Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30 would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now whatever the measure of now and in one minute is. Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2 times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the real here and now is. Is there some third factor that you think comes into play? Can you estimate quantitatively what you think the measure ratio would be? Also even if absolute measure had sense, do you mean that the measure of a 1000 years old OM is strictly zero (not infinitesimal, simply and strictly null)? No, it is not zero, but it is extremely small. I have never suggested that there is no long time tail in the measure distribution that extends to infinite time. Of course there is. Any MWIer knows that. But it is negligable. You will never experience it, or depending on definitions, at least not in any significant measure. The general argument against immortality proves that. It is no more significant then any other very-small-measure set of observations, such as the ones in which you are king of the demons. You might as well forget about it. So even if being 1000 years had a so small but not null measure, it will come into existence by MWI, then the person which will be living this OM having my currents life as past will feel as real as I am... so what's the difference ? Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 10 Feb 2009, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. You are right, but I think that Stathis is right too. When Stathis talks about two identical stream of consciousness, he make perhaps just a little abuse of language, which seems to me quite justifiable. Just give a mirror to the observer so that A *can* (but does not) look in the mirror to see if he is implemented by MA1 or by MA2. Knowing the protocol the observer can predict that IF he look at the mirror the stream of consciousness will bifurcate into A1 and A2. I don't follow that. If A1 looks in the mirror and sees A2, then, ex hypothesi, A2 looks in the mirror and sees A1 and the two streams of consciousness remain identical. I don't understand what you mean by A1 sees A2. I guess we have a misunderstanding, and I have probably be not clear. When A1 looks at itself in the third person way, he discovers is most probable running universal machine, which is MA1. So the stream of consciousness differentiate at this point. Mallah get the correct probability here. If consciousness is computation, independent of physical implementation, then computations that differ only in their physical realizations are identical and cannot be counted as more than one. But what we call the physical implementations is a sum on all possible computations going through the relevant states. The measure has to be taken on all computational histories exactly because the stream of consciousness is the same for all those computational histories. Bruno Brent Accepting the Y = II rule, that is bifurcation of future = differentiation of the whole story) makes the Stathis abuse of language an acceptable way to describe the picture. So Stathis get the correct expectation, despite the first person ambiguity in two identical stream of consciousness. If two infinitely computations *never* differentiate, should we count them as one? I am not sure but I think we should still differentiate them. UD generates infinitely often such infinitely similar streams. That should play a role for the relative (to observer-moment) measure pertaining on the computations. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you open the box in the room you will find zero or one, but not both. And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I gather you assume). Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word bifurcation or differentiation for computation which, at some point *becomes* different. Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in Platonia. Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories is what makes consciousness differentiate. Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting the same OM. You are right, but different computations can be understood locally and globally. The computation of me up to Washington is different of the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels. It is contained in the Y = II idea. Note that the same vocabulary problem occurs with Quantum Physics. Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for computation. But we can already derive what can count as different computations if we want those measure question making sense. Best, Bruno Cheers, Günther Michael Rosefield wrote: I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com mailto:jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:48, Günther Greindl wrote: Kim, Günther recommends recently the book Eveything Must Go by Ladyman et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist idea. Do you also recommend it? The book does not concern the mechanist thesis, there is only one reference to Church. Everett is given a whole section, but Ladyman et al. are agnostic as to it's application to the macroscopic world (that is, if there are macroscopic many worlds). But they are not hostile to the interpretation. The book is good for getting a very informed overview of what current physics has to say for _metaphysics_ and philosophy of science. The authors sketch their variant of structural realism - it's good to read it if you still cling to the concept of matter. Indeed, that is the point. And yes there is section on Everett (but his name is not in the index). The authors seems to be unaware that mechanism implies Everett (at least) or worst (so that mechanism is testable). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A summary I just wrote for my blog
