Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 10/6/2013 10:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs got mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer. Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the relationship between Bp, Bpp, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I pronoun in English. I understand Bp can be read as I can prove p, and Bpp as I know p. But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bpp is entirely in the verb, the pronoun I stays the same, AFAICT. Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read as he can prove p, and Bpp as he knows p, so the person order of the pronoun is also not relevant. Notice though how different I can prove the 4-color theorem. is from The 4-color theorem is true. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote: On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case where Leibniz identity rule fails, If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most certainly has NOT failed. I was talking on the rule: a = b a = c entails that b = c The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy) But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally). The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try to understand. There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the most easy part of the reasoning. Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested in learning. Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret especially the last comment by Ron Maimon. I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams. Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers. But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often just to get enough funding to survive. Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem. Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question! How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral part of research. For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more fundamental question than knowledge itself. --- I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily. Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what humans fear the most and like the less. What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is to reduce uncertainty. The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/ uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a sort of equilibrium in between. That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science psychology and entropy. That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish) and faith. As I will explain: To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the world around in order to predict better the future. But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common commintment to something or someone. The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come. Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us. Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others rely more in other different in this equation. These different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need to change. In the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion. A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this starting point. The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important separation of powers. Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are a bit out of topic here, I think. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the W-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday But I am still Bruno Marchal, apparently. The FPI depends on that appearance. But the M-guy is not the W-guy True, but the H-guy and the M-guy and the M-guy are all Bruno Marchal because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. That's my point. OK. The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician. That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please. and which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says is very very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum Mechanics says is crystal clear This is simply false. Look at the debate in the literature. See the link given just now by Brent. In this list most believe that QM is slightly more understandable with the MWI. Not all problems are solved. Anyway, it is simpler in the first six steps of the UDA, where the situation is utterly transparent, given the protocol, and the definition of 1-I and 3-I. and it gets the job done; in contrast when your ideas are not opaque they are logically inconsistent. You should prove statement like that, with specific quote and references. Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct prediction he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only Helsinki; You can apply that idea to the guy who throw a coin. You would say that such a guy can only predict that he will throw a coin. This is ridiculous, frankly. not that predictions, good or bad, have the slightest thing to do with a feeling of continuity or feeling of self. If that did not exist, no probabilities at all would ever make sense. (Note that formally your remark is met by the Dt in the formal approach, but it is met by simple common sense in UDA). And if you want to say that Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy is dead then fine, but then you must also say that Bruno Marchal of yesterday is dead and personally I don't want to torture the language more that I have to under these very odd circumstances of self duplication. And we can't do that, because it would make comp false. you fake misunderstanding Why on earth would I, or anyone, pretend not to understand something when they really did? Because you would ask question, instead of asserting that there is something false, without being able to say what. Bruno of the most easy part of the reasoning. If this is the clearest reasoning in your proof then I'm doubly glad I didn't read anymore. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and not of the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person if it emulates the correct level. But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. I agree. Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of comp) are wrong. Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the difference. People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred consciousness, Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at different times. Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- potential events which relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.) Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous statement. Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my solution to the combination problem here: http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ What it means is that it is a mistake to say we can be a partial zombie - rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what is conscious after that is less of us. OK. As Chardin said, we are not human beings having from time to time some divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time human experiences ... This is because consciousness is not a function or a process, OK it is the sole source of presence. Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical- verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 07 Oct 2013, at 06:24, chris peck wrote: Hi Brent This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things remain the same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't flow. Or the human body has an underlying form and structure that gets maintained as the constituent matter comes and goes. It is the abstract relationship between elements that constitutes identity rather than the elements themselves. I would think this reading of Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a neo-patonist. I would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he would really be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural numbers from which 'shadows of us' are derived. In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in comp. This is the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he violates in step 3. Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? Bruno I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a probability. Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he explicitly assigns probability: This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1- indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” All the best Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) JC should read this: http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a probability. Brent Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote: Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs got mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer. Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the relationship between Bp, Bpp, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I pronoun in English. As I said, in natural language we usually mix 1-I (Bp) and 3-I (Bp p). The reason is that we think we have only one body, and so, in all practical situation it does not matter. (That's also why some people will say I am my body, or I am my brain, like Searles, which used that against comp, but if that was valid, the math shows that machines can validly shows that they are not machine, which is absurd). The difference 1-I/3-I is felt sometimes by people looking at a video of themselves. The objective situation can describe many people, and you feel bizarre that you are one of them. That video lacks of course the first person perspective. The distinction is brought when we study the mind body problem. You might red the best text ever on this: the Theaetetus of Plato. But the indians have written many texts on this, and some are chef-d'oeuvre (rigorous). I understand Bp can be read as I can prove p, and Bpp as I know p. But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bpp is entirely in the verb, the pronoun I stays the same, AFAICT. Correct. Only the perspective change. Bp is Toto proves p, said by Toto. Bp p is Toto proves p and p is true, as said by Toto (or not), and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but not arithmetical predicate). So, the ideally correct machine will never been able to ascribe a name or a description to it. Intuitively, for the machine, that I is not assertable, and indeed such opertair refer to something without a name. Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read as he can prove p, but the point is that it is asserted by he, in the language of he. and Bpp as he knows p, so the person order of the pronoun is also not relevant. Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of the 1-view. Let us define [o]p by Bp p I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p). Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God: G* proves (Bp p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution. a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy. Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking. (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers. People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: Clark. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 07 Oct 2013, at 10:20, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Russell): Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of the 1-view. I meant: you get only the 3-view ON the 1-view. Not of. Sorry, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Hi Bruno Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. regards From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:G* proves (Bp p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution. a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking. (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: Clark. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com Hi Bruno * Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?* I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. regards It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... it's the same. Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. Quentin -- From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God: G* proves (Bp p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution. a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy. Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking. (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers. People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: Clark. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit
RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Quentin Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very seriously by Everetians and their critics. In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be similar in that regard. So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all. It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not two of me yet ... But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com Hi Bruno Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. regards It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... it's the same. Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. Quentin From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God: G* proves (Bp p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution. a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy. Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Quentin Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very seriously by Everetians and their critics. In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be similar in that regard. So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all. It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not two of me yet ... But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here. I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever), _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person, each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy. Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation. So when you make a statement about the probability of something happening, you are always making a statement about a possible continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a mysterious property called randomness. You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway. I think. Telmo. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com Hi Bruno Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. regards It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... it's the same. Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. Quentin From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Hi Chris, On 07 Oct 2013, at 13:39, chris peck wrote: Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive. P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) events. Yet, the idea that using teleportation, or just saying yes to the doctor, is suicidal, is a reasonable argument against comp. This can be made clearer by allowing an overlapping of the original and the copy. That is, the copy is reconstituted before, and perhaps in front of the original, and then the original is annihilated. Here comp implies that you will still survive such an experiment, yet there is (before the duplication) a probability 1/2 that you will be annihilated. I can imagine that some policy will forbid such overlapping. I can imagine some policy enforcing them, as it is the only case where the original can be sure that the reconstitution is done. This can be used to realize that we are probably all the same person, and so we survive anyway, with different forms of amnesia. But we don't need any of this for the UD Argument, and I do not allow amnesia, nor personal identity concerns (above what we need to say yes to the doctor) in the reasoning. In a sense, I agree with the idea that the comp idea itself is a bit suicidal, but then, assuming comp is correct, we die in such sense at each instant, and here is another common point with some talk given by people having introspective experiences. Best regards, Bruno regards From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?) Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God: G* proves (Bp p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution. a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy. Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking. (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) Yes, without Everett, I
Re: A challenge for Craig
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and not of the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person if it emulates the correct level. But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. I agree. Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of comp) are wrong. Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the difference. People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred consciousness, Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at different times. Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.) Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous statement. It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself that is an intellectual quale. Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have ambiguous application outside of quanta. Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my solution to the combination problem here: http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ What it means is that it is a mistake to say we can be a partial zombie - rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what is conscious after that is less of us. OK. As Chardin said, we are not human beings having from time to time some divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time human experiences ... Right, although I would go further to say that 'here' are experiences which
