Re: evangelizing robots
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 4:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The light sensitive cells in the retina of our eyes are on the wrong side, so we can't have been produced by a intelligent designer. A very very stupid designer maybe. Unless God created the cuttlefish in its own image, as cuttlefishes, octopi, and squids have the light sensitive cells in the retina of their eyes are on the right side. That's the problem with the human, they assert that God prefers them to the other creatures. It's not just humans, the light sensitive cells of ALL vertebrate animals are on the wrong side. The worst human designer on the planet wouldn't do anything that dumb, and certainly would not keep making the exact same mistake again and again many millions of times. If God exists He is a imbecile. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Robot Dog
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I don't think people attributing sentience to something is very meaningful. I'm a something so I guess you don't attributing sentience to me; if so then you've made a mistake although I have no way of proving it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 12 Feb 2015, at 12:47, Samiya Illias wrote:
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 10 Feb 2015, at 08:21, Samiya Illias wrote:
Can you show that 1 + 8 = 9. Better, tell me how many times you
will need to use the second axioms?
Nine times. Here:
1+8=9
Prove: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0= s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)
For x=s(0)
Using axiom 2,
Rewriting for y=(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))=7
Step 1: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s{s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))}
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for
y=(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))=6
Step 2: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s{s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(0))}]
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=(s(s(s(s(s(0)=5
Step 3: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s{s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(0)}]]
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=(s(s(s(s(0=4
Step 4: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s[s{s(0)+s(s(s(s(0}]]]
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=(s(s(s(0)))=3
Step 5: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s[s[s{s(0)+s(s(s(0)))}
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=s(s(0))=2
Step 6: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s[s[s[s{s(0)+s(s(0))}]
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=s(0)=1
Step 7: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s[s[s[s[s{s(0)+s(0)}]]
Simplifying the bracket on the right side, for y=0
Step 8: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s[s[s[s[s[s[s[s{s(0)+0}]]]
Using axiom 1
Step 9: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 = s[s[s[s[s[s[s[s{s(0)}]]]
Rewriting with round brackets
Step 10: s(0)+s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 =
s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)
OK.(get the feeling you use axiom 2 only 8 times, but that is a
detail).
Yes, its eight times.
OK.
Let me ask you this. Are you OK with the two following
multiplicative axioms:
3) x * 0 = 0
4) x * s(y) = x + (x * y)
Yes, they hold true when substituted with natural numbers.
Really?
Have you verified for all numbers?
Generalisation ?
Well, I explain to you the type of axioms we need to be able to
prove such generalization. P(n) means P is some formula of
arithmetic (made using only the logical symbols and the arithmetical
symbols: they are s, 0, + and * (together with (, ), and as I
said the logical symbol: we can use only - (and define ~A by A -
(0 = 1)).
So that we are speaking the same language, please see if the
following are as you mean them:
s = successor
Intuitively? Yes. But it will be of extreme importance to just use
that intuition to see if you are OK with the axioms, and then to
understand that in the formal derivation/computation we do not rely on
the intuition.
The axioms for s are just:
- for all x ~(0 = s(x)) (for all numbers x, 0 is not the successor
of x, put simply: 0 is not a successor).
- for all x and y, s(x) = s(y) - x = y (equivalent with x≠y -
s(x) ≠ s(y), that is all numbers have only one successor)
We will also use this axioms, to make things easier and straight (and
get stronger representation theorem later)
- for all x, (x = 0) or Ey(x = s(y)). That is all numbers are either
null, or have a predecessor.
In summary our assumptions are, together with some logical axioms that
we will need to make precise too:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
This is what I will call RA (for Robinson Arithmetic).
And I will show that IF we are machine, then RA is enough for a theory
of everything, and I will explain how to derive consciousness and
appearence of matter from it, without adding any new axioms, other
than computationalism translated in that theory.
0 = zero
OK. 0 is the usual symbol to denote the number zero (which is not a
symbol, but a number).
Again, what 0 really means does not concern us. We can considered
that it is defined implicitly from the axioms above. We need only
agreement on the axioms, not on the interpretation itself.
+ = plus / and
‘* = times / multiply
- = implies that
~ = all / everything / negation ?
Negation. Those logical connector will also be implicitly define by
some axioms and rules. Not today.
In fact their semantics is very easy:
(A B) is true when A is true and B is true, and it is false in the
other case.
(A v B) is false when A is false and B is false, and it is true in the
other case.
(A - B) is false when A is true and B is false, and is true otherwise
(we will come back on this one).
~A is false when A is true, and is true when A is false. OK?
(0=1) ???
It is an example of a false sentence, in arithmetic.
You can verify that
~A has the same truth value than (A - 0 = 1). Of course here 1 is
used as an abbreviation for s(0).
P = prove
Ah, no. P was for an arbitrary arithmetical sentence. It was a meta-
variable, not allowed in the formal expression.
An arithmetical formula can
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
LOP = Laws of physics On 12 February 2015 at 12:32, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: Liz, You and your acronyms! I looked up “IMHO” Google says most of the time when people use the phrase their opinion in not humble. I could not find a definition for “LOP” that made sense as you used it. According to my TOE as explained at pages 151 -153, right now our Universe is 100 percent empty space and that empty space is completely filled with Coulomb waves. That must be correct since everything in our Universe is made from point particles. But these point particles each carry a charge that produces Coulomb force waves that continuously travel forever at the speed of light. I prove that an 8 cubic centimeter block of copper is 100 percent empty space and that you and I are 100 percent empty space. But that is now. A long time ago, before there was anything there was nothing, i.e. just empty space, not even any tronnies or Coulomb waves. I admit, I do not know which came first tronnies or Coulomb force waves. I wish I knew. Maybe there was something that preceded the tronnies and their Coulomb waves or the Coulomb waves and their tronnies. Maybe you could help me out. By the way, I have continued to work on descriptions of the internal structure of atoms that I partially explained in Chapter XIII. I now know the internal structure of the nucleus of every stable and every very long-lived isotope from helium to plutonium. They are all comprised of alpha particles, and gamma ray entrons (except iron 56 and nickel 60 may not include any gamma ray entrons). Most nuclei include electrons (up to 28) and nuclei with spin may include up to three protons. There are no neutrons in stable nuclei. John Ross *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *LizR *Sent:* Wednesday, February 11, 2015 1:04 PM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential On 12 February 2015 at 08:09, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: Hi Liz, Good to hear from you again. Empty space *is *the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes the fire into the equations? etc are asking why *anything* exists. Pushing the chain of explanation back to asking Why did empty space exist? (assuming that is in fact how the universe started) is a step in the right direction, but it isn't a final explanation. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, ever, that might be the case. But if anything ever arises from the empty space, then the LOP were implicitly there, because they govern what appears. So if your description is correct the question has been reduced to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? That's progress towards a TOE, but it hasn't hit bedrock yet IMHO. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Feb 2015, at 08:21, Samiya Illias wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Feb 2015, at 05:07, Samiya Illias wrote: On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 8:27 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Feb 2015, at 17:14, Samiya Illias wrote: On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Feb 2015, at 06:02, Samiya Illias wrote: On 04-Feb-2015, at 12:01 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Then reason shows that arithmetic is already full of life, indeed full of an infinity of universal machines competing to provide your infinitely many relatively consistent continuations. Incompleteness imposes, at least formally, a soul (a first person), an observer (a first person plural), a god (an independent simple but deep truth) to any machine believing in the RA axioms together with enough induction axioms. I know you believe in them. The lexicon is p truthGod []p provable Intelligible (modal logic, G and G*) []p p the soul (modal logic, S4Grz) []p t intelligible matter(with p sigma_1) (modal logic, Z1, Z1*) []p sensible matter (with p sigma_1) (modal logic, X1, X1*) You need to study some math, I have been wanting to but it seems such an uphill task. Yet, its a mountain I would like to climb :) 7 + 0 = 7. You are OK with this? Tell me. OK Are you OK with the generalisation? For all numbers n, n + 0 = n. Right? Right :) You suggest I begin with Set Theory? No need of set theory, as I have never been able to really prefer one theory or another. It is too much powerful, not fundamental. At some point naive set theory will be used, but just for making thing easier: it will never be part of the fundamental assumptions. I use only elementary arithmetic, so you need only to understand the following statements (and some other later): Please see if my assumptions/interpretations below are correct: x + 0 = x if x=1, then 1+0=1 x + successor(y) = successor(x + y) 1 + 2 = (1+2) = 3 I agree, but you don't show the use of the axiom: x + successor(y) = successor(x + y), or x +s(y) = s(x + y). I didn't use the axioms. I just substituted the axioms variables with the natural numbers. And use your common intuition. Good. The idea now will be to see if the axioms given capture that intuition, fully, or in part. Are you OK? To avoid notational difficulties, I represent the numbers by their degree of parenthood (so to speak) with 0. Abbreviating s for successor: 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ... If the sequence represents 0, 1, 2, 3, ... We can use 0, 1, 2, 3, ... as abbreviation for 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ... Can you derive that s(s(0)) + s(0) = s(s(s(0))) with the statements just above? then 2 + 1 = 3 Hmm... s(s(0)) + s(0) = s(s(s(0))) is another writing for 2 + 1 = 3, but it is not clear if you proved it using the two axioms: 1) x + 0 = x 2) x + s(y)) = s(x + y) Let me show you: We must compute: s(s(0)) + s(0) The axiom 2) says that x + s(y) = s(x + y), for all x and y. We see that s(s(0)) + s(0) matches x + s(y), with x = s(s(0)), and y = 0. OK? So we can apply the axiom 2, and we get, by replacing x (= s(s(0))) and y (= 0) in the axiom 2). This gives s(s(0)) + s(0) = s( s(s(0)) + 0 ) OK? (this is a simple substitution, suggested by the axiom 2) But then by axiom 1, we know that s(s(0)) + 0 = s(s(0)), so the right side becomes s( s(s(0)) +0 ) = s( s(s(0)) ) So we have proved s(s(0)) + s(0) = s(s(s(0))) OK? Yes, thanks! You are welcome. Can you guess how many times you need to use the axiom 2) in case I would ask you to prove 1 + 8 = 9. You might do it for training purpose. 1+8=9 Translating in successor terms: s(0) + s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0) Applying Axiom 2 by substituting x=8 or s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0, and y=0, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 + s(0) = s( s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 + 0) Applying axiom 1 to the right side: s(0) + s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0 = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0) 1+8=9 Is the above the correct method to arrive at the proof? I only used axiom 2 once. Am I missing some basic point? Let me see. Axiom 2 says:x + s(y)) = s(x + y). Well, if x = 8, and y = 0, we get 8 + 1, and your computation/proofs is correct, in that case. So you would have been correct if I was asking you to prove/compute that 8 + 1 = 9. Unfortunately I asked to prove/compute that 1 + 8 = 9. I think that you have (consciously?) use the fact that 1 + 8 = 8 + 1, which speeds the computation. Well, later I ill show you that the idea that for all x and y x + y = y + x, is NOT provable with the axioms given (despite that theorey will be shown to be already Turing Universal. No worry. Your move was clever, but you need to put yourself
