Re: Question for the QM experts here: quantum uncertainty of the past

2013-09-02 Thread Dennis Ochei 
Given that we are elements that might belong to multiple sequences, there
is no fact of the matter as to which sequence we belong to.


On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:23 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

> Yes, exactly.
>
> > But then there are no "experiencers"...
>
> I prefer to say that experiencers are their experiences than to say there
> are no experiencers (I'm explaining my phrasing more than anything)
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 11:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  You mean experiences are purely qualitative, so there cannot be two
>> identical experiences rather, if identical they must be one (by Leibniz's
>> identity of indiscernibles) and not two.  But then there are no
>> "experiencers", only sequences of experiences which may have some unifying
>> property and which may share elements with other sequences.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> On 9/2/2013 8:55 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> "Qualitatively identical experiencers are also numerically identical" is
>> how i sum this position up
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 14, 2013 4:39:27 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/14/2013 7:48 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>>> > Citeren Russell Standish :
>>> >
>>> >> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:26:41PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
>>> >>> I need clarification of the significance of quantum theory to
>>> determining
>>> >>> the *past*. I remember having read or heard that the past itself is
>>> subject
>>> >>> to quantum uncertainty. Something like the idea that the past is
>>> determined
>>> >>> only to to the extent that it is forced to be so by the state of the
>>> >>> present, if that makes sense. In other words, there may be more than
>>> one
>>> >>> history that could lead to the current state of the world. Let's say
>>> it
>>> >>> might have been one way or another and then we make a measurement
>>> which
>>> >>> resolves this question, we are 'forcing' the past to be one way or
>>> another.
>>> >>> In MWI, that would be saying my 'track' through the multiverse is
>>> ambiguous
>>> >>> in both directions, both into the future and 'behind me' so to
>>> speak. I'm
>>> >>> unclear on this and what it precisely means. I seem to recall that
>>> it was
>>> >>> critical in calculations Hawking made about the early universe - at
>>> a
>>> >>> certain point these uncertainties became critical and it meant that
>>> it was
>>> >>> no longer possible to say that the universe had definitely been one
>>> way or
>>> >>> another. Can someone clarify this for me?
>>> >>>
>>> >>
>>> >> This idea of the past not being determinate until such a time as a
>>> >> measurement in the present forces the issue is fundamental to my
>>> >> interpretation of QM. It is also related to the Quantum Eraser.
>>> Saibal
>>> >> Mitra has written some stuff on this too - maybe he'd like to
>>> comment?
>>> >>
>>> >> On the other hand, I don't think this view is particularly
>>> >> mainstream. Even many worlds people tend to think that the multiverse
>>> >> has decohered in the past, and that there is a matter of fact which
>>> >> branch we are in, even if we're ignorant of that fact.
>>> >>
>>> >> I can't comment on Hawking's work, unfortunately, as I'm not aware of
>>> that.
>>> >>
>>> >> Cheers
>>> >> --
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Yes, I would agree with the view taken by Russell here. It has
>>> interesting consequences
>>> > for any future artificial intelligence who can reset its memory, as I
>>> explain here:
>>> >
>>> > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
>>> >
>>> > So, if you reset your memory at random with some probability p and you
>>> also do that in
>>> > case of an impending disaster, then if you find yourself in a state
>>> where you know that
>>> > your memory has been reset and you need to reload your memory, the
>>> reason why the memory
>>> > has been reset  (routine random memory reset or you were facing an
>>> impending disaster),
>>> > is no longer determined, you are identical in the different branches
>>> until you find out
>>> > the reason.
>>> >
>>> > So, while you are firmly in the classical regime and therefore you
>>> won't see any changes
>>> > in the probabilities of the outcomes of these sorts of experiments
>>> relative to what you
>>> > would expect classically, the interpretation of how these
>>> probabilities arise is
>>> > different; while it is worthwhile to do these memory resettings in a
>>> "single classical
>>> > world" it wouldn't be worthwhile.
>>> >
>>> > The article I wrote (it was just an essay for FQXI competition which
>>> got the attention
>>> > from New Scientist), is actually rather simple, it treats the problem
>>> in a
>>> > non-relativistic way, which is a bit unnatural (the times at which
>>> things happen in the
>>> > different different branches seems to matter). You can easily
>>> generalize this, also you
>>> > can consider thought experiments involving false memories that may be
>>> correct memories
>>> > in different branches etc. etc.
>>>
>>> Hmm.  It seems that "erasing your memory" would encompass a lot more
>>> than what is com

Re: Question for the QM experts here: quantum uncertainty of the past

2013-09-02 Thread Dennis Ochei 
Yes, exactly.

> But then there are no "experiencers"...

I prefer to say that experiencers are their experiences than to say there
are no experiencers (I'm explaining my phrasing more than anything)


On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 11:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  You mean experiences are purely qualitative, so there cannot be two
> identical experiences rather, if identical they must be one (by Leibniz's
> identity of indiscernibles) and not two.  But then there are no
> "experiencers", only sequences of experiences which may have some unifying
> property and which may share elements with other sequences.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 9/2/2013 8:55 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> "Qualitatively identical experiencers are also numerically identical" is
> how i sum this position up
>
> On Wednesday, August 14, 2013 4:39:27 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 8/14/2013 7:48 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>> > Citeren Russell Standish :
>> >
>> >> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:26:41PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
>> >>> I need clarification of the significance of quantum theory to
>> determining
>> >>> the *past*. I remember having read or heard that the past itself is
>> subject
>> >>> to quantum uncertainty. Something like the idea that the past is
>> determined
>> >>> only to to the extent that it is forced to be so by the state of the
>> >>> present, if that makes sense. In other words, there may be more than
>> one
>> >>> history that could lead to the current state of the world. Let's say
>> it
>> >>> might have been one way or another and then we make a measurement
>> which
>> >>> resolves this question, we are 'forcing' the past to be one way or
>> another.
>> >>> In MWI, that would be saying my 'track' through the multiverse is
>> ambiguous
>> >>> in both directions, both into the future and 'behind me' so to speak.
>> I'm
>> >>> unclear on this and what it precisely means. I seem to recall that it
>> was
>> >>> critical in calculations Hawking made about the early universe - at a
>> >>> certain point these uncertainties became critical and it meant that
>> it was
>> >>> no longer possible to say that the universe had definitely been one
>> way or
>> >>> another. Can someone clarify this for me?
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> This idea of the past not being determinate until such a time as a
>> >> measurement in the present forces the issue is fundamental to my
>> >> interpretation of QM. It is also related to the Quantum Eraser. Saibal
>> >> Mitra has written some stuff on this too - maybe he'd like to comment?
>> >>
>> >> On the other hand, I don't think this view is particularly
>> >> mainstream. Even many worlds people tend to think that the multiverse
>> >> has decohered in the past, and that there is a matter of fact which
>> >> branch we are in, even if we're ignorant of that fact.
>> >>
>> >> I can't comment on Hawking's work, unfortunately, as I'm not aware of
>> that.
>> >>
>> >> Cheers
>> >> --
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes, I would agree with the view taken by Russell here. It has
>> interesting consequences
>> > for any future artificial intelligence who can reset its memory, as I
>> explain here:
>> >
>> > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
>> >
>> > So, if you reset your memory at random with some probability p and you
>> also do that in
>> > case of an impending disaster, then if you find yourself in a state
>> where you know that
>> > your memory has been reset and you need to reload your memory, the
>> reason why the memory
>> > has been reset  (routine random memory reset or you were facing an
>> impending disaster),
>> > is no longer determined, you are identical in the different branches
>> until you find out
>> > the reason.
>> >
>> > So, while you are firmly in the classical regime and therefore you
>> won't see any changes
>> > in the probabilities of the outcomes of these sorts of experiments
>> relative to what you
>> > would expect classically, the interpretation of how these probabilities
>> arise is
>> > different; while it is worthwhile to do these memory resettings in a
>> "single classical
>> > world" it wouldn't be worthwhile.
>> >
>> > The article I wrote (it was just an essay for FQXI competition which
>> got the attention
>> > from New Scientist), is actually rather simple, it treats the problem
>> in a
>> > non-relativistic way, which is a bit unnatural (the times at which
>> things happen in the
>> > different different branches seems to matter). You can easily
>> generalize this, also you
>> > can consider thought experiments involving false memories that may be
>> correct memories
>> > in different branches etc. etc.
>>
>> Hmm.  It seems that "erasing your memory" would encompass a lot more than
>> what is commonly
>> referred to as memory.  Quantum erasure requires erasing all the
>> information that is
>> diffused into the environment.  So erasing one's memory would imply
>> quantum erasure of all
>> the information about your past - not just the infinitesimal bit that you
>> can consciously
>> recall.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>  --
> Y

Re: Question for the QM experts here: quantum uncertainty of the past

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 
You mean experiences are purely qualitative, so there cannot be two identical experiences 
rather, if identical they must be one (by Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles) and not 
two.  But then there are no "experiencers", only sequences of experiences which may have 
some unifying property and which may share elements with other sequences.


