subject:"Re\: MGA revisited paper"



On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with  
discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state  
what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.


Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far  
the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've  
heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our  
concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same  
redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in  
itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be  
correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy  
that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a  
phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of  
the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena  
actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow  
for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the  
duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on  
precisely that fact.


Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to  
pick out the right solution.  Interference implies 
superposition in the same world.


Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can  
isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I  
succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead  
state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat  
(measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I  
do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive +  
dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor  
product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one*  
world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more  
normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that  
the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building  
with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the  
superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive  
+ history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead.
Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes,  
the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of  
light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with  
Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that  
Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that  
Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one  
world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by  
a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many  
world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't  
see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear.


The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into  
the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate  
classical worlds.  My point is that superposition is not a defining  
attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces.


I have no problem with that. And despite Everett's own opinion on  
this, I think it was a good idea to call that the relative state  
theory, instead of the many worlds, which can lead to naïve view of  
multiple aristotelian worlds, which would be doing the aristotelian  
error an infinity of times.


In arithmetic also, all we have are the relative states, and their  
relative measures. (cf the ASSA/RSSA old discussion, a recurrent theme  
on the list).










I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ 
 , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum  
Computing Since Democritus is also very good).


What is his position on Everett?


(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum  
mechanics is, “OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction  
really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to  
calculate probabilities?” Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say  
they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don’t.



Many worlders, when wise avoid the questions, they do exist in the  
formalism, so if the tehiry is correct, they can't just simply  
disappear.


But it is false or ambiguous to say that the Copenhagenists would say  
they don't believe that they exist. They believe indeed that one of  
them exist!  That is why they need a mechanism to make disappearing  
some term in the wave, and they invented the collapse, which is simply  
a way to say that they believe that QM does not apply to  them, or  
the measuring apparatus, or consciousness, etc. They did not find any  
evidence that there is a collapse, nor any senseful criteria for  
something not obeying QM..






Of course, part of what

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:

On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Liz,

I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.

That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people  
would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's involved in  
consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes  
consciousness an illusion.


(Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an  
illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.)


Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.

I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that  
some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse  
than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee  
and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And  
0.1% will think so hard about it that they  
spontaneously combust.)


That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split.  Does the  
0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of  
which you have a milkshape?  Or does it require that it must split  
1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one.  I think  
Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many  
threads thru the occasion of your whim.  But this is different  
compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment.  In  
that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created.  But in the  
UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly.


In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, time disappears too. In the WM- 
duplication, guys are created relatively to you, and *that* happens  
infinitely often in the UD-computations. Like Einstein said, time is  
an illusion, although a persistent one.


Neither Everett, nor Deutsch, nor computationalism solved all problem,  
we just get the tools to formulate them.


Wise many-worlders will not pretend that no collapse explains all  
weirdness. They just feel like the collapse itself is just too much  
weird than to be accepted. Here too I am close to Einstein view: I  
don't see what it could mean to abandon 3p- determinacy and 3p- 
locality in the physical realm: God does not play dice, and there are  
no action at a distance, although it might look like that, but only if  
we abstract away some terms or the superposition. In quantum  
teleportation, Alice has to send some bit of classical information to  
tell him which part of the multiple terms wave they share.


Bruno





Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote:

On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs  
involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the  
equivalent - differentiation or whatever).
But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that  
they are separate worlds.


But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation.  
In fact they aren't even well defined, only approximations to  
what's actually there, at least according to DD (and as usual  
assuming I understood him correctly).


If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's  
just a semantic quibble.  When a photon goes thru both of Young's  
slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world.


I would say that below your substitition lebel, there is an infinity  
of worlds/computations. It is just that your relevant brain state for  
your consciousness is independent of the fact that the photon go  
through hole one or two.





Maybe Deutsch thinks of it as splitting into two worlds and then  
recombining at the detector screen.


He would say that there is never splitting, but your brain has a long  
history, and it has favorized the position base, and that can be  
justified by the decoherence theory.





Once the detection has occurred, a spot on the screen, then the  
split has been amplified and entangled into the environment and is  
statistically irreversible.  Then that defines a classical world (in  
my view).  That world will not recombine with a world in which the  
spot appears at a different place on the screen.


OK. We can define world by set of events closed for interaction.




Have you read Zeh's quantum darwinism?  He attempts to explain why  
we perceive a world whose stable observable features are the ones we  
see.  Deutsch has generally just assumed that the observable world  
must have the classical character we see.  Everett and Bohr assumed  
what variable was classically measurable was defined by the choice  
of apparatus; but that seems circular.


I agree much with Zeh, notably on its account of time. I have not read  
the more recent publication, but quantum darwinism makes, as  
computationalism, by generalizing Everett move, lead to a sort of  
logical evolution of the physical laws.


I appreciate also Mittelstaedt different books, and Piron. And thanks  
to Selesnick, my interest in Finkelstein has been revived.


But computatioanalism+computer science approache this from the other  
side, with a different conception of realitry (more platonist than  
aristotelian).


Bruno



Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 28 Oct 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought  
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble,  
and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal  
identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought  
experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could  
go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as  
Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous.


 If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first  
language.


No and I am not a member of the grammar police because I often don't  
well speak English myself, I'm talking about a fundamental error in  
Bruno's thinking process covered up by the very sloppy use of  
personal pronouns. In everyday life it's not important to be super  
careful with pronouns and it's possible to be careless with them  
without causing ambiguities, but if matter duplicating machines are  
introduced into the mix extraordinary care must be used and Bruno  
didn't do so.


Where?
But I know your answer by heart, and it consists in repeating what I  
say, but avoiding the 1p and 3p, and 3-1p, etc. distinctions that I  
introduce.


You did not show an error. You attribute me fuzzy things, but your  
can't refer where I said them, except by quoting half sentences out of  
their context.








 However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's  
trying to say.


I can't because what he's saying is tightly bound up in the meanings  
of those personal pronouns and in a world with matter duplicating  
machines the meaning of those personal pronouns is ambiguous.


In UDA I use the common sense notion of first person and third person,  
specialized in the term of duplication boxes.
In AUDA, (the arithmetical translation of the UDA) I use Kleene's  
second recursion theorem, or the

Dx = F(xx, ...) method.






 I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the  
nature of the observer in his paper


Yes, and when Everett talks about the observer there is never any  
ambiguity because the laws of physics allow us to see only one thing  
that fits that description, but that is NOT the case if you have  
matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought exparament.


If that was relevant, add in the protocol in step three that the one  
reconstituted in Moscow is send to the goulag, and the one  
reconstituted in Washington is sent to jail, and that they will never  
meet, nor have any visit. In that case, with your reasoning above, you  
would accept the uncertainty, but as this is not relevant for the  
immediate apprehension, as we could relieve you from the goulag and  
the jail, after all. So you fail to explain us what is the difference.







 If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend  
on the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will  
appear to have happened after they've happened


And that's yet another problem that I didn't mention in my last  
post, not that predictions have the slightest thing to do with  
personal identity but Bruno says that the Helsinki man's prediction  
that John Clark will see Washington AND Moscow has been proven wrong  
because afterwards the Washington Man said I see only Washington.  
But what makes Bruno think that the information received by the  
Washington Man alone (or the Moscow man alone) is enough to evaluate  
the truth or falsehood of the Helsinki Man's prediction?


Because we have agreed that you John Clark survived in both place, and  
so we take notice of both observation. When they said both W  M,  
they both agree that this failed, and understand (I hope) that if they  
would have written W v M, but not sure which one, they would have  
both note that the prediction is correct.

Children understand that.

You just stop doing the thought experience, like if you died in the  
process. You did agree that you don't die, you did agree that you will  
not feel in a superposition of feeling to see both city at once, so,  
in the thought experience, you can only expect one of the outcome W,  
or M, never both, or you are no more talking about what you expect in  
the first person sense.





I've asked Bruno this question nineteen dozen times but never  
received a coherent answer.


You did, but keep restating it introducing your ambiguities, avoiding  
the 1p/3p distinction.






  you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally  
linked to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment,


NO! You're linked to BOTH copies with equal strength, and that's  
exactly the problem


Comp avoids that problem. There is no problem at all. It is enough to  
read the notes in the diaries, as we don't talk of any more than that,  
at that step of the reasoning.




and is why when Bruno starts saying that after the duplication you

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-29 Thread LizR

On 30 October 2014 05:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just
 a semantic quibble.  When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and
 interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world.


 The universe splits because there is a difference between them,  the
 photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the
 right slit in another universe.  If after that the photons hit a
 photographic plate (or just a brick wall) both photons are destroyed and
 there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes so they
 recombine, but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon
 went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right
 slit only and this causes interference bands. If we hadn't put a
 photographic plate (or a brick wall) in the photon's path and just let them
 continue into infinite space the 2 universes would always be different and
 so never recombine. For statistical reasons we only see interference if the
 2 universes are almost identical; although it's logically possible that the
 universe where Lincoln was not assassinated and our universe could both
 evolve into a state that was identical and so recombine and cause
 interference it's astronomically unlikely. Actually astronomically is far
 too weak a word but infinitely is too strong, this my be the very rare
 occurrence where a new word might be useful.

