Re: Artificial Philosophizing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [...] Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Given that we believe in sense? Who/what gives that? Do we believe in that? Georges.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Norman Samish wrote: > > Thanks to all who replied to my question. This question has > bothered me for years, and I have hopes that some progress can > be made towards an answer. > > I've heard some interesting concepts, including: > (1) "Numbers must exist, therefore 'something' must exist." > (2) "Something exists because Nothingness cannot non-Exist." > > Perhaps the above two are equivalent. > > With respect to (1) above, why must numbers exist? I am not sure that any definitive answer can be given to this question. A possible argument is that the existence of numbers by themselves is much easier to accept than the existence of "usual material things" in a classical sense. Of course, even if it was really a weakest assumption, it is not granted. The idea behind "numbers must exist" is that "God Himself cannot make that two plus two equates something different of four". Another way to say it is that "even if there were nothing (or no thing) there would remain that whenever/wherever there would be something in which natural numbers could be thought of, the Fermat conjecture should be true". If natural numbers did not exist, this necessity would immediately apply to them whenever and wherever they appear. I would say that the set of such necessities is not different from natural numbers themselves. Of course, it is too strong to claim that natural numbers exist individually and one independently of another. The arguement is that "arithmetics" as a whole exists by itself (and as something). > With respect to (2) above, why can't "nothingness" exist? > The trivial answer is that even "nothing" is "something." > However, I don't think that this addresses the real question. > > A state of pure "NO THING" would forbid even the existence > of numbers, Yes. It should even forbid the existence of a "Fermat theorem constraint" and it is hard to imagine (at leat for me) that such a constraint could not exist. So it is not so puzzling (at least to me) that something exist. > or of empty space, or of an empty set. It would > be non-existence. > > Non-existence seems so much simpler than the infinity of > things, both material and immaterial, that surrounds us. "Material and immaterial things that surround us" most probably only appear so to us. To explain the existence of something could also be a too strong (and unachievable) requirement. Only the perception of the existence of something requires an explanation. > So why are things here? (I'm grateful that they are, of course.) > > Is this a self-consistent, if unanswerable, question? Like "Who created the world?", this formulation involves possibly unnecessary and misleading prejudices. At least: the existence of "thing*s*" and the existence of an "here". Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > Georges, your post is "on the level", I am not > I am still in common sense with my feeble > thinking-tool. Sorry, I am not a native english speaker, I don't understand what "on the level" can mean (and especially with quotes). In don't understand either what you mean by "". I think I have the same kind of feeble thinking tool as you have. However I am not sure that common sense is of much help for questions like "why is there something?". Rather it is likely that it would confuse us on such topics. It simply did not evolved for that. Our common sense is more a handicap than a good guide to understand quantum mechanics. The situation is even worse here. My common sense also says that to me. Of course, it does not follows that nothing (or everythng) makes sense. > Which leaves me with a question - please see inserted. > (I erase the rest of the lengthu discussion) > > --- Georges Quenot <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> John M a écrit : >>> Bruno wrote: >>> >>> "What can be said about numbers is that it is >>> impossible to explain what numbers are to someone who >>> does not already knows what they are..." >>> >>> >>> >>> *SKIP >>> As I said above: "what numbers do". >>> Well, what DO numbers do? -- -THEY DO NOTHING. - - >>> - This is my fundamental objection to the 'hard' >>> number theory making numbers (and their manipulations) >>> the basis of them all (I don't dare: nature, world, >>> existence, etc. as very loaded words over here). >>> Numbers do NOT add, subtract, etc., WE do it to (by, >>> with) them. Humans, Loebian machines, whatever, but >>> NOT the numbers. > SKIP >>> If there 'are' only numbers - it stays only numbers. >>> That may be a neat world, but without us thinking >>> about it. Do I miss the numberculus (I don't say: >>> himunculus) >>> DOING the operations. >> >> Who said that numbers do (or have to do or could do) anything? >> I am not sure Bruno did and I did not. I only suggested that >> natural numbers might have to exist and their existence might >> be enough to explain the existence of everything else. This >> is very different. > > So the numbers are only 'there' to explain the > existence of everything else. I would not say that. I don't believe that numbers are "there" for any purpose. They just are there (or exist). But their existence might be all that we need to explain the (perceived) existence of everything else. > What else must be there to provide such existence - We come here to the hard part of the story. My point is that nothing else needs to be there to provide such existence (this is a speculation indeed). I will try to keep it simple. Let's assume that numbers exist (this is a speculation at that point), not only natural numbers but also real numbers, Hilbert spaces and all the "higher level objects" that "comes with". Let's also consider the possibility that the universe in which we live strictly follows some "mathematical rules" and that it is completely determined by them (this is another speculation). This is equivalent to say that this universe is isomorphic to one of the above mentionned "higher level objects". The last and hard point is that, from a mathematical point of view, all the objects that are isomorphic one to another are the same mathematical object (just as there is only one set of natural numbers, no matter how is is built) and, if the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object, it could just be this mathematical object. Let's consider an outrageously simplified view of the universe as particles interacting with each others according to a set of mathematical laws. The mathematical structure of the universe is likely to be much more complex than that but the following might still be correct when applied to a more complex structure. The problem with the idea that the universe could simply be a mathematical object is that our common sense strongly suggest that a physical universe has to be different from a mathematical object because there is to be "something in the particles" to "make them real". We think that particles needs to have a mass, an electric charge, ... But do they follows mathematical rules thanks to these properties or do these properties appear as such because they actually follows such rules? Since the behavior of particles is determined by the mathematical rules, what difference can make what they actually are made of? And do they need to be made of something? Whatever they would be made of would have no impact at all on what we see and feel as soon as they follow the mathematical rules. All their properties would be defined in the same way from these rules and only from these rules and what they are made of wouldn't have any effect at all. The "substance" of the particles could very well come from the rule and only from them. We feel such a substance but it might come from the rules and only from them. Once we have started thinking according to this point of view, the charge of proof ca
