter is appreciated.>>* >>>> >>>> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks >>>> we avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely >>>> phenomenological. >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming >>> language theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT. >>> >>> Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will >>> compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a whole >>> bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It can >>> have a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your >>> semantics) could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational >>> semantics, and then physical semantics (the power consumption of the >>> apparatus, its graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the >>> physical substrate of the program, and, potentially, its experiential >>> semantics (as you yourself become immersed in its environment). >>> >>> The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type >>> modal logics for agent programs, is an important part of (intelligent to >>> conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT >>> semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as agents >>> will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic >>> biology. >>> >>> As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder >>> that we thought.” >>> >>> >>> >>> Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue >>> what you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion >>> (besides 1500 years of dogmatic brainwashing on it). >>> >>> If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s >>> thesis, then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter >>> consistent with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, >>> on the contrary, the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we can >>> test it. Today, the evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard about >>> an evidence for materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are >>> simplifying idea, useful methodologically in applied science, but they >>> should not be taken literally when doing metaphysics with the scientific >>> method. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> The ultimate dogmatic brainwashing of course is *Platonism* - the >> Platonism of mathematics in particular - that mathematical objects have a >> real existence. Generations of school children are brainwashed by Platonism. >> >> >> Platonism (in metaphysics) is under the rug since 1500 years. The >> platonism have escaped to the Middle-East, where Plato will not be >> completely forgotten up to 1258. >> >> Platonism of mathematics should be called realism in mathematics, as the >> relation with Plato’s philosophy is a complex domain. But I don’t see any >> brainwashing here. It is not taught at all, and in europa, it is not even >> well seen, as compared to Aristotle’s naturalism. >> >> Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, mechanism >> restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This is >> basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of me. >> If you have a reason to doubt that, you can give it, but usually this is >> not problematical. It is taught at primary school, and I have never heard >> anyone contesting it outside philosophers who want to avoid metaphysical >> consequences for reason of personal taste. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the > evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said. > > > > > > > That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying that > the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the one we > search. > > Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and badly > seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not understood > Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” where he seems to > suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to Plato without saying (but > that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, To be sure I > found some scholars who saw that too, like Gerson. > > That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because “truth” > when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct substitution > level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, and semantics, is > very much like the platonician notion of God. You force me to agree with > Rorty on this! > > > Bruno > > I read some philosophy (particularly of mathematics) before my 1979 Ph.D. After that was out of the way, I began to read a lot more. Two books came out in 1979 which impacted me early:
GEB: Gödel, Escher, Bach ( Douglas Hofstadter) PMN: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Richard Rorty) After 40 years now, "Rortian" is as succinct a term as any (if I had to choose one word) to say what my philosophy is. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