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 05:53, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2015 8:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:42 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 6:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The implication is that if you believe in universal personhood then even if you are selfish you will be motivated towards charity. If humans are any indication, a super-intelligence will be incredibly good at rationalizing what it wants to do. For example, if personhood is universal then what's good for me is good for the human race. Not necessarily. If personhood is universal then your pleasure is my pleasure, so the conclusion could be: Do unto others as they want done to them. But I'm they, and it's hard to be sure about what they want, so it's best to get me what I want. That way they, sharing my personhood, will also be rewarded. Good point. It is the double edged nature of the realization that there is only one person. The masochist can also become a sadist ... Science is not ethical per se, even the science of ethics. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 10 Feb 2015, at 19:04, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Well, you can derive universal personhood from simpler hypotheses, also. Of course you have to assume those simpler hypothesis. I tend to equalize belief and assumption. The difference between belief and knowledge is that beliefs are revisable. They lack []A - A. Bruno Telmo. Jason On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. A set of core beliefs. A non intelligent robot need them too: It is the set of constants. The intelligent robot can rewrite their constants from which he derive their calculations for actions and if the robot is self preserving and reproduce sexually, it has to adjust his constants i.e. his beliefs according with some darwinian algoritm that must take into account himself but specially the group in which he lives and collaborates.. If the robot does not reproduce sexually and his fellows do not execute very similar programs, it is pointless to teach them any human religion. These and other higher aspects like acting with other intelligent beings communicate perceptions, how a robot elaborate philosophical and theological concepts and collaborate with others, see my post about robotic truth But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible. 2015-02-09 21:59 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: In two senses of that term! Or something. http://bigthink.com/ideafeed/robot-religion-2 http://gizmodo.com/when-superintelligent-ai-arrives-will-religions-try-t-1682837922 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: evangelizing robots
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive. Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not? This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged. I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from my consideration of various problems of personal identity. Right. We are in complete agreement then. Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if it could be considered a preferable belief: it may be true and we are all better off assuming it to be true. It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane. It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead to a threat to freedom. If you are honest about your belief in universal personhood you won't be interested into manipulating the other versions of you into servitude. This reminds me of Nietzschean slave morality: the slave cannot conceive of true freedom, so he can only desire to become the oppressor. But this is because he does not really believe in universal personhood, otherwise he would understand true freedom. Telmo. Like I said: it is double edged. It might be a type of knowledge belonging to a []* \ [] sort of logic: you can grasp it from inside, but it would not make sense to tell others. You can still suggest means to access that knowledge, but not much more. I think, and extrapolate from the correct machine self-reference. Bruno Telmo. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 05:59, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:48 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 04:46, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 4:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 20:57, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:44 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I call this the Cyberman (or Mr Spock) problem. The Cybermen in Doctor Who are logical and unemotional, yet they wish to convert the rest of the world to be like them. Why? Without emotion they have no reason to do that, or anything else. (Likewise Mr Spock, except as we know he only repressed his emotions.) I'm not sure whether emotions are necessary to have goals. Then again, perhaps they are. The 'big' emotions like fear, rage, lust probably aren't, but values, feelings that this is preferred to that, are. I don't see how one could have an opinion on whether one should do anything without emotions being involved. So do you believe the Mars Rover is motivated to explore by its emotions? I don't believe it is motivated at all, in the sense that a conscious being is. Then couldn't the cybermen be like the Mars Rover? or vice-versa, could a Mars Rover be programmed with the goal of the cybermen yet not have emotions? No I think the cybermen are intended to be conscious, and emotions are what evolved to make conscious beings do stuff that was necessary to their survival. Do you think that consciousness is necessary for emotion? Certainly snails and insects react to things in their environment in order to enhance their survival. Is that emotion? I think it is, but maybe it's just a question of semantics? Are they conscious or merely aware? I would have said: are there self-conscious or merely conscious. Without consciousness, there is no pain/pleasure. To get emotion, you might need self-consciousness, at least to have emotion that you can express as such. Bruno Brent The cybes act as though they are motivated by certain emotions (as does Mr Spock). They wish to make everyone else like them - why? Because that is the logical thing to do, perhaps. But why do they care enough to actually do it? The Mars Rover does what it does because of the particular pattern of instructions stored in its CPU, I assume. Of course comp says there's no difference. I wonder what Bruno thinks about emotions? Since you're effectively espousing comp here, assumig Bruno's right on that I may be wrong on this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 February 2015 at 22:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Emotion provides an efficacious way to retrieve self-satisfaction, by bypassing reason, which would be too much slow. We are programmed (by evolution, perhaps) to dislike anything threatening our satisfaction. That is why a burn is painful, and a good meal is pleasant. So we are driving by good and bad. We tend to get the good, and to be away from the bad. That are the basic emotion at the heart of all our behaviors. Now, we have evolved into very complex relationships with nature and with ourselves, and the emotions can become complex and conflictual, notably with conflicts between shorterm goal (I want the pleasure of smoking a cigarette) and longterm goal (I don't want to die from a painful disease related to the cigarette). If Mars Rover has enough self-reference, a conflict between different subgoal can happen, like I want to go there quickly, but I hesitate to take the shorter path as it is near a dangerous crevasse. In such case, it might behave (at least) like it has emotions: hesitation, failed attempts in quick succession, etc. Emotions are daughter of the qualia of pain and pleasure, related to self-satisfaction and survival. You will put your hand oout of the fire more quickly than after reasoning that it could harm you, but with a lesson well memorized, like : fire hurts, not do that again, ... It sounds to me as though in order to be motivated to act, you need some sort of stimulus (eg pain, pleasure) and you would think that therefore you need to be aware of that stimulus. But I guess some simple systems do this by reflex (insects, rovers, pulling hand from fire before the pain registers consciously). So maybe you don't need to be conscious to be motivated, in a simple sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive. Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not? This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged. I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from my consideration of various problems of personal identity. Right. We are in complete agreement then. Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if it could be considered a preferable belief: it may be true and we are all better off assuming it to be true. It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane. It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead to a threat to freedom. Like I said: it is double edged. It might be a type of knowledge belonging to a []* \ [] sort of logic: you can grasp it from inside, but it would not make sense to tell others. You can still suggest means to access that knowledge, but not much more. I think, and extrapolate from the correct machine self-reference. Bruno Telmo. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 7:54 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2015, at 05:37, Samiya Illias wrote: On 11-Feb-2015, at 6:40 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. I stopped reading after the following parochial imbecility I don't see Christ's redemption limited to human beings. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. Yet another example of somebody in love with the English word religion but not with the meaning behind it. But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. Would you conclude from this that we are machine? I am thinking to some creationists who argue that animals are sort of machines, and this to give evidence for intelligent design My first problem with intelligent design is that, as an explanation, it assumes more than it explain. Where would an intelligent designer comes from? Then, if you look at the Mandelbrot set, you can see many complex structures, and this illustrates that very complex structures can arise from very simple principle. Of course we know that this is already the case in arithmetic where all possible machine already exist together with all their possible execution (which is why I suggest to explain this to you (hope my last post was not to much wishes-breaking!). So God does not need to create machines, it is enough to create 0 and the successors and told them to add and multiply. This leads to all machines + all computations, making the creationist argument non valid. That's an interesting and novel argument. However, to counter it I suspect the theist would say they don't believe in comp. A remaining possible role for a God would be in a selection process. But a selection is done automatically (by the FPI or consciousness) ... in case the relative measure on computations, provided by computer science, fits well with the measure inferred from nature (given today by QM, this makes computationalism testable). Here Quantum Mechanics illustrates indeed that apparently, those measure fits well, as far as we can say today. Bruno Samiya John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 4:53 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 8:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:42 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 6:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The implication is that if you believe in universal personhood then even if you are selfish you will be motivated towards charity. If humans are any indication, a super-intelligence will be incredibly good at rationalizing what it wants to do. For example, if personhood is universal then what's good for me is good for the human race. Not necessarily. If personhood is universal then your pleasure is my pleasure, so the conclusion could be: Do unto others as they want done to them. But I'm they, and it's hard to be sure about what they want, so it's best to get me what I want. It's not so hard when they are a man. You just have to ask. It they are a woman, it can be a bit more complicated indeed. Telmo. That way they, sharing my personhood, will also be rewarded. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are prohibited. No, as per my answer to Brent. The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does mean that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/difference in behaviors. If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, but not the other way around. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference to the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious sensations disappeared entirely. I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall within epiphenominalism? I'm not stuck on the term epiphenomenalism if it causes confusion. I'll quote Brent: ...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. Descartes Dualism Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony Berkeley's Idealism Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory Searle's Biological Naturalism Physicalism Functionalism Computationalism Eliminative Materialism I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or discount consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
