Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/6/2019 8:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 6:04 PM Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute
the idea that you could put a finite program in your friend's
head and you wouldn't not be able to tell the difference?

I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be
defined as a finitely describable TM.


If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person
you mean mind, this is the assumption of the computational
theory of mind.


That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it
unproven at best.


No one is claiming computationalism is proven.  But in any event, CT 
implies minimally "weak AI", which is all my thought experiment requires.


  And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to
model a person, physics says it will be entangled with the
environment and effectively random at a low level.  Even
Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is not TM emulable.


Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints
of the apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is
subjective, not objective).


That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition
of first person and third person views. In Bruno's
person-duplication thought experiments, there is a distinction
between 1p and 3p that makes sense in that context. But this does
not carry over to QM, where there is no viewpoint that sees fully
unitary quantum evolution.


Though we cannot observe each of the states from the vantage point of 
any single branch, we can infer their existence as the only viable 
explanation for how quantum computers work.


Not at all.  In fact a quantum computation only works because all the 
wrong answers have a high probability of being eliminated by destructive 
interference...which requires that they be computed in the same world.


The third person view is then an element of our theory, like the 
inside of blackholes (unseen yet every bit as part of the reality 
implied by the theory as what we can see).


And yet nobody thinks there is actually a singularity at the center of 
black hole.  We recognize that infinities are not physical.



Bruno seeks to avoid this fact this by defining a first
person-plural (1pp) point of view. But that is just another name
for what is normally considered the third person perspective.
Changing the name does not change the substance. The
randomness of QM is third person and objective.


It's first-person shareable, like the realities shared by the 
scientist and assistant in Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment, where 
the scientist uses a quantum-triggered bomb vest instead of a gun.


So do you believe Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment implies 
immortality?  Have you read Wilson's "Divided by Infinity"?


Brent



  When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close
friend, these concern objective out-wardly visible objective
behaviors, rather than the first person experience of your friend.


This is either badly worded, or you are agreeing that the outward
objective behaviours of your friend are 3p in the usual sense,


I am.


and influenced by the randomness of QM.


This is irrelevant to my argument.

Likewise, the first person experiences of your friend follow one
path of the quantum branching -- we do not experience all branches
of the MWI simultaneously. Your arguments against the conclusion
of Goedel and Turing have no merit.


I don't know what the above is in reference to.
Jason
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/6/2019 8:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/6/2019 2:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

How do we know other humans are
conscious (we don't, we can only suspect
it).

Why do we suspect other humans are
conscious (due to their outwardly
visible behaviors).

Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know
an appropriately programmed computer can
replicate any finitely describable
behavior. Therefore a person with an
appropriately programmed computer,
placed in someone's skill, and wired
into the nervous system of a human could
perfectly mimic the behaviors, speech
patterns, thoughts, skills, of any
person you have ever met.

Do you dispute any of the above?


It assumes you could violate Holevo's
theorem to obtain the necessary program.



You could find the program by chance or by
iteration (for the purposes of the thought
experiment).


In those cases you could never know that you
had been successful.



The question wasn't whether or not we would
succeed, but given that we know it is possible to
succeed, given there ezists a program that could
convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is
consciousness?


I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even
if it just acted as intelligent as some stranger. 
But note that it would have to be interactive.  So
I think Wegner's point is that makes its
computations not finitely describable.


Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?

I don't see how any computation could be not finitely
describable, given that any programs can be expressed
as a finite integer.


This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf
His point is that human consciousness is an interactive
program that receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from
the environment and is modified by those inputs.  He
calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine,
because it keeps a memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of
course you can say that whatever the environmental input
is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
potentially inifinite.


Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I
defined, where the program takes in inputs from the
environment via the senses and feeds those inputs to the
program.


But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on
your memory).


I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the
idea that you could put a finite program in your friend's head
and you wouldn't not be able to tell the difference?


No, but then I'm easily fooled.  The information channel between
me and my friend is very narrow.  What's your point?


 I was explaining to Philip that his basis for assuming the 
consciousness of fellow humans (based on their observable behavior) is 
known (assuming CT) to be something that a silicon-based mind is 
equally capable of meeting.



I was just reacting to you statement that a 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 6:04 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea
>> that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't
>> not be able to tell the difference?
>>
>>
>>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a
>>> finitely describable TM.
>>>
>>
>> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean
>> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.
>>
>
> That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven
> at best.
>

No one is claiming computationalism is proven.  But in any event, CT
implies minimally "weak AI", which is all my thought experiment requires.


>
>
>>   And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person,
>>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively
>>> random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is
>>> not TM emulable.
>>>
>>
>> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the
>> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not
>> objective).
>>
>
> That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first
> person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought
> experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in
> that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no
> viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution.
>

Though we cannot observe each of the states from the vantage point of any
single branch, we can infer their existence as the only viable explanation
for how quantum computers work. The third person view is then an element of
our theory, like the inside of blackholes (unseen yet every bit as part of
the reality implied by the theory as what we can see).


> Bruno seeks to avoid this fact this by defining a first person-plural
> (1pp) point of view. But that is just another name for what is normally
> considered the third person perspective. Changing the name does not change
> the substance. The randomness of QM is third person and objective.
>

It's first-person shareable, like the realities shared by the scientist and
assistant in Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment, where the scientist uses
a quantum-triggered bomb vest instead of a gun.


>
>   When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend, these
>> concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than the
>> first person experience of your friend.
>>
>
> This is either badly worded, or you are agreeing that the outward
> objective behaviours of your friend are 3p in the usual sense,
>

I am.


and influenced by the randomness of QM.
>

This is irrelevant to my argument.


> Likewise, the first person experiences of your friend follow one path of
> the quantum branching -- we do not experience all branches of the MWI
> simultaneously. Your arguments against the conclusion of Goedel and Turing
> have no merit.
>
>
I don't know what the above is in reference to.

Jason

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/6/2019 2:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only
>> suspect it).
>>
>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly
>> visible behaviors).
>>
>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed
>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's
>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have
>> ever met.
>>
>> Do you dispute any of the above?
>>
>>
>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary
>> program.
>>
>
>
> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes
> of the thought experiment).
>
>
> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.
>


 The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we
 know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could
 convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?


 I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as
 intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be
 interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
 finitely describable.

>>>
>>> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>>>
>>> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given
>>> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
>>>
>>>
>>> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
>>> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is
>>> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary
>>> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.
>>> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
>>> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the
>>> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
>>> potentially inifinite.
>>>
>>>
>> Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined,
>> where the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and
>> feeds those inputs to the program.
>>
>>
>> But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your memory).
>>
>
> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea that
> you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't not
> be able to tell the difference?
>
>
> No, but then I'm easily fooled.  The information channel between me and my
> friend is very narrow.  What's your point?
>
>
 I was explaining to Philip that his basis for assuming the consciousness
of fellow humans (based on their observable behavior) is known (assuming
CT) to be something that a silicon-based mind is equally capable of meeting.

>
>
>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a
>> finitely describable TM.
>>
>
> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean
> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.
>
>
> That's what I object to: the idea that the mind is the person and
> independent of a physical world.
>
>
You object to the computational theory of mind or the definition of a
person?

>
>
>>   And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person,
>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively
>> random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is
>> not TM emulable.
>>
>
> Quantum physics is emulable.
>
>
> Not really.  It's emulable IF you know what computation it performs...but
> you cannot 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea
> that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't
> not be able to tell the difference?
>
>
>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a
>> finitely describable TM.
>>
>
> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean
> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.
>

That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven at
best.


