Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:45 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:


> *I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious robot
> than a conscious robot.*
>

I wouldn't feel bad if Einstein outsmarted me but if something that was
only "pseudo" intelligent did I'd feel pretty stupid.

John K Clark


>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


We cannot identify first person notion with third person notion. A 
subtlety is that physics is, eventually, shown to be first person 
plural, and not third person as usually believed today.


That is merely a consequence of your idiosyncratic definitions of theses 
terms. Your definitions were devised to cope with the person duplication 
scenarios, where it is individuals that are duplicated, not worlds. So 
if you duplicate a number of persons so that they share this experience, 
then that is first person plural, and you can still have other 
non-duplicated people outside of the experiment who can take a third 
person view of things.


This is not how it works in the real world -- we do not duplicate just 
people. In MWI it is worlds that are duplicated, together with all the 
people in them. So there can be no analogy of the third person view of 
someone outside the duplication. The terminology then becomes useless, 
and we revert to the normal grammatical meaning of the terms: first, 
second, and third person; first person being one's personal view, second 
person is the person you talk to, and the third person is anyone else. 
It is a category error to use your idiosyncratic terminology in normal 
physics talk.


Bruce

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 3:55:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/5/2018 1:34 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 2:45:30 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/5/2018 8:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 6:56:42 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: 
>>>
>>> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>> > I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly 
 intelligent unless it is also conscious.

>>>
>>> Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human beings are 
>>> "truly intelligent" because you have no way of knowing if they are 
>>> conscious or not. And if you were outsmarted by something that was *NOT* 
>>> "truly intelligent" should you feel better or worse that if you were 
>>> outsmarted by something that was *WAS* "truly intelligent"?
>>>
>>> *> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to 
 "live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts screaming, 
 "Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.*

>>>
>>> Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to program.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious robot than 
>> a conscious robot.
>>
>>
>> Because you know the conscious robot would have an internal model of the 
>> world in which it knew it had outsmarted you and from which it would learn 
>> and plan future actions...like selling you a time share.  Which I think 
>> gives some insight into what constitutes consciousness and why it is 
>> inherent in high-level intelligence.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Actually I was thinking the conscious robot would *experience* a 
> satisfaction that the sans-consciousness robot could not. 
>
>
> But is satisfaction so specific.  If it's just property of some 
> bio-matter, then you could simply append a bio-component to your electronic 
> computer to proved the experience.
>
> Brent
>

 

This sounds like a hybrid silicon+bio robot that does 
information+experience processing (silicon+bio hybrids are among new 
technologies in the news now, BTW).

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/5/2018 1:34 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 2:45:30 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/5/2018 8:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 6:56:42 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift
 wrote:

> I agree with those scientists who that say something
isn't truly intelligent unless it is also conscious.


Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human
beings are "truly intelligent" because you have no way of
knowing if they are conscious or not. And if you were
outsmarted by something that was *NOT* "truly intelligent"
should you feel better or worse that if you were outsmarted
by something that was *WAS* "truly intelligent"?

/> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it
would want to "live". It would not want to be "shut
down".When Watson starts screaming, "Don't turn me off!",
then it might be conscious./


Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to
program.

John K Clark





I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious
robot than a conscious robot.


Because you know the conscious robot would have an internal model
of the world in which it knew it had outsmarted you and from which
it would learn and plan future actions...like selling you a time
share.  Which I think gives some insight into what constitutes
consciousness and why it is inherent in high-level intelligence.

Brent




Actually I was thinking the conscious robot would /experience/ a 
satisfaction that the sans-consciousness robot could not.


But is satisfaction so specific.  If it's just property of some 
bio-matter, then you could simply append a bio-component to your 
electronic computer to proved the experience.


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 2:45:30 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/5/2018 8:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 6:56:42 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: 
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> > I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly 
>>> intelligent unless it is also conscious.
>>>
>>
>> Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human beings are 
>> "truly intelligent" because you have no way of knowing if they are 
>> conscious or not. And if you were outsmarted by something that was *NOT* 
>> "truly intelligent" should you feel better or worse that if you were 
>> outsmarted by something that was *WAS* "truly intelligent"?
>>
>> *> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to 
>>> "live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts screaming, 
>>> "Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.*
>>>
>>
>> Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to program.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
>
>
>
> I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious robot than 
> a conscious robot.
>
>
> Because you know the conscious robot would have an internal model of the 
> world in which it knew it had outsmarted you and from which it would learn 
> and plan future actions...like selling you a time share.  Which I think 
> gives some insight into what constitutes consciousness and why it is 
> inherent in high-level intelligence.
>
> Brent
>



Actually I was thinking the conscious robot would *experience* a 
satisfaction that the sans-consciousness robot could not. 

(Think of how another conscious robot would feel.)

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/5/2018 8:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 6:56:42 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:

> I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't
truly intelligent unless it is also conscious.


Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human beings
are "truly intelligent" because you have no way of knowing if they
are conscious or not. And if you were outsmarted by something that
was *NOT* "truly intelligent" should you feel better or worse that
if you were outsmarted by something that was *WAS* "truly
intelligent"?

/> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it
would want to "live". It would not want to be "shut down".When
Watson starts screaming, "Don't turn me off!", then it might
be conscious./


Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to program.

John K Clark





I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious robot 
than a conscious robot.


Because you know the conscious robot would have an internal model of the 
world in which it knew it had outsmarted you and from which it would 
learn and plan future actions...like selling you a time share.  Which I 
think gives some insight into what constitutes consciousness and why it 
is inherent in high-level intelligence.