Bruce, No one can logically doubt the following: BEFORE THERE WAS ANYTHING THERE WAS NOTHING Let's start with that and explain how we now live in a universe with 100 to 400 billion galaxies. You propose a background space-time. Where did this background space-time come from? Who created that thing. Can space-time be created from nothing? If it can, don't you end up with nothing and time? How does that get you a universe? According to my thinking, empty space is nothing. Here is GOOGLES definition of time: noun 1.the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole. 2.a point of time as measured in hours and minutes past midnight or noon. 3.time as allotted, available, or used. 4.an instance of something happening or being done; an occasion. 5.(following a number) expressing multiplication. 6.the rhythmic pattern of a piece of music, as expressed by a time signature. I have shown how to build a universe from point particles, each with a charge of plus e and minus e. You have admit if you add minus e to plus e, you get zero. Is anyone aware of any other explanation for how our Universe could evolve from nothing? John R -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruce Kellett Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 4:27 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential Liz, I think you are generally correct in what you write below. Current writing by cosmologists etc on getting a universe from nothing assume the prior existence of at least a background space-time. More usually, this is assumed to be the vacuum of quantum field theory. So there is a clear assumption that a framework, and a set of laws, are logically prior to the coming into existence of the universe. This makes sense, because if you want to give an orderly account of the origin of the universe, you must give an account in terms of laws -- so these are logically prior. Basic quantum mechanics, or quantum field theory is usually assumed to govern this creation. In addition, if you have some background space-time then you need laws that describe the nature and behaviour of this substrate. General relativity is usually assumed, at least a semi-classical version of GR. My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd. People who don't want to assume that the universe just pops out of nowhere, complete with laws, generally assume a previously existing universe of some sort that spawns daughter universes in some manner. This, of course, does not answer ultimate questions of origins, but if you want to work within current understanding of the LOP, then you have little choice. The popping scenario essentially leaves origins unexplainable. Bruce LizR wrote: Now that we've sorted out the acronyms, I'd appreciate a response to the points I made - see below. Empty space _is _the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes fire into the equations? etc are asking why /anything/ exists. That includes empty space. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, forever, that might be true. (At least we wouldn't exist to ask questions about whether it's true or not.) But if anything arises from the empty space, then the LOP must govern what appears. Why should tronnies appear rather than, say, quarks? The answer, by definition, is the laws of physics. Hence, if your description of the origin of the universe is correct, the question why is there something rather than nothing? can be amended to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? This leaves open the question of why the LOP are the way they are, rather than anything else they could logically have been. Generally, attempts to answer this have taken two forms. One is to show that the LOP are unique, and logically necessary - there is some underlying reason they could only be the way we observe them to be. The other is to admit that they could have been different, and perhaps are in other universes - in this view the required explanation is not an answer to why do these particular laws of physics? but why do all these different laws of physics exist? This assumes that some more general logical necessity needs to be invoked to explain all possible LOP, and then anthropic selection can be invoked to explain why we
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
Liz, I think you are generally correct in what you write below. Current writing by cosmologists etc on getting a universe from nothing assume the prior existence of at least a background space-time. More usually, this is assumed to be the vacuum of quantum field theory. So there is a clear assumption that a framework, and a set of laws, are logically prior to the coming into existence of the universe. This makes sense, because if you want to give an orderly account of the origin of the universe, you must give an account in terms of laws -- so these are logically prior. Basic quantum mechanics, or quantum field theory is usually assumed to govern this creation. In addition, if you have some background space-time then you need laws that describe the nature and behaviour of this substrate. General relativity is usually assumed, at least a semi-classical version of GR. My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd. People who don't want to assume that the universe just pops out of nowhere, complete with laws, generally assume a previously existing universe of some sort that spawns daughter universes in some manner. This, of course, does not answer ultimate questions of origins, but if you want to work within current understanding of the LOP, then you have little choice. The popping scenario essentially leaves origins unexplainable. Bruce LizR wrote: Now that we've sorted out the acronyms, I'd appreciate a response to the points I made - see below. Empty space _is _the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes fire into the equations? etc are asking why /anything/ exists. That includes empty space. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, forever, that might be true. (At least we wouldn't exist to ask questions about whether it's true or not.) But if anything arises from the empty space, then the LOP must govern what appears. Why should tronnies appear rather than, say, quarks? The answer, by definition, is the laws of physics. Hence, if your description of the origin of the universe is correct, the question why is there something rather than nothing? can be amended to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? This leaves open the question of why the LOP are the way they are, rather than anything else they could logically have been. Generally, attempts to answer this have taken two forms. One is to show that the LOP are unique, and logically necessary - there is some underlying reason they could only be the way we observe them to be. The other is to admit that they could have been different, and perhaps are in other universes - in this view the required explanation is not an answer to why do these particular laws of physics? but why do all these different laws of physics exist? This assumes that some more general logical necessity needs to be invoked to explain all possible LOP, and then anthropic selection can be invoked to explain why we find them to be the way we do in our particular universe. PS TOE=Theory of Everything, IMO=In my opinion (be it ever so humble). I often type in a hurry, so having generally accepted acronyms available can come in handy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/11/2015 10:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 7:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 4:25 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. Having accurate beliefs about the world and having goals are two unrelated things. If I like stamp collecting, being intelligent will help me to collect stamps, it will help me see if stamp collecting clashes with a higher priority goal, but it won't help me decide if my goals are worthy. Were all your goals set at birth and driven by biology, or are some of your goals based on what you've since learned about the world? Perhaps learning about universal personhood (for example), could lead one to believe that charity is a worthy goal, and perhaps deserving of more time than collecting stamps. The implication is that if you believe in universal personhood then even if you are selfish you will be motivated towards charity. But the selfishness itself, as a primary value, is not amenable to rational analysis. There is no inconsistency in a superintelligent AI that is selfish, or one that is charitable, or one that believes the single most important thing in the world is to collect stamps. But doing something well (regardless of what it is) is almost always improved by having greater knowledge, so would not gathering greater knowledge become a secondary sub goal for nearly any supintelligence that has goals? Is it impossible that it might discover and decide to pursue other goals during that time? After all, capacity to change one's mine seems to be a requirement for any intelligence process, or any process on the path towards superintelligence. Sure, but the AI may still decide to do evil, perverse or self destructive things. There is no contradiction in superintelligence behaving this way. It's an assumption to say there is no contradiction. If it's beliefs are defined to be almost completely correct, why would its actions not follow its beliefs and also be almost completely correct? What does correct mean in this context? Instrumentally correct, i.e. well chosen to achieve it's goals? Or does it mean agreeing with Jason Resch's liberal humanist values? Interesting description of my values. By correct I mean in alignment with truth. What does alignment with truth mean? Is it just a true proposition about someone's preferences, e.g. Hitler prefers to kill Jews.? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/11/2015 10:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 10:59 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:48 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 04:46, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 4:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 20:57, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:44 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I call this the Cyberman (or Mr Spock) problem. The Cybermen in Doctor Who are logical and unemotional, yet they wish to convert the rest of the world to be like them. Why? Without emotion they have no reason to do that, or anything else. (Likewise Mr Spock, except as we know he only repressed his emotions.) I'm not sure whether emotions are necessary to have goals. Then again, perhaps they are. The 'big' emotions like fear, rage, lust probably aren't, but values, feelings that this is preferred to that, are. I don't see how one could have an opinion on whether one should do anything without emotions being involved. So do you believe the Mars Rover is motivated to explore by its emotions? I don't believe it is motivated at all, in the sense that a conscious being is. Then couldn't the cybermen be like the Mars Rover? or vice-versa, could a Mars Rover be programmed with the goal of the cybermen yet not have emotions? No I think the cybermen are intended to be conscious, and emotions are what evolved to make conscious beings do stuff that was necessary to their survival. Do you think that consciousness is necessary for emotion? Certainly snails and insects react to things in their environment in order to enhance their survival. Is that emotion? I think it is, but maybe it's just a question of semantics? Are they conscious or merely aware? How is consciousness different from awareness? I don't think there's any agreed on definition of these terms, but what I propose is that consciousness includes self-awareness, i.e. that the organism has a world-model in which it has a particular place or function relative to other things. Awareness is a lesser level of consciousness in which the organism reacts to events the environment in a way to realize some goals, such as growth and reproduction. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
