date:20140122

Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Jan 2014, at 19:27, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Bruno,

Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and  
convincing reason in English.


Rhetorical trick, and you don't answer to the question that I asked  
you. I gave everyone the proof, and I told you that the UD Argument,  
which presuppose only that a brain is a machine at some relevant  
level, entails that there is no motion, only dream of motion. The  
physical reality emerges from the coherence, or co-consistence of  
infinities of dream.




Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless  
you can prove it actually applies.


Read the UDA before, if only to give me one light on your theory.




If there is really a way to get motion from stasis


Like if anyone was pretending that ... (rhetorical trick again).



you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain  
English.


That's the UDA.



There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your  
theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective  
you want to but unless something moves nothing moves...


Indeed nothing moves at the ontological level. Things move only from  
the 'dreamer's mental perspective.





Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when  
it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time  
perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move  
anything.


Indeed? So you assume primitive moving, and thus a primitive time, and  
thus UDA shows that you are implicitly using the assumption that your  
p-time is not Turing emulable.
Indeed, if we recompute Julius Caesar' brain state, with comp, he will  
live Antic-time now, which might directly show that your notion of p- 
time is inconsistent with comp. This is coherent with your absence of  
definition of your computational space.




It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames which are obviously  
completely static. A static motionless observer sees them as a  
motionless sequence. Only an ACTIVELY MOVING reader of the cartoon  
can provide the apparent sequence of the cartoon frames that makes  
them meaningful. But of course actually both observer and universe  
are actively moving as they are continually being recomputed in the  
present moment of p-time


If the sequence seems to move it's only because that cartoon reader  
is already moving himself. So without a moving observer rather than  
a static 1p observer, to use your terminology, there can be no  
motion. Unless the 1p observer is himself alive and moving there can  
be no motion in his perspective. There is simply no way around that.


You reify reality. And this without saying. That's unconvincing  
pseudo-philosophy.


Just answer the question: can we survive with an artificial brain in  
your theory?


Bruno





Edgar

On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 12:27:59 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Bruno,

You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality  
of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the  
flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it.


Where. I just said (see below) that everybody knows it is never an  
argument. You misread me. On the contrary I said that I can explain  
it, but then it is long. Then, I point on the literature, and  
mention that the fact that arithmetic is Turing complete is known by  
experts.


Do you agree that arithmetic emulates all computations? I guess not.



Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be  
taken seriously.


By who? I have never have any problem with that. On the contrary,  
most physicists already believe that the theory of relativity go in  
that direction (even more so in Gödel's solution of Einstein's GR  
equation, with looping time.


I can give you an answer, except I am not sure you will study it. I  
will explain it to you when you answer the questions I asked about  
your theory. What does it assume, and how do you use it to prevent  
the UD Argument to proceed?





Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives  
on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would  
still be static.


Seen from the big picture (arithmetical truth) you are right. Seen  
from the perspective of the internal creatures, you are wrong, at  
least in the sense, that those creatures have all reason to infer  
time and space, etc. They will talk about that like you and me.


Do you think that a machine can distinguish being a living person  
inhabiting on Earth, and being a living person on Earth emulated  
on some computer,  or in arithmetic.



And of course block time has the exact same problem

of course is a symptom of lack of argument.

You are just looking at the 3p picture, and not at the 1p views of  
the entities in that 3p reality. You could as well say that a brain  
has no relation with consciousness, as there

Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Jan 2014, at 02:00, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Stephen,

A lot of good stuff in your post. I'll come back to some of it later  
after I think more on it but first wanted to clarify a couple of  
your points.


You say the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some  
ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a  
fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless  
spacial case.


By timeless special case it seems like you are implying the UDA is  
not an ACTUAL case describing a reality that we agree necessarily  
must move. So it seems like you are saying that though the UDA might  
somehow shed some light on reality it is not actually describing  
reality as it actually is. Is that correct?


Another problem with the UDA is I see no way a Platonia consisting  
of pure arithmetic can possible know how to actually compute what is  
actually occurring in the universe. How does pure static arithmetic  
truth know anything about what is actually happening where and how  
to compute which particles are interacting with which particles in  
what ways? I see no way that works at all.


Can we agree on something like Bruno's UDA is not an applicable  
description of a reality we agree actually moves, that actually  
includes the notion of 'becoming'?


Second point in this post is I AGREE with you that it is a mistake  
to assume that there is only a single computation going on. for a  
number of reasons. I've never claimed that. Sorry if that wasn't  
clear before.


I think the most reasonable model is a single computational REALITY  
(not a single computation) that contains myriads of computations  
each computing the current state of reality in computational  
interaction with its information environment (environment in a  
logical sense, not a dimensional or spatial sense).


This model avoids your concurrency problem, and a single  
computational reality allows computational continuity and  
consistency across the entire computational universe (again a  
logical, not physical dimensional spatial universe).


Can we agree on something like There is a single computational  
reality


Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic contains that, with the standard  
definition of computation, and Church thesis.




which includes myriads of ongoing computations which together  
continually compute the current state of the universe?


No. It only computes infinitely often all dreams, and the FPI (the  
First Person Indeterminacy on all my states in arithmetic) generates  
the persistent illusion of a physical multiverse.