 Nicely summarised. In other words any such phenomenon is a split -
including the operation of a quantum computer - and some splits can
recombine (especially if we arrange things so they do).

I didn't think a superposition made sense in Everett because it implies
both objects exist in the same (sub)universe.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a
semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and
interferes with
itself I'd say that happens in one world.

The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or
electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another
universe. If after that the photons

There's only one photon.

hit a photographic plate (or just a brick wall) both photons are destroyed and there is
no longer any difference between the 2 universes so they recombine,

But there is a difference in the path lengths from the source to detector, which produces
the probability pattern for detection. This pattern is one world. If the path lengths
were different in different worlds there would be no interference of phases, which is just
what happens when you shoot classical particles thru the slits.

but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left
slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes
interference bands.

?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if
there is such evidence, if it's not erased, the interference disappears.

If we hadn't put a photographic plate (or a brick wall) in the photon's path and just
let them continue into infinite space the 2 universes would always be different and so
never recombine.

It depends on whether they interact with the environment. In the C70 buckyball
experiment, photons that were never detected still localized the buckyballs and destroyed
the interference pattern. On the other hand in the Dopfer experiment the idler photon was
focused on the detector so that lateral momentum information was erased and the
interference pattern was observed.

Brent

For statistical reasons we only see interference if the 2 universes are almost
identical; although it's logically possible that the universe where Lincoln was not
assassinated and our universe could both evolve into a state that was identical and so
recombine and cause interference it's astronomically unlikely. Actually astronomically
is far too weak a word but infinitely is too strong, this my be the very rare occurrence
where a new word might be useful.

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience


On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to 
say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in 
Bruno's stated argument.


Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real 
(non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic 
quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly 
the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself 
contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same 
conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would 
- that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the 
person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each 
other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third 
person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on 
precisely that fact.


Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right 
solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world.


Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, 
where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat 
(prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the 
cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that 
measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the 
linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that 
superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or 
more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is 
alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and 
you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that 
Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead.
Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the 
differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there 
will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact 
that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat 
is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical 
world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That 
makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see 
how the term of the superposition can ever disappear.


The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental 
degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds.  My point is that 
superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative 
incoherence so subspaces.


I have no problem with that. And despite Everett's own opinion on this, I think it was a 
good idea to call that the relative state theory, instead of the many worlds, which 
can lead to naïve view of multiple aristotelian worlds, which would be doing the 
aristotelian error an infinity of times.


In arithmetic also, all we have are the relative states, and their relative measures. 
(cf the ASSA/RSSA old discussion, a recurrent theme on the list).










I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for 
straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus 
is also very good).


What is his position on Everett?


/(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, “OK, but 
do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical 
constructs used to calculate probabilities?” Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say 
they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don’t. /



Many worlders, when wise avoid the questions, they do exist in the formalism, so if the 
tehiry is correct, they can't just simply disappear.


But it is false or ambiguous to say that the /Copenhagenists/ would say they don't 
believe that they exist. They believe indeed that one of them exist!  That is why they 
need a mechanism to make disappearing some term in the wave, and they invented the 
collapse, which is simply a way to say that they believe that QM does not apply to  
them, or the measuring apparatus, or consciousness, etc. They did not find any evidence 
that there is a collapse, nor any senseful criteria for something not obeying QM..






/Of course, part of what makes the question slippery is that it’s

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote:

Liz,

I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.

That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with,
although they'd probably agree it's /involved/ in consciousness. But yes, using that
definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion.

(Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the
MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.)

Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.

I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will
have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to
speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And
0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.)

That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that
the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it
require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I
think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the
occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the
Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington
guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist
timelessly.

In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, time disappears too. In the WM-duplication, guys are
created relatively to you, and *that* happens infinitely often in the UD-computations.
Like Einstein said, time is an illusion, although a persistent one.

Neither Everett, nor Deutsch, nor computationalism solved all problem, we just get the
tools to formulate them.

Wise many-worlders will not pretend that no collapse explains all weirdness. They just
feel like the collapse itself is just too much weird than to be accepted. Here too I am
close to Einstein view: I don't see what it could mean to abandon 3p- determinacy and
3p-locality in the physical realm

I think we know exactly what it means - it means Copenhagen: randomness and non-locality
in spacetime. My problem with Copenhagen is that it made measurement an abstract
mathematical operation with no physics - which seems like a bad basis for fundamental
physics. Decoherence has allowed the Copenhagen interpretation to go part way in defining
measurement, but it is still not complete. Taking partial traces is just like the
projection postulate. Zurek's quantum Darwinism looks promising and it may reach all the
way to the mind/body problem.

Brent

: God does not play dice, and there are no action at a distance, although it might look
like that, but only if we abstract away some terms or the superposition. In quantum
teleportation, Alice has to send some bit of classical information to tell him which
part of the multiple terms wave they share.

Bruno
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-29 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 The universe splits because there is a difference between them,  the
 photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the
 right slit in another universe.  If after that the photons



  There's only one photon.


Not if Everett is correct, if he is then when a photon encounters
something, like a wall with 2 slits in it, everything that can happen does
happen. And for that to occur you need more than one photon and more than
one universe.


  If the path lengths were different in different worlds there would be no
 interference


If anything is still different when the photon hits the photographic plate
there will be no interference. You only see interference if there is a
change, a difference, so one universe splits into two and then another
change that makes them identical again. Unless the first change is very
very small it's almost impossible there will ever be a second change large
enough for the 2 universes to become identical again.


   but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went
 through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit
 only and this causes interference bands.


  ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to.


A interference pattern.

 Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if there is such evidence,
 if it's not erased, the interference disappears


That is correct. If the information about which slits the photons went
through exists then the 2 universe are still different when the photons hit
the plate because the information must be recorded in something physical
and whatever the physical medium is the arrangement of something physical
will be different, so the 2 universes are not identical and thus do not
recombine and no interference pattern forms on the photographic and there
is no indication that any photon went through more than one slit.

However if the information about which slits the photons went through is
erased after they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate
then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even though
there once was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a lot of
interference because they were never more than slightly different but there
is some and we see it as interference bands on that photographic plate and
indications that the photons went through both slits.

  John K Clark







-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 6:54 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the
photon (or
electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in
another
universe. If after that the photons

There's only one photon.

Not if Everett is correct, if he is then when a photon encounters something, like a wall
with 2 slits in it, everything that can happen does happen. And for that to occur you
need more than one photon and more than one universe.

If the path lengths were different in different worlds there would be no
interference

If anything is still different when the photon hits the photographic plate there will be
no interference. You only see interference if there is a change, a difference, so one
universe splits into two and then another change that makes them identical again. Unless
the first change is very very small it's almost impossible there will ever be a second
change large enough for the 2 universes to become identical again.

but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went
through
the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit
only and
this causes interference bands.

?? What kind of evidence do you refer to.

A interference pattern.

That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only.

Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if there is such evidence,
if it's
not erased, the interference disappears

That is correct. If the information about which slits the photons went through exists
then the 2 universe are still different when the photons hit the plate because the
information must be recorded in something physical and whatever the physical medium is
the arrangement of something physical will be different, so the 2 universes are not
identical and thus do not recombine and no interference pattern forms on the
photographic and there is no indication that any photon went through more than one slit.

However if the information about which slits the photons went through is erased after
they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate

No, it's called the /*delayed*/ quantum eraser experiment because the which-way
information can be erased /*after*/ they hit the detector

arXiv:quant-ph/9903047 v1 13 Mar 1999

Brent

then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even though there once
was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a lot of interference because they
were never more than slightly different but there is some and we see it as interference
bands on that photographic plate and indications that the photons went through both slits.

John K Clark

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-29 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 10:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


?? What kind of evidence do you refer to.


   A interference pattern.

  That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only.


Of course not it's would be the exact opposite,  it's evidence the photon
went through both slits.


  if the information about which slits the photons went through is erased
 after they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate


  No, it's called the *delayed* quantum eraser experiment because the
 which-way information can be erased *after* they hit the detector


Fine, you record the information about which slit the photons went through
then wait ten years, then erase the information. Provided that the recorded
information has not interacted with anything in the preceding 10 year, such
as you looking at it, then when it is erased there is no longer any
difference between the 2 universes and thus they recombine. And so if you
then develop the photographic plate a interference pattern will be observed
on it.

If you didn't erase the information they wouldn't recombine and thus no
interference pattern would be found when you developed it.

  John K Clark.







 arXiv:quant-ph/9903047 v1 13 Mar 1999

 Brent


   then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even
 though there once was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a
 lot of interference because they were never more than slightly different
 but there is some and we see it as interference bands on that photographic
 plate and indications that the photons went through both slits.

John K Clark






  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:

 It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
 just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or
 disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.

  Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the
 only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down
 to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual
 person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by
 Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes
 the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy
 that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a
 phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the
 person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map
 onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility
 that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed -
 quantum computers rely on precisely that fact.


 Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out
 the right solution.  Interference implies superposition in the same world.
 I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog
 http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum
 computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good).


