[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[...]
Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense?
Given that we believe in sense?
Who/what gives that?
Do we believe in that?
Georges.
Norman Samish wrote:
>
> Thanks to all who replied to my question. This question has
> bothered me for years, and I have hopes that some progress can
> be made towards an answer.
>
> I've heard some interesting concepts, including:
> (1) "Numbers must exist, therefore 'something' must exist."
>
John M wrote:
>
> Georges, your post is "on the level", I am not
> I am still in common sense with my feeble
> thinking-tool.
Sorry, I am not a native english speaker, I don't understand
what "on the level" can mean (and especially with quotes).
In don't understand either what you mean by "".
John M wrote:
>
> Georges: please, have merci on me! 'my' English is
> the 5th of my acquired languages, so to read - and
> realize what it stands for - that long a post is
> (almost) beyond my mental endurance.
I understand that but the point is highly unusual
and unintuitive and I felt that a
John M wrote:
>
> Unfortunately my mailbox did not take more and wrote:
> == message truncated ===
Here follows a copy of the remainder:
...
Last but not least: this view has the advantage that we no
longer have to wonder how it comes that particles follows the
rules, how can a particle influe
John M wrote:
>
> [...]
> === message truncated ===
If for some reason you receive the message truncated in your
mail tool, you can probably get the full texte from the site:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
Georges.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You rece
John M wrote:
>
> Georges,
> this is to your reflections to my remarks. It starts
> to look like a private discussion on-list,
Not completely. And some may also follow the discussion
an find it interesting even if they do not participate
(as I often do for other threads).
> but I love it.
So d
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
>> exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only
>> isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed
>> to the other mat
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
>> real and others abstract...
>
> A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
> to explain the world. QED.
This looks *very* similar
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Norman Samish wrote:
>
>>> Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
>>> it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always there,"
>>> and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quenot wrote:
>>>
>>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
>>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
> mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
adopt it either.
But can y
John M wrote:
>
> [...]
> Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
I probably missed your point.
> [...]
> By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things
> into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under
> commis, now 3+ in the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
>>> mathematical,
>> I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
>> you do not adopt it (and what
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>>>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
>>>>> mathematical,
>>>
Georges Quénot wrote:
>
> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
> equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" includes
> a counterpart of you.
I meant:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a "Harry
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>
>>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>>>> Georges Quenot wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> That "[The universe]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>
>> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
>>equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including
>>a counterpart of you would be a solution.
>
> 1) Any configuration o
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
>>>> real and others abstract...
>>&
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit :
>
*If* comp is true. I am not sure of that.
>>> Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some
>>> neat "etalon philosophy" to compare with other theories. The advantage
>>> of comp (which I recal
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
>>>>equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including
>&
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>
>> My 2. and 3. remain anyway.
>>
>> Georges.
>
> "2. There may well exist a "Harry Potter universe" that
> includes a counterpart of you but it is not causaly
> related to our un
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>> I see. So from you viewpoint the distinction between physics
>> and mathematics appears as natural
>
> It is grounded in the logical distinction between necessity and
> contingency.
Th
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>>> Georges Quenot wrote:
If you are a being that have never observed magical events
any duplicate of you "will" never have observed any magical
event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer
1Z wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>
>> Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This
>> is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience
>> something different of what you do, his acquired (and
>> possibly his lost) memories will differ fro
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>
>> That too can be discussed. It is not so sure that there
>> exist a set of equations of which a HP universe would
>> be a solution, especially if this universe must also
>> include a counterpart of me.
>
>
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> [...] What we can be sure of is that
>>> 1) we exist
>>> 2) we are conscious
>>> 3) there is some sort of external world
>>> 4) there is some phenomenon of time.
>> *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do
>
peterdjones wrote:
>
> [...]
> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them
> on the basis of not matching my experience.
Your experience *is* a prejudice.
Georges.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them
>>> on the basis of not matching my experience.
>> Your experience *is* a prejudice.
>
> Cela es
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> peterdjones wrote:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them
>>>>> on the b
peterdjones wrote:
>
> [...]
> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
> to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations
> have to end somewhere. The question is how man
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
>>> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
>>> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeal
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> peterdjones wrote:
>>>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>>>> peterdjones wrote:
>
>>>> It is just the idea that there
Our messages becomes longer and longer. I will split my
responses. I will start with this:
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> [...]
>> Furthermore, most of this HP universe is
>> in the brain of your nephew. What is in the game would be
>> almost nothing without your nephew's imaginati
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>> > Georges Quenot wrote:
>> >> peterdjones wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> "Epistemic objectivity of maths" means "every competent mathematician
>> >>> gets the same answer to a given problem". It doesn't say anything about
>> >>> the
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> [...]
>> The question of whether there could be other type of objects
>> than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could
>> mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am
>> afraid I cannot easily transmit that feeling). It is
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> Georges Quenot wrote:
>>>> [...]
>>>> The question of whether there could be other type of objects
>>>> than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could
>>
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