subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Phaneroscopy \& Phenomenology"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread John F Sowa


Gene, Gary F, and Clark,

Gene
let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning 
of Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider 
audience over many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on 
Ogden that brought Peirce into the discussion, using quotes from 
Peirce's letters to Lady Welby.


Yes.  That's the important point.  Ogden was also the translator
of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.  That meant that Lady Welby's influence
extended to that circle -- which included Frank Ramsey, who had read
and cited Peirce's work.

Wittgenstein credited Ramsey as the one who led him to recognize
the "grave errors" in the Tractatus.  Ramsey's tragic accident
was a disaster for philosophy.

Gary

There is also a phenomenological side to Peirce’s semeiotic as
revealed in the Welby letters, but despite the subject line,
we haven’t really considered that in this thread …


Clark

a rut philosophy fell into during the move to linguistic analysis
during much of the 20th century. Missing these more general cases
in preference to ordinary language.


Yes.  If Ramsey had lived, he might have promoted Peirce's ideas
as the foundation for 20th c logic and philosophy.  I blame Russell,
Carnap, and Quine for promoting Frege's very narrow vision instead
of Peirce's much broader and deeper foundation.

I develop those ideas in the article "Signs, Processes, and Language
Games":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread Eugene Halton

Adding to John's last statement concerning Peirce's letters to Lady Welby,
let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of
Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider audience over
many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on Ogden that brought
Peirce into the discussion, using quotes from Peirce's letters to Lady
Welby.
 The Wikipedia page on the book could use some introduction of the
place of Peirce in the book. For example look at the diagram on this
webpage of the "triangle of reference," and the loose similarities to
Peirce’s idea of the sign:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Meaning_of_Meaning

Gene Halton

On Aug 9, 2017 1:41 AM, "John F Sowa"  wrote:

> Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark,
>
> Kirsti
>
>> Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?
>>
>
> Yes.  Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful
> concept must show its passport at the gates of perception
> and action.  That is a major part of its context.
>
> Kirsti
>
>> Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the
>> basis to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested
>> in sign classifications.
>>
>
> The person who is addressed is also part of the context, and I agree
> that would influence the topics Peirce considered.
>
> His work in writing and editing definitions would have had a strong
> influence on "meaning", since that is the primary goal for dictionary
> definitions.  Note what he wrote to B. E. Smith, the editor of the
> _Century Dictionary_:
>
>> "The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the same
>> thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most stupendous of
>> logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished logician must break
>> down in it utterly; and even for the strongest man, it is the severest
>> possible tax on the logical equipment and faculty."
>>
>
> That comment indicates his high regard for his work on lexicography.
>
> Gary F.
>
>> Almost all of Peirce’s work on minute classification of sign types
>> was done in the period 1903-1908, and his work on almost everything
>> got set aside after that, because his health was deteriorating.
>>
>
> Clark
>
>> Peirce may have used the letter writing to clarify his thoughts,
>> but he appears to have been thinking on the issues for some time.
>>
>
> I agree with both of those comments.  Peirce did not have the time
> and energy to prepare an article for publication.  A letter was more
> likely to get attention for his ideas than a few pages in a notebook.
> Of all his correspondents, Lady Welby was the most likely to appreciate
> and circulate his letter about signs.
>
> Given his health at the time, the fact that he made the effort to write
> a long letter shows that he considered the subject matter important.
>
> John
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread Clark Goble

> On Aug 9, 2017, at 7:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> But there is another side of the question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to 
> Welby (SS 118):
> “My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear 
> Lady Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some error in consequence 
> of limiting your studies so much to Language and among languages to one very 
> peculiar language, as all Aryan Languages are; and within that language so 
> much to words.”

This is very important and also a rut philosophy fell into during the move to 
linguistic analysis during much of the 20th century. Missing these more general 
cases in preference to ordinary language. 

> There is also a phenomenological side to Peirce’s semeiotic as revealed in 
> the Welby letters, but despite the subject line, we haven’t really considered 
> that in this thread …

Yes. I have a reply to that original comment from last week I’m still working 
on. I’ll hopefully take it up in there. I’m still quite swamped though. 
Hopefully others might take it up in the meantime.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread John F Sowa


On 8/9/2017 9:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce certainly devoted a lot of study to the meanings of English 
words, especially in the period /before/ he developed his detailed 
classification of signs, but of course his work was not /limited/ 
to those studies.


Yes.  I would never "block the way of inquiry" about anything
Peirce did or might do.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread gnox

John, Clark, Kirsti, …,

 

John, I agree with everything you say here. Peirce’s “high regard for his work 
on lexicography” is well deserved, too. But there is another side of the 
question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to Welby (SS 118):

“My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear Lady 
Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some error in consequence of 
limiting your studies so much to Language and among languages to one very 
peculiar language, as all Aryan Languages are; and within that language so much 
to words.”

 

Peirce certainly devoted a lot of study to the meanings of English words, 
especially in the period before he developed his detailed classification of 
signs, but of course his work was not limited to those studies.

 

Gary f.

 

p.s. There is also a phenomenological side to Peirce’s semeiotic as revealed in 
the Welby letters, but despite the subject line, we haven’t really considered 
that in this thread …

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 9-Aug-17 01:41



Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark,

 

Kirsti

> Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?

 

Yes.  Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful concept must show 
its passport at the gates of perception and action.  That is a major part of 
its context.

 

Kirsti

> Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the 

> basis to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested 

> in sign classifications.

 

The person who is addressed is also part of the context, and I agree that would 
influence the topics Peirce considered.

 

His work in writing and editing definitions would have had a strong influence 
on "meaning", since that is the primary goal for dictionary definitions.  Note 
what he wrote to B. E. Smith, the editor of the _Century Dictionary_:

> "The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the same 

> thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most stupendous of 

> logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished logician must break 

> down in it utterly; and even for the strongest man, it is the severest 

> possible tax on the logical equipment and faculty."

 

That comment indicates his high regard for his work on lexicography.

 

Gary F.

> Almost all of Peirce’s work on minute classification of sign types was 

> done in the period 1903-1908, and his work on almost everything got 

> set aside after that, because his health was deteriorating.

 

Clark

> Peirce may have used the letter writing to clarify his thoughts, but 

> he appears to have been thinking on the issues for some time.

 

I agree with both of those comments.  Peirce did not have the time and energy 
to prepare an article for publication.  A letter was more likely to get 
attention for his ideas than a few pages in a notebook.

Of all his correspondents, Lady Welby was the most likely to appreciate and 
circulate his letter about signs.

 

Given his health at the time, the fact that he made the effort to write a long 
letter shows that he considered the subject matter important.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-08 Thread John F Sowa


Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark,

Kirsti

Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?


Yes.  Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful
concept must show its passport at the gates of perception
and action.  That is a major part of its context.

Kirsti

Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the
basis to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested
in sign classifications.


The person who is addressed is also part of the context, and I agree
that would influence the topics Peirce considered.

His work in writing and editing definitions would have had a strong
influence on "meaning", since that is the primary goal for dictionary
definitions.  Note what he wrote to B. E. Smith, the editor of the
_Century Dictionary_:

"The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the same
thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most stupendous of
logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished logician must break
down in it utterly; and even for the strongest man, it is the severest
possible tax on the logical equipment and faculty."


That comment indicates his high regard for his work on lexicography.

Gary F.

Almost all of Peirce’s work on minute classification of sign types
was done in the period 1903-1908, and his work on almost everything
got set aside after that, because his health was deteriorating. 


Clark

Peirce may have used the letter writing to clarify his thoughts,
but he appears to have been thinking on the issues for some time.


I agree with both of those comments.  Peirce did not have the time
and energy to prepare an article for publication.  A letter was more
likely to get attention for his ideas than a few pages in a notebook.
Of all his correspondents, Lady Welby was the most likely to appreciate
and circulate his letter about signs.

Given his health at the time, the fact that he made the effort to write
a long letter shows that he considered the subject matter important.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-07 Thread Jerry Rhee

gary f., list:



You said,

“I don’t see how there can be a debate about whether Peirce’s later years
were focused on signs or on meaning, because I don’t see how you can focus
on either one without the other, especially if you are C.S. Peirce.”