What exactly is superposition in the same world in the Everett view? As
far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a
temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent -
differentiation or whatever). So a quantum calculation involves a mini
multiverse being created and collapsed again under controlled conditions.
Have I misunderstood that? TBH I can't actually see what else a
superposition *could* be, in the Everett picture (although I assume if
you're looking at things from a path integral view or pilot wave (etc) then
you have something that really is more or less duplicated in one universe,
like Schrodinger's cat in the popular conception being both alive and
dead...)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

   So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've
 heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of
 an individual person.


 The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
 experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet
 from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already
 crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were
 stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person
 pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is
 just ridiculous.


If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first language.
However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying to
say.


   This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in
 1957.


 No it is not for 3 reasons:

 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum
 world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was
 able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said
 nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to,
 and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum
 interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other
 Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would
 be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't
 explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness
 has nothing to do with his theory.


I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of the
observer in his paper, but it's a while since I read it. But he does have
to explain why an observer sees what he does, why he doesn't experience
splitting, and so on. As far as I remember he does so using a similar
method to Bruno - giving the observer something like a diary to write his
experiences in.


 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to
 think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's
 just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future.


If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the
past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to
have happened after they've happened (which is true of measurements in
Everett as well).


 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always
 obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of
 physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with
 matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that
 description, and so the word he conveys zero  information.


I don't think it conveys zero information. But you do have to be more
careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy in Bruno's
thought experiment, rather than strictly linked to one by the laws of
physics.


   a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same
 conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter
 transmitter would


 Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a
 physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is
 uncertain.


??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence.


  both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third
 person viewpoint the duplication could be observed


 If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few
 member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either.


Then why did you answer my post?


  And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms


 I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though
 they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists  27 possible means of
 comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or
 consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with
 computers,  a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related
 technology.


That seems like you're being deliberately obtuse. Anyone with a theory
needs to invent terms for the components, just to keep it manageable. Do
you refuse to accept the use of top quark because top has lots of
meanings?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true
 then my consciousness is an illusion, period


Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a
deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Richard Ruquist

Liz,

I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.
But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this
world
the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world'
and perhaps every possibility in between.
So in the 3p view, all choices balance out.

Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.
(Peter wrote that in his blog) and which seems inconsistent with
duplication.
Richard


On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:01 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is
 true then my consciousness is an illusion, period


 Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a
 deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes.

  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with  
discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state  
what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.


Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far  
the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've  
heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our  
concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same  
redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in  
itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct  
will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone  
using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon  
experienced from a first person perspective because of the person  
in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map  
onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the  
possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication  
could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact.


Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick  
out the right solution.  Interference implies superposition in the  
same world.


Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can  
isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed  
in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in  
a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the  
alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I  
put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the  
linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I  
am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not  
sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that  
room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon  
enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and  
you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth  
with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that  
Shroedinger car dead.
Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes,  
the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of  
light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with  
Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger  
cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is  
dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a  
physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events  
close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal  
interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of  
the superposition can ever disappear.




I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ 
 , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum  
Computing Since Democritus is also very good).


What is his position on Everett?

Bruno



Brent

Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur  
doesn't disprove comp unless it also disproves Everett.


And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also  
doesn't show that comp is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred  
Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything- 
l...@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection  
I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining  
our concept of an individual person.


The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought  
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble,  
and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal  
identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought  
experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could  
go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as  
Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous.


  This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by  
Everett in 1957.


No it is not for 3 reasons:

1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the  
Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum  
Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical  
events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or  
consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE  
advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is  
the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum  
Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be  
OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't  
explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because  
consciousness has nothing to do with his theory.


2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems  
to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and  
that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the  
future.


3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always  
obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of  
physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world  
with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who  
fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero  information.


You are making the use of he ambiguous, by avoiding the precision I  
gave in term of memory in and outside the teleportation box. Onece you  
keep the 1p/3p distinction in mind there is no ambiguities at all. The  
notion of personality is not involved in the reasoning. Yes, I like to  
talk on this too, but it is another topic, and it has nothing to so  
with the result described in the sane04 paper.






  a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the  
same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's  
matter transmitter would


Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even  
be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a  
door is uncertain.


?




 both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the  
third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed


If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for  
a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is  
either.


Comp is a short expression used for computationalism. The precise  
version I am studying is logically weaker than most of those you can  
find in the literature. (Except for the behaviourist/ instrumentalist / 
positivist approach, which are usually abandonned today).
So the consequences of that weaker version applies to all other  
versions, and it makes some of them epistemologically inconsistent  
(and indeed some conclude that consciousness is an illusion, those are  
the eliminativists, and seems to me just continuing the Aristotelian  
tradition of putting the mind under the rug).


Computationalism, contrary to what some strong atheists desire,  
eliminates the notion of primary matter, or physicalism. The physical  
reality has to be derived from a statistics on all computations. That  
is the result of the UDA, and I have never had any problem with this,  
with few exceptions, by people like you who repeat that they have find  
a flaw, but never published it, or even send it to me, except you, but  
as people can witness, the argument is nothing but playing with words.  
precisely, invoking an ambiguity, and avoiding the disambiguation.



BTW, we have agrred on the personal identity issue, actually, and in  
that model, the step 3 still follow, and you did aknowledge, but still  
criticizing the enterprise: the argument was of the type my two years  
old niece can do that, but then OK, let us move to step 4.




 And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms

I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google  
though they most likely meant.


Argument per authority. As Kim said, the step 3 is understood easily  
by young people.






For example, Wikipedia lists  27 possible means of comp



I told you that comp is a precise generalization of the term used by  
the others (awre

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote:


On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection  
I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining  
our concept of an individual person.


The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought  
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble,  
and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal  
identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought  
experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could  
go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as  
Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous.


If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first  
language. However it may be worth looking past how he says it to  
what he's trying to say.


Thanks Liz.






  This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by  
Everett in 1957.


No it is not for 3 reasons:

1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the  
Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum  
Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical  
events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or  
consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE  
advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is  
the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum  
Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be  
OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't  
explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because  
consciousness has nothing to do with his theory.


I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature  
of the observer in his paper, but it's a while since I read it. But  
he does have to explain why an observer sees what he does, why he  
doesn't experience splitting, and so on. As far as I remember he  
does so using a similar method to Bruno - giving the observer  
something like a diary to write his experiences in.


2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems  
to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and  
that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the  
future.


If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on  
the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will  
appear to have happened after they've happened (which is true of  
measurements in Everett as well).


3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always  
obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of  
physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world  
with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who  
fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero  information.


I don't think it conveys zero information. But you do have to be  
more careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy  
in Bruno's thought experiment, rather than strictly linked to one by  
the laws of physics.


Well, even in Everett that one-one link can break. here John Clark  
uses the fact that we can interact in between superposed terms, but  
that is not relevant, as we have explained with many details to which  
Clark never answered.









  a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the  
same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's  
matter transmitter would


Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even  
be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a  
door is uncertain.


??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence.


You are not alone.






 both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the  
third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed


If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for  
a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is  
either.


Then why did you answer my post?


because, amazingly perhaps, Joihn believe in comp. he even argue that  
non-comp is necessarily crackpot (where I think only it is premature  
without experimental evidence). I show that a form of classical  
computationalism is testable. When this one is refuted, we might try  
to get non-classical version of computationalism before abandoning it.







 And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms

I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google  
though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists  27  
possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with  
intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had  
anything to do with computers,  a class of Usenet groups devoted to  
computers and related technology.


That seems like

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote:


On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it  
is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period


Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a  
deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes.


There are certainly more people who oppose determinism and free will  
than determinism and consciousness.


But determinism is not a threat for a very reasonable notion of free- 
will, which is the (self) perception of a spectrum possibilities  
(concerning my relation with my possible environments), together with  
the ability to make some choice, and yes, why not, using an algorithm  
if that can help, with simple rule like if you want a limonade this  
evening, either look now in your fridge or prepare yourself to take  
the bike for searching a night-shop).


I think that the theory of free-will based on intrinsic  
indeterminacies does not make sense in a computationalist theory (nor  
in QM). I don't see how a random generator could add any free-will,  
nor feeling of free-will. But there is a logical self-indeterminacy  
which makes sense for any self-observing machine, and that is what  
creates in the machine's mind the spectrum of possibilities, that is  
(in the toy theory): sentences of the type t, and it is up to the  
machine to realize the possibility or not, as far the possible  
environment permits. Sometimes you have to hurry.


Bruno




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Liz,

I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.



Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice,  
but I am afraid you might be conscious.
It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where  
everything is necessary and nothing is possible. It is the type  
[]f  (provable false), the consistent inconsistent realities, the  
type of dreams, wrongness, lies, and death (as geometrically they are  
cul-de-sac world, in the Kripke semantics).


The whole problem comes from the fact that consciousness is maintained  
in such realities, and the measure problem for the computationalist is  
to derive the physical reality from the need of justifying long deep  
lawfull type of  physical dreams, in arithmetic.






But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in  
this world

the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world'
and perhaps every possibility in between.


Not really. That would be the case if you rely *all* your decisions to  
a measurement of polarization of some photon or qubit in the state 1/ 
sqrt(2) I0 + I1.