Brent

On 9/2/2013 8:55 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
"Qualitatively identical experiencers are also numerically identical" is how i sum this 
position up


On Wednesday, August 14, 2013 4:39:27 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 8/14/2013 7:48 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl  wrote:
> Citeren Russell Standish >:
>
>> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:26:41PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
>>> I need clarification of the significance of quantum theory to 
determining
>>> the *past*. I remember having read or heard that the past itself is 
subject
>>> to quantum uncertainty. Something like the idea that the past is 
determined
>>> only to to the extent that it is forced to be so by the state of the
>>> present, if that makes sense. In other words, there may be more than one
>>> history that could lead to the current state of the world. Let's say it
>>> might have been one way or another and then we make a measurement which
>>> resolves this question, we are 'forcing' the past to be one way or 
another.
>>> In MWI, that would be saying my 'track' through the multiverse is 
ambiguous
>>> in both directions, both into the future and 'behind me' so to speak. 
I'm
>>> unclear on this and what it precisely means. I seem to recall that it 
was
>>> critical in calculations Hawking made about the early universe - at a
>>> certain point these uncertainties became critical and it meant that it 
was
>>> no longer possible to say that the universe had definitely been one way 
or
>>> another. Can someone clarify this for me?
>>>
>>
>> This idea of the past not being determinate until such a time as a
>> measurement in the present forces the issue is fundamental to my
>> interpretation of QM. It is also related to the Quantum Eraser. Saibal
>> Mitra has written some stuff on this too - maybe he'd like to comment?
>>
>> On the other hand, I don't think this view is particularly
>> mainstream. Even many worlds people tend to think that the multiverse
>> has decohered in the past, and that there is a matter of fact which
>> branch we are in, even if we're ignorant of that fact.
>>
>> I can't comment on Hawking's work, unfortunately, as I'm not aware of 
that.
>>
>> Cheers
>> --
>
>
> Yes, I would agree with the view taken by Russell here. It has interesting
consequences
> for any future artificial intelligence who can reset its memory, as I 
explain here:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
>
> So, if you reset your memory at random with some probability p and you 
also do
that in
> case of an impending disaster, then if you find yourself in a state where 
you know
that
> your memory has been reset and you need to reload your memory, the reason 
why the
memory
> has been reset  (routine random memory reset or you were facing an 
impending
disaster),
> is no longer determined, you are identical in the different branches 
until you
find out
> the reason.
>
> So, while you are firmly in the classical regime and therefore you won't 
see any
changes
> in the probabilities of the outcomes of these sorts of experiments 
relative to
what you
> would expect classically, the interpretation of how these probabilities 
arise is
> different; while it is worthwhile to do these memory resettings in a 
"single
classical
> world" it wouldn't be worthwhile.
>
> The article I wrote (it was just an essay for FQXI competition which got 
the
attention
> from New Scientist), is actually rather simple, it treats the problem in a
> non-relativistic way, which is a bit unnatural (the times at which things 
happen
in the
> different different branches seems to matter). You can easily generalize 
this,
also you
> can consider thought experiments involving false memories that may be 
correct
memories
> in different branches etc. etc.

Hmm.  It seems that "erasing your memory" would encompass a lot more than 
what is
commonly
referred to as memory.  Quantum erasure requires erasing all the 
information that is
diffused into the environment.  So erasing one's memory would imply quantum 
erasure
of all
the information about your past - not just the infinitesimal bit that you 
can
consciously
recall.

Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:


No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to contain itself, and 
is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a deterministic process. Only in the 
special cases, where the major causes of its action are made apparent, such as when 
someone holds a gun to its head, will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not 
freedom. In other cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the 
system might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have wanted to 
do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, without probing into a 
complete physical description of what constitutes wanting. Since the causal explanation 
is not easily available or comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar 
interaction of many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how an eight 
cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the specific opposite of engines.


Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of Schopenhauer: "Der Mensh Kann 
wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will."


Brent

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Re: God's God

2013-09-02 Thread Dennis Ochei 
I liked it until they were on earth. The human's dialogue is too preachy 
and cheesy, the preceding parts of the cartoon were fun and more subtle i 
suppose. I would have probably ended it after God 2 died

On Friday, August 23, 2013 10:19:37 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODetOE6cbbc
>

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Re: Question for the QM experts here: quantum uncertainty of the past

2013-09-02 Thread Dennis Ochei 
"Qualitatively identical experiencers are also numerically identical" is 
how i sum this position up

On Wednesday, August 14, 2013 4:39:27 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> On 8/14/2013 7:48 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl  wrote: 
> > Citeren Russell Standish >: 
> > 
> >> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:26:41PM -0700, Pierz wrote: 
> >>> I need clarification of the significance of quantum theory to 
> determining 
> >>> the *past*. I remember having read or heard that the past itself is 
> subject 
> >>> to quantum uncertainty. Something like the idea that the past is 
> determined 
> >>> only to to the extent that it is forced to be so by the state of the 
> >>> present, if that makes sense. In other words, there may be more than 
> one 
> >>> history that could lead to the current state of the world. Let's say 
> it 
> >>> might have been one way or another and then we make a measurement 
> which 
> >>> resolves this question, we are 'forcing' the past to be one way or 
> another. 
> >>> In MWI, that would be saying my 'track' through the multiverse is 
> ambiguous 
> >>> in both directions, both into the future and 'behind me' so to speak. 
> I'm 
> >>> unclear on this and what it precisely means. I seem to recall that it 
> was 
> >>> critical in calculations Hawking made about the early universe - at a 
> >>> certain point these uncertainties became critical and it meant that it 
> was 
> >>> no longer possible to say that the universe had definitely been one 
> way or 
> >>> another. Can someone clarify this for me? 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> This idea of the past not being determinate until such a time as a 
> >> measurement in the present forces the issue is fundamental to my 
> >> interpretation of QM. It is also related to the Quantum Eraser. Saibal 
> >> Mitra has written some stuff on this too - maybe he'd like to comment? 
> >> 
> >> On the other hand, I don't think this view is particularly 
> >> mainstream. Even many worlds people tend to think that the multiverse 
> >> has decohered in the past, and that there is a matter of fact which 
> >> branch we are in, even if we're ignorant of that fact. 
> >> 
> >> I can't comment on Hawking's work, unfortunately, as I'm not aware of 
> that. 
> >> 
> >> Cheers 
> >> -- 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, I would agree with the view taken by Russell here. It has 
> interesting consequences 
> > for any future artificial intelligence who can reset its memory, as I 
> explain here: 
> > 
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 
> > 
> > So, if you reset your memory at random with some probability p and you 
> also do that in 
> > case of an impending disaster, then if you find yourself in a state 
> where you know that 
> > your memory has been reset and you need to reload your memory, the 
> reason why the memory 
> > has been reset  (routine random memory reset or you were facing an 
> impending disaster), 
> > is no longer determined, you are identical in the different branches 
> until you find out 
> > the reason. 
> > 
> > So, while you are firmly in the classical regime and therefore you won't 
> see any changes 
> > in the probabilities of the outcomes of these sorts of experiments 
> relative to what you 
> > would expect classically, the interpretation of how these probabilities 
> arise is 
> > different; while it is worthwhile to do these memory resettings in a 
> "single classical 
> > world" it wouldn't be worthwhile. 
> > 
> > The article I wrote (it was just an essay for FQXI competition which got 
> the attention 
> > from New Scientist), is actually rather simple, it treats the problem in 
> a 
> > non-relativistic way, which is a bit unnatural (the times at which 
> things happen in the 
> > different different branches seems to matter). You can easily generalize 
> this, also you 
> > can consider thought experiments involving false memories that may be 
> correct memories 
> > in different branches etc. etc. 
>
> Hmm.  It seems that "erasing your memory" would encompass a lot more than 
> what is commonly 
> referred to as memory.  Quantum erasure requires erasing all the 
> information that is 
> diffused into the environment.  So erasing one's memory would imply 
> quantum erasure of all 
> the information about your past - not just the infinitesimal bit that you 
> can consciously 
> recall. 
>
> Brent 
>
>

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread Dennis Ochei 
Hi Craig,

I've been following the pattern of thought you've be exhibiting this entire 
thread, trying to understand why you believe in such a strange way. In all 
cases it seems to stem from ignorance of the processes that bring about 
your behavior, compounded with the belief that we lose something of value 
if we discard the concept of free will.