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > Georges: please, have merci on me! 'my' English is > the 5th of my acquired languages, so to read - and > realize what it stands for - that long a post is > (almost) beyond my mental endurance. I understand that but the point is highly unusual and unintuitive and I felt that a "critical mass" was necessary for it to make is way. > I try to pick some of your remarks as non-conform to > how I feel. Consider please the rest as agreed. (At > least for now - ha ha - which means the I wrote, a > usual WEB-abbreviation for . Sorry, I dont even know . > Thanks for taking so much time to respond. It helps me too to formalize things and indentify weaknesses and limitations. Thank to ypou too. >> [...] >> I think I have the same kind of feeble thinking tool >> as you have. However I am not sure that common sense >> is of much help for questions like "why is there >> something?". Rather it is likely that it would > confuse >us on such topics. It simply did not evolved > for that. >Our common sense is more a handicap than a > good guide >to understand quantum mechanics. The > situation is even >worse here. My common sense also > says that to me. Of >course it does not follows that > nothing (or everythng) >makes sense. Strange hashing of text here. ? > QM is not for me: it is a linear way to perpetrate the > reductionist model of physical sciences in ways not > too approachable for common sense - as you said. > Q-science: IMO (=in my opinion) an extension of the > QM-nightmare. Yes. But this is not only QM as a human mind activity. It really seems that the world in which we live is just like that (Who can be cruel enough to design a world like that and have sensible creatures living into it?). Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading it for him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. > A physicist once retorted: "I can live with paradoxes" > well, I cannot. I rather rely on MY common sense, even > if it is "not on the level". You are free to rely on whatever you want. However, it seems that we have no choice about the world we live in. >> [...] >> I would not say that. I don't believe that numbers >> are "there" for any purpose. They just are there (or >> exist). But their existence might be all that we >> need to explain the (perceived) existence of >> everything else. > > Right you are: not the 'numbers' are there for any > purpose, we use the idea of numbers in our logic for > explanations substituting paradoxes with other ones. > My question: "Are they (numbers) really there?" 0r > they only exist in our sophistication and usage? > [...] > Of course they exist: we invented them so they exist. I would say that we discovered them. The argument (a weak one I concede) is that we did not have so much freedom while doing so. We find and proved that the Fermat's conjecture was true and we *could not* find that is was false. This constraint is intemporal and it exists whether there are men or not and even whether there is something or not (but there cannot be nothing because there is least this constraint). The set of such constraints is likely to include or define that natural numbers themselves. >> not only natural numbers but also real numbers, >> Hilbert spaces and all the "higher level objects" >> that "comes with". > > As you said above: "this is speculation indeed". Indeed, I identified at least four speculations on which the explanation rely upon. I don't see for any of them any way to rationally make an opinion. I did not find for any of them any decisive argument for or against and I can't even imagine on what such an argument could rely upon (indeed, common sense is excluded). Furthermore, it happens that many people sharing the same biology and even the same culture have very different opinions about them. >> Let's also consider the possibility that the >> universe in which we live strictly follows some >> "mathematical rules" and that it is completely >> determined by them (this is another speculation). > > I don't think this is attributable to English: in all > languages people speak in reverse: The universe (or > whatever Bruno may call it) does not FOLLOW any rules > that humans derive from their ways of thinking - > explaining the (easily misunderstood) observations. We > observe, evaluate (right or wrong) and deduct "rules" > (again right or wrong). As long as they do not bounce > into contradiction, we pride ourselves by "nature is > following our rules". When the tachyons showed higher > speed than 'c' the verdict was "wrong observation", > not a speed exceeding Einstein's assumed limit for > nature. This is a speculation. It might be that the universe in which we live is completely ruled by mathematical laws. Indeed one c
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > Unfortunately my mailbox did not take more and wrote: > == message truncated === Here follows a copy of the remainder: ... Last but not least: this view has the advantage that we no longer have to wonder how it comes that particles follows the rules, how can a particle influence another particle and so on. The situation reversed here too. There is no more necessary magic involved. This is the last but one speculation. The last one is that our thinking and consciousness emerge from the operation of matter (that particles are empty or not). This one is more common even if not widely accepted. It might be the more puzzling one. What can be said about it is that what needs to be explained is not physical existence but the perception of a physical existence. This is (much) weaker and comes quite easily from the combination of all the previously mentionned speculations. Indeed what we perceive comes from the "structures" occuring from the applications of the rules and the same rules simply makes what we perceive appear as a physical reality. Finally, Stephen Hawking compeletely missed the point by asking "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?". He fooled himself just as if he asked "Who created the world?". Common sense can be very hard to escape to. There is no need for anything/anybody to breathe fire into the equations: the fire *is* in the equations. > > which then you want to assign to the numbers? I do not understand what you mean here. > > What I really asked: WHAT is the operator? without one > > the numbers just 'sit there as numbers. Not soo sure. The natural numbers jsut sit there bu so do also the addition and multiplication as operators from NxN into N. So do also the Hilbert space with all the operations that makes it an Hilbert space. > > Numbers do not > > "decide" to add up or else themselves into complex > > constructs (including 'ourselves') Do they? Indeed they do not but who said they did or the needed to? The addition operator may just sit there with the natural numbers. The couple that contains the second and the first also just sit there as a semi-group and so on. Nobody has to do any operation for that. All the complex constructs just sit there. The fact that we perceive them as constructs is related to the way we think of them. We ca exhibit some relations between them that appear to us as construction processes but that does not mean that they need us to just sit there all together. >> >> SKIP > > I feel that gap here: >> >> Finally, it might be that one of the (possibly very) complex >> >> objects in this world of numbers just happens to host us and >> >> all that we see. > > >> >> But do we need to actually believe in any of these >> >> speculations? > > > > I feel we have a discussion here. Do we just speculate > > to entertain ourselves with unbelieved ideas, or some > > of us take it seriously to speak about 'real' ideas? I asked the question but I did not intend to suggest that the answer should be "no". I find the above mentionned speculations and the developments above them quite entertaining. I am not sure that I am really willing to believe into them but currently I did not find any better alternative. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > [...] > === message truncated === If for some reason you receive the message truncated in your mail tool, you can probably get the full texte from the site: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > Georges, > this is to your reflections to my remarks. It starts > to look like a private discussion on-list, Not completely. And some may also follow the discussion an find it interesting even if they do not participate (as I often do for other threads). > but I love it. So do I. > We are not on 'opposite' sides, just think > differently. > Or just express ourselves differently. - Does such a distinction really make sense ? > [...] > [Reductionist thinking is the way the human mind CAN > function at our present level. To select portions of > the wholeness as our 'topics' and regard them > separately. Where I turn negative about it is the > habit of science (and other human thinking as well) to > draw universal conclusions from details learned within > such models - extending it to the domains BEYOND such > model. > That is eg. how geocentric 'findings' were extended > into the stellar movements in Ptolemistic views, or > bio-physiologic 'findings' are substituted for mental > events and their ORIGINATION. Or the physicalization > of nonphysical sciences. Etc. > I find reductionist exploration/science successful in > learning about the 'world' for constructing > technology. > Theoretically, however, I like to 'TRY' to consider > the "wholeness" (which I do not identify as TOE or > Hal's everything. I simply cannot identify it as of > today, which does not induce me to accept an > identification I disagree with. Like: omnipotens > math.] I agree with Bruno that reductionism is not equivalent to the idea that our universe has a mathematical structure or is (isomorphic to) a mathematical object. I do not try to promote reductionism and have no interest in that. The view I presented (and that I am not selling either) is quite strongly related to the approach however because it reduces phenomenology to biology, biology to chemistry, chemistry to physics, physics to mathematics and finaly, mathematics to necessity. Indeed this is speculation or conjecture at every level. I say that this is a possible way of thinking and just that: a *possible* way. I do not intend to exclude any other ways of thinking even if I do not feel able to understand them. I do not feel it very satisfactory from many respects (including social). I did not find any better way but that does not mean to me that this is the right one and even a good one. I am still agnostic form this point of view. Fortunately my everyday life does not depend at all on what should be the issue. >> [...] >> You are free to rely on whatever you want. However, it >> seems that we have no choice about the world we live in. >> > [Of course we have: you choose one eplanatory way I > another. We both assume and hypothesize. Speculate. > Then the bullies argue that only THEIR ideas are true. > What do they do: select a (reductionist) model of ways > to think (like: mathematical ways) and stone those who > like another way better. ] We may have some choice about the way we think the world (not so much however as I see things) but I meant that we have no choice about how this world actually is. [...] > (((GQ))): >> I would say that we discovered them. The argument (a >> weak one I concede) is that we did not have so much >> freedom while doing so. We find and proved that the >> Fermat's conjecture was true and we *could not* find >> that is was false. This constraint is intemporal and >> it exists whether there are men or not and even >> whether there is something or not (but there cannot >> be nothing because there is least this constraint). >> The set of such constraints is likely to include or >> define that natural numbers themselves. > > [Good game with our 'discovery'. WE paly it according > to the level we can think in. I consider that there > are other levels, too, different from OUR mathematical > logic because the totality is unrestricted. So we may > have an explanation WITHIN math, but there MAY BE (in > Hal's "all possible cases") other types as well and if > we close our minds before 'other ways', we incarcerate > ourselves into our today's stupidity. There might be, yes. > Don't ask me about those "other ways": I am not (YET? > ) omniscient. Not even an idea about how such speculation could help? >> (((GQ))): not only natural numbers but also real numbers, Hilbert spaces and all the "higher level objects" that "comes with". >>> As you said above: "this is speculation indeed". > > [Hilbert spaces make me genuflect. Did not Hilbert > himself revoke his teachings when he became old?] I did not heard about this revokation. What I was taught about them made sense to me. >> (((GQ))): >> Indeed, I identified at least four speculations on >> which the explanation rely upon. I don't see for >> any of them any way to rationally make an opinion. >> I did not find for any of them any decisive argument >> for or against and I can't even imagine on what such >> an argument could rely upon (indeed, common
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > >> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects >> exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only >> isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed >> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. > > I thought I was understanding your last comments on my post, i.e: > http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/ > and I was preparing some comment, which can't make sense with > your present remark to Peter D Jones. Eeh... Who are you replying to exactly? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object >> real and others abstract... > > A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient > to explain the world. QED. This looks *very* similar to; ]] What properties of the mind/brain would render only one (type of) ]] material object conscious and others not... ] ] A non-material property. Hence matter alone is not sufficient ] to explain the mind. QED. Georges --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quenot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: > - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise it is nonsense. >>> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects >>> exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only >>> isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed >>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. >> That is the question. >> >> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the >> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what >> I called a dualist view. > > Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. > Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical > realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". It postulates "material substance" just as classical dualism postulates a "spiritual substance" (and just as once vitalism postulated a "living substance"). Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common sense that no longer appears to be consensual. >> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that >> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse >> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends >> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while >> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed >> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." > > Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you > ever seen the number 3? Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? :-) You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does not (completely) appear as such to everybody. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Norman Samish wrote:
>
>>> Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
>>> it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always there,"
>>> and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other
>>> possibilities?
>> I think there is another possibility. I tried to explain it
>> in my exchanges with John. It relies on several speculations
>> or conjectures:
>>
>> - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were
>>(or: are, intemporal) always there"),
>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>> - Perception of existence is an internal property of the
>>multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity),
>
> Given your commitment below, you also need to suppose
> that perception is an internal property of maths.
