Re: Interactions between mind and brain

On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're say

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 10/22/2012 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Schmidhuber does not consider ontology at all. He merely asks the question "What if we're living inside a universal dovetailer?". Hi Russell, That is an ontological question in my thinking, but I will not quibble this point. He doesn't ask

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 01:45:11PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > >On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: > >>Hi Rusell, > >> > >> How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources? > >> > >>-- > >>Onward! > >

Re: A test for solipsism

On 10/22/2012 4:12 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not? Hi Alberto, C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it would not be. Hi Alberto, After reading my own post agai

Re: A test for solipsism

On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not? Hi Alberto, C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it would not be. 2012/10/22 Stephen P. King > On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger

Re: Code length = probability distribution

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King > On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > > > 2012/10/22 Russell Standish > >> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: >> > Hi Rusell, >> > >> > How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources? >> > >> > -- >> > Onwa

Re: A test for solipsism

C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not? 2012/10/22 Stephen P. King > On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > >> >> >> Hi Bruno and Roger, >> >> What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie >> from a person that does not see the world external to it as anyt

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is"

On Monday, October 22, 2012 1:39:32 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > The reasons of my neurons are not my personal reasons. > > > True. And it's also true that the letter "e" is not Shakespeare's play > "Hamlet", but its part of it. > By that a

Re: Interactions between mind and brain

On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's no

Re: A test for solipsism

On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? -- Onward! Stephen Hi Stephan,

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/22 Russell Standish > On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: > Hi Rusell, > > How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources? > > -- > On

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On 22 Oct 2012, at 04:32, meekerdb wrote: On 10/21/2012 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states of sleep. Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical reasoning where we suppose the "brain state" are obtained by

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Rusell, How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources? -- Onward! Stephen No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is that the Great Prog

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is"

On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote: > The reasons of my neurons are not my personal reasons. True. And it's also true that the letter "e" is not Shakespeare's play "Hamlet", but its part of it. > Neurons deal in GABA and acetylcholine. I deal in paychecks and days off. > Different level

Re: AGI

On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more relevant list-post sometimes. You wrote about the U-M: "...an entity capable of computing all partial

Re: Continuous Game of Life

Hi Roger, You just describe the non-comp conviction. You don't give any argument. With comp, you are the owner of an infinity of machine, it does not matter if it is in silicon or carbon, as long as the components do the right relative things in the most probable history. You are just ins

Re: 3p(1p) = FALSE, 3p(3p(1p))) = TRUE (?)

On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:04, Roger Clough wrote: Dear Bruno, WHOEVER: Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is any restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any arbitrary recursion of 1p content? BRUNO: We assume comp. If a digital computer processes

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:03, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This does not implies a reality created by an UD algorithm. It may be a mathematical universe, that is a superset of the computable universes. The computable universe is a subset of the mathematical universe. Just compare: the computable

Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists

On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie > definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind > but it can still behave just as a real person would. > > But that assum

Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of > view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some > theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. > > This is the re

Re: Solipsism = 1p

On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:37, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I t

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 10/22/2012 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/22 Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> I stop

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 21 Oct 2012, at 19:46, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of t

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote > I think you are missing something. It is a problem that I noticed after > watching the movie "The Prestige" In my opinion "The Prestige" is the best movie made in the last 10 years, and this is one of those rare instances where the movie was

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 21 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi John, On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, especially in my identification as "responding to relations". Now the "Self"? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level

One more nail in comp's coffin.

Hi Bruno, My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have consciousness as well. Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p' -- because, let's say, it's less int

Re: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2

On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:00:29 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > Good. But I think either you have to be more specific > about your definitions or else specify more broadly, > like in terms of categories. > http://multisenserealism.com > > Also, your definition of

Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:08:14 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act. > And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized > zombie know which option to take in any given situation ? > If you

Re: a criticism of comp

On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:45, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote: (previously) > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Comp cannot give subjective content, BRUNO: This is equivalent to saying that comp is false. By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get th

Re: A test for solipsism

On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:25, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say "No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. " My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with. If he has no mind, he could not know what

Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt

On 21 Oct 2012, at 12:52, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle "...the uncertainty principle is inherent in the properties of all wave-like systems" Formally yes, but the meaning of the uncertainty principle is very different acco

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we >> would expect some scientific evidence of this. > > > These words are a scientific evidence of this. The atoms of my brain are > being manipulated from the top down. I

Re: Interactions between mind and brain

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King > On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King >> wrote: >> >> If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would const

A plausibility proof for comp

Hi Bruno, This may not be the final answer, but the I Ching demonstrates that comp is possible. That Yi is a complete, homogeneous (and all of that good stuff) semantic field, the set of all possible human experiences to 64 bit resolution (the hexagrams) in numerical (binary) form. When I say "

Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012/10/22 Jason Resch > > > On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark wrote: > >> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there

Re: Re: The p-zombie is a strawman argument

Hi Stathis Papaioannou IMHO a zombie ought to be defined in such a way that you could be fooled. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/22/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiv

Re: a paper by Karl Svozil

Hi Karl, You have a good sense of humor. Perhaps this might be virtual science fiction, or perhaps a zombie novel or biography. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/22/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: St

Re: Re: A test for solipsism

Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? -- Onward! Stephen Hi Stephan, That sounds like autism to me. Roger

Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

Hi Craig Weinberg OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act. And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized zombie know which option to take in any given situation ? I don't think options would be sophisticated enough to fool anybody. But perhaps I am

Re: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2

Hi Craig Weinberg Good. But I think either you have to be more specific about your definitions or else specify more broadly, like in terms of categories. Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but I myself want to know how thinking is done. What is thinking ? Roger Clough, rclo..