Now that we've sorted out the acronyms, I'd appreciate a response to the points I made - see below. Empty space *is *the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes fire into the equations? etc are asking why *anything* exists. That includes empty space. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, forever, that might be true. (At least we wouldn't exist to ask questions about whether it's true or not.) But if anything arises from the empty space, then the LOP must govern what appears. Why should tronnies appear rather than, say, quarks? The answer, by definition, is the laws of physics. Hence, if your description of the origin of the universe is correct, the question why is there something rather than nothing? can be amended to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? This leaves open the question of why the LOP are the way they are, rather than anything else they could logically have been. Generally, attempts to answer this have taken two forms. One is to show that the LOP are unique, and logically necessary - there is some underlying reason they could only be the way we observe them to be. The other is to admit that they could have been different, and perhaps are in other universes - in this view the required explanation is not an answer to why do these particular laws of physics? but why do all these different laws of physics exist? This assumes that some more general logical necessity needs to be invoked to explain all possible LOP, and then anthropic selection can be invoked to explain why we find them to be the way we do in our particular universe. PS TOE=Theory of Everything, IMO=In my opinion (be it ever so humble). I often type in a hurry, so having generally accepted acronyms available can come in handy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 11 Feb 2015, at 11:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 11, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. Having accurate beliefs about the world and having goals are two unrelated things. If I like stamp collecting, being intelligent will help me to collect stamps, it will help me see if stamp collecting clashes with a higher priority goal, but it won't help me decide if my goals are worthy. Were all your goals set at birth and driven by biology, or are some of your goals based on what you've since learned about the world? Perhaps learning about universal personhood (for example), could lead one to believe that charity is a worthy goal, and perhaps deserving of more time than collecting stamps. The implication is that if you believe in universal personhood then even if you are selfish you will be motivated towards charity. But the selfishness itself, as a primary value, is not amenable to rational analysis. There is no inconsistency in a superintelligent AI that is selfish, or one that is charitable, or one that believes the single most important thing in the world is to collect stamps. But doing something well (regardless of what it is) is almost always improved by having greater knowledge, so would not gathering greater knowledge become a secondary sub goal for nearly any supintelligence that has goals? Is it impossible that it might discover and decide to pursue other goals during that time? After all, capacity to change one's mine seems to be a requirement for any intelligence process, or any process on the path towards superintelligence. Sure, but the AI may still decide to do evil, perverse or self destructive things. There is no contradiction in superintelligence behaving this way. I am afraid that there is some truth here. Humans are obviously the species having the most perverse and (self)-destructive activity on this planet, even intentionally sometimes. But again, that is due to its competence. By definition I would say that this is not intelligent behavior. That is why I distinguish intelligence and competence. Competence tend to oppose itself to intelligence. I would say that the virgin universal machine, or better the universal person attached to it, is maximally intelligent. To survive, it develops competence, which make asleep its intelligence. Neotony suggests that nature does invest in intelligence, by keeping the babies and children a longer time close to their initial universality. Our competence is slipping into our technologies, so we might evolve toward a possible equilibrium between intelligence and competence, but this is like babies + atomic bombs, and such an equilibrium might be unstable. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 11 Feb 2015, at 19:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 11:37 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. The light sensitive cells in the retina of our eyes are on the wrong side, so we can't have been produced by a intelligent designer. A very very stupid designer maybe. Unless God created the cuttlefish in its own image, as cuttlefishes, octopi, and squids have the light sensitive cells in the retina of their eyes are on the right side. That's the problem with the human, they assert that God prefers them to the other creatures. If true, that is hardly assertable. That feeling of superiority is what transforms intelligence into stupidity. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 11 Feb 2015, at 19:48, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 04:46, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 4:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 20:57, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:44 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I call this the Cyberman (or Mr Spock) problem. The Cybermen in Doctor Who are logical and unemotional, yet they wish to convert the rest of the world to be like them. Why? Without emotion they have no reason to do that, or anything else. (Likewise Mr Spock, except as we know he only repressed his emotions.) I'm not sure whether emotions are necessary to have goals. Then again, perhaps they are. The 'big' emotions like fear, rage, lust probably aren't, but values, feelings that this is preferred to that, are. I don't see how one could have an opinion on whether one should do anything without emotions being involved. So do you believe the Mars Rover is motivated to explore by its emotions? I don't believe it is motivated at all, in the sense that a conscious being is. Then couldn't the cybermen be like the Mars Rover? or vice-versa, could a Mars Rover be programmed with the goal of the cybermen yet not have emotions? No I think the cybermen are intended to be conscious, and emotions are what evolved to make conscious beings do stuff that was necessary to their survival. The cybes act as though they are motivated by certain emotions (as does Mr Spock). They wish to make everyone else like them - why? Because that is the logical thing to do, perhaps. But why do they care enough to actually do it? The Mars Rover does what it does because of the particular pattern of instructions stored in its CPU, I assume. Of course comp says there's no difference. I wonder what Bruno thinks about emotions? Since you're effectively espousing comp here, assumig Bruno's right on that I may be wrong on this. Emotion provides an efficacious way to retrieve self-satisfaction, by bypassing reason, which would be too much slow. We are programmed (by evolution, perhaps) to dislike anything threatening our satisfaction. That is why a burn is painful, and a good meal is pleasant. So we are driving by good and bad. We tend to get the good, and to be away from the bad. That are the basic emotion at the heart of all our behaviors. Now, we have evolved into very complex relationships with nature and with ourselves, and the emotions can become complex and conflictual, notably with conflicts between shorterm goal (I want the pleasure of smoking a cigarette) and longterm goal (I don't want to die from a painful disease related to the cigarette). If Mars Rover has enough self-reference, a conflict between different subgoal can happen, like I want to go there quickly, but I hesitate to take the shorter path as it is near a dangerous crevasse. In such case, it might behave (at least) like it has emotions: hesitation, failed attempts in quick succession, etc. Emotions are daughter of the qualia of pain and pleasure, related to self-satisfaction and survival. You will put your hand oout of the fire more quickly than after reasoning that it could harm you, but with a lesson well memorized, like : fire hurts, not do that again, ... Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 11 Feb 2015, at 22:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 02:50, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Sure, but the AI may still decide to do evil, perverse or self destructive things. There is no contradiction in superintelligence behaving this way. It's an assumption to say there is no contradiction. If it's beliefs are defined to be almost completely correct, why would its actions not follow its beliefs and also be almost completely correct? Unless we are talking about a superintelligence with some kind of malfunction, I would think its actions would be driven by its beliefs. Do you think morality is relative or universal? Morality is a value, and values have no ultimate logical or empirical justification. I agree. But I would still side with Jason, as I find conceivable that morality has an arithmetical of computer-science justification. It might be somehow based on self-satisfaction + empathy for (less and less similar) entities, leading to reasonable self-satisfaction (= without lying to others, respecting truth, etc.). Platonists usually bet on some relationships between truth and good. I am not as sure as Plato, on this. It annoys me, but even in arithmetic, lies can be fruitful, a bit like in nature spider can lie to birds to just survive (making them believe they are non edible ants, for example). Open problem, to say the least. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 11 Feb 2015, at 05:37, Samiya Illias wrote: On 11-Feb-2015, at 6:40 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. I stopped reading after the following parochial imbecility I don't see Christ's redemption limited to human beings. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. Yet another example of somebody in love with the English word religion but not with the meaning behind it. But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. Would you conclude from this that we are machine? I am thinking to some creationists who argue that animals are sort of machines, and this to give evidence for intelligent design My first problem with intelligent design is that, as an explanation, it assumes more than it explain. Where would an intelligent designer comes from? Then, if you look at the Mandelbrot set, you can see many complex structures, and this illustrates that very complex structures can arise from very simple principle. Of course we know that this is already the case in arithmetic where all possible machine already exist together with all their possible execution (which is why I suggest to explain this to you (hope my last post was not to much wishes-breaking!). So God does not need to create machines, it is enough to create 0 and the successors and told them to add and multiply. This leads to all machines + all computations, making the creationist argument non valid. A remaining possible role for a God would be in a selection process. But a selection is done automatically (by the FPI or consciousness) ... in case the relative measure on computations, provided by computer science, fits well with the measure inferred from nature (given today by QM, this makes computationalism testable). Here Quantum Mechanics illustrates indeed that apparently, those measure fits well, as far as we can say today. Bruno Samiya John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 1:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But again, that is due to its competence. By definition I would say that this is not intelligent behavior. That is why I distinguish intelligence and competence. Competence tend to oppose itself to intelligence. But then there is no operational definition of intelligent behavior. If it appears intelligent, i.e. purposeful and effective, it's mere competence. If it's purposeless or ineffective it's stupidity. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Yes it does assume an unexplainable first intelligence. However, the unexplainable is simply because of our lack of knowledge of that. The absence of an intelligent designer is more illogical. It's just filling the gap with nothing. Hmm What if we fill the gap with elementary arithmetic? What if we leave the gap with We don't know until we have more knowledge. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2015 6:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: John, Calling 'empty space' 'nothing' in the philosophical sense is just a confusion. I can only repeat what I said before: 'My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd.' Either you have pre-existing laws and substrate -- which is not 'nothing' -- or the universe just pops spontaneously, and laws, etc, are just descriptions of observed regularities in whatever has popped. You don't have many other options. The other popular option (in both religion and physics) is that the universe is eternal and no popping is needed. Some are eternal and infinite and others are eternal and cyclic. Brent Popping was perhaps a bad choice of term. It conveys the idea of a temporal progression from 'nothing' to the popped universe. I had in mind, rather, block universe ideas in which the complete space-time continuum is timelessly existent. There is no origin since time is a concept only within the block. The block could be either of infinite temporal duration (if such can be defined within the block universe), or cyclical. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