Bruno





Edgar



On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 5:17:44 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King  
wrote:

Dear Edgar,


On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net  
wrote:

Stephen,

OK, with these clarifications let's see what we can agree on so far.

1. Block time is a BS theory. We know we agree on that.

good!



2. Do you agree that Bruno's USA can also be discounted for the same  
reason block time can be, that there is no way to get movement out  
of it?



No, the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some  
ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a  
fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless  
spacial case.


3. Do you agree that there must be some fundamental notion of  
movement (not movement in space, but in the sense of things  
happening) at the fundamental level?


Yes, I denote this as Becoming is Fundamental.



4. Do you agree that implies some notion of time flowing?

The imposition of finite measures onto the Becoming is the creation  
of a clock. Clocks are strictly local entities. It has been  
repeatedly proven that a single clock cannot order all possible  
events of space-time. Thus a singular Present Moment is an  
oxymoron, a self-contradicting idea.




5. Do you agree that reality is fundamentally computational?

div
...

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/21/2014 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/20/2014 12:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/19/2014 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why should that imply *existence*.


It does not. Unless we believe in the axioms, which is the case  
for elementary arithmetic.


But what does believe in the axioms mean.  Do we really  
believe we can *always* add one more?  I find it doubtful.  It's  
just a good model for most countable things.  So I can believe  
the axioms imply the theorems and that 17 is prime is a  
theorem, but I don't think that commits me to any existence in  
the normal sense of THAT exists.


Because you are chosing the physicalist ostensive definition of  
what exists, like Aristotelians, but you beg the question here.


I don't see that you've explained what question I begged.  Just  
because I define things ostensively does not entail that reject  
explanations of their existence - if that's what you are implying.


Fair enough.




The point is that, in that case,  you should not say yes to the  
doctor.


Why not.  The doctor is going install a physical prosthetic.  As  
you've agreed before, it will not be *exactly* like me - but I'm  
not exactly the same from day to day anyway.


But you overlook the UDA here. The UDA is the explanation why if  
you say yes to the doctor qua computatio, the physical must be  
recovered from arithmetic, in some special way.


But that seems me an example of the misplaced concrete.  I have a  
lot more confidence in the physical functionality of a well tested  
artificial neuron than I have in the UDA.  So I may well say yes  
to the doctor without accepting arithmetical realism, the  
mathematical definition of exists, or the running of a UD.


Of course. If you really believe in a bigger natural number (that we  
can't always add one), what you say follows.
(personally I have more confidence in the fact that all natural  
numbers have a successor than in any artificial neuron, even if well  
tested).
So you criticize AR, but without AR, we can't explain Church thesis,  
and the notion of computer become ambiguous. You reject comp, by  
rejecting computer science. yes, in that case, even step 8 will not  
change your mind. Even step seven is no more valid, in that case.








You can always add magic of course. This can be used for any theory  
of physics.


I think your critics can be sum up by the belief that step 8 is non  
valid.


I am suspicious that it only proves that a zero-physics simulation  
is possible in a different world where the physics is simulated too.


I don't understand.


In other words it's conclusion is only valid if the scope is made  
arbitrarily large and the MG, in effect, becomes a different world.


In which case you say no to the doctor, and we are a long way from  
saying yes just by trusting the artificial neuron and glial cells,  
like you suggest to be a reason for saying yes without AR.


Bruno




Brent

But step 8 talks about reality, so it is not purely logical, and  
step 8 just shows how ad hoc that move is. It is made equivalent to  
the way creationist reason, except it is done for the creation  
instead of the creator.


Bruno


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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:25, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/21/2014 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:19, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Is it possible for a Computation to be a Model also? What is the
obstruction?

Is it possible for an apple to be an orange?

Computation are very special abstract, yet of a syntactical
nature, relations (between numbers, say, or combinators, lisp
expressions, etc.)

I have defined them by a sequence phi_i(j)^n, with n = 0, 1, 2, ...

Model are structured set (or arrows in some category) satisfying
formula.

Of course this a quite different meaning than scientists and
engineers have in mind when they say model.

Yes. It is the root of a common confusion between logician and
physicist. Logician uses model like painter, where the model is the
reality (the naked man) that the painters theorize about (paints).

They mean a theory

Yes.

which they do not assume to be complete but to only make predictions
within some limited domain - and so it may be regarded as a function
or a set of possible computations combined with an interpretation,
e.g. an elastic model of a structure.

OK. I have suggested more than once to use the term theory, and keep
model for a possible 'reality'. that would help.

Logicians are more sophisticated than physicist, they model both the
entire relationship between a theory and its models. So the notion of
theory is a modelisation of theory, and the notion of model is a
modelization of the notion of reality. That's is useful for the mind-
body problem.

Bruno

Brent

Those are quite different things. It does not mean that there are
not some relation. Usually the computations can be represented by
some object in some model of some Turing complete theory, like RA,
PA, or ZF.

Models are semantic notions, studied in model theory. Computations
are more syntactical objects (finite or infinite, though) studied
in recursion or computability theory, or in computation theory.