But if, for some reason, you really prefer the decision based on I1,  
well, you don't need the quibit the, or prepare it in the state aI0 +  
bI1, such that a^2 is very close to one, and b^2 very close to zero  
(with a^2 + b^2 = 1).


Feynman randomization does justifies the normal realities. That why  
both classical eectrionical computer functions, and why we hope that  
the quantum computer will function too. But that is what a  
computationalist have to show with an a priori larger instantiation of  
computations.








So in the 3p view, all choices balance out.


I think you are too quick here, Richard.
Everything consistent happens, but with constrained and different  
relative proportions, and you have a partial control.





Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.


We certainly hope that the aberrant worlds are not too much frequent.  
But thank to the smallness of Planck constant, the aberration seems to  
just change a bit our DNA, and we manage as we can (we befit from them  
too).


Once François Englert asked me why I took the lift, given that with  
the many-world I can jump through the window.


I told him that  jumping from one story, the QM probability is high  
that I will survive with a broken leg, from two stories, I will  
survive with two broken legs and two or one broken arm, from three  
stories, I might survive with all arms and legs broken, + the back  
broken, ... From the eleventh stories, I will survive 100% paralyzed,  
from 25 stories, I might survive in a brain in a vat, and only God  
knows where you might survive from 1000 stories. So I think that the  
lift is more safe.


QM *does* look like an mean to get normal worlds above our digital  
substitution level.



(Peter wrote that in his blog) and which seems inconsistent with  
duplication.


You mean Peter Jones?

Bruno





Richard


On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:01 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it  
is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period


Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a  
deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:

It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
just to
say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees
with in
Bruno's stated argument.

Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only
real
(non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a
semantic
quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is
exactly
the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in
itself
contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to
the same
conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter
transmitter would
- that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective
because of the
person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map
onto
each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that
from the
third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum
computers rely
on precisely that fact.

Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out
the right
solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly
recommend
Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight
talk about
quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also
very good).

What exactly is superposition in the same world in the Everett view?

You can't identify superpositions as defining worlds. An UP polarized photon is a
superposition of a LEFT and RIGHT polarized photon. World has to mean a subspace that
isn't coherent, doesn't interfere, with other subspaces.

As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary
splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever).

But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are separate
worlds.

So a quantum calculation involves a mini multiverse being created and collapsed again
under controlled conditions. Have I misunderstood that?

I'd say that's a rough and possibly misleading metaphor. But read Scott Aaronson. He's a
lot more knowledgeable than me and he good at explaining it.

Brent

TBH I can't actually see what else a superposition /could/ be, in the Everett picture
(although I assume if you're looking at things from a path integral view or pilot wave
(etc) then you have something that really is more or less duplicated in one universe,
like Schrodinger's cat in the popular conception being both alive and dead...)

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
 experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet
 from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already
 crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were
 stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person
 pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is
 just ridiculous.


  If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first
 language.


No and I am not a member of the grammar police because I often don't well
speak English myself, I'm talking about a fundamental error in Bruno's
thinking process covered up by the very sloppy use of personal pronouns. In
everyday life it's not important to be super careful with pronouns and it's
possible to be careless with them without causing ambiguities, but if
matter duplicating machines are introduced into the mix extraordinary care
must be used and Bruno didn't do so.

 However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying
 to say.


I can't because what he's saying is tightly bound up in the meanings of
those personal pronouns and in a world with matter duplicating machines the
meaning of those personal pronouns is ambiguous.

 I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of
 the observer in his paper


Yes, and when Everett talks about the observer there is never any
ambiguity because the laws of physics allow us to see only one thing that
fits that description, but that is NOT the case if you have matter
duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought exparament.

 If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the
 past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to
 have happened after they've happened


And that's yet another problem that I didn't mention in my last post, not
that predictions have the slightest thing to do with personal identity but
Bruno says that the Helsinki man's prediction that John Clark will see
Washington AND Moscow has been proven wrong because afterwards the
Washington Man said I see only Washington. But what makes Bruno think
that the information received by the Washington Man alone (or the Moscow
man alone) is enough to evaluate the truth or falsehood of the Helsinki
Man's prediction? I've asked Bruno this question nineteen dozen times but
never received a coherent answer.

  you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally linked
 to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment,


NO! You're linked to BOTH copies with equal strength, and that's exactly
the problem and is why when Bruno starts saying that after the duplication
you will see this but you will not see that its ambiguous drivel.

 rather than strictly linked to one by the laws of physics.


The matter duplicating machine works according to the laws of physics just
like everything else.

 Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a
 physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is
 uncertain.


  ??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence.


When I open the door of the duplicating machine chamber not knowing if I am
the original or the copy what will I see? I don't know.  When I open the
front door of my house what will I see? I don't know.

 both comp and Everett allow for [...]


I don't care what comp allows.


  If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a
 few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either.


  Then why did you answer my post?


Because that's the first time in it you used the silly word comp, up
until that point it made some sort of sense even if I didn't agree with it.

 That seems like you're being deliberately obtuse. Anyone with a theory
 needs to invent terms for the components,


Sometimes new jargon is needed but I'm talking about jargon for jargon's
sake. For example, the word subjective has been around for centuries and
is understood by everyone, nevertheless the acronym FPI was invented (and
1P) for the same reason government bureaucrats crank out acronyms by the
gross; somebody couldn't invent a new idea but they could always invent a
new word and they figure that will make them look smart. It doesn't.

When too many people start to understand a word (like subjective) there is
a tendency to change it to something less comprehensible, particularly if
your ideas are confused, contradictory or just plain silly because then
what you say sounds deep even when it's not. That's why psychology is so
dense with Unnecessarily Pointless and Redundantly Repetitive jargon (UPRR)
and Very Stupid Acronyms (VSA), while mathematicians prefers the simplest
words they can get away with, like continuous, limit, open, closed,
rational, irrational, compact and even simple and complex.

 Do you refuse to accept the use of

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.


Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if
you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was
unreasonable.

 My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is
 true then my consciousness is an illusion, period


I don't see how that follows nor do I understand why it would matter even
if it did because illusions are a perfectly real subjective phenomenon just
as consciousness is.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Liz,

 I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.


That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree
with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But
yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion.

(Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an
illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.)


 Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
 which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.


I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some
decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others.
So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will
decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so
hard about it that they spontaneously combust.)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience


On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say 
that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's 
stated argument.


Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real 
(non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic 
quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the 
same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself 
contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same 
conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - 
that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the 
person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each 
other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third 
person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on 
precisely that fact.


Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right 
solution.  Interference implies superposition in the same world.


Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where 
I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared 
in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat 
(measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I 
put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution 
and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* 
world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out 
of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the 
environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in 
the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the 
earth with that Shroedinger car dead.
Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation 
of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky 
ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that 
Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. 
Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the 
quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many 
world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of 
the superposition can ever disappear.


The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental 
degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds.  My point is that 
superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence 
so subspaces.






I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for 
straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is 
also very good).


What is his position on Everett?


/(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, OK, but do 
all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical 
constructs used to calculate probabilities? Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say 
they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don't. Of course, part of what makes 
the question slippery is that it's not even completely clear what we mean by words like 
exist! Now, I'd say that quantum computing theory has sharpened the question in many 
ways, and actually answered some of the sharpened versions --- but interestingly, 
sometimes the answer goes one way and sometimes it goes the other! So for example, we have 
strong evidence that quantum computers can solve certain specific problems in polynomial 
time that would require exponential time to solve using a classical computer. Some 
Many-Worlders, most notably David Deutsch, have seized on the apparent exponential 
speedups for problems like factoring, as the ultimate proof that the various branches of 
the wavefunction must literally exist: if they don't exist, they ask, then where was 
this huge number factored? where did the exponential resources to solve the problem come 
from? The trouble is, we've also learned that a quantum computer could NOT solve 
arbitrary search problems exponentially faster than a classical computer could solve them 
--- something you'd probably predict a QC could do, if you thought of all the branches of 
the wavefunction as just parallel processors. If you want a quantum speedup, then your 
problem needs a particular

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:

 As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a
 temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent -
 differentiation or whatever).

 But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they
 are separate worlds.


But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation. In fact
they aren't even well defined, only approximations to what's actually
there, at least according to DD (and as usual assuming I understood him
correctly).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience


On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com 
wrote:


Liz,

I define consciousness as my ability to make choices.


That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, 
although they'd probably agree it's /involved/ in consciousness. But yes, using that 
definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion.


(Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the 
MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.)


Bruno responds with the Gaussian  (somewhat like measure theory)
which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one.


I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will 
have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to 
speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 
0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.)


That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split.  Does the 0.01% imply that the 
world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape?  Or does it 
require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one.  I 
think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the 
occasion of your whim.  But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington 
thought experiment.  In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created.  But in the 
UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote:

As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a
temporary
splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or
whatever).

But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are
separate worlds.

But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation. In fact they aren't
even well defined, only approximations to what's actually there, at least according to
DD (and as usual assuming I understood him correctly).