John, Calling 'empty space' 'nothing' in the philosophical sense is just a confusion. I can only repeat what I said before: 'My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd.' Either you have pre-existing laws and substrate -- which is not 'nothing' -- or the universe just pops spontaneously, and laws, etc, are just descriptions of observed regularities in whatever has popped. You don't have many other options. Bruce John Ross wrote: Bruce, No one can logically doubt the following: BEFORE THERE WAS ANYTHING THERE WAS NOTHING Let's start with that and explain how we now live in a universe with 100 to 400 billion galaxies. You propose a background space-time. Where did this background space-time come from? Who created that thing. Can space-time be created from nothing? If it can, don't you end up with nothing and time? How does that get you a universe? According to my thinking, empty space is nothing. Here is GOOGLES definition of time: noun 1.the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole. 2.a point of time as measured in hours and minutes past midnight or noon. 3.time as allotted, available, or used. 4.an instance of something happening or being done; an occasion. 5.(following a number) expressing multiplication. 6.the rhythmic pattern of a piece of music, as expressed by a time signature. I have shown how to build a universe from point particles, each with a charge of plus e and minus e. You have admit if you add minus e to plus e, you get zero. Is anyone aware of any other explanation for how our Universe could evolve from nothing? John R -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruce Kellett Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 4:27 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential Liz, I think you are generally correct in what you write below. Current writing by cosmologists etc on getting a universe from nothing assume the prior existence of at least a background space-time. More usually, this is assumed to be the vacuum of quantum field theory. So there is a clear assumption that a framework, and a set of laws, are logically prior to the coming into existence of the universe. This makes sense, because if you want to give an orderly account of the origin of the universe, you must give an account in terms of laws -- so these are logically prior. Basic quantum mechanics, or quantum field theory is usually assumed to govern this creation. In addition, if you have some background space-time then you need laws that describe the nature and behaviour of this substrate. General relativity is usually assumed, at least a semi-classical version of GR. My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd. People who don't want to assume that the universe just pops out of nowhere, complete with laws, generally assume a previously existing universe of some sort that spawns daughter universes in some manner. This, of course, does not answer ultimate questions of origins, but if you want to work within current understanding of the LOP, then you have little choice. The popping scenario essentially leaves origins unexplainable. Bruce LizR wrote: Now that we've sorted out the acronyms, I'd appreciate a response to the points I made - see below. Empty space _is _the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes fire into the equations? etc are asking why /anything/ exists. That includes empty space. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, forever, that might be true. (At least we wouldn't exist to ask questions about whether it's true or not.) But if anything arises from the empty space, then the LOP must govern what appears. Why should tronnies appear rather than, say, quarks? The answer, by definition, is the laws of physics. Hence, if your description of the origin of the universe is correct, the question why is there something rather than nothing? can be amended to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? This leaves open the question of why the LOP are the way they are, rather than anything else they could logically have been. Generally, attempts to answer this have taken two forms. One is to show that the LOP are unique, and logically necessary - there is some underlying reason they
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 3:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive. Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not? This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged. I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from my consideration of various problems of personal identity. Right. We are in complete agreement then. Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if it could be considered a preferable belief: it may be true and we are all better off assuming it to be true. It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane. It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead to a threat to
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are prohibited. No, as per my answer to Brent. The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does mean that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/difference in behaviors. If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, but not the other way around. But then that is just a theory of supervienience/emergence, it is not epiphneominalism. In interactionist dualism, if you remove the consciousness you cause behavioral/physical changes since the immaterial mind can no longer control the body. With epiphenominalism, you could eliminate the immaterial mind without having any changes in the physical world. You use could in the sense of logically conceivable. But I use it nomologically, and nomologically it is impossible to remove consciousness if it an epiphenomenon of intelligent behavior. Emergence/Supervienence would not be epiphenominal theories, since under them it is not logically possible to remove or change consciousness without there being physically detectible differences in the system. No it is *logically* possible. You can't prove false from There is no physical difference, but the being is not conscious. But it is *nomologically* impossible - or at least that's what I think epiphenomenal means. But I don't care about the semantics, if that's what emergent means to you - fined call is emergent instead of epiphenomenal. In epiphenominalism, what consciousness exists or doesn't exist, and how it may appear to the experiencer is all up to the rules that govern the immaterial universe in which the mind inhabits under epiphenominalism. If there's an immaterial universe in which minds exist with rules independent of the material universe, then that's dualism. The way to view epiphenominalism is that our minds are immaterial souls on some ethereal plane, and we receive information from a physical universe (in the same way a movie might be projected to be viewed but not effected) into our conscious minds. Yet regardless of what our minds decide to do with that information, we're only watching a movie we can't change. Depends on who you're calling we. Does we include our brains? If you really believe your thoughts and mental events have no effects on the physical universe then that is epiphenominalism. Not just that you can ignore the higher supervenient layers, but that you're better off not mentioning them at all under Occam's razor, it's easier to just deny their existence altogether since they have no effects. Like it's easier to do thermodynamics by referring only to the velocity and location of molecules. Brent The only thing preventing you from cutting off your own mind via occam's razor is your own consciousness which you have direct evidence of, but then you can only ever help to justify solipsism if you cling to epiphenominalism. It's as dead-end of a theory as Berkeley's idealism is as far as trying to figure out the properties and requirements of conscious minds. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference to the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious sensations disappeared entirely. I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall within epiphenominalism? I'm not stuck on the term epiphenomenalism if it causes confusion. I'll quote Brent: ...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. The necessary part is not part of the standard definition of epiphenominalism. Descartes Dualism Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony Berkeley's Idealism Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. But this cannot be used to show that consciousness exists either generally or in a particular case. Okay but I fail to see the connection of this statement to the one I made above. The relevance is that I'm not saying that consciousness results in physically detectable differences in behaviour, even though I am saying that a certain type of behaviour may necessarily be associated with consciousness. It's a bit subtle - it might seem contradictory at first glance. I invoke Chalmers' fading qualia argument, which shows that if consciousness were contingent rather than necessary it would be possible to make partial zombies. Partial zombies are absurd; if they are not absurd then we may as well say consciousness does not exist. If partial zombies are absurd, then so are full zombies. Epiphenominalism makes full zombies logically (if not physically by your definition) possible. Therefore I also find epihpenominalism absurd as the idea of partial zombies. I agree that full zombies are also absurd. There is a potential problem here with the terms absurd, physically possible, logically possible, conceptually possible. I think zombies are conceptually possible, but I think they are logically impossible. I don't see why you say epiphenomenalism (as opposed to some other theory?) makes zombies logically possible. Epihpenominalism makes zombies not only logically possible, but physically undetectable (because consciousness is presumed to have no effects, so whether it is present or not can never be ascertained). Under epihpenominalism, no physical text, measurement, or experiment, could ever detect the presence of consciousness is some presumably conscious entity. Therefore, it could be a zombie, and no physical test, experiment, or measurement could ever (not even in theory) separate a zombie from a non-zombie. This all follows directly from the standard definition of epihpenominalism. Maybe there is no proof of another being being conscious or not, but that in itself is different from epiphenominalism, which further supposes that the existence of consciousness has no physical consequences nor yields any third-personal detectible differences in outcome or behavior. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. Those don't seem compatible to me. 2 implies that there is some outward behavior that the conscious being exhibits which cannot be exhibited by a zombie. So the presence of that behavior is a test to determine whether a being is conscious. The test is essentially what Turing proposed. So I don't understand how you maintain the compatibility? Is it because we cannot identify the crucial outward behavior? I would agree that we an never be certain we've identified it; a Turning test could go on for a long time and still reach the wrong conclusion. But I don't think we need to achieve certainty. My claim is that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent will also be conscious. But that asserts no being is conscious. The definition of zombie equivalent is a being that acts the same and is NOT conscious. So the conclusion its zombie equivalent will be conscious is a direct contradiction and always false. So it is of the form If X then FALSE. which is false whenever X is true, i.e. whenever a being is conscious. So the statement can only be true if a being is conscious is always false. But I know at least one being that is conscious. So it's empirically false. Brent This does not give us a test to determine if it is conscious. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Feb 2015, at 05:59, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:48 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 04:46, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 4:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 20:57, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:44 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2015 at 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I call this the Cyberman (or Mr Spock) problem. The Cybermen in Doctor Who are logical and unemotional, yet they wish to convert the rest of the world to be like them. Why? Without emotion they have no reason to do that, or anything else. (Likewise Mr Spock, except as we know he only repressed his emotions.) I'm not sure whether emotions are necessary to have goals. Then again, perhaps they are. The 'big' emotions like fear, rage, lust probably aren't, but values, feelings that this is preferred to that, are. I don't see how one could have an opinion on whether one should do anything without emotions being involved. So do you believe the Mars Rover is motivated to explore by its emotions? I don't believe it is motivated at all, in the sense that a conscious being is. Then couldn't the cybermen be like the Mars Rover? or vice-versa, could a Mars Rover be programmed with the goal of the cybermen yet not have emotions? No I think the cybermen are intended to be conscious, and emotions are what evolved to make conscious beings do stuff that was necessary to their survival. Do you think that consciousness is necessary for emotion? Certainly snails and insects react to things in their environment in order to enhance their survival. Is that emotion? I think it is, but maybe it's just a question of semantics? Are they conscious or merely aware? I would have said: are there self-conscious or merely conscious. Without consciousness, there is no pain/pleasure. To get emotion, you might need self-consciousness, at least to have emotion that you can express as such. I think asking for expression in language is to anthropocentric. Mammals all express fear by producing adrenalin and increasing heart rate. I don't think they need language. Of course I'd say mammals are self-conscious. But what about amoeba; they also react bio-chemically to gradients in the water. Why isn't that and expression of emotion. Yet I don't think amoeba are self-conscious. In my terms I'd say they are aware, but not conscious. Brent Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