>   And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person,
>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively
>> random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is
>> not TM emulable.
>>
>
> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the
> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not
> objective).
>

That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first
person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought
experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in
that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no
viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution. Bruno seeks to avoid
this fact this by defining a first person-plural (1pp) point of view. But
that is just another name for what is normally considered the third person
perspective. Changing the name does not change the substance. The
randomness of QM is third person and objective.

  When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend, these
> concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than the
> first person experience of your friend.
>

This is either badly worded, or you are agreeing that the outward objective
behaviours of your friend are 3p in the usual sense, and influenced by the
randomness of QM. Likewise, the first person experiences of your friend
follow one path of the quantum branching -- we do not experience all
branches of the MWI simultaneously. Your arguments against the conclusion
of Goedel and Turing have no merit.

Bruce

-- 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[cloudversed]

On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 4:58:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/6/2019 3:51 AM, PGC wrote: 
> > Now, if we could just formalize aesthetics: what makes a theorem 
> > interesting or sexy as fuck? 
>
> We could train an ANN to have the same aesthetics as the NYT art 
> critic.  :-) 
>
> Brent 
>
>
In the tech news, an ANN music composer:


https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/26/18517803/openai-musenet-artificial-intelligence-ai-music-generation-lady-gaga-harry-potter-mozart

@ https://openai.com/blog/musenet/ 

Not being critically liked by people, it seems.

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/6/2019 2:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

How do we know other humans are conscious (we
don't, we can only suspect it).

Why do we suspect other humans are conscious
(due to their outwardly visible behaviors).

Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an
appropriately programmed computer can
replicate any finitely describable behavior. 
Therefore a person with an appropriately
programmed computer, placed in someone's
skill, and wired into the nervous system of a
human could perfectly mimic the behaviors,
speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any
person you have ever met.

Do you dispute any of the above?


It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem
to obtain the necessary program.



You could find the program by chance or by
iteration (for the purposes of the thought
experiment).


In those cases you could never know that you had
been successful.



The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed,
but given that we know it is possible to succeed, given
there ezists a program that could convince you it was
your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?


I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it
just acted as intelligent as some stranger.  But note
that it would have to be interactive.  So I think
Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
finitely describable.


Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?

I don't see how any computation could be not finitely
describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a
finite integer.


This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His
point is that human consciousness is an interactive program
that receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from the
environment and is modified by those inputs.  He calls this
model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that
whatever the environmental input is, it can be included in
the TM code, but then it is potentially inifinite.


Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I
defined, where the program takes in inputs from the environment
via the senses and feeds those inputs to the program.


But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your
memory).


I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea 
that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you 
wouldn't not be able to tell the difference?


No, but then I'm easily fooled.  The information channel between me and 
my friend is very narrow.  What's your point?



I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined
as a finitely describable TM.


If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you 
mean mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.


That's what I object to: the idea that the mind is the person and 
independent of a physical world.



  And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a
person, physics says it will be entangled with the environment and
effectively random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the
physics of the world is not TM emulable.


Quantum physics is emulable.


Not really.  It's emulable IF you know what computation it 
performs...but you cannot know that.


It's the first person viewpoints of the apparent randomness are not. 
(but this randomness is subjective, not 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only
> suspect it).
>
> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly
> visible behaviors).
>
> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed
> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's
> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have
> ever met.
>
> Do you dispute any of the above?
>
>
> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary
> program.
>


 You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes
 of the thought experiment).


 In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.

>>>
>>>
>>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we
>>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could
>>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as
>>> intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be
>>> interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
>>> finitely describable.
>>>
>>
>> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>>
>> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given
>> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
>>
>>
>> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
>> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is
>> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary
>> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.
>> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
>> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the
>> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
>> potentially inifinite.
>>
>>
> Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined,
> where the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and
> feeds those inputs to the program.
>
>
> But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your memory).
>

I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea that
you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't not
be able to tell the difference?


> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a
> finitely describable TM.
>

If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean
mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.


>   And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person,
> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively
> random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is
> not TM emulable.
>

Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the
apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not
objective).  When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend,
these concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than
the first person experience of your friend.

Jason

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[cloudversed]

On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 3:44:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
 On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
>
>
> 1. The world is rational.
> 2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through 
> certain techniques).
> *3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also 
> art, etc.).*
> *4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher 
> kind.*
> 5. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live 
> or have lived.
> 6. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known.
> 7. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly 
> intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
> 8. Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
> 9. Formal rights comprise a real science.
> *10. Materialism is false.*
> *11. The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by 
> composition.*
> 12. Concepts have an objective existence.
> 13. There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals 
> with concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly 
> fruitful for science.
> 14. Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.
>
>
> Reads like a lot of assertion based on wishful thinking.
>
> Brent
>
>
> (Emphasis mine)
>
> Jason
>
>
>
On the 14 theses above, I would assert their anti-thesis.

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/6/2019 12:44 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:41 PM Jason Resch > wrote:


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made
when they pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing
emulable -- it involves intuitive leaps that are not
algorithmic, presumable coming from an uncodable environment.


Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on
this?  In my view Turing was the founder of
functionalism/computationalism, when in his 1950 paper "Computing
Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:


“The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a
superstition. Importance is often
attached to the fact that modern digital computers are
electrical, and the nervous system is also
electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and
since all digital computers are in a sense
equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of
theoretical importance. [...] If we wish to
find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical
analogies of function.”


As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have
been misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human
consciousness is not Turing emulable, I am not aware of any
writings of Godel where he expressed such ideas. It is hard for me
to believe Godel himself misunderstood his own ideas to the extent
necessary to believe human mathematicians somehow immune to its
implications.  According to Godel's 14 points (his own personal
philosophy) it suggests he sees nothing special about the material
composition, and he also believes all problems (including art) can
be addressed through systematic methods. This suggests to me he
would be a proponent of at least "weak AI", which again is
sufficient for my thought experiment.

1. The world is rational.
2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly
(through certain techniques).
*3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all
problems (also art, etc.).*
*4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different
and higher kind.*
5. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we
shall live or have lived.
6. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is
currently known.
7. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is
thoroughly intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
8. Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
9. Formal rights comprise a real science.
*10. Materialism is false.*
*11. The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy,
not by composition.*
12. Concepts have an objective existence.
13. There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology,
which deals with concepts of the highest abstractness; and
this is also most highly fruitful for science.
14. Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.


(Emphasis mine)

Jason


I base these comments on an analysis in a paper by Copeland and 
Shagrir, in the book "Computability: Turing, Goedel, Church, and 
Beyond" (MIT Press, 2015). The main argument is that "In about 1970, 
Goedel wrote a brief note entitled 'A Philosophical Error in Turing's 
Work' (1972; in Goedel's Collected Works)." "In the postscript, Goedel 
also raised the intriguing 'question of whether there exist finite 
non-mechanical procedures'; and he observed that the generalised 
incompleteness results 'do not establish any bounds for the powers of 
human reason, but rather for the potentialities of pure formalism in 
mathematics."


"A philosophical error in Turing's work. Turing in [section 9 of "On 
Computable Numbers" (1936, 75-76)} gives an argument which is supposed 
to show that mental procedures cannot go beyond mechanical procedures. 
However ... what Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, 
in its use, is not static, but constantly developing ... Although at 
each stage the number and precision of the abstract terms at our 
disposal may be finite, both (and, therefore, also Turing's number of 
distinguishable states of mind) may converge toward infinity in the 
course of the application of the procedure. (Geode 1972, 306)."