First, I feel you are being willfully blind to the constraints your biology 
puts on your supposedly "free" will. Daily, I stop doing the things I love 
to do to pass fluids or the corpses of carbon based organisms through my 
mouth. Later, defecate or micturate, further activities that honestly, I 
would rather not do. At night, I sleep, though I would rather stay up 
through the night. Though I am not enslaved in doing these things, I am 
certainly not free in a metaphysical sense. This illusory free will you are 
bound to is an artifact that emerges in a system that is complex enough to 
reflect on what it does, yet cannot completely grasp the causes of that 
which it does do. A system like this can trace some of the factors that 
contribute to its actions, but not all of them, and those factors it cannot 
picture seem to have no definite value, and therefore it thinks there is no 
logical contradction in believing that it could have done y in the 
situation in which it actually did action x.

Furthermore, a system that can draw a large number of distinctions about 
the distribution of energy crossing its surface and respond in a large 
variety of ways, and yet does not understand how these distinctions are 
made, will, when asked how it determines an object is yellow, respond "i 
don't know, it just looks yellow."

No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to 
contain itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a 
deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes of 
its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its head, 
will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In other 
cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the system 
might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have 
wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, 
without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes 
wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of 
many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how 
an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
specific opposite of engines.

You can deny that you are such a system, but I don't think you could deny 
these things are true of a complex deterministic system.

Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a 
prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning. 
1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the 
effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a 
certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active 
directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the 
effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is 
removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the 
removal of the chemical. The system will begin to "want" to do things that 
increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that 
lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a 
function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will 
even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.

Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.

On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:
>
>  Hi Brent
>
> I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they 
> have in mind.
>
> All the best
>
>
>
> --- Original Message ---
>
> From: "meekerdb" >
> Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
> Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade
>
>  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
>  
> The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
> uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain 
> activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
> that has not been triggered by external stimuli:
>
>
> And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
> a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can 
> say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.
>
> Brent
>  
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, September 2, 2013 7:54:45 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 9/2/2013 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
>
>
> On Monday, September 2, 2013 7:31:57 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>  On 9/2/2013 3:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>  
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote: 
>>>
>>>  Hi Craig
>>>
>>> Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show 
>>> anything. Here 'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the 
>>> absence of external stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 
>>> 'task unrelated' which is to say it is not activity that is bound to some 
>>> external task. Daydreaming and remembering past events are common examples. 
>>> You shouldn't confuse it with the idea of uncaused activity which evidently 
>>> you have done.
>>>
>>>   
>> I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic 
>> specialized sense, but rather it is used often, and in the general sense of 
>> being wholly unanticipated. Spontaneous in this case means originating in 
>> the brain in the absence of external stimuli but it also means originating 
>> in the brain in the absence of any known cause. 
>>
>>
>> Absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence.
>>  
>
> Sure, but absence of knowledge about brain activity cannot be construed to 
> rule out personal intention. Spontaneous can mean exactly what it implies.
>
>   
>>  The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the 
>> gist of the headings:
>>
>> Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD 
>> Variance
>> Ruling Out Evoked Activity
>> Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
>> Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation
>>
>> and finally, to directly address your claim:
>>
>> "Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds
>>
>> While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the most 
>> concerning potential confounds, other mechanisms should be considered. For 
>> example, global arousal might cause fluctuations in neuronal activity and 
>> behavior. *However, our BOLD-behavior effect should then be present in 
>> all regions or at least regions implicated in arousal (Critchley et al., 
>> 2000), not localized to the somatomotor system*. Similarly, 
>> after-effects such as the BOLD undershoot could persist from the previous 
>> trial, influencing early BOLD time points and confounding our results 
>> (Buxton et al., 1998). However, this possibility is excluded by the lack of 
>> a relationship between our BOLD measurement and ISI."
>>
>> Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor system? 
>> Probably not.
>>  
>>
>> HA!  You never had a daydream that produced an erection?
>>  
>
> Are you suggesting that the presence of spontaneous activity in the 
> somatomotor system is more likely to indicate daydreams that cause button 
> pushing behavior? It couldn't be the simple, obvious cause of our own 
> personal intent. 
>  
>
> Of course it could be the cause of your intent.
>

The activity isn't the cause of our intent, I mean that our intent is the 
cause of (some of) the activity.
 

>
>  Must be some ridiculous sideshow.
>
>  
>  
>>  
>>  
>> Another conclusion from the study:
>>
>> " Finally, it provides support for the intrinsic perspective on brain 
>> function, showing that the brain not only exhibits intrinsic organized 
>> fluctuations in neuronal activity, but that these fluctuations impact brain 
>> function and behavior in interesting and important ways."
>>
>> Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.
>>
>>
>> And there's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is not 
>> part of a causal chain extending back to the embryo.
>>  
>
> There's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is part of a 
> causal chain either. 
>  
>
> Sure there is, the detailed study of neurons and other brain structures 
> which all points to them obeying exactly the same physics as everything 
> else.
>

Without a completed physics, we have no idea what that means. Human 
intention is part of "everything else". Spontaneous activity is part of 
physics. All that we know is that when we measure neuronal activity 
personally, it looks like images, sounds like music, etc. When we measure 
it with instruments which are deaf to music and blind to images, we get 
narrowly quantitative measures. That should not be a surprise. The surprise 
is why anyone would presume that it means that the blind instruments must 
be correct, and that our own direct experience must be an 
'illusion'...which is somehow other than physics in some sense, yet can 
only be physics in another.


>  What I would say supports the thesis that the brain activity may 
> originate in the private, intentional experience of the individual, is the 
> fact that we, you know, experience private intentional experiences as 
> individuals...pretty much every waking moment. 
>  
>
> Where's the evidence that experien

RE: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread chris peck 

Hi Craig

your biases are protecting your theory from threats with a vengeance!

>>I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic 
>>specialized sense

No one is arguing that the use of 'spontaneous' is cryptic but rather that you 
have not understood the way they are using it. That's a big difference. They do 
have a specific sense in mind though, there is a whole field of study around 
spontaneous activity and the meaning is abundantly clear from reading that:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627307007192

"This “default-mode network” is believed to represent brain regions that are 
more active during rest. Since the correlated fluctuations within the resting 
state networks occur in the absence of an explicit task, they are often 
referred to as “spontaneous” or “task-unrelated” fluctuations."

>> "but it also means originating in the brain in the absence of any known 
>> cause. The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the 
>> gist of the headings:

Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD Variance
Ruling Out Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation

and finally, to directly address your claim:

"Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds"

Craig, part of any half decent study involves ruling out confounding factors 
which might interfere with the measurement of the phenomenon under scrutiny. 
What is being ruled out in these sections are not causes of the spontaneous 
activity, but alternative sources of the fMRI signals they measured. They rule 
out that the signals were not in fact 'stimulus evoked', they were not signals 
dues to changes in attention, etc. They are just isolating the phenomenon. The 
causes of spontaneous/task-unrelated fluctuations is not even addressed.

>> Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.

You brought the study up not me. It supposed to be supporting your claims. It 
doesn't support anything though, because it is not addressing the causes or 
lack of causes of spontaneous/task-unrelated fluctuation. 
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2013 16:31:57 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior


  

  
  
On 9/2/2013 3:56 PM, Craig Weinberg
  wrote:




  

  On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:
  

  Hi Craig



Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt
show anything. Here 'spontaneous' just means 'originates in
the brain in the absence of external stimuli'. This kind of
activity is often refered to as 'task unrelated' which is to
say it is not activity that is bound to some external task.
Daydreaming and remembering past events are common examples.
You shouldn't confuse it with the idea of uncaused activity
which evidently you have done.



  

  
  

I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in
any cryptic specialized sense, but rather it is used often, and
in the general sense of being wholly unanticipated. Spontaneous
in this case means originating in the brain in the absence of
external stimuli but it also means originating in the brain in
the absence of any known cause. 



Absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence.




