Re: Artificial Philosophizing

2006-02-06 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [...] Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Given that we believe in sense? Who/what gives that? Do we believe in that? Georges.

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2006-03-06 Thread Georges Quénot
Norman Samish wrote: Thanks to all who replied to my question. This question has bothered me for years, and I have hopes that some progress can be made towards an answer. I've heard some interesting concepts, including: (1) Numbers must exist, therefore 'something' must exist. (2)

Re: Numbers

2006-03-09 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: Georges, your post is on the level, I am not G I am still in common sense with my feeble thinking-tool. Sorry, I am not a native english speaker, I don't understand what on the level can mean (and especially with quotes). In don't understand either what you mean by G. I

Re: Numbers

2006-03-11 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: Georges: please, have merci on me! 'my' English is the 5th of my acquired languages, so to read - and realize what it stands for - that long a post is (almost) beyond my mental endurance. I understand that but the point is highly unusual and unintuitive and I felt that a

Re: Numbers

2006-03-11 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: Unfortunately my mailbox did not take more and wrote: == message truncated === Here follows a copy of the remainder: ... Last but not least: this view has the advantage that we no longer have to wonder how it comes that particles follows the rules, how can a particle

Re: Numbers

2006-03-12 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: Georges, this is to your reflections to my remarks. It starts to look like a private discussion on-list, Not completely. And some may also follow the discussion an find it interesting even if they do not participate (as I often do for other threads). but I love it. So do I.

Re: Numbers

2006-03-16 Thread Georges Quénot
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical

Re: Numbers

2006-03-16 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. This looks *very* similar to; ]]

Re: Numbers

2006-03-16 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise it is nonsense. No, because all

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: Norman Samish wrote: Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call it God. I can think of no possibility other than It was always there, and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view. Dualism says there are two really existing

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) adopt it either. But can you

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: [...] Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU. Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned. I probably missed your point. [...] By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under commis, now 3+ in the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes a counterpart of you. I meant: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe including

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe including a counterpart of you would be a solution. 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some very long

Re: Numbers

2006-03-19 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain

Re: Numbers

2006-03-19 Thread Georges Quénot
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit : *If* comp is true. I am not sure of that. Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some neat etalon philosophy to compare with other theories. The advantage of comp (which I recall includes Church

Re: Numbers

2006-03-19 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe including a counterpart of you would be a solution. 1) Any configuration of material

Re: Numbers

2006-03-19 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: My 2. and 3. remain anyway. Georges. 2. There may well exist a Harry Potter universe that includes a counterpart of you but it is not causaly related to our universe (too far for instance) and this is why we cannot observe

Re: Numbers

2006-03-19 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [...] I see. So from you viewpoint the distinction between physics and mathematics appears as natural It is grounded in the logical distinction between necessity and contingency. This distinction is a matter of viewpoint. Contingency

Re: Numbers

2006-03-20 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Georges Quenot wrote: If you are a being that have never observed magical events any duplicate of you will never have observed any magical event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be true

Re: Numbers

2006-03-20 Thread Georges Quénot
1Z wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience something different of what you do, his acquired (and possibly his lost) memories will differ from yours. He will still share most of your

Re: Numbers

2006-03-22 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: That too can be discussed. It is not so sure that there exist a set of equations of which a HP universe would be a solution, especially if this universe must also include a counterpart of me. As I have pointed out, there is bound

Re: Numbers

2006-03-24 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] What we can be sure of is that 1) we exist 2) we are conscious 3) there is some sort of external world 4) there is some phenomenon of time. *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do not decide for

Re: Numbers

2006-03-24 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-25 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. Prejudices

Re: Numbers

2006-03-25 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. As seen from your

Re: Numbers

2006-03-26 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: [...] (To put it another way: the point is to explain experience. Physicalism explains non-experience of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations have to end somewhere. The question is how many

Re: Numbers

2006-03-26 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] (To put it another way: the point is to explain experience. Physicalism explains non-experience of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations have

Re: Numbers

2006-03-30 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: It is just the idea that there could be no difference between mathematical existence and physical existence. Then why do we use two different

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Georges Quénot
Our messages becomes longer and longer. I will split my responses. I will start with this: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [...] Furthermore, most of this HP universe is in the brain of your nephew. What is in the game would be almost nothing without your nephew's imagination to

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Epistemic objectivity of maths means every competent mathematician gets the same answer to a given problem. It doesn't say anything about the existence of anything (except

Re: Numbers

2006-04-01 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [...] The question of whether there could be other type of objects than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am afraid I cannot easily transmit that feeling). It is harder

Re: Numbers

2006-04-02 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [...] The question of whether there could be other type of objects than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am afraid I cannot