Further: "What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in 
its use, is not static, but constantly developing. This is seen, e.g., 
from the infinite series of ever stronger axioms of infinity in set 
theory, each of which expresses a new idea or insight ... Therefore, 
although at each stage of the mind's development the number of 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/5/2019 11:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:


On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:


On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

How do we know other humans are conscious (we
don't, we can only suspect it).

Why do we suspect other humans are conscious
(due to their outwardly visible behaviors).

Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an
appropriately programmed computer can
replicate any finitely describable behavior. 
Therefore a person with an appropriately
programmed computer, placed in someone's
skill, and wired into the nervous system of a
human could perfectly mimic the behaviors,
speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any
person you have ever met.

Do you dispute any of the above?


It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem
to obtain the necessary program.



You could find the program by chance or by
iteration (for the purposes of the thought experiment).


In those cases you could never know that you had
been successful.



The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but
given that we know it is possible to succeed, given
there ezists a program that could convince you it was
your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?


I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it
just acted as intelligent as some stranger.  But note
that it would have to be interactive.  So I think
Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
finitely describable.


Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?

I don't see how any computation could be not finitely
describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a
finite integer.


This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His
point is that human consciousness is an interactive program
that receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from the
environment and is modified by those inputs.  He calls this
model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that
whatever the environmental input is, it can be included in the
TM code, but then it is potentially inifinite.

Brent


This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made
when they pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing
emulable -- it involves intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic,
presumable coming from an uncodable environment.


Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on this?  
In my view Turing was the founder of functionalism/computationalism, 
when in his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:



“The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a
superstition. Importance is often
attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical,
and the nervous system is also
electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since
all digital computers are in a sense
equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of
theoretical importance. [...] If we wish to
find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical
analogies of function.”


As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have been 
misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human consciousness is 
not Turing emulable, I am not aware of any writings of Godel where he 
expressed such ideas. It is hard for me to believe Godel himself 
misunderstood his own ideas to the extent necessary to believe human 
mathematicians somehow  immune to its implications.  According to 
Godel's 14 points (his own personal philosophy) it suggests 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/5/2019 11:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

How do we know other humans are conscious (we
don't, we can only suspect it).

Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due
to their outwardly visible behaviors).

Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an
appropriately programmed computer can replicate
any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
person with an appropriately programmed computer,
placed in someone's skill, and wired into the
nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills,
of any person you have ever met.

Do you dispute any of the above?


It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to
obtain the necessary program.



You could find the program by chance or by iteration
(for the purposes of the thought experiment).


In those cases you could never know that you had been
successful.



The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but
given that we know it is possible to succeed, given there
ezists a program that could convince you it was your friend,
why doubt it is consciousness?


I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just
acted as intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it
would have to be interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is
that makes its computations not finitely describable.


Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?

I don't see how any computation could be not finitely
describable, given that any programs can be expressed as a finite
integer.


This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His point
is that human consciousness is an interactive program that
receives arbitrary and unknown inputs from the environment and is
modified by those inputs.  He calls this model a PTM, Persistent
Turing Machine, because it keeps a memory and doesn't overwrite
it.  Of course you can say that whatever the environmental input
is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is potentially
inifinite.


Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined, 
where the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses 
and feeds those inputs to the program.


But those inputs modify the program (what you do depends on your 
memory).  I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be 
defined as a finitely describable TM.  And there is also the point that 
whatever TM you use to model a person, physics says it will be entangled 
with the environment and effectively random at a low level.  Even Bruno 
agrees that the physics of the world is not TM emulable.


Brent

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

[image: image.png]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 2:54 PM Terren Suydam 
wrote:

> You have at best an incomplete theory of how things work, if you don't
> know how qualia are generated. Which means, for starters, you can't stand
> behind the prediction you made. But more to the point, what are you even
> doing here?  Maybe you should pivot into selling cars without engines, or
> houses without roofs. I don't know how you can be so certain you're right
> when you don't even know how your theory works.
>
> Terren
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 2:37 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> Of course GR is false since it is just a conceptual construct in
>> consciousness that will continue to be replaced by other conceptual
>> constructs along the centuries until a final theory will come up that will
>> talk directly about red is red. That will be the end point because red will
>> not be anymore a conceptual construct, but an element of reality.
>>
>> Telepathy and recincarnation on the other hand are true because they are
>> phenomena directly related to consciousness. It might seem "impossible" to
>> you because you have an upside down logic in which you start from an
>> invented "physical world" in which beings are "bodies separated spatially"
>> and of course that from that fantasy that you create it seems impossible
>> for the "soul" to move to another "body separated spatially". But once you
>> use the problem downside up logic, you realize that consciousness is all
>> there is so there are no more "bodies". There being no more bodies, there
>> would be no "soul" to move from one "body" to another. It will just be the
>> same consciousnesses that experiences different qualia. And the experience
>> of different qualia is the most mundane phenomena that there can be.
>>
>> Regarding you carbon monoxide, I already told you that evolutionary
>> reasons for qualia generation is only part of the mechanism, since there
>> are also new qualia that we experience each moment of our lives that
>> clearly don't appear as a consequence of life-or-death situation. If you
>> want to hear the magic words, here they are: I don't know how qualia are
>> generated.
>>
>> On Monday, 6 May 2019 19:37:51 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>> Your turn. Is the theory of general relativity true?  I know your
>>> answer. And the fact that you consider telepath and reincarnation to be
>>> ideas to take more seriously than general relativity tells me what I need
>>> to know.
>>>
>>> You also ignored my point about how carbon monoxide deaths disprove your
>>> prediction.
>>>
>>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

You have at best an incomplete theory of how things work, if you don't know
how qualia are generated. Which means, for starters, you can't stand behind
the prediction you made. But more to the point, what are you even doing
here?  Maybe you should pivot into selling cars without engines, or houses
without roofs. I don't know how you can be so certain you're right when you
don't even know how your theory works.

Terren

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 2:37 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Of course GR is false since it is just a conceptual construct in
> consciousness that will continue to be replaced by other conceptual
> constructs along the centuries until a final theory will come up that will
> talk directly about red is red. That will be the end point because red will
> not be anymore a conceptual construct, but an element of reality.
>
> Telepathy and recincarnation on the other hand are true because they are
> phenomena directly related to consciousness. It might seem "impossible" to
> you because you have an upside down logic in which you start from an
> invented "physical world" in which beings are "bodies separated spatially"
> and of course that from that fantasy that you create it seems impossible
> for the "soul" to move to another "body separated spatially". But once you
> use the problem downside up logic, you realize that consciousness is all
> there is so there are no more "bodies". There being no more bodies, there
> would be no "soul" to move from one "body" to another. It will just be the
> same consciousnesses that experiences different qualia. And the experience
> of different qualia is the most mundane phenomena that there can be.
>
> Regarding you carbon monoxide, I already told you that evolutionary
> reasons for qualia generation is only part of the mechanism, since there
> are also new qualia that we experience each moment of our lives that
> clearly don't appear as a consequence of life-or-death situation. If you
> want to hear the magic words, here they are: I don't know how qualia are
> generated.
>
> On Monday, 6 May 2019 19:37:51 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> Your turn. Is the theory of general relativity true?  I know your answer.
>> And the fact that you consider telepath and reincarnation to be ideas to
>> take more seriously than general relativity tells me what I need to know.
>>
>> You also ignored my point about how carbon monoxide deaths disprove your
>> prediction.
>>
>> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[cloudversed]