With regard to Peirce’s focus, isn’t the answer simply the ultimate aim,
the summum bonum, growth of concrete reasonableness; since the only moral
evil is not to have an *ultimate aim?*



*In syllogisms, then, which prove the inherence of an attribute, nothing
falls outside the major term.~ Pr. An., I-23*


Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 6:42 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Clark,
>
>
>
> Sorry if I sounded combative in that post — I guess I was a bit annoyed
> with Kirsti’s claim of “historical fact” for what was really a vague
> impression. I don’t see how there can be a debate about whether Peirce’s
> later years were focused on signs or on meaning, because I don’t see how
> you can focus on either one without the other, especially if you are C.S.
> Peirce. Which I guess is pretty much what you said in reply.
>
>
>
> There may be a grain of truth behind this idea of a shift in focus. Peirce
> was all his life a very analytical thinker; the whole point of his
> existential graphs, for instance, was to break down the reasoning process
> into as many separate steps as possible. But he did take a more holistic
> view of semiosis in the 1905-10 period, for instance in his statements that
> an Argument embodies a process of transformation, and “This Process of
> Transformation, which is evidently the kernel of the matter, is no more
> built out of Propositions than a motion is built out of positions.” He also
> wrote in the 1906 “Prolegomena” that “the difference between the Term, the
> Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity,
> and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are
> severally intended to perform.” This in a long essay that was mostly
> devoted to the exposition of existential graphs. If this was a shift, it
> was a shift of emphasis, not a basic change in his concept of semiosis, but
> rather a refinement of his analysis. I think Stjernfelt’s *Natural
> Propositions* clarifies these matters considerably.
>
>
>
> Almost all of Peirce’s work on minute classification of sign types was
> done in the period 1903-1908, and his work on almost *everything* got set
> aside after that, because his health was deteriorating. That is as close as
> I’d get to stating the “historical fact” of the matter.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we
> pretend to be. [Vonnegut] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
> *Sent:* 7-Aug-17 16:54
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
>
>
>
>
>
> On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
>
>
> Clark,
>
>
>
> Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce
> detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather
> than current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material
> in EP2:477-91 you’ll see why the editors described it as “among the richest
> records of the evolution of his semiotic thought” — an evolution that was
> very much in progress as he was writing, as is obvious from his own
> comments on the process. And on p. 482, Peirce makes it very clear that
> “the accurate definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts” of
> semeiotic was central to *his* inquiry (not to Welby’s; in fact she
> apparently didn’t know what to make of his analysis of signs).
>
>
>
> Again just to be clear I’m not taking a position on the “when.” It’s just
> not something I’ve studied.
>
>
>
> I’d taken that header to the Lady Welby excerpts to imply he was working
> on it while writing to her.  However the excerpts, according to the header,
> come from a space of time from spring 1906 to Christmas 1908. So that’s a
> broad period which is all I was saying. i.e. he may have used the letter
> writing to clarify his thoughts, but he appears to have been thinking on
> the issues for some time.
>
>
>
> To your final point, I’m not quite sure what you’re arguing. Certainly to
> the degree one is studying semiotics one must have accurate definitions and
> logical analysis. The question is whether that is a means to an end or the
> end itself. I’d note that the prior paragraph to the one you quote from on
> p. 482 goes through the divisions he takes from the medievals: grammar,
> logic & rhetoric. I have a pos

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-07 Thread Clark Goble

> On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Clark,
>  
> Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce 
> detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than 
> current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material in 
> EP2:477-91 you’ll see why the editors described it as “among the richest 
> records of the evolution of his semiotic thought” — an evolution that was 
> very much in progress as he was writing, as is obvious from his own comments 
> on the process. And on p. 482, Peirce makes it very clear that “the accurate 
> definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts” of semeiotic was central to 
> his inquiry (not to Welby’s; in fact she apparently didn’t know what to make 
> of his analysis of signs).

Again just to be clear I’m not taking a position on the “when.” It’s just not 
something I’ve studied. 

I’d taken that header to the Lady Welby excerpts to imply he was working on it 
while writing to her.  However the excerpts, according to the header, come from 
a space of time from spring 1906 to Christmas 1908. So that’s a broad period 
which is all I was saying. i.e. he may have used the letter writing to clarify 
his thoughts, but he appears to have been thinking on the issues for some time.

To your final point, I’m not quite sure what you’re arguing. Certainly to the 
degree one is studying semiotics one must have accurate definitions and logical 
analysis. The question is whether that is a means to an end or the end itself. 
I’d note that the prior paragraph to the one you quote from on p. 482 goes 
through the divisions he takes from the medievals: grammar, logic & rhetoric. I 
have a post to Gary Richmond where I am dealing with his points and questions 
from last week that goes through that in more depth. It’s about half written 
but I want to be careful I get things right on it. I’d just say that the prior 
paragraph suggests meaning is quite significant. (Forgive the wordplay) It’s 
interesting that he quotes in that paragraph from his paper in 1867 as it 
relates to the relation of symbols to their objects.

My sense, perhaps mistaken, is that the debate is over which is more important, 
the grounds for meaing which Peirce puts first or the formal conditions of 
truth. That is, what does “first” mean both in how he views it in 1908 and how 
he viewed it in 1867.

Without speaking for anyone else, I’m certainly not devaluing the second 
science he discusses. Further I think even relative to meaning it is key. Yet I 
think the most important and foundational analysis consists of meaningfulness 
itself or the formal conditions of symbols having meaning. It is to conduct 
both those analysis though that one must first analyze the concepts. So I agree 
that is central, but only as a means to an end.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-07 Thread gnox

Clark,

 

Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce 
detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than 
current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material in 
EP2:477-91 you’ll see why the editors described it as “among the richest 
records of the evolution of his semiotic thought” — an evolution that was very 
much in progress as he was writing, as is obvious from his own comments on the 
process. And on p. 482, Peirce makes it very clear that “the accurate 
definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts” of semeiotic was central to 
his inquiry (not to Welby’s; in fact she apparently didn’t know what to make of 
his analysis of signs).

 

Gary f.

 

} Set thy heart upon thy work, but never upon its reward. [Bhagavad-Gita 2:47] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 7-Aug-17 11:31
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

 

 

On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi 
<mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi>  wrote:

 

As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests, 
works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that 
is.

 

Again I’ve not kept carefully up on the nuances of what was innovated when, but 
it always seemed to me that many subtle aspects of his Welby correspondence 
illustrated rethinking of some aspects of the sign. Now I’d assume those didn’t 
originate for the Welby letter but probably represent work done in this general 
period of 1905 onward. 

 

My own position doesn’t appear to be the same as Kirsti’s. While I think he did 
focus on meaning, I think it was through his work on signs that he attempted to 
understand meaning. But again I note that I’ve just not paid close attention to 
the “when” of certain aspects of of the sign that appear in the Welby 
correspondence. I admittedly am more focused on the content. 

 

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-07 Thread gnox

Helmut,

What you project here is pretty much what I’ve done with Turning Signs. One 
part of the text, the obverse I call it, consists of 19 sequential chapters 
that were completed two years ago and have not changed (except that some links 
have been added.) Another part, the reverse, is still developing and each of 
the chapters (or rePatches) is dated at the top. Then the blog posts, which are 
more bite-sized, are automatically dated when I post them, and subscribers to 
the blog always get what’s new on the same day that it’s patched into the 
reverse side of TS.

Peirce in his last few years of writing got into the habit of dating his 
manuscripts, which is very helpful if you’re trying to follow his thinking. The 
fact that he kept most of his drafts (and they’re mostly undated) is a mixed 
blessing for researchers. The fact that they were dismembered and rearranged by 
the CP editors is more unfortunate.

Anyway, if you search Turning Signs for the term “systems” 
(http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm) you might find some material or 
references that you can use for your purposes. Completing the obverse of my 
book took 15 years and some of that went into the study of systems theory.

Gary f.

} Set thy heart upon thy work, but never upon its reward. [Bhagavad-Gita 2:47] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 6-Aug-17 16:51

Thank you, Kirsti! I do not have time to write it as a scientifical correct 
book with all relevant literature mentioned (having an idea takes seconds, but 
comparing it with the most relevant existing texts about the subject has a 
different time scale) , and in the past it was always so, that things I had 
written turned out to being mistakes later, and I had to edit it all over 
again. I had done this with a website. But this way it is impossible for others 
to take the text, which changes all the time, serious. Eg. it is impossible to 
quote something from me. So, if I am going to write a kind of blog again, I 
should mark the part, that will not change anymore, as such, maybe draw a box 
around it, or use a special letter style ("font"?), and mark the other part, 
which may still be edited, too. And partition the text in chapters signed with 
dates. Or something like that. Coming soon in this theater (internet), I think.

Best wishes too,

Helmut

 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi  
wrote:

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most
superficial way.

I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are
others with similar aims.

Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi   kirjoitti 6.8.2017 
10:41:
> Helmut,
>
> That is good to know. Thanks.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:
>> Kirsti,
>> you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
>> because I do not
>> have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
>> ground
>> for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
>> understanding you are after?"
>>
>> I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
>> out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
>> systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
>> Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
>> "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
>> kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
>> is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
>> both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
>> signs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
>> kirst...@saunalahti.fi  
>> wrote:
>>
>> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
>> > Kirsti,
>> > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
>> > According to my
>> > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
>> >
>> > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
>> >
>> > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
>> add
>> > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?
>>
>> Helmut,
>>
>> It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
>> whole picture".
>>
>> A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
>> or
>> "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.
>>
>> What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
>> ground
>> of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-07 Thread Clark Goble

> On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests, 
> works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that 
> is.

Again I’ve not kept carefully up on the nuances of what was innovated when, but 
it always seemed to me that many subtle aspects of his Welby correspondence 
illustrated rethinking of some aspects of the sign. Now I’d assume those didn’t 
originate for the Welby letter but probably represent work done in this general 
period of 1905 onward. 

My own position doesn’t appear to be the same as Kirsti’s. While I think he did 
focus on meaning, I think it was through his work on signs that he attempted to 
understand meaning. But again I note that I’ve just not paid close attention to 
the “when” of certain aspects of of the sign that appear in the Welby 
correspondence. I admittedly am more focused on the content. 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-06 Thread Helmut Raulien


Thank you, Kirsti! I do not have time to write it as a scientifical correct book with all relevant literature mentioned (having an idea takes seconds, but comparing it with the most relevant existing texts about the subject has a different time scale) , and in the past it was always so, that things I had written turned out to being mistakes later, and I had to edit it all over again. I had done this with a website. But this way it is impossible for others to take the text, which changes all the time, serious. Eg. it is impossible to quote something from me. So, if I am going to write a kind of blog again, I should mark the part, that will not change anymore, as such, maybe draw a box around it, or use a special letter style ("font"?), and mark the other part, which may still be edited, too. And partition the text in chapters signed with dates. Or something like that. Coming soon in this theater (internet), I think.