  The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear..
note the gist of the headings:



Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC
BOLD Variance

Ruling Out Evoked Activity

Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity

Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation



and finally, to directly address your claim:



"Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds



While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the
most concerning potential confounds, other mechanisms should be
considered. For example, global arousal might cause fluctuations
in neuronal activity and behavior. However, our
  BOLD-behavior effect should then be present in all regions or
  at least regions implicated in arousal (Critchley et al.,
  2000), not localized to the somatomotor system. Similarly,
after-effects such as the BOLD undershoot could persist from the
previous trial, influencing early BOLD time points and
confounding our results (Buxton et al., 1998). However, this
possibility is excluded by the lack of a relationship between
our BOLD measurement and ISI."



Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor
system? Probably not.

  



HA!  You never had

Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, September 2, 2013 7:31:57 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 9/2/2013 3:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:

Hi Craig

Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show 
anything. Here
'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the absence of 
external
stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 'task unrelated' 
which
is to say it is not activity that is bound to some external task. 
Daydreaming
and remembering past events are common examples. You shouldn't confuse 
it with
the idea of uncaused activity which evidently you have done.


I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic
specialized sense, but rather it is used often, and in the general sense of 
being
wholly unanticipated. Spontaneous in this case means originating in the 
brain in
the absence of external stimuli but it also means originating in the brain 
in the
absence of any known cause.


Absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence.


Sure, but absence of knowledge about brain activity cannot be construed to rule out 
personal intention. Spontaneous can mean exactly what it implies.




The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the gist 
of the
headings:

Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD Variance
Ruling Out Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation

and finally, to directly address your claim:

"Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds

While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the most 
concerning
potential confounds, other mechanisms should be considered. For example, 
global
arousal might cause fluctuations in neuronal activity and behavior. 
*However, our
BOLD-behavior effect should then be present in all regions or at least 
regions
implicated in arousal (Critchley et al., 2000), not localized to the 
somatomotor
system*. Similarly, after-effects such as the BOLD undershoot could persist 
from
the previous trial, influencing early BOLD time points and confounding our 
results
(Buxton et al., 1998). However, this possibility is excluded by the lack of 
a
relationship between our BOLD measurement and ISI."

Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor system? 
Probably not.


HA!  You never had a daydream that produced an erection?


Are you suggesting that the presence of spontaneous activity in the somatomotor system 
is more likely to indicate daydreams that cause button pushing behavior? It couldn't be 
the simple, obvious cause of our own personal intent.


Of course it could be the cause of your intent.


Must be some ridiculous sideshow.





Another conclusion from the study:

" Finally, it provides support for the intrinsic perspective on brain 
function,
showing that the brain not only exhibits intrinsic organized fluctuations in
neuronal activity, but that these fluctuations impact brain function and 
behavior
in interesting and important ways."

Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.


And there's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is not 
part of a
causal chain extending back to the embryo.


There's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is part of a causal chain 
either.


Sure there is, the detailed study of neurons and other brain structures which all points 
to them obeying exactly the same physics as everything else.


What I would say supports the thesis that the brain activity may originate in the 
private, intentional experience of the individual, is the fact that we, you know, 
experience private intentional experiences as individuals...pretty much every waking 
moment.


Where's the evidence that experience is not part of the causal chain?  There's plenty of 
experimental evidence showing that a little electrostimulation of one's brain will produce 
an experience specific to the point stimulated.  So it certainly doesn't require your 
intention to have an experience.


I'm not sure how much of my every waking moment in 2013 is part of a causal chain 
extending back to an embryo in 1968, but my guess is, not very much.


That's your guess because you wish it to be so.

I haven't felt much like an embryo lately, but I do feel pretty certain that I am 
intentionally writing these words to convey an understanding which I intend to convey, 
for personal reasons, not because of any evolutionary or neurochemical domino effects.


But you don't know that your intention is not the consequence of a deterministic causal 
chain (which of course is personal because part of it is inside your head).


Brent

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You received this message because you are subscribed

Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, September 2, 2013 7:31:57 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 9/2/2013 3:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
>
>
> On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote: 
>>
>>  Hi Craig
>>
>> Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show anything. 
>> Here 'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the absence of 
>> external stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 'task 
>> unrelated' which is to say it is not activity that is bound to some 
>> external task. Daydreaming and remembering past events are common examples. 
>> You shouldn't confuse it with the idea of uncaused activity which evidently 
>> you have done.
>>
>>   
> I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic 
> specialized sense, but rather it is used often, and in the general sense of 
> being wholly unanticipated. Spontaneous in this case means originating in 
> the brain in the absence of external stimuli but it also means originating 
> in the brain in the absence of any known cause. 
>
>
> Absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence.
>

Sure, but absence of knowledge about brain activity cannot be construed to 
rule out personal intention. Spontaneous can mean exactly what it implies.


>  The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the 
> gist of the headings:
>
> Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD 
> Variance
> Ruling Out Evoked Activity
> Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
> Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation
>
> and finally, to directly address your claim:
>
> "Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds
>
> While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the most 
> concerning potential confounds, other mechanisms should be considered. For 
> example, global arousal might cause fluctuations in neuronal activity and 
> behavior. *However, our BOLD-behavior effect should then be present in 
> all regions or at least regions implicated in arousal (Critchley et al., 
> 2000), not localized to the somatomotor system*. Similarly, after-effects 
> such as the BOLD undershoot could persist from the previous trial, 
> influencing early BOLD time points and confounding our results (Buxton et 
> al., 1998). However, this possibility is excluded by the lack of a 
> relationship between our BOLD measurement and ISI."
>
> Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor system? 
> Probably not.
>  
>
> HA!  You never had a daydream that produced an erection?
>

Are you suggesting that the presence of spontaneous activity in the 
somatomotor system is more likely to indicate daydreams that cause button 
pushing behavior? It couldn't be the simple, obvious cause of our own 
personal intent. Must be some ridiculous sideshow.

 

>
>  
> Another conclusion from the study:
>
> " Finally, it provides support for the intrinsic perspective on brain 
> function, showing that the brain not only exhibits intrinsic organized 
> fluctuations in neuronal activity, but that these fluctuations impact brain 
> function and behavior in interesting and important ways."
>
> Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.
>
>
> And there's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is not 
> part of a causal chain extending back to the embryo.
>

There's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is part of a 
causal chain either. What I would say supports the thesis that the brain 
activity may originate in the private, intentional experience of the 
individual, is the fact that we, you know, experience private intentional 
experiences as individuals...pretty much every waking moment. I'm not sure 
how much of my every waking moment in 2013 is part of a causal chain 
extending back to an embryo in 1968, but my guess is, not very much. I 
haven't felt much like an embryo lately, but I do feel pretty certain that 
I am intentionally writing these words to convey an understanding which I 
intend to convey, for personal reasons, not because of any evolutionary or 
neurochemical domino effects.


Craig


> Brent
>  

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 3:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:

Hi Craig

Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show anything. 
Here
'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the absence of external
stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 'task unrelated' 
which is to
say it is not activity that is bound to some external task. Daydreaming and
remembering past events are common examples. You shouldn't confuse it with 
the idea
of uncaused activity which evidently you have done.


I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic specialized 
sense, but rather it is used often, and in the general sense of being wholly 
unanticipated. Spontaneous in this case means originating in the brain in the absence of 
external stimuli but it also means originating in the brain in the absence of any known 
cause.


Absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence.


The study goes to considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the gist of 
the headings:

Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD Variance
Ruling Out Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation

and finally, to directly address your claim:

"Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds

While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the most concerning 
potential confounds, other mechanisms should be considered. For example, global arousal 
might cause fluctuations in neuronal activity and behavior. *However, our BOLD-behavior 
effect should then be present in all regions or at least regions implicated in arousal 
(Critchley et al., 2000), not localized to the somatomotor system*. Similarly, 
after-effects such as the BOLD undershoot could persist from the previous trial, 
influencing early BOLD time points and confounding our results (Buxton et al., 1998). 
However, this possibility is excluded by the lack of a relationship between our BOLD 
measurement and ISI."


Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor system? Probably 
not.


HA!  You never had a daydream that produced an erection?



Another conclusion from the study:

" Finally, it provides support for the intrinsic perspective on brain function, showing 
that the brain not only exhibits intrinsic organized fluctuations in neuronal activity, 
but that these fluctuations impact brain function and behavior in interesting and 
important ways."


Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.


And there's nothing to support the thesis that the brain activity is not part of a causal 
chain extending back to the embryo.


Brent

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Re: Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 1:15 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
It is difficult to falsify, e.g. it is not strictly correct to say that local 
determinism has been falsified, as 't Hooft explains here:


http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1007


Ah, yes I should have mentioned the superdeterminism option.  I'm not sure though that 
it's compatible with with the big bang origin of the universe.  Wouldn't there have to 
have been as much information in the initial state as there is now in the Hubble sphere?


