Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
consciousness. The QM state, by definition,
Peter Jones writes:
Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total
conscious state.
I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque
re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than
one computational state. A computational state is
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 07:00:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular
Russell Standish writes:
OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
involved, but it is presumably finite.
Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1
green. The information describing one of these apples is the
component I was
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was using quantum state as synonymous with physical state, which I guess
is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a
classical
universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one
branch
of the multiverse.
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Also see my reply to Russell below:
Russell Standish
The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
1Z wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
are partially right.
The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
about a block universe is that there is no A-series,
not
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
that can be extracted from
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 08:53:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
involved, but it is presumably finite.
Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1
green.
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
that
Russell Standish writes:
If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
that can be extracted from observation.
Functionalism explicitly
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Also see my reply to Russell below:
Russell Standish
The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
an eigenvalue of, the state
Russell Standish wrote:
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 02:37:10AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Barbour argues the same way you do. But he does concede that his
argument is not yet proven. The trouble is that in the case of, for
instance, the electron, in the example you give, there is still an
environment external
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 03:21:52AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular
Russell Standish wrote:
Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible
observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is
certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's
Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to
have
Marc Geddes writes:
The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer
moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are
already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas
disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 06:02:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible
observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is
certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being
living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments
of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate
processes run in parallel on the one machine, and
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Also see my reply to Russell below:
Russell Standish
The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum
state is an observer
Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all
variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially
right *if* we
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating
observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest
above, you
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
and the 'Flowing River'
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating
observer moments with parts of the block universe. But
1Z wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
are partially right.
The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
about a block universe is that there is no A-series,
not that there is a B-series. This
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 03:38:13AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
the faulty idea that one can reason about
: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make
: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
agreed
Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
agreed-upon
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the
difference between
consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently
living through a virtual
Sure, but I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit :
That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists,
structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not
Platonists.
After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers.
Of course not.
If they say
that they are
Brent Meeker wrote:
But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The
quantum
world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some
probability.
Only under MWI.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the
difference between
consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living
through a virtual
Sure, but I don't see how I am
Bruno Marchal writes:
It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes
on no
physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object -
I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be
careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter
Le 06-oct.-06, à 19:51, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
summarise, he states that one
of the requirements for a conscious
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be
careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
That is exactly what mathematical Platonism
Brent Meeker writes:
It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no
physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also
consistent
to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and
that
perhaps if
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be
careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
That is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no
physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also
consistent
to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on
no
physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is
also consistent
to say that it supervenes on a recording, or
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For how would a1/a1b1
know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the
multiverse?
Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more
absurd than saying recordings can be
On Sat, Oct 07, 2006 at 02:25:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The quantum
world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with
some probability.
And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type
of argument could be just an argument in favor
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on
no
physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is
also consistent
to say that it supervenes
Russell Standish writes:
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For how would a1/a1b1
know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of
the multiverse?
Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
summarise, he states that one
of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the
trivial case of a recording, a
Le 06-oct.-06, à 13:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
summarise, he states that one
of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
summarise, he states that one
of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the
trivial case of a
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he
states that one
of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial
case of a recording, a
machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. He then
proposes a second
Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument:
For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you
can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is
arbitrarily low, and even
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