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 4:48 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Then Bruno is not always wrong. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. And if comp (whatever that means) is not correct then it is STILL happening all the time. we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Yes. we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer Yes. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? Obviously! Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like I and you and he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers. Bruno says he has been duplicated, so now there are TWO, but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing and only the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
2013/10/7 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 4:48 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Then Bruno is not always wrong. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. And if comp (whatever that means) is not correct then it is STILL happening all the time. we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Yes. we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer Yes. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? Obviously! Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like I and you and he and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers. Bruno says he has been duplicated, so now there are TWO, but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing and only the ONE thing that he will do; and this is nonsense. You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap. Quentin John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”. One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream of consciousness for 15 minutes: Often you use aesthetics in a pre 19th century enlightenment way, as in rigorous theory of sense, beauty, and harmony in nature and art. At the same time you use the term as synonymous for qualifying taste, which is reflected in everyday language use, but has little relation, if any, to aesthetics as theory. At other times you use it in Kantian way of transcendental, implying it to be a source for knowledge (“Ästhetische Erkenntnis” in German) about ourselves; but then at the same time you ditch distinguishing between form, existing a priori as transcendental structure which theory studies, and the impressions created for Kant a posteriori as experience, which is limited by contexts of time, space, language, and perceptual apparatus in its potential for us to grasp and study. So you take the Kantian transcendental idea in part, but make experience by perceptual apparatus primary to which Kant would reply: “without study and evolution of timeless form, the arts and our ability to engage new forms of transcendental experience with the sensory apparatus would stagnate.” In other words, his objection would be: if we reduce sensory experience to be the primary aesthetic mode, instead of the bonus and fruits of labors and histories of theory, then we’d all be waiting for the next movie to be projected in a theater, but nobody would produce new movies anymore. I’ve never seen you address this quagmire convincingly. Where does novelty or its appearance come from if everything makes sense? Why are some aesthetic objects and presences more self-evident than others? Then another use you make is aesthetics in semiotic interpretation, i.e. that we can only sense what is pre-ordained by symbolic systems. This however robs your use of aesthetics of the primary status you often assert it to have via sense. Further, it is not clear whether your use of the term corresponds to mystical traditions of antique (Beauty as expression of universality, divinity, or spirituality) or if it is the secular version including and post Baumgarten. Then, if sense is universal with aesthetic experience in primary tow, how do you explain the unique contributions of a Beethoven or Bach? Why can’t anybody write/find such well crafted triple fuges if sense and aesthetic experience are universal and give rise to the whole thing in the first place: everybody should be at least as good as Bach because all engage the world via sense. So you have to struggle with the 19th century genius problem, if you reject the primacy of forms beyond sense. It is also unclear where your model stands in more modern contexts, such as psychological aesthetics or the route of Fiedler. Sometimes you oppose aesthetics and rationality (maths and music) but when convenient this is unified when talking “sense primary”, which produces further obscurity. Would you agree with G. T. Fechner’s distinctions of “from above” and “from below” in your approach? If sense and material world experience have primary status, then you have to accept that we can hone in on the beautiful via experiment and study beauty empirically. Your model suggests sense is primary, but I have no way of studying and verifying your claims other than believing you. Your model is full of explanations, but I find no avenues for inquiry when I read you, other than that you have your positions sorted and they are correct. These are the kind of of conflicts that bar me from understanding your use of aesthetics. The list isn’t exhaustive and I don’t demand you explain these. They’re just illustrative of some difficulties I have with understanding your use. So when you throw around sense, qualia, aesthetic experience; I have difficulty following because of the jungle of possible complex interpretations. Which ones Craig? - is what this boils down to somewhere, I guess. PGC On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and not of the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person if it emulates the correct
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician. That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please. Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS of specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns that is unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers? Are you saying I've never asked Who the hell is he ? and gotten no reply? Are you really saying that?! The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says is very very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum Mechanics says is crystal clear This is simply false. What is false, that what Quantum Mechanics says is clear or that what Quantum Mechanics says is very very odd? I believe both things are true. In this list most believe that QM is slightly more understandable with the MWI. And I am a big MWI fan too, I think it's correct and who knows it might even be correct; but Evolution didn't build my monkey brain for this sort of thing so I'm not going to pretend I don't find it odd. And as I said before, whatever the correct interpretation of Quantum Mechanics turns out to be it's going to be odd. If he refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct prediction he would make is that he will see Helsinki and only Helsinki; You can apply that idea to the guy who throw a coin. You would say that such a guy can only predict that he will throw a coin. This is ridiculous, frankly. If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought experiments typically the guy is duplicated so now there are TWO, and then the guy flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only ONE result that the guy will see. And this is not just ridiculous it is logically inconsistent. your remark is met by the Dt in the formal approach Well I'm glad you cleared that up. but it is met by simple common sense in UDA. Common sense will be just as useful in understanding how things work in a world with duplication chambers in it as it is in understanding how Quantum Mechanics or your Universal Dance Association proof works. Not very. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Quentin Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very seriously by Everetians and their critics. In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be similar in that regard. So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all. It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not two of me yet ... But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here. I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever), _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person, each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy. Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this weird idea of randomness that seems to defy explanation. But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy. If the probabilities are 1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only two worlds with different weights. What if the probabilities are 1/pi and (1-1/pi)? Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, where epsilon is just to account for all those things you haven't thought of, but are really improbable? So when you make a statement about the probability of something happening, you are always making a statement about a possible There's where the problem comes in - what does possible cover? Brent continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In fact, happening becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a mysterious property called randomness. You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway. I think. Telmo. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com Hi Bruno Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp? I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor. regards It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... it's the same. Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp duplication experience. Quentin From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. Thanks for noticing. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy. Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential resolution? Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience! It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to be. That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves) is false: it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as time???) So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'. ...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.) John M On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote: On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case where Leibniz identity rule fails, If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most certainly has NOT failed. I was talking on the rule: a = b a = c entails that b = c The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy) But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally). The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the he refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try to understand. There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the most easy part of the reasoning. Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested in learning. Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret especially the last comment by Ron Maimon. I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams. Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers. But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of definition of world), but it seems to me that Everett use both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10/7/2013 1:32 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy. Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential resolution? Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience! It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to be. That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves) is false: it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as time???) So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'. ...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.) Who wrote that? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
Bruno: you wrote: *The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important separation of powers.* *Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are a bit out of topic here, I think.* * * Out of topic of everything? OK, OK, I know. But the US Constitution (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal view - drawn by duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist slave-owner despots to organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to the King of England. Now, the Supreme Court's oldies (probably younger than me) valuate the 18th c. language for the 21st c. life in a many times skewed sense. *Lobbying *I call buying votes for a special interest, *money* is not talk and *corporation* is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And so on. JM On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often just to get enough funding to survive. Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem. Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question! *How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral part of research. * * * *For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more fundamental question than knowledge itself.* --- I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily. Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what humans fear the most and like the less. What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is * to reduce uncertainty*. The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a sort of equilibrium in between. That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science psychology and entropy. That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish) and faith. As I will explain: To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the world around in order to predict better the future. But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common commintment to something or someone. The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come. Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us. Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others rely more in other different in this equation. These different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need to change. In the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion. A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this starting point. The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important separation of powers. Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are a bit out of topic here, I think. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
M On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 1:32 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy. Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential resolution? Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience! It was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to be. That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves) is false: it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as time???) So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'. ...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.) Who wrote that? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the right to bear arms meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been extended to, for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who wrote it were only aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt revolver hadn't been invented! If they're so keen to extend the original meaning to what are in effect weapons of mass destruction, why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs if they want to? On 8 October 2013 09:58, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno: you wrote: *The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important separation of powers.* *Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are a bit out of topic here, I think.* * * Out of topic of everything? OK, OK, I know. But the US Constitution (IMO) HAS BEEN very good in a 300+ year old societal view - drawn by duelling, pipe-smoking, hunting male chauvinist slave-owner despots to organize the 'colonies' NOT TO PAY taxes to the King of England. Now, the Supreme Court's oldies (probably younger than me) valuate the 18th c. language for the 21st c. life in a many times skewed sense. *Lobbying *I call buying votes for a special interest, *money* is not talk and *corporation* is not a 'person' (as e.g. a citizen). And so on. JM On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 18:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often just to get enough funding to survive. Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem. Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question! *How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral part of research. * * * *For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more fundamental question than knowledge itself.* --- I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily. Ha Ha ... That reminds me when my father told me that truth is what humans fear the most and like the less. What they aim at, is like any living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is * to reduce uncertainty*. The humans oscillate between security/certainty/control and freedom/uncertainty/universality. Basically that is why we vote, to have a sort of equilibrium in between. That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science psychology and entropy. That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish) and faith. As I will explain: To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the world around in order to predict better the future. But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common commintment to something or someone. The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come. Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these requirements, and, more important, no people that had not these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us. Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others rely more in other different in this equation. These different uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need to change. In the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion. A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this starting point. The US constitution is very good, but is not really followed, and things like prohibition have put bandits into power, who have broken the important separation of powers. Lobbying and the role of money in politics should be revised. But we are a bit out of topic here, I think. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Why is there such a huge argument about this duplication chamber business? It seems to be not getting anywhere. Could you perhaps go back to the original statement of step 3 and use that to point out what is wrong? From memory step 3 was - Helsinki man is teleported to both Washington and Moscow. From his perspective, what is his chance of arriving in Moscow (or Washington) ? This strikes me as analogous to Schrodinger's Cat. The experimenter asks what is the chance that he will see a live cat? He is talking in a folk sense I suppose, because in reality he will split into two people and see both. But like Moscow man, after the split it will seem as though he had a 50-50 chance of seeing either, so there is at least a sense of 1p indeterminacy which is clealy, to anyone else 3p certainty - that he will see both a live and a dead cat, or that H-man will see both W and M. This is just Everett's explanation for quantum indeterminacy applied to a mind, assumed to be duplicable (as comp assumes it is just the current state of an ongoing computation). Seems fairly straightforward to me, is there a problem with any of that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 10/7/2013 3:01 PM, LizR wrote: One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the right to bear arms meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been extended to, for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who wrote it were only aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt revolver hadn't been invented! If they're so keen to extend the original meaning to what are in effect weapons of mass destruction, why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs if they want to? The second amendment was adopted by people who had just fought as rebels against the army of an oppressive government. So their intent was plainly to ensure that any new central government could be overthrown as well should it become oppressive. So the arms an individual should have a right to bear would be the same as those issued to individual soldiers in the military, i.e. assault rifles (which are issued to everyone in Switzerland). Because of the media coverage of rare multiple shootings and because assault rifles look scarier, most people don't realize that 97% of gun deaths in the U.S. involve handguns. The Supreme Court could easily uphold a ban on handguns and still support the intent of the 2nd amendment and not interfere with hunting; but no state has tried such a ban. I think that the examples of Poland, South Africa, the USSR, India, and Egypt indicate that overthrow of oppressive governments can be done by unarmed citizens, and if so that's the better way. But it's clearly not the example the authors of the U.S. constitution had before them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
Yes of course it's mostly handguns, just as most deaths aren't due to mass shootings. Handguns are more common (cheaper, and easier to conceal if you intend to commit a crime). Firearms cause around 30,000 deaths/year in the US, apparently (plus about 70,000 injuries) - about the same number as car accidents - yet the budget for research into preventing gun deaths is, guess what, only one 20th of the budget for preventing car accidents. It's almost as though there's a conspiracy ... oh, wait, there is! Apparently there are 315 million people living in the US, who between them own 300 million guns, and 260 million cars. On 8 October 2013 11:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 3:01 PM, LizR wrote: One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the right to bear arms meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been extended to, for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who wrote it were only aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt revolver hadn't been invented! If they're so keen to extend the original meaning to what are in effect weapons of mass destruction, why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs if they want to? The second amendment was adopted by people who had just fought as rebels against the army of an oppressive government. So their intent was plainly to ensure that any new central government could be overthrown as well should it become oppressive. So the arms an individual should have a right to bear would be the same as those issued to individual soldiers in the military, i.e. assault rifles (which are issued to everyone in Switzerland). Because of the media coverage of rare multiple shootings and because assault rifles look scarier, most people don't realize that 97% of gun deaths in the U.S. involve handguns. The Supreme Court could easily uphold a ban on handguns and still support the intent of the 2nd amendment and not interfere with hunting; but no state has tried such a ban. I think that the examples of Poland, South Africa, the USSR, India, and Egypt indicate that overthrow of oppressive governments can be done by unarmed citizens, and if so that's the better way. But it's clearly not the example the authors of the U.S. constitution had before them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-listhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 10/7/2013 4:14 PM, LizR wrote: Yes of course it's mostly handguns, just as most deaths aren't due to mass shootings. Handguns are more common (cheaper, and easier to conceal if you intend to commit a crime). Firearms cause around 30,000 deaths/year in the US, Of which 2/3 were suicides. I don't think the government has a right to prevent suicides. apparently (plus about 70,000 injuries) - about the same number as car accidents - yet the budget for research into preventing gun deaths is, guess what, only one 20th of the budget for preventing car accidents. That would depend a lot on the accounting. You could say that all police budgets are for preventing gun deaths due to homicide. And exactly what would you expect such research to do; conclude that guns that wouldn't fire would prevent gun deaths. It's kinda the point of guns that they can kill things. With cars it's an accident. And car accidents kill six times as many people as guns, 18 times as many if you discount suicides. It's almost as though there's a conspiracy ... oh, wait, there is! Apparently there are 315 million people living in the US, who between them own 300 million guns, and 260 million cars. And about two billion pairs of shoes and 250 million TV sets. So what? Is there some prescribed, right number for these things? Brent On 8 October 2013 11:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 3:01 PM, LizR wrote: One thing wrong with the US