If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic
quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say
that happens in one world. Maybe Deutsch thinks of it as splitting into two worlds and
then recombining at the detector screen. Once the detection has occurred, a spot on the
screen, then the split has been amplified and entangled into the environment and is
statistically irreversible. Then that defines a classical world (in my view). That world
will not recombine with a world in which the spot appears at a different place on the screen.

Have you read Zeh's quantum darwinism? He attempts to explain why we perceive a world
whose stable observable features are the ones we see. Deutsch has generally just assumed
that the observable world must have the classical character we see. Everett and Bohr
assumed what variable was classically measurable was defined by the choice of apparatus;
but that seems circular.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 05:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  the only one giving ambiguity is you


 In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is
 giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used
 with enormous care.


  It has always been clear that *you should follow the diary and what's
 written on them*...


 In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who
 Quentin Anciaux is giving advice to, nor is it clear which diary should be
 followed as there are 2, the machine duplicated the diary too, and it was
 much easier to do than duplicating the brain.

  But I don't expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an
 asshole and a troll for years... which you are of course.


 In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is
 a asshole and a troll . And isn't a troll that's been around for years a
 oxymoron, like clearly confused?

 An Everett multiverse is a matter duplication machine.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
  On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
 
  wrote:
 
   Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
   (experienced) world if COMP is true.
  
 
  OK then comp is false.  And now that we know that comp is false
 what's
  the point of talking about it anymore?
 

 So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
 Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?


This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?)

You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of
the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp
assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations).

I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some
phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits -
as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess
that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I
got this completely wrong?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions
just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or
disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.

Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only
real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a
semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person.
This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in
1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to
be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that
someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon
experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in
question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each
other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from
the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum
computers rely on precisely that fact. Hence, the fact that comp says that
such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp unless it also disproves
Everett.

And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't
show that comp is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts
to ridicule the Big Bang.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 October 2014 07:33, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the
 last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn
 about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit
 about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti
 monster maybe.

 You can't tell if you're addicted to something until you try to give it up.

I recently gave up sugar. Mainly I did it by imagining that white powder is
another, more dangerous drug that I don't wish to put inside the temple of
my body. Oddly, ridiculously, almost madly, that seems to have worked. Over
the last 2 months I have cut my sugar intake to around the recommended
daily allowance (which is about 6 spoonfulls in total - which is something
like what you get in a third of a can of coca cola).

(Admittedly I may now be addicted to 90% cocoa chocolate...)

So, Mr Clark, maybe you could use a similar tactic to give up discussions
of comp? Imagine they're talking about something else, something like, say,
astrology, that you wouldn't wish to even discuss?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
 On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
 
 
  So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
  Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?
 
 
 This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?)
 
 You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of
 the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp
 assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations).
 
 I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some
 phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits -
 as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess
 that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I
 got this completely wrong?
 

No, you're right on the money. Real numbers are basically just
infinite sequences of random integers, most of which are uncomputable.

Which is what FPI is.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in  
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,


 That is not relevant for the point you made.

Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're  
talking about the sense of self and that has zero to do with  
predictions, good ones or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about  
insults.



Unless you postulate a unique little universe, all matter of  
prediction can be verified only from a first person perspective, and  
that is why Everett introduce a notion of subjective probability, not  
in the Bayesian sense, but in the computationalist sense. This is  
explained also by Wheeler.






 Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was  
valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too.


I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the  
quality of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a  
reasoned argument is John Clark is a poo poo head.


Yes, but Quentin (and others) are tired of your enormous bad faith  
about step 3. Everything is described in the third person, but you  
avoid interviewing the copies. you talk like you belief that after a  
2^n self-duplication, you would be blurred into an indeterminate  
anomaly, but all the vast majority of the John Clark interviewed  
witness having seen white noise, in fact it is easy to show they could  
distinguish a classical iterated duplication, and a quantum one.







 that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI

I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute  
either.



One joke is funny.
To repeat it infinitely often is boring.

You know perfectly well what is the FPI, but for the newbees: the FPI  
is the First Person Indeterminacy notion, which is entailed in a  
classical context, from a first person perspective,  in the case of  
self-duplication. This is explained in the beginning of the sane04 paper


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

and is the thing which motivates me to do mathematics studies instead  
of biology or philosophy.


Then the translation of UDA in the language of the machine adopts a  
different notion of indeterminacy, purely arithmetically defined, but  
still motivated by the FPI. In fact it is the particular case of P= 1,  
(the intensional nuance []p  p, with p sigma_1).


You have convinced 0 person, or if there is one who get your point, I  
am willing to listen, but up to now I have been able to debunk all  
your arguments, which relies in criticizing something for being vague,  
and mocking the simple notions used (like 1p and 3p pov) which  
precisely handle the ambiguities you mention. Or, when you got the  
point and cannot hide it, the critics are ad hominem, and does not  
justify why you don't tackle the step 4 of the UD argument.


Nor do you ever mention the proper theoretical computer science which  
provides a way to understand the math and the problem, without the FPI.


Bruno




  John K Clark








--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 27 Oct 2014, at 12:04, Russell Standish wrote:


On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au  
wrote:




So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?



This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?)

You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be  
part of
the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because  
comp
assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain  
operations).


I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that  
some
phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random  
digits -
as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I  
guess
that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or  
have I

got this completely wrong?



No, you're right on the money. Real numbers are basically just
infinite sequences of random integers, most of which are uncomputable.

Which is what FPI is.


Yes. In the case of iterated self-duplication. That leads to randomness.

Now the FPI on the sigma_1 arithmetic, or on the UD, which contains  
much more than simple iterated self-duplication, (it contains all  
rational approximations of all Heisenberg matrices evolution or  
waves, ..., and much more), should be physics, notably the physics of  
what is below our substitution level. Comp predicts/explains why it  
looks like there are parallel universes/computations below our  
substitution level. Comp predicts also (I think) a continuous  
background, if only due to the presence of those stupid iterated  
duplications of oneself in arithmetic.


Bruno




--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread meekerdb

On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say
that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's
stated argument.

Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real
(non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble
to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same
redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a
physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about
indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a
phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question
being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both
comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the
duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact.

Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right
solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly recommend Scott
Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum
computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good).

Brent

Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp
unless it also disproves Everett.

And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't show that comp
is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've
 heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of
 an individual person.


The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet
from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already
crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were
stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person
pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is
just ridiculous.

  This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in
 1957.


No it is not for 3 reasons:

1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum
world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was
able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said
nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to,
and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum
interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other
Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would
be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't
explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness
has nothing to do with his theory.

2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to
think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's
just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future.

3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious,
it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that
fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter
duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description,
and so the word he conveys zero  information.

  a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same
 conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter
 transmitter would


Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a
physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is
uncertain.

 both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third
 person viewpoint the duplication could be observed


If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few
member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either.

 And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms


I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though
they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists  27 possible means of
comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or
consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with
computers,  a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related
technology.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread Richard Ruquist

My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true
then my consciousness is an illusion, period

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

   So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've
 heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of
 an individual person.


 The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought
 experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet
 from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already
 crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were
 stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person
 pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is
 just ridiculous.

   This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in
 1957.


 No it is not for 3 reasons:

 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum
 world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was
 able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said
 nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to,
 and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum
 interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other
 Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would
 be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't
 explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness
 has nothing to do with his theory.

 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to
 think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's
 just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future.

 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always
 obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of
 physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with
 matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that
 description, and so the word he conveys zero  information.

   a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same
 conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter
 transmitter would


 Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a
 physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is
 uncertain.

  both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third
 person viewpoint the duplication could be observed


 If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few
 member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either.

  And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms


 I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though
 they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists  27 possible means of
 comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or
 consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with
 computers,  a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related
 technology.

  John K Clark

  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-27 Thread Kim Jones


 On 28 Oct 2014, at 1:10 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they 
 most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists  27 possible means of comp 
 and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or 
 personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers,  a class 
 of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology.
  
  John K Clark



You talk as though Wikipedia and Google represent some kind of Holy Book that 
contains everything that a person needs to know. They do not.  You have once 
again only succeeded in confirming what an utter shithead you are when it comes 
to reasoning something through. Even 5th graders know that you only consult 
Wikipedia as a last resort on anything. Your motivation in everything you write 
is sheer ego-talk. You want others to lick your ego because of your deep faith 
in what you alone consider your superior reasoning ability. Licking egos is an 
equivalent operation to licking arses. I don’t see anything particularly tasty 
about either in your case.

Kim

===

Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

Email:  kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
Mobile:0450 963 719
Landline: 02 9389 4239
Web:http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com

Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain





-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:


 They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already  
assumed to have unlimited tape and time.  It is likely that in the  
real world almost all integers are not computable too.


Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine



That is ambiguous. You can give an intensional definition of the  
natural numbers by listing the


phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, phi_3, phi_4, phi_5, ..., with the phi_i  
enumerating effectively the programs with zero argument.


