Peter Jones writes:
> Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total
> conscious state.
>
> I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque
> re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than
> one computational state. A computational state
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Russell Standish writes:
> > >
> > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > > > consciousness. The QM
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Russell Standish writes:
> >
> > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all informa
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 08:53:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
> > involved, but it is presumably finite.
> >
> > Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> > that can be extracted from
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > >
> > > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
> > > are partially right.
> >
> > The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
> > about a block universe is that there is no A
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Also see my reply to Russell below:
> >
> >
> > >Russell Standish
> > >
> > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
> > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the id
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I was using "quantum state" as synonymous with "physical state", which I guess
> is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a
> classical
> universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one
> branch
> of the mult
Russell Standish writes:
> OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is
> involved, but it is presumably finite.
>
> Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1
> green. The information describing one of these apples is the
> "component" I was r
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 07:00:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> > information, a particular meaning to a parti
Russell Standish writes:
> I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Computationalists do sometimes say things like "cognition is comput
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 03:21:52AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> > information, a particular meaning to a particular
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 02:37:10AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Barbour argues the same way you do. But he does concede that his
> argument is not yet proven. The trouble is that in the case of, for
> instance, the electron, in the example you give, there is still an
> environment extern
Russell Standish wrote:
> I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
>
> Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
an eigenvalue of, the state con
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Also see my reply to Russell below:
> >
> >
> > >Russell Standish
> > >
> > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
> > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the id
Russell Standish writes:
> If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> that can be extracted from observation.
Functionalism explicitly
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Also see my reply to Russell below:
>
>
> >Russell Standish
> >
> >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
> >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum
> >state is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being
> living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments
> of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate
> processes run in parallel on the one machine,
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 06:02:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > >
> >
> > Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible
> > observer moments are already "there" in the ensemble. This is
> > certainly true of my construction, as Bru
Marc Geddes writes:
> The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer
> moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are
> already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas
> disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in
Russell Standish wrote:
> >
>
> Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible
> observer moments are already "there" in the ensemble. This is
> certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's
> Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 03:38:13AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > >
> > > All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
> > > the faulty idea that one can reason ab
1Z wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
> > are partially right.
>
> The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
> about a block universe is that there is no A-series,
> not that there is a B-series. T
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
> > the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating
> > observer moments with parts of the block univers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > >
> > > My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
> > > second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
> > > and the 'Flo
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
> the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating
> observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest
> above, you
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
> > second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
> > and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) c
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
> second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
> and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially
> right *if*
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
> > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all
> > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone ne
ther ones). See the 15 year
> success of the Tucson Conferences.
>
> John
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To:
> Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM
> Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
>
>
John
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
>
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Russell, I like your position -
ee, the ominous Ccness term is a good
> platform for eternal debates. Also for grants.
>
> I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools
> allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction.
>
> John M
>
>
>
> - Original
out the
'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good
platform for eternal debates. Also for grants.
I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools
allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction.
John M
- Original Me
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the
> difference between
> consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living
> through a virtual
Sure, but I don't see how I am con
Brent Meeker wrote:
> But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The
> quantum
> world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some
> probability.
Only under MWI.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this mess
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists,
> > structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not
> > Platonists.
>
>
> After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers.
Of course not.
> If they say
> th
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit :
> That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists,
> structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not
> Platonists.
After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. If they say
that they are formalist it means they are not platonist a
Russell Standish writes:
> On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > For how would a1/a1b1
> > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of
> > the multiverse?
> >
>
> Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no m
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Brent Meeker writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on
>no
>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is
>also
On Sat, Oct 07, 2006 at 02:25:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > The quantum
> > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with
> > some probability.
>
>
> And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type
> of argument could be just an argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> For how would a1/a1b1
> know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the
> multiverse?
>
Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more
absurd than saying recordings can be
Brent Meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >
> >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on
> >>>no
> >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is
> >>>also consistent
> >>>to say that it super
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no
>>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also
>>>consistent
>>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical act
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
> >> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
> >> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects
Brent Meeker writes:
> > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no
> > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also
> > consistent
> > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and
> > that
> > perh
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
>> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
>> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
>
> That is exactly what mathematica
Le 06-oct.-06, à 19:51, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
>>
>>> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>>
>>>
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
summarise, he states that one
of the requ
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes
> > on no
> > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object -
>
>
> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
> careful because it makes some people believe (
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*]
But "reifying" do
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>
>>>Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
>>>summarise, he states that one
>>>of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the
>
Le 06-oct.-06, à 13:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
>>> summarise, he states that one
>>> of the requirements for a conscious computa
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> > Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
> > summarise, he states that one
> > of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the
> > trivial case of a recording
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could
> summarise, he states that one
> of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the
> trivial case of a recording, a
> machine that plays out the sam
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he
states that one
of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial
case of a recording, a
machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. He then
proposes a second
m
Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument:
"For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you
can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is
arbitrarily low, and even n
56 matches
Mail list logo