Brent

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, September 2, 2013 6:11:51 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:
>
>  Hi Craig
>
> Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show anything. 
> Here 'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the absence of 
> external stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 'task 
> unrelated' which is to say it is not activity that is bound to some 
> external task. Daydreaming and remembering past events are common examples. 
> You shouldn't confuse it with the idea of uncaused activity which evidently 
> you have done.
>
>
I highlighted them to show that the word is not being used in any cryptic 
specialized sense, but rather it is used often, and in the general sense of 
being wholly unanticipated. Spontaneous in this case means originating in 
the brain in the absence of external stimuli but it also means originating 
in the brain in the absence of any known cause. The study goes to 
considerable lengths to make this clear.. note the gist of the headings:

Intrinsic Activity Accounts for Behaviorally Relevant Left SMC BOLD Variance
Ruling Out Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Stimulus-Evoked Activity
Ruling Out Attention and Anticipation

and finally, to directly address your claim:

"Ruling Out Other Potential Confounds

While sensory evoked activity and attention/anticipation are the most 
concerning potential confounds, other mechanisms should be considered. For 
example, global arousal might cause fluctuations in neuronal activity and 
behavior. *However, our BOLD-behavior effect should then be present in all 
regions or at least regions implicated in arousal (Critchley et al., 2000), 
not localized to the somatomotor system*. Similarly, after-effects such as 
the BOLD undershoot could persist from the previous trial, influencing 
early BOLD time points and confounding our results (Buxton et al., 1998). 
However, this possibility is excluded by the lack of a relationship between 
our BOLD measurement and ISI."

Do daydreaming and remembering take place in the somatomotor system? 
Probably not.

Another conclusion from the study:

" Finally, it provides support for the intrinsic perspective on brain 
function, showing that the brain not only exhibits intrinsic organized 
fluctuations in neuronal activity, but that these fluctuations impact brain 
function and behavior in interesting and important ways."

Not really anything there to support anything that you are claiming.


Thanks,
Craig

 

> All the best.
>
> --- Original Message ---
>
> From: "Craig Weinberg" >
> Sent: 3 September 2013 2:48 AM
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
> Subject: Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior
>
>   "Finally, there was a pronounced difference in the effect of regressing 
> out *spontaneous* activity on the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship 
> with instructed versus *spontaneous *force variability. With 
> *spontaneous*force variability, regression of 
> *spontaneous* (right SMC) activity all but eliminated the left SMC 
> BOLD-behavior relationship. In contrast, with instructed force variability 
> regressing out *spontaneous* activity increased the significance of the 
> left SMC BOLD-behavior effect. This improvement in significance suggests 
> that regression of *spontaneous* activity removed noise that was 
> independent of the BOLD-behavior effect in the instructed condition. This 
> finding is important as it shows that an ipsilateral response alone is not 
> sufficient to eliminate the BOLD-behavior effect by regression as seen with
> * spontaneous* force variability.
>
> *In summary, there are three pronounced differences between spontaneous 
> and instructed force variability in the current experiment: (1) the 
> reversal of the time course magnitudes, (2) the difference in the timing of 
> the significant BOLD-behavior effect, and (3) the difference in the effect 
> of regressing out spontaneous activity. As such, we can be relatively 
> confident that spontaneous and instructed force variability represent 
> distinct phenomena in the current experiment. "*
>
>
> The study speaks for itself. What I think it means is what the researchers 
> also think it means. I don't know what you could imagine it would mean 
> otherwise. Spontaneous is used here in an ordinary way, not in some obscure 
> medical jargon which somehow actually means "anything but spontaneous". The 
> whole experiment is about isolating spontaneous activity from other types 
> of activity which respond to known conditions.
>
> You are welcome to explain exactly what you think this study shows in your 
> terms, but don't bother if you are just going to throw out unsupported 
> opinions.
>
> Thanks,
> Craig
>
>
> On Monday, September 2, 2013 11:18:31 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
>
>  
>
> The article doesn't show what you think it shows. "Spontaneous" doesn't 
> mean what you think it means.
>
> On 02/09/2013, at 12:35 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>   
> http://ac.els-cdn.com/S089662730700/1-s2.0-S0896627

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread chris peck 
Hi Brent

I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they have 
in mind.

All the best



--- Original Message ---

From: "meekerdb" 
Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
> The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they uncovered 
> is
> explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. More
> importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been 
> triggered by
> external stimuli:

And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by a 
stored
perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can say is it 
wasn't triggered
by a *present* external stimuli.

Brent

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread chris peck 
Hi Craig

Highlighting the word 'spontaneous' with astereixes doesnt show anything. Here 
'spontaneous' just means 'originates in the brain in the absence of external 
stimuli'. This kind of activity is often refered to as 'task unrelated' which 
is to say it is not activity that is bound to some external task. Daydreaming 
and remembering past events are common examples. You shouldn't confuse it with 
the idea of uncaused activity which evidently you have done.

All the best.

--- Original Message ---

From: "Craig Weinberg" 
Sent: 3 September 2013 2:48 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior


>
> "Finally, there was a pronounced difference in the effect of regressing
> out *spontaneous* activity on the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship
> with instructed versus *spontaneous * force variability. With *spontaneous
> * force variability, regression of *spontaneous* (right SMC) activity all
> but eliminated the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship. In contrast, with
> instructed force variability regressing out *spontaneous* activity
> increased the significance of the left SMC BOLD-behavior effect. This
> improvement in significance suggests that regression of *spontaneous*activity 
> removed noise that was independent of the BOLD-behavior effect in
> the instructed condition. This finding is important as it shows that an
> ipsilateral response alone is not sufficient to eliminate the BOLD-behavior
> effect by regression as seen with* spontaneous* force variability.
>
> *In summary, there are three pronounced differences between spontaneous
> and instructed force variability in the current experiment: (1) the
> reversal of the time course magnitudes, (2) the difference in the timing of
> the significant BOLD-behavior effect, and (3) the difference in the effect
> of regressing out spontaneous activity. As such, we can be relatively
> confident that spontaneous and instructed force variability represent
> distinct phenomena in the current experiment. "*
>

The study speaks for itself. What I think it means is what the researchers
also think it means. I don't know what you could imagine it would mean
otherwise. Spontaneous is used here in an ordinary way, not in some obscure
medical jargon which somehow actually means "anything but spontaneous". The
whole experiment is about isolating spontaneous activity from other types
of activity which respond to known conditions.

You are welcome to explain exactly what you think this study shows in your
terms, but don't bother if you are just going to throw out unsupported
opinions.

Thanks,
Craig


On Monday, September 2, 2013 11:18:31 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> The article doesn't show what you think it shows. "Spontaneous" doesn't
> mean what you think it means.
>
> On 02/09/2013, at 12:35 PM, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
>
> http://ac.els-cdn.com/S089662730700/1-s2.0-S089662730700-main.pdf?_tid=4e78eb70-1321-11e3-bc23-0aab0f01&acdnat=1378052132_997e220cfcf62a6d02d5ccd22660a221
>
>
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the
> left somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to-trial variability in
> button press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior
> relationship is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity
> similar to those observed during resting fixation.
>
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the
> left somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in
> button press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior
> relationship is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity
> similar to those observed during resting fixation - See more at:
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpuf
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human

Re: Superdeterminism

2013-09-02 Thread spudboy100 

I read through his article. What issue does applying Von Newmann's Cellular 
Automata solve in physics? It is akin to saying the cosmos is a program and 
because its based on CA, all else follows that it's now superdeterministic. How 
would we falsify his hypothesis. What observation can we make? T'Hooft made 
great progress with his Holographic Universe work, and has not been idle since 
he won his Nobel.  In such a superdeterministic universe, would the Beckenstein 
Bound on information have meaning? 1 x 10^123. 


-Original Message-
From: meekerdb 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 2, 2013 5:40 pm
Subject: Superdeterminism


Here's a possibly deterministic TOE from t'Hooft.
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1007

I'm not clear on how superdeterminism is compatible with the big bang and 
holographic 
theory.  The latter implies that the total information within the Hubble sphere 
must have 
been much smaller when the accessible universe was much smaller. Does that 
imply 
that if 
one uses photons from opposite sides of the CMB to set the angles in the EPR 
experiment 
that the results will satisfy Bell's inequality?

Brent

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Superdeterminism

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

Here's a possibly deterministic TOE from t'Hooft.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1007


I'm not clear on how superdeterminism is compatible with the big bang and holographic 
theory.  The latter implies that the total information within the Hubble sphere must have 
been much smaller when the accessible universe was much smaller. Does that imply that if 
one uses photons from opposite sides of the CMB to set the angles in the EPR experiment 
that the results will satisfy Bell's inequality?