All natural numbers will have a definition among those phi_i, and thus  
are computable *in that sense*, but not all definition of a natural  
number of that kind will define such a natural number, as some  
programs will not stop.









that has unlimited tape and time, and even with a finite tape and  
finite time good approximations can be found for the rational  
numbers and some irrational numbers, even a few transcendental  
numbers,


Yes, all constructive reals can be defined in arithmetic, and even  
many non constructive one.



but for nearly all real numbers not even approximations can be  
calculated, not even with a infinite tape and infinite time. They're  
just not computable.


In classical analysis, that is correct. In intuitionist analysis, many  
models satisfy the Brouwer axiom: all functions are continuous, or all  
functions are computable. In some models: computable = continuous. It  
is interesting, and even useful for the engineers, but it brings  
conceptual difficulties in cognitive science (typically it leads to  
different sorts of solipsisms: it cannot solve the other mind  
problem, and it is a form of consciousness of the other eliminativism).





And if a mechanical process like a Turing Machine can't produce them  
can the Real numbers have anything to do with physics? I don't claim  
to have a answer I'm just asking a question.


Take the infinite WM self-duplication, it predicts that almost all  
2^n, with n large, observers coming from such an experience, and who  
bet white noise, or non computable sequences, win the bets. So in a  
classical deterministic context we can justify the presence of non  
computable randomness in the subjective discourses (the diaries) of  
the observers involved. Now in front of the whole arithmetical truth,  
it is an harder question, but we can already ask non trivial question  
to the machines about this, and get some results. Normally, we should  
get indeterminacy below our substitution level, and quantum mechanics,  
when taken literally might confirm this, or refute it..


The computationalist hypothesis, taken with the classical definition  
of knowledge (the modal logic S4)  in the cognitive science is testable.


Bruno





  John K Clark



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference  
problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid  
also about Everett QM,


Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in  
predictions but you are interested in consciousness,


That is not relevant for the point you made. Our motivation has  
nothing to do with the fact that Quentin validly convince everybody  
that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it  
is valid on Everett too.


After that you did a valiant effort to save your pount y invoking the  
fact that in classical duplication we can met, and that is not the  
case ith QM, but that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI,  
as others showed to you.





more particularly in the continuity of the sense of self,  and that  
has absolutely positively 100% nothing to do with predictions, not  
good predictions and not bad predictions either. In fact the  
continuity of self has nothing to do with the future at all, you  
might not even have a future, all that matters is if you remember  
being Bruno Marchal yesterday.


We agree on that, and this is why the distinction between 1p and 3p  
used in this context suppress all ambiguities. But it still happen  
that to verify our theories we make prediction, be it of an eclipse, a  
spin of an electron, or the content of the diaries of people going out  
reconstitution boxes, made in the physical realities, or in  
computations.


So a theory, be it on matter and consciousness, and a fortiori for a  
theory on the relation between consciousness and matter (or matter  
appearances) has everything to do with prediction.


Everett still assume some universal waves, but with computationalism,  
this cannot help, a machine cannot distinguish all the computable  
rational approximations of the wave, with the wave itself, but then  
the quantum wave can only works if it supplant all the other possible  
computations, and that is what AUDA, or the machine interview (in  
the Sane2004 paper)  begins to compute.


Bruno






  John K Clark








--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 24 Oct 2014, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:




On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of  
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask  
what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain  
that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow


 Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the  
experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction  
Washington and Moscow.


Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the  
old prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow?


The old prediction was saying BOTH, in the 3p, and indeterminate in  
the 1p. Now that the John-Clark-Moscow and the John-Clark-washington  
get the point, they will write, if the experience is reiterated, and  
if they are asked again Waht they expect: they will answer, and  
predict W or M.








 Suddenly he understands the question,

and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to  
determine if the prediction was correct,


Why?



not that it makes the slightest difference if it was a good  
prediction or bad because in dealing with the sense of self only the  
past and present are important,


That is simply not true. If *that* was true, you could say yes to a  
doctor who will replace your brain with cheese.






Mr. He may not even have a future but Mr. He would still feel like  
he was the same person he was yesterday.
 and the brain that receives information about Washington will  
think about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his  
diary result of the experience: Washington, after having quickly  
scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow.


 Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense  
for him, now.

Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4?

I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal  2 as  
had been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1.



Can we go on step 4. We talk about the average content of diaries. In  
the UDA, everything is describable in the third person way. Indeed  
that is why we can describe all this in arithmetic. Then  
incompleteness, which is avalaible by the machines (as Gödel already  
knew) entails the needed mathematical precision for the self-reference.


I have seen more than one time that you got the point, and try only to  
distract us. Move on step 4 please.


Bruno






Here is my proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put  
it on a shelf. I take another cookie and place it in a blue box and  
add it to the shelf. I now open the red box and count the cookies in  
it and find that there is only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED


Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof?

  John K Clark


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:


   Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get
 a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a
 arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers
 why can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one
 electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a
 question.


  Assuming that position lies on a continuum,


Obviously if position or time lies on a continuum then physics will need a
continuum of numbers to do it's job (the Real Numbers). But the big
question is are they? There is no experimental evidence to indicate that
either is on a continuum and there are lots of theoretical reasons that
suggest that they do not.

 and assuming that our technological prowess shows no bounds to how
 accurate we can measure something


Even if they are on a continuum measuring them to infinite or even
arbitrary accuracy could only happen if the laws of physics are not what we
think they are. That is of course always possible but invoking new laws of
physics should be the last resort not the first.

 then yes,


Given all the above I agree, then yes.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
 predictions but you are interested in consciousness,


  That is not relevant for the point you made.


Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking
about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones
or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults.


  Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for
 the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too.


I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of
the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is
John Clark is a poo poo head.


  that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI


I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
 predictions but you are interested in consciousness,


  That is not relevant for the point you made.


 Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking
 about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones
 or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults.


Yes after 5 years of stupid arguments on your side... I gave up you're a
troll, and you should just stop posting useless things here.

   you're talking about the sense of self



  Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid
 for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too.


 I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of
 the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is
 John Clark is a poo poo head.


  that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI


 I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either.


Yeah go learn dancing at UDA and gives us a break, you clearly don't give a
damn being here.



   John K Clark







  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.




-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the
last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn
about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit
about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti
monster maybe.

Quentin

2014-10-26 19:27 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:



 2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 wrote:

  Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
 predictions but you are interested in consciousness,


  That is not relevant for the point you made.


 Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking
 about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones
 or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults.


 Yes after 5 years of stupid arguments on your side... I gave up you're a
 troll, and you should just stop posting useless things here.

you're talking about the sense of self



  Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid
 for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too.


 I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality
 of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is
 John Clark is a poo poo head.


  that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI


 I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either.


 Yeah go learn dancing at UDA and gives us a break, you clearly don't give
 a damn being here.



   John K Clark







  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.




 --
 All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
 Batty/Rutger Hauer)




-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-25 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 12:17:34AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
 On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
 wrote:
 
 
Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
  (experienced) world if COMP is true.
 
 
   OK then comp is false.  And now that we know that comp is false
  what's the point of talking about it anymore?
 
   So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
  Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?
 
 
 Although I don't know it for certain  I strongly suspect that beta decay is
 not computable,  I think it's random; but I think it could provide at best
 a few dozen digits not a infinite number of digits that the Real Numbers
 require. But never mind, if you want it to be true then comp is true, or
 if you prefer it to be false  then comp is false. I won't fight you over
 it because I don't give a damn about comp one way or the other.
 

If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question
has an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one
gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length
of time we're prepared to continue performing this operation.

This is not a few dozen digits at best that you claim. The sequence
is, as you concur, likely to be not computable, and COMP predicts that
such sequences should exist phenomenally. If beta decay arrival times
proved to be computable, as (for example) Juergen Schmidhuber
suggests, it would actually be a serious blow to COMP, though not
quite fatal as we may find some other sequence in nature that is
random.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-25 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:

 If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has
 an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one
 gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of
 time we're prepared to continue performing this operation. This is not a
 few dozen digits at best that you claim.


Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a
arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a
arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers why
can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one
electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a
question.


  The sequence is, as you concur, likely to be not computable


If it's not computable it doesn't follow that non-computable numbers must
be causing the electrons to do what they do, nothing at all may be causing
it to do what it does. After all, there is no law of logic that demands
every event have a cause.


  and COMP predicts that [...]


I don't care what COMP predicts, I don't know what it means and even
though Bruno invented the word I don't believe he does either.

 If beta decay arrival times proved to be computable, as (for example)
 Juergen Schmidhuber suggests,


If beta decay is computable then all bets are off. But is it? I would be
much more impressed by claims that everything in Quantum Mechanics is
computable if somebody would just compute something.

 it would actually be a serious blow to COMP,


If you say so, but I don't care if COMP is dealt a serious blow or not.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-25 Thread Kim Jones


 On 26 Oct 2014, at 1:28 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 If you say so, but I don't care if COMP is dealt a serious blow or not. 
 
   John K Clark


You must care you bloody blowhard because you daily go to considerable lengths 
to show just how important it is to you. 

It’s rather amusing to see someone write that that they don’t care about what 
they clearly care about. Talk about self-referentially incorrect. 


Kim

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-25 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 10:28:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
 On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
 wrote:
 
  If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has
  an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one
  gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of
  time we're prepared to continue performing this operation. This is not a
  few dozen digits at best that you claim.
 
