Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 10:44 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/12/2018 5:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:04 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

>
>
> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter
>> is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more
>> fundamental.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The
> universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual
> matter itself would seem to be superfluous.
>
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness),
> and actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of
> simulation of pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual 
> matter
> to come into existence.
>
>
> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the
> equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.
> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>

 It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's
 paper:

 In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the 
> measure
> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.


 Jason

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>>>
>>>
>> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe
>> as you see it evolve.
>>
>>
>>> What is its power supply?
>>>
>>>
>> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept
>> of the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe
>> permit the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>>
>> See the bit about reversible computing:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations that
>> are reversible require no energy).
>>
>>
>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
>> computations in the CT sense.
>>
>>
>> They are computations in the CT sense.
>>
>>
>> CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at
>> random doesn't halt.
>>
>
> A reversible computation can still halt. It doesn't have to be a never
> ending circle, it just has to be possible to re-wind back to the original
> state, in theory (by not throwing away information).
>
>
> But the point is that there must be an entropic gradient to define which
> way the computation goes if every step is reversible.  Otherwise it doesn't
> "go" anywhere.
>
>
It works the same way any other computer or computation would.  There is no
magic to it. The only difference from conventional computers and
conventional logic gates is that it preserves enough information along the
way (during the computation) such that in principal given some Nth state,
you could work backwards to determine what the N-1th state was.

For example, a "CCNOT" gate (or Toffoli gate
) is a universal logic gate,
which takes in three input bits: a, b, c. And outputs "a", "b", and "c XOR
(a AND b)".
Basically it will invert c if both a and b are 1. Otherwise c is not
inverted.

If you set c=0, then your CCNOT gate's output of c can be treated as "a AND
b". Your normal computation may only be interested in the "a AND b" result
from the circuit, a

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:55:13 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:41:13 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:21:15 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:13:10 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
>>> that 
>>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the 
>>> Internet. AG *
>>>


>>
>> Victor Stenger
>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>>
>
> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in 
> the reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks 
> back. But 
> he didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
> fundamental underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is 
> the 
> materialist position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know 
> this, 
> of course, being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  

 I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
 personally .

 Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
 substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
 particular.

 One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.

 But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
 always a hardcore materialist.

 - pt

>>>
>>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal 
>>> and unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model 
>>> of 
>>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
>>> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
>>> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
>>> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that 
>>> physical 
>>> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
>>> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of 
>>> lack of 
>>> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
>>> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
>>> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have 
>>> to 
>>> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting 
>>> books 
>>> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but 
>>> find 
>>> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
>>> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>>>
>>> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he 
>>> was on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
>>> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need 
>>> to 
>>> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that 
>> have to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in 
>> the foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the 
>> time (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more 
>> now. 
>> It was

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/12/2018 5:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:04 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift
mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason
wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6,
Jason wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of matter,
only the idea that matter is primary.  That
is, that matter is not derivative from
something more fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism
(e.g. *The universal numbers. From Biology to
Physics.* Marchal B [
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as
providing a purely informational basis for
(thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
why would *actual matter* need to come into
existence at all? Actual matter itself would seem
to be superfluous.

If actual matter is not needed for experientiality
(consciousness), and actual matter does no exist
at all, then we live in a type of simulation of
pure numericality. There would be no reason for
actual matter to come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like matter
and obeys the equations of matter how is it not
"actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we
can know about matter.  So if the "simulation" that
is simulating us, also simulates those conscious
thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as
anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a theologian so
all this "simulation" is in the mind of
God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.


It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from
Markus Muller's paper:

In particular, her observations do not
fundamentally supervene on this “physical
universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict
her future observations. Nonetheless, this universe
will seem perfectly real to her, since its state is
strongly correlated with her experiences. If the
measure µ that is computed within her computational
universe assigns probability close to one to the
experience of hitting her head against a brick,
then the corresponding experience of pain will
probably render all abstract insights into the
non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. 



Jason






What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?


The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our
universe as you see it evolve.

What is its power supply?


Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a
concept of the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws
of our universe permit the creation of computers which require
no power to run.

See the bit about reversible computing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle
(computations that are reversible require no energy).


And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are
not even computations in the CT sense.


They are computations in the CT sense.


CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an
forth at random doesn't halt.


A reversible computation can still halt. It doesn't have to be a never 
ending circle, it just has to be possible to re-wind back to the 
original state, in theory (by not throwing away information).


But the point is that there must be an entropic gradient to define which 
way the computation goes if every step is reversible. Otherwise it 
doesn't "go" anywhere.





All computations can be done reversibly.


OK.  Here's my result,  1029394857.   What two numbers did I add
to compute it?


Here you collapsed two operands down to one (you destroyed 
information).  Had you preserved either of the other operands as 
outputs in the circuit, the question could be answered.  Reversible 
logic gates require as many bits of outputs as bits of inpu

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/12/2018 1:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Right, which is what Bruno's result, Markus Muller's paper shows is 
the case with arithmetical truth in its relation to physical systems. 
Assuming arithemtical truth, one can explain how to derive physics 
from it.


No.  You can claim it's consistent with a little bit of physics. And you 
can claim that you "must be able to derive physics".