Best wishes too,

Helmut

 

 

 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most
superficial way.

I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are
others with similar aims.

Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41:
> Helmut,
>
> That is good to know. Thanks.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:
>> Kirsti,
>> you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
>> because I do not
>> have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
>> ground
>> for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
>> understanding you are after?"
>>
>> I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
>> out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
>> systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
>> Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
>> "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
>> kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
>> is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
>> both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
>> signs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
>> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>> wrote:
>>
>> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
>> > Kirsti,
>> > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
>> > According to my
>> > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
>> >
>> > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
>> >
>> > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
>> add
>> > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?
>>
>> Helmut,
>>
>> It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
>> whole picture".
>>
>> A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
>> or
>> "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.
>>
>> What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
>> ground
>> of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
>> science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
>> methods and tools for research.
>>
>> There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
>> a
>> composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
>> making them.
>>
>> I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
>> not
>> have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
>> ground
>> for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
>> understanding you are after?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Kirsti
>>
>> >
>> > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
>> > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>> >
>> > Helmut,
>> >
>> > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
>> > and
>> > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
>> > which
>> > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
>> arrived
>> > at
>> > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
>> working
>> > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
>> even
>> > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
>> >
>> > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
>> > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
>> >
>> > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
>> > spent
>> > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
>> > those
>> > issues.
>> >
>> > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
>> > CSP
>> > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
>>

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-06 Thread kirstima

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use 
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense 
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in 
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most 
superficial way.

I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are 
others with similar aims.

Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41:

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini-

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-06 Thread kirstima

Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis 
to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign 
classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in 
vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was 
explaining her about his earlier work and results on the topic, as best 
he could. Also following the rules of polite correspondence (by then) 
and taking her interests (Welby's Significs) to the foreground.


As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main 
interests, works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. 
Not strong, that is.


Best

Kirsti






kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:39:

List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work
with sign classifications.
Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-06 Thread kirstima

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification
and
 > > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
 > to
 > > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course,
is
 > not
 > > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
 > topics
 > > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-06 Thread kirstima


List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work 
with sign classifications.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone
can provide an even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but
dispenses with the focus on signs, I could take that as supporting
Kirsti's claim about "historical fact." Otherwise I don't think that
claim stands up to scrutiny.

Gary f.

} I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I
perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00

Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Kirsti,

you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs.

Best,

Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi

wrote:

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
> Kirsti,
> you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
> According to my
> view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
>
> Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
>
> But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add
> all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

Helmut,

It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
whole picture".

A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or
"good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground
of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
methods and tools for research.

There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a
composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
making them.

I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
understanding you are after?

Best,

Kirsti

>
> 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>
> Helmut,
>
> You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
> and
> "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
> which
> one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
> at
> from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
> out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
> impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
>
> Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
> view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
>
> I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
> spent
> a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
> those
> issues.
>
> Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
> CSP
> to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
> the
> firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
> three
> logically necessary approaches.
>
> I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
> this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
> I
> tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
> > Kirsti, List,
> > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
> and
> > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
> > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
> > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
> categorial
> > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
> "NAND",
> > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
> > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
> > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
> > composition is just a matter different from classification.
> Therefore
> > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
> > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
> > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
> to
> > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
> > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
> not
> > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
> topics
> > (make them one topic) to understand both.
> > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
> CSP
> > just does not work. The "pieces" only
> > work in the context of his work as a whole."
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> >

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread gnox

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that
"It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims." 

 

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have
done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for Peirce's
classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby drafted in late
December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It was here that he set
out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

 

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by him to
indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical analysis") or
"meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign" and of sign types.
Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled "Meaning":

 

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense-for the word "fast," which is
a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set
down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the
very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one
word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable,"
and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should
be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its
Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is
perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying
as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed
merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up
with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the
soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some
position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map,
the very same point qua place on the island. 

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel,"
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be
not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the
set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what
follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object
each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other
than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some
explanation or argument or other context, showing how-upon what system or
for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it
does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional
explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make
up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should,
ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those
of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such
part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has,
actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according
to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its
Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the "species"
of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the
two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign
is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the "ratio," or reason, of the
Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of
speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 (1910) ]

 

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a focus
on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone can provide an
even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but dispenses with the focus
on signs, I could take that as supporting Kirsti's claim about "historical
fact." Otherwise I don't think that claim stands up to scrutiny.

 

Gary f.

 

} I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I
perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00



Jerry, list,

 

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside
and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he found that
way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, leave me out of
any expectations of participating in further discussions on the topic.

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread John F Sowa


On 8/4/2017 5:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot
tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.
That is, because additional information is needed


Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that
three-way distinction is extremely oversimplified.

Crystals, for example, are the prime example of solids.  Glasses appear
to be solids at normal temperatures (i.e., normal for the surface of
the earth).  But over long periods of time, they flow like liquids.

Water is the most familiar liquid, but it's also the strangest.
The H2O molecule is lighter than most gases, yet it tends to be
liquid because of attractions of H atoms to O atoms in neighboring
atoms in the liquid.  As a result, clusters of H2O atoms behave
like larger molecules.

That property causes water to require an unusually large amount of
heat to cause it to boil, and it also causes it to expand when it
freezes (crystallizes).

Then there are strange things like superfluids at extremely low
temperatures and plasmas at extremely high temperatures.  In the
early universe, there was nothing but plasma.  In stars, it's
the region of nuclear fusion that generates the light and heat.

There are also strange behaviors at surfaces between solids,
liquids, and gases.  For a short book on the complex interactions
at surfaces, see the lectures by a hysicist who won a Nobel prize
for such studies:
Pierre-Gilles de Gennes (1997) _Soft Interfaces_, Cambridge UP.

Finally, there are the strange forms of matter in living things.
There are very large molecules that behave and interact in far
more complex ways than any molecules in nonliving things.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread kirstima



Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications 
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he 
found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, 
leave me out of any expectations of participating in further discussions 
on the topic.


Best,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...In view

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread kirstima

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."

Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "

But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add
all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

Helmut,

It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a 
whole picture".

A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or 
"good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground 
of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of 
science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering 
methods and tools for research.

There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a 
composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or 
making them.

I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not 
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground 
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and 
understanding you are after?

Best,

Kirsti

 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi

Helmut,

 You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
and
 "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
which
 one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
at
 from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
 out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
 impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

 Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

 I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent
 a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
those
 issues.

 Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
CSP
 to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
the
 firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
three
 logically necessary approaches.

 I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
I
 tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > Kirsti, List,
 > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
and
 > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
 > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
categorial
 > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
"NAND",
 > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
 > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > composition is just a matter different from classification.
Therefore
 > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
 > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
to
 > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
not
 > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
topics
 > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
CSP
 > just does not work. The "pieces" only
 > work in the context of his work as a whole."
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in
Peircean
 > philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
 > classifications.
 > This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
 > only,
 > or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce
definitely
 > left this road.
 >
 > By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
 > they
 > are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
 > research
 > relying on Peircean Categories.
 >
 > It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 > Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
 > the
 > reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
 > issue
 > was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on
the
 > issues involved.
 >
 > To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 > misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread kirstima


Jerry,

A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the 
world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and 
more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of 
all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in 
the context of my work.


Of your work I said nothing.

Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?

Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...

Cheers

Jerry



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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, List,

Maybe in the analogy with chemistry and physics one might say: Chemical composition is one thing, and classification into solids, liquids and gases another. Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.

That is, because additional information is needed: Temperature and pressure.

To tell whether something is a legisign, it also is not enough to look at the composition. You also need additional information, eg. whether the aligned letters or words make sense.

Best,

Helmut

04. August 2017 um 17:15 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:

Helmut, Kirsti, List:

On Aug 3, 2017, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

On Aug 3, 2017, at 4:37 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

So then, what is it to be whole for all who investigate?

On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something higher". Kirsti

My comment is again a polar opposite to Kirsti’s.

CSP was seeking “something deeper” in his sense of meaning.

In his lifetime, the logic of chemistry was utterly mysterious. It was mysterious because of

a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

That is, the chemical sign relations fails to preserve the predicates of the sinsigns, that is, the quali-signs, that is the physical properties of matter, under the compositions of the legi-signs.

The simple example of this abstract logic is the composition of water from hydrogen and oxygen.

The intrinsic electrical nature of the chemical sciences is necessary to compose a quantitative logic for rationalizing the formation of water from hydrogen and oxygen. This physical logic depends on scientific theories that were created only after CSP past away.

Thus, the three classifications of signs that were developed by CSP:

quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign

do not distinguish between the separate and distinct logics of the sentences of symbols of alphabets (propositions), mathematics (equations) and chemistry (reactions).

To make 21 st Century pragmatic sense out of the “quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign” relationships, one must look at deeper forms of multiple "universal logics” in the sense of Tarski’s meta-languages.

It seems to me that a consistent philosophical reading of CSP depends on the linguistic competencies of the reader. CSP mastered several pre-meta-languages and several symbol systems and modern readers are faced with the challenging task of grasping which of several possible meta-languages he was expressing his beliefs within the temporal history of his lifespan.

Further, it seems to me that several Procrustean beds are ready used by philosophers to avoid the difficulties of grasping the composition of CSP’s natural logical classes and categories.

Cheers

Jerry

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread Helmut Raulien


Kirsti,

you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."