We only live once, but we live forever There is no afterlife - only life eternal Kim Jones On 11/02/2009, at 4:27 AM, Michael Rosefield wrote: I wrote it for my friends, but feel free to criticise! http://rosyatrandom.livejournal.com/35445.html _ Perhaps it's time I had another go at explaining all that weird stuff I believe in and why. Well, for those few that don't know, I reckon that all possible universes exist and that everyone's immortal. I admit, this does sound rather odd. It would have sounded odd to me about 10 years ago, too. Since about the age of 8 I was a pretty hardcore rational scientific naturalist: everything is simply matter and energy, and we but its dreams. What was real? Well, a chair. An atom. Something you can touch. After all, when you think of reality, you think of something... there. Something that sits there, quietly existing to itself. But what does that mean, really? Everyone knows that matter is almost entirely empty space, anyway - the solidity is just the feather-touch of far-extended electromagnetic fields. Electrons popping in and out of existence as the energy fields knot so charge can be transferred in quantised lumps. Particles do not behave as billiard balls - they are ghosts, obeying strange equations, lacking hard and fast surfaces or reliable locations. Matter, energy, space, time... they all begin to seem a bit ethereal when you look at them. Time. There's another one. I don't really believe in that, either. Spacetime is just a barely distinguishable fabric woven by the universe. Events do not occur at a time or a place - most of the observables we see arise kaleidoscope like out of an intricate web of possibilities, their form imposed by our own consciousness. And by that, I mean that our minds are embedded within the universe, constructed in such a way that the metaphysical structure of the cosmos is implied by our design - the word without reflects the world within. This has an aspect of the anthropic principle to it - that we observe a world capable of supporting our existence because if it didn't, we wouldn't. But this still has no bearing on how I started thinking things like this, so I shall get that out of the way. The short story is that I read some stories by a science-fiction author called Greg Egan. Before you laugh too much, a lot of sci-fi is essentially just window-dressing to convey an idea - the implications of some item of technology, turn of events or scientific/philosophical argument. And Greg Egan is a 'hard' science- fiction author, an ideas merchant. Well, you get the drift. The first story I read was called Wang's Carpets (later included as a chapter of the book Diaspora), in which some spacefarers (themselves software) find a planet whose major life-form are floating mats that take the form of Wang Tiles - tesselating objects whose patterns can implement a universal turing machine. But that's just the set-up for the idea: when someone analyses the Carpets, by taking various abstract variables (appearance of certain tiles and features, etc) and putting them through frequency transforms, it turns out that the computations the Carpets encode as part of their reproductive habits give rise to a fully realised n-dimensional space containing self-aware creatures. The thought-provoking part here was not that consciousness could be digitalised and run as software - I had already pretty much accepted that - but that the mathematical transformations necessary to do this could be pretty strange, and come from processes that were essentially plucked arbitrarily from the environment. That, largely, consciousness could be a matter of perspective. The second story was the book, Permutation City. A great deal of this book concerns one of the protagonists who wakes up one day and finds he is simply a downloaded copy - and that the 'real' him is running experiments. After being run at different speeds, and distributed in space and time, backwards, in chunks of different sizes, etc., the argument becomes that it doesn't matter what or how the program is run - it is all the same from the perspective of the consciousness being implemented, and that this is so abstract that one can find the relevant computational processes within any physical substrate. That all consciousnesses can be found within a grain of sand. That there is not even any physical bedrock to fall back upon - there is no way ever to verify, even in principle, that one is on the 'fundamental' metapysical level. At the end of the book, the characters have escaped into their own computational world, completely divorced from any physical hardware. Their universe contains a simulation of another world, whose very alien inhabitants find their own
Re: adult vs. child AB
2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. I think I understand your point, but I don't see that the continuity of consciousness is any more an illusion than any other continuity: the continuity of space, the persistence of objects, etc. You are just generalizing Zeno's paradox. But once you look at it that way, the question becomes, Why imagine the continuity is made up of discrete elements? It is this conceptualization, points in space, moments in time, observer moments as atoms of consciousness, that creates the paradox. So maybe we should recognize continuity as fundamental. The continuity need not be temporal, it could be a more abstract property such a causal connection or perhaps what Bruno says distinguishes a computation from a description of the computation. I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Heart disease. Cancer. Stroke. Degradation of various organs leading to death. Such ailments are known to strike older people more than young people. Are such things unheard of in your country? I wouldn't call it sudden, but certainly by 100 the measure has dropped off a lot. By 200, survival is theoretically possible, so the measure isn't zero, but such cases are obviously quite rare. Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. There is no randomness whatsoever involved. See my replies to Stathis. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB causation
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content. That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z. Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to the idea that the stream of consciousness is just the computation? The causal chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented by different physics and hence different causation. --- On Tue, 2/10/09, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: But surely the counterfactuals are the same in each case too? In which case it is the same causal relationship. We're talking computations here, each computation will respond identically to the same counterfactual input. I believe you both are taking what I wrote out of context. Sorry if I was not clear. In the above I was talking about the moment at which the data is saved, from either A1 or A2, when making the transition to B in the thought experiment. BTW, causation (sensitivity to counterfactuals) is part of the criteria for an implementation of a computation. So in that sense causation is essential to the experience. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. Exactly. And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight. And that is the point. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. Exactly. And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight. And that is the point. I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid. So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part. Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ? Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com mailto:jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30 would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now whatever the measure of now and in one minute is. Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2 times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the real here and now is. Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreams and measure