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift
 wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism.
Confirmation does not make an idea true, but it is better
than nothing, once we postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like
some “religions” do, although only when they are used for
that purpose.  Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of
rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, and
obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea,
but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the
(youtube) lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the
"religious" fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and
their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases is
misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms"
that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the
so-called infinity.*


Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even
without the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”.
Induction axioms, infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the
phenomenology. The phenomenology is not less real, but its is not
primary, it is second order, and that fiction is needed to
survive, even if fictionally.

Bruno



To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.


That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non 
provable. The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor 
even anything describable in any 3p terms.








To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a 
digital body.


But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
body in his childhood, to survive some disease?


You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point 
will be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can 
be shown that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, 
without observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely 
many emulation of approximations of that physical reality at some 
level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for 
example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists in 
arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the 
invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
(definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to 
get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a 
continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & 
p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, 
shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p 
-> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA 
is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of 
the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, 
then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss.


But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.  Nothing which is proven 
can be false, which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.  
Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


Brent

Put in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove 
that the provability of something entails that something. PA is 
maximally modest on her own provability ability.


In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in 
general not provable and is not a theorem of PA.


Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truthp
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
consistent)

Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the 
observable and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:04 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter
> is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more
> fundamental.
>
> Jason
>


 I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal
 numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely
 informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
 why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual
 matter itself would seem to be superfluous.

 If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and
 actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of
 pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into
 existence.


 If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the
 equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
 consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.
 So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
 conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
 Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
 God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.

>>>
>>> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's
>>> paper:
>>>
>>> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
 “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
 observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
 since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure
 µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
 close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
 the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
 insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>>
>>
> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as
> you see it evolve.
>
>
>> What is its power supply?
>>
>>
> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of
> the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit
> the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>
> See the bit about reversible computing:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations that
> are reversible require no energy).
>
>
> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
> computations in the CT sense.
>
>
> They are computations in the CT sense.
>
>
> CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at
> random doesn't halt.
>

A reversible computation can still halt. It doesn't have to be a never
ending circle, it just has to be possible to re-wind back to the original
state, in theory (by not throwing away information).


>
> All computations can be done reversibly.
>
>
> OK.  Here's my result,  1029394857.   What two numbers did I add to
> compute it?
>

Here you collapsed two operands down to one (you destroyed information).
Had you preserved either of the other operands as outputs in the circuit,
the question could be answered.  Reversible logic gates require as many
bits of outputs as bits of inputs, and must be defined with all outputs
states having 1-to-1 mappings from input states.


>
> Read and write needs some energy, but is not part of the computation,
>
>
> A quantum computation stops when you read its output.  A CT computation
> must halt to provide and output...otherwise you can't recognize an output
> (and there would be no Halting Problem).
>

They can halt. Halting is just a final state that when reached, indicates
the computation is done.

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/12/2018 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:




On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason
wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of matter, only
the idea that matter is primary. That is, that
matter is not derivative from something more
fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g.
*The universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.*
Marchal B [
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as
providing a purely informational basis for (thinking
of) matter and consciousness, but then why would
*actual matter* need to come into existence at all?
Actual matter itself would seem to be superfluous.

If actual matter is not needed for experientiality
(consciousness), and actual matter does no exist at
all, then we live in a type of simulation of pure
numericality. There would be no reason for actual
matter to come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and
obeys the equations of matter how is it not "actual"
matter?  Bruno's idea is that consciousness of matter
and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  So
if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also
simulates those conscious thoughts about matter then
that's a "actual" as anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a
theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of 
God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.


It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus
Muller's paper:

In particular, her observations do not fundamentally
supervene on this “physical universe”; it is merely a
useful tool to predict her future observations.
Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to
her, since its state is strongly correlated with her
experiences. If the measure µ that is computed within
her computational universe assigns probability close to
one to the experience of hitting her head against a
brick, then the corresponding experience of pain will
probably render all abstract insights into the
non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. 



Jason






What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?


The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our 
universe as you see it evolve.


What is its power supply?


Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a 
concept of the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our 
universe permit the creation of computers which require no power to run.


See the bit about reversible computing: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle (computations 
that are reversible require no energy).


And they produce no results since they run both ways. They are not 
even computations in the CT sense.


They are computations in the CT sense.


CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at 
random doesn't halt.



All computations can be done reversibly.


OK.  Here's my result,  1029394857.   What two numbers did I add to 
compute it?



Read and write needs some energy, but is not part of the computation,


A quantum computation stops when you read its output.  A CT computation 
must halt to provide and output...otherwise you can't recognize an 
output (and there would be no Halting Problem).


Brent

unless you run the couple “you + the computation concerned”. If not QM 
would not be Turing universal, which it is.


Bruno


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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:41:13 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:21:15 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:13:10 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, 
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
>> that 
>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. 
>> AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
>
> Victor Stenger
> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>
> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>  
>

 *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
 reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. 
 But he 
 didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
 fundamental 
 underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the 
 materialist 
 position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of 
 course, 
 being a member of that group. Right? AG*

>
> - pt
>
  
>>>
>>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>>> personally .
>>>
>>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
>>> particular.
>>>
>>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>>
>>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
>>> always a hardcore materialist.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>
>>
>>
>> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
>> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
>> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
>> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that 
>> physical 
>> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
>> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack 
>> of 
>> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
>> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
>> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have 
>> to 
>> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting 
>> books 
>> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but 
>> find 
>> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
>> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>>
>> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he 
>> was on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
>> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need 
>> to 
>> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that 
> have to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in 
> the foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the 
> time (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. 
> It was like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)
>