On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 5:51:54 AM UTC-5, PGC wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 11:25:59 PM UTC+2, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 2:06 PM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> I of course think that "consciousness arises from the function of 
>> matter in some configurations" (the conscious brain is nothing but the 
>> cells and chemicals operating inside the skull), but it's doing more than* 
>> information processing*. It's doing *experience processing*. People can 
>> deliberate until the cows come home why information processing is 
>> sufficient or is not sufficient. If one is already an "information 
>> processing is sufficient for consciousness" fan, then nothing will probably 
>> change their belief in that. 
>>
>> The brain is an experience processing engine. Experience cannot be 
>> reduced to information.
>>
>>
>> The question is whether it can be reduced to a physical process and if so 
>> what processes produce experience?  Does information processing that 
>> produces intelligence also produce experience?  If not, there can be 
>> philosophical zombies.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok, but we're mostly surrounded by zombies 99% of the time anyway, 
> including members/posts of this old list, with occasional spring chicken 
> fresh meat, so it wouldn't make much of a difference in experience terms. 
> lol
>
> Nah, in this area I'm less intrigued by the list's 20 year preoccupation 
> with UDA, which merely applies Star Trek (and older Sci-Fi such as: 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO9ppicjlFg [yes have some fun once in 
> awhile], but already Frankenstein and even older ideas/fiction) to the old 
> and dusty mathematical philosophy debates. Just because it is on-topic 
> doesn't mean that it isn't a time waster or intractable infinite oracle 
> problem/solution.
>
> In contrast, I'm always interested in AI's connection to language, 
> analyzing discourse, and reading what's up with research on applying AI to 
> improve and speed up theorem proving. Like this conference one month ago: 
> http://aitp-conference.org/2019/
>
> Or meta learning being given some steroids, e.g. applying multiple AI 
> algorithms to solve cognitive problems in some framework, with each 
> algorithm solving a few steps of a problem, then switching (or parallel 
> whatever) after some intermediate result is obtained, with which another 
> appropriate algorithm produces another intermediate result etc. then apply 
> pattern mining with logical transformation rules to look at what was done. 
> Like bridging the usual gap by applying operations of commonsense intuition 
> to mathematical inference problems and endowing more mathematical precision 
> to commonsense reasoning problems. This is fascinating as it's perhaps a 
> step towards AI reasoning about its own code and the underlying algorithms 
> and be less zombie. As in "Yo AI: Are you experienced?"
>
> Now, if we could just formalize aesthetics: what makes a theorem 
> interesting or sexy as fuck? If any of you know-it-alls have work on this, 
> well you have my attention + we should hold another conference for that. 
> Spring chicken edition in Europe. Hosted by the big bad wolf, killer of 
> zombies. PGC
>



One way to spot a zombie: Its declaration of adherence to the Church-Turing 
thesis. 

On theorem proving evolution, see

Simon Sch¨afer and Stephan Schulz. *Breeding theorem proving heuristics 
with genetic algorithms.* In Georg Gottlob, Geoff Sutcliffe, and Andrei 
Voronkov, editors, Proc. of the Global Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Tibilisi, Georgia, volume 36 of EPiC, pages 263–274. 
EasyChair, 2015.

cited in
http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~regerg/arcade/papers/paper_16.pdf


@philipthrift 


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Re: for Cosmin

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Of course GR is false since it is just a conceptual construct in 
consciousness that will continue to be replaced by other conceptual 
constructs along the centuries until a final theory will come up that will 
talk directly about red is red. That will be the end point because red will 
not be anymore a conceptual construct, but an element of reality.

Telepathy and recincarnation on the other hand are true because they are 
phenomena directly related to consciousness. It might seem "impossible" to 
you because you have an upside down logic in which you start from an 
invented "physical world" in which beings are "bodies separated spatially" 
and of course that from that fantasy that you create it seems impossible 
for the "soul" to move to another "body separated spatially". But once you 
use the problem downside up logic, you realize that consciousness is all 
there is so there are no more "bodies". There being no more bodies, there 
would be no "soul" to move from one "body" to another. It will just be the 
same consciousnesses that experiences different qualia. And the experience 
of different qualia is the most mundane phenomena that there can be.

Regarding you carbon monoxide, I already told you that evolutionary reasons 
for qualia generation is only part of the mechanism, since there are also 
new qualia that we experience each moment of our lives that clearly don't 
appear as a consequence of life-or-death situation. If you want to hear the 
magic words, here they are: I don't know how qualia are generated.

On Monday, 6 May 2019 19:37:51 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Your turn. Is the theory of general relativity true?  I know your answer. 
> And the fact that you consider telepath and reincarnation to be ideas to 
> take more seriously than general relativity tells me what I need to know.
>
> You also ignored my point about how carbon monoxide deaths disprove your 
> prediction.
>
>

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Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology) '

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 10:47 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > On 3 May 2019, at 20:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 5/3/2019 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> The current darkness comes from the separation of theology from
> science, making exact science inexact and human science inhuman.
> >>
> >> Religion is the only goal,
> >
> > That's the kind of absolutist pronouncement that priests and despots
> have used to justify oppression and atrocities from auto-de-fe' to
> Buchenwald.
>
> I could have put that truth, or meaning, or value, is the only goal, but,
> normally, with what follow, i.e. “science is the only mean”, people should
> understand that this assume the minimum spiritual maturity of those who
> knows that in the religion domain, the argument-per-authority is not just
> not valid, it is catastrophic.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >>
> >> Science is the only mean.
> >
> > And every person is an end.
>
> Absolutely.
>
> Which should invite to be skeptic on all metaphysics which threat the
> existence of persons.
>
> Theology is today full of BS, not because theology is BS, only because
> theology has been separated from science, with the goal to use it as a way
> to control people. The prohibition of medication, and the idea that a
> government can have a word on this, in place of you or your doctor, is the
> same phenomenon. It is how liars get power, by appropriating the domain out
> of the serious and modest inquirers. The USSR did that with genetics,
> because theology was already just forbidden, and materialism (even the
> strong version) was obligatory. It is always the use of the argument per
> authority, in place of questions and other questions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I just found this quote by Godel, where he concluded mostly the same:

There would be no danger of an atomic war if advances in history, the
science of right and of state, philosophy, psychology, literature, art,
etc. were as great as in physics. But instead of such progress, one is
struck by significant regresses in many of the spiritual sciences. [123]


 http://kevincarmody.com/math/goedel.html

Jason

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Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology"

[cloudversed]

On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 10:35:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

With mechanism we don’t have a body, only relative “Gödel number”, ...
>
 

> Bruno
>
>
>
This always reminds me of The Prisoner:
 
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xcaxlxgnvf0 

@philipthrift

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

There are suggestive studies. My mind is open to the possibility of
paranormal phenomena. But it hasn't been proven beyond any reasonable
standard of proof. It is certainly not a "given" that telepathy and
reincarnation are real.

Your turn. Is the theory of general relativity true?  I know your answer.
And the fact that you consider telepath and reincarnation to be ideas to
take more seriously than general relativity tells me what I need to know.

You also ignored my point about how carbon monoxide deaths disprove your
prediction.

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:18 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> And ? What about the evidence that I gave you ? You are just ignoring it ?
>
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Re: for Cosmin

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

And ? What about the evidence that I gave you ? You are just ignoring it ?

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

Also, I brought up carbon monoxide poisoning a couple weeks ago, and you
had nothing to say about creating qualia back then. I suspect you're just
making it up as you go.