 

Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "

 

But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 

Helmut,

You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those
issues.

Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three
logically necessary approaches.

I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's I
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
> Kirsti, List,
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
> hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
> understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
> eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
> but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
> where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
> composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
> composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
> a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
> matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
> triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
> say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
> them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
> possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
> (make them one topic) to understand both.
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
> just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
> philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
> classifications.
> This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
> only,
> or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
> left this road.
>
> By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
> they
> are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
> research
> relying on Peircean Categories.
>
> It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
> Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
> the
> reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
> issue
> was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
> issues involved.
>
> To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
> misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
> traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
>
> Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> > List,
> > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
> is
> > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
> is
> > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
> Is
> > that so? It is my impression.
> > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
> transcendental
> > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> > wrote:
> > Clark understood pretty correctly

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Helmut, Kirsti, List:
> On Aug 3, 2017, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a 
> sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a 
> sini- or a legisign is composed of.

> On Aug 3, 2017, at 4:37 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> So then, what is it to be whole for all who investigate?
> 
>  
On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something 
higher". Kirsti

My comment is again a polar opposite to Kirsti’s.

CSP was seeking “something deeper” in his sense of meaning.

In his lifetime, the logic of chemistry was utterly mysterious. It was 
mysterious because of 
"
> a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what 
> a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

That is, the chemical sign relations fails to preserve the predicates of the 
sinsigns, that is, the quali-signs, that is the physical properties of matter, 
under the compositions of the legi-signs. 

The simple example of this abstract logic is the composition of water from 
hydrogen and oxygen. 

The intrinsic electrical nature of the chemical sciences is necessary to 
compose a quantitative logic for rationalizing the formation of water from 
hydrogen and oxygen. This physical logic depends on scientific theories that 
were created only after CSP past away.

Thus, the three classifications of signs that were developed by CSP:

quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign

do not distinguish between the separate and distinct logics of the sentences  
of symbols of alphabets (propositions), mathematics (equations) and chemistry 
(reactions).

To make 21 st Century pragmatic sense out of the “quali-sign, sin-sign and 
legi-sign” relationships, one must look at deeper forms of multiple  "universal 
logics” in the sense of Tarski’s meta-languages.

It seems to me that a consistent philosophical reading of CSP depends on the 
linguistic competencies of the reader. CSP mastered several pre-meta-languages 
and several symbol systems and modern readers are faced with the challenging 
task of grasping which of several possible meta-languages he was expressing his 
beliefs within the temporal history of his lifespan.

Further, it seems to me that several Procrustean beds are ready used by 
philosophers to avoid the difficulties of grasping the composition of CSP’s 
natural logical classes and categories.

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Kirsti:

> On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> 
> I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a 
> lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues.

In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the essence 
of human communication and the formation of human communities, including 
professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics, chemistry, biology, and 
the medical professions. 

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread kirstima

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this 
"something higher". Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12:

Supplement:
I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s
Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as
"consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a
different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too,
thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but
not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for"
something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s
supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could
not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money.
Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much
better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to
rule it.

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
 > published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
 >
 > What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
 > that
 > his starting points were different from those most often refered
and
 > discussed here in the

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-04 Thread kirstima

Helmut,

You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and 
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which 
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at 
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working 
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even 
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my 
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent 
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those 
issues.

Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP 
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the 
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three 
logically necessary approaches.

I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on 
this. This work has been immensely useful.  In 1980' and early 1990's I 
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list,

"In an illuminating image, Aristotle compares the use made by the noetic
soul of phantasia to the role of diagrams in geometry:



*It is impossible even to think (noein) without a mental picture
(phantasmatos).  The same affection (pathos) is involved in thinking
(noein) as in drawing a diagram; for in this case although we make no use
of the fact that the magnitude of a triangle is a finite quality…In the
same way the man who is thinking (ho noon), though he may not be thinking
of a finite magnitude, still puts a finite magnitude before his eyes,
though he does not think of it as such.  And even if the nature of the
object is quantitative, but indeterminate, he still puts before him a
finite magnitude, although he thinks of it as merely quantitative.  Why it
is impossible to think of anything without continuity (tou synechous) or to
think of things which are timeless except in terms of time, is another
question. *

~ White, The Meaning of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's *De Anima*, III, 3–8
one two three.. synechism



Best,

Jerry R

On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 5:05 PM,  wrote:

> Helmut,
>
> It’s not that complicated.
>
>
>
> A triad is a *set of three* — three of anything.
>
>
>
> A trichotomy is a *division* of something into three — usually a division
> of a type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, *signs* can be
> subdivided into three classes, in various ways: icon/index/symbol,
> rheme/dicisign/argument, and so on. Peirce’s classification of signs
> includes ten trichotomies.
>
>
>
> In Peirce’s analysis of semiosis, every *sign* is correlated with an
> *object* and an *interpretant*, and the interrelation of the three is
> called a *triadic relation* because it relates a triad of correlates.
>
>
>
> Peirce’s “categories” could be called a “triad” because there are three of
> them, but Peirce rarely if ever calls them a “triad.” He doesn’t call them
> a “trichotomy” either: they are “irreducible elements” of any and all
> phenomena, according to Peirce’s phaneroscopic analysis, so they are not
> arrived at by dividing phenomena into classes. They are arrived at by
> prescinding from phenomena, by “prescissive abstraction.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
> *Sent:* 3-Aug-17 15:55
>
> Kirsti, List,
>
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard
> to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the
> sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the
> difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
>
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but
> a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is
> the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of
> sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a
> matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a
> quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is
> composed of.
>
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads
> are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that
> they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have
> had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon),
> so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to
> understand both.
>
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just
> does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread gnox

Helmut,

It’s not that complicated.

 

A triad is a set of three — three of anything.

 

A trichotomy is a division of something into three — usually a division of a 
type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, signs can be subdivided into 
three classes, in various ways: icon/index/symbol, rheme/dicisign/argument, and 
so on. Peirce’s classification of signs includes ten trichotomies.

 

In Peirce’s analysis of semiosis, every sign is correlated with an object and 
an interpretant, and the interrelation of the three is called a triadic 
relation because it relates a triad of correlates.

 

Peirce’s “categories” could be called a “triad” because there are three of 
them, but Peirce rarely if ever calls them a “triad.” He doesn’t call them a 
“trichotomy” either: they are “irreducible elements” of any and all phenomena, 
according to Peirce’s phaneroscopic analysis, so they are not arrived at by 
dividing phenomena into classes. They are arrived at by prescinding from 
phenomena, by “prescissive abstraction.” 

 

Gary f.

 

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 3-Aug-17 15:55



Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to 
understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign 
triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference 
between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, 
so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign 
contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The 
answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are 
composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from 
classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a 
legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are 
two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are 
two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had 
understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is 
necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does 
not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut


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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread Jerry Rhee

Helmut, list:



You said:

“Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"?”



To which I would reply:

Consider what effects that might *conceivably* have practical bearings you
*conceive* the objects of your *conception* to have. Then, your *conception* of
those effects is the whole of your *conception* of the object.



“But then, while insisting that hypothetical generalizations should be
“submitted to the minutest criticism before being employed as premisses,”
he declares,

“It appears therefore that in scientific method the nominalists are
entirely right.  Everybody ought to be a nominalist at first, and to
continue in that opinion until he is driven out of it by the force majeure
of irreconcilable facts.

Still he ought to be all the time on the lookout for these facts,
considering how many other powerful minds have found themselves compelled
to come over to realism” [CP 4.1].  From all this, we conclude that though
a nominalist explanation is not *sufficient*, it could be at least
*necessary*?

~ Keeler and Pfeiffer



So then, what is it to be *whole* for all who investigate?



Hth,

Jerry R

On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 4:12 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement:
> I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce-
> reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as
> "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different
> topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is
> refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but not for
> Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for" something "higher"?
> Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s supposition of it, just
> the old continental hybris? But then I could not read on, they wanted my
> email adress. I guess, they want money. Maybe I will give it to them.
> Capitalism is not good, but still much better than this continental drive
> to explain the world in order to rule it.
> Kirsti, List,
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard
> to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the
> sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the
> difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but
> a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is
> the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of
> sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a
> matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a
> quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is
> composed of.
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads
> are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that
> they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have
> had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon),
> so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to
> understand both.
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just
> does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
> philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
> This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
> or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
> left this road.
>
> By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
> are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
> relying on Peircean Categories.
>
> It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
> Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
> reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
> was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
> issues involved.
>
> To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
> misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
> traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
>
> Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> > List,
> > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> > that so? It is my impression.
> > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement:

I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for" something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money. Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to rule it.

Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this road.

By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
relying on Peircean Categories.

It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
issues involved.

To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> that so? It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
> philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
> question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
> 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
> refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
> that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
> developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this road.

By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
relying on Peircean Categories.

It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
issues involved.

To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> that so? It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
> philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
> question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
> 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
> refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
> that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
> developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
>
> In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
> Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
> only
> analytical philosophy.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
> CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
> >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond
> 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
> >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important
> part
> >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
> >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
> >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
> >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
> >
> > Well I think we're saying the

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-03 Thread kirstima

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean 
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. 
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, 
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely 
left this road.

By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they 
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research 
relying on Peircean Categories.

It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work 
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the 
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue 
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the 
issues involved.