 *I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist.  POVI is simple; 
 there can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on which 
 direction one is looking. AG*

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:21:15 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:13:10 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
> that 
> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. 
> AG *
>
>>
>>

 Victor Stenger
 *Materialism Deconstructed?*

 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
  

>>>
>>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But 
>>> he 
>>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
>>> fundamental 
>>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of 
>>> course, 
>>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>>

 - pt

>>>  
>>
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>>
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
>> particular.
>>
>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
>> always a hardcore materialist.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>
>
>
> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that 
> physical 
> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack 
> of 
> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have 
> to 
> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting 
> books 
> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but 
> find 
> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>
> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he 
> was on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need 
> to 
> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

 It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that 
 have to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in 
 the foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the 
 time (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. 
 It was like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)

>>>
>>> *I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist.  POVI is simple; there 
>>> can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on which direction one 
>>> is looking. AG*
>>>




 - pt

>>>
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality_(chemistry)  ?
>>
>
> What's your point? AG 
>
>>
>> - pt 
>>
>


If laws of physics have to have "directional symmetry" (a leap of faith), 
then wh

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:13:10 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
 there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
 that 
 position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. 
 AG *

>
>
>>>
>>> Victor Stenger
>>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>>
>>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But 
>> he 
>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
>> fundamental 
>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>  
>
> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
> personally .
>
> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
> particular.
>
> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>
> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
> always a hardcore materialist.
>
> - pt
>

 Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
 unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
 materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 



 You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
 cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
 physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
 ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that physical 
 reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
 observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack 
 of 
 rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
 physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
 physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have to 
 do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting 
 books 
 like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but find 
 it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
 assumes a creator but also a creation).

 So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he 
 was on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
 comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to 
 derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.

 Bruno




>>>
>>> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that 
>>> have to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in 
>>> the foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the 
>>> time (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. 
>>> It was like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)
>>>
>>
>> *I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist.  POVI is simple; there 
>> can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on which direction one 
>> is looking. AG*
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality_(chemistry)  ?
>

What's your point? AG 

>
> - pt 
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 4:34 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 4:10 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > *Tell me why an electron is a thing and 3 is not.*
>>
>
> An electron can change in time and space, 3 can not change in either.
>

You are ruling out the block time view, which contradicts special
relativity.


>
>
>> >>Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that
>>> the Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.
>>>
>>
>> >*And the "universe of numbers that describe the coordinates of
>> mathematical objects called elections and photons" ? *
>>
>
> I don't understand the question.
>

What are particles but computations involving positional coordinates?  Why
do you believe in the computational effectiveness only of these
mathematical objects?


>
>
>> > One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it
>>> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy
>>> is the only known thing that can change.
>>>
>>
>> *> Between any two casually separated universes, there is no means of
>> comparing time, mass, size, etc. *
>>
>
> If it's separated there is no means of proving it even exists. But it's
> even worse than that, logically the number 3 can not change, if it did it
> would not be a 3. It reminds me of an old joke: 3+3=7, for extremely large
> values of 3.
>

Change is an illusion.


>
>
>> > That platonic computations seem static is only from your viewpoint.
>>
>
> But I thought our subjective viewpoint was what you were trying to figure
> out and our viewpoint is certainly not static.
>
>

>From the point of view within a computation, there is the appearance of
change.  Think of consecutively computed states in the Game of Life, for
example.  There is a single static equation (arithmetical truth) which
defines the computation and full evolution of a given game of life
universe.  If a conscious entity existed in that game of life universe and
had a memory it could perceive the progression of states.


> *> For those beings whose minds are described by those computations, they
>> would see a changing dynamic world around them.*
>>
>
>  What would they see change?  It can't be numbers, in arithmetic  numbers
> are replaced not changed, even after writing 3+3=6 the number 3 is still
> around and doing just fine. If you know of something besides matter/energy
> that can change I'd love to hear about it.
>
>
They observe changes between computation states.


> >>I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing
>>> arithmetic but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter.
>>> Matter/energy may or may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more
>>> fundamental than arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> > This statement just shows you haven't read the papers.
>>
>
> I read them until it got too silly to read more, and that didn't take long.
>

What did you disagree with in Markus Muller's paper?


>
> *>I am showing the inconsistency of the "Presentism" view, that what
>> exists must constantly change in order for us to perceive change.*
>>
>
> The past must leave some sort of record of itself for the present to know
> it existed, and to make a record something must change and numbers don't
> change, as far as we know only matter and energy have the ability to change
> in space and time.
>

The value of a variable in a computation may change from one computational
step to the next.


>
>
>> >>If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it
>>> with respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with
>>> respect to space, but such a move would take time.
>>>
>>
>> *> Change as we experience it is with respect to the self's indexical
>> position and relation to previous and later states in some causal
>> progression.*
>>
>
> Without matter/energy and thus without change how are these indexical marker
> positions of yours recorded?
>

By other variables in the equation.  For example, consider the following
Diophantine equation: Q(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, ..., x2) = 0
Which has solutions IFF:

x1 = the ASCII encoding of a LISP program
x2 = the serialization of the state of registers of an X86 architecture at
time step = x3
x3 = the time step of the execution of the program in x1
x4 ... x2 = the other terms of the equation necessary for the machine
to work as described

x3 provides a natural ordering of the sequential time steps of the clock of
the CPU.  The mathematical truth of the valid solutions to the equations
yields the executions of every possible LISP program at every possible time
step.  Its solutions yields a fractal like structure within which you would
see the execution traces of every program, and within the patterns of the
registers in some of those solutions, you would see evolved life
manifesting behaviors we would ascribe to conscious beings, such as writing
books about consciousness, and talking over e-mail lists about
consciousness.