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:53 AM Terren Suydam 
wrote:

> I know a charlatan when I see one. They tend to make claims that can't be
> verified and resort to emotional arguments and other rhetorical tricks to
> influence people.
>
> To your credit, you did manage to finally come up with a prediction, which
> puts you on the same level as someone who accepted Randi's challenge. Your
> prediction - that conscious beings will spontaneously create qualia that
> can save their lives, and then pass that ability on to other
> consciousnesses, is not just absurd but demonstrably false: why do so many
> people die of carbon monoxide poisoning?  Your prediction means people
> would create new qualia that allows them to detect it and live another day
> - and then this trait would be passed on somehow. But here we are, nobody
> can detect it and as a result, many people die every year.
>
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:42 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> Sorry mate, your ignorance is not a substitute for lack of evidence. Here
>> it is a cure for ignorance: http://deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm
>>
>> Regarding Randi, lol, haven't you already figured it out that he is a
>> charlatan ?
>>
>> On Monday, 6 May 2019 18:36:32 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>> Givens?  You have proof of reincarnation and telepathy?  This is news to
>>> me. Over a thousand people took James Randi's million dollar challenge
>>> 
>>> but nobody got the money. Would love to see your evidence.
>>>
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>

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

I know a charlatan when I see one. They tend to make claims that can't be
verified and resort to emotional arguments and other rhetorical tricks to
influence people.

To your credit, you did manage to finally come up with a prediction, which
puts you on the same level as someone who accepted Randi's challenge. Your
prediction - that conscious beings will spontaneously create qualia that
can save their lives, and then pass that ability on to other
consciousnesses, is not just absurd but demonstrably false: why do so many
people die of carbon monoxide poisoning?  Your prediction means people
would create new qualia that allows them to detect it and live another day
- and then this trait would be passed on somehow. But here we are, nobody
can detect it and as a result, many people die every year.


On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:42 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Sorry mate, your ignorance is not a substitute for lack of evidence. Here
> it is a cure for ignorance: http://deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm
>
> Regarding Randi, lol, haven't you already figured it out that he is a
> charlatan ?
>
> On Monday, 6 May 2019 18:36:32 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> Givens?  You have proof of reincarnation and telepathy?  This is news to
>> me. Over a thousand people took James Randi's million dollar challenge
>> 
>> but nobody got the money. Would love to see your evidence.
>>
>> --
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Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology) '

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 20:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/3/2019 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The current darkness comes from the separation of theology from science, 
>> making exact science inexact and human science inhuman.
>> 
>> Religion is the only goal,
> 
> That's the kind of absolutist pronouncement that priests and despots have 
> used to justify oppression and atrocities from auto-de-fe' to Buchenwald.

I could have put that truth, or meaning, or value, is the only goal, but, 
normally, with what follow, i.e. “science is the only mean”, people should 
understand that this assume the minimum spiritual maturity of those who knows 
that in the religion domain, the argument-per-authority is not just not valid, 
it is catastrophic.




> 
>> 
>> Science is the only mean.
> 
> And every person is an end.

Absolutely.

Which should invite to be skeptic on all metaphysics which threat the existence 
of persons.

Theology is today full of BS, not because theology is BS, only because theology 
has been separated from science, with the goal to use it as a way to control 
people. The prohibition of medication, and the idea that a government can have 
a word on this, in place of you or your doctor, is the same phenomenon. It is 
how liars get power, by appropriating the domain out of the serious and modest 
inquirers. The USSR did that with genetics, because theology was already just 
forbidden, and materialism (even the strong version) was obligatory. It is 
always the use of the argument per authority, in place of questions and other 
questions.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: for Cosmin

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Sorry mate, your ignorance is not a substitute for lack of evidence. Here 
it is a cure for ignorance: http://deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm

Regarding Randi, lol, haven't you already figured it out that he is a 
charlatan ?

On Monday, 6 May 2019 18:36:32 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Givens?  You have proof of reincarnation and telepathy?  This is news to 
> me. Over a thousand people took James Randi's million dollar challenge 
>  
> but nobody got the money. Would love to see your evidence.
>
>

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Re: for Cosmin

[John Clark]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:23 AM 'Cosmin Visan'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com>

*> you cherry-pick what to believe in, against all evidence.*


So says the man who doesn't believe that computers or brains or atoms or
even calculations exist, but does believe that reincarnation and telepathy
does. I haven't heard your views on spoon bending, flying saucer men armed
with anal probes, ghosts, bigfoot, virgin birth or astrology yet but I can
make a educated guess.

 John K Clark

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

Givens?  You have proof of reincarnation and telepathy?  This is news to
me. Over a thousand people took James Randi's million dollar challenge
 but
nobody got the money. Would love to see your evidence.

On the other hand, quite a few counter-intuitive things have been proven
beyond a shadow of a doubt through the scientific enterprise. Gravitational
lensing

is an example of something that proves the highly counter-intuitive theory
of general relativity. According to you though, general relativity can be
dismissed, but reincarnation cannot. Does evidence count for anything?

Terren

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:23 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Of course they are givens. It is not my fault that you cherry-pick what to
> believe in, against all evidence.
>
> On Sunday, 5 May 2019 18:58:10 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> But reincarnation and telepathy are just givens, to be accepted as real
>> with no caveats whatsoever.
>>
>> --
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

You'all must be living in a pretty beautiful world if you somehow managed 
to pass the age of 7 and still believe in Santa Claus. Wow! I really want 
your worldview! Must be pretty exciting to be a child all your life!

On Monday, 6 May 2019 01:49:22 UTC+3, Jason wrote:
>
> Therefore a person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in 
> someone's skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could 
> perfectly mimic the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any 
> person you have ever met.
>

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Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 19:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> I once corresponded with Greg Stone 
> (https://www.near-death.com/science/articles/dying-brain-theory.html 
> ), who 
> advanced a similar theory and claimed that he could detach from his body and 
> be present at places remote from it.  I offered to  fund a research program 
> by him (at the time I controlled a pot of Navy R money) if you could 
> remotely observe the titles of books in the shelf above my computer.  He 
> invented a lot of reasons why it wouldn't be useful to do this.


I do not see any relations with what I say (see the quote below). With 
mechanism we don’t have a body, only relative “Gödel number”, and the physical 
one are the most probable one, and usually, if only to make the thought 
experience easier, we assumed a level rather high, in which such “similar 
theory” (similar to Kastrup?) is not very plausible, although not entirely 
logically refutable, with assuming very low level digitalism. 

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> On 5/3/2019 7:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 1 May 2019, at 18:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> But does Kastrup's TOE yield any testable predictions?
>> 
>> 
>> Good question. Or does it at least lead to any retrodictions, based on less 
>> hypothesis (simpler)?
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> On 5/1/2019 12:28 AM, cloudver...@gmail.com  
>>> wrote:
 Not my view of course, but here is 
 
 Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology
 Bernardo Kastrup
 Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen (2019)
 https://philpapers.org/rec/KASAIA-3 
 pdf: https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAIA-3.pdf 
 
 
 Abstract
 
 This thesis articulates an analytic version of the ontology of idealism, 
 according to which universal phenomenal consciousness is all there 
 ultimately is, everything else in nature being reducible to patterns of 
 excitation of this consciousness. The thesis’ key challenge is to explain 
 how the seemingly distinct conscious inner lives of different 
 subjects—such as you and me—can arise within this fundamentally unitary 
 phenomenal field. Along the way, a variety of other challenges are 
 addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism with the fact that we 
 all inhabit a common external world; why this world unfolds independently 
 of our personal volition or imagination; why there are such tight 
 correlations between measured patterns of brain activity and reports of 
 experience; etc. The core idea of this thesis can be summarized thus: we, 
 as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of universal 
 phenomenal consciousness, analogously to how a person with Dissociative 
 Identity Disorder (DID) manifests multiple disjoint centers of 
 subjectivity also called ‘alters.’ We, and all other living organisms, are 
 surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal 
 consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative boundary of our 
 respective alter. The inanimate world we perceive around us is the 
 extrinsic appearance—i.e. the phenomenal image imprinted from across our 
 dissociative boundary—of this activity. The living organisms we share the 
 world with are the extrinsic appearances of other alters.
 