To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on 
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only 
work in the context of his work as a whole.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:

List,
Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
that so? It is my impression.
And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
Best,
Helmut

 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
question
 of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
 interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
 triads and triadic thinking (as a method).

 On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
2000's.
 As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
refer
 to the list archives.

 It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
 published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.

 What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
that
 his starting points were different from those most often refered and
 discussed here in the list.

 Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
 familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
developed
 his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.

 In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
 Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
only
 analytical philosophy.

 Best,

 Kirsti

 CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
 >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond

 >> wrote:
 >>
 >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
 >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important
part
 >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
 >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
 >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
 >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
 >
 > Well I think we're saying the same thing the question is more the
 > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity
of
 > structure in general. That's a more subtle point I don't have
 > strong positions on although I'm sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
 > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime
driver.
 > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
 >
 > I'd love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
 > driver.
 >
 > My own beliefs here (which I'm more than happy to change with
 > further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
 > earlier "Pragmatism" from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
 > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong
focus
 > on meaning.
 >
 >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
 >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
 >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
 >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
 >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
 >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is
quite
 >> another affair.
 > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
 >
 > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
 > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
 > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by
asking
 > how his

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-02 Thread Jerry Rhee

Helmust, list:

Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts
are in us.

Best,
J

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is more
> connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is that so?
> It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in opposition
> to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So Peirce has a
> connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental philosophy, and
> maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my impression too, maybe wrong,
> I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
>  kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
>
> In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
> Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only
> analytical philosophy.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
> CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
> >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
> >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
> >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
> >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
> >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
> >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
> >
> > Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
> > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
> > structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
> > strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
> > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
> > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
> >
> > I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
> > driver.
> >
> > My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
> > further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
> > earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
> > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
> > on meaning.
> >
> >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
> >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
> >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
> >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
> >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
> >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
> >> another affair.
> > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
> >
> > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
> > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
> > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
> > how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
> > to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
> > conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
> > pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
> > that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
> > paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
> > signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
> > of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
> > discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
> > be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
> > of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
> > “would be”

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is that so? It is my impression.

And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.

Best,

Helmut

 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question
of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
triads and triadic thinking (as a method).

On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's.
As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer
to the list archives.

It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.

What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that
his starting points were different from those most often refered and
discussed here in the list.

Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed
his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.

In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only
analytical philosophy.

Best,

Kirsti

CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
>> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
>> of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
>> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
>> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
>> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
>> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
>
> Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
> more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
> structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
> strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
> to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
> But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
>
> I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
> driver.
>
> My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
> further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
> earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
> variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
> on meaning.
>
>> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
>> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
>> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
>> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
>> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
>> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
>> another affair.
> (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
>
> He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
> discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
> _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
> how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
> to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
> conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
> pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
> that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
> paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
> signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
> of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
> discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
> be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
> of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
> “would be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.
>
> He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism
> contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning
> using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole
> point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences
> between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and others.
>
> Again, I’m fully willing to be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-01 Thread kirstima

Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question 
of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of 
interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into 
triads and triadic thinking (as a method).


On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's. 
As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer 
to the list archives.


It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto 
Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism" 
published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.


What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that 
his starting points were different from those most often refered and 
discussed here in the list.


Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly 
familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed 
his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.


In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics. 
Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only 
analytical philosophy.


Best,

Kirsti

CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:

On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
(meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.


Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.

I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
driver.

My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
on meaning.


Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
another affair.

 (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)

He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
_total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
“would be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.

He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism
contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning
using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole
point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences
between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and others.

Again, I’m fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far
better versed in the nuances of Peirce’s development than I. But it
really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others over
meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the structure of
the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades.






SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about
what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to
use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now?
Maybe it is both. . .


This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by
Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times
emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while
others at times emphasize

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this 
> classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters 
> to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and expansion 
> of the notion of the Interpretant (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has 
> important structural features, not to be glossed over in my opinion. 

Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the more minor 
issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of structure in 
general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have strong positions on although 
I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti to be claiming: mainly that it was 
meaning that was the prime driver. But I think we all agree with what the 
outcome of that inquiry was.

I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the driver. 

My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with further 
information) come largely from the same paper you quoted earlier “Pragmatism” 
from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different variants of the paper he worked 
with seem to me to show a strong focus on meaning. 

Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of 
metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method 
of ascertaining the meaning of hard words and abstract concepts. All 
pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially ascent to that statement. As to 
the ulterior and idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is 
quite another affair.

(Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)

He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a discussion to 
signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about total meaning in terms of 
counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking how his principles of predication are 
to be proved. He turns for that to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of 
signs is ultimately conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning 
and pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps that 
topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the paper he’s 
shifted from talking about meaning to talking about signification. But that’s 
merely because it’s a more precise way of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) 
I think he continues discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the 
sign can’t be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the 
meaning of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of “would 
be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning. 

He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism contrasting 
them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning using his discussion 
of the sign. To me that implies that the whole point of signs in that 
discussion was to elucidate the differences between his own meaning of 
pragmatism with James, Schiller and others.

Again, I’m fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far better versed in 
the nuances of Peirce’s development than I. But it really seemed to me to be 
that distancing himself from others over meaning that led to his getting into 
deeper nuance in the structure of the object and interpretant than he had in 
previous decades.

> SR:  Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about what 
> Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to use his ideas as 
> we understand them as relevant signposts to now? Maybe it is both. . .
> 
> This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by Stephen. I 
> would say that certain members of this forum at times emphasize the 
> importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while others at times 
> emphasize using his ideas to further contemporary thought. But this appears 
> to be mainly a matter of emphasis, and it seems to me that some of the 
> strongest contributors to this forum see it as a both (that is certainly my 
> position).

If the list is only for understanding the history or exegesis of Peirce’s own 
writings then it’s far too limited to be of that much interest I must confess. 
It’s in application that Peirce’s thought has most value. Whether that be in 
philosophy (my own interest) or chemistry or related fields as others have 
focused on. But if it’s merely dry history of philosophy with no interest in 
relevancy then the list will surely die quickly.

> I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's work on meaning 
> has been more influential than his work in semiotics, especially in recent 
> decades. While it is true that James and Dewey didn't fully (really, not all 
> that mujch) embrace Peirce's work on signs. But this field of modern 
> semeiotics which Peirce had pretty much invented (although drawing from 
> Classical, Medieval, and other sources) was, naturally, both entirely new to 
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread Gary Richmond

Clark,  Stephen R, list,

There a great deal I agree with in your post, Clark, but even more that I
disagree with. But I'll have to respond more fully at a later date. For now
just a few immediate reactions. I will have little to say on Heidegger as I
haven't read his work in years, and I recall thinking while I was reading
him that his emphasis on Being was, at least for me, the fixation on an
empty concept, while his discussions of meaning were for me too vague to be
of much value--at least to me. So, I'm hardly the person to engage on the
thought of Heidegger, let alone the putative relation of his thought to
Peirce's (which I don't see).

CG: Really quickly, how I took Kirsti (and please correct me if I’m reading
wrong) was just that initially Peirce’s focus was on the structure of signs
and later he was thinking through the structure in terms of meaningfulness
that led to some of the innovations in structure in the early 20th century.
(Such as those in his letters to Lady Welby)


But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this
classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters
to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and
expansion of the notion of the Interpretant (meaning, as discussed in my
last post) has important structural features, not to be glossed over in my
opinion.

Yet let me  first clarify something regarding this discussion immediately.
Off-list Stephen Rose wrote (in part; he said he was fine with my sharing
this):

SR:  Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about what
Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to use his ideas as
we understand them as relevant signposts to now? Maybe it is both. . .


This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by Stephen. I
would say that certain members of this forum at times emphasize the
importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while others at times
emphasize using his ideas to further contemporary thought. But this appears
to be mainly a matter of *emphasis*, and it seems to me that some of the
strongest contributors to this forum see it as a both (that is certainly my
position).


Stephen continued: SR: ". . .this discussion seems to me to be related to
the former which is my problem with the effort."


I would say that this particular discussion is "both." But even if part of
the discussion--or even if all of it--were emphasizing what Peirce*
actually* wrote and thought and taught, what's wrong with that?

First, as I see it, if we *are* to reliably and creatively use Peirce's
ideas, we had best understand what he was trying to say. I don't know how
much "precision" is necessarily involved in many discussion, and I*
certainly* don't think that there is any "right" interpretation of Peirce,
who himself syggested that all meaning *must* remain *vague*. while
scientific meanings should aim at whatever precision is important so that
there might be sufficient communication among researchers so as to move the
inquiry forward as efficiently as possible (in an economy of research).

The purpose of the pragmatic maxim would seem to be to help "settle
opinion," which opinion can never be fully settled as the doctrine of
fallibism makes clear enough. But while there may be many possible
different 'good' interpretations of Peirce's thought, there are also some
'bad' interpretations which some on this list think that it is important to
correct.

There's much more to be said about this, but this will have to suffice for
now. Mainly, this side discussion is once again to warn against blocking
the way of inquiry. If one in not interested in a particular thread of
inquiry here, ignore it, and possibly start another thread.

But now continuing with Clark's recent comments:

CG: . . Indeed if Peirce’s thought had an outsized influence, I think it
safe to say it was his work on meaning not signs that was most influential.
It’s worth noting that neither James nor Dewey really fully embrace his
work on signs, only his work on meaning.


