Re: A challenge for Craig

On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz wrote: > If I might just butt in (said the barman)... > > It seems to me that Craig's insistence that "nothing is Turing emulable, > only the measurements are" expresses a different ontological assumption from > the one that computationalists take for granted. It'

Re: Aaronson's paper

On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:30:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: > On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a > > 1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in > > physics. Even when talking about the

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 30 September 2013 16:56, meekerdb wrote: > > I think it's just definitional. What constitutes "you". If you see > someone else throw dice and you're bound to follow different actions > depending on how they fall then you're a slave to randomness. If you > decide to throw the dice in order t

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 30 September 2013 16:59, Russell Standish wrote: > > "Throwing dice inside my head" is part of me, part of the entity > making the decision, using a dice thrown externally to me is just > abrogating my free will to an external agent. > Sorry I still don't see the diference, if the dice is sti

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 9/29/2013 8:39 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb > wrote: On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote: The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to rando

Re: Aaronson's paper

On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 04:39:28PM +1300, LizR wrote: > On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb wrote: > > > On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote: > > > > On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish wrote: > > > >> The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the > >> will is ra

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb wrote: > On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish wrote: > >> The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the >> will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction >> between the

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish > wrote: The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction between the will and the rand

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 9/29/2013 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity. It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or duplication, as this only would only made the will more slave,

Re: A challenge for Craig

Fascinating post. The "illusion of qualia" is perhaps something like the "illusion of consciousness" - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who makes the grass green?) My 2c on the Turing Test is that "ELIZA" passed it, so if you're being pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) -

Re: A challenge for Craig

If I might just butt in (said the barman)... It seems to me that Craig's insistence that "nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are" expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if we make a flight simulator, we

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish wrote: > > I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a > 1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in > physics. Even when talking about the self-other distinction in (say) > bacteria, it is our modelling th

Re: Aaronson's paper

On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:03:15PM +1300, LizR wrote: > On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish wrote: > > > The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the > > will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction > > between the will and the random source

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 9/29/2013 2:03 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren meekerdb : On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: ... Also, you can run the copy inside a virtual environment and then the copies will never diverge. ?? I don't think so. Insofar as they are classical objects they depend on decoh

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish wrote: > The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the > will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction > between the will and the random source. > I don't see this. The random source here is the laws of phy

Re: Aaronson's paper

On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity. > It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or > duplication, as this only would only made the will more slave, to > randomness, instead of of ponder

Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology

On 30 September 2013 12:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Sensation is a kind of sense and computation is a kind of sensemaking, but > computation by itself can have no sensation. > So on this view the brain can't be an "organic computer" because it experiences sensations? -- You received this mes

Re: The canal effect

On 30 September 2013 12:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > Although this is lateral to what I wanted to say,... the decline > standpoint is just the opposite of the "the heaven is coming" of the > uthopians. The latter is genuinelly western and postchristian (I would say > puritan) > Yes, interest

Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology

"But it really all comes down to the confluence of these various factors that allows us to have this conversation in the first place," Numbers can't have a confluence though. It's not sensation that is primary, but sense. Sensation is a kind of sense and computation is a kind of sensemaking, bu

Re: The canal effect

2013/9/29 meekerdb > On 9/29/2013 4:05 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to > the western world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of > salvation. > > > The Greeks thought they had declined from a golden ag

Re: The canal effect

The danger is to think that all questions are seen through a filter of culture and language, *therefore* we don't get any closer to the truth. This is the mistake that makes postmodernism (as a philosophy) useless, and is of course what science is designed to avoid, as much as is humanly possible,

Re: Aaronson's paper

Citeren meekerdb : On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren meekerdb : On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish wrote: For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to s

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren meekerdb : On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish wrote: For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to summarise the intense d

Re: The canal effect

On 9/29/2013 4:05 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to the western world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of salvation. The Greeks thought they had declined from a golden age - long before heard of Christia

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 9/29/2013 12:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As he knows in advance that he will feel, whoever he is, live only one (again, from The 1-pov). But that sentence is hard to parse. "Whoever he is" implies there is only one "he", as if he is a soul that goes to either Moscow or Washington but not b

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 2:56 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> Does "comp" mean every event must have a cause? That question has a >> simple yes or no answer, and you made up the word so you must know the >> answer, what is it? If it's yes then I don't believe in this thing you call >> "comp". >> > > > But

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 Bruno Marchal wrote: > And "cause" is a complex high level notion. > A cause is complex and at a high level only if the effect is complex and at a high level. If Z is at the fundamental level (assuming there really is such a level and causes and effects aren't infinitely nes

Re: Aaronson's paper

On 29 Sep 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish wrote: For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to summarise the intense discussion we had earlier this year on this topic, but that w

Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology

On the other hand, is there is a great plan, if this is all a great program, with biological recursion, imitating cosmological performance, then does this work well for you? Or, better stated, what benefit does being aware of this observation, benefit yourself, or the rest of humanity? I may be

Re: Aaronson's paper

Citeren meekerdb : On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish wrote: For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to summarise the intense discussion we had earlier this year on this topi

Re: The canal effect

Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to the western world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of salvation. 2013/9/29 chris peck > Hi Alberto > > Were there ever genuinely naked questions? ie. Was there really a time > when ideas were not fr

RE: The canal effect

Hi Alberto Were there ever genuinely naked questions? ie. Was there really a time when ideas were not framed by the exciting possibilities offered by the contemporary technology? All the best --- Original Message --- From: "Alberto G. Corona" Sent: 29 September 2013 7:59 PM To: "everything-l

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply. >> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki, >> before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will >> feel to be, from his first person point of view. ---

The canal effect

I knew yesterday that the reason why Percival Lowel (and many others) saw canals -and life- in Mars is because at this time the Panama Canal was being constructed, and this novelty captivated the imagination of the people. everithing had a solution with a canal. And everything could be solved and

Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology

On 28 Sep 2013, at 21:53, LizR wrote: On 28 September 2013 21:15, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Sep 2013, at 09:44, LizR wrote: So not an ongoing computation performed by the universe, What does that mean? Actually I think I got confused, it isn't Max T who suggested that, but didn't some

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 9/28/2013 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Sep 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 Russell Standish wrote: > I do remember a conversation you had with Bruno about 5 years ago when you were discussing what a man in

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:25, meekerdb wrote: On 9/28/2013 12:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Prohibition is only a technic to sell a lot of drugs, without quality control, nor price control, + the ability to directly target all kids on all streets, making huge black markets, and leading to

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 28 Sep 2013, at 16:58, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Everett mention what you call "feeling of identity", which is a consequence of modeling the observer by a machine It doesn't matter if "modeling the observer by a machine" is valid or n