 
 Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a
 arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a
 arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers why
 can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one
 electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a
 question.
 

Assuming that position lies on a continuum, and assuming that our
technological prowess shows no bounds to how accurate we can measure
something, then yes, we could continuing measuring the same particle
with continuously improved measuring devices, and obtain a
noncomputable sequence.

But what I proposed with the Geiger counter is easier to do, and
sufficient for the point.

 
   The sequence is, as you concur, likely to be not computable
 
 
 If it's not computable it doesn't follow that non-computable numbers must
 be causing the electrons to do what they do, nothing at all may be causing
 it to do what it does. After all, there is no law of logic that demands
 every event have a cause.
 

I don't know where you're going with that ramble. 


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 the only one giving ambiguity is you


In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is
giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used
with enormous care.


  It has always been clear that *you should follow the diary and what's
 written on them*...


In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who
Quentin Anciaux is giving advice to, nor is it clear which diary should be
followed as there are 2, the machine duplicated the diary too, and it was
much easier to do than duplicating the brain.

 But I don't expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an
 asshole and a troll for years... which you are of course.


In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is a
asshole and a troll . And isn't a troll that's been around for years a
oxymoron, like clearly confused?

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Oct 2014, at 21:36, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Oct 23, 2014  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,

Yes.

 but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this

I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of  
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask  
what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain  
that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow


Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the  
experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction  
Washington and Moscow.


Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for  
him, now. Nice.





and the brain that receives information about Washington will think  
about Washington,


Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the  
experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old  
prediction Washington and Moscow.


Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for  
him, now.


Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4?


and the question which one is you can not be answered because in  
these circumstances the word you has no unique referent .


What? When I go in Washington to interview John-Clark-from-Washington,  
I use you without no trouble. The same in Moscow. you did survive,  
but are duplicated. There is no problem for your first person view.  
That view remains all the time unique from that point of view. Yet,  
from that first person view, a choice has been made between Washington  
and Moscow. As comp predicts, you, each of you, get one bit of  
information, despite no external observer got anyone. The randomness  
here is guaranty pure private or subjective, or first person.


Likewise, in the iterated self-duplication, it is a simple exercise to  
show that the best bet about the possible experience is that you will  
live is white noise. It is equivalent with looking a polarized  
photon split beam, you don't expect it to not split!


In front of arithmetic, it is a far more difficult problem, and comp  
confronts us with it, unless (by the Movie Graph Argument UDA step 8)  
you give magical special selection power to primary matter (that  
nobody has ever detect for obvious reason).


Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem,  
if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about  
Everett QM, both the frequentist and those like Deutsch using decision  
theory.


Bruno



  John K Clark





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:

 Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
 (experienced) world if COMP is true.


OK then comp is false.  And now that we know that comp is false what's
the point of talking about it anymore?

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to
 have unlimited tape and time.  It is likely that in the real world almost
 all integers are not computable too.


Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine that has unlimited tape
and time, and even with a finite tape and finite time good approximations
can be found for the rational numbers and some irrational numbers, even a
few transcendental numbers, but for nearly all real numbers not even
approximations can be calculated, not even with a infinite tape and
infinite time. They're just not computable. And if a mechanical process
like a Turing Machine can't produce them can the Real numbers have anything
to do with physics? I don't claim to have a answer I'm just asking a
question.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 24 Oct 2014, at 01:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote:

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:

On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

 Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.

Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it  
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we  
measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen  
or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified  
in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if  
there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the  
decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational  
numbers.  But then I also think rational numbers are just part of  
our model of the world.


That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of  
a model of the world.


But you left out the just.

Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a just a model of the  
world viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it  
affects everything else. You're basically postmodernising the  
entire scientific enterprise.


No, I'm just pointing out we can't be sure that something that is  
part of our model of the world is part of reality;



The map is not the territory, but when well used, the map is still a  
part of the territory.




and this is exactly the same as being uncertain that there are real  
numbers.



Yeah, but we might try not doing philosophy. A TOE must just be clear  
about what is assumed, and what is derived.


Physicalist assumes a physical universe, and, too bad, a physical  
universe is what I want to derive from simpler idea. Physics is a  
wonderful science of nature, but it assumes what I think we can prove  
to be an aspect of something else.




In spite of Kronecker, the integers are just as much a human  
invention as the reals.


How do you know that?

You make that theory. But with computationalism we explain the  
functioning of the human brain, and even its apparent observable  
quantum constitution by assuming numbers and relations between numbers.


Do you think that when Ramanujan died, the extravagance of the number  
24 disappeared?


Are you not confusing the human theories and works in their  
exploration of some realities and that realities.


The sum of consecutive odd numbers, starting from zero, gives the  
square. Do you think that this can be invented?





We shouldn't take our models to seriously.  We may find a better one  
next week.


Exactly.

And the physical primary universe idea might be among those models  
we might stop taking too much seriously.


A refinement of Wigner question is why does group theory play a so  
crucial role in physics.? Normally this should stem from the symmetry  
at the sigma_1 bottom (where p - []p is satisfied, and we get a  
quantization).


Bruno




Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if
 it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett
 QM,


Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in
predictions but you are interested in consciousness, more particularly in
the continuity of the sense of self,  and that has absolutely positively
100% nothing to do with predictions, not good predictions and not bad
predictions either. In fact the continuity of self has nothing to do with
the future at all, you might not even have a future, all that matters is if
you remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
 consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city
 will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives
 information about Moscow will think about Moscow

  Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the
 experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction
 Washington and Moscow.


Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the old
prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow?

 Suddenly he understands the question,


and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to determine
if the prediction was correct, not that it makes the slightest difference
if it was a good prediction or bad because in dealing with the sense of
self only the past and present are important, Mr. He may not even have a
future but Mr. He would still feel like he was the same person he was
yesterday.

  and the brain that receives information about Washington will think
 about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of
 the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old
 prediction Washington and Moscow.

  Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for
 him, now.
 Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4?

 I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal  2 as had
been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1. Here is my
proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put it on a shelf. I
take another cookie and place it in a blue box and add it to the shelf. I
now open the red box and count the cookies in it and find that there is
only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED

Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof?

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-10-24 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:



 On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
 consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city
 will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives
 information about Moscow will think about Moscow

  Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the
 experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction
 Washington and Moscow.


 Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the old
 prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow?

  Suddenly he understands the question,


 and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to
 determine if the prediction was correct, not that it makes the slightest
 difference if it was a good prediction or bad because in dealing with the
 sense of self only the past and present are important, Mr. He may not even
 have a future but Mr. He would still feel like he was the same person he
 was yesterday.

  and the brain that receives information about Washington will think
 about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of
 the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old
 prediction Washington and Moscow.

  Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for
 him, now.
 Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4?

 I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal  2 as had
 been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1. Here is my
 proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put it on a shelf. I
 take another cookie and place it in a blue box and add it to the shelf. I
 now open the red box and count the cookies in it and find that there is
 only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED

 Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof?


Easy... John Clark is stupid... another one ?



   John K Clark

  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.




-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-24 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
 On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
 wrote:
 
  Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
  (experienced) world if COMP is true.
 
 
 OK then comp is false.  And now that we know that comp is false what's
 the point of talking about it anymore?
 

So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:


   Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
 (experienced) world if COMP is true.


  OK then comp is false.  And now that we know that comp is false
 what's the point of talking about it anymore?

  So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a
 Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How?


Although I don't know it for certain  I strongly suspect that beta decay is
not computable,  I think it's random; but I think it could provide at best
a few dozen digits not a infinite number of digits that the Real Numbers
require. But never mind, if you want it to be true then comp is true, or
if you prefer it to be false  then comp is false. I won't fight you over
it because I don't give a damn about comp one way or the other.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 13:23, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no
 longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2  were or if it was in step 3
 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some
 other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it
 deserves a second look.


 In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at something
 you don't actually know anything about.


 No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof and
 stopped reading when I made the  determination that he didn't know what he
 was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I
 made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage
 capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and
 Bruno's proof didn't make the cut.


Nevertheless, a lot of highly intelligent people (like Brent and Russell)
have followed Bruno's proof all the way through, and although they may have
issues with it, they don't rail constantly against step 3. You're the only
person who does this. Maybe you would like to consider the possibility that
these clever people have noticed something that - despite, no doubt, being
equally clever - you've missed.

There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 13:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

 On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
 
  Brent,
  
  That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
  but is it also true for matrix theory?
  Re: real and complex numbers.
 
 
  Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM,
  the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus
  couple of real numbers), same for momentum.
 
  In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't
  find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems
  to be refuted on this point.
 
  Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it
  does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what
  we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I
  think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in
  arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers
  with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume
  computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a
  primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ...
 

 To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx
 do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite
 precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of
 an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next.

 Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors
 drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as
 an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then,
 countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the
 Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's
 ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to.

 Um, does that mean you agree with me? :-)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
 that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient assumption for
 doing proofs and calculations.

 So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine
what it is? Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become
known as Brent's Number!)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

  On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

   Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.


  Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
 with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
 the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
 right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
 that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
 to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.

 I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.  But
 then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.