> If I'm in the integer 8 in the 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:30:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
>>> that 
>>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG 
>>> *
>>>


>>
>> Victor Stenger
>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>>
>
> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But 
> he 
> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
> fundamental 
> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  

 I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
 personally .

 Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
 substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
 particular.

 One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.

 But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
 always a hardcore materialist.

 - pt

>>>
>>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
>>> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
>>> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
>>> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that physical 
>>> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
>>> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of 
>>> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
>>> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
>>> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have to 
>>> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting books 
>>> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but find 
>>> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
>>> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>>>
>>> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was 
>>> on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
>>> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to 
>>> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that have 
>> to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in the 
>> foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the time 
>> (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. It was 
>> like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)
>>
>
> *I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist.  POVI is simple; there 
> can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on which direction one 
> is looking. AG*
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality_(chemistry)  ?

- pt 

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 4:10 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> *Tell me why an electron is a thing and 3 is not.*
>

An electron can change in time and space, 3 can not change in either.


> >>Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that
>> the Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.
>>
>
> >*And the "universe of numbers that describe the coordinates of
> mathematical objects called elections and photons" ? *
>

I don't understand the question.


> > One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it
>> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy
>> is the only known thing that can change.
>>
>
> *> Between any two casually separated universes, there is no means of
> comparing time, mass, size, etc. *
>

If it's separated there is no means of proving it even exists. But it's
even worse than that, logically the number 3 can not change, if it did it
would not be a 3. It reminds me of an old joke: 3+3=7, for extremely large
values of 3.


> > That platonic computations seem static is only from your viewpoint.
>

But I thought our subjective viewpoint was what you were trying to figure
out and our viewpoint is certainly not static.


> *> For those beings whose minds are described by those computations, they
> would see a changing dynamic world around them.*
>

 What would they see change?  It can't be numbers, in arithmetic  numbers
are replaced not changed, even after writing 3+3=6 the number 3 is still
around and doing just fine. If you know of something besides matter/energy
that can change I'd love to hear about it.

>>I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic
>> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or
>> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than
>> arithmetic.
>>
>
> > This statement just shows you haven't read the papers.
>

I read them until it got too silly to read more, and that didn't take long.

*>I am showing the inconsistency of the "Presentism" view, that what exists
> must constantly change in order for us to perceive change.*
>

The past must leave some sort of record of itself for the present to know
it existed, and to make a record something must change and numbers don't
change, as far as we know only matter and energy have the ability to change
in space and time.


> >>If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with
>> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to
>> space, but such a move would take time.
>>
>
> *> Change as we experience it is with respect to the self's indexical
> position and relation to previous and later states in some causal
> progression.*
>

Without matter/energy and thus without change how are these indexical marker
positions of yours recorded? If I'm in the integer 8 in the Fibonacci
sequence there is no way I could know that I was in the Fibonacci sequence
or in a sequence of any sort unless I remembered that my previous state was
a 5 and the one before that was a 3, but to form a memory something has to
change and 3, 5 and 8 never change.


>  >* Thus our brains perceive change despite being a part of what is
> objectively a static object.  The you from 5 minutes ago is still
> perceiving the point in time 5 minutes ago.*
>

That requires a memory and that means something must have changed 5 minutes
ago that has persisted to now. And there is no way for pure numbers to do
that, but matter/energy can.

John K Clark





>
> Jason
>
>
>

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 6:57:33 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
>
> Victor Stenger
> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>
> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>  
>

 *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
 reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
 didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
 underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
 position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
 being a member of that group. Right? AG*

>
> - pt
>
  
>>>
>>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>>> personally .
>>>
>>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>>>
>>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>>
>>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always 
>>> a hardcore materialist.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>
>>
>>
>> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
>> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
>> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
>> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that physical 
>> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
>> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of 
>> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
>> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
>> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have to 
>> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting books 
>> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but find 
>> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
>> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>>
>> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was 
>> on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
>> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to 
>> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that have 
> to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in the 
> foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the time 
> (now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. It was 
> like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)
>

*I brought up POVI, not Bruno who IS a Platonist.  POVI is simple; there 
can no "laws of physics" to discover if they depend on which direction one 
is looking. AG*

>
>
>
>
> - pt
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 1:39 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there
>>> would be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained
>>> not only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly
>>> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>>>
>>
>> *> You are assuming the answer at the start.  *
>>
>
> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because
> I am very good at nothing.
>
> *> None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather
>> than derivative.*
>>
>
> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you
> can show that some things are more fundamental than others.
>


Right, which is what Bruno's result, Markus Muller's paper shows is the
case with arithmetical truth in its relation to physical systems.  Assuming
arithemtical truth, one can explain how to derive physics from it.


>
> > *So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? *
>>
>
> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
>
>
Tell me why an electron is a thing and 3 is not.


> *> How many things to count are necessary?*
>>
>
> More than none.
>
> *> Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the
>> universe of numbers *
>>
>
> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the
> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.
>

And the "universe of numbers that describe the coordinates of mathematical
objects called elections and photons" ?  Are those also like the Hulk in
the universe of Marvel comics?