Brent

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Re: Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread smitra 
It is difficult to falsify, e.g. it is not strictly correct to say that 
local determinism has been falsified, as 't Hooft explains here:


http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1007

Saibal



Citeren Craig Weinberg :


Is it scientific?

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Re: Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 12:33 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/9/2 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 9/2/2013 11:45 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Is it scientific?


As a general principle, determinism is meta-physics.  I doubt that it can be
strictly falsified because every possible test depends on auxiliary 
hypotheses which
one might be willing to give up before declaring a general metaphysical 
principle
was invalid.  But in the sense of having the preponderance of evidence 
against it,
determinism has been falsified.  Quantum mechanics showed experimentally 
that no
*local* deterministic theory can be right. So the principle of determinism 
conflicts
with the principle of localism (no faster than light signaling).  
Determinism can be
saved by introducing non-local theories, like Bohmian quantum mechanics or 
Everett's
multiple worlds.


ISTM MWI is local but multi-valued, but local (no information travel faster than the 
speed of light).


I think it depends on the model of MWI.  If you take Everett's original idea then a split 
due to a measurement "here", splits the wave function of the universe everywhere.  Of 
course it's "local" in the Hilbert space where it's just a different projection.  If you 
consider a decoherence model then the "split" propagates out from the "measurement" 
event.  If you consider the multiverse model, then nothing physical propagates, you just 
learn which universe "you" are in (which was a non-local hidden variable).


Brent

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Re: Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread Quentin Anciaux 
2013/9/2 meekerdb 

> On 9/2/2013 11:45 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> Is it scientific?
>>
>
> As a general principle, determinism is meta-physics.  I doubt that it can
> be strictly falsified because every possible test depends on auxiliary
> hypotheses which one might be willing to give up before declaring a general
> metaphysical principle was invalid.  But in the sense of having the
> preponderance of evidence against it, determinism has been falsified.
>  Quantum mechanics showed experimentally that no *local* deterministic
> theory can be right. So the principle of determinism conflicts with the
> principle of localism (no faster than light signaling).  Determinism can be
> saved by introducing non-local theories, like Bohmian quantum mechanics or
> Everett's multiple worlds.


ISTM MWI is local but multi-valued, but local (no information travel faster
than the speed of light).

Quentin


>  So it comes down to which model seems best.  Bohmian quantum mechanics
> can't seem to deal with quantum field theory.  Multiple worlds is vague on
> some questions, e.g. basis, but is still promising.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 11:45 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Is it scientific?


As a general principle, determinism is meta-physics.  I doubt that it can be strictly 
falsified because every possible test depends on auxiliary hypotheses which one might be 
willing to give up before declaring a general metaphysical principle was invalid.  But in 
the sense of having the preponderance of evidence against it, determinism has been 
falsified.  Quantum mechanics showed experimentally that no *local* deterministic theory 
can be right. So the principle of determinism conflicts with the principle of localism (no 
faster than light signaling).  Determinism can be saved by introducing non-local theories, 
like Bohmian quantum mechanics or Everett's multiple worlds.  So it comes down to which 
model seems best.  Bohmian quantum mechanics can't seem to deal with quantum field 
theory.  Multiple worlds is vague on some questions, e.g. basis, but is still promising.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 11:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, September 2, 2013 2:11:05 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:

The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
uncovered is
explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. 
More
importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been
triggered by external stimuli:


And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
a stored
perception of you grandmother when you were five?� All they can say is it 
wasn't
triggered by a *present* external stimuli.


Yes, that's true of course, but

1) 60% is a lot of stored perceptions triggering themselves for no reason.


First, by what standard is it known that 60% is too much?  Second, the stored perceptions 
are triggering themselves (although that's what you'd like to believe). They are triggered 
by the brain activities preceding them, which in turn were triggered by prior activities, 
which in turn...and so on back till you were five and saw your grandmother.  Third, 
suppose some of the activity was for no reason, i.e. quantum randomness.



2) The spontaneous activity is associated with behavioral changes. Kind of an odd thing 
for an archive of stored data to do independently of external stimuli.


First, you have no standard by which to judge it  "odd".  Second, there's no evidence it 
is independent of external stimuli - only of *present* external stimuli.




We should ask, at what point do *present* stimuli go dormant, and of how long, before 
they spontaneously (non-spontaneously) resurface as something that looks exactly like 
free will would look? We should not expect that free will can be proved to any greater 
extent than this.


This is just the compatibilist view.  It's called "free" will just because it's too hard 
to trace all the causal contributions to the will.




Again, if we were dealing with something which we knew for a fact had no intention or 
creativity,


How could you ever know that?  Only by being able to accurately predict all its actions.  
Which would imply "free will" = "unpredictable will".


then sure, what the study shows is only that we don't know where 60% of the activity is 
coming from, so maybe it is just housekeeping or scheduled tasks running, or whatever. 
Since we do have a sense that there is a difference between behavior that is 
intentional, accidental, coerced, and subconsciously driven, and that those categories 
are distinct,


We also have a sense that the Earth is flat and Sun orbits around it.

Brent

it would be absurdly unscientific and biased to rule out this rather large footprint in 
the brain as belonging to our own shoe.


Thanks,
Craig



Brent

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 11:42 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Except the experiment shows *conclusively* that the activity is the same whether the 
clocks are wound or not.


No, it just shows that they run a long time without being wound.

Brent

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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

2013-09-02 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi 

On 02.09.2013 20:41 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/2/2013 10:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 01.09.2013 21:52 meekerdb said the following:

Unconditioned=random works.


I do not think so. I would say that

If we say that the unconditioned is random, then it would be
foolish for us to try to do anything with the conditioning.


?? How do you conclude that?  Just because there is something Bohm
calls "the unconditioned" doesn't mean there is not also
conditioning, which may modify the unconditioned (=random).


I am in the middle of the book, so I cannot tell you exactly what would 
Bohm say. The answer was mine.


If I have understood Bohm correctly, he believes that we can somewhat 
influence the thought process. Along this way however, I doubt that 
random process will help. My logic is close to that of Rex Allen


http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/t/5ab5303cdb696ef5

Yet, I did not want to say that this is Bohm's opinion. If I find 
something to this end in his book, I will let you know.


Evgenii




My point is just that if you go thru the excerpts below and
substitute "random" for "unconditioned" everywhere then the meaning
is unchanged. Bohm says, "If everything is conditioned there's no way
out."  I don't know where he thinks "out" is, but if somethings are
random then he can get there.

Brent



Evgenii



Brent

On 9/1/2013 6:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes
below to the theme that is quite often under discussion here.

Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even
though, as I said, that by itself won’t really change the
reflexes. But if we don’t think of it clearly then all our
attempts to get into this will go wrong. Clear thinking implies
that we are in some way awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is
something beyond the reflex which is at work – in other words,
something unconditioned.”

p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If
everything is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the
very fact that we are sometimes able to see new things would
suggest that there is unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material
structure of the brain is unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”

p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the
movement of intelligence, then there is some possibility of
getting into this.”

p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then
it would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning. Is that clear?”

p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the
unconditioned, then we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we
assume that there is the unconditioned, again we are going to
be stuck – we will produce an image of the unconditioned in the
system of conditioning, and mistake the image for the
unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that there may be the
unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to leave room in
our thought for possibilities.”









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Is Determinism Falsifiable?

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 
Is it scientific?

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, September 2, 2013 2:35:43 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 9/2/2013 9:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
> "Finally, there was a pronounced difference in the effect of regressing 
>> out *spontaneous* activity on the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship 
>> with instructed versus *spontaneous * force variability. With *
>> spontaneous* force variability, regression of *spontaneous* (right SMC) 
>> activity all but eliminated the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship. In 
>> contrast, with instructed force variability regressing out 
>> *spontaneous*activity increased the significance of the left SMC 
>> BOLD-behavior effect. 
>> This improvement in significance suggests that regression of *spontaneous
>> * activity removed noise that was independent of the BOLD-behavior 
>> effect in the instructed condition. This finding is important as it shows 
>> that an ipsilateral response alone is not sufficient to eliminate the 
>> BOLD-behavior effect by regression as seen with* spontaneous* force 
>> variability.
>>
>> *In summary, there are three pronounced differences between spontaneous 
>> and instructed force variability in the current experiment: (1) the 
>> reversal of the time course magnitudes, (2) the difference in the timing of 
>> the significant BOLD-behavior effect, and (3) the difference in the effect 
>> of regressing out spontaneous activity. As such, we can be relatively 
>> confident that spontaneous and instructed force variability represent 
>> distinct phenomena in the current experiment. "*
>>
>
> The study speaks for itself. What I think it means is what the researchers 
> also think it means. I don't know what you could imagine it would mean 
> otherwise. Spontaneous is used here in an ordinary way, not in some obscure 
> medical jargon which somehow actually means "anything but spontaneous". The 
> whole experiment is about isolating spontaneous activity from other types 
> of activity which respond to known conditions.
>
> You are welcome to explain exactly what you think this study shows in your 
> terms, but don't bother if you are just going to throw out unsupported 
> opinions.
>
>
> It's just like my clock.  Every couple of days it gets some external 
> stimuli: I wind it up.  In between its activity is all spontaneous.
>
>
Except the experiment shows *conclusively* that the activity is the same 
whether the clocks are wound or not.