 Keywords
 
 idealism  panpsychism  cosmopsychism  dissociation  altered states of 
 consciousness  mind-body problem  consciousness  hard problem of 
 consciousness  subject combination problem
 
 
 The (1hr) thesis defense:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcMOape0PY8 
 
 
 
 - @philipthrift
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>>> 
>>> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Relax! There is no "matter". "Matter" is just an idea in consciousness. So 
yeah, final verdict: "cybernatic hocus-bogus" is just a crackpot idea.

On Sunday, 5 May 2019 16:25:26 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a problem. 
> But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is identified with 
> cybernetic dynamics. I'm exploring the consequences of that idea, which are 
> compelling IMO.
>
> You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that assumption. 
> But it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a more correct 
> way to view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about what that is, 
> vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and 
> "all matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you fall prey to the 
> cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, *you fail to explain 
> what privileges certain kinds of matter over others*. It seems pretty 
> clear to me that there's no principled way to do that... any explanation of 
> why brains can be conscious but not computers starts to sound suspiciously 
> like "spirit" and "soul", in the sense that you're invoking some property 
> of matter that cannot be detected.
>
>

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Only because you subdue to irrationalism and refuse evidence, it doesn't 
mean that telepathy doesn't exist. First of all there are clear cases from 
personal experience. To reject them as "coincidences" is just to be a 
dogmatic believer in materialism. Second of all, even scientific 
experiments in which people are asked to "guess" 1 in 4 images that another 
person is sending to them telepathically, show over and over again that the 
rate of "guessing" is 32% compared to 25% as it is expected by chance.

So sorry, anyone that plays the "smart profound serious skeptic" card is 
just a silly dogmatic materialist believer that rejects evidence only based 
on their belief, not on reason.

On Sunday, 5 May 2019 11:57:52 UTC+3, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a really 
> crackpot idea.
>
>

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Re: for Cosmin

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Of course they are givens. It is not my fault that you cherry-pick what to 
believe in, against all evidence.

On Sunday, 5 May 2019 18:58:10 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> But reincarnation and telepathy are just givens, to be accepted as real 
> with no caveats whatsoever.
>
>

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[John Clark]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 2:19 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they
> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves
> intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an
> uncodable environment.*
>

Turing was interested in intelligence and, being a scientist, he knew he
couldn't say anything about consciousness unless he made the assumption
that observable intelligent behavior implies consciousness. And deductive
logic is not the only sort of logic there is, there is also inductive logic
and there is no reason a Turing Machine can't be programed for that too and
they certainly have been, that's how Chess and GO programs are able to make
what any Grand Master would call brilliant intuitive moves. Deductive logic
is reliable but although even more useful than deduction inductive logic is
just a rule of thumb, and that is why a intuitive leap can sometimes turn
out to be brilliant and sometimes it can be dead wrong.

As for Godel, I don't think the philosophical musings he made after about
1955 when his only friend Albert Einstein died are worth much, there is no
pleasant way to say this but the poor man went nuts.

 John K Clark



>
>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[PGC]

On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 11:25:59 PM UTC+2, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/5/2019 2:06 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
> I of course think that "consciousness arises from the function of 
> matter in some configurations" (the conscious brain is nothing but the 
> cells and chemicals operating inside the skull), but it's doing more than* 
> information processing*. It's doing *experience processing*. People can 
> deliberate until the cows come home why information processing is 
> sufficient or is not sufficient. If one is already an "information 
> processing is sufficient for consciousness" fan, then nothing will probably 
> change their belief in that. 
>
> The brain is an experience processing engine. Experience cannot be reduced 
> to information.
>
>
> The question is whether it can be reduced to a physical process and if so 
> what processes produce experience?  Does information processing that 
> produces intelligence also produce experience?  If not, there can be 
> philosophical zombies.
>
> Brent
>

Ok, but we're mostly surrounded by zombies 99% of the time anyway, 
including members/posts of this old list, with occasional spring chicken 
fresh meat, so it wouldn't make much of a difference in experience terms. 
lol

Nah, in this area I'm less intrigued by the list's 20 year preoccupation 
with UDA, which merely applies Star Trek (and older Sci-Fi such as: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO9ppicjlFg [yes have some fun once in 
awhile], but already Frankenstein and even older ideas/fiction) to the old 
and dusty mathematical philosophy debates. Just because it is on-topic 
doesn't mean that it isn't a time waster or intractable infinite oracle 
problem/solution.

In contrast, I'm always interested in AI's connection to language, 
analyzing discourse, and reading what's up with research on applying AI to 
improve and speed up theorem proving. Like this conference one month ago: 
http://aitp-conference.org/2019/

Or meta learning being given some steroids, e.g. applying multiple AI 
algorithms to solve cognitive problems in some framework, with each 
algorithm solving a few steps of a problem, then switching (or parallel 
whatever) after some intermediate result is obtained, with which another 
appropriate algorithm produces another intermediate result etc. then apply 
pattern mining with logical transformation rules to look at what was done. 
Like bridging the usual gap by applying operations of commonsense intuition 
to mathematical inference problems and endowing more mathematical precision 
to commonsense reasoning problems. This is fascinating as it's perhaps a 
step towards AI reasoning about its own code and the underlying algorithms 
and be less zombie. As in "Yo AI: Are you experienced?"

Now, if we could just formalize aesthetics: what makes a theorem 
interesting or sexy as fuck? If any of you know-it-alls have work on this, 
well you have my attention + we should hold another conference for that. 
Spring chicken edition in Europe. Hosted by the big bad wolf, killer of 
zombies. PGC

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Re: Does all computation generate heat?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 11:25:50 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> No.  Erasing data generates heat.  So reversible computation is, in 
> principle,  possible without hear generation.
>
> Brent
>

That is basically it. Landauer demonstrated that information loss results 
in lost energy, internal energy or waste heat. This does not mean there is 
no thermal energy if no information is lost or erased, but that there is no 
change in such. The entropy of a quantum system with density matrix ρ is S 
= -k Tr[ρ log(ρ)]. The unitary transformation ρ = U^†ρU can be applied to 
this Shannon-von Neumann formula and shown it is invariant. It is easy, 
just take the Taylor series for the log. So quantum computer that do not 
suffer decoherence are reversible and produce no heat. Once photons come 
blasting out of there then bets are off.

I sort of follow Bruno below, and I concur with the statement the 
Fischer-Griess Monster group is important. It is important for a quantum 
error correction code. Its connection to moonshine, say with the 
Brunier-Kent-Ono partition theorem etc, that the monster is associated with 
all realizable number theoretic computations. Quantum numbers then have a 
Gödel number representation, say as prime numbers or zeros of the Riemann 
zeta function, and all possible errors computable may be ciphered by the 
Monster. Susskind has this idea of entangled black holes, but realistically 
such an entanglement must be highly partitioned into partial entanglements 
across some cosmic or inflationary landscape. This partition would obey the 
Brunier-Kent-Ono partition theorem, which its approximate solution as the 
Hardy-Ramanujan formula gives the density of states for strings and with 
black holes reproduces the Bekenstein formula. 

LC
 

>
> On 5/1/2019 1:56 AM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> By "heat" I just mean it as one studies it as a subject in a physics 
> class, for example.
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heat
>
> *Does all computation generate heat?*
>
> (Should be a simple enough question, I think.)
>
> - @philipthrift
> -- 
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>
>
>

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:14 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:25 AM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 6:55:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 6:40 PM  wrote:
>>>

 I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:

 *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever
 invented.*



>>> Is it? It's the reason you can install new apps on your smartphone
>>> without having to buy a new chip or piece of hardware everytime you do.
>>> It's why we can have virtual machines (I am writing this e-mail from a
>>> virtual machine) and emulators. It's why we have the profession of software
>>> engineers who need not care about the hardware in question.
>>>
>>>
>>>

 Is the church-Turing thesis true?

>>>
>>> Almost certainly.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
 Carol E. Cleland
 https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC

>>>
>>
>>
>> When I follow a recipe (a program) to make a meal, I mix the identified
>> ingredients in the specified order and cook according to the specified
>> times.
>>
>> The meal is tasty (hopefully). Entering the recipe into a computer (even
>> if there was some sort of recipe interpreter) does not result in a tasty
>> meal.
>>
>
> Have you just disproved that simulation hypothesis?
>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5y68ErffgM

Jason

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:25 AM  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 6:55:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 6:40 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:
>>>
>>> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever
>>> invented.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Is it? It's the reason you can install new apps on your smartphone
>> without having to buy a new chip or piece of hardware everytime you do.
>> It's why we can have virtual machines (I am writing this e-mail from a
>> virtual machine) and emulators. It's why we have the profession of software
>> engineers who need not care about the hardware in question.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Is the church-Turing thesis true?
>>>
>>
>> Almost certainly.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>> Carol E. Cleland
>>> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC
>>>
>>
>
>
> When I follow a recipe (a program) to make a meal, I mix the identified
> ingredients in the specified order and cook according to the specified
> times.
>
> The meal is tasty (hopefully). Entering the recipe into a computer (even
> if there was some sort of recipe interpreter) does not result in a tasty
> meal.
>

Have you just disproved that simulation hypothesis?

Jason

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[cloudversed]

On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 12:59:20 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. 
> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is 
> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary 
> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.  
> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a 
> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the 
> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is 
> potentially inifinite.
>
> Brent
>
>
This is the paper I cited (the pdf link above):

*The Interactive Nature of Computing: Refuting the Strong Church-Turing 
Thesis*
Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner (Brown University) 

I knew Peter Wegner [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wegner ] in the 
1970s. Very interesting, dynamic guy. (I corresponded with his student Dina 
briefly after his death.)

I see computing (I think like he did), as well as mathematics, as an 
*experimental, 
empirical endeavor*, without any preordained "theoretical" restrictions (as 
like from a* religious catechism*).

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 2:44 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:41 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they
>>> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves
>>> intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an
>>> uncodable environment.
>>>
>>
>> Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on this?  In
>> my view Turing was the founder of functionalism/computationalism, when in
>> his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:
>>
>>
>> “The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
>> was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a
>> superstition. Importance is often
>> attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and
>> the nervous system is also
>> electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all
>> digital computers are in a sense
>> equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical
>> importance. [...] If we wish to
>> find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies
>> of function.”
>>
>>
>> As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have been
>> misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human consciousness is not
>> Turing emulable, I am not aware of any writings of Godel where he expressed
>> such ideas. It is hard for me to believe Godel himself misunderstood his
>> own ideas to the extent necessary to believe human mathematicians somehow
>> immune to its implications.  According to Godel's 14 points (his own
>> personal philosophy) it suggests he sees nothing special about the material
>> composition, and he also believes all problems (including art) can be
>> addressed through systematic methods. This suggests to me he would be a
>> proponent of at least "weak AI", which again is sufficient for my thought
>> experiment.
>>
>> 1. The world is rational.
>> 2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through
>> certain techniques).
>> *3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also
>> art, etc.).*
>> *4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher
>> kind.*
>> 5. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live
>> or have lived.
>> 6. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known.
>> 7. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly
>> intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
>> 8. Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
>> 9. Formal rights comprise a real science.
>> *10. Materialism is false.*
>> *11. The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by
>> composition.*
>> 12. Concepts have an objective existence.
>> 13. There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals
>> with concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly
>> fruitful for science.
>> 14. Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.
>>
>>
>> (Emphasis mine)
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> I base these comments on an analysis in a paper by Copeland and Shagrir,
> in the book "Computability: Turing, Goedel, Church, and Beyond" (MIT Press,
> 2015). The main argument is that "In about 1970, Goedel wrote a brief note
> entitled 'A Philosophical Error in Turing's Work' (1972; in Goedel's
> Collected Works)." "In the postscript, Goedel also raised the intriguing
> 'question of whether there exist finite non-mechanical procedures'; and he
> observed that the generalised incompleteness results 'do not establish any
> bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of
> pure formalism in mathematics."
>
> "A philosophical error in Turing's work. Turing in [section 9 of "On
> Computable Numbers" (1936, 75-76)} gives an argument which is supposed to
> show that mental procedures cannot go beyond mechanical procedures. However
> ... what Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its use, is
> not static, but constantly developing ... Although at each stage the number
> and precision of the abstract terms at our disposal may be finite, both
> (and, therefore, also Turing's number of distinguishable states of mind)
> may converge toward infinity in the course of the application of the
> procedure. (Geode 1972, 306)."
>
> Further: "What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its
> use, is not static, but constantly developing. This is seen, e.g., from the
> infinite series of ever stronger axioms of infinity in set theory, each of
> which expresses a new idea or insight ... Therefore, although at each stage
> of the mind's development the number of possible states is finite, there is
> no reason why this number should not converge to infinity in the course of
> its development. (Godel in Wang 1974, 325)."
>
> The article by Copeland and Shagrir then goes on to 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[cloudversed]

On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 6:55:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 6:40 PM > wrote:
>
>>
>> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:
>>
>> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.*
>>
>>
>>
> Is it? It's the reason you can install new apps on your smartphone without 
> having to buy a new chip or piece of hardware everytime you do. It's why we 
> can have virtual machines (I am writing this e-mail from a virtual machine) 
> and emulators. It's why we have the profession of software engineers who 
> need not care about the hardware in question.
>
>  
>
>>
>> Is the church-Turing thesis true?
>>
>
> Almost certainly.
>
> Jason
>  
>
>> Carol E. Cleland
>> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC
>>
>


When I follow a recipe (a program) to make a meal, I mix the identified 
ingredients in the specified order and cook according to the specified 
times.

The meal is tasty (hopefully). Entering the recipe into a computer (even if 
there was some sort of recipe interpreter) does not result in a tasty meal.

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[cloudversed]

On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 4:25:59 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/5/2019 2:06 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
> I of course think that "consciousness arises from the function of 
> matter in some configurations" (the conscious brain is nothing but the 
> cells and chemicals operating inside the skull), but it's doing more than* 
> information processing*. It's doing *experience processing*. People can 
> deliberate until the cows come home why information processing is 
> sufficient or is not sufficient. If one is already an "information 
> processing is sufficient for consciousness" fan, then nothing will probably 
> change their belief in that. 
>
> The brain is an experience processing engine. Experience cannot be reduced 
> to information.
>
>
> The question is whether it can be reduced to a physical process and if so 
> what processes produce experience?  Does information processing that 
> produces intelligence also produce experience?  If not, there can be 
> philosophical zombies.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
That's the right questions, right there.