>
>
>> > *are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness*
>>
>
> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it
> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy
> is the only known thing that can change.
>

Between any two casually separated universes, there is no means of
comparing time, mass, size, etc.  The other universe will always appear as
static and unchanging abstract and ineffectual object from the point of
view of the universe you inhabit.  That platonic computations seem static
is only from your viewpoint. For those beings whose minds are described by
those computations, they would see a changing dynamic world around them.


>
>
>> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do
>>> anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter
>>> that obeys the laws of physics.
>>>
>>
>> *> You have provided no proof to back up this statement.*
>>
>
> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic
> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or
> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than
> arithmetic.
>

This statement just shows you haven't read the papers.


>
> *> Spacetime does not change in time or space either.*
>>
>
> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block
> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore
> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the
> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates
> of existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D
> shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it
> must be a different time.
>

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf


>
>
>> > *The universe is a static four dimensional block. *
>>
>
> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could
> only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both
> space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
>

See the link above.


>
> *> If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop
>> existing for you to experience change,*
>>
>
> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already
> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of
> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop".
>

Of course, I am showing the inconsistency of the "Presentism" view, that
what exists must constantly change in order for us to perceive change.


>
> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>>
>
> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with
> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to
> space, but such a move would take time.
>
>
Change as we experience it is with respect to the self's indexical position
and relation to previous and later states in some causal progression.  Thus
our brains perceive change despite being a part of what is objectively a
static object.  The you from 5 minutes ago is still perceiving the point in
time 5 minutes ago.

Jason

-- 
You r

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 1:39:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there 
>>> would be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained 
>>> not only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly 
>>> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>>>
>>
>> *> You are assuming the answer at the start.  *
>>
>
> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because 
> I am very good at nothing.
>
> *> None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather 
>> than derivative.*
>>
>
> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you 
> can show that some things are more fundamental than others.  
>
> > *So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? *
>>
>
> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
>
> *> How many things to count are necessary?*
>>
>
> More than none.
>
> *> Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the 
>> universe of numbers *
>>
>
> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
>  
>
>> > *are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness*
>>
>
> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it 
> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy 
> is the only known thing that can change.
>  
>
>> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do 
>>> anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter 
>>> that obeys the laws of physics.   
>>>
>>
>> *> You have provided no proof to back up this statement.*
>>
>
> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic 
> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or 
> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than 
> arithmetic. 
>
> *> Spacetime does not change in time or space either.*
>>
>
> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block 
> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore 
> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the 
> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates 
> of existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D 
> shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it 
> must be a different time.  
>  
>
>> > *The universe is a static four dimensional block. *
>>
>
> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could 
> only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both 
> space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
>
> *> If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop 
>> existing for you to experience change,*
>>
>
> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already 
> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of 
> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop".  
>
> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>>
>
> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
> space, but such a move would take time. 
>
> John K Clark
>



Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  

 

Great quotable!

- pt 

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there
>> would be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained
>> not only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly
>> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>>
>
> *> You are assuming the answer at the start.  *
>

I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because I
am very good at nothing.

*> None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather
> than derivative.*
>

Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you
can show that some things are more fundamental than others.

> *So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? *
>

Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.

*> How many things to count are necessary?*
>

More than none.

*> Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the
> universe of numbers *
>

Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the
Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.


> > *are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness*
>

One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it
involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy
is the only known thing that can change.


> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do
>> anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter
>> that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>
> *> You have provided no proof to back up this statement.*
>

I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic
but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or
may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than
arithmetic.

*> Spacetime does not change in time or space either.*
>

Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block
universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore
Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the
block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates
of existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D
shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it
must be a different time.


> > *The universe is a static four dimensional block. *
>

That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could
only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both
space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.

*> If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop
> existing for you to experience change,*
>

I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already
assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of
would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop".

> then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>

If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with
respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to
space, but such a move would take time.

John K Clark

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 10:07:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there 
> is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
> position 
> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>
>>
>>

 Victor Stenger
 *Materialism Deconstructed?*

 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
  

>>>
>>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
>>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>>

 - pt

>>>  
>>
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>>
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>>
>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always 
>> a hardcore materialist.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>
>
>
> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
> physics can be derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to 
> ignore the mind-body problem, and so he does not explain how that physical 
> reality can select our consciousness in way corresponding to what we 
> observe. So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of 
> rigour (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a 
> physical reality to do that selection, instead of deducing his first 
> physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s psychology, as we have to 
> do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his less interesting books 
> like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the content, but find 
> it bad because he identifies theology with the current theology which 
> assumes a creator but also a creation).
>
> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was 
> on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to 
> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

It is interesting that you raise the part of Stenger's writings that have 
to do with things like symmetry, point-of-view invariance (POVI) in the 
foundations of physics. That is the part I didn't get at all at the time 
(now some years ago) and I don't get it (I reject it) even more now. It was 
like *So you are a Platonist now?* :)




- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>>
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>>
>>>
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>>> some reality.
>>>
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>
>> I've been following him like forever.
>>
>> * e.g.
>>
>>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, 
>> that 
>>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on 
>> "axioms" 
>>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>>infinity.*
>>
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
>> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
>> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
>> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
>> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>
>
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. 
> The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
> describable in any 3p terms.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
> consciousness primary.
>
>
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
> body.
>
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
> body in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation 
> of approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution 
> (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely 
> many such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine 
> polynomial equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. 
> It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the 
> Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
> prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless PA proves 
> something, she will never prove that the provability of something entails 
> that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 
>
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
> ~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general 
> not provable and is not a theorem of PA.
>
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
>
> Truth p
> Provable []p
> Knowable []p & p
> Observable []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
> consistent)
> Sensible []p & <>t
>
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable 
> and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
> That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
> “terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on 
> the

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>
>>
>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>
>>
>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>> perhaps!
>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>
>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>> perspective. 
>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to 
>> control 
>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
>> be 
>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>
>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>> for 
>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we 
>> saw, 
>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
>> positive 
>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to 
>> be) 
>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>> writes,
>>
>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such 
>> resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with 
>> which 
>> the spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently 
>> in 
>> this way for once, *to want* to see differently, is no small 
>> discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 
>> “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” 
>> (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to 
>> have 
>> one’s Pro and Contra *in one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, 
>> so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in 
>> perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (
>> *GM* III, 12)
>>
>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy 
>> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>> the 
>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
>> others, 
>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
>> positive 
>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, 
>> limited 
>> cognitive agent.
>>
>>
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 4:07:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there 
> is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
> position 
> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>
>>
>>

 Victor Stenger
 *Materialism Deconstructed?*

 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
  

>>>
>>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
>>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>>

 - pt

>>>  
>>
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>>
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>>
>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always 
>> a hardcore materialist.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>
>
>
> You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible 
> cosmos”. There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that 
> physics can be derived from few principles.
>

*I don't think seeking a few first principles is particularly Platonic. 
Thales thought there were just four elements, and he was way before Plato. 
AG*



Unfortunately, he seems to ignore the mind-body problem, 
>

*You can't expect him, or anyone, to solve every outstanding problem. AG*
 

> and so he does not explain how that physical reality can select our 
> consciousness in way corresponding to what we observe. 
>

*Not a problem; Darwinian evolution. If our consciousness were disjoint or 
somehow contradicting what was "out there", in no time we'd be toast on the 
trash heap of evolution. AG*

So there is still a bit of magic in his explanation, or of lack of rigour 
> (by not seeing that he uses some non-mechanist theory to allow a physical 
> reality to do that selection, 
>

*No major AFAICT; just the observation that without POVI, a study of nature 
called "physics" couldn't exist. AG*

instead of deducing his first physical principle from arithmetic and 
> machine’s psychology, as we have to do with mechanism. That is even more 
> apparent in his less interesting books like “God the paling hypothesis, 
> (where I agree with the content, but find it bad because he identifies 
> theology with the current theology which assumes a creator but also a 
> creation).
>

*He was trying to debunk the creator theory, so he had to deny any 
creation. In fact, I think his favorite origin theory was a non-origin 
theory. AG *

>
> So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was 
> on the right track, and would have understood that his attempt to 
> comprehend the cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to 
> derive the cosmos from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.
>

*I don't think that possibility ever occurred to him. And note that those 
who know his work well, like Brent and Bruce, are not enthusiastic about 
your arithmetic theory. AG *

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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> .
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>
>
>

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 15:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:32:51 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
> 
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
 
 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).
 
 Bruno
>>> 
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>>> 
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>> 
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>>> perspective. He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the 
>>> influence of their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore 
>>> failed to control those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more 
>>> generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by 
>>> what has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been 
>>> a major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, 
>>> e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 
>>> 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There 
>>> has been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of 
>>> commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical 
>>> merits, but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide 
>>> a useful way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>> 
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>>> for ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as 
>>> we saw, he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes 
>>> a positive contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what 
>>> he takes to be) the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past 
>>> philosophers, he writes,
>>> 
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the 
>>> spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in 
>>> this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline 
>>> and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the 
>>> latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a 
>>> non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s 
>>> Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to shift them in and out, so that 
>>> one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and 
>>> affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>>> 
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>>> the way things really are, independently of any point of view 
>>> whatsoever. Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a 
>>> revised conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference 
>>> between one perspective and another, using each to overcome the 
>>> limitations of others, without assuming that anything like a “view from 
>>> nowhere” is so much as possible. There is of course an implicit 
>>> criticism of the traditional picture of a-perspectival objectivity 
>>> here, but there is equally a positive set of recommendations about how 
>>> to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited cognitive agent.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose persp

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>> 
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>> 
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>> reality.
>> 
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
>> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but 
>> eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>> 
>> I've been following him like forever.
>> 
>> * e.g.
>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in any 
3p terms.





> 
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is intrinsic 
> to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make consciousness 
> primary.

Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.

But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body in 
his childhood, to survive some disease?

You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 
decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists 
in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the invariance of 
the first person for “delays of reconstitution” (definable by the number of 
steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that 
the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a 
special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical 
“beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic 
Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of 
Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that 
PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the 
existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will 
soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless 
PA proves something, she will never prove that the provability of something 
entails that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 

In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
provable and is not a theorem of PA.

Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truth   p
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable  []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
= consistent)
Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
“terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on the 
Self, with two of them (Truth and Knowable) at the intersection of Earth 
(effective, provable) and Heaven (truth).