You were not the simulated one in your dreams, hence you can't say anything about its life expectancy... :) 2009/2/11 Saibal Mitra smi...@zonnet.nl Welcome back Jack Mallah! I have a different argument against QTI. I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended. Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream should have been be infinite. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
The Seventh Step 1 (Numbers and Notations)
Hi Kim, I told you that to grasp the seventh step we have to do some little amount of math. Now math is a bit like consciousness or time, we know very well what it is, but we cannot really define it, and such an encompassing definition can depend on the philosophical view you can have on the mathematical reality. So, if I try to be precise enough so that the math will be applicable, not just on the seventh step, but also on the 8th step and eventually for the sketch of the AUDA, that is the arithmetical translation of the universal dovetailer argument, I am tempted by providing the philosophical clues, deducible from the comp hypothesis, for the introduction to math. But I realize that this would entail philosophical discussion right at the beginning, and that would give to you the feeling that, well, elementary math is something very difficult, which is NOT the case. The truth is that philosophy of elementary math is difficult. So I have change my mind, and we will do a bit of math. Simply. It is far best to have a practice of math before getting involved in more subtle discussion, even if we will not been able to hide those subtleties when applying the math to the foundation of physics and cognition. I propose to you a shortcut to the seventh step. It is not a thorough introduction to math. Yet it starts from the very basic things. Let us begin. What I explain here is standard, except for the notations, and this for mailing technical reason. I guess you have heard about the Natural Numbers, also called Positive Integers. By default, when I use the word number, it will mean I am meaning the natural number. I guess you agree with the statement that 0 is equal to the number of occurrence of the letter y in the word spelling. OK? Then you have the number 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. OK? They are respectively equal to the number of stroke in I, II, III, , etc. OK? Of course the number four is not equal to . But the string, or sequence of symbols is a good notation for the number four. The notation is good in the sense that it is quasi self-explaining. To see what number is denoted by a string like III: just count the strokes. OK? If that stroke sequences are conceptually good for describing the numbers, it happens that it is horrible for using them, and you are probably used to the much more modern positional notation for the number. If I ask you which year we are. You will not answer me that we are in the year I You will most probably tell me that we are in the year 2009. Is that not a bit magical? The explanation of that miracle relies in the very ingenuous way we can use our hands to count on our fingers or digits. We put 0 on a little finger, and then 1 on the next up to 4, and then we use the other hand to continue with 5 on the thumb, 6, then 7, then 8, then 9 on the last right fingers. Unfortunately we lack
Re: Dreams and measure
Hello again, Saibal! It is good to see that I am not alone here in taking a stand against QS/QI. What do you think of my paper? Is it unclear, convincing, unconvincing? Are there others like us who still post here? Regards, Jack --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: children and measure
Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight. And that is the point. I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid. There are some people who will, but relatively few. That is what counts for QS to be invalid. So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part. No, I never suggested it is zero. It doesn't have to be. Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ? I answered that previously. Measure affects the commonness of an observation, not what it feels like. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight. And that is the point. I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and that's what count for the argument to be valid. There are some people who will, but relatively few. That is what counts for QS to be invalid. Well no.. because if the measure is never null there always exists a successor moment however small is measure is, it exists and that's all what is needed. (from a first person perspective, and that's what the argument is about) So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly null... and that needs an argument from your part. No, I never suggested it is zero. It doesn't have to be. So there exists a successor. Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less alive/real/conscious ? I answered that previously. Measure affects the commonness of an observation, not what it feels like. From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a next subjective moment... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of universes I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot be dead hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. If A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2 and they see something different, i.e. MA1 and MA2 are distinguishable, then you've violated the hypothesis that the computations are identical. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: children and measure