I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's work on
meaning has been more influential than his work in semiotics, especially in
recent decades. While it is true that James and Dewey didn't fully (really,
not all that mujch) embrace Peirce's work on signs. But this field of
modern semeiotics which Peirce had pretty much invented (although drawing
from Classical, Medieval, and other sources) was, naturally, both entirely
new to them and quite difficult to fully grasp (as it is even in our day,
although I see some considerable progress in this regard). As I see it,
neither James nor Dewey had studied enough of the developments in the logic
of Peirce's time to fully (much) understand his semiotic (this was
especially so for James, while Peirce did not think very much of Dewey's
work in logic).

CG:  Perhaps because it was his work on signs that quickly became so
forgotten except in vague ways

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread Clark Goble

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That 
> was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at least 
> completely in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about signs and semiotics 
> throughout his life and, as I see it, increasingly so. Indeed his very idea 
> of 'meaning' is near identical to a particular kind of sign, namely, the 
> interpretant.

I don’t disagree with that - I think what I was agreeing with her over was the 
emphasis on meaning. Of course that’s not all that Peirce was focused on. Sorry 
if I suggested deeper disagreement - I was writing quickly. I don’t think 
Heidegger was only focused on meaning either, although that clearly was one of 
his main emphasis. How to take him in that regard is still a matter of debate 
in Heideggarian circles. (Thomas Sheehan has caused a bit of a divide over how 
to take Heidegger - he emphasizes the meaning aspect and thinks the focus of 
being misses the point - many disagree with him both on the place of meaning in 
Heidegger but also the importance of being)

Really quickly, how I took Kirsti (and please correct me if I’m reading wrong) 
was just that initially Peirce’s focus was on the structure of signs and later 
he was thinking through the structure in terms of meaningfulness that led to 
some of the innovations in structure in the early 20th century. (Such as those 
in his letters to Lady Welby) But I always took the main change as arising out 
of a deeper focus on meaning leading him to adopt positions surprisingly 
similar to Hegel at times. So ironically his deeper structural analysis of 
signs arises out of inquiry on meaning. That is recognizing the differences 
within both the object and the interpretant and how the former determines the 
latter.

Since it’s precisely there that I think there’s common ground with the 
Heideggarian stream of phenomenology (particularly the gap between object and 
sign which a guess is required to bridge) this is quite important in my view. 
Those elements, while often present in a primitive fashion in the earlier 
Peirce really are explicated best in his later works.

The second thing I’d add is that the place of the pragmatic maxim is crucial in 
all of this as a verification principle of meaning (not truth as others took 
it). While one obviously can’t fully separate the maxim from his work on signs, 
the place of meaningfulness as a key factor in his thought in some ways exceeds 
his work on signs. Indeed if Peirce’s thought had an outsized influence, I 
think it safe to say it was his work on meaning not signs that was most 
influential. It’s worth noting that neither James nor Dewey really fully 
embrace his work on signs, only his work on meaning. This is arguably true of 
most pragmatists. Even those later figures who seem to be close to aspects of 
Peirce’s signs - say Grice’s work on language - still end up missing the 
crucial insights. Perhaps because it was his work on signs that quickly became 
so forgotten except in vague ways from some of his popular early works that 
continued to be reprinted. Certainly the key formulation from the end of his 
life seem largely unknown.

More later when I get some time.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread Gary Richmond

Clark, Kirsti, list,

Clark, it sounds like you have* a lot* to deal with at the moment, to say
the least! I suppose I do too, although quite very different mattersas upon
returning from the funeral of a close relative, my spouse and I have been
called out of town again to help another relative with some very serious
issues. I'm there now, but with both limited internet access and time. So,
I'll keep this short, and have more to say later. I'll look forward to your
further comments.

You included a comment of Kirsti's on Peirce and signs vs. meaning in you
excerpt from her post stating:

KM: In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his
life after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.

But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That
was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at
least *completely* in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about signs and
semiotics throughout his life and, as I see it, increasingly so. Indeed his
very idea of 'meaning' is near identical to a particular kind of sign,
namely, the interpretant. This is so obvious to most all scholars that I
know of that I had never thought I'd read on this list that for Peirce a
meaning wasn't in fact a kind of sign, that 'sign' and 'meaning' were so
completely different that someone viewing meaning in the context of signs,
of semeiotics, would be "gravely wrong."

In lieu of a discussion, for now all I'm able to contribute to this
disucssion is some excerpts from late (1907) definitions of 'Sign' which
occur in the *Commens *Dictionary. I have put *meaning* and *interpretant*
both in boldface to facilitate study of these passages (note: where
'interpretant' is also italicized, it is so in the original).

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/sign

1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:13-4 "…any sign, of whatsoever kind,
professes to mediate between an Object, on the one hand, that to which it
applies, and which is thus in a sense the cause of the sign, and, on the
other hand, a *Meaning*, or to use a preferable technical term, an
*Interpretant*, that which the sign expresses, the result which it produces
in its capacity as sign."

1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:11-2 " …any sign, of whatever kind, mediates
between an object to some sort of conformity with which it is moulded, and
which thus determines it, and an effect which it is intended to produce,
and which it represents to be the outcome of the object. These two
correlates of the sign have to be carefully distinguished. The former is
called the object of the sign; the latter is the “*meaning*,” or, as I
usually term it, the “*interpretant*” of the sign."

1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:19 "Remember my definition of a “sign,” upon
which I have a right to insist as that of a new term of logic, just as a
zoölogist has a right to define “fish” so as to exclude star-fishes.
jelly-fishes, shell-fish, and whales. A “sign,”, I say, shall beunderstood
as anything which represents itself to convey an influence from an Object,
so that this may intelligently determine a “*meaning*,” or *interpretant*.

1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:14-5 …the" essential nature of a sign is
that it mediates between its Object which is supposed to determine it and
to be, in some sense, the cause of it, and its *Meaning*, or, as I prefer
to say, in order to avoid certain ambiguities, its *Interpretant*, which is
determined by the sign; and is, in a sense, the effect of it; and which the
sign represents to flow as an influence, from the Object. [—] So far, so
good: the Object, the determinant of the Sign, and the *Meaning*, or
*Interpretant*, that which the sign, *as such*, determines, its effect.

1907 [c.] | Pragmatism | MS [R] 321:15-6, 19 "…any sign, of whatsoever
kind, mediates between an Object to some sort of conformity with which it
is moulded, and by which it is thus determined, and an effect which the
sign is intended to bring about, and which it represents to be the outcome
of the object’s influence upon it. It is of the first importance in such
studies as these that the two correlates of the sign should be clearly
distinguished: the Object by which the sign is determined and the *Meaning*,
or as I usually call it, the *Interpretant*, which is determined by the
sign, and through it by the object."

*If *Peirce was increasing interested in meaning (and one can certainly
make a strong argument for his growing interest in the Interpretant), this
in no way suggests that his interest in signs ceased--quite the contrary.

Best,

Gary R

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*Gary Richmond*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread sb


That’s interesting. I was familiar with Derrida’s and of course Habermas but I 
didn’t know there were others.

In Germany there were e.g. Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen von Kempski, Max Bense, his 
wife Elisabeth Walther-Bense, the late Karl-Otto Apel, Klaus Oehler or Helmut 
Pape.

Best,
Stefan


Am 31.07.17 um 22:31 schrieb Clark Goble:

On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life after 
SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.

Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after 
meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek heritance.  And did not accept 
the modern meanings attacted to the basic concepts. - He re-interpreted them.

With this he truly was in line with Peirce.

I think this is right, although the place of Being is different - although even 
there some of the ways Peirce uses the copula is interesting as we discussed 
back in the reading club on Natural Signs.


In 1970's  ( and onwards) Peirce became kind of covertly famous in Europe. His 
writings were studied by the top philosophers. But his name was seldom, if ever 
mentioned.

That’s interesting. I was familiar with Derrida’s and of course Habermas but I 
didn’t know there were others.


Since I read Heidegger's Time and Being, It has been quite clear to me that he 
was after something akin to Peirce. - Kind of muddled Peirce, I thought.

Afterwards I read about all Heidegger has written. And was even more convinced 
that my idea was valid.

I want to respond to Gary in some depth. Unfortunately my kids are starting 
school, my wife is 7 months pregnant, and we have an important client coming at 
work. But I am not posting and running. I think he raises some really important 
issues.





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread Jerry Rhee

Kirsti, list:

If the French style of writing relies on argumentation- within the text at
hand-

and it is assumed that any reader is thoroughly familiar with the sources,

then the reader ought to know that “see-my-otics” has a suffix that is of
Greek origin.

So, what is it we know about what the Greeks knew such that when Peirce
writes, he knew to write to that reader who knew what a Greek did know?

Well, at the very least, we ought to know that a Greek would know that:

“Greek philosophy seems to begin with an absurd notion, with the
proposition that *water* is the primal origin and the womb of all things.

Is it really necessary for us to take serious notice of this proposition?

It is, and for three reasons…

The *first* reason still leaves Thales in the company of the religious and
the superstitious;

the *second* takes him out of such company and shows him as a natural
scientist,

but the *third* makes him the first Greek philosopher.

Subsequent reflection comes with measuring devices and routinizing patterns
and tries to replace analogy with equation and synchronicity with
causality.

The Greeks, among whom Thales stood out so suddenly, were the very opposite
of realists, in that they believed only in the *reality of men and gods*,
looking upon all of nature as but a disguise, a masquerade, or a
metamorphosis of these god-men.

Man, for them was the truth and the core of all things;

everything else was but semblance and the play of illusion.  ..