This logically comes with, yes. If consciousness is reduced
(via biology and chemistry) to physics (monism 1) and physics
is reduced to mathematics (monism 2), indeed consciousness
is reduced to mathematics.
>> - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the
>>same ("there is no need that something special be inside
>>particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless
>>dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations").
>
> That can only be the case if the multiverse is isomporphic to
> *every* mathematical object and not just one.
Yes. The basic idea is that there is no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence. And this is
indeed not specific to any particular mathematical object.
> If it is only
> isomorphic to some mathematical objects, that *is* the difference
> between physical and mathematical existence.
No. The idea is that *every* class of objects isomorph one
to each other also have physical existence. Some have
perception as an internal property and some have not (this
does not need to be binary nor even one-dimensional).
>> Some details and some (weak) arguments can be found in my
>> recent posts to this group. Some papers from Max Tegmark
>> are also relevant:
>>
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe_frames.html
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.pdf
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf
>>
>> Georges.
> [...]
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
[...]
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>>> What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical
>>> object, but still is describable by a mathematical object.
>> No. I mean that there is a one to one correspondance between
>> the "components" of the multiverse and those of a particular
>> mathematical object and that this correspondance also maps the
>> "internal structures" of the multiverse with those of this
>> mathematical object. "Components" and "internal structures"
>> should not be understood here as atoms or people or the like
>> but only "at the most primitive level".
>
> That is the standard meaning of isomorphic.
Yes. I explained it because this did not seem consistent
with what Bruno said.
> And if A isomorphic
> to B, that does not mean that A is the same thing as B or
> even the same kind of thing.
Yes and no. For instance, natural numbers as seen as a
subset of real numbers may be considered as different
to "basic" natural numbers (for instance, considering
the way real numbers are "built" from natural numbers).
But as long as only the properties of natural numbers
are considered they cannot be distinguished (and one
could even "build" a new set of real numbers from them
and that set would be the set of real numbers as long
as the properties of real numbers wil be considered).
Many sets of natural numbers (and of real numbers) can
be thought of but what "really are" natural numbers
or (real numbers) has nothing to do with the details
that could make them appear different. These details
are completely irrelevant to (and have no effect at all
on) the way they "behave" as natural numbers. In order
to identify or exhibit any difference between the
elements of the class, we need to look at properties
that are not shared in the class. Now, if we consider
the universe/multiverse as a part of such a class, we
would also have to look at properties outside of the
class. But no such properties can be accessed from the
inside of the universe. All we can access to from the
inside of the universe is the shared properties of the
elements in the class. In other words: if there was
anything special inside the particle that would make
them "real", not only we would not have any access to
it but whatever that might be and whatever there is
actually something or not will not make any difference
on the way we see these particle behave (including
their mass, charge, interaction rules, ...).
Finally, what makes differences between the different
versions of the sets of natural numbers is not only
accidental and neutral from the point of view of the
structur
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: > >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Georges Quenot wrote: >>> >>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the >>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what >>>> I called a dualist view. >>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. >>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical >>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. >> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". > > No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all. Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to force you to believe or consider something you are not willing to believe or consider. The question is not whether they are real things or not. It is whether they are things or not. Once they are things, you have to decide how many types of things there must be. You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not nothing*. Just tell me: do you consider "natural numbers" as something, as nothing, as "something" that would neither be something nor nothing, or as "anything else" (please explain)? Please answer without considering whether they are "real" or not, just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can discuss *which type of* "thing" (or whatever) they might be. > There is only > one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things. You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical? Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of (or identical to) which? How do you define any of them? >> It postulates "material substance" > > yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism. No, this is "material substance" besides "abstract objetcs". You do split things between "material" and "immaterial". >> just as classical dualism >> postulates a "spiritual substance" > > as well as a material substance. Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial (abstract) ones. >> (and just as once vitalism >> postulated a "living substance"). >> >> Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean >> bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common >> sense that no longer appears to be consensual. > > I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes > that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real. Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to "real". I guarantee you that there are people (including me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not to say that something must be wrong either way, only that several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist). >>>> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that >>>> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse >>>> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends >>>> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while >>>> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed >>>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." >>> Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you >>> ever seen the number 3? >> Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? > > They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation. This might be more complicated. Looking at "them" can significantly change them. They might also be an abstraction. They can hardly be "objects" in the common sense of the word. >> Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? >> :-) > >> You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does >> not (completely) appear as such to everybody. > > The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of > consciousness, causality and time. Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for thousands of years an account of how living beings can have appeared in an inert world and though the account is now about a century and a half old it still did not make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not the majority). I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how consciousness can arise in living beings. This might take a few centuries to come. What is astounding is that it could emerge just through matter activity. Going from matter to consciousness is the hardest part for me. Once given, going from mathematics to phys