The beauty is that G* prove

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:53, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
>  As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG 
> 
> 
> 
> Victor Stenger
> Materialism Deconstructed?
> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>  
> 
>  
> 
> I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the reality of 
> matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he didn't deny 
> the possibility that there could be something more fundamental underlying 
> matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist position, but it 
> surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, being a member of 
> that group. Right? AG
> 
> - pt
>  
> 
> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
> personally .
> 
> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental substance in 
> nature") is in his books. Timeless Reality in particular.
> 
> One can be open-minded, or ironist in Rorty's definition [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism  
> ], and he was that.
> 
> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always a 
> hardcore materialist.
> 
> - pt
> 
> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and unknown 
> underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of materialism 
> among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 


You might read my favorite book by Vic, which is “The comprehensible cosmos”. 
There, it shows something very platonist-like: he shows that physics can be 
derived from few principles. Unfortunately, he seems to ignore the mind-body 
problem, and so he does not explain how that physical reality can select our 
consciousness in way corresponding to what we observe. So there is still a bit 
of magic in his explanation, or of lack of rigour (by not seeing that he uses 
some non-mechanist theory to allow a physical reality to do that selection, 
instead of deducing his first physical principle from arithmetic and machine’s 
psychology, as we have to do with mechanism. That is even more apparent in his 
less interesting books like “God the paling hypothesis, (where I agree with the 
content, but find it bad because he identifies theology with the current 
theology which assumes a creator but also a creation).

So Vic approach is still materialist or at least physicalist. But he was on the 
right track, and would have understood that his attempt to comprehend the 
cosmos was only a beginning: to work well, he would need to derive the cosmos 
from machine statistical experience in arithmetic.

Bruno




> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
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> .
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> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
> 
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
 
 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).
 
 Bruno
>>> 
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>>> 
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>> 
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>>> perspective. He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the 
>>> influence of their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore 
>>> failed to control those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more 
>>> generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by 
>>> what has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been 
>>> a major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, 
>>> e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 
>>> 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There 
>>> has been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of 
>>> commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical 
>>> merits, but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide 
>>> a useful way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>> 
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>>> for ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as 
>>> we saw, he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes 
>>> a positive contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what 
>>> he takes to be) the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past 
>>> philosophers, he writes,
>>> 
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the 
>>> spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in 
>>> this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline 
>>> and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the 
>>> latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a 
>>> non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s 
>>> Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to shift them in and out, so that 
>>> one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and 
>>> affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>>> 
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>>> the way things really are, independently of any point of view 
>>> whatsoever. Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a 
>>> revised conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference 
>>> between one perspective and another, using each to overcome the 
>>> limitations of others, without assuming that anything like a “view from 
>>> nowhere” is so much as possible. There is of course an implicit 
>>> criticism of the traditional picture of a-perspectival objectivity 
>>> here, but there is equally a positive set of recommendations about how 
>>> to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited cognitive agent.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
>> with neoplatonism, which explains every

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:32:51 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>
>>
>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>
>>
>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>> perhaps!
>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>
>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>> perspective. 
>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to 
>> control 
>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
>> be 
>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>
>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>> for 
>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we 
>> saw, 
>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
>> positive 
>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to 
>> be) 
>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>> writes,
>>
>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such 
>> resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with 
>> which 
>> the spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently 
>> in 
>> this way for once, *to want* to see differently, is no small 
>> discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 
>> “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” 
>> (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to 
>> have 
>> one’s Pro and Contra *in one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, 
>> so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in 
>> perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (
>> *GM* III, 12)
>>
>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy 
>> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>> the 
>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
>> others, 
>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
>> positive 
>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, 
>> limited 
>> cognitive agent.
>>
>>
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly 
>> not with neoplatonism

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>
>>
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>> some reality.
>>
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>
> I've been following him like forever.
>
> * e.g.
>
>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>infinity.*
>
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 23:07, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 3:44:26 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>>> fundamental.
>>> 
>>> Jason
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal 
>>> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ 
>>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 
>>>  ]) as providing a purely 
>>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
>>> why would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter 
>>> itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>>> 
>>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
>>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
>>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
>>> existence.
>> 
>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of 
>> matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that consciousness of 
>> matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  So if the 
>> "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts 
>> about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a 
>> theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  God=arithmetic; and 
>> arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>> 
>> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper:
>> 
>> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
>> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
>> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
>> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure 
>> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability 
>> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the 
>> corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights 
>> into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.  
>> 
>> Jason 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>> 
>> 
>> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as 
>> you see it evolve.
>>  
>> What is its power supply?
>> 
>> 
>> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of 
>> the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit 
>> the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>> 
>> See the bit about reversible computing: 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle 
>>   (computations that 
>> are reversible require no energy).
> 
> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
> computations in the CT sense.
> 
> I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing machines:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility 
> 
> 
> Jason 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Reversible computing is a form of unconventional computing 
> .”

OK, so you agree that some, at least, “unconventional computing” does not 
require violation of CT. Good.