Craig
 

> Brent
>  

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Re: Leibniz view on why why bottom up control cannot work for the brain

2013-09-02 Thread Richard Ruquist 
Likewise the self-driving cars on earth
and consciousness on the brain.


On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 9:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:20 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
> > The Mars Rover is controlled from Earth.
> > That's hardly a bottom-up control
> > See George Ellis http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1212/1212.2275.pdf
>
> Hi Richard,
>
> Roger's claim was that "Materialistic science and programming has no
> such feature [downward control]". The Mars Rover clearly does, because
> there is a communication delay of at least 4 minutes to Mars, so it
> must be able to do things by itself.
>
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 9:13 AM, Telmo Menezes 
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:05 PM, Roger Clough 
> wrote:
> >> > A Leibnizian view on why bottom up programing cannot work for the
> brain
> >> >
> >> > 1. In order for the brain to control or govern
> >> > there must be a single governor
> >>
> >> Why?
> >>
> >> > 2. The single governor must be the single most dominant element in the
> >> > system
> >> > and must control downward, not upward
> >>
> >> Why?
> >>
> >> > 3. Materialistic science and programming has no such feature.
> >>
> >> The Mars Rover begs to disagree.
> >>
> >> Telmo.
> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
> >> > See my Leibniz site at
> >> > http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
> >> >
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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 10:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 01.09.2013 21:52 meekerdb said the following:

Unconditioned=random works.


I do not think so. I would say that

If we say that the unconditioned is random, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning.


?? How do you conclude that?  Just because there is something Bohm calls "the 
unconditioned" doesn't mean there is not also conditioning, which may modify the 
unconditioned (=random).


My point is just that if you go thru the excerpts below and substitute "random" for 
"unconditioned" everywhere then the meaning is unchanged.  Bohm says, "If everything is 
conditioned there's no way out."  I don't know where he thinks "out" is, but if somethings 
are random then he can get there.


Brent



Evgenii



Brent

On 9/1/2013 6:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes below to
 the theme that is quite often under discussion here.

Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even though,
as I said, that by itself won’t really change the reflexes. But if
we don’t think of it clearly then all our attempts to get into this
will go wrong. Clear thinking implies that we are in some way
awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is something beyond the reflex
which is at work – in other words, something unconditioned.”

p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If
everything is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the very
fact that we are sometimes able to see new things would suggest
that there is unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material structure of
the brain is unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”

p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the movement
of intelligence, then there is some possibility of getting into
this.”

p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning. Is that clear?”

p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the unconditioned,
then we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we assume that there is the
 unconditioned, again we are going to be stuck – we will produce an
 image of the unconditioned in the system of conditioning, and
mistake the image for the unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that
there may be the unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to
leave room in our thought for possibilities.”







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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 9:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


"Finally, there was a pronounced difference in the effect of regressing out
*spontaneous* activity on the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship with 
instructed
versus *spontaneous * force variability. With *spontaneous* force 
variability,
regression of *spontaneous* (right SMC) activity all but eliminated the 
left SMC
BOLD-behavior relationship. In contrast, with instructed force variability
regressing out *spontaneous* activity increased the significance of the 
left SMC
BOLD-behavior effect. This improvement in significance suggests that 
regression of
*spontaneous* activity removed noise that was independent of the 
BOLD-behavior
effect in the instructed condition. This finding is important as it shows 
that an
ipsilateral response alone is not sufficient to eliminate the BOLD-behavior 
effect
by regression as seen with*spontaneous* force variability.

*In summary, there are three pronounced differences between spontaneous and
instructed force variability in the current experiment: (1) the reversal of 
the time
course magnitudes, (2) the difference in the timing of the significant 
BOLD-behavior
effect, and (3) the difference in the effect of regressing out spontaneous 
activity.
As such, we can be relatively confident that spontaneous and instructed 
force
variability represent distinct phenomena in the current experiment. "*


The study speaks for itself. What I think it means is what the researchers also think it 
means. I don't know what you could imagine it would mean otherwise. Spontaneous is used 
here in an ordinary way, not in some obscure medical jargon which somehow actually means 
"anything but spontaneous". The whole experiment is about isolating spontaneous activity 
from other types of activity which respond to known conditions.


You are welcome to explain exactly what you think this study shows in your terms, but 
don't bother if you are just going to throw out unsupported opinions.


It's just like my clock.  Every couple of days it gets some external stimuli: I wind it 
up.  In between its activity is all spontaneous.


Brent

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Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 8:24 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Sep 1, 2013  Telmo Menezes > wrote:


> Free will is related to the issue of determinism -- could a very powerful 
computer
precisely predict my
future behaviour? 



Yes, but only if the computer didn't tell me what it predicted beforehand, because then 
the computer's actions would effect my actions; and the computer can predict my actions 
but it can't predict its own.


I don't see that the computer predicting your action at t1 and telling you the prediction 
at t0computer predicts, "In a few seconds you're going to run from this room, because I'm going 
to detonate a bomb in it."  It will probably be right, but it didn't have to predict 
anything about it's actions.


And in many cases a computer can predict its own actions (assuming no randomness or 
external inputs).  Godel only said it can't always predict its action.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, September 2, 2013 2:11:05 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
>  
> The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
> uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain 
> activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
> that has not been triggered by external stimuli:
>
>
> And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
> a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?� All they can 
> say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.
>

Yes, that's true of course, but 

1) 60% is a lot of stored perceptions triggering themselves for no reason.
2) The spontaneous activity is associated with behavioral changes. Kind of 
an odd thing for an archive of stored data to do independently of external 
stimuli.

We should ask, at what point do *present* stimuli go dormant, and of how 
long, before they spontaneously (non-spontaneously) resurface as something 
that looks exactly like free will would look? We should not expect that 
free will can be proved to any greater extent than this.

Again, if we were dealing with something which we knew for a fact had no 
intention or creativity, then sure, what the study shows is only that we 
don't know where 60% of the activity is coming from, so maybe it is just 
housekeeping or scheduled tasks running, or whatever. Since we do have a 
sense that there is a difference between behavior that is intentional, 
accidental, coerced, and subconsciously driven, and that those categories 
are distinct, it would be absurdly unscientific and biased to rule out this 
rather large footprint in the brain as belonging to our own shoe.

Thanks,
Craig



> Brent
>  

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

2013-09-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they uncovered is 
explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. More 
importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been triggered by 
external stimuli:


And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by a stored 
perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can say is it wasn't triggered 
by a *present* external stimuli.


Brent

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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

2013-09-02 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi 

On 01.09.2013 21:52 meekerdb said the following:

Unconditioned=random works.


I do not think so. I would say that

If we say that the unconditioned is random, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning.

Evgenii



Brent

On 9/1/2013 6:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes below to
 the theme that is quite often under discussion here.

Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even though,
as I said, that by itself won’t really change the reflexes. But if
we don’t think of it clearly then all our attempts to get into this
will go wrong. Clear thinking implies that we are in some way
awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is something beyond the reflex
which is at work – in other words, something unconditioned.”

p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If
everything is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the very
fact that we are sometimes able to see new things would suggest
that there is unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material structure of
the brain is unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”

p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the movement
of intelligence, then there is some possibility of getting into
this.”

p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning. Is that clear?”

p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the unconditioned,
then we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we assume that there is the
 unconditioned, again we are going to be stuck – we will produce an
 image of the unconditioned in the system of conditioning, and
mistake the image for the unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that
there may be the unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to
leave room in our thought for possibilities.”