Herein they were the exact opposite of modern man.  For us, even the most
personal is sublimated back into an abstraction; for them, the greatest
abstraction kept running into a person.

But Thales said, “Not man, but water is the reality of all things.”

Being a mathematician and astronomer, he had turned cold against everything
mythical and allegorical, and if he did not become quite sober enough to
reach the pure abstraction “all things are one,” instead remaining at a
concrete expression of it, he was nonetheless an alien rarity among the
Greeks of his time.

The Greek word designating “sage” is etymologically related to *sapio*, I
taste, *sapiens*, he who tastes, *sisyphos* the man of keenest taste.

A sharp savoring and selecting, a meaningful discriminating, in other
words, makes out the peculiar art of the philosopher, in the eyes of the
people.

Philosophy is distinguished from science by its selectivity and its
discrimination of the unusual, the astonishing, the difficult and the
divine, just as it is distinguished from intellectual cleverness by its
emphasis on the useless.

Science rushes headlong, without selectivity, without "taste," at whatever
is knowable, in the blind desire to know all at any cost.

Philosophical thinking, on the other hand, is ever on the scent of those
things which are most worth knowing, the great and the important insights.

Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid
in determining the *summum bonum*. It is the theory of self-controlled, or
deliberate, conduct.

Now the concept of greatness is changeable, in the realm of morality as
well as in that of esthetics.

And so philosophy starts by legislating greatness.

Part of this is a sort of name-giving.

“Who taught thee me to name?”

*The philosopher seeks to hear within himself the echoes of the world
symphony and to re-project them in the form of concepts*.

"What verse is for the poet, dialectical thinking is for the philosopher.
He grasps for it in order to get hold of his own enchantment, in order to
perpetuate it.

And just as for the dramatist words and verse are but the stammering of an
alien tongue, needed to tell what he has seen and lived, what he could
utter directly only through music or gesture, just so every profound
philosophic intuition expressed through dialectic and through scientific
reflection is the only means for the philosopher to communicate what he has
seen.

But it is a sad means; basically a metaphoric and entirely unfaithful
translation into a totally different sphere and speech. Thus Thales had
seen the unity of all that is, but when he went to communicate it, he found
himself talking about water!”

~ Nietzsche, Tragic Age of the Greeks

*It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything novel in my three
categories; for if they have not, however confusedly, been recognized by
men since men began to think, that condemns them at once.  *

*To make them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is, however, no
small task*.”

~Peirce

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 3:31 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> > On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> > In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his
> life after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.
> >
> > Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was
> after meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread Clark Goble

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life 
> after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.
> 
> Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after 
> meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek heritance.  And did not 
> accept the modern meanings attacted to the basic concepts. - He 
> re-interpreted them.
> 
> With this he truly was in line with Peirce.

I think this is right, although the place of Being is different - although even 
there some of the ways Peirce uses the copula is interesting as we discussed 
back in the reading club on Natural Signs. 

> In 1970's  ( and onwards) Peirce became kind of covertly famous in Europe. 
> His writings were studied by the top philosophers. But his name was seldom, 
> if ever mentioned.

That’s interesting. I was familiar with Derrida’s and of course Habermas but I 
didn’t know there were others. 

> Since I read Heidegger's Time and Being, It has been quite clear to me that 
> he was after something akin to Peirce. - Kind of muddled Peirce, I thought.
> 
> Afterwards I read about all Heidegger has written. And was even more 
> convinced that my idea was valid.

I want to respond to Gary in some depth. Unfortunately my kids are starting 
school, my wife is 7 months pregnant, and we have an important client coming at 
work. But I am not posting and running. I think he raises some really important 
issues.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-31 Thread kirstima

Peirce did not use the term "semantics. But he did use the term: 
"semeiotics". He even gave advice in spelling the word. This was his 
advice: " see-my-o-tics".


Anyone can google this, I assume. If need be.

In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his 
life after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.


Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was 
after meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek heritance.  And 
did not accept the modern meanings attacted to the basic concepts. - He 
re-interpreted them.


With this he truly was in line with Peirce.

In 1970's  ( and onwards) Peirce became kind of covertly famous in 
Europe. His writings were studied by the top philosophers. But his name 
was seldom, if ever mentioned.


The French style of writing philosophy relies on argumentation. Within 
the text at hand. It is kind af assumed that any reader is thoroughly 
famaliar with the sources.


I do not know this much on the German tradition. Continental it was, 
that is sure.


Since I read Heidegger's Time and Being, It has been quite clear to me 
that he was after something akin to Peirce. - Kind of muddled Peirce, I 
thought.


Afterwards I read about all Heidegger has written. And was even more 
convinced that my idea was valid.


Kirsti








CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 30.7.2017 19:52:

On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his
terminology; but from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three
branches of _logica docens_, or logic as semeiotic: namely
speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or, speculative
rhetoric). These branches of logic all concern themselves with the
_study of signs as such_, while phenomenology is, as it were,
pre-logica docens (although it most certainly employs logica utens
as has been discussed on this list as we all employ logic even
before we've reflected on it in a scientific spirit).


My understanding is that for Peirce semiotics (our term) is grounded
in phenomenology or phaneroscopy. So I definitely don’t want to
argue that the semantic extension of terms is the same in the
Heideggarian tradition as in the Peircean tradition. Rather I wish to
argue that via similar influences there is a similarity of content.
Heidegger doesn’t really engage much with semiotics proper - his
focus is primarily on Being arising out of his early work on Scotus
and then via rethinking Husserl’s phenomenology - primarily
intentionality and moving from bracketing/reduction to a general
hermeneutic. Derrida is the one who later takes up semiotics in the
more Heideggarian tradition via his research on Peirce.

So I’ll readily concede some of your points, such as pointing that
some things are metaphysics rather than phenomenology for Peirce. But
again I think we have to distinguish between the content of the two
movements versus the terminology used to describe that content. I
think the latter gets focused on to the detriment of thinking through
the former.


In truth this more scientific logical _trivium_ goes back very far
indeed, to the Romans, Peirce writes:


Yes, while we often look to Peirce’s engagement with the
scholastics, particularly Scotus, a lot of this can be found in the
tradition of platonism and stoicism in late antiquity. I’ll confess
I’ve not read or studied much of Peirce’s engagement with such
figures although I know he was very well read in the texts available -
particularly Proclus and similar figures.


So while I agree that in Heidegger as in Peirce that there is no
_bracketing or reduction_ or _psychologism_ or _egoic intentiality_
as there is in Husserl, yet speculative grammar (as a branch of
logic) is, in Peirce's classification of the sciences, further down
in the list of sciences and, so, draws principles from it and not
the reverse. This is quite different from your commenting that,
"like Peirce, Heidegger uses [speculative grammar] as a stepping off
point" for his phenomenology. Quite the contrary in my opinion.






Let me think through this a bit. Although my initial inclination is to
note that in terms of thinking through issues it’s different from
the position in the taxonomy of Peirce. That is while phenomenology
ultimately grounds signs and signs these later fields that doesn’t
entail that in inquiry the process of thinking proceeds solely in that
direction. But you raise some good points and I’ll have some further
comments later.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-30 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but 
> from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of logica docens, or 
> logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or, 
> speculative rhetoric). These branches of logic all concern themselves with 
> the study of signs as such, while phenomenology is, as it were, pre-logica 
> docens (although it most certainly employs logica utens as has been discussed 
> on this list as we all employ logic even before we've reflected on it in a 
> scientific spirit). 

My understanding is that for Peirce semiotics (our term) is grounded in 
phenomenology or phaneroscopy. So I definitely don’t want to argue that the 
semantic extension of terms is the same in the Heideggarian tradition as in the 
Peircean tradition. Rather I wish to argue that via similar influences there is 
a similarity of content. Heidegger doesn’t really engage much with semiotics 
proper - his focus is primarily on Being arising out of his early work on 
Scotus and then via rethinking Husserl’s phenomenology - primarily 
intentionality and moving from bracketing/reduction to a general hermeneutic. 
Derrida is the one who later takes up semiotics in the more Heideggarian 
tradition via his research on Peirce.

So I’ll readily concede some of your points, such as pointing that some things 
are metaphysics rather than phenomenology for Peirce. But again I think we have 
to distinguish between the content of the two movements versus the terminology 
used to describe that content. I think the latter gets focused on to the 
detriment of thinking through the former.

> In truth this more scientific logical trivium goes back very far indeed, to 
> the Romans, Peirce writes: 

Yes, while we often look to Peirce’s engagement with the scholastics, 
particularly Scotus, a lot of this can be found in the tradition of platonism 
and stoicism in late antiquity. I’ll confess I’ve not read or studied much of 
Peirce’s engagement with such figures although I know he was very well read in 
the texts available - particularly Proclus and similar figures.

> So while I agree that in Heidegger as in Peirce that there is no bracketing 
> or reduction or psychologism or egoic intentiality as there is in Husserl, 
> yet speculative grammar (as a branch of logic) is, in Peirce's classification 
> of the sciences, further down in the list of sciences and, so, draws 
> principles from it and not the reverse. This is quite different from your 
> commenting that, "like Peirce, Heidegger uses [speculative grammar] as a 
> stepping off point" for his phenomenology. Quite the contrary in my opinion. 

Let me think through this a bit. Although my initial inclination is to note 
that in terms of thinking through issues it’s different from the position in 
the taxonomy of Peirce. That is while phenomenology ultimately grounds signs 
and signs these later fields that doesn’t entail that in inquiry the process of 
thinking proceeds solely in that direction. But you raise some good points and 
I’ll have some further comments later.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-29 Thread John F Sowa


On 7/28/2017 5:07 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

when [Peirce] uses “intentional” in an ordinary context, it means
pretty much the same as it typically does in ordinary usage today.
For instance, CP 1.334 (c. 1905)...