Bruno


> 
> 
> :)
> 
> - pt 
> 
> -- 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 20:20, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>>> fundamental.
>>> 
>>> Jason
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal 
>>> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ 
>>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 
>>>  ]) as providing a purely 
>>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
>>> why would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter 
>>> itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>>> 
>>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
>>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
>>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
>>> existence.
>> 
>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of 
>> matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that consciousness of 
>> matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  So if the 
>> "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts 
>> about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a 
>> theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  God=arithmetic; and 
>> arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>> 
>> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper:
>> 
>> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
>> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
>> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
>> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure 
>> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability 
>> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the 
>> corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights 
>> into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.  
>> 
>> Jason 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>> 
>> 
>> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as 
>> you see it evolve.
>>  
>> What is its power supply?
>> 
>> 
>> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of 
>> the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit 
>> the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>> 
>> See the bit about reversible computing: 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle 
>>   (computations that 
>> are reversible require no energy).
> 
> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
> computations in the CT sense.

They are computations in the CT sense. All computations can be done reversibly. 
Read and write needs some energy, but is not part of the computation, unless 
you run the couple “you + the computation concerned”. If not QM would not be 
Turing universal, which it is.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>> fundamental.
>> 
>> Jason
>>  
>> 
>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal 
>> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ 
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 
>>  ]) as providing a purely 
>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then why 
>> would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter itself 
>> would seem to be superfluous. 
>> 
>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
>> existence.
> 
> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of 
> matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that consciousness of 
> matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  So if the 
> "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts 
> about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a 
> theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  God=arithmetic; and 
> arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
> 
> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper:
> 
> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure µ 
> that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability close 
> to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the 
> corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights 
> into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.  
> 
> Jason 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What is the computer that running "her computational universe”?

With mechanism, there is no computational physical universe at all, as the 
physical universe is a non computable emergence from all computations. Digital 
physics is just an inconsistent idea, as it implies computationalism, and 
computationalism makes physics into a non computational entity.


> 
> What is its power supply?

Power emerges from 2+2=4. You don’t need any power for this to be true. It is a 
fact, and it is unrelated to anything physical. You need it, though, just to 
define what is power.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:13:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> I think truth is primitive.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  truth and matter are linked:
>> 
>> "As a matter of fact, ..."
>> "The truth of the matter is ..."
>> "It matters that ..."
>> ...
>> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter 
>>  ]
>> 
>> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
>> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>> 
>> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be 
>> true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its 
>> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave 
>> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
>> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we 
>> call matter.
>> 
>> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
>> because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there 
>> exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  Similarly, the 
>> truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 
>> and 9.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are 
>> based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a 
>> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
>> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure 
>> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
>> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth  ]
>> 
>> 
>> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
>> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
>> around us.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and 
>> linguistic (from language) truth.
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ 
>>  ] 
>> 
>> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
>> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>> 
>> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
>> Peano arithmetic (PA).
>> 
>> Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in 
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field 
>>  ]).
>> 
>> 
>> Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than assuming 
>> the primacy of arithmetical truth.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
>> ) has shown there is a "multiverse" of truths:
>> 
>> The set-theoretic multiverse
>> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223  ]
>> 
>> The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this 
>> article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each 
>> instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, 
>> in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with 
>> a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic 
>> question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains 
>> our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a 
>> phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that 
>> the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive 
>> knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no 
>> longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.
>> 
>> 
>> What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth depends 
>> on the language.
> 
> I think Hamkins could say the same thing in French.  His example of the 
> continuum hypothesis just says that by adding as axioms different undecidable 
> propositions we get different sets of theorems.  He doesn't use the word 
> "truth" and I think with good reason.  Theorems in mathematics aren't "true" 
> in any normal sense of the word.  What is true is that the axioms imply the 
> theorem...given the rules of inference.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> "truth=proof" is

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Dec 2018, at 20:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> I think truth is primitive.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  truth and matter are linked:
>> 
>> "As a matter of fact, ..."
>> "The truth of the matter is ..."
>> "It matters that ..."
>> ...
>> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter 
>>  ]
>> 
>> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
>> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>> 
>> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be 
>> true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its 
>> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave 
>> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
>> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we 
>> call matter.
>> 
>> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
>> because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there 
>> exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  Similarly, the 
>> truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 
>> and 9.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are 
>> based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a 
>> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
>> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure 
>> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
>> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth  ]
>> 
>> 
>> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
>> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
>> around us.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and 
>> linguistic (from language) truth.
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ 
>>  ] 
>> 
>> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
>> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>> 
>> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
>> Peano arithmetic (PA).
>> 
>> Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in 
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field 
>>  ]).
>> 
>> 
>> Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than assuming 
>> the primacy of arithmetical truth.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
>> ) has shown there is a "multiverse" of truths:
>> 
>> The set-theoretic multiverse
>> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223  ]
>> 
>> The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this 
>> article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each 
>> instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, 
>> in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with 
>> a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic 
>> question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains 
>> our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a 
>> phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that 
>> the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive 
>> knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no 
>> longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.
>> 
>> 
>> What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth depends 
>> on the language.
> 
> I think Hamkins could say the same thing in French.  His example of the 
> continuum hypothesis just says that by adding as axioms different undecidable 
> propositions we get different sets of theorems.  He doesn't use the word 
> "truth" and I think with good reason.  Theorems in mathematics aren't "true" 
> in any normal sense of the word.  What is true is that the axioms imply the 
> theorem...given the rules of inference.

By incompleteness truth is bigger than what *any* consistent can prove. Of 
course you can say that the meani

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>> 
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
> 
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
> 
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually 
> it hurts in front of the truth.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) lectures 
> of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
> 
> I've been following him like forever.
> 
> * e.g.
> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
needed to survive, even if fictionally. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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