2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a next subjective moment... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of universes I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot be dead hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds. But any notion of there being objective truths about what happens from the 1st person perspective, as opposed to just 3rd person truths about what various brains *report* experiencing, gets into philosophical assumptions that really need to made explicit or else people are talking at cross-purposes...this is what I was getting at with my post at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/msg/26b0bf3e1e971381 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Jesse Mazer wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse We seem to be in violent agreement. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com mailto:laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... I guess that depends on what you care about. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreams and measure
Saibal Mitra wrote: Welcome back Jack Mallah! I have a different argument against QTI. I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended. Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream should have been be infinite. Of course maybe in some other branch of the multiverse your dream is continuing. That's what makes everything-theories difficult to test. But you raise an interesting point. Everything-theories that suppose consciousness is constituted by the closest continuations need to solve the white rabbit problem. But that solution, whatever it is, would equally apply in dreams. So why don't dreams have the same physics as waking life? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you open the box in the room you will find zero or one, but not both. And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I gather you assume). Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word bifurcation or differentiation for computation which, at some point *becomes* different. Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in Platonia. Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories is what makes consciousness differentiate. Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting the same OM. You are right, but different computations can be understood locally and globally. The computation of me up to Washington is different of the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels. It is contained in the Y = II idea. This idea seems inconsistent with MWI. In QM the split is uncaused so it's hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases the measure of computations that were identical before the split. Brent Note that the same vocabulary problem occurs with Quantum Physics. Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for computation. But we can already derive what can count as different computations if we want those measure question making sense. As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on computations going through a particular state. Intuitively this implies a state at a particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are taking into account not just the present state but some period of history - which would correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a history, not just a state. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Hi Jack Nice to see you again. The assumption that measure decreases continuously has been accepted too easily. This is, however, really the crux of the discussion. One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. On the other hand, when you are really close to a near death event then you may argue that measure decreases. Whether the increase compensates for the decrease is debatable. In any case, measure is measured over a continuum and its value is infinite to begin with. So whether it increases or decreases may be a moot point. This being said, this issue is not easily dismissed and will impact ethics and philosophy for years to come. As I said, the increase or decrease in measure is at the crux of this problem.Your paper really did not illuminate the issue in a satisfactory manner. George Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum of the measures is N/N of the original. I still find this confusing. Your argument seems to be that you won't live to 1000 because the measure of 1000 year old versions of you in the multiverse is very small - the total consciousness across the multiverse is much less for 1000 year olds than 30 year olds. But by an analogous argument, the measure of 4 year old OM's is higher than that of 30 year old OM's, since you might die between age 4 and 30. But here you are, an adult rather than a child. You might die between 4 and 30, but the chance is fairly small, let's say 10% for the sake of argument. So, if we just consider these two ages, the effective probability of being 30 would be a little less than that of being 4 - not enough less to draw any conclusions from. The period of adulthood is longer than that of childhood so actually you are more likely to be an adult. How likely? Just look at a cross section of the population. Some children, more adults, basically no super-old folks. Should you feel your consciousness more thinly spread or something? No, measure affects how common an observation is, not what it feels like. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an uncommon experience gets experienced just as often as a common experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal measure. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. I think I understand your point, but I don't see that the continuity of consciousness is any more an illusion than any other continuity: the continuity of space, the persistence of objects, etc. You are just generalizing Zeno's paradox. But once you look at it that way, the question becomes, Why imagine the continuity is made up of discrete elements? It is this conceptualization, points in space, moments in time, observer moments as atoms of consciousness, that creates the paradox. So maybe we should recognize continuity as fundamental. The continuity need not be temporal, it could be a more abstract property such a causal connection or perhaps what Bruno says distinguishes a computation from a description of the computation. I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an uncommon experience gets experienced just as often as a common experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal measure. That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is garanteed to be lived by definition. What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to have at least *one* next moment for every moment. Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Seventh Step 1 (Numbers and Notations)
Dear Bruno, just lightening up a bit...you know that I graduated already
from 2nd yr grade school so I have an open mind criticizing high science.