Yes.  And note the definition of 'intentional' that he wrote
for the _Century Dictionary_ (1889):
"1. Done with intention, design, or purpose;intended;designed."

See http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/intention.jpg

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-28 Thread gnox

Clark, you wrote that for Peirce, “Intentionality is from object through signs 
rather than anything like an ego or directness.” I don’t see that this applies 
to Peirce’s use of the terms “intention” or “intentional,” and that makes it 
difficult for me to see what your sentence means. Can you supply a relevant 
quote or two from Peirce?

 

He did use the ancient technical terms “first intention” and “second intention” 
as they had been used by the Latin logicians; but when uses “intentional” in an 
ordinary context, it means pretty much the same as it typically does in 
ordinary usage today. For instance, CP 1.334 (c. 1905):

[[ No doubt there is a marked difference between the active and intentional 
volition of muscular contraction and the passive and unintentional volition 
that gives the shock of surprise and the sense of externality. But the two are 
to be classed together as alike modes of double consciousness, that is, of 
awareness, at once and in the same awareness, of an ego and a non-ego. ]]

This usage doesn’t seem to me compatible with your sentence that I quoted 
above, so I’d need some explanation of what your sentence means.

 

Gary f.

 

} We don't know who discovered water, but we're certain it wasn't a fish. 
[source unknown] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 28-Jul-17 12:39
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

 

The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We 
know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology 
and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for 
psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or bracketing in 
Peirce’s thought and intentionality is completely inverse from 
Brentano/Husserl. Intentionality is from object through signs rather than 
anything like an ego or directness. Consciousness just isn’t an issue the way 
it is for the more Cartesian inclined phenomenologists. Peirce’s sense of 
intentionality arises not from the conceptions developed in the modern era but 
from Scotus’ notion of first and second intentions.

 

I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little resemblance to 
Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it is both on the nature 
of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger breaks from Husserl. 
Heidegger too turned to Scotus and particularly Scotus’ notion of 
intentionality. Following Scotus Heidegger saw a distinction between ideal 
meaning and real Being that the intended meanings must be a priori in some 
sense. For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the a priori structures 
of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ Grammatica Speculativa.

 

Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments 
dictionary there are quite a few entries for Speculative Grammar that are tied 
to Scotus’ thought. These are the conditions of signs as signs. (See CP 1.444 
for example)

 

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/speculative-grammar

 

Like Peirce, Heidegger uses this as a stepping off point. Meaning becomes 
autonomous due to this a priori structure. That is fundamentally Heidegger 
breaks with Husserl over these same aspects of psychologism. The main place one 
might see a difference is over the meaning of an individual soul. Peirce sees 
individuals as symbols - arising out of these phenomenological structures in 
acts. Heidegger comes close, seeing historicity in the individual soul where 
these acts occur. Yet at the same time Heidegger’s notion of “living spirit” 
bears similarities to Peirce’s conception of universe in terms of sign. 
Unfortunately this is most pronounced in the early Heidegger rather than the 
more interesting Heidegger of the late 20’s and early 30’s. Yet the shift tends 
to maintain the a priori structure from his engagement with Scotus combined 
with a more historical sense. 

 

So I’m not saying they are doing the same thing, but I do think they are more 
commensurate than many think. (Unlike Husserl)

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-28 Thread Gary Richmond

Dear Clark, list,

I'm not sure what you're suggesting here. You wrote:

CG:  For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the *a priori* structures
of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ *Grammatica Speculativa.*

Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments
dictionary there are quite a few entries for Speculative Grammar that are
tied to Scotus’ thought. These are the conditions of signs as signs. (See
CP 1.444 for example)

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/speculative-grammar


But the quotation you pointed to--as well as the others given in the
*Commens* dictionary entry on "Speculative Grammar"--makes it clear that as
Peirce employs it, *Grammatica Speculativa* is the first branch of logic,
to be followed by what he often calls Crtiic, or Critical Logic.

1896 [c.] | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories from
within | CP 1.444

But besides being logical in the sense of demanding a logical analysis, our
inquiry also relates to two as a conception of logic. The term “logic” is
unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower
sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of
truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of
thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs),
it is general semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the
general conditions of signs being signs (which Duns Scotus called *grammatica
speculativa*), also of the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it
coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of
meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another,
ought, for the sake of taking advantage of an old association of terms, be
called *rhetorica speculativa*, but which I content myself with
inaccurately calling *objective logic*, because that conveys the correct
idea that it is like Hegel’s logic.

By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but
from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of *logica docens*,
or logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic
(or, speculative rhetoric). These branches of logic all concern themselves
with the *study of signs as such*, while phenomenology is, as it were,
pre-logica docens (although it most certainly employs logica utens as has
been discussed on this list as we all employ logic even before we've
reflected on it in a scientific spirit).

In truth this more scientific logical *trivium* goes back very far indeed,
to the Romans, Peirce writes:


In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, and rhetoric were felt to be akin and
to make up a rounded whole called the *trivium*. This feeling was just; for
the three disciplines named correspond to the three essential branches of
semeiotics, of which the first, called *speculative grammar* by Duns
Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a sign; the second, the
leading part of logic, best termed *speculative critic*, studies the ways
in which a sign can be related to the object independent of it that it
represents; while the third is the speculative rhetoric … (from 1904 | Ideas,
Stray or Stolen, about scientific writing. No. 1 | EP 2:326-27).

So while I agree that in Heidegger as in Peirce that there is no *bracketing
or reduction* or *psychologism* or *egoic intentiality* as there is in
Husserl, yet speculative grammar (as a branch of logic) is, in Peirce's
classification of the sciences, further down in the list of sciences and,
so, draws principles from it and not the reverse. This is quite different
from your commenting that, "like Peirce, Heidegger uses [speculative
grammar] as a stepping off point" for his phenomenology. Quite the contrary
in my opinion.

Except that some have argued that those 'structures' or 'characters' which
the phenomenologist observes must almost quasi-necessarily be signs. Now, I
don't personally hold that position--except when one is *reflectively
*examining
phenomenological structure such that, as you wrote: "Peirce sees
individuals as symbols - arising out of these phenomenological structures
in acts." While I'm exactly sure of your meaning after the dash, Peirce did
most certainly see persons as symbols. Yet, it is clear that whenever
Peirce is discussing speculative grammar (there may be some early, isolated
exceptions to this), that he is concerned with signs as they are studied by
the logician, not the phenomenologist (although it has occasionally occured
to me there may be a phenomenological utens in addition to the science
we're discussing).

Finally, your remark: "Heidegger’s notion of “living spirit” bears
similarities to Peirce’s conception of universe in terms of sign" seems to
me to relate less to phenomenology or logic than to semeiotic than to
metaphysics.

Best,

Gary R./

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-28 Thread John F Sowa


On 7/28/2017 12:39 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little 
resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it 
is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger 
breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned to Scotus and particularly 
Scotus’ notion of intentionality.


That's a significant point.  I recall reading somewhere (unfortunately
I lost the notes) that Heidegger starting reading a German translation
of some of Peirce's writings in the last few months of his life.
(He died on 26 May 1976).

He seemed to be very absorbed in whatever it was that caught his
attention.  But the author who wrote the article I read didn't say
(and very likely did not know) what it was that Heidegger found
so interesting.

Does anyone recall seeing anything along those lines?

John

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[PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-28 Thread Clark Goble

The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We 
know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology 
and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for 
psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or bracketing in 
Peirce’s thought and intentionality is completely inverse from 
Brentano/Husserl. Intentionality is from object through signs rather than 
anything like an ego or directness. Consciousness just isn’t an issue the way 
it is for the more Cartesian inclined phenomenologists. Peirce’s sense of 
intentionality arises not from the conceptions developed in the modern era but 
from Scotus’ notion of first and second intentions.

I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little resemblance to 
Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it is both on the nature 
of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger breaks from Husserl. 
Heidegger too turned to Scotus and particularly Scotus’ notion of 
intentionality. Following Scotus Heidegger saw a distinction between ideal 
meaning and real Being that the intended meanings must be a priori in some 
sense. For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the a priori structures 
of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ Grammatica Speculativa.

Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments 
dictionary there are quite a few entries for Speculative Grammar that are tied 
to Scotus’ thought. These are the conditions of signs as signs. (See CP 1.444 
for example)

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/speculative-grammar 


Like Peirce, Heidegger uses this as a stepping off point. Meaning becomes 
autonomous due to this a priori structure. That is fundamentally Heidegger 
breaks with Husserl over these same aspects of psychologism. The main place one 
might see a difference is over the meaning of an individual soul. Peirce sees 
individuals as symbols - arising out of these phenomenological structures in 
acts. Heidegger comes close, seeing historicity in the individual soul where 
these acts occur. Yet at the same time Heidegger’s notion of “living spirit” 
bears similarities to Peirce’s conception of universe in terms of sign. 
Unfortunately this is most pronounced in the early Heidegger rather than the 
more interesting Heidegger of the late 20’s and early 30’s. Yet the shift tends 
to maintain the a priori structure from his engagement with Scotus combined 
with a more historical sense. 

So I’m not saying they are doing the same thing, but I do think they are more 
commensurate than many think. (Unlike Husserl)



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