Brent

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Quentin Anciaux]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine

Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:28, Quentin Anciaux  a écrit :

>
>
> Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:17, John Clark  a écrit :
>
>> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 8:51 AM Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >>There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature but if one
 did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing proved
 over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem would.

>>>
>>> *> It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for
>>> turing machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.*
>>>
>>
>> In a way that's true but the price paid is one of ambiguity. You say the
>> oracle can predict if any Turing Machine will halt, OK but the oracle is
>> not a Turing Machine so can the oracle predict if it itself will halt?
>> Nobody known how the oracle works so nobody can say but if it can then it
>> can't and I can prove it.
>>
>
>
> It can't... Again, the oracle solves it for TM... Not for TMO.. But
> another oracle... Call it O2... Can solve it for TMO... But not for TMO2...
> Etc
>
>>
>> Let's give the turing machine + oracle you mentioned a name, I'll call
>> it a TMO. If the TMO can solve the Halting problem then if I feed in any
>> Turing Machine it can tell me if it halts or not. Any computer that is not
>> a oracle can be reduced to a Turing Machine regardless of it circuit
>> design, so let's say the TMO has 2 slots for input and one slot for
>> output, if I feed in the circuit logic design blueprints of any computer
>> into one slot the TMO can simulate that computer, and if I feed in  program
>> data into the other slot that TMO will output either "Halt" meaning the
>> simulated machine operating on that data will eventually stop or the TMO
>> will output "not halt" meaning  the simulated machine operating on that
>> data will never stop.
>>
>> I will now make a new machine called X, it has 3 parts to it. The first
>> part of X  is just a Xerox copy machine, feed in one program and it outputs
>> 2 identical programs. The second part of X is the TMO and it receives the 2
>> programs as input from the Xerox machine's outputs, and the TMO then
>> outputs either "halt" or "not halt". The third and last part of X is a very
>> simple machine called the negator, it receives as input the output of
>> the TMO and if the input to the negator is "Halt" the negator will go
>> into a infinite loop and if the input is "not halt" the negator will
>> print "halt" and then stop.
>>
>> Now let's draw the blueprint circuit design of the entire X machine that
>> fully defines it, then make 2 copies of it and feed it into the TMO; so
>> the TMO is now trying to figure out if the X machine will halt if it is
>> fed its own blueprint as data. If the TMO says "halt" the X machine will
>> not halt and the TMO was wrong.  If the TMO says "not halt" the X
>> machine will halt and the TMO was wrong again. Therefore the TMO that
>> can tell if any Turing Machine will halt or not can not logically exist.
>>
>> I suppose you could argue that the oracle operates according to some sort
>> of magic so you couldn't have the blueprints of it and therefore you
>> couldn't have the blueprints of the entire X machine, but then the very
>> question of whether the X machine halts is not a well defined question
>> because the X machine itself is not well defined and the properties of the
>> oracle are ambiguous. So oracle or no oracle, anything that can always tell
>> if any well defined program will halt or not halt when run on a well
>> defined computer will  lead to a logical contradiction.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
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>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:17, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 8:51 AM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >>There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature but if one
>>> did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing proved
>>> over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem would.
>>>
>>
>> *> It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for
>> turing machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.*
>>
>
> In a way that's true but the price paid is one of ambiguity. You say the
> oracle can predict if any Turing Machine will halt, OK but the oracle is
> not a Turing Machine so can the oracle predict if it itself will halt?
> Nobody known how the oracle works so nobody can say but if it can then it
> can't and I can prove it.
>


It can't... Again, the oracle solves it for TM... Not for TMO.. But another
oracle... Call it O2... Can solve it for TMO... But not for TMO2... Etc

>
> Let's give the turing machine + oracle you mentioned a name, I'll call it
> a TMO. If the TMO can solve the Halting problem then if I feed in any
> Turing Machine it can tell me if it halts or not. Any computer that is not
> a oracle can be reduced to a Turing Machine regardless of it circuit
> design, so let's say the TMO has 2 slots for input and one slot for
> output, if I feed in the circuit logic design blueprints of any computer
> into one slot the TMO can simulate that computer, and if I feed in  program
> data into the other slot that TMO will output either "Halt" meaning the
> simulated machine operating on that data will eventually stop or the TMO
> will output "not halt" meaning  the simulated machine operating on that
> data will never stop.
>
> I will now make a new machine called X, it has 3 parts to it. The first
> part of X  is just a Xerox copy machine, feed in one program and it outputs
> 2 identical programs. The second part of X is the TMO and it receives the 2
> programs as input from the Xerox machine's outputs, and the TMO then
> outputs either "halt" or "not halt". The third and last part of X is a very
> simple machine called the negator, it receives as input the output of the
> TMO and if the input to the negator is "Halt" the negator will go into a
> infinite loop and if the input is "not halt" the negator will print
> "halt" and then stop.
>
> Now let's draw the blueprint circuit design of the entire X machine that
> fully defines it, then make 2 copies of it and feed it into the TMO; so
> the TMO is now trying to figure out if the X machine will halt if it is
> fed its own blueprint as data. If the TMO says "halt" the X machine will
> not halt and the TMO was wrong.  If the TMO says "not halt" the X machine
> will halt and the TMO was wrong again. Therefore the TMO that can tell if
> any Turing Machine will halt or not can not logically exist.
>
> I suppose you could argue that the oracle operates according to some sort
> of magic so you couldn't have the blueprints of it and therefore you
> couldn't have the blueprints of the entire X machine, but then the very
> question of whether the X machine halts is not a well defined question
> because the X machine itself is not well defined and the properties of the
> oracle are ambiguous. So oracle or no oracle, anything that can always tell
> if any well defined program will halt or not halt when run on a well
> defined computer will  lead to a logical contradiction.
>
>  John K Clark
>
> --
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 11:14:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Nov 2018, at 11:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> But I claim an experience-processing computer (like our brain) is not 
> super-Turing, but is non-Turing: All *information* it can process is 
> Turing-computable, but it also processes *experience*.
>
>
>
> I think we agree on this. Experience is NOT information processing. That 
> is provable using very standard definition (the greek one) and using 
> mechanism.
>
> But you go out of mechanism by your use of matter in the process of those 
> experiences. Which seems to me very weird, as it is like invoking a 
> supernatural being (some primitive matter) which is actually part of the 
> difficulty when solving the mind-body problem, with or even without 
> mechanism.
>
> It would be nice if you study the first steps of the Universal Dovetailer 
> Argument so that we might perhaps be able to isolate where we might really 
> differ or not, beyond your apparent belief in “matter”.
>
> Cf  
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>   
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

The way I see it is from what I've called the (pragmatic)  *PLTOS *framework. 
At the end of the workday, one needs something that is running *inside of*
 or *as* a computer. (in the world we are living in.)

   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/

Here the idea is the robot scientist has a conscious agent program (CAP) 
codebase, but needs to compile it into a working object. The CAP codebase 
is the "theory" (which could include UD code as you have defined it). 

So the scientist could compile CAP to run inside existing of hardware, or 
use a synthetic compiler (matter compiler, molecular assembler, ...) to 
make "new" hardware (which could be "squishy") with the programming 
embedded. 

*What is the nature of the hardware that allows this task to be achieved? *is 
a question the robot scientist faces. That gets into what kinds of 
compilers/transformers are needed (the T in PLTOS).

- pt
 


>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 8:51 AM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>>There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature but if one
>> did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing proved
>> over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem would.
>>
>
> *> It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for
> turing machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.*
>

In a way that's true but the price paid is one of ambiguity. You say the
oracle can predict if any Turing Machine will halt, OK but the oracle is
not a Turing Machine so can the oracle predict if it itself will halt?
Nobody known how the oracle works so nobody can say but if it can then it
can't and I can prove it.

Let's give the turing machine + oracle you mentioned a name, I'll call it a
TMO. If the TMO can solve the Halting problem then if I feed in any Turing
Machine it can tell me if it halts or not. Any computer that is not a
oracle can be reduced to a Turing Machine regardless of it circuit design,
so let's say the TMO has 2 slots for input and one slot for output, if I
feed in the circuit logic design blueprints of any computer into one slot
the TMO can simulate that computer, and if I feed in  program data into the
other slot that TMO will output either "Halt" meaning the simulated machine
operating on that data will eventually stop or the TMO will output "not
halt" meaning  the simulated machine operating on that data will never stop.

I will now make a new machine called X, it has 3 parts to it. The first
part of X  is just a Xerox copy machine, feed in one program and it outputs
2 identical programs. The second part of X is the TMO and it receives the 2
programs as input from the Xerox machine's outputs, and the TMO then
outputs either "halt" or "not halt". The third and last part of X is a very
simple machine called the negator, it receives as input the output of the
TMO and if the input to the negator is "Halt" the negator will go into a
infinite loop and if the input is "not halt" the negator will print "halt"
and then stop.

Now let's draw the blueprint circuit design of the entire X machine that
fully defines it, then make 2 copies of it and feed it into the TMO; so the
TMO is now trying to figure out if the X machine will halt if it is fed its
own blueprint as data. If the TMO says "halt" the X machine will not halt
and the TMO was wrong.  If the TMO says "not halt" the X machine will halt
and the TMO was wrong again. Therefore the TMO that can tell if any Turing
Machine will halt or not can not logically exist.

I suppose you could argue that the oracle operates according to some sort
of magic so you couldn't have the blueprints of it and therefore you
couldn't have the blueprints of the entire X machine, but then the very
question of whether the X machine halts is not a well defined question
because the X machine itself is not well defined and the properties of the
oracle are ambiguous. So oracle or no oracle, anything that can always tell
if any well defined program will halt or not halt when run on a well
defined computer will  lead to a logical contradiction.

 John K Clark

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Re: Interpretation of Superposition

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC, Pierz wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 7:50:30 AM UTC+11, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 1, 2018 at 11:22:46 PM UTC, Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 9:40:39 PM UTC+11, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 5:08:42 PM UTC, smitra wrote:
>
> On 14-10-2018 15:24, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: 
> > In a two state system, such as a qubit, what forces the 
> interpretation 
> > that the system is in both states simultaneously before measurement, 
> > versus the interpretation that we just don't what state it's in 
> before 
> > measurement? Is the latter interpretation equivalent to Einstein 
> > Realism? And if so, is this the interpretation allegedly falsified 
> by 
> > Bell experiments? AG 
>
> It is indeed inconsistent with QM itself as Bell has shown. 
> Experiments 
> have later demonstrated that the Bell inequalities are violated in 
> precisely the way predicted by QM.  This then rules out local hidden 
> variables, therefore the information about the outcome of a 
> measurement 
> is not already present locally in the environment. 
>
> Saibal 
>

 What puzzles me is this; why would the Founders assume that a system in 
 a superposition is in all component states simultaneously -- contradicting 
 the intuitive appeal of Einstein realism -- when that assumption is not 
 used in calculating probabilities (since the component states are 
 orthogonal)? AG 

>>>
>>> I think because of interference. 
>>>
>>
*Are you unaware of the fact that when a superposition of states is written 
in the form of eigenstates of the operator, there is no interference?!  
Eigenstates with distinct eigenvalues are orthogonal, meaning there is no 
interference between any pair. AG *

Consider the paradigmatic double slit, with the single electron going 
>>> through it. It sure looks like the electron was in two place at once, 
>>> doesn't it?
>>>
>>

*No. It's never been observed. All you "see" is an interference pattern 
when you don't look at the slits. AG *

>
>> *Yes, that's my assessment how the erroneous interpretation took hold, 
>> but only if you restrict yourself to the particle interpretation. If the 
>> electron travels as a wave, it can go through both slits simultaneously and 
>> interfere with itself. This is my preferred interpretation; the only one 
>> that makes sense. AG*
>>
>
> Although as stated I think "being in two states at once" is a manner of 
> speaking quasi-classically about non-classical phenomena, it seems you 
> still have a very classical imagination of what's going on here, but I have 
> my doubts:
> 1 - You say it makes sense, but I'm not sure that an electron "travelling 
> as a wave" but being measured as a particle makes an awful lot more sense! 
>


*There is no satisfying model or picture of a slit experiment. However, one 
CAN think of a *probability* wave that interferes with itself -- they're 
generally used in quantum mechanics -- without being able to explain how 
the interfering waves coalesce into a particle when the measurement occurs. 
This is the great unsolved problem and I am content for now to leave it as 
such. But the attempt to use zig-zag paths that go forward and backward in 
time seems like a much worse model in terms of having explanatory value. AG 
*

2 - Schrödinger initially thought of his equation (the one that applies to 
> double slits) as being the equation for a physical wave, as you seem to be 
> doing. 
>


*I never referred to a physical wave. I meant a probability wave. AG *

However he was forced eventually to accept that it was something a lot more 
> abstract than that. The statistical interpretation formulated by Born 
> superseded any such notion. Interference happens whenever a quantum system 
> can reach the same state via more than one history. In the case of quantum 
> computers, complex interfering superpositions are constructed in which it 
> is impossible to conceive of the "wave function" as literally describing 
> some kind of mechanical wave. 
>

*Not a mechanical or physical wave, but a probability wave. See above. AG *

>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by "that assumption is not used in calculating 
>>> probabilities". 
>>>
>>
>> *If the operator whose eigenvalues are being measured has a well defined 
>> mathematical form -- e.g., not like |alive> -- it has specific eigenvectors 
>> and eigenvalues, and the state function can be written as superposition of 
>> these eigenvectors. It can be shown that eigenvectors with distinct 
>> eigenvalues are orthogonal, meaning the Kronecker delta applies to their 
>> mutual inner products. Therefore, to calculate the probability of observing 
>> a particular eigenvalue, one must take the inner product of the wf with the 
>> ei

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/5/2018 12:40 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 6:49:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:

/> By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip
Goff) mean that which you have within yourself right now: the
awareness that/[...]


Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness,
so when you say "/It's that experience (not just information) that
needs processing to produc/*/e consciousness/"*you're saying that
to produce consciousness you must process consciousness. I don't
find that very helpful.

> I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!


Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.

John K Clark


I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly 
intelligent unless it is also conscious.


For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to 
"live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts 
screaming, "Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.


Why would being conscious entail not wanting to be turned off? Don't you 
go to sleep at night?


Out fundamental drives have been shaped by evolution, not by 
technology.  When Watson says, "I want a woman." that will be the time 
to worry.


Brent

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Nov 2018, at 11:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 3:36:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Nov 2018, at 15:02, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 2, 2018 at 3:45:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 1 Nov 2018, at 19:43, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 2:27 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > infinite time Turing machines are more powerful than ordinary Turing 
>>> > machines
>>> 
>>> That is true, it is also true that if dragons existed they would be 
>>> dangerous and if I had some cream I could have strawberries and cream, if I 
>>> had some strawberries.   
>>> 
>>> > How  "real" you think this is depends on whether you are a Platonist or a 
>>> > fictionalist.
>>> 
>>> No, it depends on if you think logical contradictions can exist, if they 
>>> can then there is no point in reading any mathematical proof and logic is 
>>> no longer a useful tool for anything.
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on this. But 
>> an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.
>> 
>> Now, such machine have only be introduced (by Turing) to show that even such 
>> “Turing machine with magical power making them able to solve the halting 
>> problem” are still limited and cannot solve, for example the totality 
>> problem (also an arithmetical). 
>> 
>> Turing showed that there is a hierarchy of problem in arithmetic, where 
>> adding magic (his “oracle”) never make any machine complete. It is a way to 
>> show how complex the arithmetical reality is. Adding more and more magical 
>> power does not lead to completeness. 
>> 
>> Post and Kleene have related such hierarchies with the number of alternating 
>> quantifiers used in the arithmetical expression. P is a sigma_0 = pi_0 
>> formula, without quantifier.
>> 
>> ExP(x, y). Sigma_1 (negation = AxP(x,y) = Pi_1, more complex than sigma_1, 
>> already not computable).
>> ExAyP(x, y, z)  = Sigma_2 (beyond today’s math!) (negation = Pi_2).
>> Etc. 
>> 
>> More and more “infinite task” are needed.
>> 
>> Note that such magic does not change the “theology”. It remains the same 
>> variants of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay self-reference logics (G and G*).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There are other "Turing machine" models other than infinite-time ones people 
>> have "invented", e.g. inductive Turing machines:
>> 
>> Algorithmic complexity as a criterion of unsolvability
>> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cd8f/442a9f7667891fff6f276a1bc638dd59b937.pdf
>>  
>> 
>>  :
>> 
>> Let us take an inductive Turing machine M that given a description of the 
>> Turing machine T and first n + 1 words x0, x1, . . . , xn from the list x0, 
>> x1, . . . , xn, . . ., produces the (n + 1)th partial output. This output is 
>> equal to 1 when the machine T halts for all words x0, x1, . . . , xn given 
>> as its input, and is equal to 0 when the machine T does not halt for, at 
>> least, one of these words. In such a way, the machine M solves the totality 
>> problem for Turing machines.
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> 
>> cf.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Super-recursive_algorithm#Inductive_Turing_machines
>>  
>> 
>> https://bitrumagora.wordpress.com/about/marl-burgin/ 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Nothing is settled in computing.
> 
> 
> But this does not clearly violate Church-Thesis. Inference inductive is not 
> the same as computing. We know that there are many different Turing machine, 
> which are not equivalent for proving or inducting, etc. All humans are like 
> that. We are still the same *as* Turing machine (combinators, etc.). 
> Universality is with respect to computing, and is false with everything else. 
> Now, if you add magical, or actual infinities, or oracles, or infinite speed, 
> then you get machine which are no more digital finite machine, and so cannot 
> violate the Church-Turing thesis either. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From all the super-Turing math and CS news (I've followed over the years), 
> there seems to be a consensus forming:
> 
> 
>  There are no super-Turing computers! (that can be found in nature or 
> manufactured by us)
> 
> 
> cf. 
> https://phys.org/news/2015-09-limit-church-turing-thesis-accounts-noisy.html 
> 
> The only ones are fictional ones (the infinite-time and  super-recursive ones 
> above).
> 
> So that seems to be the consensus.

Thank you for the good news, although I do not care on consensus too much, 
except to despair of humanity ...



> 
> 
> But I claim an experience-processing computer (like our brain) is not 
> super-Turing, but is non-Turing: All information it can process is 
> Turing-computable, but it also processes experience.


I think we agree on this. Experience is NOT informati

Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, November 2, 2018 at 3:47:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Nov 2018, at 19:59, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 1, 2018 at 1:44:19 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 2:27 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> infinite time Turing machines are more powerful than ordinary Turing 
>>> machines*
>>
>>
>> That is true, it is also true that if dragons existed they would be 
>> dangerous and if I had some cream I could have strawberries and cream, if I 
>> had some strawberries.   
>>
>> *> How  "real" you think this is depends on whether you are a Platonist 
>>> or a fictionalist.*
>>>
>>
>> No, it depends on if you think logical contradictions can exist, if they 
>> can then there is no point in reading any mathematical proof and logic is 
>> no longer a useful tool for anything.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>>
> Of course logics are fiction too. (They're just languages after all.)
>
>
>
> There is a logical language, but that is different from a logical theory. 
> It is important to distinguish the languages from the theories, and the 
> theories from the models/interpretations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 
Logics correspond to type-theoretic programming languages.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 6:56:42 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly 
>> intelligent unless it is also conscious.
>>
>
> Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human beings are 
> "truly intelligent" because you have no way of knowing if they are 
> conscious or not. And if you were outsmarted by something that was *NOT* 
> "truly intelligent" should you feel better or worse that if you were 
> outsmarted by something that was *WAS* "truly intelligent"?
>
> *> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to 
>> "live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts screaming, 
>> "Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.*
>>
>
> Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to program.
>
> John K Clark
>




I think I would feel better being outsmarted by an unconscious robot than a 
conscious robot.

- pt



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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 à 14:48, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 4:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> *>>> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on
 this. But an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.*
>>>
>>>
>
> >>If such a oracle could exist
>>
>>
>
> > *In what sense?*
>>
>
> Whoever said there is no such thing as a stupid question was wrong.
>
> >>then logical contradictions could too
>>
>>
>> > *That does not follow. I don’t think that there are any evidence for
>> such oracle in nature, but such existence would not introduce any
>> contradiction.*
>>
>
> For god's sake! There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in
> nature but if one did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however
> Turing proved over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting
> Problem would.
>

It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for turing
machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.


>  John K Clark
>
>
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 4:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*>>> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on
>>> this. But an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.*
>>
>>

>>If such a oracle could exist
>
>

> *In what sense?*
>

Whoever said there is no such thing as a stupid question was wrong.

>>then logical contradictions could too
>
>
> > *That does not follow. I don’t think that there are any evidence for
> such oracle in nature, but such existence would not introduce any
> contradiction.*
>

For god's sake! There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature
but if one did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing
proved over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem
would.

 John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 6:33 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *Experience is manifested by information processing. But experience per
> se is not information processing.*
>

A car is not "fast" but going fast is what a car does. A brain is not a
mind but mind is what a brain does. Information processing is not
consciousness but consciousness is what information processing can do. As
for experience, anything with a memory has that, even the 1946 ENIAC
computer had memory.

*>I accumulate evidence that the more we have information processing
> ability, the less we are conscious.*
>

No you do not. You may have evidence that you are conscious (evidence that
is available only to you) but you have precisely zero evidence that *WE*
are conscious.

> *Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in
> arithmetic, where there is no matter. *


Discovered where there is no matter? So Alan Turing did not have a brain
made of matter?

> *The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we
> can build machine doing it*


Alan Turing described how physical reality can compute anything that can be
computed and he described it in the language of mathematics, the language
best suited for that purpose. Mathematics is a wonderful language but no
language is the thing it describes, no language is physical reality.

>Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3


A bit less would be preferable to a bit more because step 3 was *DUMB*.

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly
> intelligent unless it is also conscious.
>

Then you have no way of knowing if any of your fellow human beings are
"truly intelligent" because you have no way of knowing if they are
conscious or not. And if you were outsmarted by something that was *NOT*
"truly intelligent" should you feel better or worse that if you were
outsmarted by something that was *WAS* "truly intelligent"?

*> For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to
> "live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts screaming,
> "Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.*
>

Unlike winning at Jeopardy that would be trivially easy to program.

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Nov 2018, at 14:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 6:23 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> > If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the result of 
> > information (only) processing,
> 
> If? If information is not the thing that needs processing to produce 
> intelligence then what is?
> 
> > then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) reality holds. 
> 
> Only if somebody can show how information, or anything else, can be processed 
> without using matter that obeys the laws of physics.


Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in arithmetic, 
where there is no matter. 

The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we can build 
machine doing it, but unfortunately, if “matter” is taken seriously as 
primitive, the person itself can no more be attached to any particular body.

Eventually, it is the very notion of primitive matter, or physicalism, which 
needs to be abandonned if we assume Mechanism or Computationalism.

Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3 …

Please, try to convince someone else to explain what is wrong in the step 3, as 
you did not succeed in making your point up to now.




> And, despite the existence of books made of dead trees with black squiggles 
> made of ink with a high Carbon content pressed onto them, nobody has even 
> come close to doing that.


It is born in that way. Study any book in the field. You are confusing everyone 
on this.

Bruno 







> 
>  John K Clark
>  
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Nov 2018, at 12:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> On Saturday, November 3, 2018 at 6:02:50 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 3, 2018 at 5:49 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
> >Information processing can ultimately lead to just a type of intelligence: 
> >pseudo-intelligence:
> Artificial intelligence isn't synthetic intelligence: It's 
> pseudo-intelligence.
> 
> If you're outsmarted by a pseudo-intelligence how are you better off than if 
> you were outsmarted by a genuine-intelligence?  
>  
> > Consciousness requires experience processing in addition to information 
> > processing.
> 
> A experience is information so experience processing is information 
> processing, and I don't see how it makes any difference if the brain doing 
> the processing is dry and hard or wet and squishy. And  If consciousness is 
> required for intelligence and computers don't have it why do we find new 
> tasks every day that computers can do in a smarter way than we can?  
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the result of 
> information (only) processing, then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) 
> reality holds. 




Experience is manifested by information processing. But experience per se is 
not information processing.

Experience per se is the consciousness of all “virgin” universal machine 
“before differentiation”. It is what is true, immediately knowable, non 
doubtable, etc. 

I accumulate evidence that the more we have information processing ability, the 
less we are conscious. A brain filter consciousness, only. I agree this is 
counter-intuitive. I do not use this in my papers, note. But that simplifies 
the theology a lot, and physics too.

We cannot identify first person notion with third person notion. A subtlety is 
that physics is, eventually, shown to be first person plural, and not third 
person as usually believed today.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 3:36:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Nov 2018, at 15:02, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 2, 2018 at 3:45:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1 Nov 2018, at 19:43, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 2:27 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> infinite time Turing machines are more powerful than ordinary Turing 
>>> machines*
>>
>>
>> That is true, it is also true that if dragons existed they would be 
>> dangerous and if I had some cream I could have strawberries and cream, if I 
>> had some strawberries.   
>>
>> *> How  "real" you think this is depends on whether you are a Platonist 
>>> or a fictionalist.*
>>>
>>
>> No, it depends on if you think logical contradictions can exist, if they 
>> can then there is no point in reading any mathematical proof and logic is 
>> no longer a useful tool for anything.
>>
>>
>>
>> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on this. 
>> But an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.
>>
>> Now, such machine have only be introduced (by Turing) to show that even 
>> such “Turing machine with magical power making them able to solve the 
>> halting problem” are still limited and cannot solve, for example the 
>> totality problem (also an arithmetical). 
>>
>> Turing showed that there is a hierarchy of problem in arithmetic, where 
>> adding magic (his “oracle”) never make any machine complete. It is a way to 
>> show how complex the arithmetical reality is. Adding more and more magical 
>> power does not lead to completeness. 
>>
>> Post and Kleene have related such hierarchies with the number of 
>> alternating quantifiers used in the arithmetical expression. P is a sigma_0 
>> = pi_0 formula, without quantifier.
>>
>> ExP(x, y). Sigma_1 (negation = AxP(x,y) = Pi_1, more complex than 
>> sigma_1, already not computable).
>> ExAyP(x, y, z)  = Sigma_2 (beyond today’s math!) (negation = Pi_2).
>> Etc. 
>>
>> More and more “infinite task” are needed.
>>
>> Note that such magic does not change the “theology”. It remains the same 
>> variants of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay self-reference logics (G and G*).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> There are other "Turing machine" models other than infinite-time ones 
> people have "invented", e.g.* inductive* Turing machines:
>
> *Algorithmic complexity as a criterion of unsolvability*
>
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cd8f/442a9f7667891fff6f276a1bc638dd59b937.pdf
>  
> :
>
> Let us take an *inductive Turing machine M *that given a description of 
> the Turing machine T and first n + 1 words x0, x1, . . . , xn from the list 
> x0, x1, . . . , xn, . . ., produces the (n + 1)th partial output. This 
> output is equal to 1 when the machine T halts for all words x0, x1, . . . , 
> xn given as its input, and is equal to 0 when the machine T does not halt 
> for, at least, one of these words. In such a way, *the machine M solves 
> the totality problem for Turing machines*.
>
> ?
>
>
> cf.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Super-recursive_algorithm#Inductive_Turing_machines
> https://bitrumagora.wordpress.com/about/marl-burgin/
>
>
> *Nothing is settled in computing.*
>
>
>
> But this does not clearly violate Church-Thesis. Inference inductive is 
> not the same as computing. We know that there are many different Turing 
> machine, which are not equivalent for proving or inducting, etc. All humans 
> are like that. We are still the same *as* Turing machine (combinators, 
> etc.). Universality is with respect to computing, and is false with 
> everything else. Now, if you add magical, or actual infinities, or oracles, 
> or infinite speed, then you get machine which are no more digital finite 
> machine, and so cannot violate the Church-Turing thesis either. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


>From all the super-Turing math and CS news (I've followed over the years), 
there seems to be a consensus forming:


 *There are no super-Turing computers!* (that can be found in nature or 
manufactured by us)


cf. 
https://phys.org/news/2015-09-limit-church-turing-thesis-accounts-noisy.html 

The only ones are *fictional* ones (the infinite-time and  super-recursive 
ones above).

So that seems to be the consensus.


But I claim an experience-processing computer (like our brain) is not 
super-Turing, but is non-Turing: All *information* it can process is 
Turing-computable, but it also processes *experience*.


- pt



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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Nov 2018, at 17:47, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2018 at 12:16 AM  > wrote:
> 
> > You sound like a young fool who has no respect for his elders. 
> 
> And you sound like a old fool who has placed so much respect for his elders 
> it approaches the level of ancestor worship. But It's not just you, this 
> entire list's reverence for the ancient Greeks has reached comic proportions.


But you are the one still unable to criticise Aristotle metaphysics. 

There two huge different way to consider Reality: Plato’s conception, and 
Aristotle’s one.

To make thing short, Aristotle’s believe only in what he can see touch, etc. 
And Plato suggests that what we see is only the shadow, or a symptom of some 
deeper, non physical, reality.

To abstract from Plato, consists in (unconscious?) reverence to Aristotle. 

Bruno




> 
>  > Zeno pointed out something significant
> 
> When Zeno  pointed it out it was a significant puzzle with no obvious answer, 
> but in the last 2500 years we've learned a thing or two and an answer has 
> been found so it is no longer a paradox.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Nov 2018, at 18:06, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2018 at 4:45 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on this. But 
> > an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.
> 
> If such a oracle could exist

In what sense? I guess you mean in the physical sense. 



> then logical contradictions could too


That does not follow. I don’t think that there are any evidence for such oracle 
in nature, but such existence would not introduce any contradiction.

Bruno




> and then there would be no point in listening to your arguments or anybody's 
> logical argument about anything because mathematics and even logic itself 
> would be purest form of nonsense. 
> 
> > Note that such magic does not change the “theology” [...]
> 
> Sorry, I don't know what you said after that, I fell asleep.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Nov 2018, at 15:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, November 2, 2018 at 3:45:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Nov 2018, at 19:43, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 2:27 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> > infinite time Turing machines are more powerful than ordinary Turing 
>> > machines
>> 
>> That is true, it is also true that if dragons existed they would be 
>> dangerous and if I had some cream I could have strawberries and cream, if I 
>> had some strawberries.   
>> 
>> > How  "real" you think this is depends on whether you are a Platonist or a 
>> > fictionalist.
>> 
>> No, it depends on if you think logical contradictions can exist, if they can 
>> then there is no point in reading any mathematical proof and logic is no 
>> longer a useful tool for anything.
>> 
> 
> 
> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on this. But 
> an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.
> 
> Now, such machine have only be introduced (by Turing) to show that even such 
> “Turing machine with magical power making them able to solve the halting 
> problem” are still limited and cannot solve, for example the totality problem 
> (also an arithmetical). 
> 
> Turing showed that there is a hierarchy of problem in arithmetic, where 
> adding magic (his “oracle”) never make any machine complete. It is a way to 
> show how complex the arithmetical reality is. Adding more and more magical 
> power does not lead to completeness. 
> 
> Post and Kleene have related such hierarchies with the number of alternating 
> quantifiers used in the arithmetical expression. P is a sigma_0 = pi_0 
> formula, without quantifier.
> 
> ExP(x, y). Sigma_1 (negation = AxP(x,y) = Pi_1, more complex than sigma_1, 
> already not computable).
> ExAyP(x, y, z)  = Sigma_2 (beyond today’s math!) (negation = Pi_2).
> Etc. 
> 
> More and more “infinite task” are needed.
> 
> Note that such magic does not change the “theology”. It remains the same 
> variants of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay self-reference logics (G and G*).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There are other "Turing machine" models other than infinite-time ones people 
> have "invented", e.g. inductive Turing machines:
> 
> Algorithmic complexity as a criterion of unsolvability
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cd8f/442a9f7667891fff6f276a1bc638dd59b937.pdf
>  :
> 
> Let us take an inductive Turing machine M that given a description of the 
> Turing machine T and first n + 1 words x0, x1, . . . , xn from the list x0, 
> x1, . . . , xn, . . ., produces the (n + 1)th partial output. This output is 
> equal to 1 when the machine T halts for all words x0, x1, . . . , xn given as 
> its input, and is equal to 0 when the machine T does not halt for, at least, 
> one of these words. In such a way, the machine M solves the totality problem 
> for Turing machines.
> 
> ?
> 
> 
> cf.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Super-recursive_algorithm#Inductive_Turing_machines
> https://bitrumagora.wordpress.com/about/marl-burgin/
> 
> 
> Nothing is settled in computing.


But this does not clearly violate Church-Thesis. Inference inductive is not the 
same as computing. We know that there are many different Turing machine, which 
are not equivalent for proving or inducting, etc. All humans are like that. We 
are still the same *as* Turing machine (combinators, etc.). Universality is 
with respect to computing, and is false with everything else. Now, if you add 
magical, or actual infinities, or oracles, or infinite speed, then you get 
machine which are no more digital finite machine, and so cannot violate the 
Church-Turing thesis either. 

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 6:49:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip Goff) mean 
>> that which you have within yourself right now: the awareness that* [...]
>>
>
> Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness, so when 
> you say  "*It's that experience (not just information) that needs 
> processing to produc**e consciousness" *you're saying that to produce 
> consciousness you must process consciousness. I don't find that very 
> helpful. 
>
>> > I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!
>>
>
> Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.
>
> John K Clark   
>
>  
>

I agree with those scientists who that say something isn't truly 
intelligent unless it is also conscious.

For something to be fully conscious, or self aware, it would want to 
"live". It would not want to be "shut down". When Watson starts screaming, 
"Don't turn me off!", then it might be conscious.

- pt

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Re: Interpretation of Superposition

[Pierz]

On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 7:50:30 AM UTC+11, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 1, 2018 at 11:22:46 PM UTC, Pierz wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 9:40:39 PM UTC+11, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 5:08:42 PM UTC, smitra wrote:

 On 14-10-2018 15:24, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: 
 > In a two state system, such as a qubit, what forces the 
 interpretation 
 > that the system is in both states simultaneously before measurement, 
 > versus the interpretation that we just don't what state it's in 
 before 
 > measurement? Is the latter interpretation equivalent to Einstein 
 > Realism? And if so, is this the interpretation allegedly falsified by 
 > Bell experiments? AG 

 It is indeed inconsistent with QM itself as Bell has shown. Experiments 
 have later demonstrated that the Bell inequalities are violated in 
 precisely the way predicted by QM.  This then rules out local hidden 
 variables, therefore the information about the outcome of a measurement 
 is not already present locally in the environment. 

 Saibal 

>>>
>>> What puzzles me is this; why would the Founders assume that a system in 
>>> a superposition is in all component states simultaneously -- contradicting 
>>> the intuitive appeal of Einstein realism -- when that assumption is not 
>>> used in calculating probabilities (since the component states are 
>>> orthogonal)? AG 
>>>
>>
>> I think because of interference. Consider the paradigmatic double slit, 
>> with the single electron going through it. It sure looks like the electron 
>> was in two place at once, doesn't it?
>>
>
> *Yes, that's my assessment how the erroneous interpretation took hold, but 
> only if you restrict yourself to the particle interpretation. If the 
> electron travels as a wave, it can go through both slits simultaneously and 
> interfere with itself. This is my preferred interpretation; the only one 
> that makes sense. AG*
>

Although as stated I think "being in two states at once" is a manner of 
speaking quasi-classically about non-classical phenomena, it seems you 
still have a very classical imagination of what's going on here, but I have 
my doubts:
1 - You say it makes sense, but I'm not sure that an electron "travelling 
as a wave" but being measured as a particle makes an awful lot more sense! 
2 - Schrödinger initially thought of his equation (the one that applies to 
double slits) as being the equation for a physical wave, as you seem to be 
doing. However he was forced eventually to accept that it was something a 
lot more abstract than that. The statistical interpretation formulated by 
Born superseded any such notion. Interference happens whenever a quantum 
system can reach the same state via more than one history. In the case of 
quantum computers, complex interfering superpositions are constructed in 
which it is impossible to conceive of the "wave function" as literally 
describing some kind of mechanical wave. 

>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "that assumption is not used in calculating 
>> probabilities". 
>>
>
> *If the operator whose eigenvalues are being measured has a well defined 
> mathematical form -- e.g., not like |alive> -- it has specific eigenvectors 
> and eigenvalues, and the state function can be written as superposition of 
> these eigenvectors. It can be shown that eigenvectors with distinct 
> eigenvalues are orthogonal, meaning the Kronecker delta applies to their 
> mutual inner products. Therefore, to calculate the probability of observing 
> a particular eigenvalue, one must take the inner product of the wf with the 
> eigenvector which has that eigenvalue. Due to the orthogonality, all terms 
> drop out except for the term in the superposition which contains the 
> eigenvector whose eigenvalue you want to measure. As you should see, there 
> is nothing in this process of calculating probabilities that in any way 
> implies, assumes, or uses, the concept that the system is simultaneously in 
> ALL component states of the superposition (written as a sum of 
> eigenvectors). AG*
>  
>
Sure, but this relates to measurement *outcomes* not to the question fo 
what state the system is in while not being measured. Clearly the fact that 
the vector spans more than one dimension expresses a state that *in a 
mathematical sense* is a combination of more than one component state. If 
it weren't for interference and entanglement (per Bell), no doubt 
scientists would simply consider this combination of states a measure of 
our ignorance of the underlying reaility (the hidden variables). But those 
three elements of quantum weirdness make it impossible to sustain that view.

If you take a sum-over-histories approach it's explicitly assumed the 
>> electron went via all possible paths.
>>
>
> *I don't know that method, but offhand POSSIBLE PATHS might have nothing 
> to do w