Not that if I see 'I' that means 1, but if I see 'III' that does not mean
3 to me, it means 111. You have to teach first what those funny 'figures'
(3,7,etc.) mean. If you teach: III and III mean 3 and 7, then you
said nothing, just named them. No content meant. Quantity???(vs. number?)
Having 10 digits on 2 hands is the 2nd mental evolutionary step after
recognizing 5 digits on 1 hand, which was the earlier stage (among others
old Hungarians had that and a folks music in pentatonic scale). The
'ancient' computer-folks have ony 2 digits on their mind, Yin and Yang (0
and 1) and voila they made lots of marvels from this simplified system
already. (You have that). And the French? with quatrevingtdix for nonante?
XC is not XX-XX-XX-XX-X - Romans still recognizing the '5' as a basic tenet
(V, L, D,) as cornerstones in their number system.
Also your digital 0,9,8,7,6 and then 5,4,3,2,1 was trouble in ancient Rome..
The Romans had no zero, yet used a (quasi) decimal system. However they did
not write rather IV and then for 9: IX anticipating V and X as the next
one. They also subtracted 4 from 7 as counting backwards: like 7,6,5,4,
which made 7-4=4 in all calendar countings which was based on the
subtraction of day-numbers from the next 'fix' day in the month. Can you
figure the consequences of this in paying interest (or taxes?)
(That may be the reason why Muslims are banned from counting interest).
I think your teaching is fine, but one has to know it before learning it.
And: as a nun said to a friend when she had questions 'upon thinking': you
should not think, you should believe.
About the 12 digital creation: In J.Cohen - J.Stewart ('Chaos' and
'Reality') the Zarathustran 'aliens' had an 8 based thinking (octimal) as
best and perfect. Well, 10 gives a prime after one halfing, 12 after two, 8
after 3. I think there were 12 digit creatures but failed. 10 proved
practical - maybe not because of the decimal as best mathematical system. It
just survived...
Your teachings made an enjoyable reading, thank you. I confess: I did not
count the 'I'-s just believed that there are 2009 of them. It is not
magical, in other calendar-countings the year has quite different number of
'I'-s.
If I should ask a question: how would one note 1 billion on the planet of
centipeds with 8 fingers on all 100 feet? (Don't answer, please). (Q2: which
billion? the 1000M or the MM?)
John M
On Wed, Feb 11, 2009 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Kim,
I told you that to grasp the seventh step we have to do some little
amount of math.
Now math is a bit like consciousness or time, we know very well what
it is, but we cannot really define it, and such an encompassing
definition can depend on the philosophical view you can have on the
mathematical reality.
So, if I try to be precise enough so that the math will be applicable,
not just on the seventh step, but also on the 8th step and eventually
for the sketch of the AUDA, that is the arithmetical translation of
the universal dovetailer argument, I am tempted by providing the
philosophical clues, deducible from the comp hypothesis, for the
introduction to math.
But I realize that this would entail philosophical discussion right at
the beginning, and that would give to you the feeling that, well,
elementary math is something very difficult, which is NOT the case.
The truth is that philosophy of elementary math is difficult.
So I have change my mind, and we will do a bit of math. Simply. It is
far best to have a practice of math before getting involved in more
subtle discussion, even if we will not been able to hide those
subtleties when applying the math to the foundation of physics and
cognition.
I propose to you a shortcut to the seventh step. It is not a thorough
introduction to math. Yet it starts from the very basic things.
Let us begin. What I explain here is standard, except for the
notations, and this for mailing technical reason.
I guess you have heard about the Natural Numbers, also called Positive
Integers. By default, when I use the word number, it will mean I am
meaning the natural number.
I guess you agree with the statement that 0 is equal to the number of
occurrence of the letter y in the word spelling. OK?
Then you have the number 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. OK? They are respectively
equal to the number of stroke in I, II, III, , etc. OK?
Of course the number four is not equal to . But the string, or
sequence of symbols is a good notation for the number four. The
notation is good in the sense that it is quasi self-explaining. To see
what number is denoted by a string like III: just count the
strokes. OK?
If that stroke sequences are conceptually good for describing the
numbers, it happens that it is horrible for using them, and
ASSA vs. RSSA and the no cul-de-sac conjecture was (AB continuity)
While I wasn't around for the original ASSA vs. RSSA arguments on the list here, and I'm sure I'm risking a rehash of things back then, the recent traffic over adult vs. child and AB continuity seems to revolve around this anyway. It seems intuitively obvious to me that from a 1st-person perspective, I have to treat successor observer moments with a /conditional/ probability. My next observer moment I face would be selected from among only those where a), I am conscious, and b) those with memories of this one, or more generally, with a causal thread of continuity with this one (unitary evolution of SW). So my subjective expectation would then be the absolute probability of those occurring conditioned on, or given, that the one I'm in now has already occurred. It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any observer moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW goes to zero. If it does not, then this implies that the always branching tree of observer moments has no leaf nodes--rather, it becomes an ever finer filigree of lines, but any particular point will always have a downstream set of forks. This is the essence of the no cul-de-sac conjecture, and the crux of the quantum theory of immortality. If the above is true, then the absolute measure of an observer moment becomes irrelevant; it's clear that as one traces through a particular branch it would always be dramatically decreasing anyway. But the relative measure of my next observer moment to this one becomes the thing that drives my expectations of what I am likely to experience. Indeed, some version of me experiences all of them, but each split copy of me can only say to himself, what I am experiencing now was likely (or unlikely) given where I was a moment ago. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
Jack, There are some people who will, but relatively few. That is what counts for QS to be invalid. Hmm, that does not make QS invalid (see Quentin and Jonathan's posts for my views on the issue, they have expressed everything clearly), and in fact you have already conceded QI (by asserting that measure never drops to null). It seems to me (judging from your abstract) that your real problem is with the ethical conclusions which may or may not follow from QI. But then the correct way is not to argue against QI but to tackle the ethical questions head on. Hilary Greaves would be an example (care for all your successors); or even better, adopt a benevolent attitude toward all conscious OMs so that you try to act to _increase_ conscious states (of all beings) in the whole universe, and not decrease them. I do not see a true ethical problem following from QI when people are ethical in the first case. And if they are not, I don't think that QI will add much incentive to be unethical. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreams and measure
2009/2/12 Saibal Mitra smi...@zonnet.nl: Welcome back Jack Mallah! I have a different argument against QTI. I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended. Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream should have been be infinite. If you remember that you had a nice dream then the version of you in the dream is continuing. And if you had forgotten it, there would be other versions of you that didn't, as Brent suggested. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
2009/2/12 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. Exactly. And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will probably die overnight. And that is the point. You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. But that could lead to absurd conclusions. Suppose you discover that you have a disease which breaks the required continuity every time you go to sleep, and that this has been happening your whole life. Will you worry about falling asleep tonight? Should your property be disposed of tomorrow according to your will? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. But that could lead to absurd conclusions. Suppose you discover that you have a disease Who has this disease? :-) which breaks the required continuity every time you go to sleep, and that this has been happening your whole life. Will you worry about falling asleep tonight? Should your property be disposed of tomorrow according to your will? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again. At least I think your point here is new to the list. --- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote: One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. I guess you are basing that on some kind of branch-counting idea. If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail. Perhaps the probability rule would be more like proportionality to norm^2 exp(entropy) instead of just norm^2. If that was it, then for example unstable nuclei would be observed to decay a lot faster than the Born Rule predicts. Conventional half life calculations are accurate. So either entropy would not be a factor, or the MWI is experimentally disproven already. Well, if it is a weak enough function of entropy then maybe it hasn't been disproven, but inclusion of free parameters like that which can always be made small enough goes against Occam's Razor. Otherwise there'd be no end of possible correction factors. At least your idea was testable, with none of the meaningless first person sloganeering. Ideas like that, keep em' coming! In any case, measure is measured over a continuum and its value is infinite to begin with. So whether it increases or decreases may be a moot point. It's not moot. Just take density ratios. The size of the universe may be infinite, but that didn't stop Hubble from saying it's getting bigger. As I said, the increase or decrease in measure is at the crux of this problem. Your paper really did not illuminate the issue in a satisfactory manner. It could no doubt use some tweaking, which is why I'm on the list now. I know I'm not always a good communicator. What should be clarified or added to it? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: continuity - cloning
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. You won't know this evening if you are one of the extra versions or the original. So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around tomorrow. Only the original will. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength. Not at all. I guess that is a joke? Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does not result in a net decrease in measure. That is why the movie The Prestige bears no resemblance whatsoever to QS despite rumors to the contrary. If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net increase in measure. That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your memories. This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an uncommon experience gets experienced just as often as a common experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal measure. That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is garanteed to be lived by definition. It will be experienced - but not by most of you. For all practical purposes it might as well not exist. What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to have at least *one* next moment for every moment. No and no. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: continuity - cloning
The effects of have clones is interesting, though, regardless of the sapping strength notion. You would have reason to worry about being killed if there were clones and then a shell game was played with you being mixed up with the clones, and then all of the yous were killed except one. All of the yous would have reason to worry. This has implications on ethics of cloning and killing clones. As far as measure, it seems that having a clone of you and killing one of you while you were asleep would be equivalent (w.r.t how much you should worry at least) to not having any clones and someone saying they were going to roll a die and if it came up odd they would kill you. Tom On Feb 11, 8:44 pm, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote: --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. You won't know this evening if you are one of the extra versions or the original. So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around tomorrow. Only the original will. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength. Not at all. I guess that is a joke? Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does not result in a net decrease in measure. That is why the movie The Prestige bears no resemblance whatsoever to QS despite rumors to the contrary. If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net increase in measure. That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your memories. This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: continuity - cloning
But of course you would worry just as much if the clone were replaced by a zombie... I guess that gets back to the distinction between first person and third person. On Feb 11, 9:05 pm, Tom Caylor daddycay...@msn.com wrote: The effects of have clones is interesting, though, regardless of the sapping strength notion. You would have reason to worry about being killed if there were clones and then a shell game was played with you being mixed up with the clones, and then all of the yous were killed except one. All of the yous would have reason to worry. This has implications on ethics of cloning and killing clones. As far as measure, it seems that having a clone of you and killing one of you while you were asleep would be equivalent (w.r.t how much you should worry at least) to not having any clones and someone saying they were going to roll a die and if it came up odd they would kill you. Tom On Feb 11, 8:44 pm, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote: --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. You won't know this evening if you are one of the extra versions or the original. So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around tomorrow. Only the original will. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength. Not at all. I guess that is a joke? Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does not result in a net decrease in measure. That is why the movie The Prestige bears no resemblance whatsoever to QS despite rumors to the contrary. If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net increase in measure. That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your memories. This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG.- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: continuity - cloning