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is > mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) adopt it either. But can you make a difference between adopting it and being able to consider that it might make sense (whether it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections in a context in which it would be conjectured as true? > [...] Maps are isomorphic to > territories, but are not territories. Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type of map but maps anyway. Identity is just an isomorphism among possibly many others. The territory can be the map and indeed vice versa. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > [...] > Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU. Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned. I probably missed your point. > [...] > By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things > into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under > commis, now 3+ in the (hypocritical) US 'free' speach! Well. OK Again. But what was your point then? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is >>> mathematical, >> I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that >> you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to >> respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) >> adopt it either. >> >> But can you make a difference between adopting it and >> being able to consider that it might make sense (whether >> it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections >> in a context in which it would be conjectured as true? > > I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense OK. Just consider that it does make sense to some people. > (to be precise it > is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical > objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that > they all do).. I do not see how it can be inconsistent with observation. >>> [...] Maps are isomorphic to >>> territories, but are not territories. >> Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type >> of map but maps anyway. > > err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a map of a farm. > >> Identity is just an isomorphism >> among possibly many others. > > All identity relations are isomorphisms as well. > Not all isomporhisms are identity relations. > >> The territory can be the map >> and indeed vice versa. > > You can't fold up the farm and put it in your pocket. You're right. I can't. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>>>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is >>>>> mathematical, >>>> I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that >>>> you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to >>>> respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) >>>> adopt it either. >>>> >>>> But can you make a difference between adopting it and >>>> being able to consider that it might make sense (whether >>>> it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections >>>> in a context in which it would be conjectured as true? >>> I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense >> OK. Just consider that it does make sense to some people. >> >>> (to be precise it >>> is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical >>> objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that >>> they all do).. >> I do not see how it can be inconsistent with observation. > > If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical > structures consisting of a counterpart of me plus a "Harry > Potter" universe exist. Yet this is not observed. Of course > that might be coincidence. I see at least three possibilities: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" includes a counterpart of you. 2. There may well exist a "Harry Potter universe" that includes a counterpart of you but it is not causaly related to our universe (too far for instance) and this is why we cannot observe it. 3. You actually are in a "Harry Potter universe" but it just happened that you are not a sorcerer and you must know that in "Harry Potter universes", non sorcerers are prevented fromm observing magical events. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: > > 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of > equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" includes > a counterpart of you. I meant: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including a counterpart of you would be a solution. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>> >>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>>>> Georges Quenot wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the >>>>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what >>>>>> I called a dualist view. >>>>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. >>>>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical >>>>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. >>>> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". >>> No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all. >> Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to >> force you to believe or consider something you are not >> willing to believe or consider. >> >> The question is not whether they are real things or not. >> It is whether they are things or not. > > [...] Thanks for your answers. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> >> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of >>equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including >>a counterpart of you would be a solution. > > 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some > very long number Unlike some others I did not introduce representations. One cannot represent "any configuration of material bodies" by a number with an infinite precision however long the number. As some mentioned also, you would need a (de)coding scheme. My 2. and 3. remain anyway. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>>> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object >>>> real and others abstract... >>> A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient >>> to explain the world. QED. > > This has to be a non-mathematical property because it is contingent, > and all mathematical > truth is necessary. > >> This looks *very* similar to; >> >> ]] What properties of the mind/brain would render only one (type of) >> ]] material object conscious and others not... >> ] >> ] A non-material property. Hence matter alone is not sufficient >> ] to explain the mind. QED. > > That is assumed arbitrarily. I see. So from you viewpoint the distinction between physics and mathematics appears as natural and the distinction between mind and mattter appears as arbitrary while from my viewpoint both appear equally natural (if I refer to common sense) and equally arbitrary (if I refer to Ockam's razor). Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit : > *If* comp is true. I am not sure of that. >>> Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some >>> neat "etalon philosophy" to compare with other theories. The advantage >>> of comp (which I recall includes Church thesis) is that, at least, >>> many >>> fundamental questions can be addressed. >> Which one for instance (that is not addressed in the view of >> the universe/multiverse as a mathematical object)? > > The relation between first and third person concepts. Comp allows (at > least) and actually necessitates the use of theoretical computer > science(s). It is a mine of interesting results. My work exploits many > of them for the translation of the UD Argument in the language of the > universal machine. Actually it is one of them, Godel's theorem, which > convinces me of the possibility of the enterprise. I am sorry. I don't see. What Comp can say about the relation between first and third person concepts that could not be said in a "simple" "mathematical-monism" context? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>>> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of >>>>equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including >>>>a counterpart of you would be a solution. >>> 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some >>> very long number >> Unlike some others I did not introduce representations. >> >> One cannot represent "any configuration of material bodies" >> by a number with an infinite precision however long the number. >> As some mentioned also, you would need a (de)coding scheme. > > If numbers don't represent material, then somehow they mus *be* > material bodies. In a mathematical-monist view, yes. But everything is in the "somehow" (maybe also in what you mean by "numbers"). You should not think of a greedy correspondence. > And if they can't do either, Mathematical Monism fails. And if > they can, you have the Harry Potter problem. What it might mean that "they can (or can't)" could be more subtle than you imagine. From *my* viewpoint there is no problem in either case. > Unless only one > mathemical object is instantiated. But that isn't monism. Indeed. And monism is not that all are instantiated (that would just be a different dualism), it is that instanciation is meaningless. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: > >> My 2. and 3. remain anyway. >> >> Georges. > > "2. There may well exist a "Harry Potter universe" that > includes a counterpart of you but it is not causaly > related to our universe (too far for instance) and > this is why we cannot observe it. " > > The idea that some universes causally relate and others > do not is a kind of physical law. But if every mathematical > object is instantiated, evey mathematically describable physical law > must be as well. So there must be universes, or rather sets of > universes, in which the law about non interacting is false or > works differently. There might be universes interacting one with each other (though from my viewpoint I would tend to consider a set of interactive universes as a single universe) but it might also be that the one in which we live is among the ones that are not causally connected to any other. And what about 3. ? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> >> [...] >> I see. So from you viewpoint the distinction between physics >> and mathematics appears as natural > > It is grounded in the logical distinction between necessity and > contingency. This distinction is a matter of viewpoint. Contingency is a matter of viewpoint. At least as seen from *my* viewpoint. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quenot wrote: >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : >>> Georges Quenot wrote: If you are a being that have never observed magical events any duplicate of you "will" never have observed any magical event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be true duplicates). >>> That doesn't work the other way round. A duplicate of me up to >>> 16:51 GMT 20 mar 2006 could suddenly start observing them. >> Your duplicate will know. Not You. And he will no longer >> be your duplicate. > > I am, conventionally, the same person as my previous selves. > I have their memories. No. You may have lost some of them, acquired some new ones and still share most of them (if the previous self you consider is not too far in the past). In some sense, you are the same person and in some sense you are a different person. > My duplicate will have my memories. Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience something different of what you do, his acquired (and possibly his lost) memories will differ from yours. He will still share most of your previous common memories but he will not know your new ones and you will not know his new ones. If he evenutally encoutered Harry Potter and you do not, whatever memories you shared before, you will not share these ones. > Or are you saying that I am not the same person as my > previous selves ? As I said above, in some sense, you are the same person and in some sense you are a different person. I feel I am the same person as I was 25 years ago and meanwhile I also feel very different. Maybe you also experienced something similar. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
1Z wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> >> Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This >> is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience >> something different of what you do, his acquired (and >> possibly his lost) memories will differ from yours. He >> will still share most of your previous common memories >> but he will not know your new ones and you will not >> know his new ones. If he evenutally encoutered Harry >> Potter and you do not, whatever memories you shared >> before, you will not share these ones. > > But he could be writing this posting this message > instead of me? Why isn't he ? Because his HP universe > is isolated from your universe ? Something like that, yes. > What keeps it isolated ? This might just come from the mathematical properties of these universes. >> As I said above, in some sense, you are the same person >> and in some sense you are a different person. I feel I >> am the same person as I was 25 years ago and meanwhile >> I also feel very different. Maybe you also experienced >> something similar. > > If I am the same person as my previous selves, presumably > I am the same person as my counterparts. That can be discussed. This can be true "until I fork" but no longer after that. When invoking "counterparts" or "duplicates" one must specify whether this must be understood over the full person lifespan or not. > So Mathematical > Monism *does* predict that I will witness HP universes That too can be discussed. It is not so sure that there exist a set of equations of which a HP universe would be a solution, especially if this universe must also include a counterpart of me. > -- in a broad sense of "I". This "I in a broad sense" does not make sense to me. If "I" fork, there will be two new "I" that will each have their common (old) memories and their different (new) ones. There will not be a single "I" that will have the new memories of both. Even if we admit both statements above, I don't see any problem with the idea that some of the forked "I" will witness a HP universe. Finally, I don't see what mathematical monism has to do with that. The problem would be the same if one had to explain why HP universes don't physically exist (as being equally mathematically possible as ours). Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: > >> That too can be discussed. It is not so sure that there >> exist a set of equations of which a HP universe would >> be a solution, especially if this universe must also >> include a counterpart of me. > > As I have pointed out, there is bound to be an equation to which > any given number is the solution. > >>> -- in a broad sense of "I". >> This "I in a broad sense" does not make sense to me >> If "I" fork, there will be two new "I" that will each >> have their common (old) memories and their different >> (new) ones. There will not be a single "I" that will >> have the new memories of both. > > But both 'I's" will identify **themselves** as Georges Quenot. > >> Even if we admit both statements above, I don't see any >> problem with the idea that some of the forked "I" will >> witness a HP universe. > > It's not observed ! > >> Finally, I don't see what mathematical monism has to >> do with that. The problem would be the same if one >> had to explain why HP universes don't physically exist >> (as being equally mathematically possible as ours). > > It's not the same problem, because the whole point > of physical existence is that not all logical > possibilities are instantiated. > > (To put it another way: the point is to explain > experience. Physicalism explains non-experience > of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals > to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations > have to end somewhere. The question is how many > unexplained assumptions there are). OK. The idea of "mathematical monism" does not make sense for you while it does for me. I have absolutely no problem with that. I am not a proselyte. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quenot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> [...] What we can be sure of is that >>> 1) we exist >>> 2) we are conscious >>> 3) there is some sort of external world >>> 4) there is some phenomenon of time. >> *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do >> not decide for others. > > Is it possible for me to have a discussion with you ? Good question. After having tried I am not so sure. > If the answer is "yes", you are conceding: > > 1) you and I exist > 2) you and I are conscious > 3) you are external to me and vice-versa All of these statements can be understood in many ways depending upon the context and the person. *I do not* consider them *universally* true. > That only leaves (4), but I suppose all discussions take some time. In the context of this discussion, 1) through 4) are left, and especially 3). >>> These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; >> As *you* believe and understand them, certainly. *I* do not >> see any problem for mathematical monism (I do not need the >> upper cases) to make sense. > > So you say. As things stand, I have to take your word, Thanks. We at least accomplished this. > since you have not offered any explanation. I am afraid I can't. I tried hard but you appeared to reject all grounds on which I could have built one. That's your freedom but I don't see what more I can do. Finally I pointed that we did not share enough grounds but even this did not seem to make it. >>> [...] Arguments should start with what you can be sure of. >> What "we" can be sure of (as well as what it might mean) can >> be very different from my viewpoint and from yours. > > Viewpoints can differ without being equally valid. Note that you need a viewpoint to decide that a viewpoint is more valid than another. > If you cannot account for the existence of such a thing as > a discussion *in* a discussion, I think I can and I do. > you are in trouble. I don't think so. Even if it turns out that we cannot discuss one with each other, I feel nothing wrong with that. That's just life. >> In order to have a chance to make the point, arguments that >> *you* address to *me* should start wtih what *I* can be sure >> of and not with what *you* can be sure of. And vice versa >> indeed. >> >> What I can be sure of is probably "weaker" than what you can >> be sure of. It is likely to be quite different too. That must >> be why it can be compatible with more (or different) ideas. I feel that we are drifting off topic... Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > [...] > I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them > on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> [...] >>> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them >>> on the basis of not matching my experience. >> Your experience *is* a prejudice. > > Cela est faux. As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. Prejudices are things that bias our jugement while making us believe that it is not biased. This is exactly what does our experience. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>>> peterdjones wrote: >>>>> [...] >>>>> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them >>>>> on the basis of not matching my experience. >>>> Your experience *is* a prejudice. >>> Cela est faux. >> As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. >> >> Prejudices are things that bias our judgement while making us >> believe that it is not biased. This is exactly what does our >> experience. > > what makes you immune ? You must have misunderstood me. I do not feel immune. I do not even feel better placed than anybody else. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote:
>
> [...]
> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
> to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations
> have to end somewhere. The question is how many
> unexplained assumptions there are).
I would like to understand your view. How do *you* solve
the "HP universe" problem? In your view of things, amongst
all the mathematical objects to which a universe could be
isomorphic to, *what* does make only one (or a few) "exist"
or "be real" or "be physical" or "be instanciated" and all
others not?
Also, you reject "mathematical monism" as not making sense
for you but what about the ohter conjectures I mentionned?
Do you find that "physical monism" ("mind emerges from
matter activity"), "mathematical realism" ("mathematical
objects exist by themselves") and "Tegmark's hypothesis"
("our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object",
though Tegmark might no be the first to propose the idea)
make sense? Have some chance of being true?
Georges.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
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Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
>>> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
>>> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
>>> to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations
>>> have to end somewhere. The question is how many
>>> unexplained assumptions there are).
>> I would like to understand your view. How do *you* solve
>> the "HP universe" problem? In your view of things, amongst
>> all the mathematical objects to which a universe could be
>> isomorphic to, *what* does make only one (or a few) "exist"
>> or "be real" or "be physical" or "be instanciated" and all
>> others not?
>
> In your view, what means that only mathematical objects exist ?
I can try to answer to this but I do not see how it helps
to answer my question. It is hard to explain what it means
to someone that resist the idea (that must be like trying
to explain a mystic experience to a non believer).
It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence. I would say
that it makes sense only in the case in which the three other
mentionned conjectures also make sense and could be true.
I believe that we have a diffculty here because we have very
different intuitions about what mathematical objects can be
and about what a mathematical object corresponding to a
universe hosting conscious beings could look like. I already
mentionned three possibilities to deal with the HP universe
"problem" in this context. I understood that it did not make
it for you because of this difference between our intuitions.
> All explanations stop somewhere. The question is whether they
> succeed in explaining experience.
Do you mean that it is "just so" that the "mathematical
object" that is isomorph to our universe is "instantiated"
and that the "mathematical objects" that would be isomorph
to HP universes are not?
Isn't that a bit ad'hoc? Does it explain anything at all?
>> Also, you reject "mathematical monism" as not making sense
>> for you but what about the ohter conjectures I mentionned?
>> Do you find that "physical monism" ("mind emerges from
>> matter activity"), "mathematical realism" ("mathematical
>> objects exist by themselves") and "Tegmark's hypothesis"
>> ("our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object",
>> though Tegmark might no be the first to propose the idea)
>> make sense? Have some chance of being true?
>
>> Do you find that "physical monism" ("mind emerges from
> matter activity"),
>
> All the evidence points to this.
OK. So in your view this makes sense and is likeky to be true.
Evidence is also that a lot of people resist physical monism
just as you resist mathematical monism.
>> "mathematical realism" ("mathematical objects exist by themselves")
>
> Not supported by empirical evidence; not needed to explain
> the epistemic objectivity of mathematics.
That could be a language problem. In my view, what I was
thinking of is likely to be equivalent to the "epistemic
objectivity of mathematics" in your view.
>> and "Tegmark's hypothesis"
>> ("our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object",
>
> Must be at least partially true, or physics would not work,
Partially is not of much help in this context. Th question is
whether it can/could be *fully/absolutely* true.
Georges.
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Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: > >> peterdjones wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>>> peterdjones wrote: >>>>> Georges Quénot wrote: >>>>>> peterdjones wrote: > >>>> It is just the idea that there could be no difference between >>>> mathematical existence and physical existence. >>> Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and physical) ? >> For various historical and practical reasons and because >> identity is still a conjecture/speculation. Just like we >> used to consider "inertial mass" and "gravitational mass". > > So you meant "there might not be any difference", not "there cannot > possibly be any difference". I wonder... Do you understand what "conjecture" or "speculation" means? Can you think only of what you believe to be true? I will address the rest later. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Our messages becomes longer and longer. I will split my responses. I will start with this: peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> [...] >> Furthermore, most of this HP universe is >> in the brain of your nephew. What is in the game would be >> almost nothing without your nephew's imagination to fill >> the (huge) gaps. > > [ shrugs ] your mathematical multiverse contains every possible > structure, however detailed, Maybe not *my* mathematical multiverse. It seems that many (and actually almost all) "real numbers" cannot be "reached" by any mathematician, however competent. A mathematician can specify or designate only a countable number of real numbers (by formulas) while real numbers are known to be uncountably infinite. It might be that those real that can't be reached do not exist "by themselves" as others would. Similarly, a quite limited (countable) number of mathematical objects would so exist "by themselves" while others can't be reached in any way by a mathematician however competent. > so it contains a class of structures resembling the HP game but > with infinitely more detail. These could be in in the "non reachable part" and could not exist for this reason. Especially if an infinite level of detail is required. Also you should notice that the view I presented is not in the context of "Comp". This a view that is different from both yours and mine (I mean the one I described here). > You don't seem to be following your own hypothesis through. I follow in the "reachable" part (I am not sure of what existence the "rest" can have). We do not know it enough yet to determine how likely it is to include HP universes or not. >> >>> However, we are bound to end up with >> >>> physical laws being "just so". >> >> Not really. What is "just so" is that a conscious being >> >> has to live in only one universe at once just as he has >> >> to live in only one place and in only one period of time >> >> at once. >> > >> > That does not follow form the mathematical >> > hypothesis. If I am a set, I am a subset of any >> > number of other sets. If I am a digit-string, I a m a >> > substring of any number of other substrings. >> >> This is where we