constitution is that the right to bear arms meant muskets and flintlock pistols at the time, but has been extended to, for example, semi-automatic weapons. The people who wrote it were only aware of single-shot weapons, even the colt revolver hadn't been invented! If they're so keen to extend the original meaning to what are in effect weapons of mass destruction, why not, say, let citizens build nuclear bombs if they want to? The second amendment was adopted by people who had just fought as rebels against the army of an oppressive government. So their intent was plainly to ensure that any new central government could be overthrown as well should it become oppressive. So the arms an individual should have a right to bear would be the same as those issued to individual soldiers in the military, i.e. assault rifles (which are issued to everyone in Switzerland). Because of the media coverage of rare multiple shootings and because assault rifles look scarier, most people don't realize that 97% of gun deaths in the U.S. involve handguns. The Supreme Court could easily uphold a ban on handguns and still support the intent of the 2nd amendment and not interfere with hunting; but no state has tried such a ban. I think that the examples of Poland, South Africa, the USSR, India, and Egypt indicate that overthrow of oppressive governments can be done by unarmed citizens, and if so that's the better way. But it's clearly not the example the authors of the U.S. constitution had before them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4142 / Virus Database: 3604/6718 - Release Date: 10/02/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
I can understand why it seems that my use of 'aesthetic' (and sense) is all over the place, and part of that is because I am trying to prompt others to make a connection between all of the different uses of the word. What I like about aesthetic is: Anesthetic is used to refer to both general unconsciousness and local numbness. This hints at a natural link between sensitivity and consciousness. The loss of consciousness is a general an-aesthesia. Aesthetic also has a connotation of patterns which are intended to be appreciated artistically or decoratively rather than for function. For example, there is a specific difference between red and green that is not reflected in the difference between wavelength measurements. We might explain the fact *that* there seem to be X number of functional breakpoints within the E-M continuum because of the function of our optical system, but there is no functional accounting for the the aesthetic presence of red or green. The aesthetic of red or green is far more than a recognition that there is a functional difference between E-M wavelengths associated with one part of the continuum or another. Aesthetic then is a synonym for qualia, but without the nebulous baggage of that term. It just means something that is experienced directly as a presentation of sight, sound, touch, taste, etc - whether as a dream or imagined shape or a public object. When we hook up a video monitor to a computer, we are giving ourselves an aesthetic interface with which to display the anesthetic functions of software. Of course, I think that the entire cosmos is aesthetic, so that the functions of software are not absolutely anesthetic, but whatever aesthetic dimensions they have arise at the level of physics, not on the logical level that we have abstracted on top of it. A computer made of gears and pumps has no common aesthetic with an electronic computer, even though they may be running what we think is the same program, the program itself is an expectation, not a presence. There are common aesthetic themes within physics which give computation a ready medium in any group of rigid bodies that can be controlled reliably, but they cannot be made to scale up qualitatively from the outside in. If they could, we might expect the pixels of a video screen to realize that they are all contributing to a coherent image and merge into a more intelligent unified pixel-less screen. The fact that we can take a set of data in a computer and make it play as music or an image or text output is evidence that computation is blind to of higher aesthetic qualities. On Monday, October 7, 2013 1:24:58 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”. One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream of consciousness for 15 minutes: Often you use aesthetics in a pre 19th century enlightenment way, as in rigorous theory of sense, beauty, and harmony in nature and art. At the same time you use the term as synonymous for qualifying taste, which is reflected in everyday language use, but has little relation, if any, to aesthetics as theory. At other times you use it in Kantian way of transcendental, implying it to be a source for knowledge (“Ästhetische Erkenntnis” in German) about ourselves; but then at the same time you ditch distinguishing between form, existing a priori as transcendental structure which theory studies, and the impressions created for Kant a posteriori as experience, which is limited by contexts of time, space, language, and perceptual apparatus in its potential for us to grasp and study. So you take the Kantian transcendental idea in part, but make experience by perceptual apparatus primary to which Kant would reply: “without study and evolution of timeless form, the arts and our ability to engage new forms of transcendental experience with the sensory apparatus would stagnate.” In other words, his objection would be: if we reduce sensory experience to be the primary aesthetic mode, instead of the bonus and fruits of labors and histories of theory, then we’d all be waiting for the next movie to be projected in a theater, but nobody would produce new movies anymore. I’ve never seen you address this quagmire convincingly. Where does novelty or its appearance come from if everything makes sense? Why are some aesthetic objects and presences more self-evident than others? Then another use you make is aesthetics in semiotic interpretation, i.e. that we can only sense what is pre-ordained by symbolic systems. This however robs your use of aesthetics of the primary status you often assert it to have via sense. Further, it is not clear whether your use of the term corresponds to mystical traditions
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 8 October 2013 12:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 4:14 PM, LizR wrote: Yes of course it's mostly handguns, just as most deaths aren't due to mass shootings. Handguns are more common (cheaper, and easier to conceal if you intend to commit a crime). Firearms cause around 30,000 deaths/year in the US, Of which 2/3 were suicides. I don't think the government has a right to prevent suicides. Good point, I didn't realise that. I agree with you there, although I would be interested to know how the suicide rate compares to countries with less easily available (or certain) methods. Perhaps some suicides wouldn't have carried it through without it being so easy, and would have gone on to overcome their suicidal depression and live happy and fulfilling lives (I managed it. I wonder how I would have fared if there had been a firearm handy...) apparently (plus about 70,000 injuries) - about the same number as car accidents - yet the budget for research into preventing gun deaths is, guess what, only one 20th of the budget for preventing car accidents. That would depend a lot on the accounting. You could say that all police budgets are for preventing gun deaths due to homicide. And exactly what would you expect such research to do; conclude that guns that wouldn't fire would prevent gun deaths. It's kinda the point of guns that they can kill things. With cars it's an accident. And car accidents kill six times as many people as guns, 18 times as many if you discount suicides. I guess this Wintemute guy in New Scientist got his stats wrong, then. (He's some sort of researcher into this field, too, so a surprising mistake.) He placed the numbers at about equal. Yes, why guns kill people is a no-brainer, which is why most countries don't allow them to be available to everyone in apparently unlimited quantities. But apparently the US doesn't agree with that, and requires people to do research on the subject (and then makes publishing their results illegal, or so I'm told). It's almost as though there's a conspiracy ... oh, wait, there is! Apparently there are 315 million people living in the US, who between them own 300 million guns, and 260 million cars. And about two billion pairs of shoes and 250 million TV sets. So what? Is there some prescribed, right number for these things? That's a strange comment. Given that the topic under discussion is guns in the US, and a comparison was made with cars, it seems reasonable to fill in a few extra pieces of gun and car related background information. And obviously these both relate to the population - a million guns in a population of 100,000 would seem more significant than if the population was 1 billion - don't you think? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 10/7/2013 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 October 2013 12:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 4:14 PM, LizR wrote: Yes of course it's mostly handguns, just as most deaths aren't due to mass shootings. Handguns are more common (cheaper, and easier to conceal if you intend to commit a crime). Firearms cause around 30,000 deaths/year in the US, Of which 2/3 were suicides. I don't think the government has a right to prevent suicides. Good point, I didn't realise that. I agree with you there, although I would be interested to know how the suicide rate compares to countries with less easily available (or certain) methods. Perhaps some suicides wouldn't have carried it through without it being so easy, and would have gone on to overcome their suicidal depression and live happy and fulfilling lives (I managed it. I wonder how I would have fared if there had been a firearm handy...) Yes, I'm sure availability has an effect. Switzerland which has a very low homicide rate but high gun availability, has a higher suicide rate by gun than the U.S. But Finland has an even higher one - suicide rate seems to go with low population density and lack of sunshine. apparently (plus about 70,000 injuries) - about the same number as car accidents - yet the budget for research into preventing gun deaths is, guess what, only one 20th of the budget for preventing car accidents. That would depend a lot on the accounting. You could say that all police budgets are for preventing gun deaths due to homicide. And exactly what would you expect such research to do; conclude that guns that wouldn't fire would prevent gun deaths. It's kinda the point of guns that they can kill things. With cars it's an accident. And car accidents kill six times as many people as guns, 18 times as many if you discount suicides. I guess this Wintemute guy in New Scientist got his stats wrong, then. (He's some sort of researcher into this field, too, so a surprising mistake.) He placed the numbers at about equal. No, he was right and I was wrong. I checked and I had inadvertently compared gun deaths (about 30,000) to all injury deaths (180,000). Auto deaths are about (33,000). Yes, why guns kill people is a no-brainer, which is why most countries don't allow them to be available to everyone in apparently unlimited quantities. But apparently the US doesn't agree with that, and requires people to do research on the subject (and then makes publishing their results illegal, or so I'm told). Not exactly. Congress just stopped funding the CDC to study gun violence; no doubt due to various lobbying pressures. But I think they still include gun death and injury in their statistical summaries. Anyone who wants to can study and publish whatever they want. It's almost as though there's a conspiracy ... oh, wait, there is! Apparently there are 315 million people living in the US, who between them own 300 million guns, and 260 million cars. And about two billion pairs of shoes and 250 million TV sets. So what? Is there some prescribed, right number for these things? That's a strange comment. Given that the topic under discussion is guns in the US, and a comparison was made with cars, it seems reasonable to fill in a few extra pieces of gun and car related background information. And obviously these both relate to the population - a million guns in a population of 100,000 would seem more significant than if the population was 1 billion - don't you think? I guess. But my point is that people decided to have three television sets and seven pairs of shoes and three guns and two cars and... So who is to say, No, you can decide how many shoes and TVs and cars you want, but you can't decide how many guns you want. I own six guns, only two of which I bought (I inherited the others). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
I've found the article I read... http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2013/10/gun_violence_epidemiology_garen_wintemute_on_mental_illness_and_background.html Unfortunately I haven't been able to find where I read that there would be restrictions on what research into gun control would be allowed to say. Whatever it was implied that it would be illegal to draw certain conclusions, but until I come across it again I will have to leave that one aside. By the way, here is the main reason I object to gun cultures... http://readersupportednews.org/off-site-news-section/417-gun-control-/19650-children-and-guns-the-hidden-toll -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
Oops, silly me, it was in the very same article. I missed it when I skimmed through to check... *TO: After recent mass shootings, hasn't funding for gun violence research received more attention?* *GM:* There is a proposal in Congress to allow for $10 million in research funding. But I suspect it essentially has no chance of making it. Even if it did, our Department of Health and Human Services prohibits any of the funds from being usedhttp://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html, and I'm quoting directly here, “to advocate or promote gun controlhttp://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html.” That means even if I had money to do the research, it would be a crime to talk about the policy implications. Here's the article he links to: http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html And here is the grant, with the prohibition mentioned: http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html I assume this is the relevant bit: *Prohibition on Use of CDC Funds for Certain Gun Control Activities* The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act specifies that: None of the funds made available for injury prevention and control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to advocate or promote gun control. Anti-Lobbying Act requirements prohibit lobbying Congress with appropriated Federal monies. Specifically, this Act prohibits the use of Federal funds for direct or indirect communications intended or designed to influence a member of Congress with regard to specific Federal legislation. This prohibition includes the funding and assistance of public grassroots campaigns intended or designed to influence members of Congress with regard to specific legislation or appropriation by Congress. In addition to the restrictions in the Anti-Lobbying Act, CDC interprets the language in the CDC's Appropriations Act to mean that CDC's funds may not be spent on political action or other activities designed to affect the passage of specific Federal, State, or local legislation intended to restrict or control the purchase or use of firearms. So the implication *seems *to be that if the research discovered that the best way to stop people being killed and injured by guns was gun control, it wouldn't be allowed to say so. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 10/7/2013 8:15 PM, LizR wrote: Oops, silly me, it was in the very same article. I missed it when I skimmed through to check... *TO: After recent mass shootings, hasn't funding for gun violence research received more attention?* *GM:* There is a proposal in Congress to allow for $10 million in research funding. But I suspect it essentially has no chance of making it. Even if it did, our Department of Health and Human Services prohibits any of the funds from being used http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html, and I'm quoting directly here, “to advocate or promote gun control http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html.” That means even if I had money to do the research, it would be a crime to talk about the policy implications. That assumes the result of the research would imply gun control. Would the research consider the possibility of armed revolt against and oppressive government which was the original motivation for the 2nd amendment? Would he consider the value of recreational hunting? I think not. I think the researcher had already assumed his conclusion. Just because a certain device results in people being killed and injured is not sufficient reason for banning it. I'm sure there would be fewer deaths per year if motorcycles were banned, ditto for sky diving, swimming, skiing, and drinking beer. Here's the article he links to: http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html And here is the grant, with the prohibition mentioned: http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html I assume this is the relevant bit: *Prohibition on Use of CDC Funds for Certain Gun Control Activities* The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act specifies that:None of the funds made available for injury prevention and control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to advocate or promote gun control. Anti-Lobbying Act requirements prohibit lobbying Congress with appropriated Federal monies. Specifically, this Act prohibits the use of Federal funds for direct or indirect communications intended or designed to influence a member of Congress with regard to specific Federal legislation. This prohibition includes the funding and assistance of public grassroots campaigns intended or designed to influence members of Congress with regard to specific legislation or appropriation by Congress. In addition to the restrictions in the Anti-Lobbying Act, CDC interprets the language in the CDC's Appropriations Act to mean that CDC's funds may not be spent on political action or other activities designed to affect the passage of specific Federal, State, or local legislation intended to restrict or control the purchase or use of firearms. So the implication /seems /to be that if the research discovered that the best way to stop people being killed and injured by guns was gun control, it wouldn't be allowed to say so. I'm not sure whether a technical report of research would count as advocacy or political action or not. But the reason is obvious. Congress doesn't want the CDC going around them to advocate for legislation. And in any case the Supreme court has ruled that owning a gun is a Constitutionally guaranteed individual right, subject only to reasonable restrictions. The Anti-Lobbying rule has been around a long time and wasn't motivated by gun control issues. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 8 October 2013 16:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 8:15 PM, LizR wrote: Oops, silly me, it was in the very same article. I missed it when I skimmed through to check... *TO: After recent mass shootings, hasn't funding for gun violence research received more attention?* *GM:* There is a proposal in Congress to allow for $10 million in research funding. But I suspect it essentially has no chance of making it. Even if it did, our Department of Health and Human Services prohibits any of the funds from being usedhttp://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html, and I'm quoting directly here, “to advocate or promote gun controlhttp://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html.” That means even if I had money to do the research, it would be a crime to talk about the policy implications. That assumes the result of the research would imply gun control. Would the research consider the possibility of armed revolt against and oppressive government which was the original motivation for the 2nd amendment? Would he consider the value of recreational hunting? I think not. I think the researcher had already assumed his conclusion. Just because a certain device results in people being killed and injured is not sufficient reason for banning it. I'm sure there would be fewer deaths per year if motorcycles were banned, ditto for sky diving, swimming, skiing, and drinking beer. That wasn't the impression I got. I assumed he was saying that *if* that was the case, then he'd be gagged. (But anyway, this does show that there are legal constraints on reporting some possible results, which is all he said, and wha I quoted.) I'm not sure whether a technical report of research would count as advocacy or political action or not. But the reason is obvious. Congress doesn't want the CDC going around them to advocate for legislation. And in any case the Supreme court has ruled that owning a gun is a Constitutionally guaranteed individual right, subject only to reasonable restrictions. Well, if it wouldn't be advocacy then he's OK to report whatever he sees fit. Personally I would think it shouldn't be considered advocacy, but he's closer to the whole thing and he seems to think it would. The Anti-Lobbying rule has been around a long time and wasn't motivated by gun control issues. You're telling me *no one* is allowed to lobby the US govt??? Oh well, anyway I suppose I shouldn't make so much fuss, although as I said I find the child deaths horrifying (as I do the millions of unnecessary child deaths worldwide, most caused by diseases even more preventable than US firearm deaths). But if adult Americans want to shoot one another, I guess that's their business. I don't live there, thank God! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing
On 10/7/2013 9:08 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 October 2013 16:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/7/2013 8:15 PM, LizR wrote: Oops, silly me, it was in the very same article. I missed it when I skimmed through to check... *TO: After recent mass shootings, hasn't funding for gun violence research received more attention?* *GM:* There is a proposal in Congress to allow for $10 million in research funding. But I suspect it essentially has no chance of making it. Even if it did, our Department of Health and Human Services prohibits any of the funds from being used http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/gun_violence_research_nra_and_congress_blocked_gun_control_studies_at_cdc.html, and I'm quoting directly here, “to advocate or promote gun control http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CE-07-001.html.” That means even if I had money to do the research, it would be a crime to talk about the policy implications. That assumes the result of the research would imply gun control. Would the research consider the possibility of armed revolt against and oppressive government which was the original motivation for the 2nd amendment? Would he consider the value of recreational hunting? I think not. I think the researcher had already assumed his conclusion. Just because a certain device results in people being killed and injured is not sufficient reason for banning it. I'm sure there would be fewer deaths per year if motorcycles were banned, ditto for sky diving, swimming, skiing, and drinking beer. That wasn't the impression I got. I assumed he was saying that /if/ that was the case, then he'd be gagged. Suppose his research showed that liberalized concealed carry laws reduced gun violence (a popular argument among gun-rights advocates). Then he wouldn't be gagged. So he was assuming the opposite conclusion in order to infer reporting the study would be a crime. (But anyway, this does show that there are legal constraints on reporting some possible results, which is all he said, and wha I quoted.) I'm not sure whether a technical report of research would count as advocacy or political action or not. But the reason is obvious. Congress doesn't want the CDC going around them to advocate for legislation. And in any case the Supreme court has ruled that owning a gun is a Constitutionally guaranteed individual right, subject only to reasonable restrictions. Well, if it wouldn't be advocacy then he's OK to report whatever he sees fit. Personally I would think it shouldn't be considered advocacy, but he's closer to the whole thing and he seems to think it would. Bureaucrats tend to be timid about offending Congress and may self-censor. The Anti-Lobbying rule has been around a long time and wasn't motivated by gun control issues. You're telling me /no one/ is allowed to lobby the US govt??? No, nobody who is an employee of the U.S. government is allowed to lobby it. Civil service employees and uniformed military are not allowed to campaign for any partisan candidates either (even in local elections if they are partisan). Oh well, anyway I suppose I shouldn't make so much fuss, although as I said I find the child deaths horrifying (as I do the millions of unnecessary child deaths worldwide, most caused by diseases even more preventable than US firearm deaths). But if adult Americans want to shoot one another, I guess that's their business. I don't live there, thank God! Yes, it's unfortunate that the psychology seems to be It's dangerous out there. So I should be able to have a gun to protect myself. That's what defeated a gun ban in Brazil, which has even more shootings than the U.S., in spite of requirements to register and license all guns. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