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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Craig Weinberg 

>
> "Finally, there was a pronounced difference in the effect of regressing 
> out *spontaneous* activity on the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship 
> with instructed versus *spontaneous * force variability. With *spontaneous
> * force variability, regression of *spontaneous* (right SMC) activity all 
> but eliminated the left SMC BOLD-behavior relationship. In contrast, with 
> instructed force variability regressing out *spontaneous* activity 
> increased the significance of the left SMC BOLD-behavior effect. This 
> improvement in significance suggests that regression of *spontaneous*activity 
> removed noise that was independent of the BOLD-behavior effect in 
> the instructed condition. This finding is important as it shows that an 
> ipsilateral response alone is not sufficient to eliminate the BOLD-behavior 
> effect by regression as seen with* spontaneous* force variability.
>
> *In summary, there are three pronounced differences between spontaneous 
> and instructed force variability in the current experiment: (1) the 
> reversal of the time course magnitudes, (2) the difference in the timing of 
> the significant BOLD-behavior effect, and (3) the difference in the effect 
> of regressing out spontaneous activity. As such, we can be relatively 
> confident that spontaneous and instructed force variability represent 
> distinct phenomena in the current experiment. "*
>

The study speaks for itself. What I think it means is what the researchers 
also think it means. I don't know what you could imagine it would mean 
otherwise. Spontaneous is used here in an ordinary way, not in some obscure 
medical jargon which somehow actually means "anything but spontaneous". The 
whole experiment is about isolating spontaneous activity from other types 
of activity which respond to known conditions.

You are welcome to explain exactly what you think this study shows in your 
terms, but don't bother if you are just going to throw out unsupported 
opinions.

Thanks,
Craig


On Monday, September 2, 2013 11:18:31 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> The article doesn't show what you think it shows. "Spontaneous" doesn't 
> mean what you think it means.
>
> On 02/09/2013, at 12:35 PM, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
>
> http://ac.els-cdn.com/S089662730700/1-s2.0-S089662730700-main.pdf?_tid=4e78eb70-1321-11e3-bc23-0aab0f01&acdnat=1378052132_997e220cfcf62a6d02d5ccd22660a221
>
>
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the 
> left somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to-trial variability in 
> button press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior 
> relationship is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity 
> similar to those observed during resting fixation.
>
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the 
> left somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in 
> button press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior 
> relationship is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity 
> similar to those observed during resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpuf
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the 
> left somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in 
> button press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior 
> relationship is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity 
> similar to those observed during resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpuf
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-09-02 Thread John Clark 
On Sun, Sep 1, 2013  Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> Free will is related to the issue of determinism -- could a very powerful
> computer precisely predict my
> future behaviour?


Yes, but only if the computer didn't tell me what it predicted beforehand,
because then the computer's actions would effect my actions; and the
computer can predict my actions but it can't predict its own.

> And if not,


If not then my actions could not be predicted because they happened for no
reason, they were random.

> is there an "I" that has ultimate control over my decisions?


If something ("I" or anything else) controlled my decisions then my
decisions were deterministic. And if "I" pushed decisions down path X
rather than path Y for a reason then "I" too is deterministic, and if "I"
pushed decisions down path X rather than path Y for NO reason then "I" is
random.


> > In that case, what is this "I"?


"I" is a set of memories modulated by a imperfect logical processor that
works better in some directions than others; and perhaps most important,
"I" is a particular set of likes and dislikes that in the English language
is called "will". "Will" is not the problem, it's "free will" that's
gibberish.

   John K Clark
  

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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou 


The article doesn't show what you think it shows. "Spontaneous" doesn't mean 
what you think it means.

On 02/09/2013, at 12:35 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> http://ac.els-cdn.com/S089662730700/1-s2.0-S089662730700-main.pdf?_tid=4e78eb70-1321-11e3-bc23-0aab0f01&acdnat=1378052132_997e220cfcf62a6d02d5ccd22660a221
> 
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the left 
> somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to-trial variability in button press 
> force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship is 
> attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to those 
> observed during resting fixation.
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the left 
> somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in button 
> press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship 
> is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to 
> those observed during resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpufThe resting brain is 
> not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in neuronal activity even in 
> the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic brain activity persists 
> during task performance and contributes to variability in evoked brain 
> responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic activity also contributes to 
> variability in behavior. In the current fMRI study, we identify a relation- 
> ship between human brain activity in the left somatomotor cortex and 
> spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in button press force. We then 
> demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship is attributable to 
> ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to those observed during 
> resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpuf
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Re: Spontaneous Brain Activity Controls Behavior

2013-09-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou 


On 02/09/2013, at 12:35 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> http://ac.els-cdn.com/S089662730700/1-s2.0-S089662730700-main.pdf?_tid=4e78eb70-1321-11e3-bc23-0aab0f01&acdnat=1378052132_997e220cfcf62a6d02d5ccd22660a221
> 
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the left 
> somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to-trial variability in button press 
> force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship is 
> attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to those 
> observed during resting fixation.
> The resting brain is not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in 
> neuronal activity even in the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic 
> brain activity persists during task performance and contributes to 
> variability in evoked brain responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic 
> activity also contributes to variability in behavior. In the current fMRI 
> study, we identify a relation- ship between human brain activity in the left 
> somatomotor cortex and spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in button 
> press force. We then demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship 
> is attributable to ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to 
> those observed during resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpufThe resting brain is 
> not silent, but exhibits organized fluctuations in neuronal activity even in 
> the absence of tasks or stimuli. This intrinsic brain activity persists 
> during task performance and contributes to variability in evoked brain 
> responses. What is unknown is if this intrinsic activity also contributes to 
> variability in behavior. In the current fMRI study, we identify a relation- 
> ship between human brain activity in the left somatomotor cortex and 
> spontaneous trial-to- trial variability in button press force. We then 
> demonstrate that 74% of this brain-behavior relationship is attributable to 
> ongoing fluctuations in intrinsic activity similar to those observed during 
> resting fixation - See more at: 
> http://s33light.org/post/60036139333#sthash.sgzmIpwx.dpuf
> -- 
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Re: Leibniz view on why why bottom up control cannot work for the brain

2013-09-02 Thread Telmo Menezes 
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:20 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
> The Mars Rover is controlled from Earth.
> That's hardly a bottom-up control
> See George Ellis http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1212/1212.2275.pdf

Hi Richard,

Roger's claim was that "Materialistic science and programming has no
such feature [downward control]". The Mars Rover clearly does, because
there is a communication delay of at least 4 minutes to Mars, so it
must be able to do things by itself.

>
> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 9:13 AM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:05 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>> > A Leibnizian view on why bottom up programing cannot work for the brain
>> >
>> > 1. In order for the brain to control or govern
>> > there must be a single governor
>>
>> Why?
>>
>> > 2. The single governor must be the single most dominant element in the
>> > system
>> > and must control downward, not upward
>>
>> Why?
>>
>> > 3. Materialistic science and programming has no such feature.
>>
>> The Mars Rover begs to disagree.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
>> > See my Leibniz site at
>> > http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
>> >
>> > --
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Re: Leibniz view on why why bottom up control cannot work for the brain

2013-09-02 Thread Richard Ruquist 
The Mars Rover is controlled from Earth.
That's hardly a bottom-up control
See George Ellis http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1212/1212.2275.pdf


On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 9:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:05 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> > A Leibnizian view on why bottom up programing cannot work for the brain
> >
> > 1. In order for the brain to control or govern
> > there must be a single governor
>
> Why?
>
> > 2. The single governor must be the single most dominant element in the
> > system
> > and must control downward, not upward
>
> Why?
>
> > 3. Materialistic science and programming has no such feature.
>
> The Mars Rover begs to disagree.
>
> Telmo.
>
> >
> >
> >
> > Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
> > See my Leibniz site at
> > http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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Re: Leibniz view on why why bottom up control cannot work for the brain

2013-09-02 Thread Telmo Menezes 
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:05 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> A Leibnizian view on why bottom up programing cannot work for the brain
>
> 1. In order for the brain to control or govern
> there must be a single governor

Why?

> 2. The single governor must be the single most dominant element in the
> system
> and must control downward, not upward

Why?

> 3. Materialistic science and programming has no such feature.

The Mars Rover begs to disagree.

Telmo.

>
>
>
> Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
> See my Leibniz site at
> http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
>
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Leibniz view on why why bottom up control cannot work for the brain

2013-09-02 Thread Roger Clough 
A Leibnizian view on why bottom up programing cannot work for the brain

1. In order for the brain to control or govern 
there must be a single governor 

2. The single governor must be the single most dominant element in the system
and must control downward, not upward

3. Materialistic science and programming has no such feature.




Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough

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