Bruno

On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 20 Jan 2014, at 07:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:

No! This is not unknown. I am cobbling ideas together, sure,
think about it! What are we thinking? If the UD implements or
emulates all computations then it implements all worlds, ala
Kripke. That would include all models of self-consistent theories.

It is not that simple, alas. A computation is not a model. I have
try hard to get a relation like that, because this would simplify
the relation between UDA and AUDA. I progress on this, but that
problem is not yet solved.

Bruno

On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 1:22 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/19/2014 10:01 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Exactly, what about all the models of all the worlds that
follow different axioms? Those can possibly exist, thus they
must. What is not impossible, is compulsory!

Did you just make that up? :-)

Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/21/2014 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2014, at 02:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/20/2014 5:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 21 January 2014 06:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/20/2014 1:11 AM, LizR wrote:

On 20 January 2014 18:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

You seem not to appreciate that this dissipates the one  
essential advantage of mathematical monism: we understand  
mathematics (because, I say, we invent it).  But if it's a mere  
human invention trying to model the Platonic ding and sich  then  
PA may not be the real arithmetic.  And there will have to be  
some magic math stuff that makes the real arithmetic really real.


Surely the real test is whether it works better than any other  
theory.  (The phrase  
unreasonable   
effectiveness appears to indicate that it does.)


Would it work any less well if there were a biggest number?

I don't know. I would imagine so, because that would be a theory  
with an ad hoc extra clause with no obvious justification, so  
every calculation would have to carry extra baggage around. If I  
raise a number to the power of 100, say, I have to check first  
that the result isn't going to exceed the biggest number, and  
take appropriate action - whatever that is - if it will... what  
would be the point of that?


Just make it an axiom that the biggest number is bigger than any  
number you calculate.  In other words just prohibit using those  
... and so forth in your theorems.


Just to be sure, step 8 shows that a physicalist form of  
ultrafinitism (there is a primitively ontological universe, and it  
is small) is a red herring.


If you assume a mathematical ultrafinitism, then yes, UDA does no  
more go through. But mathematical ultrafinitism makes it impossible  
to even define comp, so that is really a stopping at step zero.


So, yes, an ultrafinitist *mathematician* can say yes to the doctor  
(without knowing what it does), and survive, and this is one little  
universe.


But he can't know what it does in an infinitist universe either.


Right.


I thought that's why you've always emphasized that saying yes to  
the doctor was a bet, not something one could be certain of.


The fact that the ultrafinitist can't know what he is doing, does not  
entail that the computationalist can know what he is doing. So you are  
right, but I was not implying the contrary.


Bruno





Brent



If UDA leads to mathematical ultrafinitism, that is enough a  
reductio ad absurdo to me.


God created 0, 1, ... and when getting 10^100, he felt tired and  
stop. Then he *has* to create a primitive physical universe, if he  
want see Adam and Eve indeed.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a  
mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes  
elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x  
≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism).

Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless.


How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by  
computation on finite digital computers and all observations are  
finite rational numbers?


We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and  
indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse).  
I guess it makes sense in most case.




 I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not  
from an axiom system.


Because you reify reality, an put the meaning there. But we can't do  
that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical  
notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays  
that role.
That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It is a  
truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or  
PA, or ZF, etc.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Jan 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary  
extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility.


It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor  
diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we  
actually use arithmetic.




I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes  
makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of  
infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be  
ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter.


Would this biggest number be different for different beings in  
different universes? What is it contingent on?


You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic  
and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question.


Ah! I just said that is was not. Somehow you deny the reality of math.



I'm saying it's an invention.  We invented an system in which you  
can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to  
think about whether you can or not.


So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no  
definite (a priori) fact of the matter of  whether or not a given  
program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing  
that program and observe it terminate?


That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means  
something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it.   
In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on  
a machine terminate, for one reason or another.  Non-terminating  
programs are the result of over idealization.



What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not  
also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)?
Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I  
guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know  
that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind- 
body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty.








If that is the case, when is it determined (for us) that a certain  
program terminates? Is it when the first being anywhere in any  
universe tests it, when someone in our universe tests it, when  
someone in our past light cone tests it, when you test it yourself  
or read about someone who did? Would it ever be possible for two  
beings in two different universes to find different results  
regarding the same program? If not, then what enforces this  
agreement?


But if it leads to paradoxes or absurdities we should just modify  
our invention keeping the good part and avoiding the paradoxes if  
we can.  Peano's arithmetic will still be there in Platonia and  
sqrt(2) will be irrational there.  But the diagonal of a unit  
square may depend on how we measure it or what it's made of.


Does this instrumentalist approach prevents one from having a  
theory of reality?


Who said it's instrumentalist?  Just because it considers a finite  
model of reality?  When Bruno proposes to base things on arithmetic  
and leave analysis and set theory alone, does that make him an  
instrumentalist?


Of course not. As the comp hypothesis use a non instrumentalist  
interpretation of arithmetic. It makes only comp being a finitism (not  
an ultrafinitism). There is no axiom of infinity at the ontological  
level. Infinity is a correct illusion from inside, and mainly due to  
the FPI, and the fact that for all x, s(x)  x.


Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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