On 2/12/2015 6:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: John, Calling 'empty space' 'nothing' in the philosophical sense is just a confusion. I can only repeat what I said before: 'My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd.' Either you have pre-existing laws and substrate -- which is not 'nothing' -- or the universe just pops spontaneously, and laws, etc, are just descriptions of observed regularities in whatever has popped. You don't have many other options. The other popular option (in both religion and physics) is that the universe is eternal and no popping is needed. Some are eternal and infinite and others are eternal and cyclic. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 9:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are prohibited. No, as per my answer to Brent. The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does mean that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/difference in behaviors. If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, but not the other way around. But then that is just a theory of supervienience/emergence, it is not epiphneominalism. In interactionist dualism, if you remove the consciousness you cause behavioral/physical changes since the immaterial mind can no longer control the body. With epiphenominalism, you could eliminate the immaterial mind without having any changes in the physical world. You use could in the sense of logically conceivable. But I use it nomologically, and nomologically it is impossible to remove consciousness if it an epiphenomenon of intelligent behavior. Emergence/Supervienence would not be epiphenominal theories, since under them it is not logically possible to remove or change consciousness without there being physically detectible differences in the system. No it is *logically* possible. You can't prove false from There is no physical difference, but the being is not conscious. But it is *nomologically* impossible - or at least that's what I think epiphenomenal means. But I don't care about the semantics, if that's what emergent means to you - fined call is emergent instead of epiphenomenal. In epiphenominalism, what consciousness exists or doesn't exist, and how it may appear to the experiencer is all up to the rules that govern the immaterial universe in which the mind inhabits under epiphenominalism. If there's an immaterial universe in which minds exist with rules independent of the material universe, then that's dualism. Epiphenominalism is a form of dualism. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation The way to view epiphenominalism is that our minds are immaterial souls on some ethereal plane, and we receive information from a physical universe (in the same way a movie might be projected to be viewed but not effected) into our conscious minds. Yet regardless of what our minds decide to do with that information, we're only watching a movie we can't change. Depends on who you're calling we. Does we include our brains? Under epiphenominalism, mental events are caused by the brain, but the mental events play no further causal role. It's up to you then whether you identify with your cause or the effect. If you really believe your thoughts and mental events have no effects on the physical universe then that is epiphenominalism. Not just that you can ignore the higher supervenient layers, but that you're better off not mentioning them at all under Occam's razor, it's easier to just deny their existence altogether since they have no effects. Like it's easier to do thermodynamics by referring only to the velocity and location of molecules. Except for that pesky first-person view, everything would be so much simpler if not for it. Jason Brent The only thing preventing you from cutting off your own mind via occam's razor is your own consciousness which you have direct evidence of, but then you can only ever help to justify solipsism if you cling to epiphenominalism. It's as dead-end of a theory as Berkeley's idealism is as far as trying to figure out the properties and requirements of conscious minds. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference to the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious sensations disappeared entirely. I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall within epiphenominalism? I'm not stuck on the term epiphenomenalism if it causes confusion. I'll quote Brent: ...being an
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
On 2/12/2015 9:34 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2015 6:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: John, Calling 'empty space' 'nothing' in the philosophical sense is just a confusion. I can only repeat what I said before: 'My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd.' Either you have pre-existing laws and substrate -- which is not 'nothing' -- or the universe just pops spontaneously, and laws, etc, are just descriptions of observed regularities in whatever has popped. You don't have many other options. The other popular option (in both religion and physics) is that the universe is eternal and no popping is needed. Some are eternal and infinite and others are eternal and cyclic. Brent Popping was perhaps a bad choice of term. It conveys the idea of a temporal progression from 'nothing' to the popped universe. I had in mind, rather, block universe ideas in which the complete space-time continuum is timelessly existent. There is no origin since time is a concept only within the block. The block could be either of infinite temporal duration (if such can be defined within the block universe), or cyclical. Then it seems it could also be finite and non-cyclical. Augustine already thought that time only existed within the universe, yet he supposed it was semi-infinite. I wonder if there has ever been a religion that proposed a world that was future finite, but past eternal? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 3:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 4:53 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 8:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:42 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/10/2015 6:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The implication is that if you believe in universal personhood then even if you are selfish you will be motivated towards charity. If humans are any indication, a super-intelligence will be incredibly good at rationalizing what it wants to do. For example, if personhood is universal then what's good for me is good for the human race. Not necessarily. If personhood is universal then your pleasure is my pleasure, so the conclusion could be: Do unto others as they want done to them. But I'm they, and it's hard to be sure about what they want, so it's best to get me what I want. It's not so hard when they are a man. You just have to ask. It they are a woman, it can be a bit more complicated indeed. Good point. Sometimes you just have to go with your best guess. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 2/12/2015 2:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive. Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not? This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged. I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from my consideration of various problems of personal identity. Right. We are in complete agreement then. Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if it could be considered a preferable belief: it may be true and we are all better off assuming it to be true. It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane. It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead to a threat to freedom. Like I said: it is double edged. It might be a type of knowledge belonging to a []* \ [] sort of logic: you can grasp it from inside, but it would not make sense to tell others. On the contrary it makes excellent sense to tell others, and to persuade them of it's truth and importance: / //Ethics is, at bottom, the art of recommending to others the// //self-sacrifice necessary to
Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2015 9:34 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2015 6:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: John, Calling 'empty space' 'nothing' in the philosophical sense is just a confusion. I can only repeat what I said before: 'My position is that the idea that you can explain the origin of a universe from nothing is absurd.' Either you have pre-existing laws and substrate -- which is not 'nothing' -- or the universe just pops spontaneously, and laws, etc, are just descriptions of observed regularities in whatever has popped. You don't have many other options. The other popular option (in both religion and physics) is that the universe is eternal and no popping is needed. Some are eternal and infinite and others are eternal and cyclic. Brent Popping was perhaps a bad choice of term. It conveys the idea of a temporal progression from 'nothing' to the popped universe. I had in mind, rather, block universe ideas in which the complete space-time continuum is timelessly existent. There is no origin since time is a concept only within the block. The block could be either of infinite temporal duration (if such can be defined within the block universe), or cyclical. Then it seems it could also be finite and non-cyclical. Augustine already thought that time only existed within the universe, yet he supposed it was semi-infinite. I wonder if there has ever been a religion that proposed a world that was future finite, but past eternal? Yes, it could certainly be finite and non cyclical. Current physics seems to point to a universe that is past finite and future eternal. Religious models appear to presume a finite extension into both the past and future -- there would be little motivation for a past eternal but future finite model in religious thinking, I would suppose. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. But this cannot be used to show that consciousness exists either generally or in a particular case. Okay but I fail to see the connection of this statement to the one I made above. The relevance is that I'm not saying that consciousness results in physically detectable differences in behaviour, even though I am saying that a certain type of behaviour may necessarily be associated with consciousness. It's a bit subtle - it might seem contradictory at first glance. I invoke Chalmers' fading qualia argument, which shows that if consciousness were contingent rather than necessary it would be possible to make partial zombies. Partial zombies are absurd; if they are not absurd then we may as well say consciousness does not exist. If partial zombies are absurd, then so are full zombies. Epiphenominalism makes full zombies logically (if not physically by your definition) possible. Therefore I also find epihpenominalism absurd as the idea of partial zombies. I agree that full zombies are also absurd. There is a potential problem here with the terms absurd, physically possible, logically possible, conceptually possible. I think zombies are conceptually possible, but I think they are logically impossible. I don't see why you say epiphenomenalism (as opposed to some other theory?) makes zombies logically possible. Epihpenominalism makes zombies not only logically possible, but physically undetectable (because consciousness is presumed to have no effects, so whether it is present or not can never be ascertained). Under epihpenominalism, no physical text, measurement, or experiment, could ever detect the presence of consciousness is some presumably conscious entity. Therefore, it could be a zombie, and no physical test, experiment, or measurement could ever (not even in theory) separate a zombie from a non-zombie. This all follows directly from the standard definition of epihpenominalism. Maybe there is no proof of another being being conscious or not, but that in itself is different from epiphenominalism, which further supposes that the existence of consciousness has no physical consequences nor yields any third-personal detectible differences in outcome or behavior. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. Those don't seem compatible to me. 2 implies that there is some outward behavior that the conscious being exhibits which cannot be exhibited by a zombie. So the presence of that behavior is a test to determine whether a being is conscious. The test is essentially what Turing proposed. So I don't understand how you maintain the compatibility? Is it because we cannot identify the crucial outward behavior? I would agree that we an never be certain we've identified it; a Turning test could go on for a long time and still reach the wrong conclusion. But I don't think we need to achieve certainty. My claim is that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent will also be conscious. But that asserts no being is conscious. The definition of zombie equivalent is a being that acts the same and is NOT conscious. So the conclusion its zombie equivalent will be conscious is a direct contradiction and always false. So it is of the form If X then FALSE. which is false whenever X is true, i.e. whenever a being is conscious. So the statement can only be true if a being is conscious is always false. But I know at least one being that is conscious. So it's empirically false. OK, it was clumsy phrasing on my part. I meant that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent would be impossible, because it would also be conscious and hence not a zombie. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12-Feb-2015, at 1:54 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2015, at 05:37, Samiya Illias wrote: On 11-Feb-2015, at 6:40 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. I stopped reading after the following parochial imbecility I don't see Christ's redemption limited to human beings. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. Yet another example of somebody in love with the English word religion but not with the meaning behind it. But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. Would you conclude from this that we are machine? Aren't we mechanical and chemical systems? I suppose the answer would depend on the definition of machine. I am thinking to some creationists who argue that animals are sort of machines, and this to give evidence for intelligent design My first problem with intelligent design is that, as an explanation, it assumes more than it explain. Where would an intelligent designer comes from? Yes it does assume an unexplainable first intelligence. However, the unexplainable is simply because of our lack of knowledge of that. The absence of an intelligent designer is more illogical. It's just filling the gap with nothing. Then, if you look at the Mandelbrot set, you can see many complex structures, and this illustrates that very complex structures can arise from very simple principle. Simply beautiful! Of course we know that this is already the case in arithmetic where all possible machine already exist together with all their possible execution (which is why I suggest to explain this to you (hope my last post was not to much wishes-breaking!). I've answered that :) So God does not need to create machines, it is enough to create 0 and the successors and told them to add and multiply. That would imply that God built a simple, evolutionary system. One would marvel at such engineering! This leads to all machines + all computations, making the creationist argument non valid. A remaining possible role for a God would be in a selection process. But a selection is done automatically (by the FPI or consciousness) ... in case the relative measure on computations, provided by computer science, fits well with the measure inferred from nature (given today by QM, this makes computationalism testable). Here Quantum Mechanics illustrates indeed that apparently, those measure fits well, as far as we can say today. Let's not jump to conclusions. Remember the Uncertainty Principle! Who knows and who decides? Samiya Bruno Samiya John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 14:02, Samiya Illias wrote: On 12-Feb-2015, at 1:54 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2015, at 05:37, Samiya Illias wrote: On 11-Feb-2015, at 6:40 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. I stopped reading after the following parochial imbecility I don't see Christ's redemption limited to human beings. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. Yet another example of somebody in love with the English word religion but not with the meaning behind it. But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. Would you conclude from this that we are machine? Aren't we mechanical and chemical systems? Of course, we don't know, but there are no 3p evidences for the contrary, except the collapse of the wave packet, or the existence of primary matter, which are more speculations than facts for which we would have some evidences. I suppose the answer would depend on the definition of machine. Well, by machine I means anything emulable by a Turing machine. This includes most analog machines, but excludes analog machines using actual infinities (something which makes sense in mathematics and theoretical physics). I am thinking to some creationists who argue that animals are sort of machines, and this to give evidence for intelligent design My first problem with intelligent design is that, as an explanation, it assumes more than it explain. Where would an intelligent designer comes from? Yes it does assume an unexplainable first intelligence. However, the unexplainable is simply because of our lack of knowledge of that. The absence of an intelligent designer is more illogical. It's just filling the gap with nothing. Hmm What if we fill the gap with elementary arithmetic? It is part of what I will try to explain to you: but if you agree with the axioms that I gave, plus some others (which I will give) then we can prove the existence of all machines and all computations. We might need God for helping us to make sense of x + 0 = 0, x + s(y) = s(x + y), but once we have those beliefs, we can believe in all machines, without adding any assumptions. Then, if you look at the Mandelbrot set, you can see many complex structures, and this illustrates that very complex structures can arise from very simple principle. Simply beautiful! So what about the argument that we might find a very simple explanation of the origin of consciousness and stable appearances of realities? Of course we know that this is already the case in arithmetic where all possible machine already exist together with all their possible execution (which is why I suggest to explain this to you (hope my last post was not to much wishes-breaking!). I've answered that :) Ah! OK :) So God does not need to create machines, it is enough to create 0 and the successors and told them to add and multiply. That would imply that God built a simple, evolutionary system. One would marvel at such engineering! So you might lean toward the idea that God created the numbers, and the laws + and *, and that all the rest emerges from that (in some precise way which can be described, but actually not been computed exactly). But, with this God is still a bit trivial, and is superseded by the arithmetical truth, and the intelligible noùs, whose role is more subtle than just creating the numbers. This leads to all machines + all computations, making the creationist argument non valid. A remaining possible role for a God would be in a selection process. But a selection is done automatically (by the FPI or consciousness) ... in case the relative measure on computations, provided by computer science, fits well with the measure inferred from nature (given today by QM, this makes computationalism testable). Here Quantum Mechanics illustrates indeed that apparently, those measure fits well, as far as we can say today. Let's not jump to conclusions. Remember the Uncertainty Principle! I do not assume quantum mechanics, except as a way to test the comp prediction. Who knows and who decides? Who asks? Bruno Samiya Bruno Samiya John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 11:11, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 22:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Emotion provides an efficacious way to retrieve self-satisfaction, by bypassing reason, which would be too much slow. We are programmed (by evolution, perhaps) to dislike anything threatening our satisfaction. That is why a burn is painful, and a good meal is pleasant. So we are driving by good and bad. We tend to get the good, and to be away from the bad. That are the basic emotion at the heart of all our behaviors. Now, we have evolved into very complex relationships with nature and with ourselves, and the emotions can become complex and conflictual, notably with conflicts between shorterm goal (I want the pleasure of smoking a cigarette) and longterm goal (I don't want to die from a painful disease related to the cigarette). If Mars Rover has enough self-reference, a conflict between different subgoal can happen, like I want to go there quickly, but I hesitate to take the shorter path as it is near a dangerous crevasse. In such case, it might behave (at least) like it has emotions: hesitation, failed attempts in quick succession, etc. Emotions are daughter of the qualia of pain and pleasure, related to self-satisfaction and survival. You will put your hand oout of the fire more quickly than after reasoning that it could harm you, but with a lesson well memorized, like : fire hurts, not do that again, ... It sounds to me as though in order to be motivated to act, you need some sort of stimulus (eg pain, pleasure) and you would think that therefore you need to be aware of that stimulus. I agree. But you need more than just aware of the stimulus, you need to interpret it as pleasant and/or unpleasant, especially for the long term. For simple direct avoidance, reflex are enough. For the long term, you might have the conflict with the pleasure in the short term (like with smoking cigarette, ...). But I guess some simple systems do this by reflex (insects, rovers, pulling hand from fire before the pain registers consciously). The pain coming after is an investment in the future, which is quite useful for the perpetuation of the complex social species, plausibly. This does not explain entirely why pain is felt as painful, though. So maybe you don't need to be conscious to be motivated, in a simple sense. OK. Our basic motivations are instinct. We are self-satisfied, at the basic simple level when a number of beliefs/goal are satisfied, like if hungry: hunt and feed, if theatened, fight or run , if thirsty, drink, if bored, do something, etc. This implies implicitly an anticipation that you can do something to satisfy the goal, which is an implicit belief that there is a reality, and that makes it possibly selected from the universal consciousness of the (Church-Turing) universal machine. Self-consciousness is when this becomes explicit, through more powerful cognitive abilities. I think you get it when you add the induction axioms, which gives to the machine the ability to justify generalisation, or proof of universal statement (like for all n and m, n+m=m+n). But the induction axioms are limitation axioms. In a sense, there are already delusional, and that is why I don't put them in the ontology. Then, in that ontology, we can prove the existence of machines which do those generalizations, and their many-histories can be particularized and guide the universal consciousness of the universal person. It is a concretization. I see more that universal person more like an abstract universal baby, virtuous by innocence, than as an accomplished God. An accomplished god would be a maximally correct extension of such a baby, but it is an open difficult question to me if that is still a person. Then maximal can be extended to the analytical truth, but then in many different ways. I guess I will say more on the induction axioms in a reply to Samia. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 11:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 Feb 2015, at 7:54 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2015, at 05:37, Samiya Illias wrote: On 11-Feb-2015, at 6:40 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I can´t even enumerate the number of ways in which that article is wrong. I stopped reading after the following parochial imbecility I don't see Christ's redemption limited to human beings. First of all, any intelligent robot MUST have a religion in order to act in any way. Yet another example of somebody in love with the English word religion but not with the meaning behind it. But I think that a robot with such level of intelligence will never be possible So you think that random mutation and natural selection can produce a intelligent being but a intelligent designer can't. Why? I am so happy to read this comment of yours. I hope someday you'll come to reason that even we have been produced by an intelligent designer. Would you conclude from this that we are machine? I am thinking to some creationists who argue that animals are sort of machines, and this to give evidence for intelligent design My first problem with intelligent design is that, as an explanation, it assumes more than it explain. Where would an intelligent designer comes from? Then, if you look at the Mandelbrot set, you can see many complex structures, and this illustrates that very complex structures can arise from very simple principle. Of course we know that this is already the case in arithmetic where all possible machine already exist together with all their possible execution (which is why I suggest to explain this to you (hope my last post was not to much wishes-breaking!). So God does not need to create machines, it is enough to create 0 and the successors and told them to add and multiply. This leads to all machines + all computations, making the creationist argument non valid. That's an interesting and novel argument. However, to counter it I suspect the theist would say they don't believe in comp. Yes. But then they must accept that the argument by design does not apply to us. God would have created the bacterium flagella, (it looks so much like a designed machine, they say), but not the human soul. God would have made nature minus the human. Bruno A remaining possible role for a God would be in a selection process. But a selection is done automatically (by the FPI or consciousness) ... in case the relative measure on computations, provided by computer science, fits well with the measure inferred from nature (given today by QM, this makes computationalism testable). Here Quantum Mechanics illustrates indeed that apparently, those measure fits well, as far as we can say today. Bruno Samiya John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
RE: Cosmology from Quantum Potential
Thanks. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 3:22 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential LOP = Laws of physics On 12 February 2015 at 12:32, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: Liz, You and your acronyms! I looked up “IMHO” Google says most of the time when people use the phrase their opinion in not humble. I could not find a definition for “LOP” that made sense as you used it. According to my TOE as explained at pages 151 -153, right now our Universe is 100 percent empty space and that empty space is completely filled with Coulomb waves. That must be correct since everything in our Universe is made from point particles. But these point particles each carry a charge that produces Coulomb force waves that continuously travel forever at the speed of light. I prove that an 8 cubic centimeter block of copper is 100 percent empty space and that you and I are 100 percent empty space. But that is now. A long time ago, before there was anything there was nothing, i.e. just empty space, not even any tronnies or Coulomb waves. I admit, I do not know which came first tronnies or Coulomb force waves. I wish I knew. Maybe there was something that preceded the tronnies and their Coulomb waves or the Coulomb waves and their tronnies. Maybe you could help me out. By the way, I have continued to work on descriptions of the internal structure of atoms that I partially explained in Chapter XIII. I now know the internal structure of the nucleus of every stable and every very long-lived isotope from helium to plutonium. They are all comprised of alpha particles, and gamma ray entrons (except iron 56 and nickel 60 may not include any gamma ray entrons). Most nuclei include electrons (up to 28) and nuclei with spin may include up to three protons. There are no neutrons in stable nuclei. John Ross From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 1:04 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Cosmology from Quantum Potential On 12 February 2015 at 08:09, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: Hi Liz, Good to hear from you again. Empty space is the same as nothing. I would say far from it. Why should empty space exist? The questions why is there something rather than nothing? Why does the universe go to the bother of existing? What breathes the fire into the equations? etc are asking why anything exists. Pushing the chain of explanation back to asking Why did empty space exist? (assuming that is in fact how the universe started) is a step in the right direction, but it isn't a final explanation. I don’t understand your comment, “It presupposes the laws of physics.” I don’t think empty space presupposes the laws of physics and I don’t think “nothing” presupposes the laws of physics. In my mind neither one presupposes anything. Maybe if the empty space does nothing, ever, that might be the case. But if anything ever arises from the empty space, then the LOP were implicitly there, because they govern what appears. So if your description is correct the question has been reduced to why should empty space plus the laws of physics exist? That's progress towards a TOE, but it hasn't hit bedrock yet IMHO. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are prohibited. No, as per my answer to Brent. The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does mean that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/difference in behaviors. If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, but not the other way around. But then that is just a theory of supervienience/emergence, it is not epiphneominalism. In interactionist dualism, if you remove the consciousness you cause behavioral/physical changes since the immaterial mind can no longer control the body. With epiphenominalism, you could eliminate the immaterial mind without having any changes in the physical world. Emergence/Supervienence would not be epiphenominal theories, since under them it is not logically possible to remove or change consciousness without there being physically detectible differences in the system. In epiphenominalism, what consciousness exists or doesn't exist, and how it may appear to the experiencer is all up to the rules that govern the immaterial universe in which the mind inhabits under epiphenominalism. The way to view epiphenominalism is that our minds are immaterial souls on some ethereal plane, and we receive information from a physical universe (in the same way a movie might be projected to be viewed but not effected) into our conscious minds. Yet regardless of what our minds decide to do with that information, we're only watching a movie we can't change. If you really believe your thoughts and mental events have no effects on the physical universe then that is epiphenominalism. Not just that you can ignore the higher supervenient layers, but that you're better off not mentioning them at all under Occam's razor, it's easier to just deny their existence altogether since they have no effects. The only thing preventing you from cutting off your own mind via occam's razor is your own consciousness which you have direct evidence of, but then you can only ever help to justify solipsism if you cling to epiphenominalism. It's as dead-end of a theory as Berkeley's idealism is as far as trying to figure out the properties and requirements of conscious minds. Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no zombie equivalent of that being. My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference to the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious sensations disappeared entirely. I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall within epiphenominalism? I'm not stuck on the term epiphenomenalism if it causes confusion. I'll quote Brent: ...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. The necessary part is not part of the standard definition of epiphenominalism. Descartes Dualism Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony Berkeley's Idealism Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory Searle's Biological Naturalism Physicalism Functionalism Computationalism Eliminative Materialism I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or discount consciousness. But none of those theories are forms of dualism. Wouldn't you agree that the conventional account of epiphenominalism is a form of dualism? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: evangelizing robots
On 12 Feb 2015, at 12:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Feb 2015, at 22:26, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 9:07 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you define increased intelligence as decreased probability of having a false belief on any randomly chosen proposition, then superintelligences will be wrong on almost nothing, and their beliefs will converge as their intelligence rises. Therefore nearly all superintelligences will operate according to the same belief system. We should stop worrying about trying to ensure friendly AI, it will either be friendly or it won't according to what is right. I wonder if this isn't prevented by Gödel's incompleteness. Given that the superintelligence can never be certain of its own consistency, it must remain fundamentally agnostic. In this case, we might have different superintelligences working under different hypothesis, possibly occupying niches just like what happens with Darwinism. Interesting point. Yes a true super intelligence may never perform any actions, as its trapped in never being certain (and knowing it never can be certain) that its actions are right. Fitness for survival may play some role in how intelligent active agents can be before they become inactive. Yes, that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder. I think chances are that it will be friendly, since I happen to believe in universal personhood, and if that belief is correct, then superintelligences will also come to believe it is correct. And with the belief in universal personhood it would know that harm to others is harm to the self. I agree with you, with the difference that I try to assume universal personhood without believing in it, to avoid becoming a religious fundamentalist. Interesting. Why do you think having beliefs can lead to religious fundamentalism. Would you not say you belief the Earth is round? Could such a belief lead to religious fundamentalism and if not why not? This leads us back to a recurring discussion on this mailing list. I would say that you can believe the Earth to be round in the informal sense of the word: your estimation of the probability that the earth is round is very close to one. I don't think you can believe the earth to be round with 100% certainty without falling into religious fundamentalism. This implies a total belief in your senses, for example. That is a strong position about the nature of reality that is not really backed up by anything. Just like believing literally in the Bible or the Quran or Atlas Shrugged. I see. I did not mean it in the sense of absolute certitude, merely that universal personhood is one of my current working hypotheses derived from my consideration of various problems of personal identity. Right. We are in complete agreement then. Universal personhood is also one of my main working hypotheses. I wonder if it could be considered a preferable belief: it may be true and we are all better off assuming it to be true. It might be useful after death, but I am not sure if it is a preferable belief/assumption on the terrestrial (effective) plane. It makes sense only through a personal understanding, for example of the universal person that all machine can recognized by themselves to be when introspecting, in case they are enough self-referentially correct. If not, it will becomes a statement that the parrots will repeat and impose without understanding, and that will quickly lead to a threat to freedom. If you are honest about your belief in universal personhood I thought you were assuming it. you won't be interested into manipulating the other versions of you into servitude. Why? On the contrary, if they are myself, I feel I have the right to do to myself what I want, and I might suffer, as a universal baby, from an inconceivable curiosity. I am the advocate of the devil, here. I mean only that I am not sure about what exactly that universal baby want when crying. I appreciate your ethic, and I wish you are correct, but I am not sure it can be use a norm to be preferred. people can do experiences which open their mind, but to ascribe virtue to anything publicly might lead to the contraries. Cf the []*- [] difference. This reminds me of Nietzschean slave morality: the slave cannot conceive of true freedom, so he can only desire to become the oppressor. But this is because he does not really believe in universal personhood, otherwise he would understand true