Another:

Is there a calculus of experience?

(like one for motion, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, ...)

@philipthrift
 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:41 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they
>> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves
>> intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an
>> uncodable environment.
>>
>
> Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on this?  In my
> view Turing was the founder of functionalism/computationalism, when in his
> 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:
>
>
> “The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
> was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a
> superstition. Importance is often
> attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and the
> nervous system is also
> electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all
> digital computers are in a sense
> equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical
> importance. [...] If we wish to
> find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of
> function.”
>
>
> As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have been
> misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human consciousness is not
> Turing emulable, I am not aware of any writings of Godel where he expressed
> such ideas. It is hard for me to believe Godel himself misunderstood his
> own ideas to the extent necessary to believe human mathematicians somehow
> immune to its implications.  According to Godel's 14 points (his own
> personal philosophy) it suggests he sees nothing special about the material
> composition, and he also believes all problems (including art) can be
> addressed through systematic methods. This suggests to me he would be a
> proponent of at least "weak AI", which again is sufficient for my thought
> experiment.
>
> 1. The world is rational.
> 2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through
> certain techniques).
> *3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also
> art, etc.).*
> *4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher
> kind.*
> 5. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live
> or have lived.
> 6. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known.
> 7. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly
> intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
> 8. Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
> 9. Formal rights comprise a real science.
> *10. Materialism is false.*
> *11. The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by
> composition.*
> 12. Concepts have an objective existence.
> 13. There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals
> with concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly
> fruitful for science.
> 14. Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.
>
>
> (Emphasis mine)
>
> Jason
>

I base these comments on an analysis in a paper by Copeland and Shagrir, in
the book "Computability: Turing, Goedel, Church, and Beyond" (MIT Press,
2015). The main argument is that "In about 1970, Goedel wrote a brief note
entitled 'A Philosophical Error in Turing's Work' (1972; in Goedel's
Collected Works)." "In the postscript, Goedel also raised the intriguing
'question of whether there exist finite non-mechanical procedures'; and he
observed that the generalised incompleteness results 'do not establish any
bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of
pure formalism in mathematics."

"A philosophical error in Turing's work. Turing in [section 9 of "On
Computable Numbers" (1936, 75-76)} gives an argument which is supposed to
show that mental procedures cannot go beyond mechanical procedures. However
... what Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its use, is
not static, but constantly developing ... Although at each stage the number
and precision of the abstract terms at our disposal may be finite, both
(and, therefore, also Turing's number of distinguishable states of mind)
may converge toward infinity in the course of the application of the
procedure. (Geode 1972, 306)."

Further: "What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its
use, is not static, but constantly developing. This is seen, e.g., from the
infinite series of ever stronger axioms of infinity in set theory, each of
which expresses a new idea or insight ... Therefore, although at each stage
of the mind's development the number of possible states is finite, there is
no reason why this number should not converge to infinity in the course of
its development. (Godel in Wang 1974, 325)."

The article by Copeland and Shagrir then goes on to defend Turing against
Goedel's criticism, by pointing out that Turing actually says "Having
defined a certain infinite binary sequence \delta, which he shows to be
uncomputable, 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>
>
>> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>

 On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only
> suspect it).
>
> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly
> visible behaviors).
>
> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed
> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's
> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have
> ever met.
>
> Do you dispute any of the above?
>
>
> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary
> program.
>


 You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes
 of the thought experiment).


 In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.

>>>
>>>
>>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we
>>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could
>>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as
>>> intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be
>>> interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
>>> finitely describable.
>>>
>>
>> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>>
>> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given
>> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
>>
>>
>> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
>> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is
>> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary
>> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.
>> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
>> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the
>> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
>> potentially inifinite.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they
> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves
> intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an
> uncodable environment.
>
>
Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on this?  In my
view Turing was the founder of functionalism/computationalism, when in his
1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:


“The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a superstition.
Importance is often
attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and the
nervous system is also
electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all
digital computers are in a sense
equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical
importance. [...] If we wish to
find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of
function.”


As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have been
misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human consciousness is not
Turing emulable, I am not aware of any writings of Godel where he expressed
such ideas. It is hard for me to believe Godel himself misunderstood his
own ideas to the extent necessary to believe human mathematicians somehow
immune to its implications.  According to Godel's 14 points (his own
personal philosophy) it suggests he sees nothing special about the material
composition, and he also believes all problems (including art) can be
addressed through systematic methods. This suggests to me he would be a
proponent of at least "weak AI", which again is sufficient for my thought
experiment.

1. The world is rational.
2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through
certain techniques).
*3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also
art, etc.).*
*4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher
kind.*
5. The world in which we live 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 12:59 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only
 suspect it).

 Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly
 visible behaviors).

 Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed
 computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
 person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's
 skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
 the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have
 ever met.

 Do you dispute any of the above?


 It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary
 program.

>>>
>>>
>>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes
>>> of the thought experiment).
>>>
>>>
>>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.
>>>
>>
>>
>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we
>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could
>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
>>
>>
>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as
>> intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be
>> interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
>> finitely describable.
>>
>
> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>
> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given
> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
>
>
> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is
> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary
> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.
> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the
> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
> potentially inifinite.
>
>
Even if true, this doesn't preclude the thought experiment I defined, where
the program takes in inputs from the environment via the senses and feeds
those inputs to the program.

Jason


> Brent
>
>
> Jason
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>


 If you encountered a close friend who had to get a computer replacement
 for his brain (e.g. due to an inoperable tumor), and this friend displayed
 perfect mimicry of the behavior prior to the surgery, would you continue to
 tell him he his not conscious, despite his protestations that he is every
 bit as conscious as before?  On what basis would this your claim rest?


 Some of my friends I'd tell him it was amazing how much smarter he was.

 Brent


 Jason

 On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:33 PM  wrote:

>
> Re:  "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all matter
> is conscious"
>
> I do think the first (human brains at least, and perhaps some
> non-human brains, from primates to down* the "food-chain").
>
> Some think there was no fully or cognitively conscious (only a sensory
> conscious) human before language. There may be something to that.
>
> But not the second (where there is self and self-awareness).  *Rocks
> are not conscious.* But the idea is that all matter does have some
> level of *elementary protoconsciousness* in various  types, phases,
> and configurations of matter. When some matter is combined into certain
> configurations (like a human brain), these *protopsychical parts* are
> fused into something conscious.
>
> * Do Insects Have Consciousness and Ego?
> *The brains of insects are similar to a structure in human brains,
> which could show a rudimentary form of consciousness*
>
>
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/do-insects-have-consciousness-ego-180958824/
>
>
> I don't think that societies are conscious, the Earth is conscious,
> the universe is conscious.
>
> The Earth is aware of itself? I don't think so.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>


> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only
 suspect it).

 Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly
 visible behaviors).

 Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed
 computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a
 person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's
 skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic
 the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have
 ever met.

 Do you dispute any of the above?


 It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary
 program.

>>>
>>>
>>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes
>>> of the thought experiment).
>>>
>>>
>>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.
>>>
>>
>>
>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we
>> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could
>> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
>>
>>
>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as
>> intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be
>> interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not
>> finitely describable.
>>
>
> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>
> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given
> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
>
>
> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly.
> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf  His point is
> that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary
> and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.
> He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a
> memory and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the
> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is
> potentially inifinite.
>
> Brent
>

This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they
pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves
intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an
uncodable environment.

Bruce

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