That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model
of the world.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Brent,

That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.


Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM,
the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus
couple of real numbers), same for momentum.

In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't
find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems
to be refuted on this point.

Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it
does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what
we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I
think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in
arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers
with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume
computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a
primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ...


To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx
do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some  
finite
precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the  
needle of

an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next.

Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and  
eigenvectors

drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as
an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And  
even then,

countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's
ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to.


But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to  
think that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient  
assumption for doing proofs and calculations.


All depends on what you assume.

The idea is: let us start from simple, and if we need something more,  
we can add more.


Once we assume the brain is turing emulable, then it is emulated  
infinitely often in arithmetic, and the question is more: does this  
define a unique universe, a unique multiverse, ... or not?


Arithmetic needs its Gleason theorem, and the intensional variant of  
provability shows that the machine dreams might be enough linear and  
symmetrical for that. Does all physical realities have to exploit  
Unitary = e^i * (self-adjointness)?


Bruno





Brent



Cheers


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Oct 2014, at 03:41, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Oct 22, 2014   Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 Wait? How long should I wait?
 Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or  
not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for  
the search of a proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a  
bit long more. You can bound the running time of the programs with  
the Busy Beaver function (BB). The answer to your question is : no  
more than BB(k) seconds where k is the number of bit used to  
describe the program you ask if it stops or not. I assume a machine  
doing computational step in one second.


If the program is to find the smallest even integer greater than 2  
that is not the sum of two primes and then stop, and if there are no  
even integers greater than 2 that are not the sum of two primes then  
I will be waiting forever for it to stop and forever be uncertain if  
Goldbach is true or not.


Maybe someday it will find such a number and stop or maybe there is  
no such number and it will never stop; but the Busy Beaver function  
is only defined for the class of Turing Machines that eventually  
stop, and nobody knows if the the Goldbach Turing Machine is of that  
class or not. And even if it is and  Busy Beaver has a meaning for  
it nobody knows what number BB(k) is and nobody has anyway of  
calculating it so it does me no good whatsoever.


  Do you think real numbers exist or do you not?

 What I think is of no concern to you.

Sorry for asking such a personal question.

I work in a theory (computationalism + an infinitesimal use of Occam  
Razor, and the classical theory of knowledge). In that theory, the  
real numbers do not exist, as what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)),  
etc.
But the real numbers still exists at the machine epistemological  
level.


So at the human epistemological level Harry Potter exists.


I don't see your point, nor if there is a point.

Bruno





  John K Clark



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Oct 2014, at 02:23, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could  
no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2  were or if it was in  
step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it  
was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently  
makes me think it deserves a second look.


In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at  
something you don't actually know anything about.


No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's  
proof and stopped reading when I made the  determination that he  
didn't know what he was talking about.
Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong  
decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity  
I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and  
Bruno's proof didn't make the cut.



No. You have pretended that something did not follow, but when asked  
what you have offered until now, as Liz just said, are semantical  
quibbles. +  hand wavings, mockeries of the entire field, and many ad  
hominem unfair allusions.


In the original thesis, as I was told that I might have some jury  
member allergic to thought experiences, I manage to use them only to  
motivate the technical definitions of the modal probability  
one (with S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). AUDA (the arithmetical UDA), technically  
does not need UDA. It makes the reasoning embedded in computer  
science, indeed even in arithmetic.


But you are providing evidence that some people propagate rumors like  
if there was something controversial about what you call my proof,  
which is only the formulation of a problem, and the attempt of  
solution is AUDA.


To negate the step three, you have to build a robot able to predict  
its first person diary continuation in a WM-like duplication. As Kim  
remarked, the impossibility of this can be understood by kids. Then  
AUDA exploits the fact that we can even explain this to enough rich  
machine, using the recursion theoretic tools, and defined in  
mathematics, indeed in arithmetic, what we mean by  
understand (indeed using Gödel's provability predicate or variants).


Do the work John.  If not,  try at least to be more cautious with the  
words. Only idiots pronounce judgement  on what they do not  
understand. Want to play that role? Be my guess.


The problem for you, is that the very tone that you are using will not  
help you to change your mind. I do suspect you have had the aha! more  
than one time, but then you prefer to stop the thinking and come back  
with your attitude of nobody can doubt physics is the fundamental  
science. That dogmatic attitude will just prevent your ability to  
conceive other fundamental theories. Many physicists are open to the  
idea that physics might eventually be explained mathematically, with  
or without comp, like on the other side number theorists flirt with  
fundamental physics, almost for their pure number theoretical  
motivation.


You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, but it seems  
that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this for having a  
theory unifying what we can observe and shared, what we can live and  
experience, what we can conceive, and what we can hope + the minimal  
amount of the inconceivable (here limited to 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ... with  
their addition laws and their multiplication laws). Here we is for  
the ideally arithmetically sound machines.


Bruno










  John K Clark




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
 with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
 the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
 right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
 that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
 to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.


  I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
 But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
 world.


I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers,
particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.
And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles  and
crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model,
but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but
part of our the world .


  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof
 and stopped reading when I made the  determination that he didn't know what
 he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I
 made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage
 capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and
 Bruno's proof didn't make the cut.


  Nevertheless, a lot of highly intelligent people (like Brent and
 Russell) have followed Bruno's proof all the way through, and although they
 may have issues with it, they don't rail constantly against step 3. You're
 the only person who does this.


As I said I no longer remember what any of the steps were and see no reason
to refresh my memory, but if I was the only one to catch a blunder in step
3 then good for me. I do remember that Bruno made a big deal about
something he called first person indeterminacy that on first reading seemed
utterly ridiculous to me and when questioned extensively about it over a
period of many months  (I hope never to see Helsinki or Moscow) proved
incapable of defending it.  He also maintained that the chain of personal
identity depends on how accurately your predictions about the future were
are rather than remembering who you were yesterday, and that  is even more
ridiculous.

 Maybe you would like to consider the possibility that these clever people
 have noticed something that - despite, no doubt, being equally clever -
 you've missed.


Neither Bruno nor Brent nor Russell nor anybody else has come even close to
answering the objections I have to my satisfaction, if fact the defense was
so inept it only reinforced my opinion that Bruno didn't know what he was
talking about. And I refuse to accept anybody's idea on faith.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
 you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.


I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal
pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core
of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's proof and accompanied thought
experiments is to make words like I and you and he crystal clear. In
our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world
where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have
such machines already is engineering difficulties  not scientific
difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the
very beginning Bruno  assumes that even after the duplication everything
has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like you will see this
and he will predict that. It is not allowed to assume what you're trying
to prove.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,


Yes.

 but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this


I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness
not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be
in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information
about Moscow will think about Moscow and the brain that receives
information about Washington will think about Washington, and the question
which one is you can not be answered because in these circumstances the
word you has no unique referent .

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-10-23 21:21 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
 you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.


 I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal
 pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core
 of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's proof and accompanied thought
 experiments is to make words like I and you and he crystal clear. In
 our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world
 where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have
 such machines already is engineering difficulties  not scientific
 difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the
 very beginning Bruno  assumes that even after the duplication everything
 has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like you will see this
 and he will predict that. It is not allowed to assume what you're trying
 to prove.


No, the only one giving ambiguity is you... It has always been clear that
*you should follow the diary and what's written on them*... But I don't
expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an asshole and a
troll for years... which you are of course.


   John K Clark





 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.




-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that
every
integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs
and
calculations.

So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine what
it is?

I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there to be a largest
integer. It is certainly is more convenient to reason about some things by assuming there
is not, but that's true of real numbers too.

Brent

Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become known as Brent's
Number!)

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience


On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

 Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.


Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with 
experiment
the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment 
have only
had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. 
Are
we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if 
there
were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point?  I 
honestly
don't know.

I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.  But 
then I
also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.


That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of 
the world.


But you left out the just.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

  On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

   Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.


  Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
 with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
 the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
 right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
 that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
 to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.

  I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
 But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
 world.


  That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a
 model of the world.


 But you left out the just.


Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a just a model of the world
viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects
everything else. You're basically postmodernising the entire scientific
enterprise.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
 that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient assumption for
 doing proofs and calculations.

   So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how
 might one determine what it is?


 I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there
 to be a largest integer.  It is certainly is more convenient to reason
 about some things by assuming there is not, but that's true of real numbers
 too.


I don't know what you mean by invented the integers. And whenever I've
asked I get a vague handwavey answer, and then you say you have no
viewpoint so it isn't worth arguing with you.

So, OK, whatever.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Russell Standish

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 01:08:37PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
 On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 
  Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
  with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
  the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
  right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
  that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
  to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
 
 
   I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
  But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
  world.
 
 
 I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers,
 particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.
 And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles  and
 crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model,
 but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but
 part of our the world .
 
 
   John K Clark
 

Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true. They needn't be ontological, though.

But then that's exactly the argument you reject!

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 10:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure
after the
experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
right of the
decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it
would work
just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of
the
decimal point? I honestly don't know.

I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
But then I
also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.

I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers, particularly the
non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.

They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited
tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable
too.

Brent

And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles and crystalline
spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model, but I want to know if the
Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but part of our the world .

John K Clark

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience