Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King OK if you're satisfied with a vague feeling of agreement among multiple observers. That of course would cause you to see fuzzy or incomplete objects. The Turing Test was suggested to try to wake you up. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 11:37:13 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? Umm, I only assume the barest appearance of interactions. All of this is fully consistent with Leibniz' monadology. Monads have no windows and do not exchange substances. All interactions are only mutual synchronizations of their percepts. The surest test could only be a Turing Test. I am not sure how that is related... Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. Existence must be primitive ontologically, or else how are properties to be extracted from it by perception? There are no knives (or spoons), only phenomena of mutual agreements. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? The surest test could only be a Turing Test. Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/16/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? Umm, I only assume the barest appearance of interactions. All of this is fully consistent with Leibniz' monadology. Monads have no windows and do not exchange substances. All interactions are only mutual synchronizations of their percepts. The surest test could only be a Turing Test. I am not sure how that is related... Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. Existence must be primitive ontologically, or else how are properties to be extracted from it by perception? There are no knives (or spoons), only phenomena of mutual agreements. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/15/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 12:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Dear Roger, OK, but what allows those 'external truths to be knowable? Maybe they are unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? Think about what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds to infinity. Does the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary statement or not? Is it possible for an infinite number of minds to agree on the truth value of more than one sentence? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on _many minds_ in agreement. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society's preferences will exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so easily seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: The moon still exists if I am not looking at it! We always over-value our own individual contribution to the definiteness of properties that we observe in the physical universe. It also might have something to do with theproblem of Free Will http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ and the absurd implications of the Quantum Suicide argument http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Hmmm. Spacetime is xyzt and so extended, 1p is inextended and so not part of that. Thus, contrary to you and Berkeley, 1p and the physical universe do not need each other. xyzt does fine on its own. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:35:50 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Hi Roger, I do not assume a single physical universe that is independent of entities with 1p. I call this idea the Fish bowl model. I see the physical universe as a dream that is the same for many 1p, a literal mass delusion! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Simple. All truths can probably only be known by the One who it seems generated them (not sure). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:43:57 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Dear Roger, OK, but what allows those 'external truths to be knowable? Maybe they are unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? Think about what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds to infinity. Does the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary statement or not? Is it possible for an infinite number of minds to agree on the truth value of more than one sentence? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Thanks for the heads up. We ask that question every four years in the USA-- namely should the popular vote or should the votes from the individual states (the electoral vote) decide who becomes president ? In the first Bush election, Gore won the popular vote but Bush at the last moment narrowly squeezed out the electoral vote and so won at least officially. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:51:48 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it? impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society? preferences will exactly mimic one person? preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so easily seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: The moon still exists if I am not looking at it! We always over-value our own individual contribution to the definiteness of properties that we observe in the physical universe. It also might have something to do with the problem of Free Will and the absurd implications of the Quantum Suicide argument. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society's preferences will exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. Which is why science is successful in reaching agreements. It seeks to persuade people by evidence instead of just aggregating opinions. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/4/2012 7:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Hi Roger, Yes, in our mutual consistency and individually, but we have to start with a 'now' at the 1p for each observer. Every observer perceived itself at the center of its own universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 02 Nov 2012, at 20:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, Why do you consider magic as a potential answer to your question? After thinking about your question while I was waiting to pick up my daughter from school, it occurred to me that we see in the Big Bang model and in almost all cosmogenesis myths before it, an attempt to answer your question. Do you believe that properties are innate in objects? The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. If so, how do you propose the dependency on measurement, to 'make definite' the properties of objects that we see in quantum theory, works? QM is not part of the theory. My pathetic claim is that properties emerge from a 'subtractive process' (hat tip to Craig) between observers and that the One (totality of what exists) has all possible properties simultaneously (hat tip to Russell Standish). ? I have never understood what aspects of QM theory are derivable from COMP. Then study UDA. You must understand that the *whole* of physics is derivable, not from comp, but from elemntary arithmetic only. This is what is proved from comp. Ask question if you have a problem with any step. Do you have any result that show the general non-commutativity between observables of QM, Yes. That is testable in the Z1* comp quantum logic. It has not yet been completely justified, as the statement involve too many nesting of modal operator to be currently tractable. or do you just show that the linear algebraic structure of observables (as we see in Hilbert spaces) can be derived from 1p indeterminacy? Both. The linear properties and the general non-commutativity properties of operators (representing physical observables) are not the same thing... Of course. But the whole physics is given by the first order extension of the Z and X logic. This is necessary if we assume comp and the classical theory of knowledge (S4). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's/monads/---which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object/has to/possess and those that it possesses/throughout its existence/coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce...And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways...the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is...a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Hi, This paper might be interesting to any one that would like to see a nice discussion of who it is that we come to understand numbers: http://web.media.mit.edu/~stefanm/society/som_final.html http://web.media.mit.edu/%7Estefanm/society/som_final.html -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads—which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce…And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways…the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is…a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:17:58 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads?hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce?nd he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways?he result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is? substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Those are psychological versions of numbers etc,. The innate properties are arithmetical. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:20:37 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Hi, This paper might be interesting to any one that would like to see a nice discussion of who it is that we come to understand numbers: http://web.media.mit.edu/~stefanm/society/som_final.html -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen, ' Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 08:22:27 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads?hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce?nd he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways?he result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is? substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on _many minds_ in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Hi Roger, I do not assume a single physical universe that is independent of entities with 1p. I call this idea the Fish bowl model. I see the physical universe as a dream that is the same for many 1p, a literal mass delusion! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, Why do you consider magic as a potential answer to your question? After thinking about your question while I was waiting to pick up my daughter from school, it occurred to me that we see in the Big Bang model and in almost all cosmogenesis myths https://www.google.com/#hl=ensugexp=les%3Bgs_nf=3tok=1XoTsmBbCpme0mnC57FQ9Qcp=18gs_id=3xhr=tq=cosmogenesis+mythspf=poutput=searchsclient=psy-aboq=cosmogenesis+mythsgs_l=pbx=1bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.fp=41b2cca49596839ebpcl=37189454biw=1527bih=812 before it, an attempt to answer your question. Do you believe that properties are innate in objects? If so, how do you propose the dependency on measurement, to 'make definite' the properties of objects that we see in quantum theory, works? My pathetic claim is that properties emerge from a 'subtractive process' (hat tip to Craig) between observers and that the One (totality of what exists) has all possible properties simultaneously (hat tip to Russell Standish). I have never understood what aspects of QM theory are derivable from COMP. Do you have any result that show the general non-commutativity between observables of QM, or do you just show that the linear algebraic structure of observables (as we see in Hilbert spaces) can be derived from 1p indeterminacy? The linear properties and the general non-commutativity properties of operators (representing physical observables) are not the same thing... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.