2009/2/12 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. You won't know this evening if you are one of the extra versions or the original. So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around tomorrow. Only the original will. Well, this seems to be the real point of disagreement between you and the pro-QI people. If I am one of the extra versions and die overnight, but the original survives, then I have survived. This is why there can be a many to one relationship between earlier and later copies. If you don't agree with this then you should make explicit your theory of personal identity. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: continuity - cloning
2009/2/12 Tom Caylor daddycay...@msn.com: The effects of have clones is interesting, though, regardless of the sapping strength notion. You would have reason to worry about being killed if there were clones and then a shell game was played with you being mixed up with the clones, and then all of the yous were killed except one. All of the yous would have reason to worry. This has implications on ethics of cloning and killing clones. As far as measure, it seems that having a clone of you and killing one of you while you were asleep would be equivalent (w.r.t how much you should worry at least) to not having any clones and someone saying they were going to roll a die and if it came up odd they would kill you. I wouldn't worry if the clones were all kept in perfect lockstep. If one of my clones survived, I would survive. It doesn't matter that the clones are made up of different matter, as long as this matter is in a configuration such that it could be a future version of myself. For this is what happens in ordinary life: the matter comprising my body is almost all replaced over the course of months or years, but I still feel that I'm me. Whatever you want to call the important part of me - mind, consciousness, soul - is preserved if the pattern making up my brain is preserved. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Jack Mallah wrote: Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again. At least I think your point here is new to the list. I have also been overwhelmed by the volume on this list. The idea is not to take more than you can chew. --- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote: One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. I guess you are basing that on some kind of branch-counting idea. If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail. Perhaps the probability rule would be more like proportionality to norm^2 exp(entropy) instead of just norm^2. If that was it, then for example unstable nuclei would be observed to decay a lot faster than the Born Rule predicts. Yes I am linking the entropy to MW branching. So if you start with a low entropy state such as the Big Bang or having $1 million after a QS your entropy is going to increase. (There are many ways I could spend that million). The number of possible states you can reach increases, hence your entropy increases. You say that the Born Rule would fail if measure *increases*. Here is a counterexample: Using your own argument I could say that the Born rule would fail if measure *decreases *according to function f(t). For example it could be norm^2 f(t) . So using your own argument since the Born rule is only norm^2 therefore measure stays constant? I do not understand why you say that the Born rule would fail. Linking entropy with measure may bring some interesting insights. Let's see how far we can go with this. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
2009/2/12 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an uncommon experience gets experienced just as often as a common experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal measure. That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is garanteed to be lived by definition. It will be experienced - but not by most of you. For all practical purposes it might as well not exist. Well either the measure is strictly null and then I agree it does not exist or it is not null and therefore it exists (by MWI). This all boils down to: - If there always exists a moment after any given moment then from 1st person perspective you will be one of the available next moment whatever it is (and whatever low absolute measure it could have, but with the most probable expectation given by the highest measure next moment where you exist). - If there isn't then OK, QI is false. But here you're not clear at all, if the measure never drop to null, your conclusion is erroneous. What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to have at least *one* next moment for every moment. No and no. Yes and yes or I don't understand what you're talking about. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AB continuity
And could you explicit the not by you, if the me of 1000 years old has all my memories up to now (+ his own from now on to 1000 years old)... It is me, if you disagree what is personnal identity for you ? What is the magical I you're talking about ? Quentin 2009/2/12 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/2/12 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an uncommon experience gets experienced just as often as a common experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal measure. That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is garanteed to be lived by definition. It will be experienced - but not by most of you. For all practical purposes it might as well not exist. Well either the measure is strictly null and then I agree it does not exist or it is not null and therefore it exists (by MWI). This all boils down to: - If there always exists a moment after any given moment then from 1st person perspective you will be one of the available next moment whatever it is (and whatever low absolute measure it could have, but with the most probable expectation given by the highest measure next moment where you exist). - If there isn't then OK, QI is false. But here you're not clear at all, if the measure never drop to null, your conclusion is erroneous. What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to have at least *one* next moment for every moment. No and no. Yes and yes or I don't understand what you're talking about. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