have a different intuition about what >> mathematical objects can be and what a mathematical object >> containing (description of) conscious beings might be. For >> me this is just like you have to live here and now and not >> in Egypt 3500 years ago. > > That is true on the common-sense basis. Yes. > I don't see any justification for it mathematically ? I understood that. >> What "aspect" of a mathematical >> object I could be is not so clear to me but it is unlikely >> to be as trivial as a digit string. > > What mathematical object cannot be embedded as an exact duplicate in > another object ? I do not perceive myself exactly as "an object embedded in another object". I do not think I can be abstracted from the whole "I am part of". > Do you have anything specific in mind ? Something like a "quantum wave function" at the scale of the whole space-time universe. > actually know ? I do not see what we can actually *know* in such domains. I only consider conjectures. >> >> It is no more mysterious that I do not live >> >> Harry Potter's life that I do not live Akenaton's life. >> > >> > From the common-sense POV, yes. From the MM POV, no. >> >> Maybe there is more than one MM POV. MM does not really >> have POV. You and I have POV on what MM can or cannot be. >> And they do differ. > > it's called "logic". > Hypotheses have whatever implications they have. We are using words. These might have different meanings depending upon who uses them and the context in which one uses them. Different "logical" implications can also come out from them. >> >> And lots of "HP-like" events have also been reported in >> >> *this* world. >> > >> > Nowhere near enough! (compared to what MM predicts). >> >> MM does not predict. > > Hypotheses have implications. Fuzzy hypotheses have even more fuzzy implications. >> You do and I do from our respective >> interpretations of what MM could or should be (or not). > > It's becoming increasin apparent that your mathematical metaphysics is > embedded in a subjective relativism. This is not specific in any way to (what you call) my "mathematical metaphysics". Subjective relativism is something what human thinking at large cannot escape from (and if one thinks it can while I think it cannot, he only illustrates what I am saying). > What is wrong with stating > axioms clearly, and seeing what the consequences are ? There is no such thing as an unambiguous statement (in my view of things and in the context, indeed). I am not sure that we can formulate these questions as sets of axioms. I am even less sure that we are able to develop their consequences. We can't even reach a consensus about what a "mathematical object" could be or not. Intuitions are difficult to formalize and to share. George
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >> > Georges Quenot wrote: >> >> peterdjones wrote: >> >>> >> >>> "Epistemic objectivity of maths" means "every competent mathematician >> >>> gets the same answer to a given problem". It doesn't say anything about >> >>> the existence of anything (except possibly mathematicians). >> >> Well, if "every competent mathematician gets the same answer >> >> to a given problem", "competent mathematicians" do not have >> >> much freedom about what they might find as an answer to some >> >> given problems. So there must "exist" "something" that >> >> "constrain" them. >> > >> > Yes: rules, the principle of non-contradiction. >> >> So. These exist for you too? Are they physical objects? These were two separate questions. > I don't need to hold that they have any existence separate > from mathematicians or textbooks. This is a response to none of them. It seems to me that "they" do constrain mathematicians but they do not come from them, neither are part of them and are even less part of textbooks. >> [...] >> This is a question of viewpoint. I would rather say that more >> than Tegmark's hypothesis is needed for *something else* (or >> something more) than MM. > > Tegmark's hypothesis is explcitly a claim of isomorphism. > MM is a claim of identity. Isomorphims *can* be identity Yes. > but to show that one *is*, something more is required. Well. You may see things that way. One (and Okham's razor) could say sa well: "but to show that one *is not*, something more is required". Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> [...] >> The question of whether there could be other type of objects >> than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could >> mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am >> afraid I cannot easily transmit that feeling). It is harder >> for me to imagine what non mathematical objects could be and >> how/why they happened to come to existence. > > My candidates for non-mathematical properties are > 1) existence/materiality itself (that is, physical existence in a > partiuclar place at a partiouclar time) > 2) time (causality, laws) > 3) consciousness, specifically qualia. These might be "non mathematical" properties but, at leat from my point of view, they do not need to be non mathematical. You probably think that they must be non mathematical because you are not able to figure exactly *how* they could be "just mathematical". Two centuries ago, people weren't able to figure out *how* complex living beings could have emerged from simple and inert matter and they thought too that this was impossible and that they had to choose another default "explanation". >> Did some God pull >> them out of nothingness? > > Why would a God be needed to create non-mathematical objects > but not mathematical ones ? Is that a feeling, too ? Yes. For me, this is a feeling. "Constraints" that apply to "competent matehematicians" do not a need a God to exist (and no God, however powerful, could not escape or change them). Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quénot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> Georges Quenot wrote: >>>> [...] >>>> The question of whether there could be other type of objects >>>> than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could >>>> mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am >>>> afraid I cannot easily transmit that feeling). It is harder >>>> for me to imagine what non mathematical objects could be and >>>> how/why they happened to come to existence. >>> My candidates for non-mathematical properties are >>> 1) existence/materiality itself (that is, physical existence in a >>> partiuclar place at a partiouclar time) >>> 2) time (causality, laws) >>> 3) consciousness, specifically qualia. >> These might be "non mathematical" properties but, at leat >> from my point of view, they do not need to be non mathematical. >> You probably think that they must be non mathematical because >> you are not able to figure exactly *how* they could be "just >> mathematical". > >> Two centuries ago, people weren't able to figure >> out *how* complex living beings could have emerged from simple >> and inert matter and they thought too that this was impossible >> and that they had to choose another default "explanation". > > Two centuries ago people thought they could build perpetual motion > machines and square the circle. There is no guarantee that things > we cannot figure out now will be figured out in the future. There is no guarantee either that they won't. While we don't know, they remain conjectures and lots of progress usually come out from their study whatever the outcome. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
